diff --git a/Android.bp b/Android.bp
index 1ec7570..a43a689 100644
--- a/Android.bp
+++ b/Android.bp
@@ -294,6 +294,20 @@
     // top_half: "31.0.ignore.cil",
 }
 
+se_cil_compat_map {
+    name: "system_ext_30.0.ignore.cil",
+    bottom_half: [":30.0.board.ignore.map"],
+    // top_half: "system_ext_31.0.ignore.cil",
+    system_ext_specific: true,
+}
+
+se_cil_compat_map {
+    name: "product_30.0.ignore.cil",
+    bottom_half: [":30.0.board.ignore.map"],
+    // top_half: "product_31.0.ignore.cil",
+    product_specific: true,
+}
+
 se_compat_cil {
     name: "26.0.compat.cil",
     srcs: [":26.0.board.compat.cil"],
@@ -913,63 +927,3 @@
     cts: true,
     exclude_build_test: true,
 }
-
-//////////////////////////////////
-// modules for microdroid
-//////////////////////////////////
-
-// microdroid's system sepolicy is almost identical to host's system sepolicy, except that
-// microdroid doesn't have system_ext and product. So microdroid's plat_pub_versioned.cil is
-// generated with plat_pub_policy.cil (exported system), not pub_policy.cil (exported system +
-// system_ext + product). Other two files, plat_sepolicy.cil and plat_mapping_file, are copied from
-// host's files.
-se_versioned_policy {
-    name: "microdroid_plat_pub_versioned.cil",
-    stem: "plat_pub_versioned.cil",
-    base: ":plat_pub_policy.cil",
-    target_policy: ":plat_pub_policy.cil",
-    version: "current",
-    dependent_cils: [
-        ":plat_sepolicy.cil",
-        ":plat_mapping_file",
-    ],
-    installable: false,
-}
-
-// microdroid's vendor sepolicy is a minimalized sepolicy needed for microdroid to boot. It just
-// contains system/sepolicy/public and system/sepolicy/vendor.
-se_policy_conf {
-    name: "microdroid_vendor_sepolicy.conf",
-    srcs: [":se_build_files{.plat_vendor}"],
-    installable: false,
-}
-
-se_policy_cil {
-    name: "microdroid_vendor_sepolicy.cil.raw",
-    src: ":microdroid_vendor_sepolicy.conf",
-    filter_out: [":reqd_policy_mask.cil"],
-    secilc_check: false, // will be done in se_versioned_policy module
-    installable: false,
-}
-
-se_versioned_policy {
-    name: "microdroid_vendor_sepolicy.cil",
-    stem: "vendor_sepolicy.cil",
-    base: ":plat_pub_policy.cil",
-    target_policy: ":microdroid_vendor_sepolicy.cil.raw",
-    version: "current", // microdroid is bundled to system
-    dependent_cils: [
-        ":plat_sepolicy.cil",
-        ":microdroid_plat_pub_versioned.cil",
-        ":plat_mapping_file",
-    ],
-    filter_out: [":microdroid_plat_pub_versioned.cil"],
-    installable: false,
-}
-
-sepolicy_vers {
-    name: "microdroid_plat_sepolicy_vers.txt",
-    version: "platform",
-    stem: "plat_sepolicy_vers.txt",
-    installable: false,
-}
diff --git a/Android.mk b/Android.mk
index 882f397..d9c5b3c 100644
--- a/Android.mk
+++ b/Android.mk
@@ -1380,6 +1380,130 @@
 	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/build_sepolicy -a $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES) filter_out \
 		-f $(PRIVATE_REQD_MASK) -t $@
 
+
+#####################################################
+intermediates := $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,built_system_ext_sepolicy,,,,)
+
+policy_files := $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
+  $(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY) $(SYSTEM_EXT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(SYSTEM_EXT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
+base_system_ext_policy.conf := $(intermediates)/base_system_ext_policy.conf
+$(base_system_ext_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
+$(base_system_ext_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
+$(base_system_ext_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT := user
+$(base_system_ext_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_ARCH := $(my_target_arch)
+$(base_system_ext_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN := $(with_asan)
+$(base_system_ext_policy.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
+$(base_system_ext_policy.conf): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY_SPLIT := true
+$(base_system_ext_policy.conf): PRIVATE_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY := $(PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY)
+$(base_system_ext_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW := $(treble_sysprop_neverallow)
+$(base_system_ext_policy.conf): PRIVATE_POLICY_FILES := $(policy_files)
+$(base_system_ext_policy.conf): $(policy_files) $(M4)
+	$(transform-policy-to-conf)
+	$(hide) sed '/^\s*dontaudit.*;/d' $@ | sed '/^\s*dontaudit/,/;/d' > $@.dontaudit
+
+built_system_ext_sepolicy := $(intermediates)/built_system_ext_sepolicy
+$(built_system_ext_sepolicy): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_CIL_FILES := \
+  $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_cil_workaround_files), $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
+$(built_system_ext_sepolicy): PRIVATE_NEVERALLOW_ARG := $(NEVERALLOW_ARG)
+$(built_system_ext_sepolicy): $(base_system_ext_policy.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy \
+$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc \
+$(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_cil_workaround_files), $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY)) \
+$(built_sepolicy_neverallows)
+	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -C -c \
+                $(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
+	$(hide) cat $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_CIL_FILES) >> $@
+	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc -m -M true -G -c $(POLICYVERS) $(PRIVATE_NEVERALLOW_ARG) $@ -o $@ -f /dev/null
+
+policy_files := $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
+$(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(SYSTEM_EXT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY))
+base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf := $(intermediates)/base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT := user
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_ARCH := $(my_target_arch)
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN := $(with_asan)
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY_SPLIT := true
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY := $(PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY)
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW := $(treble_sysprop_neverallow)
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_POLICY_FILES := $(policy_files)
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf): $(policy_files) $(M4)
+	$(transform-policy-to-conf)
+
+base_system_ext_pub_policy.cil := $(intermediates)/base_system_ext_pub_policy.cil
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.cil): PRIVATE_POL_CONF := $(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf)
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.cil): PRIVATE_REQD_MASK := $(reqd_policy_mask.cil)
+$(base_system_ext_pub_policy.cil): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy \
+$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/build_sepolicy $(base_system_ext_pub_policy.conf) $(reqd_policy_mask.cil)
+	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $< -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $(PRIVATE_POL_CONF)
+	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/build_sepolicy -a $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES) filter_out \
+		-f $(PRIVATE_REQD_MASK) -t $@
+
+
+################################################################################
+intermediates := $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,built_product_sepolicy,,,,)
+
+policy_files := $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
+  $(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY) $(SYSTEM_EXT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(SYSTEM_EXT_PRIVATE_POLICY) \
+  $(PRODUCT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(PRODUCT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
+base_product_policy.conf := $(intermediates)/base_product_policy.conf
+$(base_product_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
+$(base_product_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
+$(base_product_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT := user
+$(base_product_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_ARCH := $(my_target_arch)
+$(base_product_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN := $(with_asan)
+$(base_product_policy.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
+$(base_product_policy.conf): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY_SPLIT := true
+$(base_product_policy.conf): PRIVATE_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY := $(PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY)
+$(base_product_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW := $(treble_sysprop_neverallow)
+$(base_product_policy.conf): PRIVATE_POLICY_FILES := $(policy_files)
+$(base_product_policy.conf): $(policy_files) $(M4)
+	$(transform-policy-to-conf)
+	$(hide) sed '/^\s*dontaudit.*;/d' $@ | sed '/^\s*dontaudit/,/;/d' > $@.dontaudit
+
+built_product_sepolicy := $(intermediates)/built_product_sepolicy
+$(built_product_sepolicy): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_CIL_FILES := \
+  $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_cil_workaround_files), $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
+$(built_product_sepolicy): PRIVATE_NEVERALLOW_ARG := $(NEVERALLOW_ARG)
+$(built_product_sepolicy): $(base_product_policy.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy \
+$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc \
+$(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_cil_workaround_files), $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY)) \
+$(built_sepolicy_neverallows)
+	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -C -c \
+                $(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
+	$(hide) cat $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_CIL_FILES) >> $@
+	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc -m -M true -G -c $(POLICYVERS) $(PRIVATE_NEVERALLOW_ARG) $@ -o $@ -f /dev/null
+
+
+policy_files := $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
+$(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(SYSTEM_EXT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(PRODUCT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY))
+base_product_pub_policy.conf := $(intermediates)/base_product_pub_policy.conf
+$(base_product_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
+$(base_product_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
+$(base_product_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT := user
+$(base_product_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_ARCH := $(my_target_arch)
+$(base_product_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TGT_WITH_ASAN := $(with_asan)
+$(base_product_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
+$(base_product_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY_SPLIT := true
+$(base_product_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY := $(PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY)
+$(base_product_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW := $(treble_sysprop_neverallow)
+$(base_product_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_POLICY_FILES := $(policy_files)
+$(base_product_pub_policy.conf): $(policy_files) $(M4)
+	$(transform-policy-to-conf)
+
+base_product_pub_policy.cil := $(intermediates)/base_product_pub_policy.cil
+$(base_product_pub_policy.cil): PRIVATE_POL_CONF := $(base_product_pub_policy.conf)
+$(base_product_pub_policy.cil): PRIVATE_REQD_MASK := $(reqd_policy_mask.cil)
+$(base_product_pub_policy.cil): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy \
+$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/build_sepolicy $(base_product_pub_policy.conf) $(reqd_policy_mask.cil)
+	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $< -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $(PRIVATE_POL_CONF)
+	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/build_sepolicy -a $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES) filter_out \
+                -f $(PRIVATE_REQD_MASK) -t $@
+
 ifeq ($(PRODUCT_SEPOLICY_SPLIT),true)
 # Tests for Treble compatibility of current platform policy and vendor policy of
 # given release version.
diff --git a/OWNERS b/OWNERS
index 866b7b6..c5b61ae 100644
--- a/OWNERS
+++ b/OWNERS
@@ -9,3 +9,4 @@
 jiyong@google.com
 smoreland@google.com
 trong@google.com
+tweek@google.com
diff --git a/apex/Android.bp b/apex/Android.bp
index 2ffaa9e..b5199f0 100644
--- a/apex/Android.bp
+++ b/apex/Android.bp
@@ -71,6 +71,13 @@
 }
 
