diff --git a/private/apexd.te b/private/apexd.te
index c3da0fe..f6e8058 100644
--- a/private/apexd.te
+++ b/private/apexd.te
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
 # Allow creating, reading and writing of APEX files/dirs in the APEX data dir
 allow apexd apex_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow apexd apex_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+# Allow relabeling file created in /data/apex/decompressed
+allow apexd apex_data_file:file relabelfrom;
 
 # Allow creating, reading and writing of APEX files/dirs in the APEX metadata dir
 allow apexd metadata_file:dir search;
@@ -78,6 +80,8 @@
 # allow apexd to read files from /data/app-staging and hardlink them to /data/apex.
 allow apexd staging_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow apexd staging_data_file:file { r_file_perms link };
+# # Allow relabeling file created in /data/apex/decompressed
+allow apexd staging_data_file:file relabelto;
 
 # allow apexd to read files from /vendor/apex
 allow apexd vendor_apex_file:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index cf0fa67..aff3a0a 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@
 
 # Untrusted apps are not allowed to use cgroups.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup:file *;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup_v2:file *;
 
 # /mnt/sdcard symlink was supposed to have been removed in Gingerbread. Apps
 # must not use it.
diff --git a/private/bpfloader.te b/private/bpfloader.te
index b2e5992..f1932bb 100644
--- a/private/bpfloader.te
+++ b/private/bpfloader.te
@@ -4,27 +4,32 @@
 typeattribute bpfloader coredomain;
 
 # These permissions are required to pin ebpf maps & programs.
-allow bpfloader fs_bpf:dir { create search write add_name };
-allow bpfloader fs_bpf:file { create setattr read };
+allow bpfloader { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir { add_name create search write };
+allow bpfloader { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file { create read setattr };
+allow fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf:filesystem associate;
 
 # Allow bpfloader to create bpf maps and programs.
 allow bpfloader self:bpf { map_create map_read map_write prog_load prog_run };
 
 allow bpfloader self:capability { chown sys_admin };
 
+set_prop(bpfloader, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
 
-# TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init
-neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } fs_bpf:dir setattr;
-neverallow { domain -bpfloader } fs_bpf:dir { create write add_name };
-neverallow domain fs_bpf:dir { reparent rename rmdir };
+# TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init; Note: we don't care about getattr/mounton/search
+neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir { open read setattr };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir { add_name create write };
+neverallow domain { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir ~{ add_name create getattr mounton open read search setattr write };
 
 # TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init
-neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -vendor_init } fs_bpf:file setattr;
-neverallow { domain -bpfloader } fs_bpf:file create;
-neverallow domain fs_bpf:file { rename unlink };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file { map open setattr };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file create;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -init -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file read;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file write;
+neverallow domain { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file ~{ create map open read setattr write };
 
 neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
 neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } *:bpf prog_run;
@@ -32,9 +37,7 @@
 
 neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init } bpfloader_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
 
-neverallow bpfloader domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow bpfloader *:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
 
 # No domain should be allowed to ptrace bpfloader
 neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') } bpfloader:process ptrace;
-
-set_prop(bpfloader, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
diff --git a/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil
index 61c073a..0f0069a 100644
--- a/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
     domain_verification_service
     dumpstate_tmpfs
     framework_watchdog_config_prop
+    fs_bpf_tethering
     fwk_stats_service
     game_service
     font_data_file
@@ -48,12 +49,15 @@
     hal_keymint_service
     hal_neuralnetworks_service
     hal_power_stats_service
+    hal_secureclock_service
+    hal_sharedsecret_service
     hal_weaver_service
     keystore_compat_hal_service
     keystore2_key_contexts_file
     legacy_permission_service
     location_time_zone_manager_service
     media_communication_service
+    media_metrics_service
     mediatuner_exec
     mediatuner_service
     mediatuner
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 57e93e4..94bd059 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
 allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:dir w_dir_perms;
 allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:file w_file_perms;
 
