diff --git a/private/app.te b/private/app.te
index fa40b52..34cd2f0 100644
--- a/private/app.te
+++ b/private/app.te
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
   -platform_app
   -priv_app
   -shell
-  -sdk_sandbox
+  -sdk_sandbox_all
   -system_app
   -untrusted_app_all
 }, proc_net_type)
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
     -priv_app
     -shell
     -su
-    -sdk_sandbox
+    -sdk_sandbox_all
     -system_app
     -untrusted_app_all
   } proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
 dontaudit appdomain vendor_default_prop:file read;
 
 # Access to /mnt/media_rw/<vol> (limited by DAC to apps with external_storage gid)
-allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox } mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
+allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox_all } mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
 
 # allow apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
 # modify them other than to connect
@@ -137,67 +137,67 @@
 neverallow appdomain tombstone_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
 
 # Execute the shell or other system executables.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
-not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
 
 # Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
 # apps which cannot be in /vendor.
-r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, vendor_app_file)
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } vendor_app_file:file execute;
+r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, vendor_app_file)
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } vendor_app_file:file execute;
 
 # Perform binder IPC to sdk sandbox.
-binder_call(appdomain, sdk_sandbox)
+binder_call(appdomain, sdk_sandbox_all)
 
 # Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
 # and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
 # Read/write visible storage
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
 # This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
 # accesses to the underlying FS.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 
 # Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
 # http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
 #
 # USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
 # and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
 
 #logd access
-control_logd({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
+control_logd({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all })
 
 # application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
 
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
 
-use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
+use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all })
 
-use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
+use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all })
 
 # For app fuse.
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_client)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_manager)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_vsync)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, performance_client)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, display_client)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, display_manager)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, display_vsync)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, performance_client)
 # Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
-pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, bufferhub_client)
+pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, bufferhub_client)
 
 # Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
 # device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
-allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
+allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
 
 
 # WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
@@ -223,11 +223,11 @@
 allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 
 # Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
 # Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
-allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox_all } tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 
 # Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
 allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;
@@ -261,11 +261,14 @@
 allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
 
 # App sandbox file accesses.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox_all } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox_all } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
 
 # Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
+
+# Access open fds from SDK sandbox
+allow appdomain sdk_sandbox_data_file:file { getattr read };
 
 # Traverse into expanded storage
 allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -411,7 +414,7 @@
 allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
 
 # Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
 
 # Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
 allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
@@ -503,7 +506,7 @@
   nfc
   radio
   shared_relro
-  sdk_sandbox
+  sdk_sandbox_all
   system_app
 } {
   data_file_type
diff --git a/private/attributes b/private/attributes
index 991bac1..77143a3 100644
--- a/private/attributes
+++ b/private/attributes
@@ -10,3 +10,7 @@
 # property owner attributes must be exclusive.
 attribute system_and_vendor_property_type;
 expandattribute system_and_vendor_property_type false;
+
+# All SDK sandbox domains
+attribute sdk_sandbox_all;
+
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index b51fd3c..30ceb24 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@
   isolated_app_all
   ephemeral_app
   priv_app
-  sdk_sandbox
+  sdk_sandbox_all
   untrusted_app_all
 } system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
 
diff --git a/private/isolated_app_all.te b/private/isolated_app_all.te
index 200af1b..0617a57 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app_all.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app_all.te
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
 # excluding unix_stream_socket and unix_dgram_socket.
 # Many of these are socket families which have never and will never
 # be compiled into the Android kernel.
-neverallow isolated_app_all { self ephemeral_app priv_app sdk_sandbox untrusted_app_all }:{
+neverallow isolated_app_all { self ephemeral_app priv_app sdk_sandbox_all untrusted_app_all }:{
   socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket
   key_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket
   netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket
diff --git a/private/mediaprovider_app.te b/private/mediaprovider_app.te
index 1f84eca..7ad8feb 100644
--- a/private/mediaprovider_app.te
+++ b/private/mediaprovider_app.te
@@ -35,9 +35,6 @@
 # Talk to regular app services
 allow mediaprovider_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
 
