diff --git a/Android.mk b/Android.mk
index 2fcc177..96b2237 100644
--- a/Android.mk
+++ b/Android.mk
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # is made which breaks compatibility with the previous platform sepolicy version,
 # not just on every increase in PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION.  The minor version should
 # be reset to 0 on every bump of the PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION.
-sepolicy_major_vers := 25
+sepolicy_major_vers := 26
 sepolicy_minor_vers := 0
 
 ifneq ($(sepolicy_major_vers), $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION))
@@ -25,38 +25,6 @@
 sepolicy_minor_vers :=
 
 include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-LOCAL_MODULE := selinux_policy
-LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
-# Include SELinux policy. We do this here because different modules
-# need to be included based on the value of PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE. This
-# type of conditional inclusion cannot be done in top-level files such
-# as build/target/product/embedded.mk.
-# This conditional inclusion closely mimics the conditional logic
-# inside init/init.cpp for loading SELinux policy from files.
-ifeq ($(PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE),true)
-# Use split SELinux policy
-LOCAL_REQUIRED_MODULES += \
-    mapping_sepolicy.cil \
-    nonplat_sepolicy.cil \
-    plat_sepolicy.cil \
-    plat_and_mapping_sepolicy.cil.sha256 \
-    secilc \
-    nonplat_file_contexts \
-    plat_file_contexts
-
-# Include precompiled policy, unless told otherwise
-ifneq ($(PRODUCT_PRECOMPILED_SEPOLICY),false)
-LOCAL_REQUIRED_MODULES += precompiled_sepolicy precompiled_sepolicy.plat_and_mapping.sha256
-endif
-
-else
-# Use monolithic SELinux policy
-LOCAL_REQUIRED_MODULES += sepolicy \
-    file_contexts.bin
-endif
-include $(BUILD_PHONY_PACKAGE)
-
-include $(CLEAR_VARS)
 # SELinux policy version.
 # Must be <= /sys/fs/selinux/policyvers reported by the Android kernel.
 # Must be within the compatibility range reported by checkpolicy -V.
@@ -121,21 +89,14 @@
 # version identifier corresponding to the sepolicy on which the non-platform
 # policy is to be based. If unspecified, this will build against the current
 # public platform policy in tree
-# BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR should contain the public platform policy which
-#  is associated with the given BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS.  The policy therein will be
-#  versioned according to the BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS identifier and included as
-#  part of the non-platform policy to ensure removal of access in future
-#  platform policy does not break non-platform policy.
 ifndef BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS
 $(warning BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS not specified, assuming current platform version)
 # The default platform policy version.
 BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS := $(PLATFORM_SEPOLICY_VERSION)
-BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR := $(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY)
-else
-ifndef BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR
-$(error BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR not specified for versioned sepolicy.)
 endif
-endif
+
+
+platform_mapping_file := $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS).cil
 
 ###########################################################
 # Compute policy files to be used in policy build.
@@ -197,6 +158,40 @@
   with_asan := true
 endif
 
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+LOCAL_MODULE := selinux_policy
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+# Include SELinux policy. We do this here because different modules
+# need to be included based on the value of PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE. This
+# type of conditional inclusion cannot be done in top-level files such
+# as build/target/product/embedded.mk.
+# This conditional inclusion closely mimics the conditional logic
+# inside init/init.cpp for loading SELinux policy from files.
+ifeq ($(PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE),true)
+
+# Use split SELinux policy
+LOCAL_REQUIRED_MODULES += \
+    $(platform_mapping_file) \
+    nonplat_sepolicy.cil \
+    plat_sepolicy.cil \
+    plat_and_mapping_sepolicy.cil.sha256 \
+    secilc \
+    nonplat_file_contexts \
+    plat_file_contexts \
+    plat_sepolicy_vers.txt
+
+# Include precompiled policy, unless told otherwise
+ifneq ($(PRODUCT_PRECOMPILED_SEPOLICY),false)
+LOCAL_REQUIRED_MODULES += precompiled_sepolicy precompiled_sepolicy.plat_and_mapping.sha256
+endif
+
+else
+# Use monolithic SELinux policy
+LOCAL_REQUIRED_MODULES += sepolicy \
+    file_contexts.bin
+endif
+include $(BUILD_PHONY_PACKAGE)
+
 ##################################
 # reqd_policy_mask - a policy.conf file which contains only the bare minimum
 # policy necessary to use checkpolicy.  This bare-minimum policy needs to be
@@ -246,7 +241,7 @@
 $(plat_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN := $(with_asan)
 $(plat_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
 $(plat_pub_policy.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
-$(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY))
+$(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY))
 	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
 	 $(hide) m4 $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) \
 		-D mls_num_sens=$(PRIVATE_MLS_SENS) -D mls_num_cats=$(PRIVATE_MLS_CATS) \
@@ -314,25 +309,16 @@
 		-s $^ > $@
 	$(hide) sed '/dontaudit/d' $@ > $@.dontaudit
 
-plat_policy_nvr := $(intermediates)/plat_policy_nvr.cil
-$(plat_policy_nvr): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_CIL_FILES := \
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_CIL_FILES := \
   $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_cil_workaround_files), $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
-$(plat_policy_nvr): $(plat_policy.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy \
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(plat_policy.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy \
+  $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc \
   $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_cil_workaround_files), $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
 	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
 	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -C -c \
 		$(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
 	$(hide) cat $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_CIL_FILES) >> $@
-
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_CIL_FILES := $(plat_policy_nvr)
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc $(plat_policy_nvr)
-	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	# Strip out neverallow statements. They aren't needed on-device and their presence
-	# significantly slows down on-device compilation (e.g., from 400 ms to 6,400 ms on
-	# sailfish-eng).
-	grep -v '^(neverallow' $(PRIVATE_CIL_FILES) > $@
-	# Confirm that the resulting policy compiles
-	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc -M true -c $(POLICYVERS) $@ -o /dev/null -f /dev/null
+	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc -M true -G -N -c $(POLICYVERS) $@ -o /dev/null -f /dev/null
 
 built_plat_cil := $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE)
 plat_policy.conf :=
@@ -340,10 +326,26 @@
 #################################
 include $(CLEAR_VARS)
 
-LOCAL_MODULE := mapping_sepolicy.cil
+LOCAL_MODULE := plat_sepolicy_vers.txt
 LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := ETC
 LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
-LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_OUT)/etc/selinux
+LOCAL_PROPRIETARY_MODULE := true
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_OUT_VENDOR)/etc/selinux
+
+include $(BUILD_SYSTEM)/base_rules.mk
+
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE) : PRIVATE_PLAT_SEPOL_VERS := $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS)
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE) :
+	mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+	echo $(PRIVATE_PLAT_SEPOL_VERS) > $@
+
+#################################
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+
+LOCAL_MODULE := $(platform_mapping_file)
+LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := ETC
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_OUT)/etc/selinux/mapping
 
 include $(BUILD_SYSTEM)/base_rules.mk
 
@@ -357,16 +359,13 @@
 
 
 ifeq ($(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS), $(PLATFORM_SEPOLICY_VERSION))
-mapping_policy_nvr := $(current_mapping.cil)
+mapping_policy := $(current_mapping.cil)
 else
-mapping_policy_nvr := $(addsuffix /$(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS).cil, $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY)/mapping)
+mapping_policy := $(addsuffix /$(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS).cil, $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY)/mapping)
 endif
 
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(mapping_policy_nvr)
-	# Strip out neverallow statements. They aren't needed on-device and their presence
-	# significantly slows down on-device compilation (e.g., from 400 ms to 6,400 ms on
-	# sailfish-eng).
-	grep -v '^(neverallow' $< > $@
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(mapping_policy) $(ACP)
+	$(hide) $(ACP) $< $@
 
 built_mapping_cil := $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE)
 current_mapping.cil :=
@@ -407,7 +406,7 @@
 $(nonplat_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN := $(with_asan)
 $(nonplat_policy.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
 $(nonplat_policy.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
-$(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY) $(PLAT_VENDOR_POLICY) $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS))
+$(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY) $(PLAT_VENDOR_POLICY) $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS))
 	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
 	$(hide) m4 $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) \
 		-D mls_num_sens=$(PRIVATE_MLS_SENS) -D mls_num_cats=$(PRIVATE_MLS_CATS) \
@@ -428,25 +427,15 @@
 	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $< -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $(PRIVATE_POL_CONF)
 	$(hide) grep -Fxv -f $(PRIVATE_REQD_MASK) $@.tmp > $@
 
-nonplat_policy_nvr := $(intermediates)/nonplat_policy_nvr.cil
-$(nonplat_policy_nvr) : PRIVATE_VERS := $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS)
-$(nonplat_policy_nvr) : PRIVATE_TGT_POL := $(nonplat_policy_raw)
-$(nonplat_policy_nvr) : $(plat_pub_policy.cil) $(nonplat_policy_raw) \
-$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/version_policy
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE) : PRIVATE_VERS := $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS)
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE) : PRIVATE_TGT_POL := $(nonplat_policy_raw)
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE) : PRIVATE_DEP_CIL_FILES := $(built_plat_cil) $(built_mapping_cil)
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE) : $(plat_pub_policy.cil) $(nonplat_policy_raw) \
+$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/version_policy $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc \
+$(built_plat_cil) $(built_mapping_cil)
 	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
 	$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/version_policy -b $< -t $(PRIVATE_TGT_POL) -n $(PRIVATE_VERS) -o $@
-
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_NONPLAT_CIL_FILES := $(nonplat_policy_nvr)
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_DEP_CIL_FILES := $(built_plat_cil) $(built_mapping_cil)
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc $(nonplat_policy_nvr) $(built_plat_cil) \
-$(built_mapping_cil)
-	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	# Strip out neverallow statements. They aren't needed on-device and their presence
-	# significantly slows down on-device compilation (e.g., from 400 ms to 6,400 ms on
-	# sailfish-eng).
-	grep -v '^(neverallow' $(PRIVATE_NONPLAT_CIL_FILES) > $@
-	# Confirm that the resulting policy compiles combined with platform and mapping policies
-	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc -M true -c $(POLICYVERS) \
+	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc -M true -G -N -c $(POLICYVERS) \
 		$(PRIVATE_DEP_CIL_FILES) $@ -o /dev/null -f /dev/null
 
 built_nonplat_cil := $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE)
@@ -468,7 +457,7 @@
 $(built_plat_cil) $(built_mapping_cil) $(built_nonplat_cil)
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc \
 $(built_plat_cil) $(built_mapping_cil) $(built_nonplat_cil)
-	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc -M true -c $(POLICYVERS) \
+	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc -M true -G -c $(POLICYVERS) \
 		$(PRIVATE_CIL_FILES) -o $@ -f /dev/null
 
 built_precompiled_sepolicy := $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE)
@@ -502,14 +491,14 @@
 include $(BUILD_SYSTEM)/base_rules.mk
 
 all_cil_files := \
-    $(plat_policy_nvr) \
-    $(mapping_policy_nvr) \
-    $(nonplat_policy_nvr) \
+    $(built_plat_cil) \
+    $(built_mapping_cil) \
+    $(built_nonplat_cil)
 
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_CIL_FILES := $(all_cil_files)
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sepolicy-analyze $(all_cil_files)
 	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	$(hide) $< -M true -c $(POLICYVERS) $(PRIVATE_CIL_FILES) -o $@.tmp -f /dev/null
+	$(hide) $< -M true -G -c $(POLICYVERS) $(PRIVATE_CIL_FILES) -o $@.tmp -f /dev/null
 	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sepolicy-analyze $@.tmp permissive > $@.permissivedomains
 	$(hide) if [ "$(TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT)" = "user" -a -s $@.permissivedomains ]; then \
 		echo "==========" 1>&2; \
@@ -536,43 +525,15 @@
 
 include $(BUILD_SYSTEM)/base_rules.mk
 
-plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf := $(intermediates)/plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf
-$(plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
-$(plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
-$(plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_ARCH := $(my_target_arch)
-$(plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN := $(with_asan)
-$(plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
-$(plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
-$(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY))
-	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	$(hide) m4 $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) \
-		-D mls_num_sens=$(PRIVATE_MLS_SENS) -D mls_num_cats=$(PRIVATE_MLS_CATS) \
-		-D target_build_variant=$(TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT) \
-		-D target_with_dexpreopt=$(WITH_DEXPREOPT) \
-		-D target_arch=$(PRIVATE_TGT_ARCH) \
-		-D target_with_asan=$(PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN) \
-		-D target_recovery=true \
-		-s $^ > $@
-
-plat_pub_policy.recovery.cil := $(intermediates)/plat_pub_policy.recovery.cil
-$(plat_pub_policy.recovery.cil): PRIVATE_POL_CONF := $(plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf)
-$(plat_pub_policy.recovery.cil): PRIVATE_REQD_MASK := $(reqd_policy_mask.cil)
-$(plat_pub_policy.recovery.cil): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy \
-$(plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf) $(reqd_policy_mask.cil)
-	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $< -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $(PRIVATE_POL_CONF)
-	$(hide) grep -Fxv -f $(PRIVATE_REQD_MASK) $@.tmp > $@
-
-plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf :=
-
-plat_policy.recovery.conf := $(intermediates)/plat_policy.recovery.conf
-$(plat_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
-$(plat_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
-$(plat_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_ARCH := $(my_target_arch)
-$(plat_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN := $(with_asan)
-$(plat_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
-$(plat_policy.recovery.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
-$(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
+sepolicy.recovery.conf := $(intermediates)/sepolicy.recovery.conf
+$(sepolicy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
+$(sepolicy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
+$(sepolicy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_ARCH := $(my_target_arch)
+$(sepolicy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN := $(with_asan)
+$(sepolicy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
+$(sepolicy.recovery.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
+                           $(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY) \
+                           $(PLAT_VENDOR_POLICY) $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS))
 	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
 	$(hide) m4 $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) \
 		-D mls_num_sens=$(PRIVATE_MLS_SENS) -D mls_num_cats=$(PRIVATE_MLS_CATS) \
@@ -584,85 +545,11 @@
 		-s $^ > $@
 	$(hide) sed '/dontaudit/d' $@ > $@.dontaudit
 
-plat_policy_nvr.recovery := $(intermediates)/plat_policy_nvr.recovery.cil
-$(plat_policy_nvr.recovery): $(plat_policy.recovery.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(sepolicy.recovery.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy \
+                       $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sepolicy-analyze
 	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -C -c \
-		$(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
-
-plat_policy.recovery.conf :=
-
-# auto-generate the mapping file for current platform policy, since it needs to
-# track platform policy development
-current_mapping.recovery.cil := $(intermediates)/mapping/$(PLATFORM_SEPOLICY_VERSION).recovery.cil
-$(current_mapping.recovery.cil) : PRIVATE_VERS := $(PLATFORM_SEPOLICY_VERSION)
-$(current_mapping.recovery.cil) : $(plat_pub_policy.recovery.cil) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/version_policy
-	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/version_policy -b $< -m -n $(PRIVATE_VERS) -o $@
-
-ifeq ($(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS), $(PLATFORM_SEPOLICY_VERSION))
-mapping_policy_nvr.recovery := $(current_mapping.recovery.cil)
-else
-mapping_policy_nvr.recovery := $(addsuffix /$(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS).recovery.cil, \
-                               $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY)/mapping)
-endif
-
-current_mapping.recovery.cil :=
-
-# nonplat_policy.recovery.conf - A combination of the non-platform private,
-# vendor and the exported platform policy associated with the version the
-# non-platform policy targets.  This needs attributization and to be combined
-# with the platform-provided policy.  Like plat_pub_policy.recovery.conf, this
-# needs to make use of the reqd_policy_mask files from private policy in order
-# to use checkpolicy.
-nonplat_policy.recovery.conf := $(intermediates)/nonplat_policy.recovery.conf
-$(nonplat_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
-$(nonplat_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
-$(nonplat_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_ARCH := $(my_target_arch)
-$(nonplat_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN := $(with_asan)
-$(nonplat_policy.recovery.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
-$(nonplat_policy.recovery.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
-$(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY) $(PLAT_VENDOR_POLICY) $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS))
-	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	$(hide) m4 $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) \
-		-D mls_num_sens=$(PRIVATE_MLS_SENS) -D mls_num_cats=$(PRIVATE_MLS_CATS) \
-		-D target_build_variant=$(TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT) \
-		-D target_with_dexpreopt=$(WITH_DEXPREOPT) \
-		-D target_arch=$(PRIVATE_TGT_ARCH) \
-		-D target_with_asan=$(PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN) \
-		-D target_recovery=true \
-		-s $^ > $@
-	$(hide) sed '/dontaudit/d' $@ > $@.dontaudit
-
-nonplat_policy_raw.recovery := $(intermediates)/nonplat_policy_raw.recovery.cil
-$(nonplat_policy_raw.recovery): PRIVATE_POL_CONF := $(nonplat_policy.recovery.conf)
-$(nonplat_policy_raw.recovery): PRIVATE_REQD_MASK := $(reqd_policy_mask.cil)
-$(nonplat_policy_raw.recovery): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy $(nonplat_policy.recovery.conf) \
-$(reqd_policy_mask.cil)
-	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $< -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $(PRIVATE_POL_CONF)
-	$(hide) grep -Fxv -f $(PRIVATE_REQD_MASK) $@.tmp > $@
-
-nonplat_policy_nvr.recovery := $(intermediates)/nonplat_policy_nvr.recovery.cil
-$(nonplat_policy_nvr.recovery) : PRIVATE_VERS := $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS)
-$(nonplat_policy_nvr.recovery) : PRIVATE_TGT_POL := $(nonplat_policy_raw.recovery)
-$(nonplat_policy_nvr.recovery) : $(plat_pub_policy.recovery.cil) $(nonplat_policy_raw.recovery) \
-$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/version_policy
-	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/version_policy -b $< -t $(PRIVATE_TGT_POL) -n $(PRIVATE_VERS) -o $@
-
-nonplat_policy.recovery.conf :=
-nonplat_policy_raw.recovery :=
-
-all_cil_files.recovery := \
-    $(plat_policy_nvr.recovery) \
-    $(mapping_policy_nvr.recovery) \
-    $(nonplat_policy_nvr.recovery) \
-
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_CIL_FILES := $(all_cil_files.recovery)
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sepolicy-analyze $(all_cil_files.recovery)
-	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	$(hide) $< -M true -c $(POLICYVERS) $(PRIVATE_CIL_FILES) -o $@.tmp -f /dev/null
+	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -c \
+		$(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $<
 	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sepolicy-analyze $@.tmp permissive > $@.permissivedomains
 	$(hide) if [ "$(TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT)" = "user" -a -s $@.permissivedomains ]; then \
 		echo "==========" 1>&2; \
@@ -673,13 +560,12 @@
 		fi
 	$(hide) mv $@.tmp $@
 
-all_cil_files.recovery :=
-plat_pub_policy.recovery.cil :=
-plat_policy_nvr.recovery :=
-mapping_policy_nvr.recovery :=
-nonplat_policy_nvr.recovery :=
+sepolicy.recovery.conf :=
 
 ##################################
+# SELinux policy embedded into CTS.
+# CTS checks neverallow rules of this policy against the policy of the device under test.
+##################################
 include $(CLEAR_VARS)
 
 LOCAL_MODULE := general_sepolicy.conf
@@ -699,29 +585,10 @@
 		-D target_with_dexpreopt=$(WITH_DEXPREOPT) \
 		-D target_arch=$(PRIVATE_TGT_ARCH) \
 		-D target_with_asan=false \
+		-D target_full_treble=cts \
 		-s $^ > $@
 	$(hide) sed '/dontaudit/d' $@ > $@.dontaudit
 
-built_general_sepolicy.conf := $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE)
-exp_sepolicy_build_files :=
-
-##################################
-include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-
-LOCAL_MODULE := sepolicy.general
-LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := ETC
-LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := tests
-
-include $(BUILD_SYSTEM)/base_rules.mk
-
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_BUILT_SEPOLICY.CONF := $(built_general_sepolicy.conf)
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(built_general_sepolicy.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy
-	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
-	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -c \
-		$(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $(PRIVATE_BUILT_SEPOLICY.CONF) > /dev/null
-
-built_general_sepolicy := $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE)
-
 ##################################
 # TODO - remove this.   Keep around until we get the filesystem creation stuff taken care of.
 #
@@ -956,8 +823,6 @@
 $(plat_property_contexts.tmp): $(plat_pcfiles)
 	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
 	$(hide) m4 -s $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) $(PRIVATE_PC_FILES) > $@
-
-
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_sepolicy)
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(plat_property_contexts.tmp) $(built_sepolicy) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc
 	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
@@ -970,7 +835,6 @@
 
 ##################################
 include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-
 LOCAL_MODULE := nonplat_property_contexts
 LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := ETC
 LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
@@ -1019,7 +883,6 @@
 
 ##################################
 include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-
 LOCAL_MODULE := nonplat_property_contexts.recovery
 LOCAL_MODULE_STEM := nonplat_property_contexts
 LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := ETC
@@ -1100,6 +963,101 @@
 ##################################
 include $(CLEAR_VARS)
 