+allow domain cgroup_v2:dir search;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:dir w_dir_perms;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
 allow domain cgroup_rc_file:dir search;
 allow domain cgroup_rc_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow domain task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 8399cc8..c9779c8 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@
 /data/apex(/.*)?		u:object_r:apex_data_file:s0
 /data/apex/active/(.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
 /data/apex/backup/(.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+/data/apex/decompressed/(.*)?    u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
 /data/app(/.*)?                       u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
 # Traditional /data/app/[packageName]-[randomString]/base.apk location
 /data/app/[^/]+/oat(/.*)?                u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
diff --git a/private/genfs_contexts b/private/genfs_contexts
index 05dc06f..d205cd5 100644
--- a/private/genfs_contexts
+++ b/private/genfs_contexts
@@ -349,3 +349,4 @@
 genfscon usbfs / u:object_r:usbfs:s0
 genfscon binfmt_misc / u:object_r:binfmt_miscfs:s0
 genfscon bpf / u:object_r:fs_bpf:s0
+genfscon bpf /tethering u:object_r:fs_bpf_tethering:s0
diff --git a/private/logpersist.te b/private/logpersist.te
index ac324df..ab2c9c6 100644
--- a/private/logpersist.te
+++ b/private/logpersist.te
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 userdebug_or_eng(`
 
   r_dir_file(logpersist, cgroup)
+  r_dir_file(logpersist, cgroup_v2)
 
   allow logpersist misc_logd_file:file create_file_perms;
   allow logpersist misc_logd_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
diff --git a/private/network_stack.te b/private/network_stack.te
index f130e80..9598fa5 100644
--- a/private/network_stack.te
+++ b/private/network_stack.te
@@ -29,6 +29,13 @@
 
 binder_call(network_stack, netd);
 
+# in order to invoke side effect of close() on such a socket calling synchronize_rcu()
+# TODO: Remove this permission when 4.9 kernel is deprecated.
+allow network_stack self:key_socket create;
+
+# Grant read permission of connectivity namespace system property prefix.
+get_prop(network_stack, device_config_connectivity_prop)
+
 # Create/use netlink_tcpdiag_socket to get tcp info
 allow network_stack self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read nlmsg_write };
 ############### Tethering Service app - Tethering.apk ##############
@@ -37,13 +44,15 @@
 allow network_stack self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 allow network_stack network_stack_service:service_manager find;
 # allow Tethering(network_stack process) to run/update/read the eBPF maps to offload tethering traffic by eBPF.
-allow network_stack fs_bpf:dir search;
-allow network_stack fs_bpf:file { read write };
+allow network_stack { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir search;
+allow network_stack { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file { read write };
 allow network_stack bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
 
-# in order to invoke side effect of close() on such a socket calling synchronize_rcu()
-# TODO: Remove this permission when 4.9 kernel is deprecated.
-allow network_stack self:key_socket create;
+# Only the bpfloader and the network_stack should ever touch 'fs_bpf_tethering' programs/maps.
+# TODO: remove netd once netd/tethering mainline module split is complete
+# Unfortunately init/vendor_init have all sorts of extra privs
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:dir ~getattr;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:file *;
 
-# Grant read permission of connectivity namespace system property prefix.
-get_prop(network_stack, device_config_connectivity_prop)
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -network_stack } fs_bpf_tethering:dir ~{ getattr open read search setattr };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -network_stack } fs_bpf_tethering:file ~{ map open read setattr };
diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index 6e85b42..e5889d1 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@
 
