SEPolicy for boringssl_self_test.
This CL adds hand-written SELinux rules to:
- define the boringssl_self_test security domain
- label the corresponding files at type boringssl_self_test_marker
and boringssl_self_test_exec.
- define an automatic transition from init to boringssl_self_test
domains, plus appropriate access permissions.
Bug: 137267623
Test: When run together with the other changes from draft CL topic
http://aosp/q/topic:bug137267623_bsslselftest, check that:
- both /dev/boringssl/selftest/* marker files are
present after the device boots.
- Test: after the boringssl_self_test{32,64} binaries have
run, no further SELinux denials occur for processes
trying to write the marker file.
Change-Id: I77de0bccdd8c1e22c354d8ea146e363f4af7e36f
diff --git a/private/boringssl_self_test.te b/private/boringssl_self_test.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..869b924
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/boringssl_self_test.te
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+type boringssl_self_test, domain;
+type boringssl_self_test_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type boringssl_self_test_marker, file_type;
+
+typeattribute boringssl_self_test coredomain;
+
+# switch to boringssl_self_test security domain when running boringssl_self_test_exec from init.
+init_daemon_domain(boringssl_self_test)
+
+# Allow boringssl_self_test binaries to create/check for the existence of boringssl_self_test_marker
+# files.
+allow boringssl_self_test boringssl_self_test_marker:file create_file_perms;
+allow boringssl_self_test boringssl_self_test_marker:dir ra_dir_perms;
+
+# No other process should be able to create these files because their existence causes the
+# boringssl self test to be skipped.
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -boringssl_self_test
+ -init
+ -vendor_init
+} boringssl_self_test_marker:file no_rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
index 24c733b..9c444c4 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
(typeattribute new_objects)
(typeattributeset new_objects
( new_objects
+ boringssl_self_test
charger_prop
cold_boot_done_prop
platform_compat_service
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index ee0ef6e..b1d6a32 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@
allow domain linkerconfig_file:dir search;
allow domain linkerconfig_file:file r_file_perms;
+# Allow all processes to check for the existence of the boringssl_self_test_marker files.
+allow domain boringssl_self_test_marker:dir search;
+
# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
# with other UIDs to these whitelisted domains.
neverallow {
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 8e6d00f..32bf827 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
/dev/block/vold/.+ u:object_r:vold_device:s0
/dev/block/ram[0-9]* u:object_r:ram_device:s0
/dev/block/zram[0-9]* u:object_r:ram_device:s0
+/dev/boringssl/selftest(/.*)? u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_marker:s0
/dev/bus/usb(.*)? u:object_r:usb_device:s0
/dev/console u:object_r:console_device:s0
/dev/cpu_variant:.* u:object_r:dev_cpu_variant:s0
@@ -188,6 +189,7 @@
/system/bin/auditctl u:object_r:auditctl_exec:s0
/system/bin/bcc u:object_r:rs_exec:s0
/system/bin/blank_screen u:object_r:blank_screen_exec:s0
+/system/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64) u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
/system/bin/charger u:object_r:charger_exec:s0
/system/bin/e2fsdroid u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
/system/bin/mke2fs u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0