 filegroup {
+  name: "com.android.compos-file_contexts",
+  srcs: [
+    "com.android.compos-file_contexts",
+  ],
+}
+
+filegroup {
   name: "com.android.conscrypt-file_contexts",
   srcs: [
     "com.android.conscrypt-file_contexts",
diff --git a/apex/com.android.compos-file_contexts b/apex/com.android.compos-file_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83b4b58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apex/com.android.compos-file_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+(/.*)?                   u:object_r:system_file:s0
diff --git a/apex/com.android.virt-file_contexts b/apex/com.android.virt-file_contexts
index 4703eba..ad8d55c 100644
--- a/apex/com.android.virt-file_contexts
+++ b/apex/com.android.virt-file_contexts
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-(/.*)?                   u:object_r:system_file:s0
-/bin/crosvm              u:object_r:crosvm_exec:s0
-/bin/virtmanager         u:object_r:virtmanager_exec:s0
+(/.*)?                     u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/bin/crosvm                u:object_r:crosvm_exec:s0
+/bin/virtualizationservice u:object_r:virtualizationservice_exec:s0
diff --git a/build/soong/compat_cil.go b/build/soong/compat_cil.go
index 5cc73f9..230fdc3 100644
--- a/build/soong/compat_cil.go
+++ b/build/soong/compat_cil.go
@@ -87,15 +87,6 @@
 
 	srcPaths := c.expandSeSources(ctx)
 	out := android.PathForModuleGen(ctx, c.Name())
-
-	// TODO(b/183362912): Patch secilc to handle empty cil files.
-	// Put a header so that the generated cil mustn't be empty.
-	header := android.PathForModuleGen(ctx, c.Name()+"_header")
-	rule := android.NewRuleBuilder(pctx, ctx)
-	rule.Command().Text("echo").Flag(proptools.ShellEscape(";; " + c.stem())).Text(">").Output(header)
-	rule.Build(c.Name()+"_header", "Generate cil header")
-	srcPaths = append(android.Paths{header}, srcPaths...)
-
 	ctx.Build(pctx, android.BuildParams{
 		Rule:        android.Cat,
 		Inputs:      srcPaths,
diff --git a/build/soong/policy.go b/build/soong/policy.go
index 75fbdf1..604014f 100644
--- a/build/soong/policy.go
+++ b/build/soong/policy.go
@@ -175,13 +175,13 @@
 }
 
 func (c *policyConf) GenerateAndroidBuildActions(ctx android.ModuleContext) {
-	c.installSource = c.transformPolicyToConf(ctx)
-	c.installPath = android.PathForModuleInstall(ctx, "etc")
-	ctx.InstallFile(c.installPath, c.stem(), c.installSource)
-
 	if !c.installable() {
 		c.SkipInstall()
 	}
+
+	c.installSource = c.transformPolicyToConf(ctx)
+	c.installPath = android.PathForModuleInstall(ctx, "etc")
+	ctx.InstallFile(c.installPath, c.stem(), c.installSource)
 }
 
 func (c *policyConf) AndroidMkEntries() []android.AndroidMkEntries {
@@ -325,6 +325,10 @@
 	conf := android.PathForModuleSrc(ctx, *c.properties.Src)
 	cil := c.compileConfToCil(ctx, conf)
 
+	if !c.Installable() {
+		c.SkipInstall()
+	}
+
 	if c.InstallInDebugRamdisk() {
 		// for userdebug_plat_sepolicy.cil
 		c.installPath = android.PathForModuleInstall(ctx)
@@ -333,10 +337,6 @@
 	}
 	c.installSource = cil
 	ctx.InstallFile(c.installPath, c.stem(), c.installSource)
-
-	if !c.Installable() {
-		c.SkipInstall()
-	}
 }
 
 func (c *policyCil) AndroidMkEntries() []android.AndroidMkEntries {
diff --git a/build/soong/sepolicy_vers.go b/build/soong/sepolicy_vers.go
index 0d938e7..9d1fe78 100644
--- a/build/soong/sepolicy_vers.go
+++ b/build/soong/sepolicy_vers.go
@@ -82,13 +82,13 @@
 	rule.Command().Text("echo").Text(ver).Text(">").Output(out)
 	rule.Build("sepolicy_vers", v.Name())
 
-	v.installPath = android.PathForModuleInstall(ctx, "etc", "selinux")
-	v.installSource = out
-	ctx.InstallFile(v.installPath, v.stem(), v.installSource)
-
 	if !v.installable() {
 		v.SkipInstall()
 	}
+
+	v.installPath = android.PathForModuleInstall(ctx, "etc", "selinux")
+	v.installSource = out
+	ctx.InstallFile(v.installPath, v.stem(), v.installSource)
 }
 
 func (v *sepolicyVers) AndroidMkEntries() []android.AndroidMkEntries {
diff --git a/build/soong/versioned_policy.go b/build/soong/versioned_policy.go
index f25cd59..d4bdd74 100644
--- a/build/soong/versioned_policy.go
+++ b/build/soong/versioned_policy.go
@@ -151,16 +151,16 @@
 
 	rule.Build("mapping", "Versioning mapping file "+ctx.ModuleName())
 