 # Do not allow priv_app access to cgroups.
 neverallow priv_app cgroup:file *;
+neverallow priv_app cgroup_v2:file *;
 
 # Do not allow loading executable code from non-privileged
 # application home directories. Code loading across a security boundary
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index 1e248d4..42efcff 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -982,6 +982,7 @@
 ro.surface_flinger.set_touch_timer_ms                     u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
 ro.surface_flinger.set_display_power_timer_ms             u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
 ro.surface_flinger.support_kernel_idle_timer              u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.supports_background_blur               u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.surface_flinger.use_smart_90_for_video                 u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.surface_flinger.use_content_detection_for_refresh_rate u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.surface_flinger.color_space_agnostic_dataspace         u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index 502403c..7e250db 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 android.hardware.power.stats.IPowerStats/default                     u:object_r:hal_power_stats_service:s0
 android.hardware.rebootescrow.IRebootEscrow/default                  u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_service:s0
 android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintDevice/default             u:object_r:hal_keymint_service:s0
+android.hardware.security.secureclock.ISecureClock/default             u:object_r:hal_secureclock_service:s0
+android.hardware.security.sharedsecret.ISharedSecret/default             u:object_r:hal_sharedsecret_service:s0
 android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator/default                          u:object_r:hal_vibrator_service:s0
 android.hardware.vibrator.IVibratorManager/default                   u:object_r:hal_vibrator_service:s0
 android.hardware.weaver.IWeaver/default                              u:object_r:hal_weaver_service:s0
@@ -164,6 +166,7 @@
 media.drm                                 u:object_r:mediadrmserver_service:s0
 media.tuner                               u:object_r:mediatuner_service:s0
 media_communication                       u:object_r:media_communication_service:s0
+media_metrics                             u:object_r:media_metrics_service:s0
 media_projection                          u:object_r:media_projection_service:s0
 media_resource_monitor                    u:object_r:media_session_service:s0
 media_router                              u:object_r:media_router_service:s0
diff --git a/private/surfaceflinger.te b/private/surfaceflinger.te
index 37601b9..8549bd5 100644
--- a/private/surfaceflinger.te
+++ b/private/surfaceflinger.te
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
 allow surfaceflinger self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
 allow surfaceflinger proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, cgroup_v2)
 r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, system_file)
 allow surfaceflinger tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow surfaceflinger system_server:fd use;
diff --git a/private/system_app.te b/private/system_app.te
index 0aa46e3..36208bf 100644
--- a/private/system_app.te
+++ b/private/system_app.te
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@
 
 # Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks.
 allow system_app cgroup:file w_file_perms;
+allow system_app cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
 
 control_logd(system_app)
 read_runtime_log_tags(system_app)
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 479f85e..a11e951 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -192,6 +192,14 @@
 # Read /sys/kernel/dma_heap/*.
 allow system_server sysfs_dma_heap:file r_file_perms;
 
+# Allow reading DMA-BUF sysfs stats from /sys/kernel/dmabuf.
+allow system_server sysfs_dmabuf_stats:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server sysfs_dmabuf_stats:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow ActivityManager to look at the list of DMA-BUF heaps from /dev/dma_heap
+# for dumpsys meminfo
+allow system_server dmabuf_heap_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
 # The DhcpClient and WifiWatchdog use packet_sockets
 allow system_server self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 
@@ -887,8 +895,10 @@
 allow system_server frp_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
 allowxperm system_server frp_block_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKSECDISCARD BLKDISCARD };
 
-# Clean up old cgroups
+# Create new process groups and clean up old cgroups
 allow system_server cgroup:dir { remove_name rmdir };
+allow system_server cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server cgroup_v2:file { r_file_perms setattr };
 
 # /oem access
 r_dir_file(system_server, oemfs)
@@ -967,9 +977,8 @@
 allow system_server preloads_media_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name rmdir };
 
 r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup_v2)
 allow system_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
-allow system_server cgroup_v2:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow system_server cgroup_v2:file rw_file_perms;
 
 # Access to /dev/dma_heap/system
 allow system_server dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/zygote.te b/private/zygote.te
index 23fed52..1a3bcc6 100644
--- a/private/zygote.te
+++ b/private/zygote.te
@@ -108,6 +108,8 @@
 # Control cgroups.
 allow zygote cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow zygote cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+allow zygote cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow zygote cgroup_v2:{ file lnk_file } { r_file_perms setattr };
 allow zygote self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
 
 # Allow zygote to stat the files that it opens. The zygote must
@@ -190,7 +192,10 @@
 get_prop(zygote, device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
 
 # ingore spurious denials
-dontaudit zygote self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
+# fsetid can be checked as a consequence of chmod when using cgroup v2 uid/pid hierarchy. This is
+# done to determine if the file should inherit setgid. In this case, setgid on the file is
+# undesirable, so suppress the denial.
+dontaudit zygote self:global_capability_class_set { sys_resource fsetid };
 
 # Ignore spurious denials calling access() on fuse
 # TODO(b/151316657): avoid the denials
diff --git a/public/charger.te b/public/charger.te
index f57853a..37359e3 100644
--- a/public/charger.te
+++ b/public/charger.te
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 # Read access to pseudo filesystems.
 r_dir_file(charger, rootfs)
 r_dir_file(charger, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(charger, cgroup_v2)
 
