diff --git a/Android.bp b/Android.bp
index b44c296..4a0253c 100644
--- a/Android.bp
+++ b/Android.bp
@@ -1 +1,31 @@
+package {
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
+// Added automatically by a large-scale-change that took the approach of
+// 'apply every license found to every target'. While this makes sure we respect
+// every license restriction, it may not be entirely correct.
+//
+// e.g. GPL in an MIT project might only apply to the contrib/ directory.
+//
+// Please consider splitting the single license below into multiple licenses,
+// taking care not to lose any license_kind information, and overriding the
+// default license using the 'licenses: [...]' property on targets as needed.
+//
+// For unused files, consider creating a 'fileGroup' with "//visibility:private"
+// to attach the license to, and including a comment whether the files may be
+// used in the current project.
+// See: http://go/android-license-faq
+license {
+    name: "system_security_license",
+    visibility: [":__subpackages__"],
+    license_kinds: [
+        "SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0",
+        "SPDX-license-identifier-BSD",
+    ],
+    license_text: [
+        "NOTICE",
+    ],
+}
+
 subdirs = ["*"]
diff --git a/OWNERS b/OWNERS
index fca66f8..bb51005 100644
--- a/OWNERS
+++ b/OWNERS
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 swillden@google.com
 cbrubaker@google.com
 jdanis@google.com
-kroot@google.com
\ No newline at end of file
+hasinitg@google.com
+kroot@google.com
+zeuthen@google.com
diff --git a/fsverity_init/Android.bp b/fsverity_init/Android.bp
index 3c9ade0..39d4e6b 100644
--- a/fsverity_init/Android.bp
+++ b/fsverity_init/Android.bp
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 cc_binary {
     name: "fsverity_init",
     srcs: [
diff --git a/identity/Android.bp b/identity/Android.bp
index dd61930..d66f4ec 100644
--- a/identity/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/Android.bp
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 cc_defaults {
     name: "identity_defaults",
     cflags: [
@@ -30,17 +39,20 @@
     shared_libs: [
         "libbase",
         "libbinder",
-        "libkeystore_aidl",
+        "libbinder_ndk",
+        "android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
         "libcredstore_aidl",
         "libutils",
         "libhidlbase",
         "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
         "libkeymaster4support",
         "libkeystore-attestation-application-id",
+        "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
+        "android.security.authorization-ndk_platform",
     ],
     static_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.identity-unstable-cpp",
-        "android.hardware.keymaster-unstable-cpp",
+        "android.hardware.identity-V3-cpp",
+        "android.hardware.keymaster-V3-cpp",
         "libcppbor",
     ]
 }
diff --git a/identity/Credential.cpp b/identity/Credential.cpp
index 4a2bae1..7c75d8a 100644
--- a/identity/Credential.cpp
+++ b/identity/Credential.cpp
@@ -14,16 +14,14 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
-#define LOG_TAG "Credential"
+#define LOG_TAG "credstore"
 
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
-
+#include <android/binder_manager.h>
 #include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
 
 #include <android/security/identity/ICredentialStore.h>
 
-#include <android/security/keystore/BnCredstoreTokenCallback.h>
-#include <android/security/keystore/IKeystoreService.h>
 #include <binder/IPCThreadState.h>
 #include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
 #include <keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h>
@@ -33,6 +31,11 @@
 #include <future>
 #include <tuple>
 
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/HardwareAuthToken.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.h>
+#include <aidl/android/security/authorization/AuthorizationTokens.h>
+#include <aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.h>
+
 #include "Credential.h"
 #include "CredentialData.h"
 #include "Util.h"
@@ -46,8 +49,6 @@
 using std::promise;
 using std::tuple;
 
-using android::security::keystore::IKeystoreService;
-
 using ::android::hardware::identity::IWritableIdentityCredential;
 
 using ::android::hardware::identity::support::ecKeyPairGetPkcs12;
@@ -55,11 +56,17 @@
 using ::android::hardware::identity::support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey;
 using ::android::hardware::identity::support::sha256;
 
+using android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel;
 using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::HardwareAuthToken;
 using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::VerificationToken;
 using AidlHardwareAuthToken = android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthToken;
 using AidlVerificationToken = android::hardware::keymaster::VerificationToken;
 
+using KeyMintAuthToken = ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::HardwareAuthToken;
+using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::secureclock::TimeStampToken;
+using ::aidl::android::security::authorization::AuthorizationTokens;
+using ::aidl::android::security::authorization::IKeystoreAuthorization;
+
 Credential::Credential(CipherSuite cipherSuite, const std::string& dataPath,
                        const std::string& credentialName, uid_t callingUid,
                        HardwareInformation hwInfo, sp<IIdentityCredentialStore> halStoreBinder,
@@ -117,73 +124,94 @@
                                                 "Error loading data for credential");
     }
 
-    selectedAuthKey_ = data->selectAuthKey(allowUsingExhaustedKeys, allowUsingExpiredKeys);
-    if (selectedAuthKey_ == nullptr) {
+    // We just check if a key is available, we actually don't store it since we
+    // don't keep CredentialData around between binder calls.
+    const AuthKeyData* authKey =
+        data->selectAuthKey(allowUsingExhaustedKeys, allowUsingExpiredKeys);
+    if (authKey == nullptr) {
         return Status::fromServiceSpecificError(
             ICredentialStore::ERROR_NO_AUTHENTICATION_KEY_AVAILABLE,
             "No suitable authentication key available");
     }
 
-    int64_t challenge;
-    Status status = halBinder_->createAuthChallenge(&challenge);
-    if (!status.isOk()) {
-        return halStatusToGenericError(status);
-    }
-    if (challenge == 0) {
+    if (!ensureChallenge()) {
         return Status::fromServiceSpecificError(ICredentialStore::ERROR_GENERIC,
-                                                "Returned challenge is 0 (bug in HAL or TA)");
+                                                "Error getting challenge (bug in HAL or TA)");
     }
-
-    selectedChallenge_ = challenge;
-    *_aidl_return = challenge;
+    *_aidl_return = selectedChallenge_;
     return Status::ok();
 }
 
