Introduce a new sdk_sandbox domain
Define the selinux domain to apply to SDK runtime for
targetSdkVersion=34.
The existing sdk_sandbox domain has been renamed to sdk_sandbox_next.
Future CLs will add logic to apply one of these to the SDK runtime
processes on the device, based on a flag.
auditallow block from sdk_sandbox has been removed as we haven't yet
measured the system health impact of adding this. It'll be added to an
audit domain later after we've ruled out negative system health impact.
Bug: 270148964
Test: make and boot the test device, load SDK using test app
Change-Id: I7438fb16c1c5e85e30683e421ce463f9e0b1470d
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_all.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_all.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..807b51f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_all.te
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+###
+### sdk_sandbox_all
+###
+### This file defines the rules shared by all sdk_sandbox* domains.
+### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
+### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
+### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
+### directory). The sdk_sandbox_all attribute is assigned to all default
+### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between FIRST_SDK_SANDBOX_UID (20000)
+### and LAST_SDK_SANDBOX_UID (29999) if the app has no specific seinfo
+### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.
+
+# allow sandbox to search in sdk system server directory
+# additionally, for webview to work, getattr has been permitted
+allow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+# allow sandbox to create files and dirs in sdk data directory
+allow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow sdk_sandbox_all system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Required to read CTS tests data from the shell_data_file location.
+allow sdk_sandbox_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow sdk_sandbox_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# allow sdk sandbox to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow sdk_sandbox_all system_server:udp_socket {
+ connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Receive or send uevent messages.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+
+# Receive or send generic netlink messages
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all domain:netlink_socket *;
+
+# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
+# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all debugfs:file read;
+
+# execute gpu_device
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all gpu_device:chr_file execute;
+
+# access files in /sys with the default sysfs label
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all sysfs:file *;
+
+# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
+# Create a more specific label if needed
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Directly access external storage
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox_all -sdk_sandbox_34 } { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file {open create};
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox_all -sdk_sandbox_34 } { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:dir search;
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox_all -sdk_sandbox_34 } { media_rw_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox_all -sdk_sandbox_34 } { media_rw_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Avoid reads to proc_net, it contains too much device wide information about
+# ongoing connections.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all proc_net:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox_all } { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file }:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+
+# SDK sandbox processes have their own storage not related to app_data_file or privapp_data_file
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox_all } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox_all } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox_all } tmpfs:dir no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox_all -sdk_sandbox_34 } hal_drm_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Only certain system components should have access to sdk_sandbox_system_data_file
+# sdk_sandbox_all only needs search. Restricted in follow up neverallow rule.
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -installd
+ -system_server
+ -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { relabelfrom };
+
+# sdk_sandbox_all only needs to traverse through the sdk_sandbox_system_data_file
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir ~{ getattr search };
+
+# Only dirs should be created at sdk_sandbox_system_data_file level
+neverallow { domain -init } sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:file *;
+