+LOCAL_MODULE := plat_hwservice_contexts
+LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := ETC
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+ifeq ($(PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE),true)
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_OUT)/etc/selinux
+else
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_ROOT_OUT)
+endif
+
+include $(BUILD_SYSTEM)/base_rules.mk
+
+plat_hwsvcfiles := $(call build_policy, hwservice_contexts, $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
+
+plat_hwservice_contexts.tmp := $(intermediates)/plat_hwservice_contexts.tmp
+$(plat_hwservice_contexts.tmp): PRIVATE_SVC_FILES := $(plat_hwsvcfiles)
+$(plat_hwservice_contexts.tmp): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
+$(plat_hwservice_contexts.tmp): $(plat_hwsvcfiles)
+	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+	$(hide) m4 -s $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) $(PRIVATE_SVC_FILES) > $@
+
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_sepolicy)
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(plat_hwservice_contexts.tmp) $(built_sepolicy) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc $(ACP)
+	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+	sed -e 's/#.*$$//' -e '/^$$/d' $< > $@
+	$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -e -l $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $@
+
+plat_hwsvcfiles :=
+plat_hwservice_contexts.tmp :=
+
+##################################
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+
+LOCAL_MODULE := nonplat_hwservice_contexts
+LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := ETC
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+ifeq ($(PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE),true)
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_OUT_VENDOR)/etc/selinux
+else
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_ROOT_OUT)
+endif
+
+include $(BUILD_SYSTEM)/base_rules.mk
+
+nonplat_hwsvcfiles := $(call build_policy, hwservice_contexts, $(PLAT_VENDOR_POLICY) $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY))
+
+nonplat_hwservice_contexts.tmp := $(intermediates)/nonplat_hwservice_contexts.tmp
+$(nonplat_hwservice_contexts.tmp): PRIVATE_SVC_FILES := $(nonplat_hwsvcfiles)
+$(nonplat_hwservice_contexts.tmp): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
+$(nonplat_hwservice_contexts.tmp): $(nonplat_hwsvcfiles)
+	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+	$(hide) m4 -s $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) $(PRIVATE_SVC_FILES) > $@
+
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_sepolicy)
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(nonplat_hwservice_contexts.tmp) $(built_sepolicy) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc $(ACP)
+	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+	sed -e 's/#.*$$//' -e '/^$$/d' $< > $@
+	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -e -l $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $@
+
+nonplat_hwsvcfiles :=
+nonplat_hwservice_contexts.tmp :=
+
+##################################
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+
+LOCAL_MODULE := vndservice_contexts
+LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := ETC
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+ifeq ($(PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE),true)
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_OUT_VENDOR)/etc/selinux
+else
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_ROOT_OUT)
+endif
+
+include $(BUILD_SYSTEM)/base_rules.mk
+
+vnd_svcfiles := $(call build_policy, vndservice_contexts, $(PLAT_VENDOR_POLICY) $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY))
+
+vndservice_contexts.tmp := $(intermediates)/vndservice_contexts.tmp
+$(vndservice_contexts.tmp): PRIVATE_SVC_FILES := $(vnd_svcfiles)
+$(vndservice_contexts.tmp): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
+$(vndservice_contexts.tmp): $(vnd_svcfiles)
+	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+	$(hide) m4 -s $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) $(PRIVATE_SVC_FILES) > $@
+
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_sepolicy)
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(vndservice_contexts.tmp) $(built_sepolicy) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc $(ACP)
+	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+	sed -e 's/#.*$$//' -e '/^$$/d' $< > $@
+	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -e -v $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $@
+
+vnd_svcfiles :=
+vndservice_contexts.tmp :=
+##################################
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+
 LOCAL_MODULE := plat_mac_permissions.xml
 LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := ETC
 LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
@@ -1166,8 +1124,6 @@
 build_policy :=
 built_plat_fc :=
 built_nonplat_fc :=
-built_general_sepolicy :=
-built_general_sepolicy.conf :=
 built_nl :=
 built_plat_cil :=
 built_mapping_cil :=
@@ -1180,10 +1136,8 @@
 built_sepolicy :=
 built_plat_svc :=
 built_nonplat_svc :=
-mapping_policy_nvr :=
+mapping_policy :=
 my_target_arch :=
-nonplat_policy_nvr :=
-plat_policy_nvr :=
 plat_pub_policy.cil :=
 reqd_policy_mask.cil :=
 sepolicy_build_files :=
diff --git a/CleanSpec.mk b/CleanSpec.mk
index 9e2c464..0933115 100644
--- a/CleanSpec.mk
+++ b/CleanSpec.mk
@@ -70,3 +70,4 @@
 $(call add-clean-step, rm -rf $(PRODUCT_OUT)/vendor/etc/selinux/mapping_sepolicy.cil)
 $(call add-clean-step, rm -rf $(PRODUCT_OUT)/system/etc/selinux/plat_sepolicy.cil.sha256)
 $(call add-clean-step, rm -rf $(PRODUCT_OUT)/vendor/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy.plat.sha256)
+$(call add-clean-step, rm -rf $(PRODUCT_OUT)/system/etc/selinux/mapping_sepolicy.cil)
diff --git a/private/access_vectors b/private/access_vectors
index c4f13bb..74cf530 100644
--- a/private/access_vectors
+++ b/private/access_vectors
@@ -668,6 +668,13 @@
 	list
 }
 
+class hwservice_manager
+{
+	add
+	find
+	list
+}
+
 class keystore_key
 {
 	get_state
@@ -688,6 +695,7 @@
 	clear_uid
 	add_auth
 	user_changed
+	gen_unique_id
 }
 
 class drmservice {
diff --git a/private/adbd.te b/private/adbd.te
index 73302ac..52597eb 100644
--- a/private/adbd.te
+++ b/private/adbd.te
@@ -100,6 +100,14 @@
 allow adbd selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow adbd selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
 allow adbd kernel:security read_policy;
+allow adbd service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd sepolicy_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow pulling config.gz for CTS purposes
+allow adbd config_gz:file r_file_perms;
 
 allow adbd surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
 allow adbd bootchart_data_file:dir search;
diff --git a/private/app.te b/private/app.te
index 359c354..33c51fc 100644
--- a/private/app.te
+++ b/private/app.te
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@
 # Communicate with surfaceflinger.
 allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
 
+# Query whether a Surface supports wide color
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # App sandbox file accesses.
 allow { appdomain -isolated_app } app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow { appdomain -isolated_app } app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
@@ -81,18 +84,44 @@
 allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 
+# TextClassifier
+r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app }, textclassifier_data_file)
+
 # Access to OEM provided data and apps
 allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
 
 # Execute the shell or other system executables.
 allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } system_file:file x_file_perms;
 allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } system_file:file x_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
 
 # Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
 allow appdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain system_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };
+# Renderscript specific permissions to open /system/vendor/lib64.
+not_full_treble(`
+    allow appdomain vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+    allow appdomain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr open read };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    # For looking up Renderscript vendor drivers
+    allow { appdomain -isolated_app } vendor_file:dir { open read };
+')
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
+# apps which cannot be in /vendor.
+r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app }, vendor_app_file)
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } vendor_app_file:file execute;
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_overlay_file)
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/framework
+# for vendor provided libraries.
+r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_framework_file)
 
 # Execute dex2oat when apps call dexclassloader
 allow appdomain dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
@@ -152,9 +181,14 @@
 # Perform binder IPC to ephemeral apps.
 binder_call(appdomain, ephemeral_app)
 
-# hidl access for mediacodec
-# TODO(b/34454312): only allow getting and talking to mediacodec service
-hwbinder_use(appdomain)
+# TODO(b/36375899): Replace this with hal_client_domain once mediacodec is properly attributized
+# as OMX HAL
+hwbinder_use({ appdomain  -isolated_app })
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_omx_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# Talk with graphics composer fences
+allow appdomain hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
 
 # Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
 # hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
@@ -246,15 +280,18 @@
 # TODO(b/36375899) replace with hal_client_domain for mediacodec (hal_omx)
 get_prop({ appdomain -isolated_app }, hwservicemanager_prop);
 
-# Allow app to access the graphic allocator HAL
-binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app }, hal_graphics_allocator)
+# Allow app access to mediacodec (IOMX HAL)
+binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app }, mediacodec)
 
-# App can access configstore HAL which is read only
-binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app }, hal_configstore)
+# Allow AAudio apps to use shared memory file descriptors from the HAL
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_audio:fd use;
 
 # Allow app to access shared memory created by camera HAL1
 allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_camera:fd use;
 
+# RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # TODO: switch to meminfo service
 allow appdomain proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 
@@ -264,8 +301,6 @@
 pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_client)
 pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_manager)
 pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_vsync)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, sensors_client)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, pose_client)
 pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, performance_client)
 # Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
 pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, bufferhub_client)
diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index dfaee86..9c762a1 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
 # services.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps service_manager_type:service_manager add;
 
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to use VendorBinder
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps vndservice_manager_type:service_manager *;
+
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to connect to the property service
 # or set properties. b/10243159
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } property_socket:sock_file write;
@@ -95,6 +99,9 @@
   ')
 }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
 
+# No untrusted component should be touching /dev/fuse
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps fuse_device:chr_file *;
+
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to directly open tun_device
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps tun_device:chr_file open;
 
@@ -106,9 +113,68 @@
 # Create a more specific label if needed
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
 
+# Avoid all access to kernel configuration
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps config_gz:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
 # Do not allow untrusted apps access to preloads data files
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps preloads_data_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
 
 # Locking of files on /system could lead to denial of service attacks
 # against privileged system components
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps system_file:file lock;
+
+# Do not permit untrusted apps to perform actions on HwBinder service_manager
+# other than find actions for services listed below
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:hwservice_manager ~find;
+
+# Do not permit access from apps which host arbitrary code to HwBinder services,
+# except those considered sufficiently safe for access from such apps.
+# The two main reasons for this are:
+# 1. HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because HIDL
+#    currently does not expose caller UID information and, even if it did, many
+#    HwBinder services either operate at a level below that of apps (e.g., HALs)
+#    or must not rely on app identity for authorization. Thus, to be safe, the
+#    default assumption is that every HwBinder service treats all its clients as
+#    equally authorized to perform operations offered by the service.
+# 2. HAL servers (a subset of HwBinder services) contain code with higher
+#    incidence rate of security issues than system/core components and have
+#    access to lower layes of the stack (all the way down to hardware) thus
+#    increasing opportunities for bypassing the Android security model.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
+  hwservice_manager_type
+  # Same process services are safe because they by definition run in the process
+  # of the client and thus have the same access as the client domain in which
+  # the process runs
+  -same_process_hwservice
+  -coredomain_hwservice # neverallows for coredomain HwBinder services are below
+  -hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs # Designed for use by any domain
+  # These operations are also offered by surfaceflinger Binder service which
+  # apps are permitted to access
+  -hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice
+  # HwBinder version of mediacodec Binder service which apps were permitted to
+  # access
+  -hal_omx_hwservice
+}:hwservice_manager find;
+# HwBinder services offered by core components (as opposed to vendor components)
+# are considered somewhat safer due to point #2 above.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
+  coredomain_hwservice
+  -same_process_hwservice
+  -hidl_allocator_hwservice # Designed for use by any domain
+  -hidl_manager_hwservice # Designed for use by any domain
+  -hidl_memory_hwservice # Designed for use by any domain
+  -hidl_token_hwservice # Designed for use by any domain
+}:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# Restrict *Binder access from apps to HAL domains. We can only do this on full
+# Treble devices where *Binder communications between apps and HALs are tightly
+# restricted.
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
+    halserverdomain
+    -coredomain
+    -hal_configstore_server
+    -hal_graphics_allocator_server
+    -binder_in_vendor_violators # TODO(b/35870313): Remove once all violations are gone
+  }:binder { call transfer };
+')
diff --git a/private/asan_extract.te b/private/asan_extract.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c20d78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/asan_extract.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
+# public, but conceptually should go with this
+# Technically not a daemon but we do want the transition from init domain to
+# asan_extract to occur.
+with_asan(`
+typeattribute asan_extract coredomain;
+init_daemon_domain(asan_extract)
+')
diff --git a/private/attributes b/private/attributes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fcbfecf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/attributes
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Temporary attribute used for migrating permissions out of domain.
+# Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions
+# from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute.
+# Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all
+# domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains
+# and to start removing domain_deprecated where it's not required or
+# reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain
+# when necessary.
+attribute domain_deprecated;
diff --git a/private/audioserver.te b/private/audioserver.te
index 61ccefc..9119daa 100644
--- a/private/audioserver.te
+++ b/private/audioserver.te
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@
 binder_service(audioserver)
 
 hal_client_domain(audioserver, hal_allocator)
+# /system/lib64/hw for always-passthrough Allocator HAL ashmem / mapper .so
+r_dir_file(audioserver, system_file)
+
 hal_client_domain(audioserver, hal_audio)
 
 userdebug_or_eng(`
@@ -36,6 +39,12 @@
 allow audioserver audio_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
 allow audioserver audio_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 
+# allow access to ALSA MMAP FDs for AAudio API
+allow audioserver audio_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+# For A2DP bridge which is loaded directly into audioserver
+unix_socket_connect(audioserver, bluetooth, bluetooth)
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/private/bluetooth.te b/private/bluetooth.te
index ac2f39b..451d27a 100644
--- a/private/bluetooth.te
+++ b/private/bluetooth.te
@@ -51,9 +51,6 @@
 allow bluetooth app_api_service:service_manager find;
 allow bluetooth system_api_service:service_manager find;
 
-# Bluetooth Sim Access Profile Socket to the RIL
-unix_socket_connect(bluetooth, sap_uim, rild)
-
 # already open bugreport file descriptors may be shared with
 # the bluetooth process, from a file in
 # /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-*.
@@ -63,7 +60,6 @@
 allow bluetooth self:capability sys_nice;
 
 hal_client_domain(bluetooth, hal_bluetooth)
-binder_call(bluetooth, hal_telephony)
 hal_client_domain(bluetooth, hal_telephony)
 
 read_runtime_log_tags(bluetooth)
diff --git a/private/clatd.te b/private/clatd.te
index 5ba0fc5..c09398d 100644
--- a/private/clatd.te
+++ b/private/clatd.te
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
 typeattribute clatd coredomain;
+typeattribute clatd domain_deprecated;
diff --git a/private/dex2oat.te b/private/dex2oat.te
index fd45484..89c3970 100644
--- a/private/dex2oat.te
+++ b/private/dex2oat.te
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
 typeattribute dex2oat coredomain;
+typeattribute dex2oat domain_deprecated;
diff --git a/private/dhcp.te b/private/dhcp.te
index b2f8ac7..6a6a139 100644
--- a/private/dhcp.te
+++ b/private/dhcp.te
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 typeattribute dhcp coredomain;
+typeattribute dhcp domain_deprecated;
 
 init_daemon_domain(dhcp)
 type_transition dhcp system_data_file:{ dir file } dhcp_data_file;
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 6f8814e..d37a0bd 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -13,3 +13,6 @@
   -system_server
   userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
 } self:capability sys_ptrace;
+
+# Limit ability to generate hardware unique device ID attestations to priv_apps
+neverallow { domain -priv_app } *:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
diff --git a/public/domain_deprecated.te b/private/domain_deprecated.te
similarity index 94%
rename from public/domain_deprecated.te
rename to private/domain_deprecated.te
index 64ad3e6..43f1135 100644
--- a/public/domain_deprecated.te
+++ b/private/domain_deprecated.te
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
 # rules removed from the domain attribute
 
 # Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
-allow domain_deprecated tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { domain_deprecated -installd } tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 userdebug_or_eng(`
 auditallow {
   domain_deprecated
   -appdomain
+  -installd
   -sdcardd
   -surfaceflinger
   -system_server
@@ -71,7 +72,6 @@
 
 # System file accesses.
 allow domain_deprecated system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow domain_deprecated system_file:file r_file_perms;
 userdebug_or_eng(`
 auditallow {
   domain_deprecated
@@ -79,21 +79,12 @@
   -fingerprintd
   -installd
   -keystore
-  -rild
   -surfaceflinger
   -system_server
   -update_engine
   -vold
   -zygote
 } system_file:dir { open read ioctl lock }; # search getattr in domain
-auditallow {
-  domain_deprecated
-  -appdomain
-  -rild
-  -surfaceflinger
-  -system_server
-  -zygote
-} system_file:file { ioctl lock }; # read open getattr in domain
 ')
 
 # Read files already opened under /data.
@@ -201,7 +192,6 @@
   domain_deprecated
   -fsck
   -fsck_untrusted
-  -rild
   -sdcardd
   -system_server
   -update_engine
@@ -211,7 +201,6 @@
   domain_deprecated
   -fsck
   -fsck_untrusted
-  -rild
   -system_server
   -vold
 } proc:lnk_file { open ioctl lock }; # getattr read granted in domain
@@ -220,7 +209,6 @@
   -fingerprintd
   -healthd
   -netd
-  -rild
   -system_app
   -surfaceflinger
   -system_server
@@ -233,7 +221,6 @@
   -fingerprintd
   -healthd
   -netd
-  -rild
   -system_app
   -surfaceflinger
   -system_server
@@ -246,7 +233,6 @@
   -fingerprintd
   -healthd
   -netd
-  -rild
   -system_app
   -surfaceflinger
   -system_server
@@ -264,7 +250,6 @@
   -installd
   -keystore
   -netd
-  -rild
   -surfaceflinger
   -system_server
   -zygote
@@ -279,7 +264,6 @@
   -installd
   -keystore
   -netd
-  -rild
   -surfaceflinger
   -system_server
   -zygote
diff --git a/private/drmserver.te b/private/drmserver.te
index 45663bb..afe4f0a 100644
--- a/private/drmserver.te
+++ b/private/drmserver.te
@@ -3,3 +3,5 @@
 init_daemon_domain(drmserver)
 
 type_transition drmserver apk_data_file:sock_file drmserver_socket;
+
+typeattribute drmserver_socket coredomain_socket;
diff --git a/private/dumpstate.te b/private/dumpstate.te
index b8f8152..0fe2adf 100644
--- a/private/dumpstate.te
+++ b/private/dumpstate.te
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 typeattribute dumpstate coredomain;
+typeattribute dumpstate domain_deprecated;
 
 init_daemon_domain(dumpstate)
 
diff --git a/private/ephemeral_app.te b/private/ephemeral_app.te
index 9289027..2d4b1f1 100644
--- a/private/ephemeral_app.te
+++ b/private/ephemeral_app.te
@@ -20,6 +20,13 @@
 allow ephemeral_app { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file {read write getattr ioctl lock append};
 
 # services
+allow ephemeral_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediacasserver_service:service_manager find;
 allow ephemeral_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
 allow ephemeral_app radio_service:service_manager find;
 allow ephemeral_app ephemeral_app_api_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 6b64984..4c047b0 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -38,20 +38,23 @@
 /sdcard             u:object_r:rootfs:s0
 
 # SELinux policy files
-/file_contexts\.bin u:object_r:rootfs:s0
-/nonplat_file_contexts u:object_r:rootfs:s0
-/plat_file_contexts u:object_r:rootfs:s0
-/mapping_sepolicy\.cil   u:object_r:rootfs:s0
-/nonplat_sepolicy\.cil   u:object_r:rootfs:s0
-/plat_sepolicy\.cil      u:object_r:rootfs:s0
-/plat_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts:s0
-/nonplat_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts:s0
-/seapp_contexts     u:object_r:rootfs:s0
-/nonplat_seapp_contexts     u:object_r:rootfs:s0
-/plat_seapp_contexts     u:object_r:rootfs:s0
-/sepolicy           u:object_r:rootfs:s0
-/plat_service_contexts   u:object_r:rootfs:s0
-/nonplat_service_contexts   u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/file_contexts\.bin     u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/nonplat_file_contexts  u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/plat_file_contexts     u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/mapping_sepolicy\.cil   u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/nonplat_sepolicy\.cil   u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/plat_sepolicy\.cil      u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/plat_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/nonplat_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/seapp_contexts     u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/nonplat_seapp_contexts     u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/plat_seapp_contexts     u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/sepolicy           u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/plat_service_contexts   u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/plat_hwservice_contexts   u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/nonplat_service_contexts   u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/nonplat_hwservice_contexts   u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/vndservice_contexts   u:object_r:vndservice_contexts_file:s0
 
 ##########################
 # Devices
@@ -116,7 +119,6 @@
 /dev/snd/audio_seq_device	u:object_r:audio_seq_device:s0
 /dev/socket(/.*)?	u:object_r:socket_device:s0
 /dev/socket/adbd	u:object_r:adbd_socket:s0
-/dev/socket/sap_uim_socket[0-9]        u:object_r:sap_uim_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/cryptd	u:object_r:vold_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/dnsproxyd	u:object_r:dnsproxyd_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/dumpstate	u:object_r:dumpstate_socket:s0
@@ -133,10 +135,6 @@
 /dev/socket/pdx/system/buffer_hub/client	u:object_r:pdx_bufferhub_client_endpoint_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/pdx/system/performance	u:object_r:pdx_performance_dir:s0
 /dev/socket/pdx/system/performance/client	u:object_r:pdx_performance_client_endpoint_socket:s0
-/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/sensors	u:object_r:pdx_sensors_dir:s0
-/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/sensors/client	u:object_r:pdx_sensors_client_endpoint_socket:s0
-/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/pose	u:object_r:pdx_pose_dir:s0
-/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/pose/client	u:object_r:pdx_pose_client_endpoint_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display	u:object_r:pdx_display_dir:s0
 /dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/client	u:object_r:pdx_display_client_endpoint_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/manager	u:object_r:pdx_display_manager_endpoint_socket:s0
@@ -157,7 +155,6 @@
 /dev/socket/zygote_secondary	u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
 /dev/spdif_out.*	u:object_r:audio_device:s0
 /dev/tegra.*		u:object_r:video_device:s0
-/dev/tf_driver		u:object_r:tee_device:s0
 /dev/tty		u:object_r:owntty_device:s0
 /dev/tty[0-9]*		u:object_r:tty_device:s0
 /dev/ttyS[0-9]*		u:object_r:serial_device:s0
@@ -198,11 +195,11 @@
 /system/bin/surfaceflinger	u:object_r:surfaceflinger_exec:s0
 /system/bin/bufferhubd	u:object_r:bufferhubd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/performanced	u:object_r:performanced_exec:s0
-/system/bin/sensord	u:object_r:sensord_exec:s0
 /system/bin/drmserver	u:object_r:drmserver_exec:s0
 /system/bin/dumpstate   u:object_r:dumpstate_exec:s0
 /system/bin/incident   u:object_r:incident_exec:s0
 /system/bin/incidentd   u:object_r:incidentd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/netutils-wrapper-1\.0    u:object_r:netutils_wrapper_exec:s0
 /system/bin/vold	u:object_r:vold_exec:s0
 /system/bin/netd	u:object_r:netd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/wificond	u:object_r:wificond_exec:s0
@@ -212,7 +209,6 @@
 /system/bin/mediametrics	u:object_r:mediametrics_exec:s0
 /system/bin/cameraserver	u:object_r:cameraserver_exec:s0
 /system/bin/mediaextractor	u:object_r:mediaextractor_exec:s0
-/system/bin/mediacodec	u:object_r:mediacodec_exec:s0
 /system/bin/mdnsd	u:object_r:mdnsd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/installd	u:object_r:installd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/otapreopt_chroot   u:object_r:otapreopt_chroot_exec:s0
@@ -230,13 +226,11 @@
 /system/bin/dhcpcd-6.8.2	u:object_r:dhcp_exec:s0
 /system/bin/mtpd	u:object_r:mtp_exec:s0
 /system/bin/pppd	u:object_r:ppp_exec:s0
-/system/bin/tf_daemon	u:object_r:tee_exec:s0
 /system/bin/racoon	u:object_r:racoon_exec:s0
 /system/xbin/su		u:object_r:su_exec:s0
 /system/xbin/perfprofd  u:object_r:perfprofd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/dnsmasq     u:object_r:dnsmasq_exec:s0
 /system/bin/healthd     u:object_r:healthd_exec:s0
-/system/bin/hostapd     u:object_r:hostapd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/clatd	u:object_r:clatd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/lmkd        u:object_r:lmkd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/inputflinger u:object_r:inputflinger_exec:s0
@@ -264,11 +258,48 @@
 /system/bin/webview_zygote64     u:object_r:webview_zygote_exec:s0
 /system/bin/virtual_touchpad     u:object_r:virtual_touchpad_exec:s0
 /system/bin/hw/android\.hidl\.allocator@1\.0-service          u:object_r:hal_allocator_default_exec:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/mapping/[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.cil       u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_service_contexts  u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_hwservice_contexts  u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_file_contexts  u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_seapp_contexts  u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_sepolicy.cil       u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_and_mapping_sepolicy\.cil\.sha256 u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/system/bin/vr_hwc               u:object_r:vr_hwc_exec:s0
 