-class CredstoreTokenCallback : public android::security::keystore::BnCredstoreTokenCallback,
-                               public promise<tuple<bool, vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>>> {
-  public:
-    CredstoreTokenCallback() {}
-    virtual Status onFinished(bool success, const vector<uint8_t>& authToken,
-                              const vector<uint8_t>& verificationToken) override {
-        this->set_value({success, authToken, verificationToken});
-        return Status::ok();
+bool Credential::ensureChallenge() {
+    if (selectedChallenge_ != 0) {
+        return true;
     }
-};
+
+    int64_t challenge;
+    Status status = halBinder_->createAuthChallenge(&challenge);
+    if (!status.isOk()) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting challenge: " << status.exceptionMessage();
+        return false;
+    }
+    if (challenge == 0) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Returned challenge is 0 (bug in HAL or TA)";
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    selectedChallenge_ = challenge;
+    return true;
+}
 
 // Returns false if an error occurred communicating with keystore.
 //
-bool getTokensFromKeystore(uint64_t challenge, uint64_t secureUserId,
-                           unsigned int authTokenMaxAgeMillis, vector<uint8_t>& authToken,
-                           vector<uint8_t>& verificationToken) {
-    sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
-    sp<IBinder> binder = sm->getService(String16("android.security.keystore"));
-    sp<IKeystoreService> keystore = interface_cast<IKeystoreService>(binder);
-    if (keystore == nullptr) {
-        return false;
-    }
+bool getTokensFromKeystore2(uint64_t challenge, uint64_t secureUserId,
+                            unsigned int authTokenMaxAgeMillis,
+                            AidlHardwareAuthToken& aidlAuthToken,
+                            AidlVerificationToken& aidlVerificationToken) {
+    // try to connect to IKeystoreAuthorization AIDL service first.
+    AIBinder* authzAIBinder = AServiceManager_checkService("android.security.authorization");
+    ::ndk::SpAIBinder authzBinder(authzAIBinder);
+    auto authzService = IKeystoreAuthorization::fromBinder(authzBinder);
+    if (authzService) {
+        AuthorizationTokens authzTokens;
+        auto result = authzService->getAuthTokensForCredStore(challenge, secureUserId,
+                                                              authTokenMaxAgeMillis, &authzTokens);
+        // Convert KeyMint auth token to KeyMaster authtoken, only if tokens are
+        // returned
+        if (result.isOk()) {
+            KeyMintAuthToken keymintAuthToken = authzTokens.authToken;
+            aidlAuthToken.challenge = keymintAuthToken.challenge;
+            aidlAuthToken.userId = keymintAuthToken.userId;
+            aidlAuthToken.authenticatorId = keymintAuthToken.authenticatorId;
+            aidlAuthToken.authenticatorType =
+                ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType(
+                    int32_t(keymintAuthToken.authenticatorType));
+            aidlAuthToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = keymintAuthToken.timestamp.milliSeconds;
+            aidlAuthToken.mac = keymintAuthToken.mac;
 
-    sp<CredstoreTokenCallback> callback = new CredstoreTokenCallback();
-    auto future = callback->get_future();
-
-    Status status =
-        keystore->getTokensForCredstore(challenge, secureUserId, authTokenMaxAgeMillis, callback);
-    if (!status.isOk()) {
+            // Convert timestamp token to KeyMaster verification token
+            TimeStampToken timestampToken = authzTokens.timestampToken;
+            aidlVerificationToken.challenge = timestampToken.challenge;
+            aidlVerificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = timestampToken.timestamp.milliSeconds;
+            // Legacy verification tokens were always minted by TEE.
+            aidlVerificationToken.securityLevel = SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT;
+            aidlVerificationToken.mac = timestampToken.mac;
+        } else {
+            if (result.getServiceSpecificError() == 0) {
+                // Here we differentiate the errors occurred during communication
+                // from the service specific errors.
+                LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting tokens from keystore2: " << result.getDescription();
+                return false;
+            } else {
+                // Log the reason for not receiving auth tokens from keystore2.
+                LOG(INFO) << "Auth tokens were not received due to: " << result.getDescription();
+            }
+        }
+        return true;
+    } else {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Error connecting to IKeystoreAuthorization service";
         return false;
     }
-
-    auto fstatus = future.wait_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(5000));
-    if (fstatus != std::future_status::ready) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Waited 5 seconds from tokens for credstore, aborting";
-        return false;
-    }
-    auto [success, returnedAuthToken, returnedVerificationToken] = future.get();
-    if (!success) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting tokens from credstore";
-        return false;
-    }
-    authToken = returnedAuthToken;
-    verificationToken = returnedVerificationToken;
-    return true;
 }
 
 Status Credential::getEntries(const vector<uint8_t>& requestMessage,
@@ -279,13 +307,6 @@
         }
     }
 
-    // If requesting a challenge-based authToken the idea is that authentication
-    // happens as part of the transaction. As such, authTokenMaxAgeMillis should
-    // be nearly zero. We'll use 10 seconds for this.
-    if (userAuthNeeded && selectedChallenge_ != 0) {
-        authTokenMaxAgeMillis = 10 * 1000;
-    }
-
     // Reset tokens and only get them if they're actually needed, e.g. if user authentication
     // is needed in any of the access control profiles for data items being requested.
     //
@@ -303,63 +324,58 @@
     aidlVerificationToken.securityLevel = ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
     aidlVerificationToken.mac.clear();
     if (userAuthNeeded) {
-        vector<uint8_t> authTokenBytes;
-        vector<uint8_t> verificationTokenBytes;
-        if (!getTokensFromKeystore(selectedChallenge_, data->getSecureUserId(),
-                                   authTokenMaxAgeMillis, authTokenBytes, verificationTokenBytes)) {
-            LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting tokens from keystore";
+        // If user authentication is needed, always get a challenge from the
+        // HAL/TA since it'll need it to check the returned VerificationToken
+        // for freshness.
+        if (!ensureChallenge()) {
             return Status::fromServiceSpecificError(ICredentialStore::ERROR_GENERIC,
-                                                    "Error getting tokens from keystore");
+                                                    "Error getting challenge (bug in HAL or TA)");
         }
 