+	if !m.installable() {
+		m.SkipInstall()
+	}
+
 	m.installSource = out
 	m.installPath = android.PathForModuleInstall(ctx, "etc", "selinux")
 	if subdir := proptools.String(m.properties.Relative_install_path); subdir != "" {
 		m.installPath = m.installPath.Join(ctx, subdir)
 	}
 	ctx.InstallFile(m.installPath, m.installSource.Base(), m.installSource)
-
-	if !m.installable() {
-		m.SkipInstall()
-	}
 }
 
 func (m *versionedPolicy) AndroidMkEntries() []android.AndroidMkEntries {
diff --git a/prebuilt_policy.mk b/prebuilt_policy.mk
index a591a48..e46f92a 100644
--- a/prebuilt_policy.mk
+++ b/prebuilt_policy.mk
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@
 	$(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -C -c \
 	$(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
 	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/build_sepolicy -a $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES) filter_out \
-		-f $(PRIVATE_PLAT_CIL) -t $@
+		-f $(PRIVATE_PLAT_CIL_FILES) -t $@
 	# Line markers (denoted by ;;) are malformed after above cmd. They are only
 	# used for debugging, so we remove them.
 	$(hide) grep -v ';;' $@ > $@.tmp
diff --git a/private/adbd.te b/private/adbd.te
index 3fc77a2..c2c6164 100644
--- a/private/adbd.te
+++ b/private/adbd.te
@@ -84,6 +84,10 @@
 allow adbd anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow adbd anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 
+# adb pull /vendor/framework/*
+allow adbd vendor_framework_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd vendor_framework_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 # Set service.adb.*, sys.powerctl, and sys.usb.ffs.ready properties.
 set_prop(adbd, shell_prop)
 set_prop(adbd, powerctl_prop)
@@ -213,6 +217,9 @@
 allow adbd apex_data_file:dir search;
 allow adbd staging_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 
+# Allow adbd to pull /apex/apex-info-list.xml for CTS tests.
+allow adbd apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/private/apexd.te b/private/apexd.te
index 862bab9..b05fecb 100644
--- a/private/apexd.te
+++ b/private/apexd.te
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 allow apexd apex_ota_reserved_file:file create_file_perms;
 
 # Allow apexd to create files and directories for snapshots of apex data
+allow apexd apex_appsearch_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_appsearch_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
 allow apexd apex_art_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
 allow apexd apex_art_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
 allow apexd apex_permission_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
@@ -81,6 +83,9 @@
 # allow apexd to create /apex/apex-info-list.xml and relabel to apex_info_file
 allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom mounton };
 allow apexd apex_info_file:file relabelto;
+# apexd needs to update /apex/apex-info-list.xml after non-staged APEX update.
+allow apexd apex_info_file:file rw_file_perms;
+
 # allow apexd to unlink apex files in /data/apex/active
 # note that apexd won't be able to unlink files in /data/app-staging/session_XXXX,
 # because it doesn't have write permission for staging_data_file object.
@@ -187,6 +192,13 @@
 # only apexd can write apex-info-list.xml
 neverallow { domain -apexd } apex_info_file:file no_w_file_perms;
 
+# Only apexd and init should be allowed to manage /apex mounts
+# A note on otapreopt_chroot. It used to mount APEXes during postainstall stage of A/B OTAs,
+# but starting from S it just calls into apexd to prepare /apex for otapreoprt. Once the sepolicies
+# around otapreopt_chroot are cleaned up we should be able to remove it from the lists below.
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:filesystem { mount unmount };
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:dir { mounton };
+
 # Allow for use in postinstall
 allow apexd otapreopt_chroot:fd use;
 allow apexd postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
diff --git a/private/app.te b/private/app.te
index 94d24e0..2b3554f 100644
--- a/private/app.te
+++ b/private/app.te
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@
 get_prop(appdomain, vold_config_prop)
 get_prop(appdomain, adbd_config_prop)
 
+# Allow ART to be configurable via device_config properties
+# (ART "runs" inside the app process)
+get_prop(appdomain, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
 userdebug_or_eng(`perfetto_producer({ appdomain })')
 
 # Prevent apps from causing presubmit failures.
diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index aff3a0a..096a41b 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -117,12 +117,7 @@
 } *;
 
 # Disallow sending RTM_GETLINK messages on netlink sockets.
-neverallow {
-  all_untrusted_apps
-  -untrusted_app_25
-  -untrusted_app_27
-  -untrusted_app_29
-} domain:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps access to /cache
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
diff --git a/private/app_zygote.te b/private/app_zygote.te
index 7f2236c..4ee3af7 100644
--- a/private/app_zygote.te
+++ b/private/app_zygote.te
@@ -75,6 +75,10 @@
 # Send unsolicited message to system_server
 unix_socket_send(app_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
 
+# Allow the app_zygote to access the runtime feature flag properties.
+get_prop(app_zygote, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(app_zygote, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
 #####
 ##### Neverallow
 #####
diff --git a/private/artd.te b/private/artd.te
index a76074b..0aa12dc 100644
--- a/private/artd.te
+++ b/private/artd.te
@@ -10,3 +10,7 @@
 typeattribute artd coredomain;
 
 init_daemon_domain(artd)
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(artd, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(artd, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
diff --git a/private/audioserver.te b/private/audioserver.te
index 5047e2c..feda8d4 100644
--- a/private/audioserver.te
+++ b/private/audioserver.te
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 allow audioserver external_vibrator_service:service_manager find;
 allow audioserver package_native_service:service_manager find;
 allow audioserver permission_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver permission_checker_service:service_manager find;
 allow audioserver power_service:service_manager find;
 allow audioserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
 allow audioserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
@@ -94,7 +95,8 @@
 # permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
 # Lengthier explanation here:
 # https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
-neverallow audioserver domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow audioserver domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow audioserver { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;
 
 # Allow using wake locks
 wakelock_use(audioserver)
diff --git a/private/bpfloader.te b/private/bpfloader.te
index ae9b52c..343ec7a 100644
--- a/private/bpfloader.te
+++ b/private/bpfloader.te
@@ -27,13 +27,13 @@
 # TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init
 neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file { map open setattr };
 neverallow { domain -bpfloader } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file create;
-neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -init -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file read;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -init -lmkd -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file read;
 neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file write;
 neverallow domain { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file ~{ create map open read setattr write };
 
 neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
 neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } *:bpf prog_run;
-neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -network_stack -system_server } *:bpf { map_read map_write };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -lmkd -netd -network_stack -system_server } *:bpf { map_read map_write };
 
 neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init } bpfloader_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
 
diff --git a/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil
index 59c07d3..6e66493 100644
--- a/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
     ab_update_gki_prop
     adbd_config_prop
     apc_service
+    apex_appsearch_data_file
     apex_art_data_file
     apex_art_staging_data_file
     apex_info_file
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@
     cgroup_v2
     codec2_config_prop
     ctl_snapuserd_prop
+    dck_prop
     debugfs_kprobes
     debugfs_mm_events_tracing
     debugfs_bootreceiver_tracing
diff --git a/private/crosvm.te b/private/crosvm.te
index 5d7080a..f7729fd 100644
--- a/private/crosvm.te
+++ b/private/crosvm.te
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
 # Let crosvm create temporary files.
 tmpfs_domain(crosvm)
 
-# Let crosvm receive file descriptors from virtmanager.
-allow crosvm virtmanager:fd use;
+# Let crosvm receive file descriptors from VirtualizationService.
+allow crosvm virtualizationservice:fd use;
 
 # Let crosvm open /dev/kvm.
 allow crosvm kvm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/dexoptanalyzer.te b/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
index 5f0a41e..d194acb 100644
--- a/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
+++ b/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
@@ -47,3 +47,7 @@
 
 # Allow testing /data/user/0 which symlinks to /data/data
 allow dexoptanalyzer system_data_file:lnk_file { getattr };
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(dexoptanalyzer, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(dexoptanalyzer, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
diff --git a/private/fastbootd.te b/private/fastbootd.te
index 0174faa..40b3945 100644
--- a/private/fastbootd.te
+++ b/private/fastbootd.te
@@ -41,4 +41,7 @@
 
   # Mount /metadata to interact with Virtual A/B snapshots.
   allow fastbootd labeledfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
+
+  # Needed for reading boot properties.
+  allow fastbootd proc_bootconfig:file r_file_perms;
 ')
diff --git a/private/file.te b/private/file.te
index a024600..0f7e689 100644
--- a/private/file.te
+++ b/private/file.te
@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@
 # /data/misc/odsign
 type odsign_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 
+# /data/misc/virtualizationservice
+type virtualizationservice_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
 # /data/system/environ
 type environ_system_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 4a4867b..89b63d6 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -565,12 +565,12 @@
 