-# Read SDK sandbox data files
-allow mediaprovider_app sdk_sandbox_data_file:file { getattr read };
-
 # Talk to the GPU service
 binder_call(mediaprovider_app, gpuservice)
 
diff --git a/private/net.te b/private/net.te
index 07e4271..4adf84c 100644
--- a/private/net.te
+++ b/private/net.te
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Bind to ports.
-allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox} node_type:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } node_bind;
-allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox} port_type:udp_socket name_bind;
-allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox} port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all} node_type:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } node_bind;
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all} port_type:udp_socket name_bind;
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all} port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
 
 # b/141455849 gate RTM_GETLINK with a new permission nlmsg_readpriv and block access from
 # untrusted_apps.
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
   -ephemeral_app
   -mediaprovider
   -priv_app
-  -sdk_sandbox
+  -sdk_sandbox_all
   -untrusted_app_all
 } self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv nlmsg_getneigh };
 
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index 8135ae5..102c111 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -406,6 +406,8 @@
 ro.camera.notify_nfc          u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.camera.enableLazyHal       u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.camera.enableCamera1MaxZsl u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.camera.disableJpegR        u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.camera.enableCompositeAPI0JpegR u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 
 ro.camerax.extensions.enabled u:object_r:camerax_extensions_prop:s0 exact bool
 