-        // It's entirely possible getTokensFromKeystore() succeeded but didn't
-        // return any tokens (in which case the returned byte-vectors are
-        // empty). For example, this can happen if no auth token is available
-        // which satifies e.g. |authTokenMaxAgeMillis|.
+        // Note: if all selected profiles require auth-on-every-presentation
+        // then authTokenMaxAgeMillis will be 0 (because timeoutMillis for each
+        // profile is 0). Which means that keystore will only return an
+        // AuthToken if its challenge matches what we pass, regardless of its
+        // age. This is intended b/c the HAL/TA will check not care about
+        // the age in this case, it only cares that the challenge matches.
         //
-        if (authTokenBytes.size() > 0) {
-            HardwareAuthToken authToken =
-                android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::support::hidlVec2AuthToken(authTokenBytes);
-            // Convert from HIDL to AIDL...
-            aidlAuthToken.challenge = int64_t(authToken.challenge);
-            aidlAuthToken.userId = int64_t(authToken.userId);
-            aidlAuthToken.authenticatorId = int64_t(authToken.authenticatorId);
-            aidlAuthToken.authenticatorType =
-                ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType(
-                    int32_t(authToken.authenticatorType));
-            aidlAuthToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = int64_t(authToken.timestamp);
-            aidlAuthToken.mac = authToken.mac;
-        }
+        // Otherwise, if one or more of the profiles is auth-with-a-timeout then
+        // authTokenMaxAgeMillis will be set to the largest of those
+        // timeouts. We'll get an AuthToken which satisfies this deadline if it
+        // exists. This authToken _may_ have the requested challenge but it's
+        // not a guarantee and it's also not required.
+        //
 
-        if (verificationTokenBytes.size() > 0) {
-            optional<VerificationToken> token =
-                android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::support::deserializeVerificationToken(
-                    verificationTokenBytes);
-            if (!token) {
-                LOG(ERROR) << "Error deserializing verification token";
-                return Status::fromServiceSpecificError(ICredentialStore::ERROR_GENERIC,
-                                                        "Error deserializing verification token");
-            }
-            aidlVerificationToken.challenge = token->challenge;
-            aidlVerificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = token->timestamp;
-            aidlVerificationToken.securityLevel =
-                ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel(token->securityLevel);
-            aidlVerificationToken.mac = token->mac;
+        if (!getTokensFromKeystore2(selectedChallenge_, data->getSecureUserId(),
+                                    authTokenMaxAgeMillis, aidlAuthToken, aidlVerificationToken)) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting tokens from keystore2";
+            return Status::fromServiceSpecificError(ICredentialStore::ERROR_GENERIC,
+                                                    "Error getting tokens from keystore2");
         }
     }
 
     // Note that the selectAuthKey() method is only called if a CryptoObject is involved at
     // the Java layer. So we could end up with no previously selected auth key and we may
     // need one.
-    const AuthKeyData* authKey = selectedAuthKey_;
-    if (sessionTranscript.size() > 0) {
-        if (authKey == nullptr) {
-            authKey = data->selectAuthKey(allowUsingExhaustedKeys, allowUsingExpiredKeys);
-            if (authKey == nullptr) {
-                return Status::fromServiceSpecificError(
-                    ICredentialStore::ERROR_NO_AUTHENTICATION_KEY_AVAILABLE,
-                    "No suitable authentication key available");
-            }
+    //
+    const AuthKeyData* authKey =
+        data->selectAuthKey(allowUsingExhaustedKeys, allowUsingExpiredKeys);
+    if (authKey == nullptr) {
+        // If no authKey is available, consider it an error only when a
+        // SessionTranscript was provided.
+        //
+        // We allow no SessionTranscript to be provided because it makes
+        // the API simpler to deal with insofar it can be used without having
+        // to generate any authentication keys.
+        //
+        // In this "no SessionTranscript is provided" mode we don't return
+        // DeviceNameSpaces nor a MAC over DeviceAuthentication so we don't
+        // need a device key.
+        //
+        if (sessionTranscript.size() > 0) {
+            return Status::fromServiceSpecificError(
+                ICredentialStore::ERROR_NO_AUTHENTICATION_KEY_AVAILABLE,
+                "No suitable authentication key available and one is needed");
         }
     }
     vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob;
@@ -750,31 +766,36 @@
     //
     // It is because of this we need to set the CredentialKey certificate chain,
     // keyCount, and maxUsesPerKey below.
-    sp<WritableCredential> writableCredential =
-        new WritableCredential(dataPath_, credentialName_, docType.value(), true, hwInfo_,
-                               halWritableCredential, halApiVersion_);
+    sp<WritableCredential> writableCredential = new WritableCredential(
+        dataPath_, credentialName_, docType.value(), true, hwInfo_, halWritableCredential);
 
     writableCredential->setAttestationCertificate(data->getAttestationCertificate());
     auto [keyCount, maxUsesPerKey] = data->getAvailableAuthenticationKeys();
     writableCredential->setAvailableAuthenticationKeys(keyCount, maxUsesPerKey);
 