 # Misc data
 /data/misc/adb(/.*)?            u:object_r:adb_keys_file:s0
-/data/misc/a11ytrace(/.*)?        u:object_r:accessibility_trace_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/a11ytrace(/.*)?      u:object_r:accessibility_trace_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
-/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.art(/.*)?    u:object_r:apex_art_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.art(/.*)?           u:object_r:apex_art_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.permission(/.*)?    u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.scheduling(/.*)?    u:object_r:apex_scheduling_data_file:s0
-/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)?    u:object_r:apex_wifi_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)?          u:object_r:apex_wifi_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/apns(/.*)?           u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/appcompat(/.*)?      u:object_r:appcompat_data_file:s0
@@ -620,6 +620,7 @@
 /data/misc/textclassifier(/.*)?       u:object_r:textclassifier_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/train-info(/.*)?     u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/user(/.*)?           u:object_r:misc_user_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/virtualizationservice(/.*)? u:object_r:virtualizationservice_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/vpn(/.*)?            u:object_r:vpn_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/wifi(/.*)?           u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0
 /data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0
@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@
 # Apex data directories
 /data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
 /data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.appsearch(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_appsearch_data_file:s0
 /data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.permission(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
 /data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.permission(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
 /data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_wifi_data_file:s0
diff --git a/private/gmscore_app.te b/private/gmscore_app.te
index 10de777..571d155 100644
--- a/private/gmscore_app.te
+++ b/private/gmscore_app.te
@@ -135,3 +135,6 @@
 # b/168059475 Allow GMSCore to read Virtual AB properties to determine
 # if device supports VAB.
 get_prop(gmscore_app, virtual_ab_prop)
+
+# b/186488185: Allow GMSCore to read dck properties
+get_prop(gmscore_app, dck_prop)
diff --git a/private/lmkd.te b/private/lmkd.te
index fef3a89..ec9a93e 100644
--- a/private/lmkd.te
+++ b/private/lmkd.te
@@ -8,4 +8,8 @@
 # Set lmkd.* properties.
 set_prop(lmkd, lmkd_prop)
 
+allow lmkd fs_bpf:dir search;
+allow lmkd fs_bpf:file read;
+allow lmkd bpfloader:bpf map_read;
+
 neverallow { domain -init -lmkd -vendor_init } lmkd_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/private/mediaserver.te b/private/mediaserver.te
index 7fb8029..6fe460c 100644
--- a/private/mediaserver.te
+++ b/private/mediaserver.te
@@ -15,3 +15,6 @@
 
 get_prop(mediaserver, drm_service_config_prop)
 get_prop(mediaserver, media_config_prop)
+
+# Allow mediaserver to start media.transcoding service via ctl.start.
+set_prop(mediaserver, ctl_mediatranscoding_prop);
diff --git a/private/mediatranscoding.te b/private/mediatranscoding.te
index 2a43cf9..d812525 100644
--- a/private/mediatranscoding.te
+++ b/private/mediatranscoding.te
@@ -61,4 +61,5 @@
 # permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
 # Lengthier explanation here:
 # https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
-neverallow mediatranscoding domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow mediatranscoding domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow mediatranscoding { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;
diff --git a/private/odrefresh.te b/private/odrefresh.te
index 3ea8ad2..7a64247 100644
--- a/private/odrefresh.te
+++ b/private/odrefresh.te
@@ -48,3 +48,7 @@
 
 # Allow updating boot animation status.
 set_prop(odrefresh, bootanim_system_prop)
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(odrefresh, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(odrefresh, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
diff --git a/private/platform_app.te b/private/platform_app.te
index a112081..f746f1c 100644
--- a/private/platform_app.te
+++ b/private/platform_app.te
@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@
 # suppress denials caused by debugfs_tracing
 dontaudit platform_app debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
 
+# Allow platform apps to act as Perfetto producers.
+perfetto_producer(platform_app)
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/private/property.te b/private/property.te
index 267ff85..01d4fd9 100644
--- a/private/property.te
+++ b/private/property.te
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 system_internal_prop(userspace_reboot_test_prop)
 system_internal_prop(verity_status_prop)
 system_internal_prop(zygote_wrap_prop)
+system_internal_prop(ctl_mediatranscoding_prop)
 
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index 5d1f117..0799e57 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -168,6 +168,9 @@
 # Restrict access to stopping apexd.
 ctl.stop$apexd          u:object_r:ctl_apexd_prop:s0
 
+# Restrict access to starting media.transcoding.
+ctl.start$media.transcoding  u:object_r:ctl_mediatranscoding_prop:s0
+
 # Restrict access to restart dumpstate
 ctl.interface_restart$android.hardware.dumpstate u:object_r:ctl_dumpstate_prop:s0
 
@@ -312,8 +315,9 @@
 audio.offload.video             u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 audio.offload.min.duration.secs u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact int
 
-ro.audio.ignore_effects  u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
-ro.audio.monitorRotation u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.audio.ignore_effects   u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.audio.monitorRotation  u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.audio.offload_wakelock u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 
 persist.config.calibration_fac u:object_r:camera_calibration_prop:s0 exact string
 
@@ -326,7 +330,13 @@
 
 ro.camerax.extensions.enabled u:object_r:camerax_extensions_prop:s0 exact bool
 
-# Should always_debuggable be bool? It's checked against the string "1".
+# ART properties
+dalvik.vm.                 u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0
+ro.dalvik.vm.              u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0
+ro.zygote                  u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# A set of ART properties listed explicitly for compatibility purposes.
+ro.dalvik.vm.native.bridge u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
 dalvik.vm.always_debuggable                   u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
 dalvik.vm.appimageformat                      u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
 dalvik.vm.backgroundgctype                    u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -350,6 +360,7 @@
 dalvik.vm.dex2oat-swap                        u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 dalvik.vm.dex2oat64.enabled                   u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 dalvik.vm.dexopt.secondary                    u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.dexopt.thermal-cutoff               u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
 dalvik.vm.execution-mode                      u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
 dalvik.vm.extra-opts                          u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
 dalvik.vm.foreground-heap-growth-multiplier   u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -401,7 +412,6 @@
 dalvik.vm.usejit                              u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 dalvik.vm.usejitprofiles                      u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 dalvik.vm.zygote.max-boot-retry               u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
-ro.zygote                                     u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
 
 persist.sys.dalvik.vm.lib.2 u:object_r:dalvik_runtime_prop:s0 exact string
 
@@ -442,6 +452,7 @@
 pm.dexopt.ab-ota                            u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
 pm.dexopt.bg-dexopt                         u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
 pm.dexopt.boot                              u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.cmdline                           u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
 pm.dexopt.disable_bg_dexopt                 u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact bool
 pm.dexopt.downgrade_after_inactive_days     u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
 pm.dexopt.first-boot                        u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -488,8 +499,6 @@
 ro.crypto.volume.metadata.method                u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.crypto.volume.options                        u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact string
 
-ro.dalvik.vm.native.bridge u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
-
 external_storage.projid.enabled   u:object_r:storage_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 external_storage.casefold.enabled u:object_r:storage_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 external_storage.sdcardfs.enabled u:object_r:storage_config_prop:s0 exact bool
@@ -550,6 +559,7 @@
 sys.usb.controller u:object_r:usb_control_prop:s0 exact string
 sys.usb.state      u:object_r:usb_control_prop:s0 exact string
 
+sys.usb.mtp.batchcancel u:object_r:usb_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 sys.usb.mtp.device_type u:object_r:usb_config_prop:s0 exact int
 
 sys.usb.config. u:object_r:usb_prop:s0
@@ -825,6 +835,7 @@
 ro.vendor.build.date                        u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.vendor.build.date.utc                    u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
 ro.vendor.build.fingerprint                 u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor.build.fingerprint_has_digest      u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.vendor.build.id                          u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.vendor.build.tags                        u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.vendor.build.type                        u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -832,6 +843,7 @@
 ro.vendor.build.version.release             u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.vendor.build.version.release_or_codename u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.vendor.build.version.sdk                 u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.vendor.build.dont_use_vabc               u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact bool
 
 # All vendor CPU abilist props are set by /vendor/build.prop
 ro.vendor.product.cpu.abilist   u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -1056,6 +1068,7 @@
 ro.surface_flinger.enable_frame_rate_override             u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.surface_flinger.enable_layer_caching                   u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.surface_flinger.display_update_imminent_timeout_ms     u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.uclamp.min                             u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
 
 ro.sf.disable_triple_buffer u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.sf.lcd_density           u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
@@ -1184,3 +1197,6 @@
 