 #############################
 # Vendor files
 #
-/vendor(/.*)?		u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)(/.*)?                  u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/sh                 u:object_r:vendor_shell_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/toybox_vendor      u:object_r:vendor_toolbox_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/egl(/.*)?     u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/vndk-sp(/.*)? u:object_r:vndk_sp_file:s0
+
+# TODO: b/36790901 move this to /vendor/etc
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/manifest.xml           u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/app(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/overlay(/.*)?          u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/framework(/.*)?        u:object_r:vendor_framework_file:s0
+
+# HAL location
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/hw            u:object_r:vendor_hal_file:s0
+
+/vendor/etc/selinux/nonplat_mac_permissions.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
+/vendor/etc/selinux/nonplat_property_contexts   u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor/etc/selinux/nonplat_service_contexts    u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor/etc/selinux/nonplat_hwservice_contexts    u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor/etc/selinux/nonplat_file_contexts   u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor/etc/selinux/nonplat_seapp_contexts    u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor/etc/selinux/nonplat_sepolicy.cil       u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/vendor/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy        u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/vendor/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy\.plat_and_mapping\.sha256 u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/vendor/etc/selinux/vndservice_contexts         u:object_r:vndservice_contexts_file:s0
 
 #############################
 # OEM and ODM files
@@ -340,12 +371,12 @@
 /data/misc/shared_relro(/.*)?   u:object_r:shared_relro_file:s0
 /data/misc/sms(/.*)?            u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/systemkeys(/.*)?     u:object_r:systemkeys_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/textclassifier(/.*)?       u:object_r:textclassifier_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/user(/.*)?           u:object_r:misc_user_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/vpn(/.*)?            u:object_r:vpn_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/wifi(/.*)?           u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/wifi/sockets(/.*)?   u:object_r:wpa_socket:s0
 /data/misc/wifi/sockets/wpa_ctrl.*   u:object_r:system_wpa_socket:s0
-/data/misc/wifi/hostapd(/.*)?   u:object_r:hostapd_socket:s0
 /data/misc/zoneinfo(/.*)?       u:object_r:zoneinfo_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/vold(/.*)?           u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/perfprofd(/.*)?      u:object_r:perfprofd_data_file:s0
@@ -472,6 +503,28 @@
 /sys/kernel(/debug)?/tracing/trace_marker                                           u:object_r:debugfs_trace_marker:s0
 /sys/kernel(/debug)?/tracing/tracing_on                                             u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable:s0
 
+###########################################
+# debug-only tracing
+#
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sync/enable                         u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/workqueue/enable                    u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/regulator/enable                    u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/pagecache/enable                    u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/irq/enable                          u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/ipi/enable                          u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_enter/enable    u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_exit/enable     u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_write_begin/enable        u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_write_end/enable          u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/ext4/ext4_da_write_begin/enable     u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/ext4/ext4_da_write_end/enable       u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_enter/enable    u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_exit/enable     u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/block/block_rq_issue/enable         u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/block/block_rq_complete/enable      u:object_r:tracing_shell_writable_debug:s0
+
 #############################
 # asec containers
 /mnt/asec(/.*)?             u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0
diff --git a/private/file_contexts_asan b/private/file_contexts_asan
index 5e756fc..d35cd3c 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts_asan
+++ b/private/file_contexts_asan
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
 /data/asan/system/lib64(/.*)?              u:object_r:system_file:s0
 /data/asan/vendor/lib(/.*)?                u:object_r:system_file:s0
 /data/asan/vendor/lib64(/.*)?              u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/system/bin/asan_extract       u:object_r:asan_extract_exec:s0
diff --git a/private/fingerprintd.te b/private/fingerprintd.te
index eb73ef8..0c1dfaa 100644
--- a/private/fingerprintd.te
+++ b/private/fingerprintd.te
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 typeattribute fingerprintd coredomain;
+typeattribute fingerprintd domain_deprecated;
 
 init_daemon_domain(fingerprintd)
diff --git a/private/fsck.te b/private/fsck.te
index 3a36329..e846797 100644
--- a/private/fsck.te
+++ b/private/fsck.te
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 typeattribute fsck coredomain;
+typeattribute fsck domain_deprecated;
 
 init_daemon_domain(fsck)
diff --git a/private/fsck_untrusted.te b/private/fsck_untrusted.te
index 9a57bf0..2a1a39f 100644
--- a/private/fsck_untrusted.te
+++ b/private/fsck_untrusted.te
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
 typeattribute fsck_untrusted coredomain;
+typeattribute fsck_untrusted domain_deprecated;
diff --git a/private/halclientdomain.te b/private/halclientdomain.te
index d4bdef9..9dcd3ee 100644
--- a/private/halclientdomain.te
+++ b/private/halclientdomain.te
@@ -8,3 +8,6 @@
 
 # Used to wait for hwservicemanager
 get_prop(halclientdomain, hwservicemanager_prop)
+
+# Wait for HAL server to be up (used by getService)
+allow halclientdomain hidl_manager_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/private/hostapd.te b/private/hostapd.te
deleted file mode 100644
index d895f29..0000000
--- a/private/hostapd.te
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-# type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
-# public, but conceptually should go with this
-init_daemon_domain(hostapd)
diff --git a/private/hwservice_contexts b/private/hwservice_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35c95ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/hwservice_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+android.frameworks.displayservice::IDisplayService              u:object_r:fwk_display_hwservice:s0
+android.frameworks.schedulerservice::ISchedulingPolicyService   u:object_r:fwk_scheduler_hwservice:s0
+android.frameworks.sensorservice::ISensorManager                u:object_r:fwk_sensor_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.audio.effect::IEffectsFactory                  u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.audio::IDevicesFactory                         u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint::IBiometricsFingerprint u:object_r:hal_fingerprint_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.bluetooth::IBluetoothHci                       u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.boot::IBootControl                             u:object_r:hal_bootctl_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.broadcastradio::IBroadcastRadioFactory         u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.camera.provider::ICameraProvider               u:object_r:hal_camera_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.configstore::ISurfaceFlingerConfigs            u:object_r:hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:s0
+android.hardware.contexthub::IContexthub                        u:object_r:hal_contexthub_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.drm::ICryptoFactory                            u:object_r:hal_drm_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.drm::IDrmFactory                               u:object_r:hal_drm_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.dumpstate::IDumpstateDevice                    u:object_r:hal_dumpstate_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.gatekeeper::IGatekeeper                        u:object_r:hal_gatekeeper_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.gnss::IGnss                                    u:object_r:hal_gnss_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.graphics.allocator::IAllocator                 u:object_r:hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.graphics.composer::IComposer                   u:object_r:hal_graphics_composer_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.graphics.mapper::IMapper                       u:object_r:hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.health::IHealth                                u:object_r:hal_health_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.ir::IConsumerIr                                u:object_r:hal_ir_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.keymaster::IKeymasterDevice                    u:object_r:hal_keymaster_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.light::ILight                                  u:object_r:hal_light_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.media.omx::IOmx                                u:object_r:hal_omx_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.media.omx::IOmxStore                           u:object_r:hal_omx_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.memtrack::IMemtrack                            u:object_r:hal_memtrack_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.nfc::INfc                                      u:object_r:hal_nfc_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.power::IPower                                  u:object_r:hal_power_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.radio.deprecated::IOemHook                     u:object_r:hal_telephony_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.radio::IRadio                                  u:object_r:hal_telephony_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.radio::ISap                                    u:object_r:hal_telephony_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.renderscript::IDevice                          u:object_r:hal_renderscript_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.sensors::ISensors                              u:object_r:hal_sensors_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.soundtrigger::ISoundTriggerHw                  u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.thermal::IThermal                              u:object_r:hal_thermal_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.tv.cec::IHdmiCec                               u:object_r:hal_tv_cec_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.tv.input::ITvInput                             u:object_r:hal_tv_input_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.usb::IUsb                                      u:object_r:hal_usb_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.vibrator::IVibrator                            u:object_r:hal_vibrator_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.vr::IVr                                        u:object_r:hal_vr_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.wifi::IWifi                                    u:object_r:hal_wifi_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.wifi.supplicant::ISupplicant                   u:object_r:hal_wifi_supplicant_hwservice:s0
+android.hidl.allocator::IAllocator                              u:object_r:hidl_allocator_hwservice:s0
+android.hidl.base::IBase                                        u:object_r:hidl_base_hwservice:s0
+android.hidl.manager::IServiceManager                           u:object_r:hidl_manager_hwservice:s0
+android.hidl.memory::IMapper                                    u:object_r:hidl_memory_hwservice:s0
+android.hidl.token::ITokenManager                               u:object_r:hidl_token_hwservice:s0
+android.system.wifi.keystore::IKeystore                         u:object_r:system_wifi_keystore_hwservice:s0
+*                                                               u:object_r:default_android_hwservice:s0
diff --git a/private/hwservicemanager.te b/private/hwservicemanager.te
index 627b93f..a43eb02 100644
--- a/private/hwservicemanager.te
+++ b/private/hwservicemanager.te
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
 typeattribute hwservicemanager coredomain;
 
 init_daemon_domain(hwservicemanager)
+
+add_hwservice(hwservicemanager, hidl_manager_hwservice)
+add_hwservice(hwservicemanager, hidl_token_hwservice)
diff --git a/private/installd.te b/private/installd.te
index f74843d..d726e7d 100644
--- a/private/installd.te
+++ b/private/installd.te
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 typeattribute installd coredomain;
+typeattribute installd domain_deprecated;
 
 init_daemon_domain(installd)
 
diff --git a/private/keystore.te b/private/keystore.te
index 6aa8884..1e56338 100644
--- a/private/keystore.te
+++ b/private/keystore.te
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
 typeattribute keystore coredomain;
+typeattribute keystore domain_deprecated;
 
 init_daemon_domain(keystore)
+
+# talk to keymaster
+hal_client_domain(keystore, hal_keymaster)
+
+# Offer the Wifi Keystore HwBinder service
+typeattribute keystore wifi_keystore_service_server;
+add_hwservice(keystore, system_wifi_keystore_hwservice)
diff --git a/private/mediacodec.te b/private/mediacodec.te
deleted file mode 100644
index ff290bc..0000000
--- a/private/mediacodec.te
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-typeattribute mediacodec coredomain;
-
-init_daemon_domain(mediacodec)
diff --git a/private/mediadrmserver.te b/private/mediadrmserver.te
index def8759..4e511a8 100644
--- a/private/mediadrmserver.te
+++ b/private/mediadrmserver.te
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
 typeattribute mediadrmserver coredomain;
 
 init_daemon_domain(mediadrmserver)
+
+# allocate and use graphic buffers
+hal_client_domain(mediadrmserver, hal_graphics_allocator)
+auditallow mediadrmserver hal_graphics_allocator_server:binder call;
+
diff --git a/private/mediaserver.te b/private/mediaserver.te
index 4b510a5..a9b85be 100644
--- a/private/mediaserver.te
+++ b/private/mediaserver.te
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
 typeattribute mediaserver coredomain;
 
 init_daemon_domain(mediaserver)
+
+# allocate and use graphic buffers
+hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+# TODO(b/36375899): Remove this once OMX HAL is attributized and mediaserver is marked as a client
+# of OMX HAL.
+allow mediaserver hal_omx_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/private/mtp.te b/private/mtp.te
index 732e111..3cfda0b 100644
--- a/private/mtp.te
+++ b/private/mtp.te
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 typeattribute mtp coredomain;
+typeattribute mtp domain_deprecated;
 
 init_daemon_domain(mtp)
diff --git a/private/netd.te b/private/netd.te
index f501f25..3a824af 100644
--- a/private/netd.te
+++ b/private/netd.te
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 typeattribute netd coredomain;
+typeattribute netd domain_deprecated;
 
 init_daemon_domain(netd)
 
diff --git a/private/netutils_wrapper.te b/private/netutils_wrapper.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7fe32a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/netutils_wrapper.te
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+typeattribute netutils_wrapper coredomain;
+
+r_dir_file(netutils_wrapper, system_file);
+
+# For netutils (ip, iptables, tc)
+allow netutils_wrapper self:capability net_raw;
+
+allow netutils_wrapper system_file:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+allow netutils_wrapper proc_net:file { open read getattr };
+allow netutils_wrapper self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow netutils_wrapper self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow netutils_wrapper self:capability net_admin;
+# ip utils need everything but ioctl
+allow netutils_wrapper self:netlink_route_socket ~ioctl;
+allow netutils_wrapper self:netlink_xfrm_socket ~ioctl;
+
+# For netutils (ndc) to be able to talk to netd
+allow netutils_wrapper netd_socket:sock_file { open getattr read write append };
+allow netutils_wrapper netd:unix_stream_socket { read getattr connectto };
+
+# For /data/misc/net access to ndc and ip
+r_dir_file(netutils_wrapper, net_data_file)
+
+domain_auto_trans({
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+}, netutils_wrapper_exec, netutils_wrapper)
diff --git a/private/perfprofd.te b/private/perfprofd.te
index 9c249fd..a655f1d 100644
--- a/private/perfprofd.te
+++ b/private/perfprofd.te
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 userdebug_or_eng(`
   typeattribute perfprofd coredomain;
+  typeattribute perfprofd domain_deprecated;
   init_daemon_domain(perfprofd)
 ')
diff --git a/private/platform_app.te b/private/platform_app.te
index 984bb7b..fd4634a 100644
--- a/private/platform_app.te
+++ b/private/platform_app.te
@@ -61,3 +61,10 @@
 allow platform_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
 read_runtime_log_tags(platform_app)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# app domains which access /dev/fuse should not run as platform_app
+neverallow platform_app fuse_device:chr_file *;
diff --git a/private/ppp.te b/private/ppp.te
index 968b221..9b301f4 100644
--- a/private/ppp.te
+++ b/private/ppp.te
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 typeattribute ppp coredomain;
+typeattribute ppp domain_deprecated;
 
 domain_auto_trans(mtp, ppp_exec, ppp)
diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index 0eac99e..109c869 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
 allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
 allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app oem_lock_service:service_manager find;
 allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
 allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
 allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
@@ -72,9 +73,6 @@
   allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 ')
 
-# Allow GMS core to scan executables on the system partition
-allow priv_app exec_type:file { getattr read open };
-
 # For AppFuse.
 allow priv_app vold:fd use;
 allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
@@ -84,6 +82,9 @@
 r_dir_file(priv_app, proc)
 r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs)
 
+# Allow GMS core to open kernel config for OTA matching through libvintf
+allow priv_app config_gz:file { open read getattr };
+
 # access the mac address
 allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
 
@@ -91,6 +92,10 @@
 binder_call(priv_app, update_engine)
 allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
 
+# Allow GMS core to communicate with dumpsys storaged.
+binder_call(priv_app, storaged)
+allow priv_app storaged_service:service_manager find;
+
 # Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
 allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
 
@@ -100,6 +105,9 @@
 allow priv_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow priv_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
+# Allow privileged apps (e.g. GMS core) to generate unique hardware IDs
+allow priv_app keystore:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
+
 read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app)
 
 ###
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index 2315034..4c27b35 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -111,3 +111,6 @@
 
 # hwservicemanager properties
 hwservicemanager.       u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0
+
+# ASAN install trigger
+asan.restore_reboot  u:object_r:asan_reboot_prop:s0
diff --git a/private/radio.te b/private/radio.te
index b4f5390..83b5b41 100644
--- a/private/radio.te
+++ b/private/radio.te
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 typeattribute radio coredomain;
+typeattribute radio domain_deprecated;
 
 app_domain(radio)
 
diff --git a/private/recovery.te b/private/recovery.te
index 2a7fdc7..b7b2847 100644
--- a/private/recovery.te
+++ b/private/recovery.te
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
 typeattribute recovery coredomain;
+typeattribute recovery domain_deprecated;
diff --git a/private/runas.te b/private/runas.te
index ef31aac..73a91ff 100644
--- a/private/runas.te
+++ b/private/runas.te
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 typeattribute runas coredomain;
+typeattribute runas domain_deprecated;
 
 # ndk-gdb invokes adb shell run-as.
 domain_auto_trans(shell, runas_exec, runas)
diff --git a/private/sdcardd.te b/private/sdcardd.te
index 126d643..ac6bb4e 100644
--- a/private/sdcardd.te
+++ b/private/sdcardd.te
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 typeattribute sdcardd coredomain;
+typeattribute sdcardd domain_deprecated;
 
 type_transition sdcardd system_data_file:{ dir file } media_rw_data_file;
diff --git a/private/security_classes b/private/security_classes
index a202c5d..02e3ef2 100644
--- a/private/security_classes
+++ b/private/security_classes
@@ -134,6 +134,9 @@
 # Service manager
 class service_manager           # userspace
 
+# hardware service manager      # userspace
+class hwservice_manager
+
 # Keystore Key
 class keystore_key              # userspace
 
diff --git a/private/sensord.te b/private/sensord.te
deleted file mode 100644
index bdeded6..0000000
--- a/private/sensord.te
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-typeattribute sensord coredomain;
-
-init_daemon_domain(sensord)
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index 8be98e9..dc77cb9 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 commontime_management                     u:object_r:commontime_management_service:s0
 common_time.clock                         u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0
 common_time.config                        u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0
-companion_device                          u:object_r:companion_device_service:s0
+companiondevice                           u:object_r:companion_device_service:s0
 connectivity                              u:object_r:connectivity_service:s0
 connmetrics                               u:object_r:connmetrics_service:s0
 consumer_ir                               u:object_r:consumer_ir_service:s0
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
 launcherapps                              u:object_r:launcherapps_service:s0
 location                                  u:object_r:location_service:s0
 lock_settings                             u:object_r:lock_settings_service:s0
+media.aaudio                              u:object_r:audioserver_service:s0
 media.audio_flinger                       u:object_r:audioserver_service:s0
 media.audio_policy                        u:object_r:audioserver_service:s0
 media.camera                              u:object_r:cameraserver_service:s0
@@ -104,6 +105,7 @@
 network_time_update_service               u:object_r:network_time_update_service:s0
 nfc                                       u:object_r:nfc_service:s0
 notification                              u:object_r:notification_service:s0
+oem_lock                                  u:object_r:oem_lock_service:s0
 otadexopt                                 u:object_r:otadexopt_service:s0
 overlay                                   u:object_r:overlay_service:s0
 package                                   u:object_r:package_service:s0
@@ -157,6 +159,7 @@
 vibrator                                  u:object_r:vibrator_service:s0
 virtual_touchpad                          u:object_r:virtual_touchpad_service:s0
 voiceinteraction                          u:object_r:voiceinteraction_service:s0
+vr_hwc                                    u:object_r:vr_hwc_service:s0
 vrmanager                                 u:object_r:vr_manager_service:s0
 wallpaper                                 u:object_r:wallpaper_service:s0
 webviewupdate                             u:object_r:webviewupdate_service:s0
diff --git a/private/shared_relro.te b/private/shared_relro.te
index 02f7206..8d06294 100644
--- a/private/shared_relro.te
+++ b/private/shared_relro.te
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 typeattribute shared_relro coredomain;
+typeattribute shared_relro domain_deprecated;
 
 # The shared relro process is a Java program forked from the zygote, so it
 # inherits from app to get basic permissions it needs to run.
diff --git a/private/shell.te b/private/shell.te
index afb1f49..90bed27 100644
--- a/private/shell.te
+++ b/private/shell.te
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@
 allow shell debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
 allow shell atrace_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 
+# read config.gz for CTS purposes
+allow shell config_gz:file r_file_perms;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow shell tracing_shell_writable_debug:file rw_file_perms;
+')
+
 # Run app_process.
 # XXX Transition into its own domain?
 app_domain(shell)
diff --git a/private/storaged.te b/private/storaged.te
index bf13a15..d5abd73 100644
--- a/private/storaged.te
+++ b/private/storaged.te
@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@
 allow storaged shell:fd use;
 allow storaged shell:fifo_file write;
 
+# Needed for GMScore to call dumpsys storaged
+allow storaged priv_app:fd use;
+allow storaged app_data_file:file write;
+allow storaged permission_service:service_manager find;
+
 # Binder permissions
 add_service(storaged, storaged_service)
 
diff --git a/private/surfaceflinger.te b/private/surfaceflinger.te
index f1ad667..3595ee4 100644
--- a/private/surfaceflinger.te
+++ b/private/surfaceflinger.te
@@ -6,16 +6,16 @@
 init_daemon_domain(surfaceflinger)
 
 typeattribute surfaceflinger mlstrustedsubject;
+typeattribute surfaceflinger display_service_server;
 
 read_runtime_log_tags(surfaceflinger)
 
 # Perform HwBinder IPC.
-hwbinder_use(surfaceflinger)
 hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_graphics_allocator)
-binder_call(surfaceflinger, hal_graphics_composer)
 hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_graphics_composer)
-binder_call(surfaceflinger, hal_configstore)
 hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_configstore)
+allow surfaceflinger hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:hwservice_manager find;
+allow surfaceflinger hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
 
 # Perform Binder IPC.
 binder_use(surfaceflinger)
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@
 allow surfaceflinger appdomain:fd use;
 allow surfaceflinger app_data_file:file { read write };
 
+# Use socket supplied by adbd, for cmd gpu vkjson etc.
+allow surfaceflinger adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write getattr };
+
 # Allow a dumpstate triggered screenshot
 binder_call(surfaceflinger, dumpstate)
 binder_call(surfaceflinger, shell)
@@ -60,7 +63,6 @@
 
 # Needed on some devices for playing DRM protected content,
 # but seems expected and appropriate for all devices.
-allow surfaceflinger tee:unix_stream_socket connectto;
 allow surfaceflinger tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
 
@@ -97,8 +99,6 @@
 
 pdx_client(surfaceflinger, bufferhub_client)
 pdx_client(surfaceflinger, performance_client)
-pdx_client(surfaceflinger, sensors_client)
-pdx_client(surfaceflinger, pose_client)
 
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
diff --git a/private/system_app.te b/private/system_app.te
index 606c4a0..7950044 100644
--- a/private/system_app.te
+++ b/private/system_app.te
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 
 allow system_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
 # TODO: scope this down? Too broad?
-allow system_app { service_manager_type -netd_service -dumpstate_service -installd_service }:service_manager find;
+allow system_app { service_manager_type -netd_service -dumpstate_service -installd_service -virtual_touchpad_service -vr_hwc_service }:service_manager find;
 
 allow system_app keystore:keystore_key {
     get_state
@@ -83,3 +83,10 @@
 
 control_logd(system_app)
 read_runtime_log_tags(system_app)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# app domains which access /dev/fuse should not run as system_app
+neverallow system_app fuse_device:chr_file *;
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 6a11448..925c82d 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
 # ptrace to processes in the same domain for debugging crashes.
 allow system_server self:process ptrace;
 
+# Read and delete last_reboot_reason file
+allow system_server reboot_data_file:file { rename r_file_perms unlink };
+allow system_server reboot_data_file:dir { write search open remove_name };
+
 # Child of the zygote.
 allow system_server zygote:fd use;
 allow system_server zygote:process sigchld;
@@ -62,16 +66,13 @@
     net_raw
     sys_boot
     sys_nice
-    sys_resource
+    sys_ptrace
     sys_time
     sys_tty_config
 };
 
 wakelock_use(system_server)
 
-# Triggered by /proc/pid accesses, not allowed.
-dontaudit system_server self:capability sys_ptrace;
-
 # Trigger module auto-load.
 allow system_server kernel:system module_request;
 