-    // Because its data has changed, we need to reconnect to the HAL when the
-    // credential has been updated... otherwise the remote object will have
-    // stale data for future calls (e.g. getAuthKeysNeedingCertification().
+    // Because its data has changed, we need to replace the binder for the
+    // IIdentityCredential when the credential has been updated... otherwise the
+    // remote object will have stale data for future calls, for example
+    // getAuthKeysNeedingCertification().
     //
-    // The joys and pitfalls of mutable objects...
+    // The way this is implemented is that setCredentialToReloadWhenUpdated()
+    // instructs the WritableCredential to call writableCredentialPersonalized()
+    // on |this|.
     //
-    writableCredential->setCredentialUpdatedCallback([this] {
-        Status status = this->ensureOrReplaceHalBinder();
-        if (!status.isOk()) {
-            LOG(ERROR) << "Error loading credential";
-        }
-    });
+    //
+    writableCredential->setCredentialToReloadWhenUpdated(this);
 
     *_aidl_return = writableCredential;
     return Status::ok();
 }
 
+void Credential::writableCredentialPersonalized() {
+    Status status = ensureOrReplaceHalBinder();
+    if (!status.isOk()) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Error reloading credential";
+    }
+}
+
 }  // namespace identity
 }  // namespace security
 }  // namespace android
diff --git a/identity/Credential.h b/identity/Credential.h
index 7f08515..a76f3cc 100644
--- a/identity/Credential.h
+++ b/identity/Credential.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
     ~Credential();
 
     Status ensureOrReplaceHalBinder();
+    void writableCredentialPersonalized();
 
     // ICredential overrides
     Status createEphemeralKeyPair(vector<uint8_t>* _aidl_return) override;
@@ -94,12 +95,13 @@
     HardwareInformation hwInfo_;
     sp<IIdentityCredentialStore> halStoreBinder_;
 
-    const AuthKeyData* selectedAuthKey_ = nullptr;
     uint64_t selectedChallenge_ = 0;
 
     sp<IIdentityCredential> halBinder_;
     int halApiVersion_;
 
+    bool ensureChallenge();
+
     ssize_t
     calcExpectedDeviceNameSpacesSize(const vector<uint8_t>& requestMessage,
                                      const vector<RequestNamespaceParcel>& requestNamespaces,
diff --git a/identity/CredentialData.cpp b/identity/CredentialData.cpp
index 96c436a..d95c1ac 100644
--- a/identity/CredentialData.cpp
+++ b/identity/CredentialData.cpp
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
-#define LOG_TAG "CredentialData"
+#define LOG_TAG "credstore"
 
 #include <chrono>
 
diff --git a/identity/CredentialData.h b/identity/CredentialData.h
index b037997..24b55d3 100644
--- a/identity/CredentialData.h
+++ b/identity/CredentialData.h
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
 
     vector<uint8_t> certificate;
     vector<uint8_t> keyBlob;
-    int64_t expirationDateMillisSinceEpoch;
+    int64_t expirationDateMillisSinceEpoch = 0;
     vector<uint8_t> staticAuthenticationData;
     vector<uint8_t> pendingCertificate;
     vector<uint8_t> pendingKeyBlob;
diff --git a/identity/CredentialStore.cpp b/identity/CredentialStore.cpp
index f77294e..071cf24 100644
--- a/identity/CredentialStore.cpp
+++ b/identity/CredentialStore.cpp
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
-#define LOG_TAG "CredentialStore"
+#define LOG_TAG "credstore"
 
 #include <algorithm>
 
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
     }
 
     sp<IWritableCredential> writableCredential = new WritableCredential(
-        dataPath_, credentialName, docType, false, hwInfo_, halWritableCredential, halApiVersion_);
+        dataPath_, credentialName, docType, false, hwInfo_, halWritableCredential);
     *_aidl_return = writableCredential;
     return Status::ok();
 }
diff --git a/identity/CredentialStoreFactory.cpp b/identity/CredentialStoreFactory.cpp
index 5c3bf36..0e901ba 100644
--- a/identity/CredentialStoreFactory.cpp
+++ b/identity/CredentialStoreFactory.cpp
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
-#define LOG_TAG "CredentialStoreFactory"
+#define LOG_TAG "credstore"
 
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
 
diff --git a/identity/TEST_MAPPING b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87707a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+  "presubmit": [
+    {
+      "name": "CtsIdentityTestCases"
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/identity/Util.cpp b/identity/Util.cpp
index cd29017..3a46bca 100644
--- a/identity/Util.cpp
+++ b/identity/Util.cpp
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
-#define LOG_TAG "Util"
+#define LOG_TAG "credstore"
 
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
diff --git a/identity/WritableCredential.cpp b/identity/WritableCredential.cpp
index d0688b8..9827d75 100644
--- a/identity/WritableCredential.cpp
+++ b/identity/WritableCredential.cpp
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
-#define LOG_TAG "WritableCredential"
+#define LOG_TAG "credstore"
 
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
 #include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
@@ -41,15 +41,14 @@
 WritableCredential::WritableCredential(const string& dataPath, const string& credentialName,
                                        const string& docType, bool isUpdate,
                                        HardwareInformation hwInfo,
-                                       sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> halBinder, int halApiVersion)
+                                       sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> halBinder)
     : dataPath_(dataPath), credentialName_(credentialName), docType_(docType), isUpdate_(isUpdate),
-      hwInfo_(std::move(hwInfo)), halBinder_(halBinder), halApiVersion_(halApiVersion) {}
+      hwInfo_(std::move(hwInfo)), halBinder_(halBinder) {}
 
 WritableCredential::~WritableCredential() {}
 
-void WritableCredential::setCredentialUpdatedCallback(
-    std::function<void()>&& onCredentialUpdatedCallback) {
-    onCredentialUpdatedCallback_ = onCredentialUpdatedCallback;
+void WritableCredential::setCredentialToReloadWhenUpdated(sp<Credential> credential) {
+    credentialToReloadWhenUpdated_ = credential;
 }
 
