sepolicy: Clean up mls constraints.
Require equivalence for all write operations. We were already
doing this for app_data_file as a result of restricting open
rather than read/write, so this makes the model consistent across
all objects and operations. It also addresses the scenario where
we have mixed usage of levelFrom=all and levelFrom=user for
different apps on the same device where the dominated-by (domby)
relation may not be sufficiently restrictive.
Drop the System V IPC constraints since System V IPC is never allowed
by TE and thus these constraints are dead policy.
Change-Id: Ic06a35030c086e3978c02d501c380889af8d21e0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
diff --git a/mls b/mls
index 474bd72..5589b4b 100644
--- a/mls
+++ b/mls
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@
mlsconstrain process { getsched getsession getpgid getcap getattr ptrace share }
(l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
-# Process write operations: No write down unless trusted.
+# Process write operations: Require equivalence unless trusted.
mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop signal setsched setpgid setcap setrlimit ptrace share }
- (l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+ (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
#
# Socket constraints
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@
mlsconstrain socket_class_set { create relabelfrom relabelto }
((h1 eq h2 and l1 eq l2) or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
-# Datagram send: Sender must be dominated by receiver unless one of them is
-# trusted.
+# Datagram send: Sender must be equivalent to the receiver unless one of them
+# is trusted.
mlsconstrain unix_dgram_socket { sendto }
- (l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedsubject);
+ (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedsubject);
# Stream connect: Client must be equivalent to server unless one of them
# is trusted.
@@ -83,13 +83,13 @@
mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file chr_file blk_file } { read getattr execute }
(t2 == app_data_file or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
-# Write operations: Subject must be dominated by the object unless the
+# Write operations: Subject must be equivalent to the object unless the
# subject or the object is trusted.
mlsconstrain dir { write setattr rename add_name remove_name reparent rmdir }
- (t2 == app_data_file or l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
+ (t2 == app_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file chr_file blk_file } { write setattr append unlink link rename }
- (t2 == app_data_file or l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
+ (t2 == app_data_file or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
# Special case for FIFOs.
# These can be unnamed pipes, in which case they will be labeled with the
@@ -100,23 +100,7 @@
(l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject or t2 == domain);
mlsconstrain fifo_file { write setattr append unlink link rename }
- (l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject or t2 == domain);
-
-#
-# IPC constraints
-#
-
-# Create/destroy: equivalence or trusted.
-mlsconstrain ipc_class_set { create destroy }
- (l2 eq h2 and (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject));
-
-# Read ops: No read up unless trusted.
-mlsconstrain ipc_class_set r_ipc_perms
- (l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
-
-# Write ops: No write down unless trusted.
-mlsconstrain ipc_class_set w_ipc_perms
- (l1 domby l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+ (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject or t2 == domain);
#
# Binder IPC constraints