@@ -171,38 +172,48 @@
 binder_call(system_server, wificond)
 binder_service(system_server)
 
-# Perform HwBinder IPC.
-hwbinder_use(system_server)
+# Use HALs
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_allocator)
-binder_call(system_server, hal_contexthub)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_contexthub)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_fingerprint)
-binder_call(system_server, hal_gnss)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_gnss)
-binder_call(system_server, hal_graphics_allocator)
-binder_call(system_server, hal_ir)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_graphics_allocator)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_ir)
-binder_call(system_server, hal_light)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_light)
-binder_call(system_server, hal_memtrack)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_memtrack)
-binder_call(system_server, hal_power)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_oemlock)
+allow system_server hal_omx_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow system_server hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_power)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_sensors)
-binder_call(system_server, hal_thermal)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_thermal)
-binder_call(system_server, hal_usb)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tv_cec)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tv_input)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_usb)
-binder_call(system_server, hal_vibrator)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_vibrator)
-binder_call(system_server, hal_vr)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_vr)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_weaver)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_wifi)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_wifi_supplicant)
 
+binder_call(system_server, mediacodec)
+
+# Talk with graphics composer fences
+allow system_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
+# Use RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
+allow system_server hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# Offer HwBinder services
+add_hwservice(system_server, fwk_scheduler_hwservice)
+add_hwservice(system_server, fwk_sensor_hwservice)
+
 # Talk to tombstoned to get ANR traces.
 unix_socket_connect(system_server, tombstoned_intercept, tombstoned)
 
+# List HAL interfaces to get ANR traces.
+allow system_server hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
+
 # Send signals to trigger ANR traces.
 allow system_server {
   # This is derived from the list that system server defines as interesting native processes
@@ -224,6 +235,7 @@
   hal_audio_server
   hal_bluetooth_server
   hal_camera_server
+  hal_graphics_composer_server
   hal_vr_server
   mediacodec # TODO(b/36375899): hal_omx_server
 }:process { signal };
@@ -238,6 +250,10 @@
 allow system_server mediadrmserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
 allow system_server mediadrmserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
 
+# Get file context
+allow system_server file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+# access for mac_permissions
+allow system_server mac_perms_file: file r_file_perms;
 # Check SELinux permissions.
 selinux_check_access(system_server)
 
@@ -291,6 +307,12 @@
 allow system_server apk_tmp_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow system_server apk_tmp_file:file create_file_perms;
 
+# Access /vendor/app
+r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_app_file)
+
+# Access /vendor/app
+r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_overlay_file)
+
 # Manage /data/app-private.
 allow system_server apk_private_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow system_server apk_private_data_file:file create_file_perms;
@@ -331,6 +353,10 @@
 allow system_server systemkeys_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow system_server systemkeys_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 
+# Manage /data/misc/textclassifier.
+allow system_server textclassifier_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server textclassifier_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
 # Access /data/tombstones.
 allow system_server tombstone_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow system_server tombstone_data_file:file r_file_perms;
@@ -449,9 +475,6 @@
 allow system_server appdomain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { getattr getopt setopt read write shutdown };
 allow system_server appdomain:{ fifo_file unix_stream_socket } { getattr read write };
 
-# Allow abstract socket connection
-allow system_server rild:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-
 # BackupManagerService needs to manipulate backup data files
 allow system_server cache_backup_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow system_server cache_backup_file:file create_file_perms;
@@ -614,7 +637,6 @@
 
 r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup)
 allow system_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
-allow system_server hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
 
 r_dir_file(system_server, proc)
 r_dir_file(system_server, proc_meminfo)
@@ -622,9 +644,6 @@
 r_dir_file(system_server, rootfs)
 r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_type)
 
-# Allow system_server to make binder calls to hwservicemanager
-binder_call(system_server, hwservicemanager)
-
 ### Rules needed when Light HAL runs inside system_server process.
 ### These rules should eventually be granted only when needed.
 allow system_server sysfs_leds:lnk_file read;
@@ -706,3 +725,11 @@
 # dexoptanalyzer is currently used only for secondary dex files which
 # system_server should never access.
 neverallow system_server dexoptanalyzer_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# No ptracing others
+neverallow system_server { domain -system_server }:process ptrace;
+
+# CAP_SYS_RESOURCE was traditionally needed for sensitive /proc/PID
+# file read access. However, that is now unnecessary (b/34951864)
+# This neverallow can be removed after b/34951864 is fixed.
+neverallow system_server system_server:capability sys_resource;
diff --git a/private/technical_debt.cil b/private/technical_debt.cil
index 2d9ec8b..ccbae10 100644
--- a/private/technical_debt.cil
+++ b/private/technical_debt.cil
@@ -11,3 +11,18 @@
 ;     typeattribute hal_allocator_client halclientdomain;
 (typeattributeset hal_allocator_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
 (typeattributeset halclientdomain (hal_allocator_client))
+
+; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Configstore HAL
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_configstore_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_configstore_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+
+; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Graphics Allocator HAL
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_graphics_allocator_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_graphics_allocator_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+
+; Domains hosting Camera HAL implementations are clients of Allocator HAL
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute hal_camera hal_allocator_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_allocator_client (hal_camera))
diff --git a/private/tee.te b/private/tee.te
deleted file mode 100644
index 99f501e..0000000
--- a/private/tee.te
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-typeattribute tee coredomain;
-
-init_daemon_domain(tee)
diff --git a/private/ueventd.te b/private/ueventd.te
index 1bd6773..0df587f 100644
--- a/private/ueventd.te
+++ b/private/ueventd.te
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 typeattribute ueventd coredomain;
+typeattribute ueventd domain_deprecated;
 
 tmpfs_domain(ueventd)
diff --git a/private/uncrypt.te b/private/uncrypt.te
index e4e9224..fde686b 100644
--- a/private/uncrypt.te
+++ b/private/uncrypt.te
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 typeattribute uncrypt coredomain;
+typeattribute uncrypt domain_deprecated;
 
 init_daemon_domain(uncrypt)
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_all.te b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
index 993b3d0..fc80129 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_all.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 ###
 ### Untrusted_app_all.
 ###
-### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains.
+### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains except
+### apps which target the v2 security sandbox (ephemeral_app for instant apps,
+### untrusted_v2_app for fully installed v2 apps).
 ### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
 ### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
 ### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
@@ -16,6 +18,8 @@
 ### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
 ### seapp_contexts.
 ###
+### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also
+### added to untrusted_v2_app.te and ephemeral_app.te.
 
 # Legacy text relocations
 allow untrusted_app_all apk_data_file:file execmod;
@@ -92,3 +96,11 @@
 allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir search;
+
+# Allow untrusted apps read / execute access to /vendor/app for there can
+# be pre-installed vendor apps that package a library within themselves.
+# TODO (b/37784178) Consider creating  a special type for /vendor/app installed
+# apps.
+allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:dir { open getattr read search };
+allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { open getattr read execute };
+allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read };
diff --git a/private/update_engine.te b/private/update_engine.te
index 5af7db6..f460272 100644
--- a/private/update_engine.te
+++ b/private/update_engine.te
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 typeattribute update_engine coredomain;
+typeattribute update_engine domain_deprecated;
 
 init_daemon_domain(update_engine);
diff --git a/private/vold.te b/private/vold.te
index a6d1001..f2416f8 100644
--- a/private/vold.te
+++ b/private/vold.te
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 typeattribute vold coredomain;
+typeattribute vold domain_deprecated;
 
 init_daemon_domain(vold)
 
diff --git a/private/vr_hwc.te b/private/vr_hwc.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..053c03d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/vr_hwc.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+typeattribute vr_hwc coredomain;
+
+# Daemon started by init.
+init_daemon_domain(vr_hwc)
+
+hal_server_domain(vr_hwc, hal_graphics_composer)
diff --git a/private/webview_zygote.te b/private/webview_zygote.te
index b2a1951..501581a 100644
--- a/private/webview_zygote.te
+++ b/private/webview_zygote.te
@@ -10,9 +10,6 @@
 # resulting process into webview_zygote domain.
 init_daemon_domain(webview_zygote)
 
-# Access to system files for SELinux contexts.
-allow webview_zygote rootfs:file r_file_perms;
-
 # Allow reading/executing installed binaries to enable preloading the
 # installed WebView implementation.
 allow webview_zygote apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -46,6 +43,8 @@
 # Interaction between the webview_zygote and its children.
 allow webview_zygote isolated_app:process setpgid;
 
+# Get seapp_contexts
+allow webview_zygote seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
 # Check validity of SELinux context before use.
 selinux_check_context(webview_zygote)
 # Check SELinux permissions.
diff --git a/private/zygote.te b/private/zygote.te
index e9ec672..daabbc0 100644
--- a/private/zygote.te
+++ b/private/zygote.te
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@
 allow zygote idmap_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 allow zygote dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(zygote, vendor_overlay_file)
+
 # Control cgroups.
 allow zygote cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow zygote cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
@@ -62,6 +65,8 @@
 allow zygote pmsg_device:chr_file getattr;
 allow zygote debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
 
+# Get seapp_contexts
+allow zygote seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
 # Check validity of SELinux context before use.
 selinux_check_context(zygote)
 # Check SELinux permissions.
diff --git a/public/asan_extract.te b/public/asan_extract.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d0de6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/asan_extract.te
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# asan_extract
+#
+# This command set moves the artifact corresponding to the current slot
+# from /data/ota to /data/dalvik-cache.
+
+with_asan(`
+  type asan_extract, domain, coredomain;
+  type asan_extract_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+
+  # Allow asan_extract to execute itself using #!/system/bin/sh
+  allow asan_extract shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+  # We execute log, rm, gzip and tar.
+  allow asan_extract toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+  allow asan_extract system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+
+  # asan_extract deletes old /data/lib.
+  allow asan_extract system_file:dir { open read remove_name rmdir write };
+  allow asan_extract system_file:file unlink;
+
+  # asan_extract untars ASAN libraries into /data.
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:dir create_dir_perms ;
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms ;
+
+  # Relabel the libraries with restorecon.
+  allow asan_extract file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:{ dir file } relabelfrom;
+  allow asan_extract system_file:dir { relabelto setattr };
+  allow asan_extract system_file:file relabelto;
+
+  # Restorecon will actually already try to run with sanitized libraries (libpackagelistparser).
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:file execute;
+
+  # We use asan.restore_reboot to signal a reboot is required.
+  set_prop(asan_extract, asan_reboot_prop)
+')
diff --git a/public/attributes b/public/attributes
index d729a7b..66c3a14 100644
--- a/public/attributes
+++ b/public/attributes
@@ -10,16 +10,6 @@
 # All types used for processes.
 attribute domain;
 
-# Temporary attribute used for migrating permissions out of domain.
-# Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions
-# from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute.
-# Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all
-# domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains
-# and to start removing domain_deprecated where it's not required or
-# reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain
-# when necessary.
-attribute domain_deprecated;
-
 # All types used for filesystems.
 # On change, update CHECK_FC_ASSERT_ATTRS
 # definition in tools/checkfc.c.
@@ -39,6 +29,10 @@
 
 # All types used for /data files.
 attribute data_file_type;
+# All types in /data, not in /data/vendor
+attribute core_data_file_type;
+# All types in /vendor
+attribute vendor_file_type;
 
 # All types use for sysfs files.
 attribute sysfs_type;
@@ -82,11 +76,26 @@
 # services which export only system_api
 attribute system_api_service;
 
-# All types used for services managed by service_manager.
+# All types used for services managed by servicemanager.
 # On change, update CHECK_SC_ASSERT_ATTRS
 # definition in tools/checkfc.c.
 attribute service_manager_type;
 
+# All types used for services managed by hwservicemanager
+attribute hwservice_manager_type;
+
+# All HwBinder services guaranteed to be passthrough. These services always run
+# in the process of their clients, and thus operate with the same access as
+# their clients.
+attribute same_process_hwservice;
+
+# All HwBinder services guaranteed to be offered only by core domain components
+attribute coredomain_hwservice;
+
+# All types used for services managed by vndservicemanager
+attribute vndservice_manager_type;
+
+
 # All domains that can override MLS restrictions.
 # i.e. processes that can read up and write down.
 attribute mlstrustedsubject;
@@ -118,10 +127,23 @@
 # All core domains (as opposed to vendor/device-specific domains)
 attribute coredomain;
 
+# All socket devices owned by core domain components
+attribute coredomain_socket;
+
 # All vendor domains which violate the requirement of not using Binder
 # TODO(b/35870313): Remove this once there are no violations
 attribute binder_in_vendor_violators;
 
+# All vendor domains which violate the requirement of not using sockets for
+# communicating with core components
+# TODO(b/36577153): Remove this once there are no violations
+attribute socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
+
+# All vendor domains which violate the requirement of not executing
+# system processes
+# TODO(b/36463595)
+attribute vendor_executes_system_violators;
+
 # PDX services
 attribute pdx_endpoint_dir_type;
 attribute pdx_endpoint_socket_type;
@@ -132,8 +154,6 @@
 pdx_service_attributes(display_screenshot)
 pdx_service_attributes(display_vsync)
 pdx_service_attributes(performance_client)
-pdx_service_attributes(sensors_client)
-pdx_service_attributes(pose_client);
 pdx_service_attributes(bufferhub_client)
 
 # All HAL servers
@@ -202,6 +222,9 @@
 attribute hal_nfc;
 attribute hal_nfc_client;
 attribute hal_nfc_server;
+attribute hal_oemlock;
+attribute hal_oemlock_client;
+attribute hal_oemlock_server;
 attribute hal_power;
 attribute hal_power_client;
 attribute hal_power_server;
@@ -214,6 +237,12 @@
 attribute hal_thermal;
 attribute hal_thermal_client;
 attribute hal_thermal_server;
+attribute hal_tv_cec;
+attribute hal_tv_cec_client;
+attribute hal_tv_cec_server;
+attribute hal_tv_input;
+attribute hal_tv_input_client;
+attribute hal_tv_input_server;
 attribute hal_usb;
 attribute hal_usb_client;
 attribute hal_usb_server;
@@ -223,9 +252,25 @@
 attribute hal_vr;
 attribute hal_vr_client;
 attribute hal_vr_server;
+attribute hal_weaver;
+attribute hal_weaver_client;
+attribute hal_weaver_server;
 attribute hal_wifi;
 attribute hal_wifi_client;
 attribute hal_wifi_server;
+attribute hal_wifi_keystore;
+attribute hal_wifi_keystore_client;
+attribute hal_wifi_keystore_server;
 attribute hal_wifi_supplicant;
 attribute hal_wifi_supplicant_client;
 attribute hal_wifi_supplicant_server;
+
+# HwBinder services offered across the core-vendor boundary
+#
+# We annotate server domains with x_server  to loosen the coupling between
+# system and vendor images. For example, it should be possible to move a service
+# from one core domain to another, without having to update the vendor image
+# which contains clients of this service.
+
+attribute display_service_server;
+attribute wifi_keystore_service_server;
diff --git a/public/bootanim.te b/public/bootanim.te
index 9922451..e2584c3 100644
--- a/public/bootanim.te
+++ b/public/bootanim.te
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
 
 allow bootanim audioserver_service:service_manager find;
 allow bootanim surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
-allow bootanim audioserver_service:service_manager find;
 
 # Allow access to ion memory allocation device
 allow bootanim ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/cameraserver.te b/public/cameraserver.te
index d1b55cf..0dd4a80 100644
--- a/public/cameraserver.te
+++ b/public/cameraserver.te
@@ -8,10 +8,14 @@
 binder_service(cameraserver)
 
 hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_camera)
+
 hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_graphics_allocator)
 
 allow cameraserver ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
+# Talk with graphics composer fences
+allow cameraserver hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
 add_service(cameraserver, cameraserver_service)
 allow cameraserver appops_service:service_manager find;
 allow cameraserver audioserver_service:service_manager find;
@@ -22,6 +26,8 @@
 allow cameraserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
 allow cameraserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
 
+allow cameraserver hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/clatd.te b/public/clatd.te
index 8632087..212b76e 100644
--- a/public/clatd.te
+++ b/public/clatd.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # 464xlat daemon
-type clatd, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type clatd, domain;
 type clatd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 net_domain(clatd)
diff --git a/public/crash_dump.te b/public/crash_dump.te
index 0bab782..c101b34 100644
--- a/public/crash_dump.te
+++ b/public/crash_dump.te
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
 # Read APK files.
 r_dir_file(crash_dump, apk_data_file);
 
+# Read all /vendor
+r_dir_file(crash_dump, { vendor_file same_process_hal_file })
+
 # Talk to tombstoned
 unix_socket_connect(crash_dump, tombstoned_crash, tombstoned)
 
diff --git a/public/dex2oat.te b/public/dex2oat.te
index 4ae45ca..47f3bcb 100644
--- a/public/dex2oat.te
+++ b/public/dex2oat.te
@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
 # dex2oat
-type dex2oat, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type dex2oat, domain;
 type dex2oat_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 r_dir_file(dex2oat, apk_data_file)
+# Access to /vendor/app
+r_dir_file(dex2oat, vendor_app_file)
+# Access /vendor/framework
+allow dex2oat vendor_framework_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow dex2oat vendor_framework_file:file { getattr open read };
 
 allow dex2oat tmpfs:file { read getattr };
 
@@ -13,6 +18,9 @@
 allow dex2oat dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file read;
 allow dex2oat installd:fd use;
 
+# Acquire advisory lock on /system/framework/arm/*
+allow dex2oat system_file:file lock;
+
 # Read already open asec_apk_file file descriptors passed by installd.
 # Also allow reading unlabeled files, to allow for upgrading forward
 # locked APKs.
@@ -35,6 +43,7 @@
 allow dex2oat postinstall_dexopt:fd use;
 
 allow dex2oat postinstall_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:filesystem getattr;
 allow dex2oat postinstall_file:lnk_file read;
 
 # Allow dex2oat access to files in /data/ota.
diff --git a/public/dhcp.te b/public/dhcp.te
index 6b9fb4a..2b54b7f 100644
--- a/public/dhcp.te
+++ b/public/dhcp.te
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
-type dhcp, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type dhcp, domain;
 type dhcp_exec, exec_type, file_type;
-type dhcp_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
 
 net_domain(dhcp)
 
@@ -10,6 +9,7 @@
 allow dhcp self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
 allow dhcp shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 allow dhcp system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow dhcp vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;')
 
 # dhcpcd runs dhcpcd-hooks/*, which runs getprop / setprop (toolbox_exec)
 allow dhcp toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/display_service_server.te b/public/display_service_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5839fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/display_service_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+add_hwservice(display_service_server, fwk_display_hwservice)
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index 958481f..5a3853f 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -67,7 +67,12 @@
 allow domain zero_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow domain ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 # /dev/binder can be accessed by non-vendor domains and by apps
-allow { coredomain appdomain -hwservicemanager } binder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow {
+  coredomain
+  appdomain
+  binder_in_vendor_violators # TODO(b/35870313): Remove once all violations are gone
+  -hwservicemanager
+} binder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 # Devices which are not full TREBLE have fewer restrictions on access to /dev/binder
 not_full_treble(`allow { domain -hwservicemanager -vndservicemanager } binder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;')
 allow { domain -servicemanager -vndservicemanager } hwbinder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
@@ -84,7 +89,7 @@
 # messages to logd.
 get_prop(domain, log_property_type)
 dontaudit domain property_type:file audit_access;
-allow domain property_contexts:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
 
 allow domain init:key search;
 allow domain vold:key search;
@@ -97,10 +102,52 @@
 allow domain system_file:file { execute read open getattr };
 allow domain system_file:lnk_file { getattr read };
 
+# Make sure system/vendor split doesn not affect non-treble
+# devices
+not_full_treble(`
+    allow domain vendor_file_type:dir { search getattr };
+    allow domain vendor_file_type:file { execute read open getattr };
+    allow domain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr read };
+')
+
+# All domains are allowed to open and read directories
+# that contain HAL implementations (e.g. passthrough
+# HALs require clients to have these permissions)
+allow domain vendor_hal_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Everyone can read and execute all same process HALs
+allow domain same_process_hal_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow domain same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr };
+
+# Any process can load vndk-sp libraries, which are system libraries
+# used by same process HALs
+allow domain vndk_sp_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow domain vndk_sp_file:file { execute read open getattr };
+
+# All domains get access to /vendor/etc
+allow domain vendor_configs_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow domain vendor_configs_file:file { read open getattr };
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Allow all domains to be able to follow /system/vendor symlink
+    allow domain vendor_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };
+
+    # This is required to be able to search & read /vendor/lib64
+    # in order to lookup vendor libraries. The execute permission
+    # for coredomains is granted *only* for same process HALs
+    allow domain vendor_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+    # Allow reading and executing out of /vendor to all vendor domains
+    allow { domain -coredomain } vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+    allow { domain -coredomain } vendor_file_type:file { read open getattr execute };
+    allow { domain -coredomain } vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr read };
+')
+
 # read any sysfs symlinks
 allow domain sysfs:lnk_file read;
 
 # libc references /data/misc/zoneinfo for timezone related information
+# This directory is considered to be a VNDK-stable
 r_dir_file(domain, zoneinfo_data_file)
 
 # Lots of processes access current CPU information
@@ -109,8 +156,11 @@
 r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_usb);
 
 # files under /data.
-allow domain system_data_file:dir { search getattr };
-allow domain system_data_file:lnk_file read;
+not_full_treble(`allow domain system_data_file:dir getattr;')
+allow { coredomain appdomain } system_data_file:dir getattr;
+# /data has the label system_data_file. Vendor components need the search
+# permission on system_data_file for path traversal to /data/vendor.
+allow domain system_data_file:dir search;
 
 # required by the dynamic linker
 allow domain proc:lnk_file { getattr read };
@@ -162,6 +212,13 @@
 # separately.
 allowxperm domain devpts:chr_file ioctl unpriv_tty_ioctls;
 
+# Workaround for policy compiler being too aggressive and removing hwservice_manager_type
+# when it's not explicitly used in allow rules
+allow { domain -domain } hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager { add find };
+# Workaround for policy compiler being too aggressive and removing vndservice_manager_type
+# when it's not explicitly used in allow rules
+allow { domain -domain } vndservice_manager_type:service_manager { add find };
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
@@ -291,13 +348,21 @@
 neverallow {
     domain
     -appdomain
+    with_asan(`-asan_extract')
     -dumpstate
     -shell
     userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
     -system_server
     -webview_zygote
     -zygote
-} { file_type -system_file -exec_type -postinstall_file }:file execute;
+} {
+    file_type
+    -system_file
+    -vendor_file_type
+    -exec_type
+    -postinstall_file
+}:file execute;
+
 neverallow {
     domain
     -appdomain # for oemfs
@@ -326,14 +391,22 @@
 neverallow { domain -init } properties_device:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
 neverallow { domain -init } properties_serial:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
 
-# Only recovery should be doing writes to /system
-neverallow { domain -recovery } { system_file exec_type }:dir_file_class_set
-    { create write setattr relabelfrom append unlink link rename };
-neverallow { domain -recovery -kernel } { system_file exec_type }:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
+# Only recovery should be doing writes to /system & /vendor
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -recovery
+    with_asan(`-asan_extract')
+} {
+    system_file
+    vendor_file_type
+    exec_type
+}:dir_file_class_set { create write setattr relabelfrom append unlink link rename };
+
+neverallow { domain -recovery -kernel with_asan(`-asan_extract') } { system_file vendor_file_type exec_type }:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
 
