Merge "Allow init to relabelto console_device"
diff --git a/mac_permissions.mk b/mac_permissions.mk
index 7c478b4..43c98c9 100644
--- a/mac_permissions.mk
+++ b/mac_permissions.mk
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
$(hide) $(M4) --fatal-warnings -s $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) $(PRIVATE_KEYS) > $@
# Should be synced with keys.conf.
-all_plat_keys := platform media networkstack shared testkey
+all_plat_keys := platform media networkstack sdk_sandbox shared testkey
all_plat_keys := $(all_plat_keys:%=$(dir $(DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE))/%.x509.pem)
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_MAC_PERMS_FILES := $(all_plat_mac_perms_files)
diff --git a/private/app.te b/private/app.te
index e152591..436af5a 100644
--- a/private/app.te
+++ b/private/app.te
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
dontaudit appdomain vendor_default_prop:file read;
# Access to /mnt/media_rw/<vol> (limited by DAC to apps with external_storage gid)
-allow appdomain mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
+allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox } mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
neverallow appdomain system_server:udp_socket {
accept append bind create ioctl listen lock name_bind
@@ -111,11 +111,11 @@
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
-allow appdomain tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
# Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;
@@ -149,11 +149,11 @@
allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
# App sandbox file accesses.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
# Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
# Traverse into expanded storage
allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -171,10 +171,10 @@
allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
# Execute the shell or other system executables.
-allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow appdomain system_file:file x_file_perms;
-not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
+not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
# Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
allow appdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -192,8 +192,11 @@
# Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
# apps which cannot be in /vendor.
-r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app }, vendor_app_file)
-allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_app_file:file execute;
+r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, vendor_app_file)
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } vendor_app_file:file execute;
+
+# Perform binder IPC to sdk sandbox.
+binder_call(appdomain, sdk_sandbox)
# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_overlay_file)
@@ -275,6 +278,7 @@
-isolated_app
-platform_app
-priv_app
+ -sdk_sandbox
-shell
-system_app
-untrusted_app_all
@@ -287,6 +291,7 @@
-isolated_app
-platform_app
-priv_app
+ -sdk_sandbox
-shell
-su
-system_app
@@ -328,33 +333,33 @@
allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# Read/write visible storage
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
# accesses to the underlying FS.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
#
# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
# For art.
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
@@ -374,19 +379,19 @@
# logd access
read_logd(appdomain)
-control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app })
+control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
-use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
+use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
-use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
+use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };
@@ -417,12 +422,12 @@
# For app fuse.
allow appdomain app_fuse_file:file { getattr read append write map };
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_client)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_manager)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_vsync)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, performance_client)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_client)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_manager)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_vsync)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, performance_client)
# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
-pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, bufferhub_client)
+pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, bufferhub_client)
###
### CTS-specific rules
@@ -435,8 +440,8 @@
# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
-allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
+allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
# This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
@@ -465,6 +470,7 @@
isolated_app
nfc
radio
+ sdk_sandbox
shared_relro
system_app
} {
diff --git a/private/bpfloader.te b/private/bpfloader.te
index 7644cac..d7b27b5 100644
--- a/private/bpfloader.te
+++ b/private/bpfloader.te
@@ -40,7 +40,17 @@
neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
-neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -mediaprovider_app -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } *:bpf prog_run;
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -bpfloader
+ -gpuservice
+ -hal_health_server
+ -mediaprovider_app
+ -netd
+ -netutils_wrapper
+ -network_stack
+ -system_server
+} *:bpf prog_run;
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -lmkd -mediaprovider_app -netd -network_stack -system_server } *:bpf { map_read map_write };
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init } bpfloader_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
diff --git a/private/compat/31.0/31.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/31.0/31.0.ignore.cil
index 29378d4..22381b5 100644
--- a/private/compat/31.0/31.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/31.0/31.0.ignore.cil
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
proc_watermark_scale_factor
untrusted_app_30
proc_vendor_sched
+ sdk_sandbox_service
sysfs_fs_fuse_bpf
sysfs_vendor_sched
tv_iapp_service
diff --git a/private/compat/32.0/32.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/32.0/32.0.ignore.cil
index d29417d..3547ebb 100644
--- a/private/compat/32.0/32.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/32.0/32.0.ignore.cil
@@ -57,9 +57,10 @@
remotelyprovisionedkeypool_service
resources_manager_service
rootdisk_sysdev
+ sdk_sandbox_service
selection_toolbar_service
+ smart_idle_maint_enabled_prop
snapuserd_proxy_socket
- supplemental_process_service
sysfs_fs_fuse_bpf
system_dlkm_file
tare_service
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index ef9d036..f95df34 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -612,3 +612,22 @@
userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationservice')
userdebug_or_eng(`-crosvm')
} shell_data_file:file open;
+
+# respect system_app sandboxes
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -appdomain # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
+ -system_server #populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
+ -installd # creation of app sandbox
+ -iorap_inode2filename
+ -traced_probes # resolve inodes for i/o tracing.