 # Allow to read /sys/class/power_supply directory
 allow charger sysfs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/public/credstore.te b/public/credstore.te
index db16a8d..a2376d2 100644
--- a/public/credstore.te
+++ b/public/credstore.te
@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@
 allow credstore dropbox_service:service_manager find;
 
 r_dir_file(credstore, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(credstore, cgroup_v2)
diff --git a/public/dhcp.te b/public/dhcp.te
index 67fd038..1d875ab 100644
--- a/public/dhcp.te
+++ b/public/dhcp.te
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 net_domain(dhcp)
 
 allow dhcp cgroup:dir { create write add_name };
+allow dhcp cgroup_v2:dir { create write add_name };
 allow dhcp self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid net_admin net_raw net_bind_service };
 allow dhcp self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 allow dhcp self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index aaac8f0..6b29595 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -1322,10 +1322,12 @@
 
 # cgroupfs directories can be created, but not files within them.
 neverallow domain cgroup:file create;
+neverallow domain cgroup_v2:file create;
 
 dontaudit domain proc_type:dir write;
 dontaudit domain sysfs_type:dir write;
 dontaudit domain cgroup:file create;
+dontaudit domain cgroup_v2:file create;
 
 # These are only needed in permissive mode - in enforcing mode the
 # directory write check fails and so these are never attempted.
diff --git a/public/drmserver.te b/public/drmserver.te
index a24ad41..eede0fc 100644
--- a/public/drmserver.te
+++ b/public/drmserver.te
@@ -61,4 +61,5 @@
 selinux_check_access(drmserver)
 
 r_dir_file(drmserver, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(drmserver, cgroup_v2)
 r_dir_file(drmserver, system_file)
diff --git a/public/dumpstate.te b/public/dumpstate.te
index 2c5086f..45540b3 100644
--- a/public/dumpstate.te
+++ b/public/dumpstate.te
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@
 
 # Read /dev/cpuctl and /dev/cpuset
 r_dir_file(dumpstate, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(dumpstate, cgroup_v2)
 
 # Allow dumpstate to make binder calls to any binder service
 binder_call(dumpstate, binderservicedomain)
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index 181979c..a188c78 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@
 type sysfs_fs_f2fs, sysfs_type, fs_type;
 type sysfs_fs_incfs_features, sysfs_type, fs_type;
 type fs_bpf, fs_type;
+type fs_bpf_tethering, fs_type;
 type configfs, fs_type;
 # /sys/devices/cs_etm
 type sysfs_devices_cs_etm, fs_type, sysfs_type;
diff --git a/public/gatekeeperd.te b/public/gatekeeperd.te
index 7295c24..d48c5f8 100644
--- a/public/gatekeeperd.te
+++ b/public/gatekeeperd.te
@@ -39,3 +39,4 @@
 allow gatekeeperd hardware_properties_service:service_manager find;
 
 r_dir_file(gatekeeperd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(gatekeeperd, cgroup_v2)
diff --git a/public/hal_cas.te b/public/hal_cas.te
index 7de6a13..e699a6b 100644
--- a/public/hal_cas.te
+++ b/public/hal_cas.te
@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@
 allow hal_cas cgroup:dir { search write };
 allow hal_cas cgroup:file w_file_perms;
 
+r_dir_file(hal_cas, cgroup_v2)
+allow hal_cas cgroup_v2:dir { search write };
+allow hal_cas cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
 # Allow access to ion memory allocation device
 allow hal_cas ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_cas hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
diff --git a/public/hal_drm.te b/public/hal_drm.te
index 5987491..bb1bd91 100644
--- a/public/hal_drm.te
+++ b/public/hal_drm.te
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
 allow hal_drm cgroup:dir { search write };
 allow hal_drm cgroup:file w_file_perms;
 