 # Don't allow mounting on top of /system files or directories
 neverallow * exec_type:dir_file_class_set mounton;
-neverallow { domain -init } system_file:dir_file_class_set mounton;
+neverallow { domain -init } { system_file vendor_file_type }:dir_file_class_set mounton;
 
 # Nothing should be writing to files in the rootfs.
 neverallow * rootfs:file { create write setattr relabelto append unlink link rename };
@@ -348,12 +421,23 @@
 neverallow { domain -recovery } contextmount_type:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 
-# Do not allow service_manager add for default_android_service.
+# Do not allow service_manager add for default service labels.
 # Instead domains should use a more specific type such as
 # system_app_service rather than the generic type.
-# New service_types are defined in service.te and new mappings
-# from service name to service_type are defined in service_contexts.
+# New service_types are defined in {,hw,vnd}service.te and new mappings
+# from service name to service_type are defined in {,hw,vnd}service_contexts.
 neverallow * default_android_service:service_manager add;
+neverallow * default_android_vndservice:service_manager { add find };
+neverallow * default_android_hwservice:hwservice_manager { add find };
+
+# Looking up the base class/interface of all HwBinder services is a bad idea.
+# hwservicemanager currently offer such lookups only to make it so that security
+# decisions are expressed in SELinux policy. However, it's unclear whether this
+# lookup has security implications. If it doesn't, hwservicemanager should be
+# modified to not offer this lookup.
+# This rule can be removed if hwservicemanager is modified to not permit these
+# lookups.
+neverallow * hidl_base_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
 
 # Require that domains explicitly label unknown properties, and do not allow
 # anyone but init to modify unknown properties.
@@ -436,11 +520,215 @@
   neverallow {
     domain
     -coredomain
+    -appdomain # restrictions for vendor apps are declared lower down
+    -binder_in_vendor_violators # TODO(b/35870313): Remove once all violations are gone
+  } service_manager_type:service_manager find;
+  # Vendor apps are permited to use only stable public services. If they were to use arbitrary
+  # services which can change any time framework/core is updated, breakage is likely.
+  neverallow {
+    appdomain
+    -coredomain
+  } {
+    service_manager_type
+    -app_api_service
+    -ephemeral_app_api_service
+    -audioserver_service # TODO(b/36783122) remove exemptions below once app_api_service is fixed
+    -cameraserver_service
+    -drmserver_service
+    -keystore_service
+    -mediacasserver_service
+    -mediadrmserver_service
+    -mediaextractor_service
+    -mediametrics_service
+    -mediaserver_service
+    -nfc_service
+    -radio_service
+    -surfaceflinger_service
+    -virtual_touchpad_service
+    -vr_hwc_service
+    -vr_manager_service
+  }:service_manager find;
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
     -appdomain
     -binder_in_vendor_violators # TODO(b/35870313): Remove once all violations are gone
   } servicemanager:binder { call transfer };
 ')
 
+# On full TREBLE devices, only vendor components, shell, and su can use VendorBinder.
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -shell
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+    -ueventd # uevent is granted create for this device, but we still neverallow I/O below
+  } vndbinder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+  neverallow ueventd vndbinder_device:chr_file { read write append ioctl };
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -shell
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+  } vndservice_manager_type:service_manager *;
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -shell
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+  } vndservicemanager:binder *;
+')
+
+# On full TREBLE devices, socket communications between core components and vendor components are
+# not permitted.
+full_treble_only(`
+  # Most general rules first, more specific rules below.
+
+  # Core domains are not permitted to initiate communications to vendor domain sockets.
+  # We are not restricting the use of already established sockets because it is fine for a process
+  # to obtain an already established socket via some public/official/stable API and then exchange
+  # data with its peer over that socket. The wire format in this scenario is dicatated by the API
+  # and thus does not break the core-vendor separation.
+  neverallow_establish_socket_comms({
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -adbd
+  }, {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+  });
+  # Vendor domains are not permitted to initiate communications to core domain sockets
+  neverallow_establish_socket_comms({
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+  }, {
+    coredomain
+    -logd # Logging by writing to logd Unix domain socket is public API
+    -netd # netdomain needs this
+    -mdnsd # netdomain needs this
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su') # communications with su are permitted only on userdebug or eng builds
+    -init
+    -incidentd # TODO(b/35870313): Remove incidentd from this list once vendor domains no longer declare Binder services
+    -tombstoned # TODO(b/36604251): Remove tombstoned from this list once mediacodec (OMX HAL) no longer declares Binder services
+  });
+
+  # Vendor domains (except netdomain) are not permitted to initiate communications to netd sockets
+  neverallow_establish_socket_comms({
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -netdomain
+    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+  }, netd);
+
+  # Vendor domains are not permitted to initiate create/open sockets owned by core domains
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain # appdomain restrictions below
+    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+  } {
+    coredomain_socket
+    core_data_file_type
+    unlabeled # used only by core domains
+  }:sock_file ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };
+  neverallow {
+    appdomain
+    -coredomain
+  } {
+    coredomain_socket
+    unlabeled # used only by core domains
+    core_data_file_type
+    -app_data_file
+    -pdx_endpoint_socket_type # used by VR layer
+    -pdx_channel_socket_type # used by VR layer
+  }:sock_file ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };
+
+  # Core domains are not permitted to create/open sockets owned by vendor domains
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -ueventd
+    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+  } {
+    file_type
+    dev_type
+    -coredomain_socket
+    -core_data_file_type
+    -unlabeled
+  }:sock_file ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };
+')
+
+# On TREBLE devices, a limited set of files in /vendor are accessible to
+# only a few whitelisted coredomains to keep system/vendor separation.
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Limit access to /vendor/app
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -dex2oat
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -postinstall_dexopt
+        -system_server
+    } vendor_app_file:dir { open read getattr search };
+
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -dex2oat
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -postinstall_dexopt
+        -system_server
+    } vendor_app_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+
+    # Limit access to /vendor/overlay
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -system_server
+        -zygote
+    } vendor_overlay_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -system_server
+        -zygote
+    } vendor_overlay_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+
+    # Non-vendor domains are not allowed to file execute shell
+    # from vendor
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -init
+    } vendor_shell_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+
+    # Do not allow vendor components to execute files from system
+    # except for the ones whitelist here.
+    neverallow {
+        domain
+        -coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -rild
+        -vendor_executes_system_violators
+    } {
+        exec_type
+        -vendor_file_type
+        -crash_dump_exec
+        -netutils_wrapper_exec
+    }:file { entrypoint execute execute_no_trans };
+')
+
 # Only authorized processes should be writing to files in /data/dalvik-cache
 neverallow {
   domain
@@ -562,6 +850,7 @@
   -system_app
   -init
   -installd # for relabelfrom and unlink, check for this in explicit neverallow
+  with_asan(`-asan_extract')
 } system_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
 # do not grant anything greater than r_file_perms and relabelfrom unlink
 # to installd
@@ -570,10 +859,17 @@
 # respect system_app sandboxes
 neverallow {
   domain
-  -system_app # its own sandbox
+  -appdomain # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
   -system_server #populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
   -installd # creation of app sandbox
 } system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
+neverallow {
+  isolated_app
+  untrusted_app_all # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
+  ephemeral_app
+  priv_app
+} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
+
 
 # Services should respect app sandboxes
 neverallow {
@@ -652,8 +948,18 @@
   userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
 } shell_data_file:file open;
 
-# servicemanager is the only process which handles list request
-neverallow * ~servicemanager:service_manager list;
+
+# servicemanager and vndservicemanager are the only processes which handle the
+# service_manager list request
+neverallow * ~{
+    servicemanager
+    vndservicemanager
+    }:service_manager list;
+
+# hwservicemanager is the only process which handles hw list requests
+neverallow * ~{
+    hwservicemanager
+    }:hwservice_manager list;
 
 # only service_manager_types can be added to service_manager
 # TODO - rework this: neverallow * ~service_manager_type:service_manager { add find };
@@ -680,26 +986,6 @@
 # TODO: fix system_server and dumpstate
 neverallow { domain -init -system_server -dumpstate } debugfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
 
-neverallow {
-  domain
-  -init
-  -recovery
-  -sdcardd
-  -vold
-} fuse_device:chr_file open;
-neverallow {
-  domain
-  -dumpstate
-  -init
-  -priv_app
-  -recovery
-  -sdcardd
-  -shell # Restricted by shell.te to only getattr
-  -system_server
-  -ueventd
-  -vold
-} fuse_device:chr_file *;
-
 # Profiles contain untrusted data and profman parses that. We should only run
 # in from installd forked processes.
 neverallow {
@@ -711,7 +997,7 @@
 # Enforce restrictions on kernel module origin.
 # Do not allow kernel module loading except from system,
 # vendor, and boot partitions.
-neverallow * ~{ system_file rootfs }:system module_load;
+neverallow * ~{ system_file vendor_file rootfs }:system module_load;
 
 # Only allow filesystem caps to be set at build time or
 # during upgrade by recovery.
@@ -722,3 +1008,12 @@
 
 # Enforce AT_SECURE for executing crash_dump.
 neverallow domain crash_dump:process noatsecure;
+
+# Do not permit non-core domains to register HwBinder services which are
+# guaranteed to be provided by core domains only.
+neverallow ~coredomain coredomain_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;
+
+# Do not permit the registeration of HwBinder services which are guaranteed to
+# be passthrough only (i.e., run in the process of their clients instead of a
+# separate server process).
+neverallow * same_process_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;
diff --git a/public/drmserver.te b/public/drmserver.te
index 825e828..f752c13 100644
--- a/public/drmserver.te
+++ b/public/drmserver.te
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
 # Clearly, /data/app is the most logical place to create a socket.  Not.
 allow drmserver apk_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow drmserver drmserver_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
-allow drmserver tee:unix_stream_socket connectto;
 # Delete old socket file if present.
 allow drmserver apk_data_file:sock_file unlink;
 
diff --git a/public/dumpstate.te b/public/dumpstate.te
index 9b54329..4f66ffb 100644
--- a/public/dumpstate.te
+++ b/public/dumpstate.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # dumpstate
-type dumpstate, domain, domain_deprecated, mlstrustedsubject;
+type dumpstate, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
 type dumpstate_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 net_domain(dumpstate)
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #   /system/bin/logcat
 #   /system/bin/dumpsys
 allow dumpstate system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+not_full_treble(`allow dumpstate vendor_file:file execute_no_trans;')
 allow dumpstate toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 
 # Create and write into /data/anr/
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@
   hal_audio_server
   hal_bluetooth_server
   hal_camera_server
+  hal_graphics_composer_server
   hal_vr_server
   mediacodec # TODO(b/36375899): hal_omx_server
 }:process signal;
@@ -93,10 +95,9 @@
 binder_call(dumpstate, binderservicedomain)
 binder_call(dumpstate, { appdomain netd wificond })
 
-# Vibrate the device after we are done collecting the bugreport
-# For binderized mode:
 hal_client_domain(dumpstate, hal_dumpstate)
-binder_call(dumpstate, hal_vibrator)
+hal_client_domain(dumpstate, hal_graphics_allocator)
+# Vibrate the device after we are done collecting the bugreport
 hal_client_domain(dumpstate, hal_vibrator)
 # For passthrough mode:
 allow dumpstate sysfs_vibrator:file { rw_file_perms getattr };
@@ -170,8 +171,9 @@
   allow dumpstate misc_logd_file:file r_file_perms;
 ')
 
-allow dumpstate { service_manager_type -gatekeeper_service -dumpstate_service -incident_service -virtual_touchpad_service }:service_manager find;
+allow dumpstate { service_manager_type -gatekeeper_service -dumpstate_service -incident_service -virtual_touchpad_service -vr_hwc_service }:service_manager find;
 allow dumpstate servicemanager:service_manager list;
+allow dumpstate hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
 
 allow dumpstate devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
@@ -184,6 +186,9 @@
 # Read device's serial number from system properties
 get_prop(dumpstate, serialno_prop)
 
+# Read state of logging-related properties
+get_prop(dumpstate, device_logging_prop)
+
 # Access to /data/media.
 # This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
 # accesses to the underlying FS.
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index 8a48dfe..057af41 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
 type debugfs_tracing_instances, fs_type, debugfs_type;
 type debugfs_wifi_tracing, fs_type, debugfs_type;
 type tracing_shell_writable, fs_type, debugfs_type;
+type tracing_shell_writable_debug, fs_type, debugfs_type;
+
 type pstorefs, fs_type;
 type functionfs, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
 type oemfs, fs_type, contextmount_type;
@@ -78,8 +80,29 @@
 
 # File types
 type unlabeled, file_type;
+
 # Default type for anything under /system.
 type system_file, file_type;
+
+# Default type for directories search for
+# HAL implementations
+type vendor_hal_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for under /vendor or /system/vendor
+type vendor_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for everything in /vendor/app
+type vendor_app_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for everything under /vendor/etc/
+type vendor_configs_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for all *same process* HALs.
+# e.g. libEGL_xxx.so, android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.0-impl.so
+type same_process_hal_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for vndk-sp libs. /vendor/lib/vndk-sp
+type vndk_sp_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for everything in /vendor/framework
+type vendor_framework_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for everything in /vendor/overlay
+type vendor_overlay_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
 # Speedup access for trusted applications to the runtime event tags
 type runtime_event_log_tags_file, file_type;
 # Type for /system/bin/logcat.
@@ -87,54 +110,56 @@
 # /cores for coredumps on userdebug / eng builds
 type coredump_file, file_type;
 # Default type for anything under /data.
-type system_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type system_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # Unencrypted data
-type unencrypted_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type unencrypted_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/.layout_version or other installd-created files that
 # are created in a system_data_file directory.
-type install_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type install_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/drm - DRM plugin data
-type drm_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type drm_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/adb - adb debugging files
-type adb_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type adb_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/anr - ANR traces
-type anr_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type anr_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # /data/tombstones - core dumps
-type tombstone_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type tombstone_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # /data/app - user-installed apps
-type apk_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type apk_tmp_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type apk_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apk_tmp_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # /data/app-private - forward-locked apps
-type apk_private_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type apk_private_tmp_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type apk_private_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apk_private_tmp_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # /data/dalvik-cache
-type dalvikcache_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type dalvikcache_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/ota
-type ota_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type ota_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/ota_package
-type ota_package_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type ota_package_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # /data/misc/profiles
-type user_profile_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type user_profile_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # /data/misc/profman
-type profman_dump_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type profman_dump_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/resource-cache
-type resourcecache_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type resourcecache_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/local - writable by shell
-type shell_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type shell_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # /data/property
-type property_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type property_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/bootchart
-type bootchart_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type bootchart_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/system/heapdump
-type heapdump_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type heapdump_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # /data/nativetest
-type nativetest_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type nativetest_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/system_de/0/ringtones
-type ringtone_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type ringtone_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # /data/preloads
-type preloads_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type preloads_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/preloads/media
-type preloads_media_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type preloads_media_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/misc/dhcp and /data/misc/dhcp-6.8.2
+type dhcp_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 
 # Mount locations managed by vold
 type mnt_media_rw_file, file_type;
@@ -152,41 +177,44 @@
 type postinstall_file, file_type;
 
 # /data/misc subdirectories
-type adb_keys_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type audio_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type audiohal_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type audioserver_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type bluetooth_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type bluetooth_logs_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type bootstat_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type boottrace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type camera_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type gatekeeper_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type incident_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type keychain_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type keystore_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type media_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type media_rw_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type misc_user_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type net_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type nfc_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type radio_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type reboot_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type recovery_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type shared_relro_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type systemkeys_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type vpn_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type wifi_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type zoneinfo_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type vold_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
-type perfprofd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type adb_keys_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type audio_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type audiohal_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type audioserver_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type bluetooth_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type bluetooth_logs_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type bootstat_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type boottrace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type camera_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type gatekeeper_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type incident_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type keychain_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type keystore_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type media_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type media_rw_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type misc_user_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type net_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type nfc_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type radio_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type reboot_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type recovery_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type shared_relro_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type systemkeys_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type textclassifier_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type vpn_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type wifi_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type zoneinfo_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type vold_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type perfprofd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type tee_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type update_engine_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/misc/trace for method traces on userdebug / eng builds
-type method_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type method_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 
 # /data/data subdirectories - app sandboxes
-type app_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type app_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/data subdirectory for system UID apps.
-type system_app_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type system_app_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # Compatibility with type name used in Android 4.3 and 4.4.
 # Default type for anything under /cache
 type cache_file, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
@@ -199,67 +227,62 @@
 # Default type for anything under /efs
 type efs_file, file_type;
 # Type for wallpaper file.
-type wallpaper_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type wallpaper_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # Type for shortcut manager icon file.
-type shortcut_manager_icons, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type shortcut_manager_icons, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # Type for user icon file.
-type icon_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type icon_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /mnt/asec
-type asec_apk_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type asec_apk_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # Elements of asec files (/mnt/asec) that are world readable
-type asec_public_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type asec_public_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/app-asec
-type asec_image_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type asec_image_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /data/backup and /data/secure/backup
-type backup_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type backup_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 # All devices have bluetooth efs files. But they
 # vary per device, so this type is used in per
 # device policy
 type bluetooth_efs_file, file_type;
 # Type for fingerprint template file
-type fingerprintd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type fingerprintd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # Type for appfuse file.
-type app_fuse_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type app_fuse_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 
 # Socket types
-type adbd_socket, file_type;
-type bluetooth_socket, file_type;
-type dnsproxyd_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type dumpstate_socket, file_type;
-type fwmarkd_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type lmkd_socket, file_type;
-type logd_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type logdr_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type logdw_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type mdns_socket, file_type;
-type mdnsd_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type misc_logd_file, file_type;
-type mtpd_socket, file_type;
-type netd_socket, file_type;
-type property_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type racoon_socket, file_type;
+type adbd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type bluetooth_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type dnsproxyd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type dumpstate_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type fwmarkd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type lmkd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type logd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type logdr_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type logdw_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type mdns_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type mdnsd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type misc_logd_file, coredomain_socket, file_type;
+type mtpd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type netd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type property_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type racoon_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
 type rild_socket, file_type;
 type rild_debug_socket, file_type;
-type system_wpa_socket, file_type;
-type system_ndebug_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type tombstoned_crash_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type tombstoned_intercept_socket, file_type;
-type uncrypt_socket, file_type;
-type vold_socket, file_type;
-type webview_zygote_socket, file_type;
+type system_wpa_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type system_ndebug_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type tombstoned_crash_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type tombstoned_intercept_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type uncrypt_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type vold_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type webview_zygote_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
 type wpa_socket, file_type;
-# hostapd control interface.
-type hostapd_socket, file_type;
-type zygote_socket, file_type;
-type sap_uim_socket, file_type;
+type zygote_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
 # UART (for GPS) control proc file
 type gps_control, file_type;
 
 # PDX endpoint types
 type pdx_display_dir, pdx_endpoint_dir_type, file_type;
 type pdx_performance_dir, pdx_endpoint_dir_type, file_type;
-type pdx_sensors_dir, pdx_endpoint_dir_type, file_type;
-type pdx_pose_dir, pdx_endpoint_dir_type, file_type;
 type pdx_bufferhub_dir, pdx_endpoint_dir_type, file_type;
 
 pdx_service_socket_types(display_client, pdx_display_dir)
@@ -267,12 +290,31 @@
 pdx_service_socket_types(display_screenshot, pdx_display_dir)
 pdx_service_socket_types(display_vsync, pdx_display_dir)
 pdx_service_socket_types(performance_client, pdx_performance_dir)
-pdx_service_socket_types(sensors_client, pdx_sensors_dir)
-pdx_service_socket_types(pose_client, pdx_pose_dir)
 pdx_service_socket_types(bufferhub_client, pdx_bufferhub_dir)
 
+# file_contexts files
+type file_contexts_file, file_type;
+
+# mac_permissions file
+type mac_perms_file, file_type;
+
 # property_contexts file
-type property_contexts, file_type;
+type property_contexts_file, file_type;
+
+# seapp_contexts file
+type seapp_contexts_file, file_type;
+
+# sepolicy files binary and others
+type sepolicy_file, file_type;
+
+# service_contexts file
+type service_contexts_file, file_type;
+
+# hwservice_contexts file
+type hwservice_contexts_file, file_type;
+
+# vndservice_contexts file
+type vndservice_contexts_file, file_type;
 
 # Allow files to be created in their appropriate filesystems.
 allow fs_type self:filesystem associate;
diff --git a/public/fingerprintd.te b/public/fingerprintd.te
index 57cde1d..5dd18a3 100644
--- a/public/fingerprintd.te
+++ b/public/fingerprintd.te
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-type fingerprintd, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type fingerprintd, domain;
 type fingerprintd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 binder_use(fingerprintd)
diff --git a/public/fsck.te b/public/fsck.te
index 8f3b17a..b682a87 100644
--- a/public/fsck.te
+++ b/public/fsck.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # Any fsck program run by init
-type fsck, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type fsck, domain;
 type fsck_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 # /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
diff --git a/public/fsck_untrusted.te b/public/fsck_untrusted.te
index a9dd805..e2aceb8 100644
--- a/public/fsck_untrusted.te
+++ b/public/fsck_untrusted.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # Any fsck program run on untrusted block devices
-type fsck_untrusted, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type fsck_untrusted, domain;
 
 # Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
 allow fsck_untrusted devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
diff --git a/public/hal_allocator.te b/public/hal_allocator.te
index b444593..646cebd 100644
--- a/public/hal_allocator.te
+++ b/public/hal_allocator.te
@@ -1,2 +1,6 @@
 # HwBinder IPC from client to server
 binder_call(hal_allocator_client, hal_allocator_server)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_allocator_server, hidl_allocator_hwservice)
+allow hal_allocator_client hidl_allocator_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow hal_allocator_client hidl_memory_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hal_audio.te b/public/hal_audio.te
index a51f382..33330bf 100644
--- a/public/hal_audio.te
+++ b/public/hal_audio.te
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 binder_call(hal_audio_client, hal_audio_server)
 binder_call(hal_audio_server, hal_audio_client)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_audio_server, hal_audio_hwservice)
+allow hal_audio_client hal_audio_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 allow hal_audio ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
 
 userdebug_or_eng(`
@@ -20,10 +23,6 @@
 allow hal_audio dumpstate:fd use;
 allow hal_audio dumpstate:fifo_file write;
 
-# Needed on some devices for playing audio on paired BT device,
-# but seems appropriate for all devices.
-unix_socket_connect(hal_audio, bluetooth, bluetooth)
-
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/hal_bluetooth.te b/public/hal_bluetooth.te
index 46fd9d7..2394e2e 100644
--- a/public/hal_bluetooth.te
+++ b/public/hal_bluetooth.te
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 binder_call(hal_bluetooth_client, hal_bluetooth_server)
 binder_call(hal_bluetooth_server, hal_bluetooth_client)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_bluetooth_server, hal_bluetooth_hwservice)
+allow hal_bluetooth_client hal_bluetooth_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 wakelock_use(hal_bluetooth);
 