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox.te b/private/sdk_sandbox.te
deleted file mode 100644
index 3aca881..0000000
--- a/private/sdk_sandbox.te
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
-###
-### SDK Sandbox process.
-###
-### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes.
-
-type sdk_sandbox, domain;
-
-typeattribute sdk_sandbox coredomain;
-
-net_domain(sdk_sandbox)
-app_domain(sdk_sandbox)
-
-# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
-# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
-allow sdk_sandbox {
-    activity_service
-    activity_task_service
-    appops_service
-    audio_service
-    audioserver_service
-    batteryproperties_service
-    batterystats_service
-    cameraserver_service
-    connectivity_service
-    connmetrics_service
-    deviceidle_service
-    display_service
-    dropbox_service
-    ephemeral_app_api_service
-    font_service
-    game_service
-    gpu_service
-    graphicsstats_service
-    hardware_properties_service
-    hint_service
-    imms_service
-    input_method_service
-    input_service
-    IProxyService_service
-    ipsec_service
-    launcherapps_service
-    legacy_permission_service
-    light_service
-    locale_service
-    media_communication_service
-    mediadrmserver_service
-    mediaextractor_service
-    mediametrics_service
-    media_projection_service
-    media_router_service
-    mediaserver_service
-    media_session_service
-    memtrackproxy_service
-    midi_service
-    netpolicy_service
-    netstats_service
-    network_management_service
-    notification_service
-    package_service
-    permission_checker_service
-    permission_service
-    permissionmgr_service
-    platform_compat_service
-    power_service
-    procstats_service
-    radio_service
-    registry_service
-    restrictions_service
-    rttmanager_service
-    search_service
-    selection_toolbar_service
-    sensor_privacy_service
-    sensorservice_service
-    servicediscovery_service
-    settings_service
-    speech_recognition_service
-    statusbar_service
-    storagestats_service
-    surfaceflinger_service
-    telecom_service
-    tethering_service
-    textclassification_service
-    textservices_service
-    texttospeech_service
-    thermal_service
-    translation_service
-    tv_iapp_service
-    tv_input_service
-    uimode_service
-    vcn_management_service
-    webviewupdate_service
-}:service_manager find;
-
-allow sdk_sandbox system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans;
-
-# Required to read CTS tests data from the shell_data_file location.
-allow sdk_sandbox shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-allow sdk_sandbox shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-# allow sdk sandbox to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
-# modify them other than to connect
-allow sdk_sandbox system_server:udp_socket {
-        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
-
-# allow sandbox to search in sdk system server directory
-# additionally, for webview to work, getattr has been permitted
-allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { getattr search };
-# allow sandbox to create files and dirs in sdk data directory
-allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_data_file:file create_file_perms;
-
-###
-### neverallow rules
-###
-
-neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file }:file { execute execute_no_trans };
-
-# Receive or send uevent messages.
-neverallow sdk_sandbox domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
-
-# Receive or send generic netlink messages
-neverallow sdk_sandbox domain:netlink_socket *;
-
-# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
-# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
-neverallow sdk_sandbox debugfs:file read;
-
-# execute gpu_device
-neverallow sdk_sandbox gpu_device:chr_file execute;
-
-# access files in /sys with the default sysfs label
-neverallow sdk_sandbox sysfs:file *;
-
-# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
-# Create a more specific label if needed
-neverallow sdk_sandbox proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
-
-# Directly access external storage
-neverallow sdk_sandbox { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file {open create};
-neverallow sdk_sandbox { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:dir search;
-
-# Avoid reads to proc_net, it contains too much device wide information about
-# ongoing connections.
-neverallow sdk_sandbox proc_net:file no_rw_file_perms;
-
-# SDK sandbox processes have their own storage not related to app_data_file or privapp_data_file
-neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
-neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
-
-# SDK sandbox processes don't  have any access to external storage
-neverallow sdk_sandbox { media_rw_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
-neverallow sdk_sandbox { media_rw_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
-
-neverallow { sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:dir no_rw_file_perms;
-
-neverallow sdk_sandbox hal_drm_service:service_manager find;
-
-# Only certain system components should have access to sdk_sandbox_system_data_file
-# sdk_sandbox only needs search. Restricted in follow up neverallow rule.
-neverallow {
-    domain
-    -init
-    -installd
-    -system_server
-    -vold_prepare_subdirs
-} sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { relabelfrom };
-
-neverallow {
-    domain
-    -init
-    -installd
-    -sdk_sandbox
-    -system_server
-    -vold_prepare_subdirs
-    -zygote
-} sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
-
-# Only certain domains should be able to open and write to the SDK's data directory.
-neverallow {
-    domain
-    -artd
-    -init
-    -installd
-    -sdk_sandbox
-    -vold_prepare_subdirs
-} sdk_sandbox_data_file:dir ~{read getattr search};
-
-# Most domains shouldn't be able to open files in the SDK's data directory, unless given an open FD.
-neverallow {
-    domain
-    -artd
-    -init
-    -installd
-    -sdk_sandbox
-    -vold_prepare_subdirs
-} sdk_sandbox_data_file:file ~{append read write getattr lock map};
-
-# sdk_sandbox only needs to traverse through the sdk_sandbox_system_data_file
-neverallow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir ~{ getattr search };
-
-# Only dirs should be created at sdk_sandbox_system_data_file level
-neverallow { domain -init } sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:file *;
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d45da88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+###
+### SDK Sandbox process.
+###
+### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes
+### for targetSdkVersion=34.
+type sdk_sandbox_34, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all;
+
+net_domain(sdk_sandbox_34)
+app_domain(sdk_sandbox_34)
+
+# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
+# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
+allow sdk_sandbox_34 {
+    activity_service
+    activity_task_service
+    appops_service
+    audio_service
+    audioserver_service
+    batteryproperties_service
+    batterystats_service
+    cameraserver_service
+    connectivity_service
+    connmetrics_service
+    deviceidle_service
+    display_service
+    dropbox_service
+    ephemeral_app_api_service
+    font_service
+    game_service
+    gpu_service
+    graphicsstats_service
+    hardware_properties_service
+    hint_service
+    imms_service
+    input_method_service
+    input_service
+    IProxyService_service
+    ipsec_service
+    launcherapps_service
+    legacy_permission_service
+    light_service
+    locale_service
+    media_communication_service
+    mediadrmserver_service
+    mediaextractor_service
+    mediametrics_service
+    media_projection_service
+    media_router_service
+    mediaserver_service
+    media_session_service
+    memtrackproxy_service
+    midi_service
+    netpolicy_service
+    netstats_service
+    network_management_service
+    notification_service
+    package_service
+    permission_checker_service
+    permission_service
+    permissionmgr_service
+    platform_compat_service
+    power_service
+    procstats_service
+    radio_service
+    registry_service
+    restrictions_service
+    rttmanager_service
+    search_service
+    selection_toolbar_service
+    sensor_privacy_service
+    sensorservice_service
+    servicediscovery_service
+    settings_service
+    speech_recognition_service
+    statusbar_service
+    storagestats_service
+    surfaceflinger_service
+    telecom_service
+    tethering_service
+    textclassification_service
+    textservices_service
+    texttospeech_service
+    thermal_service
+    translation_service
+    tv_iapp_service
+    tv_input_service
+    uimode_service
+    vcn_management_service