+ # only needs open and read, the rest is neverallow in
+ # traced_probes.te.
+} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
+neverallow {
+ isolated_app
+ untrusted_app_all # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
+ ephemeral_app
+ priv_app
+ sdk_sandbox
+} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
diff --git a/private/file.te b/private/file.te
index ec3944e..54d6df6 100644
--- a/private/file.te
+++ b/private/file.te
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
# /data/misc/perfetto-configs for perfetto configs
type perfetto_configs_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/misc_{ce/de}/<user>/sdksandbox/<app-name>/* subdirectory for sdk sandbox processes
+type sdk_sandbox_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, app_data_file_type;
+
# /sys/kernel/debug/kcov for coverage guided kernel fuzzing in userdebug builds.
type debugfs_kcov, fs_type, debugfs_type;
diff --git a/private/gsid.te b/private/gsid.te
index fa76da0..e795cea 100644
--- a/private/gsid.te
+++ b/private/gsid.te
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
# Needed to read fstab, which is used to validate that system verity does not
# use check_once_at_most for sdcard installs. (Note: proc_cmdline is needed
# to get the A/B slot suffix).
-allow gsid proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+read_fstab(gsid)
allow gsid sysfs_dt_firmware_android:dir r_dir_perms;
allow gsid sysfs_dt_firmware_android:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/isolated_app.te b/private/isolated_app.te
index 800775b..0d90756 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
# excluding unix_stream_socket and unix_dgram_socket.
# Many of these are socket families which have never and will never
# be compiled into the Android kernel.
-neverallow isolated_app { self ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{
+neverallow isolated_app { self ephemeral_app priv_app sdk_sandbox untrusted_app_all }:{
socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket
key_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket
netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket
diff --git a/private/keys.conf b/private/keys.conf
index 362e73d..30739f9 100644
--- a/private/keys.conf
+++ b/private/keys.conf
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
[@PLATFORM]
ALL : $DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE/platform.x509.pem
+[@SDK_SANDBOX]
+ALL : $MAINLINE_SEPOLICY_DEV_CERTIFICATES/sdk_sandbox.x509.pem
+
[@MEDIA]
ALL : $DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE/media.x509.pem
diff --git a/private/mac_permissions.xml b/private/mac_permissions.xml
index 7fc37c1..ec3df0f 100644
--- a/private/mac_permissions.xml
+++ b/private/mac_permissions.xml
@@ -51,6 +51,11 @@
<seinfo value="platform" />
</signer>
+ <!-- Sdk Sandbox key -->
+ <signer signature="@SDK_SANDBOX" >
+ <seinfo value="sdk_sandbox" />
+ </signer>
+
<!-- Media key in AOSP -->
<signer signature="@MEDIA" >
<seinfo value="media" />
diff --git a/private/net.te b/private/net.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25bd538
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/net.te
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Bind to ports.
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox} node_type:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } node_bind;
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox} port_type:udp_socket name_bind;
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox} port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
+
+# b/141455849 gate RTM_GETLINK with a new permission nlmsg_readpriv and block access from
+# untrusted_apps.
+# b/171572148 gate RTM_GETNEIGH{TBL} with a new permission nlmsg_getneigh and block access from
+# untrusted_apps. Some untrusted apps (e.g. untrusted_app_25-30) are granted access elsewhere
+# to avoid app-compat breakage.
+allow {
+ netdomain
+ -ephemeral_app
+ -mediaprovider
+ -sdk_sandbox
+ -untrusted_app_all
+} self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv nlmsg_getneigh };
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index f92e558..6f7b64e 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
persist.sys.tap_gesture u:object_r:gesture_prop:s0
persist.sys.theme u:object_r:theme_prop:s0
persist.sys.fflag.override.settings_dynamic_system u:object_r:dynamic_system_prop:s0
+dynamic_system.data_transfer.shared_memory.size u:object_r:dynamic_system_prop:s0 exact uint
ro.sys.safemode u:object_r:safemode_prop:s0
persist.sys.audit_safemode u:object_r:safemode_prop:s0
persist.sys.dalvik.jvmtiagent u:object_r:system_jvmti_agent_prop:s0
@@ -257,6 +258,9 @@
persist.device_config.virtualization_framework_native. u:object_r:device_config_virtualization_framework_native_prop:s0
persist.device_config.window_manager_native_boot. u:object_r:device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop:s0
+# F2FS smart idle maint prop
+persist.device_config.storage_native_boot.smart_idle_maint_enabled u:object_r:smart_idle_maint_enabled_prop:s0 exact bool
+
# MM Events config props
persist.mm_events.enabled u:object_r:mm_events_config_prop:s0 exact bool
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox.te b/private/sdk_sandbox.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..782bb46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox.te
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+###
+### SDK Sandbox process.