 # The HAL toggles rfkill to power the chip off/on.
@@ -22,3 +25,6 @@
 
 # /proc access (bluesleep etc.).
 allow hal_bluetooth proc_bluetooth_writable:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# allow to run with real-time scheduling policy
+allow hal_bluetooth self:capability sys_nice;
diff --git a/public/hal_bootctl.te b/public/hal_bootctl.te
index b731fd6..8b240b1 100644
--- a/public/hal_bootctl.te
+++ b/public/hal_bootctl.te
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
 # HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
 binder_call(hal_bootctl_client, hal_bootctl_server)
 binder_call(hal_bootctl_server, hal_bootctl_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_bootctl_server, hal_bootctl_hwservice)
+allow hal_bootctl_client hal_bootctl_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hal_camera.te b/public/hal_camera.te
index b05239b..413a057 100644
--- a/public/hal_camera.te
+++ b/public/hal_camera.te
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 binder_call(hal_camera_client, hal_camera_server)
 binder_call(hal_camera_server, hal_camera_client)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_camera_server, hal_camera_hwservice)
+allow hal_camera_client hal_camera_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # access /data/misc/camera
 allow hal_camera camera_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow hal_camera camera_data_file:file create_file_perms;
@@ -29,6 +32,5 @@
 # hal_camera should never need network access. Disallow network sockets.
 neverallow hal_camera domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
 
-# Only camera HAL may directly access the camera and video hardware
+# Only camera HAL may directly access the camera hardware
 neverallow { halserverdomain -hal_camera_server } camera_device:chr_file *;
-neverallow { halserverdomain -hal_camera_server } video_device:chr_file *;
diff --git a/public/hal_configstore.te b/public/hal_configstore.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4bf6cfd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_configstore.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_configstore_client, hal_configstore_server)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_configstore_server, hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs)
+# As opposed to the rules of most other HALs, the different services exposed by
+# this HAL should be restricted to different clients. Thus, the allow rules for
+# clients are defined in the .te files of the clients.
diff --git a/public/hal_contexthub.te b/public/hal_contexthub.te
index d991e9d..f11bfc8 100644
--- a/public/hal_contexthub.te
+++ b/public/hal_contexthub.te
@@ -1,2 +1,6 @@
-# call into system_server process (callbacks)
-binder_call(hal_contexthub, system_server)
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_contexthub_client, hal_contexthub_server)
+binder_call(hal_contexthub_server, hal_contexthub_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_contexthub_server, hal_contexthub_hwservice)
+allow hal_contexthub_client hal_contexthub_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hal_drm.te b/public/hal_drm.te
index 05fe347..5a6bf5c 100644
--- a/public/hal_drm.te
+++ b/public/hal_drm.te
@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@
 binder_call(hal_drm_client, hal_drm_server)
 binder_call(hal_drm_server, hal_drm_client)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_drm_server, hal_drm_hwservice)
+allow hal_drm_client hal_drm_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+allow hal_drm hidl_memory_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # Required by Widevine DRM (b/22990512)
 allow hal_drm self:process execmem;
 
@@ -27,6 +32,9 @@
 allow hal_drm ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_drm hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
 
+# Allow access to fds allocated by mediaserver
+allow hal_drm mediaserver:fd use;
+
 # Allow access to app_data and media_data_files
 allow hal_drm media_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow hal_drm media_data_file:file create_file_perms;
@@ -34,8 +42,6 @@
 
 allow hal_drm sysfs:file r_file_perms;
 
-# Connect to tee service.
-allow hal_drm tee:unix_stream_socket connectto;
 allow hal_drm tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
 # only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
diff --git a/public/hal_dumpstate.te b/public/hal_dumpstate.te
index 884b6fc..2853567 100644
--- a/public/hal_dumpstate.te
+++ b/public/hal_dumpstate.te
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 binder_call(hal_dumpstate_client, hal_dumpstate_server)
 binder_call(hal_dumpstate_server, hal_dumpstate_client)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_dumpstate_server, hal_dumpstate_hwservice)
+allow hal_dumpstate_client hal_dumpstate_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # write bug reports in /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport
 allow hal_dumpstate shell_data_file:file write;
 # allow reading /proc/interrupts for all hal impls
diff --git a/public/hal_fingerprint.te b/public/hal_fingerprint.te
index 580ef37..bef9f55 100644
--- a/public/hal_fingerprint.te
+++ b/public/hal_fingerprint.te
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 binder_call(hal_fingerprint_client, hal_fingerprint_server)
 binder_call(hal_fingerprint_server, hal_fingerprint_client)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_fingerprint_server, hal_fingerprint_hwservice)
+allow hal_fingerprint_client hal_fingerprint_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # allow HAL module to read dir contents
 allow hal_fingerprint fingerprintd_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 
diff --git a/public/hal_gatekeeper.te b/public/hal_gatekeeper.te
index 618a2ee..123acf5 100644
--- a/public/hal_gatekeeper.te
+++ b/public/hal_gatekeeper.te
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 binder_call(hal_gatekeeper_client, hal_gatekeeper_server)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_gatekeeper_server, hal_gatekeeper_hwservice)
+allow hal_gatekeeper_client hal_gatekeeper_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # TEE access.
 allow hal_gatekeeper tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_gatekeeper ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/hal_gnss.te b/public/hal_gnss.te
index 753791b..b59cd1d 100644
--- a/public/hal_gnss.te
+++ b/public/hal_gnss.te
@@ -1 +1,6 @@
-binder_call(hal_gnss, system_server)
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_gnss_client, hal_gnss_server)
+binder_call(hal_gnss_server, hal_gnss_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_gnss_server, hal_gnss_hwservice)
+allow hal_gnss_client hal_gnss_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te b/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te
index e434751..f56e8f6 100644
--- a/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te
+++ b/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te
@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@
 # HwBinder IPC from client to server
 binder_call(hal_graphics_allocator_client, hal_graphics_allocator_server)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_graphics_allocator_server, hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice)
+allow hal_graphics_allocator_client hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow hal_graphics_allocator_client hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # GPU device access
 allow hal_graphics_allocator gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_graphics_allocator ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow to run with real-time scheduling policy
+allow hal_graphics_allocator self:capability sys_nice;
diff --git a/public/hal_graphics_composer.te b/public/hal_graphics_composer.te
index 9ba0bdb..2d8483d 100644
--- a/public/hal_graphics_composer.te
+++ b/public/hal_graphics_composer.te
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
-# IComposerCallback
-binder_call(hal_graphics_composer, surfaceflinger)
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_graphics_composer_client, hal_graphics_composer_server)
+binder_call(hal_graphics_composer_server, hal_graphics_composer_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_graphics_composer_server, hal_graphics_composer_hwservice)
+allow hal_graphics_composer_client hal_graphics_composer_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
 
 # GPU device access
 allow hal_graphics_composer gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/hal_health.te b/public/hal_health.te
index 341efdd..c19c5f1 100644
--- a/public/hal_health.te
+++ b/public/hal_health.te
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
-# call into healthd for callbacks
-binder_call(hal_health, healthd)
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_health_client, hal_health_server)
+binder_call(hal_health_server, hal_health_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_health_server, hal_health_hwservice)
+allow hal_health_client hal_health_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
 
 # Read access to system files for HALs in
 # /{system,vendor,odm}/lib[64]/hw/ in order
diff --git a/public/hal_ir.te b/public/hal_ir.te
index adfb5ae..b1bfdd8 100644
--- a/public/hal_ir.te
+++ b/public/hal_ir.te
@@ -1,2 +1,6 @@
-# call into system_server process (callbacks)
-binder_call(hal_ir, system_server)
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_ir_client, hal_ir_server)
+binder_call(hal_ir_server, hal_ir_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_ir_server, hal_ir_hwservice)
+allow hal_ir_client hal_ir_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hal_keymaster.te b/public/hal_keymaster.te
index d50812c..dc5f6d0 100644
--- a/public/hal_keymaster.te
+++ b/public/hal_keymaster.te
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 # HwBinder IPC from client to server
 binder_call(hal_keymaster_client, hal_keymaster_server)
 
-allow hal_keymaster tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow hal_keymaster tee:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+add_hwservice(hal_keymaster_server, hal_keymaster_hwservice)
+allow hal_keymaster_client hal_keymaster_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
 
+allow hal_keymaster tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_keymaster ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/hal_light.te b/public/hal_light.te
index 145b02e..5b93dd1 100644
--- a/public/hal_light.te
+++ b/public/hal_light.te
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
-# call into system_server process (callbacks)
-binder_call(hal_light, system_server)
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_light_client, hal_light_server)
+binder_call(hal_light_server, hal_light_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_light_server, hal_light_hwservice)
+allow hal_light_client hal_light_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
 
 allow hal_light sysfs_leds:lnk_file read;
 allow hal_light sysfs_leds:file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/hal_memtrack.te b/public/hal_memtrack.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2cc9cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_memtrack.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_memtrack_client, hal_memtrack_server)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_memtrack_server, hal_memtrack_hwservice)
+allow hal_memtrack_client hal_memtrack_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hal_nfc.te b/public/hal_nfc.te
index b4ad160..a027c48 100644
--- a/public/hal_nfc.te
+++ b/public/hal_nfc.te
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 binder_call(hal_nfc_client, hal_nfc_server)
 binder_call(hal_nfc_server, hal_nfc_client)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_nfc_server, hal_nfc_hwservice)
+allow hal_nfc_client hal_nfc_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # Set NFC properties (used by bcm2079x HAL).
 set_prop(hal_nfc, nfc_prop)
 
diff --git a/public/hal_oemlock.te b/public/hal_oemlock.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dcbb964
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_oemlock.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+# binder_call(hal_oemlock_client, hal_oemlock_server)
diff --git a/public/hal_power.te b/public/hal_power.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fcba3d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_power.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_power_client, hal_power_server)
+binder_call(hal_power_server, hal_power_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_power_server, hal_power_hwservice)
+allow hal_power_client hal_power_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hal_sensors.te b/public/hal_sensors.te
index 0d6dfe0..068c93b 100644
--- a/public/hal_sensors.te
+++ b/public/hal_sensors.te
@@ -1,5 +1,15 @@
 # HwBinder IPC from client to server
 binder_call(hal_sensors_client, hal_sensors_server)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_sensors_server, hal_sensors_hwservice)
+allow hal_sensors_client hal_sensors_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # Allow sensor hals to access ashmem memory allocated by apps
 allow hal_sensors { appdomain -isolated_app }:fd use;
+
+# Allow sensor hals to access ashmem memory allocated by android.hidl.allocator
+# fd is passed in from framework sensorservice HAL.
+allow hal_sensors hal_allocator:fd use;
+
+# allow to run with real-time scheduling policy
+allow hal_sensors self:capability sys_nice;
diff --git a/public/hal_telephony.te b/public/hal_telephony.te
index 704adc0..41cfd4b 100644
--- a/public/hal_telephony.te
+++ b/public/hal_telephony.te
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
-# Perform HwBinder IPC.
-binder_call(hal_telephony, radio)
-binder_call(hal_telephony, bluetooth)
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_telephony_client, hal_telephony_server)
+binder_call(hal_telephony_server, hal_telephony_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_telephony_server, hal_telephony_hwservice)
+allow hal_telephony_client hal_telephony_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
diff --git a/public/hal_thermal.te b/public/hal_thermal.te
index a59a978..b1764f1 100644
--- a/public/hal_thermal.te
+++ b/public/hal_thermal.te
@@ -1,2 +1,6 @@
-# call into system_server process (callbacks)
-binder_call(hal_thermal, system_server)
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_thermal_client, hal_thermal_server)
+binder_call(hal_thermal_server, hal_thermal_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_thermal_server, hal_thermal_hwservice)
+allow hal_thermal_client hal_thermal_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hal_tv_cec.te b/public/hal_tv_cec.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7719cae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_tv_cec.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from clients into server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_tv_cec_client, hal_tv_cec_server)
+binder_call(hal_tv_cec_server, hal_tv_cec_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_tv_cec_server, hal_tv_cec_hwservice)
+allow hal_tv_cec_client hal_tv_cec_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hal_tv_input.te b/public/hal_tv_input.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31a0067
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_tv_input.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from clients into server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_tv_input_client, hal_tv_input_server)
+binder_call(hal_tv_input_server, hal_tv_input_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_tv_input_server, hal_tv_input_hwservice)
+allow hal_tv_input_client hal_tv_input_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hal_usb.te b/public/hal_usb.te
index 5c31c06..9cfd516 100644
--- a/public/hal_usb.te
+++ b/public/hal_usb.te
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
-# call into system_server process (callbacks)
-binder_call(hal_usb, system_server)
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_usb_client, hal_usb_server)
+binder_call(hal_usb_server, hal_usb_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_usb_server, hal_usb_hwservice)
+allow hal_usb_client hal_usb_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
 
 allow hal_usb self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create;
 allow hal_usb self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket setopt;
diff --git a/public/hal_vibrator.te b/public/hal_vibrator.te
index 0d9d308..c8612d7 100644
--- a/public/hal_vibrator.te
+++ b/public/hal_vibrator.te
@@ -1,2 +1,8 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_vibrator_client, hal_vibrator_server)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_vibrator_server, hal_vibrator_hwservice)
+allow hal_vibrator_client hal_vibrator_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # vibrator sysfs rw access
 allow hal_vibrator sysfs_vibrator:file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/hal_vr.te b/public/hal_vr.te
index 08102ad..3cb392d 100644
--- a/public/hal_vr.te
+++ b/public/hal_vr.te
@@ -1,2 +1,6 @@
-# call into system_server process
-binder_call(hal_vr, system_server)
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_vr_client, hal_vr_server)
+binder_call(hal_vr_server, hal_vr_client)
+
+add_hwservice(hal_vr_server, hal_vr_hwservice)
+allow hal_vr_client hal_vr_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hal_weaver.te b/public/hal_weaver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1910cf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_weaver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+# binder_call(hal_weaver_client, hal_weaver_server)
diff --git a/public/hal_wifi.te b/public/hal_wifi.te
index e06d8f9..5e0b9bc 100644
--- a/public/hal_wifi.te
+++ b/public/hal_wifi.te
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 binder_call(hal_wifi_client, hal_wifi_server)
 binder_call(hal_wifi_server, hal_wifi_client)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_wifi_server, hal_wifi_hwservice)
+allow hal_wifi_client hal_wifi_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 r_dir_file(hal_wifi, proc_net)
 r_dir_file(hal_wifi, sysfs_type)
 
diff --git a/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te b/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
index ed10f8d..0f2540e 100644
--- a/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
+++ b/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 binder_call(hal_wifi_supplicant_client, hal_wifi_supplicant_server)
 binder_call(hal_wifi_supplicant_server, hal_wifi_supplicant_client)
 
+add_hwservice(hal_wifi_supplicant_server, hal_wifi_supplicant_hwservice)
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant_client hal_wifi_supplicant_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # in addition to ioctls whitelisted for all domains, grant hal_wifi_supplicant priv_sock_ioctls.
 allowxperm hal_wifi_supplicant self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
 
@@ -23,17 +26,6 @@
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant wpa_socket:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant wpa_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
 
-# TODO(b/34131400): Use hwbinder to access keystore.
-use_keystore(hal_wifi_supplicant)
-binder_use(hal_wifi_supplicant)
-
-# WPA (wifi) has a restricted set of permissions from the default.
-allow hal_wifi_supplicant keystore:keystore_key {
-    get
-    sign
-    verify
-};
-
 # Allow wpa_cli to work. wpa_cli creates a socket in
 # /data/misc/wifi/sockets which hal_wifi_supplicant supplicant communicates with.
 userdebug_or_eng(`
diff --git a/public/healthd.te b/public/healthd.te
index 8737dbe..c0a7bec 100644
--- a/public/healthd.te
+++ b/public/healthd.te
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@
 binder_use(healthd)
 binder_service(healthd)
 binder_call(healthd, system_server)
-binder_call(healthd, hwservicemanager)
-binder_call(healthd, hal_health)
 hal_client_domain(healthd, hal_health)
 
 # Write to state file.
diff --git a/public/hwservice.te b/public/hwservice.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca99105
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hwservice.te
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+type default_android_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type fwk_display_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+type fwk_scheduler_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+type fwk_sensor_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+type hal_audio_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_bluetooth_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_bootctl_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_camera_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_contexthub_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_drm_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_dumpstate_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_fingerprint_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_gatekeeper_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_gnss_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_graphics_composer_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, same_process_hwservice;
+type hal_health_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_ir_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_keymaster_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_light_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_memtrack_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_nfc_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_omx_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_power_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_renderscript_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, same_process_hwservice;
+type hal_sensors_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_telephony_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_thermal_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_tv_cec_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_tv_input_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_usb_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_vibrator_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_vr_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_wifi_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_wifi_supplicant_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hidl_allocator_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+type hidl_base_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hidl_manager_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+type hidl_memory_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+type hidl_token_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+type system_wifi_keystore_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
diff --git a/public/hwservicemanager.te b/public/hwservicemanager.te
index 77074f4..1ffd2a6 100644
--- a/public/hwservicemanager.te
+++ b/public/hwservicemanager.te
@@ -2,9 +2,6 @@
 type hwservicemanager, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
 type hwservicemanager_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
-# serving android.hidl.manager@1.0 and android.hidl.token@1.0
-typeattribute hwservicemanager halserverdomain;
-
 # Note that we do not use the binder_* macros here.
 # hwservicemanager provides name service (aka context manager)
 # for hwbinder.
@@ -18,6 +15,8 @@
 # Scan through /system/lib64/hw looking for installed HALs
 allow hwservicemanager system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
-# TODO once hwservicemanager checks whether HALs are
-# allowed to register a certain service, add policy here
-# for allowing to check SELinux permissions.
+# Read hwservice_contexts
+allow hwservicemanager hwservice_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Check SELinux permissions.
+selinux_check_access(hwservicemanager)
diff --git a/public/idmap.te b/public/idmap.te
index 61f1e1c..1c32f8f 100644
--- a/public/idmap.te
+++ b/public/idmap.te
@@ -9,3 +9,9 @@
 # Open and read from target and overlay apk files passed by argument.
 allow idmap apk_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow idmap apk_data_file:dir search;
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/app
+r_dir_file(idmap, vendor_app_file)
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(idmap, vendor_overlay_file)
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index 4571c49..b2fc484 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
 
 # Create and mount on directories in /.
 allow init rootfs:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow init { rootfs cache_file cgroup storage_file system_data_file system_file postinstall_mnt_dir }:dir mounton;
+allow init { rootfs cache_file cgroup storage_file system_data_file system_file vendor_file postinstall_mnt_dir }:dir mounton;
 
 # Mount on /dev/usb-ffs/adb.
 allow init device:dir mounton;
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@
   -misc_logd_file
   -system_app_data_file
   -system_file
+  -vendor_file_type
 }:dir { create search getattr open read setattr ioctl };
 
 allow init {
@@ -143,6 +144,7 @@
   -shell_data_file
   -system_app_data_file
   -system_file
+  -vendor_file_type
   -vold_data_file
 }:dir { write add_name remove_name rmdir relabelfrom };
 
@@ -156,6 +158,7 @@
   -shell_data_file
   -system_app_data_file
   -system_file
+  -vendor_file_type
   -vold_data_file
 }:file { create getattr open read write setattr relabelfrom unlink };
 
@@ -168,6 +171,7 @@
   -shell_data_file
   -system_app_data_file
   -system_file
+  -vendor_file_type
   -vold_data_file
 }:{ sock_file fifo_file } { create getattr open read setattr relabelfrom unlink };
 
@@ -180,12 +184,13 @@
   -shell_data_file
   -system_app_data_file
   -system_file
+  -vendor_file_type
   -vold_data_file
 }:lnk_file { create getattr setattr relabelfrom unlink };
 
 allow init cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
-allow init { file_type -system_file -exec_type }:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
+allow init { file_type -system_file -vendor_file_type -exec_type }:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
 allow init { sysfs debugfs debugfs_tracing }:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr relabelfrom };
 allow init { sysfs_type debugfs_type }:{ dir file lnk_file } { relabelto getattr };
 allow init dev_type:dir create_dir_perms;
@@ -205,7 +210,13 @@
 
 # init should not be able to read or open generic devices
 # TODO: auditing to see if this can be deleted entirely
-allow init { dev_type -kmem_device -port_device -device }:chr_file { read open };
+allow init {
+  dev_type
+  -kmem_device
+  -port_device
+  -device
+  -vndbinder_device
+  }:chr_file { read open };
 auditallow init {
   dev_type
   -alarm_device
@@ -304,6 +315,12 @@
 # setsockcreate is for labeling local/unix domain sockets.
 allow init self:process { setexec setfscreate setsockcreate };
 
+# Get file context
+allow init file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# sepolicy access
+allow init sepolicy_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 # Perform SELinux access checks on setting properties.
 selinux_check_access(init)
 
@@ -383,11 +400,14 @@
 allow init misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
 
 r_dir_file(init, system_file)
+r_dir_file(init, vendor_file_type)
 allow init proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 
 allow init system_data_file:file { getattr read };
 allow init system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
+# For init to be able to run shell scripts from vendor
+allow init vendor_shell_exec:file execute;
 
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
diff --git a/public/install_recovery.te b/public/install_recovery.te
index 06794ee..2115663 100644
--- a/public/install_recovery.te
+++ b/public/install_recovery.te
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 # Execute /system/bin/applypatch
 allow install_recovery system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow install_recovery vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;')
 
 allow install_recovery toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 
diff --git a/public/installd.te b/public/installd.te
index 0a5b8a3..939a481 100644
--- a/public/installd.te
+++ b/public/installd.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # installer daemon
-type installd, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type installd, domain;
 type installd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 typeattribute installd mlstrustedsubject;
 allow installd self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid setgid setuid sys_admin };
@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@
 r_dir_file(installd, rootfs)
 # Scan through APKs in /system/app and /system/priv-app
 r_dir_file(installd, system_file)
+# Scan through APKs in /vendor/app
+r_dir_file(installd, vendor_app_file)
+# Scan through Runtime Resource Overlay APKs in /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(installd, vendor_overlay_file)
+# Get file context
+allow installd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+# Get seapp_context
+allow installd seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
 
 # Search /data/app-asec and stat files in it.
 allow installd asec_image_file:dir search;
@@ -46,6 +54,12 @@
 allow installd system_data_file:dir relabelfrom;
 allow installd media_rw_data_file:dir relabelto;
 
+# Delete /data/media files through sdcardfs, instead of going behind its back
+allow installd tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow installd storage_file:dir search;
+allow installd sdcardfs:dir { search open read write remove_name getattr rmdir };
+allow installd sdcardfs:file { getattr unlink };
+
 # Upgrade /data/misc/keychain for multi-user if necessary.
 allow installd misc_user_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow installd misc_user_data_file:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/kernel.te b/public/kernel.te
index 75043b8..7f5d224 100644
--- a/public/kernel.te
+++ b/public/kernel.te
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 allow kernel selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow kernel selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
 
