diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index 6407755..31551ac 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
   -sdcard_type
   file_type
   -app_data_file            # The apps sandbox itself
+  -privapp_data_file
   -media_rw_data_file       # Internal storage. Known that apps can
                             # leave artfacts here after uninstall.
   -user_profile_data_file   # Access to profile files
diff --git a/private/compat/26.0/26.0.cil b/private/compat/26.0/26.0.cil
index f53a194..c8b7a1f 100644
--- a/private/compat/26.0/26.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/26.0/26.0.cil
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 (typeattributeset apk_private_data_file_26_0 (apk_private_data_file))
 (typeattributeset apk_private_tmp_file_26_0 (apk_private_tmp_file))
 (typeattributeset apk_tmp_file_26_0 (apk_tmp_file))
-(typeattributeset app_data_file_26_0 (app_data_file))
+(typeattributeset app_data_file_26_0 (app_data_file privapp_data_file))
 (typeattributeset app_fuse_file_26_0 (app_fuse_file))
 (typeattributeset app_fusefs_26_0 (app_fusefs))
 (typeattributeset appops_service_26_0 (appops_service))
diff --git a/private/compat/27.0/27.0.cil b/private/compat/27.0/27.0.cil
index e3ca2d0..d0cb9b7 100644
--- a/private/compat/27.0/27.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/27.0/27.0.cil
@@ -737,7 +737,7 @@
 (typeattributeset apk_private_data_file_27_0 (apk_private_data_file))
 (typeattributeset apk_private_tmp_file_27_0 (apk_private_tmp_file))
 (typeattributeset apk_tmp_file_27_0 (apk_tmp_file))
-(typeattributeset app_data_file_27_0 (app_data_file))
+(typeattributeset app_data_file_27_0 (app_data_file privapp_data_file))
 (typeattributeset app_fuse_file_27_0 (app_fuse_file))
 (typeattributeset app_fusefs_27_0 (app_fusefs))
 (typeattributeset appops_service_27_0 (appops_service))
diff --git a/private/compat/28.0/28.0.cil b/private/compat/28.0/28.0.cil
index d733132..a784b44 100644
--- a/private/compat/28.0/28.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/28.0/28.0.cil
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@
 (typeattributeset apk_private_data_file_28_0 (apk_private_data_file))
 (typeattributeset apk_private_tmp_file_28_0 (apk_private_tmp_file))
 (typeattributeset apk_tmp_file_28_0 (apk_tmp_file))
-(typeattributeset app_data_file_28_0 (app_data_file))
+(typeattributeset app_data_file_28_0 (app_data_file privapp_data_file))
 (typeattributeset app_fuse_file_28_0 (app_fuse_file))
 (typeattributeset app_fusefs_28_0 (app_fusefs))
 (typeattributeset appops_service_28_0 (appops_service))
diff --git a/private/dexoptanalyzer.te b/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
index dfc81b8..7d01ef5 100644
--- a/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
+++ b/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
@@ -19,12 +19,12 @@
 
 # Allow reading secondary dex files that were reported by the app to the
 # package manager.
-allow dexoptanalyzer app_data_file:dir { getattr search };
-allow dexoptanalyzer app_data_file:file { getattr read };
+allow dexoptanalyzer { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir { getattr search };
+allow dexoptanalyzer { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file { getattr read };
 # dexoptanalyzer calls access(2) with W_OK flag on app data. We can use the
 # "dontaudit...audit_access" policy line to suppress the audit access without
 # suppressing denial on actual access.
-dontaudit dexoptanalyzer app_data_file:dir audit_access;
+dontaudit dexoptanalyzer { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir audit_access;
 
 # Allow testing /data/user/0 which symlinks to /data/data
 allow dexoptanalyzer system_data_file:lnk_file { getattr };
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index f7f5d66..1ae31ae 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
   domain
   -appdomain
   -installd # creation of sandbox
-} app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
 
 # Only the following processes should be directly accessing private app
 # directories.
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
   -runas
   -system_server
   -vold
-} app_data_file:dir *;
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir *;
 
 # Only apps should be modifying app data. init and installd are exempted for
 # restorecon and package install/uninstall.
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@
   -appdomain
   -init
   -installd
-} app_data_file:dir ~r_dir_perms;
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir ~r_dir_perms;
 
 neverallow {
   domain
@@ -163,16 +163,16 @@
   -mediaserver # b/80300620
   userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
   -vold # b/80418809
-} app_data_file:file_class_set open;
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file_class_set open;
 
 neverallow {
   domain
   -appdomain
   -installd # creation of sandbox
-} app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
 
 neverallow {
   domain
   -init
   -installd
-} app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
diff --git a/private/ephemeral_app.te b/private/ephemeral_app.te
index 75a6317..f28d28f 100644
--- a/private/ephemeral_app.te
+++ b/private/ephemeral_app.te
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 
 # Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
 # to their sandbox directory and then execute.
-allow ephemeral_app app_data_file:file {r_file_perms execute};
+allow ephemeral_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file {r_file_perms execute};
 
 # services
 allow ephemeral_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
 
-neverallow ephemeral_app app_data_file:file execute_no_trans;
+neverallow ephemeral_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file execute_no_trans;
 
 # Receive or send uevent messages.
 neverallow ephemeral_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
diff --git a/private/isolated_app.te b/private/isolated_app.te
index a6276b3..26cb122 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 app_domain(isolated_app)
 
 # Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
-allow isolated_app app_data_file:file { append read write getattr lock };
+allow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { append read write getattr lock };
 
 allow isolated_app activity_service:service_manager find;
 allow isolated_app display_service:service_manager find;
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
 neverallow isolated_app tun_device:chr_file open;
 
