diff --git a/private/aconfigd.te b/private/aconfigd.te
index 5ee967d..7a46959 100644
--- a/private/aconfigd.te
+++ b/private/aconfigd.te
@@ -16,12 +16,6 @@
     aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file
 }:file create_file_perms;
 
-# allow aconfigd to access shell_data_file for atest
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-    allow aconfigd shell_data_file:dir search;
-    allow aconfigd shell_data_file:file { getattr read open map };
-')
-
 # allow aconfigd to log to the kernel dmesg via a file descriptor
 # passed from init to aconfigd
 allow aconfigd kmsg_device:chr_file write;
@@ -41,3 +35,35 @@
 # only init is allowed to enter the aconfigd domain
 neverallow { domain -init } aconfigd:process transition;
 neverallow * aconfigd:process dyntransition;
+
+# Do not allow write access to boot/map storage files except, aconfigd and aconfigd_mainline.
+# These files are meant to serve flag reads for all processes. They are created by aconfigd (for
+# platform storage files) and aconfigd_mainline (mainline storage files) processes.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -aconfigd
+  -aconfigd_mainline
+} aconfig_storage_metadata_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -aconfigd
+  -aconfigd_mainline
+} aconfig_storage_metadata_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# Only aconfigd and aconfigd_mainline can access persist storage files
+# These files are meant to serve as persist flag value storage, only aconfigd and
+# aconfigd_mainline process should manage them. Other processes should have zero access.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -aconfigd
+  -aconfigd_mainline
+} aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:dir *;
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -aconfigd
+  -aconfigd_mainline
+} aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/aconfigd_mainline.te b/private/aconfigd_mainline.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd98d4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/aconfigd_mainline.te
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# aconfigd_mainline -- manager for mainline aconfig flags
+type aconfigd_mainline, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type aconfigd_mainline_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(aconfigd_mainline)
+
+# allow aconfigd_mainline to search /metadata dir as it needs to access files under
+# /metadata/aconfig dir
+allow aconfigd_mainline metadata_file:dir search;
+
+# aconfigd_mainline should be able to create storage files under /metadata/aconfig dir
+allow aconfigd_mainline {
+    aconfig_storage_metadata_file
+    aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file
+}:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+allow aconfigd_mainline {
+    aconfig_storage_metadata_file
+    aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file
+}:file create_file_perms;
+
+# allow aconfigd_mainline to log to the kernel.
+allow aconfigd_mainline kmsg_device:chr_file write;
+
+# allow aconfigd_mainline to read /apex dir, aconfigd_mainline need to loop thru all
+# dirs under /apex to find all currently mounted mainline modules and get their
+# storage files
+allow aconfigd_mainline apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow aconfigd_mainline apex_mnt_dir:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit aconfigd_mainline apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+###
+### Neverallow assertions
+###
+
+# only init is allowed to enter the aconfigd_mainline domain
+neverallow { domain -init } aconfigd_mainline:process transition;
+neverallow * aconfigd_mainline:process dyntransition;
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index e941e10..3e9f018 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -2179,7 +2179,6 @@
   -artd
   -dumpstate
   -installd
-  userdebug_or_eng(`-aconfigd')
   userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
   userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationmanager')
   userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationservice')
@@ -2227,7 +2226,6 @@
   -installd
   -simpleperf_app_runner
   -system_server # why?
-  userdebug_or_eng(`-aconfigd')
   userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
   userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationmanager')
   userdebug_or_eng(`-crosvm')
@@ -2258,10 +2256,6 @@
 # For now, don't allow processes other than gmscore to access /data/misc_ce/<userid>/checkin
 neverallow { domain -gmscore_app -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } checkin_data_file:{dir file} *;
 
-# Do not allow write access to aconfig flag value files except init and aconfigd
-neverallow { domain -init -aconfigd -system_server } aconfig_storage_metadata_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
-neverallow { domain -init -aconfigd -system_server } aconfig_storage_metadata_file:file no_w_file_perms;
-
 neverallow { domain -dexopt_chroot_setup -init } proc:{ file dir } mounton;
 neverallow { domain -dexopt_chroot_setup -init -zygote } proc_type:{ file dir } mounton;
 
diff --git a/private/file.te b/private/file.te
index 5512b6e..189fb47 100644
--- a/private/file.te
+++ b/private/file.te
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@
 # Type for aconfig daemon socket
 type aconfigd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
 
+# Type for aconfig mainline daemon socket
+type aconfigd_mainline_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket,  mlstrustedobject;
+
 # Type for /(system|system_ext|product)/etc/aconfig
 type system_aconfig_storage_file, system_file_type, file_type;
 
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 3ff72aa..d6f7113 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@
 /dev/snd(/.*)?		u:object_r:audio_device:s0
 /dev/socket(/.*)?	u:object_r:socket_device:s0
 /dev/socket/adbd	u:object_r:adbd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/aconfigd_mainline	u:object_r:aconfigd_mainline_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/aconfigd_system	u:object_r:aconfigd_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/dnsproxyd	u:object_r:dnsproxyd_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/dumpstate	u:object_r:dumpstate_socket:s0
diff --git a/private/gmscore_app.te b/private/gmscore_app.te
index fa3420a..148cb7e 100644
--- a/private/gmscore_app.te
+++ b/private/gmscore_app.te
@@ -132,8 +132,10 @@
 allow gmscore_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
 # allow gms core app write to aconfigd socket
-allow gmscore_app aconfigd_socket:sock_file {read write};
-allow gmscore_app aconfigd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+unix_socket_connect(gmscore_app, aconfigd, aconfigd);
+
+# allow gms core app write to aconfigd_mainline socket
+unix_socket_connect(gmscore_app, aconfigd_mainline, aconfigd_mainline);
 
 # b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
 allow gmscore_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 99ef142..a764df4 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -1530,10 +1530,6 @@
 allow system_server watchdog_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow system_server watchdog_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
 
-allow system_server aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow system_server aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
-allow system_server aconfig_storage_metadata_file:dir search;
-
 allow system_server aconfigd_socket:sock_file {read write};
 allow system_server aconfigd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
 
@@ -1585,10 +1581,6 @@
 } password_slot_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
 neverallow { domain -init -system_server } password_slot_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set *;
 
-# Only system server should access /metadata/aconfig
-neverallow { domain -init -system_server -aconfigd } aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:dir *;
-neverallow { domain -init -system_server -aconfigd } aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
-
 # Allow systemserver to read/write the invalidation property
 set_prop(system_server, binder_cache_system_server_prop)
 neverallow { domain -system_server -init }