+###
+### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes.
+
+type sdk_sandbox, domain;
+
+typeattribute sdk_sandbox coredomain;
+
+net_domain(sdk_sandbox)
+app_domain(sdk_sandbox)
+
+# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
+# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
+allow sdk_sandbox activity_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox activity_task_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox audio_service:service_manager find;
+# Audit the access to signal that we are still investigating whether sdk_sandbox
+# should have access to audio_service
+# TODO(b/211632068): remove this line
+auditallow sdk_sandbox audio_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox hint_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox trust_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox uimode_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
+# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(sdk_sandbox)
+
+# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
+can_profile_heap(sdk_sandbox)
+can_profile_perf(sdk_sandbox)
+
+# allow sdk sandbox to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow sdk_sandbox system_server:udp_socket {
+ connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
+
+# allow access to sdksandbox data directory
+allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+
+# Receive or send uevent messages.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+
+# Receive or send generic netlink messages
+neverallow sdk_sandbox domain:netlink_socket *;
+
+# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
+# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox debugfs:file read;
+
+# execute gpu_device
+neverallow sdk_sandbox gpu_device:chr_file execute;
+
+# access files in /sys with the default sysfs label
+neverallow sdk_sandbox sysfs:file *;
+
+# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
+# Create a more specific label if needed
+neverallow sdk_sandbox proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Directly access external storage
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file {open create};
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:dir search;
+
+# Avoid reads to proc_net, it contains too much device wide information about
+# ongoing connections.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox proc_net:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# SDK sandbox processes have their own storage not related to app_data_file or privapp_data_file
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# SDK sandbox processes don't have any access to external storage
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { media_rw_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { media_rw_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:dir no_rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index 5cf0711..78a98e1 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
# isEphemeralApp=true will match apps marked by PackageManager as Ephemeral
# user=_app will match any regular app process.
# user=_isolated will match any isolated service process.
+# user=_sdksandbox will match sdk sandbox process for an app.
# Other values of user are matched against the name associated with the process
# UID.
# seinfo= matches aginst the seinfo tag for the app, determined from
@@ -137,6 +138,9 @@
isSystemServer=true domain=system_server_startup
+# sdksandbox must run in the sdksandbox domain
+neverallow name=com.android.sdksandbox domain=((?!sdk_sandbox).)*
+
user=_app seinfo=platform name=com.android.traceur domain=traceur_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.android.remoteprovisioner domain=remote_prov_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
user=system seinfo=platform domain=system_app type=system_app_data_file
@@ -149,6 +153,7 @@
user=shell seinfo=platform domain=shell name=com.android.shell type=shell_data_file
user=webview_zygote seinfo=webview_zygote domain=webview_zygote
user=_isolated domain=isolated_app levelFrom=user
+user=_sdksandbox domain=sdk_sandbox type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
user=_app seinfo=app_zygote domain=app_zygote levelFrom=user
user=_app seinfo=media domain=mediaprovider type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index 4fb4b29..c7f8811 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -294,6 +294,7 @@
safety_center u:object_r:safety_center_service:s0
samplingprofiler u:object_r:samplingprofiler_service:s0
scheduling_policy u:object_r:scheduling_policy_service:s0
+sdk_sandbox u:object_r:sdk_sandbox_service:s0
search u:object_r:search_service:s0
search_ui u:object_r:search_ui_service:s0
secure_element u:object_r:secure_element_service:s0
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 275bb6f..a927a83 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -736,6 +736,7 @@
set_prop(system_server, device_config_connectivity_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_surface_flinger_native_boot_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_virtualization_framework_native_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, smart_idle_maint_enabled_prop)
# Allow query ART device config properties
get_prop(system_server, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
diff --git a/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te b/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
index e4004e4..3171ee0 100644
--- a/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
+++ b/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
fingerprint_vendor_data_file
iris_vendor_data_file
rollback_data_file
+ sdk_sandbox_data_file
storaged_data_file
system_data_file
vold_data_file
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@
fingerprint_vendor_data_file
iris_vendor_data_file
rollback_data_file
+ sdk_sandbox_data_file
storaged_data_file
system_data_file
vold_data_file
diff --git a/public/charger_vendor.te b/public/charger_vendor.te
index 2dd106f..d8f3bb2 100644
--- a/public/charger_vendor.te
+++ b/public/charger_vendor.te
@@ -2,3 +2,5 @@
type charger_vendor, charger_type, domain;
hal_server_domain(charger_vendor, hal_health)
+
+typeattribute charger_vendor bpfdomain;
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index 705c13a..a98e369 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -1131,24 +1131,6 @@
# to installd
neverallow installd system_data_file:file ~{ r_file_perms relabelfrom unlink };
-# respect system_app sandboxes
-neverallow {
- domain
- -appdomain # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
- -system_server #populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
- -installd # creation of app sandbox
- -iorap_inode2filename
- -traced_probes # resolve inodes for i/o tracing.