 # bootanimation properties
 ro.bootanim.quiescent.enabled u:object_r:bootanim_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# dck properties
+ro.gms.dck.eligible_wcc u:object_r:dck_prop:s0 exact int
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index b8e42ea..1d38fd9 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -158,7 +158,6 @@
 user=_app seinfo=media domain=mediaprovider type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app isEphemeralApp=true domain=ephemeral_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
-user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=31 isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.permissioncontroller domain=permissioncontroller_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app seinfo=media isPrivApp=true name=com.android.providers.media.module domain=mediaprovider_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index 3357943..b410b18 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
 carrier_config                            u:object_r:radio_service:s0
 clipboard                                 u:object_r:clipboard_service:s0
 com.android.net.IProxyService             u:object_r:IProxyService_service:s0
-android.system.virtmanager                u:object_r:virtualization_service:s0
+android.system.virtualizationservice      u:object_r:virtualization_service:s0
 companiondevice                           u:object_r:companion_device_service:s0
 platform_compat                           u:object_r:platform_compat_service:s0
 platform_compat_native                    u:object_r:platform_compat_service:s0
diff --git a/private/shell.te b/private/shell.te
index 5831d54..40b19fd 100644
--- a/private/shell.te
+++ b/private/shell.te
@@ -114,6 +114,11 @@
 allow shell self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
 neverallow shell self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
 
+# Allow shell to read /apex/apex-info-list.xml and the vendor apexes
+allow shell apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell vendor_apex_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell vendor_apex_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
 # Set properties.
 set_prop(shell, shell_prop)
 set_prop(shell, ctl_bugreport_prop)
@@ -197,3 +202,6 @@
 
 # Allow ReadDefaultFstab() for CTS.
 read_fstab(shell)
+
+# Allow shell read access to /apex/apex-info-list.xml for CTS.
+allow shell apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/system_app.te b/private/system_app.te
index 48d5f9d..10b8177 100644
--- a/private/system_app.te
+++ b/private/system_app.te
@@ -169,6 +169,9 @@
 # Settings app reads ro.oem_unlock_supported
 get_prop(system_app, oem_unlock_prop)
 
+# Allow system apps to act as Perfetto producers.
+perfetto_producer(system_app)
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index dcccc5e..f35f9a8 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -44,11 +44,28 @@
   INCFS_IOCTL_FILL_BLOCKS
   INCFS_IOCTL_GET_FILLED_BLOCKS
   INCFS_IOCTL_GET_BLOCK_COUNT
+  F2FS_IOC_GET_FEATURES
+  F2FS_IOC_GET_COMPRESS_BLOCKS
+  F2FS_IOC_COMPRESS_FILE
+  F2FS_IOC_DECOMPRESS_FILE
+  F2FS_IOC_RELEASE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS
+  F2FS_IOC_RESERVE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS
+  FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+};
+
+allowxperm system_server apk_tmp_file:file ioctl {
+  F2FS_IOC_RELEASE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS
+  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
 };
 
 # For Incremental Service to check incfs metrics
 allow system_server sysfs_fs_incfs_metrics:file r_file_perms;
 
+# For f2fs-compression support
+allow system_server sysfs_fs_f2fs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server sysfs_fs_f2fs:file r_file_perms;
+
 # For art.
 allow system_server { apex_art_data_file dalvikcache_data_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow system_server { apex_art_data_file dalvikcache_data_file }:file r_file_perms;
@@ -205,6 +222,9 @@
 # for dumpsys meminfo
 allow system_server dmabuf_heap_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 
+# Allow reading /proc/vmstat for the oom kill count
+allow system_server proc_vmstat:file r_file_perms;
+
 # The DhcpClient and WifiWatchdog use packet_sockets
 allow system_server self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 
@@ -319,6 +339,7 @@
   drmserver
   gpuservice
   inputflinger
+  keystore
   mediadrmserver
   mediaextractor
   mediametrics
@@ -688,6 +709,11 @@
 set_prop(system_server, device_config_configuration_prop)
 set_prop(system_server, device_config_connectivity_prop)
 
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(system_server, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+get_prop(system_server, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+
 # BootReceiver to read ro.boot.bootreason
 get_prop(system_server, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
 # PowerManager to read sys.boot.reason
@@ -1120,6 +1146,12 @@
 # Allow system process to setup fs-verity for font files
 allowxperm system_server font_data_file:file ioctl FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY;
 
+# Read qemu.hw.mainkeys property
+get_prop(system_server, qemu_hw_prop)
+
+# Allow system server to read profcollectd reports for upload.
+userdebug_or_eng(`r_dir_file(system_server, profcollectd_data_file)')
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
@@ -1258,6 +1290,8 @@
 
 # Allow the system server to manage relevant apex module data files.
 allow system_server apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow system_server apex_appsearch_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server apex_appsearch_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 allow system_server apex_permission_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow system_server apex_permission_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 allow system_server apex_scheduling_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
@@ -1373,6 +1407,3 @@
 # Only system server can write the font files.
 neverallow { domain -init -system_server } font_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
 neverallow { domain -init -system_server } font_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
-
-# Read qemu.hw.mainkeys property
-get_prop(system_server, qemu_hw_prop)
diff --git a/private/system_server_startup.te b/private/system_server_startup.te
index 902941e..3301304 100644
--- a/private/system_server_startup.te
+++ b/private/system_server_startup.te
@@ -14,3 +14,7 @@
 
 # Child of the zygote.
 allow system_server_startup zygote:process sigchld;
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(system_server_startup, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+get_prop(system_server_startup, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
diff --git a/private/toolbox.te b/private/toolbox.te
index a2b958d..6077f0b 100644
--- a/private/toolbox.te
+++ b/private/toolbox.te
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
 typeattribute toolbox coredomain;
 
 init_daemon_domain(toolbox)
+
+# rm -rf /data/misc/virtualizationservice
+allow toolbox virtualizationservice_data_file:dir { remove_name rmdir };
+allow toolbox virtualizationservice_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_25.te b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
index 41cabe8..82c07ff 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_25.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
@@ -48,7 +48,3 @@
 
 # Read /mnt/sdcard symlink.
 allow untrusted_app_25 mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-
-# allow binding to netlink route sockets and sending RTM_GETLINK messages.
-allow untrusted_app_25 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
-auditallow untrusted_app_25 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_27.te b/private/untrusted_app_27.te
index 0993faa..7a326a5 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_27.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_27.te
@@ -36,7 +36,3 @@
 
 # Read /mnt/sdcard symlink.
 allow untrusted_app_27 mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-
-# allow binding to netlink route sockets and sending RTM_GETLINK messages.
-allow untrusted_app_27 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
-auditallow untrusted_app_27 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_29.te b/private/untrusted_app_29.te
index c5652b1..d03f399 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_29.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_29.te
@@ -14,7 +14,3 @@
 untrusted_app_domain(untrusted_app_29)
 net_domain(untrusted_app_29)
 bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app_29)
-
-# allow binding to netlink route sockets and sending RTM_GETLINK messages.
-allow untrusted_app_29 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
-auditallow untrusted_app_29 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
diff --git a/private/virtmanager.te b/private/virtmanager.te
deleted file mode 100644
index 467f7d4..0000000
--- a/private/virtmanager.te
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-type virtmanager, domain, coredomain;
-type virtmanager_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
-
-# When init runs a file labelled with virtmanager_exec, run it in the virtmanager domain.
-init_daemon_domain(virtmanager)
-
-# Let the virtmanager domain use Binder.
-binder_use(virtmanager)
-
-# Let the virtmanager domain register the virtualization_service with ServiceManager.
-add_service(virtmanager, virtualization_service)
-
-# When virtmanager execs a file with the crosvm_exec label, run it in the crosvm domain.
-domain_auto_trans(virtmanager, crosvm_exec, crosvm)
-
-# Let virtmanager kill crosvm.
-allow virtmanager crosvm:process sigkill;
diff --git a/private/virtualizationservice.te b/private/virtualizationservice.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c6f1f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/virtualizationservice.te
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+type virtualizationservice, domain, coredomain;
+type virtualizationservice_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# When init runs a file labelled with virtualizationservice_exec, run it in the
+# virtualizationservice domain.
+init_daemon_domain(virtualizationservice)
+
+# Let the virtualizationservice domain use Binder.
+binder_use(virtualizationservice)
+
+# Let the virtualizationservice domain register the virtualization_service with ServiceManager.
+add_service(virtualizationservice, virtualization_service)
+
+# When virtualizationservice execs a file with the crosvm_exec label, run it in the crosvm domain.
+domain_auto_trans(virtualizationservice, crosvm_exec, crosvm)
+
+# Let virtualizationservice exec other files (e.g. mk_cdisk) in the same domain.
+allow virtualizationservice system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Let virtualizationservice kill crosvm.
+allow virtualizationservice crosvm:process sigkill;
+
+# Let virtualizationservice access its data directory.
+allow virtualizationservice virtualizationservice_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow virtualizationservice virtualizationservice_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
diff --git a/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te b/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
index 1414f6c..956e94e 100644
--- a/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
+++ b/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
   vendor_data_file
 }:dir { open read write add_name remove_name rmdir relabelfrom };
 allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
+    apex_appsearch_data_file
     apex_art_data_file
     apex_module_data_file
     apex_permission_data_file
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@
     vold_data_file
 }:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
 allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
+    apex_appsearch_data_file
     apex_art_data_file
     apex_art_staging_data_file
     apex_module_data_file
diff --git a/private/wait_for_keymaster.te b/private/wait_for_keymaster.te
index 8878acf..da98e2e 100644
--- a/private/wait_for_keymaster.te
+++ b/private/wait_for_keymaster.te
@@ -10,6 +10,6 @@
 