+r_dir_file(hal_drm, cgroup_v2)
+allow hal_drm cgroup_v2:dir { search write };
+allow hal_drm cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
 # Allow access to ion memory allocation device
 allow hal_drm ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_drm hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
diff --git a/public/hal_fingerprint.te b/public/hal_fingerprint.te
index 99b6065..444cfda 100644
--- a/public/hal_fingerprint.te
+++ b/public/hal_fingerprint.te
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 allow hal_fingerprint fingerprint_vendor_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
 
 r_dir_file(hal_fingerprint, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(hal_fingerprint, cgroup_v2)
 r_dir_file(hal_fingerprint, sysfs)
 
 
diff --git a/public/hal_telephony.te b/public/hal_telephony.te
index 4cb0c5a..f0cf075 100644
--- a/public/hal_telephony.te
+++ b/public/hal_telephony.te
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 allow hal_telephony_server self:global_capability_class_set { setpcap setgid setuid net_admin net_raw };
 allow hal_telephony_server cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow hal_telephony_server cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server cgroup_v2:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
 allow hal_telephony_server radio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_telephony_server radio_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
 allow hal_telephony_server efs_file:dir create_dir_perms;
diff --git a/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te b/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
index 5fbe9f2..e19ad1c 100644
--- a/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
+++ b/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant kernel:system module_request;
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:global_capability_class_set { setuid net_admin setgid net_raw };
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
diff --git a/public/healthd.te b/public/healthd.te
index 8673846..05acb84 100644
--- a/public/healthd.te
+++ b/public/healthd.te
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 allow healthd sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 r_dir_file(healthd, rootfs)
 r_dir_file(healthd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(healthd, cgroup_v2)
 
 allow healthd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_tty_config };
 allow healthd self:global_capability_class_set sys_boot;
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index 59e6b4e..e546ece 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -103,7 +103,6 @@
     postinstall_mnt_dir
     mirror_data_file
 }:dir mounton;
-allow init cgroup_v2:dir { mounton create_dir_perms };
 
 # Mount bpf fs on sys/fs/bpf
 allow init fs_bpf:dir mounton;
@@ -132,6 +131,8 @@
 allow init cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow init cgroup_desc_api_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow init vendor_cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow init cgroup_v2:dir { mounton create_dir_perms};
+allow init cgroup_v2:file rw_file_perms;
 
 # /config
 allow init configfs:dir mounton;
diff --git a/public/inputflinger.te b/public/inputflinger.te
index c3f4da8..b62c06d 100644
--- a/public/inputflinger.te
+++ b/public/inputflinger.te
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@
 allow inputflinger input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
 r_dir_file(inputflinger, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(inputflinger, cgroup_v2)
diff --git a/public/installd.te b/public/installd.te
index b9c7b3e..61c8bce 100644
--- a/public/installd.te
+++ b/public/installd.te
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 allow installd oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow installd oemfs:file r_file_perms;
 allow installd cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow installd cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow installd mnt_expand_file:dir { search getattr };
 # Check validity of SELinux context before use.
 selinux_check_context(installd)
diff --git a/public/keystore.te b/public/keystore.te
index b8c599c..1c8d3bd 100644
--- a/public/keystore.te
+++ b/public/keystore.te
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 selinux_check_access(keystore)
 
 r_dir_file(keystore, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(keystore, cgroup_v2)
 
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
diff --git a/public/lmkd.te b/public/lmkd.te
index c9f2e64..de6052d 100644
--- a/public/lmkd.te
+++ b/public/lmkd.te
@@ -26,9 +26,11 @@
 
 # Clean up old cgroups
 allow lmkd cgroup:dir { remove_name rmdir };
+allow lmkd cgroup_v2:dir { remove_name rmdir };
 
 # Allow to read memcg stats
 allow lmkd cgroup:file r_file_perms;
+allow lmkd cgroup_v2:file r_file_perms;
 
 # Set self to SCHED_FIFO
 allow lmkd self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
diff --git a/public/logd.te b/public/logd.te
index b0acb14..8187179 100644
--- a/public/logd.te
+++ b/public/logd.te
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 # Read access to pseudo filesystems.
 r_dir_file(logd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(logd, cgroup_v2)
 r_dir_file(logd, proc_kmsg)
 r_dir_file(logd, proc_meminfo)
 
diff --git a/public/mediaextractor.te b/public/mediaextractor.te
index 1f34030..06f7928 100644
--- a/public/mediaextractor.te
+++ b/public/mediaextractor.te
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 hal_client_domain(mediaextractor, hal_allocator)
 