- # only needs open and read, the rest is neverallow in
- # traced_probes.te.
-} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
-neverallow {
- isolated_app
- untrusted_app_all # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
- ephemeral_app
- priv_app
-} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
-
#
# Only these domains should transition to shell domain. This domain is
# permissible for the "shell user". If you need a process to exec a shell
diff --git a/public/hal_health.te b/public/hal_health.te
index e2a6a60..a31da4d 100644
--- a/public/hal_health.te
+++ b/public/hal_health.te
@@ -26,3 +26,9 @@
# Allow to use timerfd to wake itself up periodically to send health info.
allow hal_health_server self:capability2 wake_alarm;
+
+# Use bpf programs
+allow hal_health_server fs_bpf:dir search;
+allow hal_health_server fs_bpf_vendor:dir search;
+allow hal_health_server fs_bpf_vendor:file read;
+allow hal_health_server bpfloader:bpf prog_run;
diff --git a/public/installd.te b/public/installd.te
index b0b2815..84ef1fd 100644
--- a/public/installd.te
+++ b/public/installd.te
@@ -115,9 +115,10 @@
allow installd app_data_file_type:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
allow installd app_data_file_type:notdevfile_class_set { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
-# Allow setting extended attributes (for project quota IDs) on dirs
+# Allow setting extended attributes (for project quota IDs) on dirs and files
# and to enable project ID inheritance through FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
-allowxperm installd { app_data_file_type system_data_file }:{ dir file } ioctl {
+# Added install_data_file to be able to create file under /data/misc/installd/ioctl_check
+allowxperm installd { app_data_file_type system_data_file install_data_file}:{ dir file } ioctl {
FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR
FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
diff --git a/public/net.te b/public/net.te
index 714bcde..31c9c45 100644
--- a/public/net.te
+++ b/public/net.te
@@ -13,23 +13,8 @@
# Connect to ports.
allow netdomain port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-# Bind to ports.
-allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} node_type:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } node_bind;
-allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} port_type:udp_socket name_bind;
-allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
# See changes to the routing table.
allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket { create read getattr write setattr lock append connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read };
-# b/141455849 gate RTM_GETLINK with a new permission nlmsg_readpriv and block access from
-# untrusted_apps.
-# b/171572148 gate RTM_GETNEIGH{TBL} with a new permission nlmsg_getneigh and block access from
-# untrusted_apps. Some untrusted apps (e.g. untrusted_app_25-30) are granted access elsewhere
-# to avoid app-compat breakage.
-allow {
- netdomain
- -ephemeral_app
- -mediaprovider
- -untrusted_app_all
-} self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv nlmsg_getneigh };
# Talks to netd via dnsproxyd socket.
unix_socket_connect(netdomain, dnsproxyd, netd)
diff --git a/public/property.te b/public/property.te
index 46d6776..55d94b8 100644
--- a/public/property.te
+++ b/public/property.te
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
system_restricted_prop(provisioned_prop)
system_restricted_prop(restorecon_prop)
system_restricted_prop(retaildemo_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(smart_idle_maint_enabled_prop)
system_restricted_prop(socket_hook_prop)
system_restricted_prop(sqlite_log_prop)
system_restricted_prop(surfaceflinger_display_prop)
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index b5197a9..4583186 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@
type rttmanager_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type samplingprofiler_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type scheduling_policy_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type sdk_sandbox_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type search_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type search_ui_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
diff --git a/public/te_macros b/public/te_macros
index 06d292c..e70c5d3 100644
--- a/public/te_macros
+++ b/public/te_macros
@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@
define(`read_fstab', `
allow $1 { metadata_file gsi_metadata_file_type }:dir search;
allow $1 gsi_public_metadata_file:file r_file_perms;
- allow $1 proc_bootconfig:file r_file_perms;
+ allow $1 { proc_bootconfig proc_cmdline }:file r_file_perms;
')
######################################
diff --git a/vendor/hal_health_default.te b/vendor/hal_health_default.te
index a48c7b8..8e118e9 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_health_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_health_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
# health info abstraction
type hal_health_default, domain;
+
+typeattribute hal_health_default bpfdomain;
+
hal_server_domain(hal_health_default, hal_health)
type hal_health_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;