 # wait_for_keymaster needs to find keystore and call methods with the returned
 # binder reference.
-allow wait_for_keymaster servicemanager:binder call;
+binder_use(wait_for_keymaster)
 allow wait_for_keymaster keystore_service:service_manager find;
-allow wait_for_keymaster keystore:binder call;
+binder_call(wait_for_keymaster, keystore)
diff --git a/private/webview_zygote.te b/private/webview_zygote.te
index 3f217e1..10bcf1c 100644
--- a/private/webview_zygote.te
+++ b/private/webview_zygote.te
@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@
 # Send unsolicited message to system_server
 unix_socket_send(webview_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
 
+# Allow the webview_zygote to access the runtime feature flag properties.
+get_prop(webview_zygote, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(webview_zygote, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
 #####
 ##### Neverallow
 #####
diff --git a/public/cameraserver.te b/public/cameraserver.te
index 7a29240..b7e555f 100644
--- a/public/cameraserver.te
+++ b/public/cameraserver.te
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 allow cameraserver cameraproxy_service:service_manager find;
 allow cameraserver mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
 allow cameraserver package_native_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver permission_checker_service:service_manager find;
 allow cameraserver processinfo_service:service_manager find;
 allow cameraserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
 allow cameraserver sensor_privacy_service:service_manager find;
@@ -53,7 +54,8 @@
 # permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
 # Lengthier explanation here:
 # https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
-neverallow cameraserver domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow cameraserver domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow cameraserver { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;
 
 # Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
 allow cameraserver adbd:fd use;
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index 8244b9c..d84abf1 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
 allow domain device:dir search;
 allow domain dev_type:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 allow domain devpts:dir search;
-allow domain dmabuf_heap_device:dir search;
+allow domain dmabuf_heap_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow domain socket_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow domain owntty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow domain null_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index 2250482..20348b5 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -385,6 +385,7 @@
 
 # /data/misc subdirectories
 type adb_keys_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apex_appsearch_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type apex_module_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type apex_ota_reserved_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type apex_permission_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
diff --git a/public/hal_neverallows.te b/public/hal_neverallows.te
index 4117878..0214e2a 100644
--- a/public/hal_neverallows.te
+++ b/public/hal_neverallows.te
@@ -25,7 +25,21 @@
   -hal_wifi_hostapd_server
   -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
   -hal_telephony_server
-} domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+} domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+
+neverallow {
+  halserverdomain
+  -hal_automotive_socket_exemption
+  -hal_can_controller_server
+  -hal_tetheroffload_server
+  -hal_wifi_server
+  -hal_wifi_hostapd_server
+  -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
+  -hal_telephony_server
+} {
+  domain
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+}:tcp_socket *;
 
 ###
 # HALs are defined as an attribute and so a given domain could hypothetically
diff --git a/public/hal_omx.te b/public/hal_omx.te
index 8e74383..2611dcd 100644
--- a/public/hal_omx.te
+++ b/public/hal_omx.te
@@ -46,4 +46,5 @@
 # permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
 # Lengthier explanation here:
 # https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
-neverallow hal_omx_server domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow hal_omx_server domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow hal_omx_server { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;
diff --git a/public/installd.te b/public/installd.te
index eb13cfa..08060e3 100644
--- a/public/installd.te
+++ b/public/installd.te
@@ -160,6 +160,10 @@
 #add for move app to sd card
 get_prop(installd, storage_config_prop)
 
+# Allow installd to access apps installed on the Incremental File System
+# Accessing files on the Incremental File System uses fds opened in the context of vold.
+allow installd vold:fd use;
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/ioctl_defines b/public/ioctl_defines
index afb0b2d..5ac4d94 100644
--- a/public/ioctl_defines
+++ b/public/ioctl_defines
@@ -698,22 +698,30 @@
 define(`EVIOCSKEYCODE', `0x40084504')
 define(`EVIOCSKEYCODE_V2', `0x40284504')
 define(`EVIOCSREP', `0x40084503')
-define(`F2FS_IOC_ABORT_VOLATILE_WRITE', `0xf505')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE', `0xf501')
 define(`F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE', `0xf502')
-define(`F2FS_IOC_DEFRAGMENT', `0xf508')
-define(`F2FS_IOC_FLUSH_DEVICE', `0xf50a')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_START_VOLATILE_WRITE', `0xf503')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_RELEASE_VOLATILE_WRITE', `0xf504')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_ABORT_VOLATILE_WRITE', `0xf505')
 define(`F2FS_IOC_GARBAGE_COLLECT', `0xf506')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_WRITE_CHECKPOINT', `0xf507')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_DEFRAGMENT', `0xf508')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE', `0xf509')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_FLUSH_DEVICE', `0xf50a')
 define(`F2FS_IOC_GARBAGE_COLLECT_RANGE', `0xf50b')
 define(`F2FS_IOC_GET_FEATURES', `0xf50c')
-define(`F2FS_IOC_GET_PIN_FILE', `0xf50e')
-define(`F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE', `0xf509')
-define(`F2FS_IOC_PRECACHE_EXTENTS', `0xf50f')
-define(`F2FS_IOC_RELEASE_VOLATILE_WRITE', `0xf504')
-define(`F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE', `0xf514')
 define(`F2FS_IOC_SET_PIN_FILE', `0xf50d')
-define(`F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE', `0xf501')
-define(`F2FS_IOC_START_VOLATILE_WRITE', `0xf503')
-define(`F2FS_IOC_WRITE_CHECKPOINT', `0xf507')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_GET_PIN_FILE', `0xf50e')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_PRECACHE_EXTENTS', `0xf50f')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_RESIZE_FS', `0xf510')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_GET_COMPRESS_BLOCKS', `0xf511')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_RELEASE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS', `0xf512')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_RESERVE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS', `0xf513')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE', `0xf514')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_GET_COMPRESS_OPTION', `0xf515')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_SET_COMPRESS_OPTION', `0xf516')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_DECOMPRESS_FILE', `0xf517')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_COMPRESS_FILE', `0xf518')
 define(`FAT_IOCTL_GET_ATTRIBUTES', `0x80047210')
 define(`FAT_IOCTL_GET_VOLUME_ID', `0x80047213')
 define(`FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES', `0x40047211')
diff --git a/public/iorapd.te b/public/iorapd.te
index b970699..b772af8 100644
--- a/public/iorapd.te
+++ b/public/iorapd.te
@@ -94,4 +94,5 @@
 }:binder call;
 
 neverallow { domain -init } iorapd:process { transition dyntransition };
-neverallow iorapd domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow iorapd domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow iorapd { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;
diff --git a/public/mediaextractor.te b/public/mediaextractor.te
index 06f7928..a29e5dc 100644
--- a/public/mediaextractor.te
+++ b/public/mediaextractor.te
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@
 # permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
 # Lengthier explanation here:
 # https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
-neverallow mediaextractor domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow mediaextractor domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow mediaextractor { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;
 