+# Get file contexts during first stage
+allow kernel file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 # Allow init relabel itself.
 allow kernel rootfs:file relabelfrom;
 allow kernel init_exec:file relabelto;
diff --git a/public/keystore.te b/public/keystore.te
index 55cafc5..ee5e675 100644
--- a/public/keystore.te
+++ b/public/keystore.te
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-type keystore, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type keystore, domain;
 type keystore_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 # keystore daemon
@@ -7,9 +7,6 @@
 binder_service(keystore)
 binder_call(keystore, system_server)
 
-# talk to keymaster
-hal_client_domain(keystore, hal_keymaster)
-
 allow keystore keystore_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow keystore keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
 allow keystore keystore_exec:file { getattr };
diff --git a/public/mediacodec.te b/public/mediacodec.te
index ff3795a..5ca41fc 100644
--- a/public/mediacodec.te
+++ b/public/mediacodec.te
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # mediacodec - audio and video codecs live here
 type mediacodec, domain;
-type mediacodec_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type mediacodec_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 
 typeattribute mediacodec mlstrustedsubject;
 
@@ -8,25 +8,38 @@
 # and use macro hal_server_domain
 get_prop(mediacodec, hwservicemanager_prop)
 
-binder_use(mediacodec)
+# can route /dev/binder traffic to /dev/vndbinder
+vndbinder_use(mediacodec)
+
+not_full_treble(`
+    # on legacy devices, continue to allow /dev/binder traffic
+    binder_use(mediacodec)
+    binder_service(mediacodec)
+    add_service(mediacodec, mediacodec_service)
+    allow mediacodec mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+    allow mediacodec surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+')
 binder_call(mediacodec, binderservicedomain)
 binder_call(mediacodec, appdomain)
-binder_service(mediacodec)
 
-add_service(mediacodec, mediacodec_service)
-allow mediacodec mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
-allow mediacodec surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+# Allow mediacodec access to composer sync fences
+allow mediacodec hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
 allow mediacodec gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow mediacodec video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow mediacodec video_device:dir search;
 allow mediacodec ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow mediacodec hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
 allow mediacodec hal_camera:fd use;
 
 crash_dump_fallback(mediacodec)
 
+add_hwservice(mediacodec, hal_omx_hwservice)
+
 hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_allocator)
 
+# allocate and use graphic buffers
+hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
 # Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that mediacodec never
 # directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge
 # between those two: it talks to mediacodec via Binder and talks to bufferhubd
diff --git a/public/mediadrmserver.te b/public/mediadrmserver.te
index 94ff76f..cef8121 100644
--- a/public/mediadrmserver.te
+++ b/public/mediadrmserver.te
@@ -16,9 +16,11 @@
 allow mediadrmserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
 allow mediadrmserver processinfo_service:service_manager find;
 allow mediadrmserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediadrmserver system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
 add_service(mediadrmserver, mediacasserver_service)
 
+binder_call(mediadrmserver, mediacodec)
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/mediaextractor.te b/public/mediaextractor.te
index 398d413..e1b460d 100644
--- a/public/mediaextractor.te
+++ b/public/mediaextractor.te
@@ -20,6 +20,14 @@
 
 crash_dump_fallback(mediaextractor)
 
+# allow mediaextractor read permissions for file sources
+allow mediaextractor media_rw_data_file:file { getattr read };
+
+# Read resources from open apk files passed over Binder
+allow mediaextractor apk_data_file:file { read getattr };
+allow mediaextractor asec_apk_file:file { read getattr };
+allow mediaextractor ringtone_file:file { read getattr };
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/mediametrics.te b/public/mediametrics.te
index ce2dab7..4c10d87 100644
--- a/public/mediametrics.te
+++ b/public/mediametrics.te
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
 r_dir_file(mediametrics, cgroup)
 allow mediametrics proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 
+# allows interactions with dumpsys to GMScore
+allow mediametrics app_data_file:file write;
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/mediaserver.te b/public/mediaserver.te
index 93f1548..6efaf0f 100644
--- a/public/mediaserver.te
+++ b/public/mediaserver.te
@@ -67,9 +67,6 @@
 allow mediaserver qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
 allow mediaserver qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
 
-# Allow abstract socket connection
-allow mediaserver rild:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write setopt };
-
 # Needed on some devices for playing DRM protected content,
 # but seems expected and appropriate for all devices.
 unix_socket_connect(mediaserver, drmserver, drmserver)
@@ -78,9 +75,6 @@
 # but seems appropriate for all devices.
 unix_socket_connect(mediaserver, bluetooth, bluetooth)
 
-# Connect to tee service.
-allow mediaserver tee:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-
 add_service(mediaserver, mediaserver_service)
 allow mediaserver activity_service:service_manager find;
 allow mediaserver appops_service:service_manager find;
@@ -101,6 +95,9 @@
 # for ModDrm/MediaPlayer
 allow mediaserver mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
 
+# For interfacing with OMX HAL
+allow mediaserver hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
 # /oem access
 allow mediaserver oemfs:dir search;
 allow mediaserver oemfs:file r_file_perms;
@@ -132,12 +129,15 @@
 
 allow mediaserver ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
 allow mediaserver hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
+allow mediaserver hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
 allow mediaserver hal_camera:fd use;
 
 allow mediaserver system_server:fd use;
 
 hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_allocator)
 
+binder_call(mediaserver, mediacodec)
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/modprobe.te b/public/modprobe.te
index ca0657f..24a6b3b 100644
--- a/public/modprobe.te
+++ b/public/modprobe.te
@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@
   allow modprobe rootfs:system module_load;
   allow modprobe rootfs:file r_file_perms;
 ')
-allow modprobe system_file:system module_load;
+allow modprobe { system_file vendor_file }:system module_load;
+r_dir_file(modprobe, { system_file vendor_file })
diff --git a/public/mtp.te b/public/mtp.te
index 0ca7cea..a776240 100644
--- a/public/mtp.te
+++ b/public/mtp.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # vpn tunneling protocol manager
-type mtp, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type mtp, domain;
 type mtp_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 net_domain(mtp)
diff --git a/public/netd.te b/public/netd.te
index 35d9b7c..691887f 100644
--- a/public/netd.te
+++ b/public/netd.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # network manager
-type netd, domain, domain_deprecated, mlstrustedsubject;
+type netd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
 type netd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 net_domain(netd)
@@ -27,8 +27,12 @@
 allow netd self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 allow netd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 allow netd system_file:file x_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow netd vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
 allow netd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
+# Acquire advisory lock on /system/etc/xtables.lock
+allow netd system_file:file lock;
+
 r_dir_file(netd, proc_net)
 # For /proc/sys/net/ipv[46]/route/flush.
 allow netd proc_net:file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/netutils_wrapper.te b/public/netutils_wrapper.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c844762
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/netutils_wrapper.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+type netutils_wrapper, domain;
+type netutils_wrapper_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+
+neverallow domain netutils_wrapper_exec:file execute_no_trans;
diff --git a/public/neverallow_macros b/public/neverallow_macros
index b36cceb..e2b6ed1 100644
--- a/public/neverallow_macros
+++ b/public/neverallow_macros
@@ -4,3 +4,12 @@
 define(`no_rw_file_perms', `{ no_w_file_perms open read ioctl lock }')
 define(`no_x_file_perms', `{ execute execute_no_trans }')
 define(`no_w_dir_perms',  `{ add_name create link relabelfrom remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr write }')
+
+#####################################
+# neverallow_establish_socket_comms(src, dst)
+# neverallow src domain establishing socket connections to dst domain.
+#
+define(`neverallow_establish_socket_comms', `
+  neverallow $1 $2:socket_class_set { connect sendto };
+  neverallow $1 $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+')
diff --git a/public/otapreopt_slot.te b/public/otapreopt_slot.te
index 5f037c5..6551864 100644
--- a/public/otapreopt_slot.te
+++ b/public/otapreopt_slot.te
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 # the directory afterwards. For logging of aggregate size, we need getattr.
 allow otapreopt_slot ota_data_file:dir { rw_dir_perms rename reparent rmdir };
 allow otapreopt_slot ota_data_file:{ file lnk_file } getattr;
+# (du follows symlinks)
+allow otapreopt_slot ota_data_file:lnk_file read;
 
 # Delete old content of the dalvik-cache.
 allow otapreopt_slot dalvikcache_data_file:dir { add_name getattr open read remove_name rmdir search write };
diff --git a/public/performanced.te b/public/performanced.te
index 7f2e13f..3d3fadb 100644
--- a/public/performanced.te
+++ b/public/performanced.te
@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@
 # Access /proc to validate we're only affecting threads in the same thread group.
 # Performanced also shields unbound kernel threads.  It scans every task in the
 # root cpu set, but only affects the kernel threads.
-r_dir_file(performanced, { appdomain bufferhubd kernel sensord surfaceflinger })
+r_dir_file(performanced, { appdomain bufferhubd kernel surfaceflinger })
 dontaudit performanced domain:dir read;
-allow performanced { appdomain bufferhubd kernel sensord surfaceflinger }:process setsched;
+allow performanced { appdomain bufferhubd kernel surfaceflinger }:process setsched;
 
 # Access /dev/cpuset/cpuset.cpus
 r_dir_file(performanced, cgroup)
diff --git a/public/perfprofd.te b/public/perfprofd.te
index eed7e58..bfb8693 100644
--- a/public/perfprofd.te
+++ b/public/perfprofd.te
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 # perfprofd - perf profile collection daemon
+type perfprofd, domain;
 type perfprofd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 userdebug_or_eng(`
 
-  type perfprofd, domain, domain_deprecated, mlstrustedsubject;
+  typeattribute perfprofd coredomain;
+  typeattribute perfprofd mlstrustedsubject;
 
   # perfprofd needs to control CPU hot-plug in order to avoid kernel
   # perfevents problems in cases where CPU goes on/off during measurement;
diff --git a/public/postinstall_dexopt.te b/public/postinstall_dexopt.te
index 76001f7..0ce617b 100644
--- a/public/postinstall_dexopt.te
+++ b/public/postinstall_dexopt.te
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 allow postinstall_dexopt self:capability { chown dac_override fowner setgid setuid };
 
+allow postinstall_dexopt postinstall_file:filesystem getattr;
 allow postinstall_dexopt postinstall_file:dir { getattr search };
 allow postinstall_dexopt postinstall_file:lnk_file read;
 allow postinstall_dexopt proc:file { getattr open read };
@@ -17,6 +18,8 @@
 
 # Read app data (APKs) as input to dex2oat.
 r_dir_file(postinstall_dexopt, apk_data_file)
+# Read vendor app data (APKs) as input to dex2oat.
+r_dir_file(postinstall_dexopt, vendor_app_file)
 # Access to app oat directory.
 r_dir_file(postinstall_dexopt, dalvikcache_data_file)
 
diff --git a/public/ppp.te b/public/ppp.te
index 7a5eada..04e17f5 100644
--- a/public/ppp.te
+++ b/public/ppp.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # Point to Point Protocol daemon
-type ppp, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type ppp, domain;
 type ppp_device, dev_type;
 type ppp_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 allow ppp ppp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow ppp self:capability net_admin;
 allow ppp system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow ppp vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;')
 allow ppp vpn_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
 allow ppp vpn_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 allow ppp mtp:fd use;
diff --git a/public/property.te b/public/property.te
index daac0fb..d6fa868 100644
--- a/public/property.te
+++ b/public/property.te
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+type asan_reboot_prop, property_type;
 type audio_prop, property_type, core_property_type;
 type boottime_prop, property_type;
 type bluetooth_prop, property_type;
diff --git a/public/racoon.te b/public/racoon.te
index d5d5a4e..00744d8 100644
--- a/public/racoon.te
+++ b/public/racoon.te
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 
 # XXX: should we give ip-up-vpn its own label (currently racoon domain)
 allow racoon system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow racoon vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;')
 allow racoon vpn_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 allow racoon vpn_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
 
diff --git a/public/radio.te b/public/radio.te
index a896659..87329d9 100644
--- a/public/radio.te
+++ b/public/radio.te
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 # phone subsystem
-type radio, domain, domain_deprecated, mlstrustedsubject;
+type radio, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
 
 net_domain(radio)
 bluetooth_domain(radio)
 binder_service(radio)
 
+# TODO(b/36613472): Remove this once radio no longer communicates with rild over sockets.
 # Talks to rild via the rild socket.
 unix_socket_connect(radio, rild, rild)
 
@@ -36,5 +37,4 @@
 
 # Perform HwBinder IPC.
 hwbinder_use(radio)
-binder_call(radio, hal_telephony)
 hal_client_domain(radio, hal_telephony)
diff --git a/public/recovery.te b/public/recovery.te
index 0f47be7..6e211ac 100644
--- a/public/recovery.te
+++ b/public/recovery.te
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 # Declare the domain unconditionally so we can always reference it
 # in neverallow rules.
-type recovery, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type recovery, domain;
 
 # But the allow rules are only included in the recovery policy.
 # Otherwise recovery is only allowed the domain rules.
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
   # currently loaded policy. Allow it.
   allow recovery unlabeled:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
   allow recovery unlabeled:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
+  # Get file contexts
+  allow recovery file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
 
   # 0eb17d944704b3eb140bb9dded299d3be3aed77e in build/ added SELinux
   # support to OTAs. However, that code has a bug. When an update occurs,
@@ -49,6 +51,9 @@
   # Write to /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
   allow recovery proc_drop_caches:file w_file_perms;
 
+  # Read kernel config through libvintf for OTA matching
+  allow recovery config_gz:file { open read getattr };
+
   # Write to /sys/class/android_usb/android0/enable.
   # TODO: create more specific label?
   allow recovery sysfs:file w_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/rild.te b/public/rild.te
index e4b0186..14420df 100644
--- a/public/rild.te
+++ b/public/rild.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # rild - radio interface layer daemon
-type rild, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type rild, domain;
 hal_server_domain(rild, hal_telephony)
 
 net_domain(rild)
diff --git a/public/runas.te b/public/runas.te
index 19e30e8..cda02ef 100644
--- a/public/runas.te
+++ b/public/runas.te
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-type runas, domain, domain_deprecated, mlstrustedsubject;
+type runas, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
 type runas_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 allow runas adbd:process sigchld;
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
 allow runas self:process setcurrent;
 allow runas non_system_app_set:process dyntransition; # setcon
 
+# runas/libselinux needs access to seapp_contexts_file to
+# determine which domain to transition to.
+allow runas seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/sdcardd.te b/public/sdcardd.te
index 3cb69be..47a2f80 100644
--- a/public/sdcardd.te
+++ b/public/sdcardd.te
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-type sdcardd, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type sdcardd, domain;
 type sdcardd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 allow sdcardd cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
diff --git a/public/sensord.te b/public/sensord.te
deleted file mode 100644
index c9749cb..0000000
--- a/public/sensord.te
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-# sensord
-type sensord, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
-type sensord_exec, exec_type, file_type;
-
-hal_client_domain(sensord, hal_graphics_allocator)
-allow sensord hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
-
-pdx_server(sensord, sensors_client)
-pdx_server(sensord, pose_client)
-pdx_client(sensord, bufferhub_client)
-pdx_client(sensord, performance_client)
-
-# Access /dev/ion
-allow sensord ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
-
-allow sensord sensors_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-binder_use(sensord)
-binder_call(sensord, system_server)
-allow sensord system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write };
-
-allow sensord sensorservice_service:service_manager find;
-# permission_service is used by the NDK sensor APIs.
-allow sensord permission_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index 909b96a..da540db 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 type system_app_service,        service_manager_type;
 type update_engine_service,     service_manager_type;
 type virtual_touchpad_service,  service_manager_type;
+type vr_hwc_service,            service_manager_type;
 
 # system_server_services broken down
 type accessibility_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@
 type bluetooth_manager_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type cameraproxy_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type clipboard_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type contexthub_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type contexthub_service, app_api_service,  system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type IProxyService_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type commontime_management_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type companion_device_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@
 type coverage_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type cpuinfo_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type dbinfo_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type device_policy_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type device_policy_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type deviceidle_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type device_identifiers_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type devicestoragemonitor_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -69,8 +70,8 @@
 type DockObserver_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type dreams_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type dropbox_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type ethernet_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type fingerprint_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type ethernet_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type fingerprint_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type gfxinfo_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type graphicsstats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type hardware_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@
 type network_score_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type network_time_update_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type notification_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type oem_lock_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type otadexopt_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type overlay_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type package_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -118,19 +120,19 @@
 type serial_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type servicediscovery_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type settings_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type shortcut_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type shortcut_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type statusbar_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type storagestats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type task_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type textclassification_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type textservices_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type telecom_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type trust_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type trust_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type tv_input_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type uimode_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type updatelock_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type usagestats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type usb_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type usb_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type user_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type vibrator_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type voiceinteraction_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
diff --git a/public/servicemanager.te b/public/servicemanager.te
index 46b3b0e..3cf5a46 100644
--- a/public/servicemanager.te
+++ b/public/servicemanager.te
@@ -9,9 +9,17 @@
 # created by other domains.  It never passes its own references
 # or initiates a Binder IPC.
 allow servicemanager self:binder set_context_mgr;
-allow servicemanager { domain -init }:binder transfer;
+allow servicemanager {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -hwservicemanager
+  -vndservicemanager
+}:binder transfer;
 
-r_dir_file(servicemanager, rootfs)
+# Access to all (system and vendor) service_contexts
+# TODO(b/36866029) access to nonplat_service_contexts
+#                  should not be allowed on full treble devices
+allow servicemanager service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
 
 # Check SELinux permissions.
 selinux_check_access(servicemanager)
diff --git a/public/shared_relro.te b/public/shared_relro.te
index 9794b0b..91cf44d 100644
--- a/public/shared_relro.te
+++ b/public/shared_relro.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # Process which creates/updates shared RELRO files to be used by other apps.
-type shared_relro, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type shared_relro, domain;
 
 # Grant write access to the shared relro files/directory.
 allow shared_relro shared_relro_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
diff --git a/public/shell.te b/public/shell.te
index ee49891..9540cca 100644
--- a/public/shell.te
+++ b/public/shell.te
@@ -76,17 +76,21 @@
 # Read device's serial number from system properties
 get_prop(shell, serialno_prop)
 
+# Read state of logging-related properties
+get_prop(shell, device_logging_prop)
+
 # allow shell access to services
 allow shell servicemanager:service_manager list;
 # don't allow shell to access GateKeeper service
 # TODO: why is this so broad? Tightening candidate? It needs at list:
 # - dumpstate_service (so it can receive dumpstate progress updates)
-allow shell { service_manager_type -gatekeeper_service -incident_service -installd_service -netd_service -virtual_touchpad_service }:service_manager find;
+allow shell { service_manager_type -gatekeeper_service -incident_service -installd_service -netd_service -virtual_touchpad_service -vr_hwc_service }:service_manager find;
 allow shell dumpstate:binder call;
 
 # allow shell to get information from hwservicemanager
 # for instance, listing hardware services with lshal
 hwbinder_use(shell)
+allow shell hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
 
 # allow shell to look through /proc/ for ps, top, netstat
 r_dir_file(shell, proc)
@@ -146,6 +150,13 @@
 #
 allow shell dev_type:blk_file getattr;
 
+# read selinux policy files
+allow shell file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell sepolicy_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/su.te b/public/su.te
index 8cb386d..8ddd162 100644
--- a/public/su.te
+++ b/public/su.te
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+# All types must be defined regardless of build variant to ensure
+# policy compilation succeeds with userdebug/user combination at boot
+type su, domain;
+
 # File types must be defined for file_contexts.
 type su_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
@@ -5,11 +9,14 @@
   # Domain used for su processes, as well as for adbd and adb shell
   # after performing an adb root command.  The domain definition is
   # wrapped to ensure that it does not exist at all on -user builds.
-  type su, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+  typeattribute su mlstrustedsubject;
 
   # Add su to various domains
   net_domain(su)
 
+  # grant su access to vndbinder
+  vndbinder_use(su)
+
   dontaudit su self:capability_class_set *;
   dontaudit su kernel:security *;
   dontaudit su kernel:system *;
@@ -34,7 +41,11 @@
   dontaudit su property_type:property_service *;
   dontaudit su property_type:file *;
   dontaudit su service_manager_type:service_manager *;
+  dontaudit su hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager *;
+  dontaudit su vndservice_manager_type:service_manager *;
   dontaudit su servicemanager:service_manager list;
+  dontaudit su hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
+  dontaudit su vndservicemanager:service_manager list;
   dontaudit su keystore:keystore_key *;
   dontaudit su domain:drmservice *;
   dontaudit su unlabeled:filesystem *;
diff --git a/public/te_macros b/public/te_macros
index 125ca81..80b5696 100644
--- a/public/te_macros
+++ b/public/te_macros
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@
 # Define types for endpoint and channel sockets.
 define(`pdx_service_socket_types', `
 typeattribute $2 pdx_$1_endpoint_dir_type;
-type pdx_$1_endpoint_socket, pdx_$1_endpoint_socket_type, pdx_endpoint_socket_type, file_type, mlstrustedobject, mlstrustedsubject;
-type pdx_$1_channel_socket, pdx_$1_channel_socket_type, pdx_channel_socket_type;
+type pdx_$1_endpoint_socket, pdx_$1_endpoint_socket_type, pdx_endpoint_socket_type, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject, mlstrustedsubject;
+type pdx_$1_channel_socket, pdx_$1_channel_socket_type, pdx_channel_socket_type, coredomain_socket;
 ')
 
 #####################################
@@ -222,12 +222,16 @@
 typeattribute $1 halclientdomain;
 typeattribute $1 $2_client;
 
-# TODO(b/34170079): Make the inclusion of the rules below conditional,
-# once we know at build time whether a HAL is going to run in
-# passthrough or binderized mode.
+# TODO(b/34170079): Make the inclusion of the rules below conditional also on
+# non-Treble devices. For now, on non-Treble device, always grant clients of a
+# HAL sufficient access to run the HAL in passthrough mode (i.e., in-process).
+not_full_treble(`
 typeattribute $1 $2;
 # Find passthrough HAL implementations
 allow $2 system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $2 vendor_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $2 vendor_file:file { read open getattr execute };
+')
 ')
 
 #####################################
@@ -244,6 +248,8 @@
 typeattribute $1 $2;
 # Find passthrough HAL implementations
 allow $2 system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $2 vendor_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $2 vendor_file:file { read open getattr execute };
 ')
 
 #####################################
@@ -430,7 +436,12 @@
 # Full TREBLE only
 # SELinux rules which apply only to full TREBLE devices
 #
-define(`full_treble_only', ifelse(target_full_treble, `true', $1, ))
+define(`full_treble_only', ifelse(target_full_treble, `true', $1,
+ifelse(target_full_treble, `cts',
+# BEGIN_TREBLE_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+$1
+# END_TREBLE_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+, )))
 
 #####################################
 # Not full TREBLE
@@ -538,6 +549,17 @@
   neverallow { domain -$1 } $2:service_manager add;
 ')
 