 Status WritableCredential::ensureAttestationCertificateExists(const vector<uint8_t>& challenge) {
@@ -268,7 +267,10 @@
                                                 "Error saving credential data to disk");
     }
 
-    onCredentialUpdatedCallback_();
+    if (credentialToReloadWhenUpdated_) {
+        credentialToReloadWhenUpdated_->writableCredentialPersonalized();
+        credentialToReloadWhenUpdated_.clear();
+    }
 
     *_aidl_return = proofOfProvisioningSignature;
     return Status::ok();
diff --git a/identity/WritableCredential.h b/identity/WritableCredential.h
index 6ff31ae..838b956 100644
--- a/identity/WritableCredential.h
+++ b/identity/WritableCredential.h
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
 
 #include <android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.h>
 
+#include "Credential.h"
+
 namespace android {
 namespace security {
 namespace identity {
@@ -38,13 +40,15 @@
   public:
     WritableCredential(const string& dataPath, const string& credentialName, const string& docType,
                        bool isUpdate, HardwareInformation hwInfo,
-                       sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> halBinder, int halApiVersion);
+                       sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> halBinder);
     ~WritableCredential();
 
     // Used when updating a credential
     void setAttestationCertificate(const vector<uint8_t>& attestationCertificate);
     void setAvailableAuthenticationKeys(int keyCount, int maxUsesPerKey);
-    void setCredentialUpdatedCallback(std::function<void()>&& onCredentialUpdatedCallback);
+
+    // Used by Credential::update()
+    void setCredentialToReloadWhenUpdated(sp<Credential> credential);
 
     // IWritableCredential overrides
     Status getCredentialKeyCertificateChain(const vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
@@ -61,13 +65,12 @@
     bool isUpdate_;
     HardwareInformation hwInfo_;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> halBinder_;
-    int halApiVersion_;
 
     vector<uint8_t> attestationCertificate_;
     int keyCount_ = 0;
     int maxUsesPerKey_ = 1;
 
-    std::function<void()> onCredentialUpdatedCallback_ = []() {};
+    sp<Credential> credentialToReloadWhenUpdated_;
 
     ssize_t calcExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(
         const vector<AccessControlProfileParcel>& accessControlProfiles,
diff --git a/identity/main.cpp b/identity/main.cpp
index 8f4968d..2559789 100644
--- a/identity/main.cpp
+++ b/identity/main.cpp
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
-#define LOG_TAG "android.security.identity"
+#define LOG_TAG "credstore"
 
 #include <filesystem>
 
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 using ::android::security::identity::CredentialStoreFactory;
 
 int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
-    InitLogging(argv, StderrLogger);
+    InitLogging(argv);
 
     CHECK(argc == 2) << "A directory must be specified";
     string data_dir = string(argv[1]);
@@ -51,11 +51,10 @@
 
     auto ret = sm->addService(String16("android.security.identity"), factory);
     CHECK(ret == ::android::OK) << "Couldn't register binder service";
-    LOG(ERROR) << "Registered binder service";
+    LOG(INFO) << "Registered binder service";
 
-    // This is needed for binder callbacks from keystore on a ICredstoreTokenCallback binder.
-    android::ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
-
+    // Credstore is a single-threaded process. So devote the main thread
+    // to handling binder messages.
     IPCThreadState::self()->joinThreadPool();
 
     return 0;
diff --git a/keystore-engine/Android.bp b/keystore-engine/Android.bp
index 6512c66..9980765 100644
--- a/keystore-engine/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore-engine/Android.bp
@@ -12,12 +12,22 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-BSD
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 cc_library_shared {
     name: "libkeystore-engine",
 
     srcs: [
         "android_engine.cpp",
         "keystore_backend_binder.cpp",
+        "keystore2_engine.cpp",
     ],
 
     cflags: [
@@ -27,7 +37,9 @@
     ],
 
     shared_libs: [
+        "android.system.keystore2-V1-ndk_platform",
         "libbinder",
+        "libbinder_ndk",
         "libcrypto",
         "libcutils",
         "libhidlbase",
@@ -49,6 +61,7 @@
     srcs: [
         "android_engine.cpp",
         "keystore_backend_hidl.cpp",
+        "keystore2_engine.cpp",
     ],
 
     cflags: [
@@ -59,7 +72,10 @@
     ],
 
     shared_libs: [
+        "android.system.keystore2-V1-ndk_platform",
         "android.system.wifi.keystore@1.0",
+        "libbase",
+        "libbinder_ndk",
         "libcrypto",
         "liblog",
         "libhidlbase",
diff --git a/keystore-engine/android_engine.cpp b/keystore-engine/android_engine.cpp
index e3525b2..5881523 100644
--- a/keystore-engine/android_engine.cpp
+++ b/keystore-engine/android_engine.cpp
@@ -23,10 +23,7 @@
 #define LOG_TAG "keystore-engine"
 
 #include <pthread.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include <log/log.h>
 
@@ -41,6 +38,8 @@
 
 #include <memory>
 
+#include "keystore2_engine.h"
+
 #ifndef BACKEND_WIFI_HIDL
 #include "keystore_backend_binder.h"
 #else
@@ -335,6 +334,10 @@
 EVP_PKEY* EVP_PKEY_from_keystore(const char* key_id) {
     ALOGV("EVP_PKEY_from_keystore(\"%s\")", key_id);
 