 r_dir_file(mediaextractor, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(mediaextractor, cgroup_v2)
 allow mediaextractor proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 
 crash_dump_fallback(mediaextractor)
diff --git a/public/mediametrics.te b/public/mediametrics.te
index 0e56b07..468c0d0 100644
--- a/public/mediametrics.te
+++ b/public/mediametrics.te
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 allow mediametrics system_server:fd use;
 
 r_dir_file(mediametrics, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(mediametrics, cgroup_v2)
 allow mediametrics proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 
 # allows interactions with dumpsys to GMScore
diff --git a/public/mediaserver.te b/public/mediaserver.te
index d32b9d9..388001d 100644
--- a/public/mediaserver.te
+++ b/public/mediaserver.te
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 
 r_dir_file(mediaserver, sdcard_type)
 r_dir_file(mediaserver, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(mediaserver, cgroup_v2)
 
 # stat /proc/self
 allow mediaserver proc:lnk_file getattr;
diff --git a/public/netd.te b/public/netd.te
index ff0bff6..4472938 100644
--- a/public/netd.te
+++ b/public/netd.te
@@ -64,8 +64,9 @@
 
 r_dir_file(netd, cgroup_v2)
 
-allow netd fs_bpf:dir search;
-allow netd fs_bpf:file { read write };
+# TODO: remove 'fs_bpf_tethering' once netd/tethering mainline module split is completed.
+allow netd { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir search;
+allow netd { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file { read write };
 
 # TODO: netd previously thought it needed these permissions to do WiFi related
 #       work.  However, after all the WiFi stuff is gone, we still need them.
diff --git a/public/performanced.te b/public/performanced.te
index 7dcb5ea..d694fda 100644
--- a/public/performanced.te
+++ b/public/performanced.te
@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@
 
 # Access /dev/cpuset/cpuset.cpus
 r_dir_file(performanced, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(performanced, cgroup_v2)
diff --git a/public/racoon.te b/public/racoon.te
index 6888740..e4b299e 100644
--- a/public/racoon.te
+++ b/public/racoon.te
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 allow racoon tun_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
 allowxperm racoon tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNSETIFF;
 allow racoon cgroup:dir { add_name create };
+allow racoon cgroup_v2:dir { add_name create };
 allow racoon kernel:system module_request;
 
 allow racoon self:key_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
diff --git a/public/sdcardd.te b/public/sdcardd.te
index 1ae3770..bb1c919 100644
--- a/public/sdcardd.te
+++ b/public/sdcardd.te
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 type sdcardd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
 
 allow sdcardd cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow sdcardd cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow sdcardd fuse_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow sdcardd rootfs:dir mounton;  # TODO: deprecated in M
 allow sdcardd sdcardfs:filesystem remount;
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index aea1b7c..2e7f8b1 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@
 type lock_settings_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type looper_stats_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type media_communication_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type media_metrics_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type media_projection_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type media_router_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type media_session_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -251,6 +252,8 @@
 type hal_power_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
 type hal_power_stats_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
 type hal_rebootescrow_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_secureclock_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_sharedsecret_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
 type hal_vibrator_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
 type hal_weaver_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
 
diff --git a/public/shell.te b/public/shell.te
index c8aa9e9..29c07a4 100644
--- a/public/shell.te
+++ b/public/shell.te
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@
 allow shell cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow shell cgroup_desc_api_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow shell vendor_cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(shell, cgroup_v2)
 allow shell domain:dir { search open read getattr };
 allow shell domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };
 
diff --git a/public/vendor_init.te b/public/vendor_init.te
index 5a0382d..97cbd0d 100644
--- a/public/vendor_init.te
+++ b/public/vendor_init.te
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
 # Create cgroups mount points in tmpfs and mount cgroups on them.
 allow vendor_init cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow vendor_init cgroup:file w_file_perms;
+allow vendor_init cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vendor_init cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
 
 # /config
 allow vendor_init configfs:dir mounton;
diff --git a/vendor/hal_keymint_default.te b/vendor/hal_keymint_default.te
index d86b7b4..3b86a1b 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_keymint_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_keymint_default.te
@@ -4,4 +4,7 @@
 type hal_keymint_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_keymint_default)
 
+hal_attribute_service(hal_keymint, hal_secureclock_service)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_keymint, hal_sharedsecret_service)
+
 get_prop(hal_keymint_default, vendor_security_patch_level_prop);