+###########################################
+# add_hwservice(domain, service)
+# Ability for domain to add a service to hwservice_manager
+# and find it. It also creates a neverallow preventing
+# others from adding it.
+define(`add_hwservice', `
+  allow $1 $2:hwservice_manager { add find };
+  allow $1 hidl_base_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;
+  neverallow { domain -$1 } $2:hwservice_manager add;
+')
+
 ##########################################
 # print a message with a trailing newline
 # print(`args')
diff --git a/public/tee.te b/public/tee.te
index a95be88..f023d5c 100644
--- a/public/tee.te
+++ b/public/tee.te
@@ -1,18 +1,7 @@
 ##
 # trusted execution environment (tee) daemon
 #
-type tee, domain, domain_deprecated;
-type tee_exec, exec_type, file_type;
-type tee_device, dev_type;
-type tee_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type tee, domain;
 
-allow tee self:capability { dac_override };
-allow tee tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow tee tee_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow tee tee_data_file:file create_file_perms;
-allow tee self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
-allow tee self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
-allow tee ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
-r_dir_file(tee, sysfs_type)
-allow tee system_data_file:file { getattr read };
-allow tee system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+# Device(s) for communicating with the TEE
+type tee_device, dev_type;
diff --git a/public/ueventd.te b/public/ueventd.te
index b0706c8..4c77e11 100644
--- a/public/ueventd.te
+++ b/public/ueventd.te
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # ueventd seclabel is specified in init.rc since
 # it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
-type ueventd, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type ueventd, domain;
 
 # Write to /dev/kmsg.
 allow ueventd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@
 # Get SELinux enforcing status.
 r_dir_file(ueventd, selinuxfs)
 
+# Access for /vendor/ueventd.rc and /vendor/firmware
+r_dir_file(ueventd, vendor_file)
+
+# Get file contexts for new device nodes
+allow ueventd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 # Use setfscreatecon() to label /dev directories and files.
 allow ueventd self:process setfscreate;
 
diff --git a/public/uncrypt.te b/public/uncrypt.te
index ef1289c..7ae7d39 100644
--- a/public/uncrypt.te
+++ b/public/uncrypt.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # uncrypt
-type uncrypt, domain, domain_deprecated, mlstrustedsubject;
+type uncrypt, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
 type uncrypt_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 allow uncrypt self:capability dac_override;
diff --git a/public/update_engine.te b/public/update_engine.te
index 33eb2a8..b8f0035 100644
--- a/public/update_engine.te
+++ b/public/update_engine.te
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 # Domain for update_engine daemon.
-type update_engine, domain, domain_deprecated, update_engine_common;
+type update_engine, domain, update_engine_common;
 type update_engine_exec, exec_type, file_type;
-type update_engine_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
 
 net_domain(update_engine);
 
diff --git a/public/vendor_shell.te b/public/vendor_shell.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b330542
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/vendor_shell.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# vendor shell MUST never run as interactive or login shell.
+# vendor shell CAN never be traisitioned to by any process, so it is
+# only intended by shell script interpreter.
+type vendor_shell_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
diff --git a/public/vendor_toolbox.te b/public/vendor_toolbox.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39462f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/vendor_toolbox.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Toolbox installation for vendor binaries / scripts
+# Non-vendor processes are not allowed to execute the binary
+# and is always executed without transition.
+type vendor_toolbox_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+# Do not allow domains to transition to vendor toolbox
+# or read, execute the vendor_toolbox file.
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Do not allow non-vendor domains to transition
+    # to vendor toolbox
+    neverallow coredomain vendor_toolbox_exec:file { entrypoint execute execute_no_trans };
+')
diff --git a/public/virtual_touchpad.te b/public/virtual_touchpad.te
index 92d5c27..c2800e3 100644
--- a/public/virtual_touchpad.te
+++ b/public/virtual_touchpad.te
@@ -5,8 +5,12 @@
 binder_service(virtual_touchpad)
 add_service(virtual_touchpad, virtual_touchpad_service)
 
+# Needed to check app permissions.
+binder_call(virtual_touchpad, system_server)
+
 # Requires access to /dev/uinput to create and feed the virtual device.
 allow virtual_touchpad uhid_device:chr_file { w_file_perms ioctl };
 
-# Limit access so that nothing else can inject input.
-neverallow { domain -system_app -virtual_touchpad } virtual_touchpad_service:service_manager find;
+# Requires access to the permission service to validate that clients have the
+# appropriate VR permissions.
+allow virtual_touchpad permission_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/public/vndservice.te b/public/vndservice.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d309bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/vndservice.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type default_android_vndservice, vndservice_manager_type;
diff --git a/public/vold.te b/public/vold.te
index f4a3916..81ee28c 100644
--- a/public/vold.te
+++ b/public/vold.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # volume manager
-type vold, domain, domain_deprecated;
+type vold, domain;
 type vold_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 # Read already opened /cache files.
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
 r_dir_file(vold, rootfs)
 allow vold proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 
+#Get file contexts
+allow vold file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 # Allow us to jump into execution domains of above tools
 allow vold self:process setexec;
 
@@ -28,6 +31,7 @@
 typeattribute vold mlstrustedsubject;
 allow vold self:process setfscreate;
 allow vold system_file:file x_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow vold vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
 allow vold block_device:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow vold device:dir write;
 allow vold devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/vr_hwc.te b/public/vr_hwc.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c05dd63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/vr_hwc.te
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+type vr_hwc, domain;
+type vr_hwc_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Get buffer metadata.
+hal_client_domain(vr_hwc, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+binder_use(vr_hwc)
+binder_service(vr_hwc)
+
+binder_call(vr_hwc, surfaceflinger)
+# Needed to check for app permissions.
+binder_call(vr_hwc, system_server)
+
+add_service(vr_hwc, vr_hwc_service)
+
+# Hosts the VR HWC implementation and provides a simple Binder interface for VR
+# Window Manager to receive the layers/buffers.
+hwbinder_use(vr_hwc)
+
+# Load vendor libraries.
+allow vr_hwc system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+allow vr_hwc ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow connection to VR DisplayClient to get the primary display metadata
+# (ie: size).
+pdx_client(vr_hwc, display_client)
+
+# Requires access to the permission service to validate that clients have the
+# appropriate VR permissions.
+allow vr_hwc permission_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/public/wificond.te b/public/wificond.te
index dd22d26..c91053e 100644
--- a/public/wificond.te
+++ b/public/wificond.te
@@ -7,10 +7,6 @@
 
 add_service(wificond, wificond_service)
 
-# wificond writes firmware paths to this file.
-# wificond also changes the owership of this file on startup.
-allow wificond sysfs_wlan_fwpath:file { w_file_perms setattr };
-
 set_prop(wificond, wifi_prop)
 set_prop(wificond, ctl_default_prop)
 
@@ -31,14 +27,8 @@
 allow wificond wifi_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow wificond wifi_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 
-# wificond drops root shortly after starting
-# wificond changes the ownership of some files before dropping root
-allow wificond self:capability { setuid setgid setpcap chown };
-
-# wificond cleans up sockets created by wpa_supplicant and framework
-allow wificond wpa_socket:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow wificond system_wpa_socket:sock_file unlink;
-allow wificond wpa_socket:sock_file unlink;
+# allow wificond to check permission for dumping logs
+allow wificond permission_service:service_manager find;
 
 # dumpstate support
 allow wificond dumpstate:fd use;
diff --git a/tools/checkfc.c b/tools/checkfc.c
index 8a28f3c..9cbd912 100644
--- a/tools/checkfc.c
+++ b/tools/checkfc.c
@@ -15,12 +15,16 @@
 static const char * const CHECK_FC_ASSERT_ATTRS[] = { "fs_type", "dev_type", "file_type", NULL };
 static const char * const CHECK_PC_ASSERT_ATTRS[] = { "property_type", NULL };
 static const char * const CHECK_SC_ASSERT_ATTRS[] = { "service_manager_type", NULL };
+static const char * const CHECK_HW_SC_ASSERT_ATTRS[] = { "hwservice_manager_type", NULL };
+static const char * const CHECK_VND_SC_ASSERT_ATTRS[] = { "vndservice_manager_type", NULL };
 
 typedef enum filemode filemode;
 enum filemode {
     filemode_file_contexts = 0,
     filemode_property_contexts,
-    filemode_service_contexts
+    filemode_service_contexts,
+    filemode_hw_service_contexts,
+    filemode_vendor_service_contexts
 };
 
 static struct {
@@ -55,6 +59,10 @@
         return CHECK_PC_ASSERT_ATTRS;
     case filemode_service_contexts:
         return CHECK_SC_ASSERT_ATTRS;
+    case filemode_hw_service_contexts:
+        return CHECK_HW_SC_ASSERT_ATTRS;
+    case filemode_vendor_service_contexts:
+        return CHECK_VND_SC_ASSERT_ATTRS;
     }
     /* die on invalid parameters */
     fprintf(stderr, "Error: Invalid mode of operation: %d\n", mode);
@@ -185,10 +193,13 @@
 }
 
 static void usage(char *name) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "usage1:  %s [-p|-s] [-e] sepolicy context_file\n\n"
+    fprintf(stderr, "usage1:  %s [-l|-p|-s|-v] [-e] sepolicy context_file\n\n"
         "Parses a context file and checks for syntax errors.\n"
-        "The context_file is assumed to be a file_contexts file\n"
-        "unless the -p or -s option is used to indicate the property or service backend respectively.\n"
+        "If -p is specified, the property backend is used.\n"
+        "If -s is specified, the service backend is used to verify binder services.\n"
+        "If -l is specified, the service backend is used to verify hwbinder services.\n"
+        "If -v is specified, the service backend is used to verify vndbinder services.\n"
+        "Otherwise, context_file is assumed to be a file_contexts file\n"
         "If -e is specified, then the context_file is allowed to be empty.\n\n"
 
         "usage2:  %s -c file_contexts1 file_contexts2\n\n"
@@ -332,7 +343,7 @@
 
   filemode mode = filemode_file_contexts;
 
-  while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "cpse")) != -1) {
+  while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "clpsve")) != -1) {
     switch (c) {
       case 'c':
         compare = true;
@@ -348,6 +359,14 @@
         mode = filemode_service_contexts;
         backend = SELABEL_CTX_ANDROID_SERVICE;
         break;
+      case 'l':
+        mode = filemode_hw_service_contexts;
+        backend = SELABEL_CTX_ANDROID_SERVICE;
+        break;
+      case 'v':
+        mode = filemode_vendor_service_contexts;
+        backend = SELABEL_CTX_ANDROID_SERVICE;
+        break;
       case 'h':
       default:
         usage(argv[0]);
diff --git a/tools/sepolicy-analyze/neverallow.c b/tools/sepolicy-analyze/neverallow.c
index b288ea7..26ce144 100644
--- a/tools/sepolicy-analyze/neverallow.c
+++ b/tools/sepolicy-analyze/neverallow.c
@@ -173,9 +173,6 @@
         }
     }
 
-    if (warn && ebitmap_length(&typeset->types) == 0 && !(*flags))
-        fprintf(stderr, "Warning!  Empty type set\n");
-
     *ptr = p;
     return 0;
 err:
diff --git a/vendor/file.te b/vendor/file.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aeafb4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/file.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Socket types
+type hostapd_socket, file_type;
diff --git a/vendor/file_contexts b/vendor/file_contexts
index 970cb09..3f9fcc1 100644
--- a/vendor/file_contexts
+++ b/vendor/file_contexts
@@ -20,13 +20,29 @@
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.light@2\.0-service          u:object_r:hal_light_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.memtrack@1\.0-service       u:object_r:hal_memtrack_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.nfc@1\.0-service            u:object_r:hal_nfc_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.media\.omx@1\.0-service            u:object_r:mediacodec_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.power@1\.0-service          u:object_r:hal_power_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.sensors@1\.0-service        u:object_r:hal_sensors_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/rild                                           u:object_r:rild_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.thermal@1\.0-service        u:object_r:hal_thermal_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.tv\.cec@1\.0-service        u:object_r:hal_tv_cec_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.tv\.input@1\.0-service      u:object_r:hal_tv_input_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.usb@1\.0-service            u:object_r:hal_usb_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.vibrator@1\.0-service       u:object_r:hal_vibrator_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.vr@1\.0-service             u:object_r:hal_vr_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.wifi@1\.0-service           u:object_r:hal_wifi_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/wpa_supplicant                                 u:object_r:hal_wifi_supplicant_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hostapd                                           u:object_r:hostapd_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/vndservicemanager                                 u:object_r:vndservicemanager_exec:s0
+
+#############################
+# Same process HALs installed by platform into /vendor
+#
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/hw/android\.hardware\.graphics\.mapper@2\.0-impl\.so u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/hw/android\.hardware\.renderscript@1\.0-impl\.so     u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/hw/gralloc\.default\.so                              u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Data files
+#
+/data/misc/wifi/hostapd(/.*)?   u:object_r:hostapd_socket:s0
diff --git a/vendor/hal_audio_default.te b/vendor/hal_audio_default.te
index 04ef7aa..0dc2170 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_audio_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_audio_default.te
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 type hal_audio_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_audio_default, hal_audio)
 
-type hal_audio_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_audio_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_audio_default)
 
 hal_client_domain(hal_audio_default, hal_allocator)
+
diff --git a/vendor/hal_bluetooth_default.te b/vendor/hal_bluetooth_default.te
index e32770d..01d60db 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_bluetooth_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_bluetooth_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_bluetooth_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_bluetooth_default, hal_bluetooth)
 
-type hal_bluetooth_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_bluetooth_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_bluetooth_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_bootctl_default.te b/vendor/hal_bootctl_default.te
index 9986fb5..ca30e58 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_bootctl_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_bootctl_default.te
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 type hal_bootctl_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_bootctl_default, hal_bootctl)
 
-type hal_bootctl_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_bootctl_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_bootctl_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_camera_default.te b/vendor/hal_camera_default.te
index 8fdb4f0..239e5c1 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_camera_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_camera_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 type hal_camera_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_camera_default, hal_camera)
 
-type hal_camera_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_camera_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_camera_default)
+
+allow hal_camera_default fwk_sensor_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/vendor/hal_configstore_default.te b/vendor/hal_configstore_default.te
index e8930ca..cc61a16 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_configstore_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_configstore_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_configstore_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_configstore_default, hal_configstore)
 
-type hal_configstore_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_configstore_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_configstore_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_contexthub_default.te b/vendor/hal_contexthub_default.te
index 67dd530..b29808d 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_contexthub_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_contexthub_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_contexthub_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_contexthub_default, hal_contexthub)
 
-type hal_contexthub_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_contexthub_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_contexthub_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_drm_default.te b/vendor/hal_drm_default.te
index eba763a..b79c3b5 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_drm_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_drm_default.te
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 type hal_drm_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_drm_default, hal_drm)
 
-type hal_drm_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_drm_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_drm_default)
 
 allow hal_drm_default mediacodec:fd use;
diff --git a/vendor/hal_dumpstate_default.te b/vendor/hal_dumpstate_default.te
index fa772e1..6fbf40f 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_dumpstate_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_dumpstate_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_dumpstate_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_dumpstate_default, hal_dumpstate)
 
-type hal_dumpstate_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_dumpstate_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_dumpstate_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_fingerprint_default.te b/vendor/hal_fingerprint_default.te
index 2b9001e..638b603 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_fingerprint_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_fingerprint_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_fingerprint_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_fingerprint_default, hal_fingerprint)
 
-type hal_fingerprint_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_fingerprint_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_fingerprint_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_gatekeeper_default.te b/vendor/hal_gatekeeper_default.te
index d48af16..a3654cc 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_gatekeeper_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_gatekeeper_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_gatekeeper_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_gatekeeper_default, hal_gatekeeper)
 
-type hal_gatekeeper_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_gatekeeper_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_gatekeeper_default);
diff --git a/vendor/hal_gnss_default.te b/vendor/hal_gnss_default.te
index 18da090..4c40617 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_gnss_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_gnss_default.te
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 type hal_gnss_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_gnss_default, hal_gnss)
 
-type hal_gnss_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_gnss_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_gnss_default)
 
 # Read access to system files for HALs in
diff --git a/vendor/hal_graphics_allocator_default.te b/vendor/hal_graphics_allocator_default.te
index f47a604..5afa2b5 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_graphics_allocator_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_graphics_allocator_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_graphics_allocator_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_graphics_allocator_default, hal_graphics_allocator)
 
-type hal_graphics_allocator_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_graphics_allocator_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_graphics_allocator_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_graphics_composer_default.te b/vendor/hal_graphics_composer_default.te
index b65b8fe..47343d9 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_graphics_composer_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_graphics_composer_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_graphics_composer_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_graphics_composer_default, hal_graphics_composer)
 
-type hal_graphics_composer_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_graphics_composer_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_graphics_composer_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_health_default.te b/vendor/hal_health_default.te
index 3add20b..9b2b921 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_health_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_health_default.te
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 type hal_health_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_health_default, hal_health)
 
-type hal_health_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_health_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_health_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_ir_default.te b/vendor/hal_ir_default.te
index e43bf07..943aab0 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_ir_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_ir_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_ir_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_ir_default, hal_ir)
 
-type hal_ir_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_ir_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_ir_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_keymaster_default.te b/vendor/hal_keymaster_default.te
index 32df262..82a5a20 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_keymaster_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_keymaster_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_keymaster_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_keymaster_default, hal_keymaster)
 
-type hal_keymaster_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_keymaster_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_keymaster_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_light_default.te b/vendor/hal_light_default.te
index 8c1bfb6..c7fa9a1 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_light_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_light_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_light_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_light_default, hal_light)
 
-type hal_light_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_light_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_light_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_memtrack_default.te b/vendor/hal_memtrack_default.te
index 0e3ba21..c547699 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_memtrack_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_memtrack_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_memtrack_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_memtrack_default, hal_memtrack)
 
-type hal_memtrack_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_memtrack_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_memtrack_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_nfc_default.te b/vendor/hal_nfc_default.te
index b155f27..c13baa7 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_nfc_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_nfc_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_nfc_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_nfc_default, hal_nfc)
 
-type hal_nfc_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_nfc_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_nfc_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_omx.te b/vendor/hal_omx.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fdb4aca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_omx.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+init_daemon_domain(mediacodec)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_power_default.te b/vendor/hal_power_default.te
index 47065ea..3be4f22 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_power_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_power_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_power_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_power_default, hal_power)
 
-type hal_power_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_power_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_power_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_sensors_default.te b/vendor/hal_sensors_default.te
index b4c9a86..8379c82 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_sensors_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_sensors_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 type hal_sensors_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_sensors_default, hal_sensors)
 
-type hal_sensors_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_sensors_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_sensors_default)
+
+allow hal_sensors_default fwk_scheduler_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/vendor/hal_thermal_default.te b/vendor/hal_thermal_default.te
index 9a777e0..73b2eff 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_thermal_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_thermal_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_thermal_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_thermal_default, hal_thermal)
 
-type hal_thermal_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_thermal_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_thermal_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_tv_cec_default.te b/vendor/hal_tv_cec_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..080e73b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_tv_cec_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_tv_cec_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_tv_cec_default, hal_tv_cec)
+
+type hal_tv_cec_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_tv_cec_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_tv_input_default.te b/vendor/hal_tv_input_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12d9743
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_tv_input_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+type hal_tv_input_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_tv_input_default, hal_tv_input)
+
+type hal_tv_input_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_tv_input_default)
+
diff --git a/vendor/hal_usb_default.te b/vendor/hal_usb_default.te
index cc28a65..5642a2a 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_usb_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_usb_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_usb_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_usb_default, hal_usb)
 
-type hal_usb_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_usb_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_usb_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_vibrator_default.te b/vendor/hal_vibrator_default.te
index 8bc8a72..6c10d8a 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_vibrator_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_vibrator_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_vibrator_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_vibrator_default, hal_vibrator)
 
-type hal_vibrator_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_vibrator_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_vibrator_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_vr_default.te b/vendor/hal_vr_default.te
index 7475524..6a60192 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_vr_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_vr_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_vr_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_vr_default, hal_vr)
 
-type hal_vr_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_vr_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_vr_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_wifi_default.te b/vendor/hal_wifi_default.te
index 7c3949e..75a9842 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_wifi_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_wifi_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 type hal_wifi_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_wifi_default, hal_wifi)
 
-type hal_wifi_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_wifi_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_wifi_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_wifi_supplicant_default.te b/vendor/hal_wifi_supplicant_default.te
index 5e49605..8d7069c 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_wifi_supplicant_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_wifi_supplicant_default.te
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 # wpa supplicant or equivalent
 type hal_wifi_supplicant_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_wifi_supplicant_default, hal_wifi_supplicant)
-type hal_wifi_supplicant_default_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hal_wifi_supplicant_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_wifi_supplicant_default)
 
 net_domain(hal_wifi_supplicant_default)
 # Create a socket for receiving info from wpa
 type_transition hal_wifi_supplicant_default wifi_data_file:dir wpa_socket "sockets";
 
-# TODO(b/34603782): Remove this once Wi-Fi Supplicant HAL stops using Binder
-typeattribute hal_wifi_supplicant_default binder_in_vendor_violators;
+# Allow wpa_supplicant to talk to Wifi Keystore HwBinder service.
+hwbinder_use(hal_wifi_supplicant_default)
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant_default system_wifi_keystore_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+binder_call(hal_wifi_supplicant_default, wifi_keystore_service_server)
diff --git a/public/hostapd.te b/vendor/hostapd.te
similarity index 92%
rename from public/hostapd.te
rename to vendor/hostapd.te
index b40bdc8..2c62cf0 100644
--- a/public/hostapd.te
+++ b/vendor/hostapd.te
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 # userspace wifi access points
 type hostapd, domain;
-type hostapd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type hostapd_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 
+init_daemon_domain(hostapd)
 
 net_domain(hostapd)
 allow hostapd self:capability { net_admin net_raw };
diff --git a/vendor/rild.te b/vendor/rild.te
index 515d1b4..ea9109b 100644
--- a/vendor/rild.te
+++ b/vendor/rild.te
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 # type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
 # public, but conceptually should go with this
-type rild_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type rild_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(rild)
+
+# TODO(b/36613472), TODO(b/36718031): Remove this once rild no longer
+# communicates with non-vendor components over sockets.
+typeattribute rild socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
diff --git a/vendor/tee.te b/vendor/tee.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..348d715
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/tee.te
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+##
+# trusted execution environment (tee) daemon
+#
+type tee_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(tee)
+
+allow tee self:capability { dac_override };
+allow tee tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow tee tee_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow tee tee_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow tee self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow tee self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow tee ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(tee, sysfs_type)
+
+allow tee system_data_file:file { getattr read };
+allow tee system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/vendor/vndservice_contexts b/vendor/vndservice_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4cca2fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/vndservice_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+*                       u:object_r:default_android_vndservice:s0
diff --git a/vendor/vndservicemanager.te b/vendor/vndservicemanager.te
index dff18ce..f956af8 100644
--- a/vendor/vndservicemanager.te
+++ b/vendor/vndservicemanager.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # vndservicemanager - the Binder context manager for vendor processes
-type vndservicemanager_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type vndservicemanager_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 
 init_daemon_domain(vndservicemanager);
 
@@ -10,5 +10,8 @@
 
 allow vndservicemanager vndbinder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
+# Read vndservice_contexts
+allow vndservicemanager vndservice_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 # Check SELinux permissions.
 selinux_check_access(vndservicemanager)