+    if (auto ks2_key = EVP_PKEY_from_keystore2(key_id)) {
+        return ks2_key;
+    }
+
     ensure_keystore_engine();
 
     uint8_t *pubkey = nullptr;
diff --git a/keystore-engine/keystore2_engine.cpp b/keystore-engine/keystore2_engine.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..69d2ca6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore-engine/keystore2_engine.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "keystore2_engine.h"
+
+#include <aidl/android/system/keystore2/IKeystoreService.h>
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/strings.h>
+#include <android/binder_manager.h>
+
+#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#define AT __func__ << ":" << __LINE__ << " "
+
+constexpr const char keystore2_service_name[] = "android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default";
+const std::string keystore2_grant_id_prefix("ks2_keystore-engine_grant_id:");
+
+/**
+ * Keystore 2.0 namespace identifiers.
+ * Keep in sync with system/sepolicy/private/keystore2_key_contexts.
+ */
+constexpr const int64_t KS2_NAMESPACE_WIFI = 102;
+
+namespace ks2 = ::aidl::android::system::keystore2;
+namespace KMV1 = ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint;
+
+namespace {
+
+int64_t getNamespaceforCurrentUid() {
+    auto uid = getuid();
+    switch (uid) {
+    case AID_WIFI:
+        return KS2_NAMESPACE_WIFI;
+    // 0 is the super user namespace, and nothing has access to this namespace on user builds.
+    // So this will always fail.
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+struct Keystore2KeyBackend {
+    ks2::KeyDescriptor descriptor_;
+    std::shared_ptr<ks2::IKeystoreSecurityLevel> i_keystore_security_level_;
+};
+
+/* key_backend_dup is called when one of the RSA or EC_KEY objects is duplicated. */
+extern "C" int key_backend_dup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA* /* to */, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA* /* from */,
+                               void** from_d, int /* index */, long /* argl */, void* /* argp */) {
+    auto key_backend = reinterpret_cast<std::shared_ptr<Keystore2KeyBackend>*>(*from_d);
+    if (key_backend != nullptr) {
+        *from_d = new std::shared_ptr<Keystore2KeyBackend>(*key_backend);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* key_backend_free is called when one of the RSA, DSA or EC_KEY object is freed. */
+extern "C" void key_backend_free(void* /* parent */, void* ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA* /* ad */,
+                                 int /* index */, long /* argl */, void* /* argp */) {
+    delete reinterpret_cast<std::shared_ptr<Keystore2KeyBackend>*>(ptr);
+}
+
+extern "C" int rsa_private_transform(RSA* rsa, uint8_t* out, const uint8_t* in, size_t len);
+extern "C" int ecdsa_sign(const uint8_t* digest, size_t digest_len, uint8_t* sig,
+                          unsigned int* sig_len, EC_KEY* ec_key);
+/* KeystoreEngine is a BoringSSL ENGINE that implements RSA and ECDSA by
+ * forwarding the requested operations to Keystore. */
+class Keystore2Engine {
+  public:
+    Keystore2Engine()
+        : rsa_index_(RSA_get_ex_new_index(0 /* argl */, nullptr /* argp */, nullptr /* new_func */,
+                                          key_backend_dup, key_backend_free)),
+          ec_key_index_(EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(0 /* argl */, nullptr /* argp */,
+                                                nullptr /* new_func */, key_backend_dup,
+                                                key_backend_free)),
+          engine_(ENGINE_new()) {
+        memset(&rsa_method_, 0, sizeof(rsa_method_));
+        rsa_method_.common.is_static = 1;
+        rsa_method_.private_transform = rsa_private_transform;
+        rsa_method_.flags = RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE;
+        ENGINE_set_RSA_method(engine_, &rsa_method_, sizeof(rsa_method_));
+
+        memset(&ecdsa_method_, 0, sizeof(ecdsa_method_));
+        ecdsa_method_.common.is_static = 1;
+        ecdsa_method_.sign = ecdsa_sign;
+        ecdsa_method_.flags = ECDSA_FLAG_OPAQUE;
+        ENGINE_set_ECDSA_method(engine_, &ecdsa_method_, sizeof(ecdsa_method_));
+    }
+
+    int rsa_ex_index() const { return rsa_index_; }
+    int ec_key_ex_index() const { return ec_key_index_; }
+
+    const ENGINE* engine() const { return engine_; }
+
+    static const Keystore2Engine& get() {
+        static Keystore2Engine engine;
+        return engine;
+    }
+
+  private:
+    const int rsa_index_;
+    const int ec_key_index_;
+    RSA_METHOD rsa_method_;
+    ECDSA_METHOD ecdsa_method_;
+    ENGINE* const engine_;
+};
+
+#define OWNERSHIP_TRANSFERRED(x) x.release()
+
+/* wrap_rsa returns an |EVP_PKEY| that contains an RSA key where the public
+ * part is taken from |public_rsa| and the private operations are forwarded to
+ * KeyStore and operate on the key named |key_id|. */
+bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> wrap_rsa(std::shared_ptr<Keystore2KeyBackend> key_backend,
+                                   const RSA* public_rsa) {
+    bssl::UniquePtr<RSA> rsa(RSA_new_method(Keystore2Engine::get().engine()));
+    if (rsa.get() == nullptr) {
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    auto key_backend_copy = new decltype(key_backend)(key_backend);
+
+    if (!RSA_set_ex_data(rsa.get(), Keystore2Engine::get().rsa_ex_index(), key_backend_copy)) {
+        delete key_backend_copy;
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    rsa->n = BN_dup(public_rsa->n);
+    rsa->e = BN_dup(public_rsa->e);
+    if (rsa->n == nullptr || rsa->e == nullptr) {
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> result(EVP_PKEY_new());
+    if (result.get() == nullptr || !EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(result.get(), rsa.get())) {
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+    OWNERSHIP_TRANSFERRED(rsa);
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+/* wrap_ecdsa returns an |EVP_PKEY| that contains an ECDSA key where the public
+ * part is taken from |public_rsa| and the private operations are forwarded to
+ * KeyStore and operate on the key named |key_id|. */
+bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> wrap_ecdsa(std::shared_ptr<Keystore2KeyBackend> key_backend,
+                                     const EC_KEY* public_ecdsa) {
+    bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> ec(EC_KEY_new_method(Keystore2Engine::get().engine()));
+    if (ec.get() == nullptr) {
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_KEY_set_group(ec.get(), EC_KEY_get0_group(public_ecdsa)) ||
+        !EC_KEY_set_public_key(ec.get(), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(public_ecdsa))) {
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    auto key_backend_copy = new decltype(key_backend)(key_backend);
+
+    if (!EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec.get(), Keystore2Engine::get().ec_key_ex_index(), key_backend_copy)) {
+        delete key_backend_copy;
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> result(EVP_PKEY_new());
+    if (result.get() == nullptr || !EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(result.get(), ec.get())) {
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+    OWNERSHIP_TRANSFERRED(ec);
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> keystore2_sign(const Keystore2KeyBackend& key_backend,
+                                                   std::vector<uint8_t> input,
+                                                   KMV1::Algorithm algorithm) {
+    auto sec_level = key_backend.i_keystore_security_level_;
+    ks2::CreateOperationResponse response;
+
+    std::vector<KMV1::KeyParameter> op_params(4);
+    op_params[0] = KMV1::KeyParameter{
+        .tag = KMV1::Tag::PURPOSE,
+        .value = KMV1::KeyParameterValue::make<KMV1::KeyParameterValue::keyPurpose>(
+            KMV1::KeyPurpose::SIGN)};
+    op_params[1] = KMV1::KeyParameter{
+        .tag = KMV1::Tag::ALGORITHM,
+        .value = KMV1::KeyParameterValue::make<KMV1::KeyParameterValue::algorithm>(algorithm)};
+    op_params[2] = KMV1::KeyParameter{
+        .tag = KMV1::Tag::PADDING,
+        .value = KMV1::KeyParameterValue::make<KMV1::KeyParameterValue::paddingMode>(
+            KMV1::PaddingMode::NONE)};
+    op_params[3] =
+        KMV1::KeyParameter{.tag = KMV1::Tag::DIGEST,
+                           .value = KMV1::KeyParameterValue::make<KMV1::KeyParameterValue::digest>(
+                               KMV1::Digest::NONE)};
+
+    auto rc = sec_level->createOperation(key_backend.descriptor_, op_params, false /* forced */,
+                                         &response);
+    if (!rc.isOk()) {
+        auto exception_code = rc.getExceptionCode();
+        if (exception_code == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Keystore createOperation returned service specific error: "
+                       << rc.getServiceSpecificError();
+        } else {
+            LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Communication with Keystore createOperation failed error: "