+    webviewupdate_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_all.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_all.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e7ba50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_all.te
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+###
+### sdk_sandbox_all
+###
+### This file defines the rules shared by all sdk_sandbox_all domains.
+### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
+### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
+### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
+### directory).  The sdk_sandbox_all_all attribute is assigned to all default
+### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between FIRST_SDK_SANDBOX_UID (20000)
+### and LAST_SDK_SANDBOX_UID (29999) if the app has no specific seinfo
+### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.
+
+allow sdk_sandbox_all system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Required to read CTS tests data from the shell_data_file location.
+allow sdk_sandbox_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow sdk_sandbox_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# allow sdk sandbox to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow sdk_sandbox_all system_server:udp_socket {
+        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
+
+# allow sandbox to search in sdk system server directory
+# additionally, for webview to work, getattr has been permitted
+allow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+# allow sandbox to create files and dirs in sdk data directory
+allow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# allow apps to pass open fds to the sdk sandbox
+allow sdk_sandbox_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { getattr read };
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file }:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+
+# Receive or send uevent messages.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+
+# Receive or send generic netlink messages
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all domain:netlink_socket *;
+
+# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
+# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all debugfs:file read;
+
+# execute gpu_device
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all gpu_device:chr_file execute;
+
+# access files in /sys with the default sysfs label
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all sysfs:file *;
+
+# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
+# Create a more specific label if needed
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Directly access external storage
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file {open create};
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:dir search;
+
+# Avoid reads to proc_net, it contains too much device wide information about
+# ongoing connections.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all proc_net:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# SDK sandbox processes have their own storage not related to app_data_file or privapp_data_file
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file ~{ getattr read };
+
+# SDK sandbox processes don't  have any access to external storage
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { media_rw_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { media_rw_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox_all } tmpfs:dir no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all hal_drm_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Only certain system components should have access to sdk_sandbox_system_data_file
+# sdk_sandbox only needs search. Restricted in follow up neverallow rule.
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -installd
+    -system_server
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { relabelfrom };
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -installd
+    -sdk_sandbox_all
+    -system_server
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+    -zygote
+} sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+
+# Only certain system components should have access to sdk_sandbox_all_system_data_file
+# sdk_sandbox_all only needs search. Restricted in follow up neverallow rule.
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -installd
+    -system_server
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { relabelfrom };
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -installd
+    -sdk_sandbox_all
+    -system_server
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+    -zygote
+} sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+
+# sdk_sandbox_all only needs to traverse through the sdk_sandbox_all_system_data_file
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir ~{ getattr search };
+
+# Only dirs should be created at sdk_sandbox_all_system_data_file level
+neverallow { domain -init } sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:file *;
+
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_next.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_next.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fd16ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_next.te
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+###
+### SDK Sandbox process.
+###
+### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes
+### for a test set of restrictions. These restrictions will be adapted
+### with modifications, into the set of restrictions for the next SDK
+### level.
+type sdk_sandbox_next, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all;
+
+net_domain(sdk_sandbox_next)
+app_domain(sdk_sandbox_next)
+
+# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
+# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
+allow sdk_sandbox_next {
+    activity_service
+    activity_task_service
+    appops_service
+    audio_service
+    audioserver_service
+    batteryproperties_service
+    batterystats_service
+    connectivity_service
+    connmetrics_service
+    deviceidle_service
+    display_service
+    dropbox_service
+    font_service
+    game_service
+    gpu_service
+    graphicsstats_service
+    hardware_properties_service
+    hint_service
+    imms_service
+    input_method_service
+    input_service
+    IProxyService_service
+    ipsec_service
+    launcherapps_service
+    legacy_permission_service
+    light_service
+    locale_service
+    media_communication_service
+    mediaextractor_service
+    mediametrics_service
+    media_projection_service
+    media_router_service
+    mediaserver_service
+    media_session_service
+    memtrackproxy_service
+    midi_service
+    netpolicy_service
+    netstats_service
+    network_management_service
+    notification_service
+    package_service
+    permission_checker_service
+    permission_service
+    permissionmgr_service
+    platform_compat_service
+    power_service
+    procstats_service
+    registry_service
+    restrictions_service
+    rttmanager_service
+    search_service
+    selection_toolbar_service
+    sensor_privacy_service
+    sensorservice_service
+    servicediscovery_service
+    settings_service
+    speech_recognition_service
+    statusbar_service
+    storagestats_service
+    surfaceflinger_service
+    telecom_service
+    tethering_service
+    textclassification_service
+    textservices_service
+    texttospeech_service
+    thermal_service
+    translation_service
+    tv_iapp_service
+    tv_input_service
+    uimode_service
+    vcn_management_service
+    webviewupdate_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index 48ddeb8..4454bd7 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #       minTargetSdkVersion (unsigned integer)
 #       fromRunAs (boolean)
 #       isIsolatedComputeApp (boolean)
+#       isSdkSandboxNext (boolean)
 #
 # All specified input selectors in an entry must match (i.e. logical AND).
 # An unspecified string or boolean selector with no default will match any
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@
 # with user=_isolated. This selector should not be used unless it is intended
 # to provide isolated processes with relaxed security restrictions.
 #
+# isSdkSandboxNext=true means sdk sandbox processes will get
+# sdk_sandbox_next sepolicy applied to them.
+#
 # Precedence: entries are compared using the following rules, in the order shown
 # (see external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android_platform.c,
 # seapp_context_cmp()).
@@ -64,6 +68,7 @@
 #              defaults to 0 if unspecified.
 #       (8) fromRunAs=true before fromRunAs=false.
 #       (9) isIsolatedComputeApp=true before isIsolatedComputeApp=false
+#       (10) isSdkSandboxNext=true before isSdkSandboxNext=false
 # (A fixed selector is more specific than a prefix, i.e. ending in *, and a
 # longer prefix is more specific than a shorter prefix.)
 # Apps are checked against entries in precedence order until the first match,
@@ -148,8 +153,8 @@
 