 # mediaextractor should not be opening /data files directly. Any files
 # it touches (with a few exceptions) need to be passed to it via a file
diff --git a/public/mediametrics.te b/public/mediametrics.te
index 468c0d0..76f819e 100644
--- a/public/mediametrics.te
+++ b/public/mediametrics.te
@@ -42,4 +42,5 @@
 # permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
 # Lengthier explanation here:
 # https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
-neverallow mediametrics domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow mediametrics domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow mediametrics { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;
diff --git a/public/mediaserver.te b/public/mediaserver.te
index 388001d..ad460e1 100644
--- a/public/mediaserver.te
+++ b/public/mediaserver.te
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
 allow mediaserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
 allow mediaserver media_session_service:service_manager find;
 allow mediaserver permission_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver permission_checker_service:service_manager find;
 allow mediaserver power_service:service_manager find;
 allow mediaserver processinfo_service:service_manager find;
 allow mediaserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/public/profman.te b/public/profman.te
index 8ff6271..c014d79 100644
--- a/public/profman.te
+++ b/public/profman.te
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@
 allow profman { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file { getattr read write lock map };
 allow profman { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir { getattr read search };
 
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(profman, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(profman, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/property.te b/public/property.te
index 5edb59e..57146a4 100644
--- a/public/property.te
+++ b/public/property.te
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
 system_internal_prop(device_config_media_native_prop)
 system_internal_prop(device_config_netd_native_prop)
 system_internal_prop(device_config_reset_performed_prop)
-system_internal_prop(device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
-system_internal_prop(device_config_runtime_native_prop)
 system_internal_prop(firstboot_prop)
 
 compatible_property_only(`
@@ -67,6 +65,8 @@
 system_restricted_prop(build_bootimage_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(build_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(charger_status_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(device_config_runtime_native_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(fingerprint_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(hal_instrumentation_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(init_service_status_prop)
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@
 system_vendor_config_prop(wifi_config_prop)
 system_vendor_config_prop(zram_config_prop)
 system_vendor_config_prop(zygote_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(dck_prop)
 
 # Properties with no restrictions
 system_public_prop(adbd_config_prop)
diff --git a/public/simpleperf_app_runner.te b/public/simpleperf_app_runner.te
index b7ff7a0..2ed007e 100644
--- a/public/simpleperf_app_runner.te
+++ b/public/simpleperf_app_runner.te
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
 allow simpleperf_app_runner seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
 
 # simpleperf_app_runner passes pipe fds.
-allow simpleperf_app_runner shell:fifo_file read;
+# simpleperf_app_runner writes app type (debuggable or profileable) to pipe fds.
+allow simpleperf_app_runner shell:fifo_file { read write };
 
 # simpleperf_app_runner checks shell data paths.
 # simpleperf_app_runner passes shell data fds.
diff --git a/public/te_macros b/public/te_macros
index 8d15d47..2a218cb 100644
--- a/public/te_macros
+++ b/public/te_macros
@@ -670,6 +670,12 @@
 define(`add_service', `
   allow $1 $2:service_manager { add find };
   neverallow { domain -$1 } $2:service_manager add;
+
+  # On debug builds with root, allow binder services to use binder over TCP.
+  # Not using rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl to avoid granting too many permissions.
+  userdebug_or_eng(`
+    allow $1 su:tcp_socket { accept getopt read write };
+  ')
 ')
 
 ###########################################
diff --git a/public/uncrypt.te b/public/uncrypt.te
index 0f549c9..3b04671 100644
--- a/public/uncrypt.te
+++ b/public/uncrypt.te
@@ -32,8 +32,12 @@
 
 r_dir_file(uncrypt, rootfs)
 
-# uncrypt reads /proc/cmdline
-allow uncrypt proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+# Access to bootconfig is needed when calling ReadDefaultFstab.
+allow uncrypt {
+  proc_bootconfig
+  proc_cmdline
+
+}:file r_file_perms;
 
 # Read files in /sys
 r_dir_file(uncrypt, sysfs_dt_firmware_android)
diff --git a/public/vendor_init.te b/public/vendor_init.te
index 7e96cb1..b0e1da5 100644
--- a/public/vendor_init.te
+++ b/public/vendor_init.te
@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@
 get_prop(vendor_init, surfaceflinger_display_prop)
 get_prop(vendor_init, test_harness_prop)
 get_prop(vendor_init, theme_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, dck_prop)
 
 
 ###
diff --git a/tests/sepolicy_tests.py b/tests/sepolicy_tests.py
index edd1708..1d26dfc 100644
--- a/tests/sepolicy_tests.py
+++ b/tests/sepolicy_tests.py
@@ -40,11 +40,18 @@
 
 def TestDebugfsTypeViolations(pol):
     ret = pol.AssertGenfsFilesystemTypesHaveAttr("debugfs", "debugfs_type")
-    ret += pol.AssertGenfsFilesystemTypesHaveAttr("tracefs", "debugfs_type")
     ret += pol.AssertPathTypesHaveAttr(["/sys/kernel/debug/",
                                     "/sys/kernel/tracing"], [], "debugfs_type")
     return ret
 
+def TestTracefsTypeViolations(pol):
+    ret = pol.AssertGenfsFilesystemTypesHaveAttr("tracefs", "tracefs_type")
+    ret += pol.AssertPathTypesHaveAttr(["/sys/kernel/tracing"], [], "tracefs_type")
+    ret += pol.AssertPathTypesDoNotHaveAttr(["/sys/kernel/debug"],
+                                            ["/sys/kernel/debug/tracing"], "tracefs_type",
+                                            [])
+    return ret
+
 def TestVendorTypeViolations(pol):
     partitions = ["/vendor/", "/odm/"]
     exceptions = [
@@ -111,6 +118,7 @@
     "TestSysfsTypeViolations",
     "TestSystemTypeViolators",
     "TestDebugfsTypeViolations",
+    "TestTracefsTypeViolations",
     "TestVendorTypeViolations",
     "TestCoreDataTypeViolations",
     "TestPropertyTypeViolations",
@@ -165,6 +173,8 @@
         results += TestSystemTypeViolations(pol)
     if options.test is None or "TestDebugfsTypeViolations" in options.test:
         results += TestDebugfsTypeViolations(pol)
+    if options.test is None or "TestTracefsTypeViolations" in options.test:
+        results += TestTracefsTypeViolations(pol)
     if options.test is None or "TestVendorTypeViolations" in options.test:
         results += TestVendorTypeViolations(pol)
     if options.test is None or "TestCoreDataTypeViolations" in options.test:
diff --git a/treble_sepolicy_tests_for_release.mk b/treble_sepolicy_tests_for_release.mk
index fdfe9ee..1f27727 100644
--- a/treble_sepolicy_tests_for_release.mk
+++ b/treble_sepolicy_tests_for_release.mk
@@ -11,6 +11,27 @@
 LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := FAKE
 LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
 
+# BOARD_SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_DIR can be set as system_ext prebuilt dir in sepolicy
+# make file of the system_ext partition.
+SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_POLICY := $(BOARD_SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_DIR)
+# BOARD_PRODUCT_PREBUILT_DIR can be set as product prebuilt dir in sepolicy
+# make file of the product partition.
+PRODUCT_PREBUILT_POLICY := $(BOARD_PRODUCT_PREBUILT_DIR)
+# BOARD_PLAT_PUB_VERSIONED_POLICY - path_to_plat_pub_versioned_of_vendor
+# plat_pub_versioned.cil should be in
+# $(BOARD_PLAT_PUB_VERSIONED_POLICY)/prebuilts/api/$(version) dir.
+# plat_pub_versioned.cil should have platform, system_ext and product sepolicies
+# similar to system/sepolicy/prebuilts/api/$(version/plat_pub_verioned.cil file.
+# In order to enable treble sepolicy tests for platform, system_ext and product
+# sepolicies SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_POLICY , PRODUCT_PREBUILT_POLICY and
+# BOARD_PLAT_PUB_VERSIONED_POLICY should be set.
+IS_TREBLE_TEST_ENABLED_PARTNER := false
+ifeq ($(filter 26.0 27.0 28.0 29.0,$(version)),)
+ifneq (,$(BOARD_PLAT_PUB_VERSIONED_POLICY))
+IS_TREBLE_TEST_ENABLED_PARTNER := true
+endif # (,$(BOARD_PLAT_PUB_VERSIONED_POLICY))
+endif # ($(filter 26.0 27.0 28.0 29.0,$(version)),)
+
 include $(BUILD_SYSTEM)/base_rules.mk
 
