Merge "SELinux update to support aconfigd_mainline process" into main
diff --git a/apex/com.android.configinfrastructure-file_contexts b/apex/com.android.configinfrastructure-file_contexts
index 23e7b89..de74547 100644
--- a/apex/com.android.configinfrastructure-file_contexts
+++ b/apex/com.android.configinfrastructure-file_contexts
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-(/.*)? u:object_r:system_file:s0
\ No newline at end of file
+(/.*)? u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/bin/aconfigd-mainline u:object_r:aconfigd_mainline_exec:s0
diff --git a/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test b/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test
index 7b3b85b..41ff4be 100644
--- a/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test
+++ b/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@
/dev/socket socket_device
/dev/socket/does_not_exist socket_device
/dev/socket/adbd adbd_socket
+/dev/socket/aconfigd_mainline aconfigd_mainline_socket
/dev/socket/aconfigd_system aconfigd_socket
/dev/socket/dnsproxyd dnsproxyd_socket
/dev/socket/dumpstate dumpstate_socket
diff --git a/private/aconfigd.te b/private/aconfigd.te
index 15ce3cc..211405b 100644
--- a/private/aconfigd.te
+++ b/private/aconfigd.te
@@ -16,12 +16,6 @@
aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file
}:file create_file_perms;
-# allow aconfigd to access shell_data_file for atest
-userdebug_or_eng(`
- allow aconfigd shell_data_file:dir search;
- allow aconfigd shell_data_file:file { getattr read open map };
-')
-
# allow aconfigd to log to the kernel dmesg via a file descriptor
# passed from init to aconfigd
allow aconfigd kmsg_device:chr_file write;
@@ -42,3 +36,35 @@
# only init is allowed to enter the aconfigd domain
neverallow { domain -init } aconfigd:process transition;
neverallow * aconfigd:process dyntransition;
+
+# Do not allow write access to boot/map storage files except, aconfigd and aconfigd_mainline.
+# These files are meant to serve flag reads for all processes. They are created by aconfigd (for
+# platform storage files) and aconfigd_mainline (mainline storage files) processes.
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -aconfigd
+ -aconfigd_mainline
+} aconfig_storage_metadata_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -aconfigd
+ -aconfigd_mainline
+} aconfig_storage_metadata_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# Only aconfigd and aconfigd_mainline can access persist storage files
+# These files are meant to serve as persist flag value storage, only aconfigd and
+# aconfigd_mainline process should manage them. Other processes should have zero access.
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -aconfigd
+ -aconfigd_mainline
+} aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:dir *;
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -aconfigd
+ -aconfigd_mainline
+} aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/aconfigd_mainline.te b/private/aconfigd_mainline.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd98d4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/aconfigd_mainline.te
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# aconfigd_mainline -- manager for mainline aconfig flags
+type aconfigd_mainline, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type aconfigd_mainline_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(aconfigd_mainline)
+
+# allow aconfigd_mainline to search /metadata dir as it needs to access files under
+# /metadata/aconfig dir
+allow aconfigd_mainline metadata_file:dir search;
+
+# aconfigd_mainline should be able to create storage files under /metadata/aconfig dir
+allow aconfigd_mainline {
+ aconfig_storage_metadata_file
+ aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file
+}:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+allow aconfigd_mainline {
+ aconfig_storage_metadata_file
+ aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file
+}:file create_file_perms;
+
+# allow aconfigd_mainline to log to the kernel.
+allow aconfigd_mainline kmsg_device:chr_file write;
+
+# allow aconfigd_mainline to read /apex dir, aconfigd_mainline need to loop thru all
+# dirs under /apex to find all currently mounted mainline modules and get their
+# storage files
+allow aconfigd_mainline apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow aconfigd_mainline apex_mnt_dir:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit aconfigd_mainline apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+###
+### Neverallow assertions
+###
+
+# only init is allowed to enter the aconfigd_mainline domain
+neverallow { domain -init } aconfigd_mainline:process transition;
+neverallow * aconfigd_mainline:process dyntransition;
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 5e801c2..4563895 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -2177,7 +2177,6 @@
-artd
-dumpstate
-installd
- userdebug_or_eng(`-aconfigd')
userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationmanager')
userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationservice')
@@ -2225,7 +2224,6 @@
-installd
-simpleperf_app_runner
-system_server # why?
- userdebug_or_eng(`-aconfigd')
userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationmanager')
userdebug_or_eng(`-crosvm')
@@ -2256,10 +2254,6 @@
# For now, don't allow processes other than gmscore to access /data/misc_ce/<userid>/checkin
neverallow { domain -gmscore_app -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } checkin_data_file:{dir file} *;
-# Do not allow write access to aconfig flag value files except init and aconfigd
-neverallow { domain -init -aconfigd -system_server } aconfig_storage_metadata_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
-neverallow { domain -init -aconfigd -system_server } aconfig_storage_metadata_file:file no_w_file_perms;
-
neverallow { domain -dexopt_chroot_setup -init } proc:{ file dir } mounton;
neverallow { domain -dexopt_chroot_setup -init -zygote } proc_type:{ file dir } mounton;
diff --git a/private/file.te b/private/file.te
index 5512b6e..189fb47 100644
--- a/private/file.te
+++ b/private/file.te
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@
# Type for aconfig daemon socket
type aconfigd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+# Type for aconfig mainline daemon socket
+type aconfigd_mainline_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+
# Type for /(system|system_ext|product)/etc/aconfig
type system_aconfig_storage_file, system_file_type, file_type;
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 3ff72aa..d6f7113 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@
/dev/snd(/.*)? u:object_r:audio_device:s0
/dev/socket(/.*)? u:object_r:socket_device:s0
/dev/socket/adbd u:object_r:adbd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/aconfigd_mainline u:object_r:aconfigd_mainline_socket:s0
/dev/socket/aconfigd_system u:object_r:aconfigd_socket:s0
/dev/socket/dnsproxyd u:object_r:dnsproxyd_socket:s0
/dev/socket/dumpstate u:object_r:dumpstate_socket:s0
diff --git a/private/gmscore_app.te b/private/gmscore_app.te
index fa3420a..148cb7e 100644
--- a/private/gmscore_app.te
+++ b/private/gmscore_app.te
@@ -132,8 +132,10 @@
allow gmscore_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# allow gms core app write to aconfigd socket
-allow gmscore_app aconfigd_socket:sock_file {read write};
-allow gmscore_app aconfigd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+unix_socket_connect(gmscore_app, aconfigd, aconfigd);
+
+# allow gms core app write to aconfigd_mainline socket
+unix_socket_connect(gmscore_app, aconfigd_mainline, aconfigd_mainline);
# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
allow gmscore_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 99ef142..a764df4 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -1530,10 +1530,6 @@
allow system_server watchdog_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server watchdog_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
-allow system_server aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow system_server aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
-allow system_server aconfig_storage_metadata_file:dir search;
-
allow system_server aconfigd_socket:sock_file {read write};
allow system_server aconfigd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
@@ -1585,10 +1581,6 @@
} password_slot_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } password_slot_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set *;
-# Only system server should access /metadata/aconfig
-neverallow { domain -init -system_server -aconfigd } aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:dir *;
-neverallow { domain -init -system_server -aconfigd } aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
-
# Allow systemserver to read/write the invalidation property
set_prop(system_server, binder_cache_system_server_prop)
neverallow { domain -system_server -init }