+                       << exception_code;
+        }
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+
+    auto op = response.iOperation;
+
+    std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> output = std::nullopt;
+    rc = op->finish(std::move(input), {}, &output);
+    if (!rc.isOk()) {
+        auto exception_code = rc.getExceptionCode();
+        if (exception_code == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Keystore finish returned service specific error: "
+                       << rc.getServiceSpecificError();
+        } else {
+            LOG(ERROR) << AT
+                       << "Communication with Keystore finish failed error: " << exception_code;
+        }
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+
+    if (!output) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "We did not get a signature from Keystore.";
+    }
+
+    return output;
+}
+
+/* rsa_private_transform takes a big-endian integer from |in|, calculates the
+ * d'th power of it, modulo the RSA modulus, and writes the result as a
+ * big-endian integer to |out|. Both |in| and |out| are |len| bytes long. It
+ * returns one on success and zero otherwise. */
+extern "C" int rsa_private_transform(RSA* rsa, uint8_t* out, const uint8_t* in, size_t len) {
+    auto key_backend = reinterpret_cast<std::shared_ptr<Keystore2KeyBackend>*>(
+        RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, Keystore2Engine::get().rsa_ex_index()));
+
+    if (key_backend == nullptr) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Invalid key.";
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    auto output =
+        keystore2_sign(**key_backend, std::vector<uint8_t>(in, in + len), KMV1::Algorithm::RSA);
+    if (!output) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (output->size() > len) {
+        /* The result of the RSA operation can never be larger than the size of
+         * the modulus so we assume that the result has extra zeros on the
+         * left. This provides attackers with an oracle, but there's nothing
+         * that we can do about it here. */
+        LOG(WARNING) << "Reply len " << output->size() << " greater than expected " << len;
+        memcpy(out, &output->data()[output->size() - len], len);
+    } else if (output->size() < len) {
+        /* If the Keystore implementation returns a short value we assume that
+         * it's because it removed leading zeros from the left side. This is
+         * bad because it provides attackers with an oracle but we cannot do
+         * anything about a broken Keystore implementation here. */
+        LOG(WARNING) << "Reply len " << output->size() << " less than expected " << len;
+        memset(out, 0, len);
+        memcpy(out + len - output->size(), output->data(), output->size());
+    } else {
+        memcpy(out, output->data(), len);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* ecdsa_sign signs |digest_len| bytes from |digest| with |ec_key| and writes
+ * the resulting signature (an ASN.1 encoded blob) to |sig|. It returns one on
+ * success and zero otherwise. */
+extern "C" int ecdsa_sign(const uint8_t* digest, size_t digest_len, uint8_t* sig,
+                          unsigned int* sig_len, EC_KEY* ec_key) {
+    auto key_backend = reinterpret_cast<std::shared_ptr<Keystore2KeyBackend>*>(
+        EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ec_key, Keystore2Engine::get().ec_key_ex_index()));
+
+    if (key_backend == nullptr) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Invalid key.";
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    size_t ecdsa_size = ECDSA_size(ec_key);
+
+    auto output = keystore2_sign(**key_backend, std::vector<uint8_t>(digest, digest + digest_len),
+                                 KMV1::Algorithm::EC);
+    if (!output) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "There was an error during ecdsa_sign.";
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (output->size() == 0) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "No valid signature returned";
+        return 0;
+    } else if (output->size() > ecdsa_size) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Signature is too large";
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(sig, output->data(), output->size());
+    *sig_len = output->size();
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+/* EVP_PKEY_from_keystore returns an |EVP_PKEY| that contains either an RSA or
+ * ECDSA key where the public part of the key reflects the value of the key
+ * named |key_id| in Keystore and the private operations are forwarded onto
+ * KeyStore. */
+extern "C" EVP_PKEY* EVP_PKEY_from_keystore2(const char* key_id) {
+    ::ndk::SpAIBinder keystoreBinder(AServiceManager_checkService(keystore2_service_name));
+    auto keystore2 = ks2::IKeystoreService::fromBinder(keystoreBinder);
+
+    if (!keystore2) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Unable to connect to Keystore 2.0.";
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    std::string alias = key_id;
+    if (android::base::StartsWith(alias, "USRPKEY_")) {
+        LOG(WARNING) << AT << "Keystore backend used with legacy alias prefix - ignoring.";
+        alias = alias.substr(8);
+    }
+
+    ks2::KeyDescriptor descriptor = {
+        .domain = ks2::Domain::SELINUX,
+        .nspace = getNamespaceforCurrentUid(),
+        .alias = alias,
+        .blob = std::nullopt,
+    };
+
+    // If the key_id starts with the grant id prefix, we parse the following string as numeric
+    // grant id. We can then use the grant domain without alias to load the designated key.
+    if (alias.find(keystore2_grant_id_prefix) == 0) {
+        std::stringstream s(alias.substr(keystore2_grant_id_prefix.size()));
+        s >> std::hex >> reinterpret_cast<uint64_t&>(descriptor.nspace);
+        descriptor.domain = ks2::Domain::GRANT;
+        descriptor.alias = std::nullopt;
+    }
+
+    ks2::KeyEntryResponse response;
+    auto rc = keystore2->getKeyEntry(descriptor, &response);
+    if (!rc.isOk()) {
+        auto exception_code = rc.getExceptionCode();
+        if (exception_code == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Keystore getKeyEntry returned service specific error: "
+                       << rc.getServiceSpecificError();
+        } else {
+            LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Communication with Keystore getKeyEntry failed error: "
+                       << exception_code;
+        }
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    if (!response.metadata.certificate) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "No public key found.";
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    const uint8_t* p = response.metadata.certificate->data();
+    bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(d2i_X509(nullptr, &p, response.metadata.certificate->size()));
+    if (!x509) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed to parse x509 certificate.";
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+    bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(x509.get()));
+    if (!pkey) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed to extract public key.";
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    auto key_backend = std::make_shared<Keystore2KeyBackend>(
+        Keystore2KeyBackend{response.metadata.key, response.iSecurityLevel});
+
+    bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> result;
+    switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type)) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA: {
+        bssl::UniquePtr<RSA> public_rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey.get()));
+        result = wrap_rsa(key_backend, public_rsa.get());
+        break;
+    }
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC: {
+        bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> public_ecdsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey.get()));
+        result = wrap_ecdsa(key_backend, public_ecdsa.get());
+        break;
+    }
+    default:
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Unsupported key type " << EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type);
+        return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    return result.release();
+}
diff --git a/keystore-engine/keystore2_engine.h b/keystore-engine/keystore2_engine.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8381d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore-engine/keystore2_engine.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+extern "C" EVP_PKEY* EVP_PKEY_from_keystore2(const char* key_id);
diff --git a/keystore/Android.bp b/keystore/Android.bp
index 45b721b..7278cee 100644
--- a/keystore/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore/Android.bp
@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-BSD
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 cc_defaults {
     name: "keystore_defaults",
 