 # Isolated apps should not directly open app data files themselves.
-neverallow isolated_app app_data_file:file open;
+neverallow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file open;
 
 # Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
 # TODO: are there situations where isolated_apps write to this file?
diff --git a/private/mls b/private/mls
index 3b8ee3f..2eb621d 100644
--- a/private/mls
+++ b/private/mls
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@
 # Also constrain other forms of manipulation, e.g. chmod/chown, unlink, rename, etc.
 # Subject must dominate object unless the subject is trusted.
 mlsconstrain dir { open search setattr rename add_name remove_name reparent rmdir }
-	     (t2 != app_data_file or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+	     ( (t2 != app_data_file and t2 != privapp_data_file ) or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
 mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file } { open setattr unlink link rename }
-	     (t2 != app_data_file or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+	     ( (t2 != app_data_file and t2 != privapp_data_file) or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
 
 #
 # Constraints for file types other than app data files.
@@ -66,18 +66,18 @@
 # Read operations: Subject must dominate object unless the subject
 # or the object is trusted.
 mlsconstrain dir { read getattr search }
-	     (t2 == app_data_file or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
+	     (t2 == app_data_file or t2 == privapp_data_file or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
 
 mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file chr_file blk_file } { read getattr execute }
-	     (t2 == app_data_file or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
+	     (t2 == app_data_file or t2 == privapp_data_file or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
 
 # Write operations: Subject must be equivalent to the object unless the
 # subject or the object is trusted.
 mlsconstrain dir { write setattr rename add_name remove_name reparent rmdir }
-	     (t2 == app_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
+	     (t2 == app_data_file or t2 == privapp_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
 
 mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file chr_file blk_file } { write setattr append unlink link rename }
-	     (t2 == app_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
+	     (t2 == app_data_file or t2 == privapp_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
 
 # Special case for FIFOs.
 # These can be unnamed pipes, in which case they will be labeled with the
diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index a952769..0afd721 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 
 # Some apps ship with shared libraries that they write out
 # to their sandbox directory and then dlopen().
-allow priv_app app_data_file:file execute;
+allow priv_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file execute;
 
 allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
 allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/storaged.te b/private/storaged.te
index 0916adf..f5f0735 100644
--- a/private/storaged.te
+++ b/private/storaged.te
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 
 # Needed for GMScore to call dumpsys storaged
 allow storaged priv_app:fd use;
-allow storaged app_data_file:file write;
+allow storaged { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file write;
 allow storaged permission_service:service_manager find;
 
 # Binder permissions
diff --git a/private/surfaceflinger.te b/private/surfaceflinger.te
index d9d7dea..a5ebfb0 100644
--- a/private/surfaceflinger.te
+++ b/private/surfaceflinger.te
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
 
 # Use open files supplied by an app.
 allow surfaceflinger appdomain:fd use;
-allow surfaceflinger app_data_file:file { read write };
+allow surfaceflinger { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { read write };
 
 # Allow writing surface traces to /data/misc/wmtrace.
 userdebug_or_eng(`
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 01da377..8950240 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -446,7 +446,16 @@
 
 # Walk /data/data subdirectories.
 # Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields.
-allow system_server { system_app_data_file bluetooth_data_file nfc_data_file radio_data_file shell_data_file app_data_file }:dir { getattr read search };
+allow system_server {
+  system_app_data_file
+  bluetooth_data_file
+  nfc_data_file
+  radio_data_file
+  shell_data_file
+  app_data_file
+  privapp_data_file
+}:dir { getattr read search };
+
 # Also permit for unlabeled /data/data subdirectories and
 # for unlabeled asec containers on upgrades from 4.2.
 allow system_server unlabeled:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -459,7 +468,15 @@
 
 # Receive and use open app data files passed over binder IPC.
 # Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields.
-allow system_server { system_app_data_file bluetooth_data_file nfc_data_file radio_data_file shell_data_file app_data_file }:file { getattr read write append };
+allow system_server {
+  system_app_data_file
+  bluetooth_data_file
+  nfc_data_file
+  radio_data_file
+  shell_data_file
+  app_data_file
+  privapp_data_file
+}:file { getattr read write append };
 
 # Access to /data/media for measuring disk usage.
 allow system_server media_rw_data_file:dir { search getattr open read };
@@ -821,7 +838,13 @@
 # file descriptor.
 # Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields, excluding
 # those types that system_server needs to open directly.
-neverallow system_server { bluetooth_data_file nfc_data_file shell_data_file app_data_file }:file { open create unlink link };
+neverallow system_server {
+  bluetooth_data_file
+  nfc_data_file
+  shell_data_file
+  app_data_file
+  privapp_data_file
+}:file { open create unlink link };
 
 # Forking and execing is inherently dangerous and racy. See, for
 # example, https://www.linuxprogrammingblog.com/threads-and-fork-think-twice-before-using-them
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_all.te b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
index 07d9d4d..65be583 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_all.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 
 # Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
 # to their sandbox directory and then execute.
-allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms };
+allow untrusted_app_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { rx_file_perms };
 
 # ASEC
 allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/webview_zygote.te b/private/webview_zygote.te
index 55b268a..ea01412 100644
--- a/private/webview_zygote.te
+++ b/private/webview_zygote.te
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@
 # Should not have any access to app data files.
 neverallow webview_zygote {
     app_data_file
+    privapp_data_file
     system_app_data_file
     bluetooth_data_file
     nfc_data_file