 isSystemServer=true domain=system_server_startup
 
-# sdksandbox must run in the sdksandbox domain
-neverallow name=com.android.sdksandbox domain=((?!sdk_sandbox).)*
+# sdksandbox must run in an sdksandbox domain
+neverallow user=_sdksandbox domain=((?!sdk_sandbox).)*
 
 user=_app seinfo=platform name=com.android.traceur domain=traceur_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=system seinfo=platform domain=system_app type=system_app_data_file
@@ -164,7 +169,8 @@
 user=webview_zygote seinfo=webview_zygote domain=webview_zygote
 user=_isolated domain=isolated_app levelFrom=user
 user=_isolated isIsolatedComputeApp=true domain=isolated_compute_app levelFrom=user
-user=_sdksandbox domain=sdk_sandbox type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_sdksandbox domain=sdk_sandbox_34 type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_sdksandbox isSdkSandboxNext=true domain=sdk_sandbox_next type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app seinfo=app_zygote domain=app_zygote levelFrom=user
 user=_app seinfo=media domain=mediaprovider type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index 69c4a94..a617016 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@
 storaged                                  u:object_r:storaged_service:s0
 storaged_pri                              u:object_r:storaged_service:s0
 storagestats                              u:object_r:storagestats_service:s0
+# sdk_sandbox here refers to the service name, not the domain name.
 sdk_sandbox                               u:object_r:sdk_sandbox_service:s0
 SurfaceFlinger                            u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0
 SurfaceFlingerAIDL                        u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index db6820d..4356c26 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -1207,6 +1207,7 @@
 
 # On userdebug build we may profile system server. Allow it to write and create its own profile.
 userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow system_server user_profile_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
   allow system_server user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 ')
 # Allow system server to load JVMTI agents under control of a property.
diff --git a/private/technical_debt.cil b/private/technical_debt.cil
index 485ce53..4286053 100644
--- a/private/technical_debt.cil
+++ b/private/technical_debt.cil
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 
 ; Apps, except isolated apps and SDK sandboxes, are clients of Drm-related services
 ; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
-(typeattributeset hal_drm_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (or (isolated_app_all) (sdk_sandbox)))))))
+(typeattributeset hal_drm_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (or (isolated_app_all) (sdk_sandbox_all)))))))
 
 ; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Configstore HAL
 ; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
diff --git a/tools/check_seapp.c b/tools/check_seapp.c
index e57a6b3..0d7a4d1 100644
--- a/tools/check_seapp.c
+++ b/tools/check_seapp.c
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@
                 { .name = "minTargetSdkVersion", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_uint },
                 { .name = "fromRunAs",       .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
                 { .name = "isIsolatedComputeApp", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
+                { .name = "isSdkSandboxNext", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
                 /*Outputs*/
                 { .name = "domain",         .dir = dir_out, .fn_validate = validate_domain  },
                 { .name = "type",           .dir = dir_out, .fn_validate = validate_type  },