 # $(version)_plat - the platform policy shipped as part of the $(version) release.  This is
@@ -19,6 +40,20 @@
 # been maintained by our mapping files.
 $(version)_PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY := $(LOCAL_PATH)/prebuilts/api/$(version)/public
 $(version)_PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY := $(LOCAL_PATH)/prebuilts/api/$(version)/private
+ifeq ($(IS_TREBLE_TEST_ENABLED_PARTNER),true)
+ifneq (,$(SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_POLICY))
+$(version)_PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY += \
+    $(SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_POLICY)/prebuilts/api/$(version)/public
+$(version)_PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY += \
+    $(SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_POLICY)/prebuilts/api/$(version)/private
+endif # (,$(SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_POLICY))
+ifneq (,$(PRODUCT_PREBUILT_POLICY))
+$(version)_PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY += \
+    $(PRODUCT_PREBUILT_POLICY)/prebuilts/api/$(version)/public
+$(version)_PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY += \
+    $(PRODUCT_PREBUILT_POLICY)/prebuilts/api/$(version)/private
+endif # (,$(PRODUCT_PREBUILT_POLICY))
+endif # ($(IS_TREBLE_TEST_ENABLED_PARTNER),true)
 policy_files := $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), $($(version)_PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $($(version)_PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
 $(version)_plat_policy.conf := $(intermediates)/$(version)_plat_policy.conf
 $($(version)_plat_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
@@ -52,7 +87,6 @@
 
 $(version)_plat_policy.conf :=
 
-
 # $(version)_compat - the current plat_sepolicy.cil built with the compatibility file
 # targeting the $(version) SELinux release.  This ensures that our policy will build
 # when used on a device that has non-platform policy targetting the $(version) release.
@@ -61,6 +95,21 @@
 $(version)_mapping.ignore.cil := \
     $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,$(version).ignore.cil)/$(version).ignore.cil
 $(version)_prebuilts_dir := $(LOCAL_PATH)/prebuilts/api/$(version)
+ifeq ($(IS_TREBLE_TEST_ENABLED_PARTNER),true)
+ifneq (,$(SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_POLICY))
+$(version)_mapping.cil += \
+    $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,system_ext_$(version).cil)/system_ext_$(version).cil
+$(version)_mapping.ignore.cil += \
+    $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,system_ext_$(version).ignore.cil)/system_ext_$(version).ignore.cil
+endif # (,$(SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_POLICY))
+ifneq (,$(PRODUCT_PREBUILT_POLICY))
+$(version)_mapping.cil += \
+    $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,product_$(version).cil)/product_$(version).cil
+$(version)_mapping.ignore.cil += \
+    $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,product_$(version).ignore.cil)/product_$(version).ignore.cil
+endif # (,$(PRODUCT_PREBUILT_POLICY))
+$(version)_prebuilts_dir := $(BOARD_PLAT_PUB_VERSIONED_POLICY)/prebuilts/api/$(version)
+endif #($(IS_TREBLE_TEST_ENABLED_PARTNER),true)
 
 # vendor_sepolicy.cil and plat_pub_versioned.cil are the new design to replace
 # nonplat_sepolicy.cil.
@@ -70,10 +119,18 @@
 $(version)_nonplat := $($(version)_prebuilts_dir)/nonplat_sepolicy.cil
 endif
 
-$($(version)_compat): PRIVATE_CIL_FILES := \
-$(built_plat_cil) $($(version)_mapping.cil) $($(version)_nonplat)
-$($(version)_compat): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc \
-$(built_plat_cil) $($(version)_mapping.cil) $($(version)_nonplat)
+cil_files := $(built_plat_cil)
+ifeq ($(IS_TREBLE_TEST_ENABLED_PARTNER),true)
+ifneq (,$(SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_POLICY)
+cil_files += $(built_system_ext_cil)
+endif # (,$(SYSTEM_EXT_PREBUILT_POLICY)
+ifneq (,$(PRODUCT_PREBUILT_POLICY)
+cil_files += $(built_product_cil)
+endif # (,$(PRODUCT_PREBUILT_POLICY)
+endif # ($(IS_TREBLE_TEST_ENABLED_PARTNER),true)
+cil_files += $($(version)_mapping.cil) $($(version)_nonplat)
+$($(version)_compat): PRIVATE_CIL_FILES := $(cil_files)
+$($(version)_compat): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc $(cil_files)
 	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc -m -M true -G -N -c $(POLICYVERS) \
 		$(PRIVATE_CIL_FILES) -o $@ -f /dev/null
 
@@ -86,32 +143,47 @@
 	mkdir -p $(dir $@)
 	cat $^ > $@
 
+ifeq ($(IS_TREBLE_TEST_ENABLED_PARTNER),true)
+built_sepolicy_files := $(built_product_sepolicy)
+public_cil_files := $(base_product_pub_policy.cil)
+else
+built_sepolicy_files := $(built_plat_sepolicy)
+public_cil_files := $(base_plat_pub_policy.cil)
+endif # ($(IS_TREBLE_TEST_ENABLED_PARTNER),true)
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): ALL_FC_ARGS := $(all_fc_args)
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_sepolicy)
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY_OLD := $(built_$(version)_plat_sepolicy)
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_COMBINED_MAPPING := $($(version)_mapping.combined.cil)
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_PLAT_SEPOLICY := $(built_plat_sepolicy)
-$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_PLAT_PUB_SEPOLICY := $(base_plat_pub_policy.cil)
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_PLAT_SEPOLICY := $(built_sepolicy_files)
+$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_PLAT_PUB_SEPOLICY := $(public_cil_files)
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_FAKE_TREBLE :=
 ifeq ($(PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE_OVERRIDE),true)
 # TODO(b/113124961): remove fake-treble
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_FAKE_TREBLE := --fake-treble
 endif # PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE_OVERRIDE = true
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/treble_sepolicy_tests \
-  $(all_fc_files) $(built_sepolicy) $(built_plat_sepolicy) \
-  $(base_plat_pub_policy.cil) \
+  $(all_fc_files) $(built_sepolicy) \
+  $(built_sepolicy_files) \
+  $(public_cil_files) \
   $(built_$(version)_plat_sepolicy) $($(version)_compat) $($(version)_mapping.combined.cil)
 	@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
 	$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/treble_sepolicy_tests -l \
-		$(HOST_OUT)/lib64/libsepolwrap.$(SHAREDLIB_EXT) $(ALL_FC_ARGS) \
-		-b $(PRIVATE_PLAT_SEPOLICY) -m $(PRIVATE_COMBINED_MAPPING) \
-		-o $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY_OLD) -p $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) \
-		-u $(PRIVATE_PLAT_PUB_SEPOLICY) \
-		$(PRIVATE_FAKE_TREBLE)
+                $(HOST_OUT)/lib64/libsepolwrap.$(SHAREDLIB_EXT) $(ALL_FC_ARGS) \
+                -b $(PRIVATE_PLAT_SEPOLICY) -m $(PRIVATE_COMBINED_MAPPING) \
+                -o $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY_OLD) -p $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) \
+                -u $(PRIVATE_PLAT_PUB_SEPOLICY) \
+                $(PRIVATE_FAKE_TREBLE)
 	$(hide) touch $@
 
+$(version)_SYSTEM_EXT_PUBLIC_POLICY :=
+$(version)_SYSTEM_EXT_PRIVATE_POLICY :=
+$(version)_PRODUCT_PUBLIC_POLICY :=
+$(version)_PRODUCT_PRIVATE_POLICY :=
 $(version)_PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY :=
 $(version)_PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY :=
+built_sepolicy_files :=
+public_cil_files :=
+cil_files :=
 $(version)_compat :=
 $(version)_mapping.cil :=
 $(version)_mapping.combined.cil :=
diff --git a/vendor/mediacodec.te b/vendor/mediacodec.te
index f78b58f..8587e12 100644
--- a/vendor/mediacodec.te
+++ b/vendor/mediacodec.te
@@ -34,5 +34,6 @@
 # permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
 # Lengthier explanation here:
 # https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
-neverallow mediacodec domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow mediacodec domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow mediacodec { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;