diff --git a/keystore/auth_token_table.cpp b/keystore/auth_token_table.cpp
index 5e6d572..971f9ef 100644
--- a/keystore/auth_token_table.cpp
+++ b/keystore/auth_token_table.cpp
@@ -178,33 +178,39 @@
                                               int64_t authTokenMaxAgeMillis) {
     std::vector<uint64_t> sids = {secureUserId};
     HardwareAuthenticatorType auth_type = HardwareAuthenticatorType::ANY;
-
     time_t now = clock_function_();
+    int64_t nowMillis = now * 1000;
 
-    // challenge-based - the authToken has to contain the given challenge.
-    if (challenge != 0) {
-        auto matching_op = find_if(
-            entries_, [&](Entry& e) { return e.token().challenge == challenge && !e.completed(); });
-        if (matching_op == entries_.end()) {
-            return {AUTH_TOKEN_NOT_FOUND, {}};
-        }
-
-        if (!matching_op->SatisfiesAuth(sids, auth_type)) {
-            return {AUTH_TOKEN_WRONG_SID, {}};
-        }
-
-        if (authTokenMaxAgeMillis > 0) {
-            if (static_cast<int64_t>(matching_op->time_received()) + authTokenMaxAgeMillis <
-                static_cast<int64_t>(now)) {
-                return {AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED, {}};
-            }
-        }
-
-        return {OK, matching_op->token()};
+    // It's an error to call this without a non-zero challenge.
+    if (challenge == 0) {
+        return {OP_HANDLE_REQUIRED, {}};
     }
 
-    // Otherwise, no challenge - any authToken younger than the specified maximum
-    // age will do.
+    // First see if we can find a token which matches the given challenge. If we
+    // can, return the newest one. We specifically don't care about its age.
+    //
+    Entry* newest_match_for_challenge = nullptr;
+    for (auto& entry : entries_) {
+        if (entry.token().challenge == challenge && !entry.completed() &&
+            entry.SatisfiesAuth(sids, auth_type)) {
+            if (newest_match_for_challenge == nullptr ||
+                entry.is_newer_than(newest_match_for_challenge)) {
+                newest_match_for_challenge = &entry;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (newest_match_for_challenge != nullptr) {
+        newest_match_for_challenge->UpdateLastUse(now);
+        return {OK, newest_match_for_challenge->token()};
+    }
+
+    // If that didn't work, we'll take the most recent token within the specified
+    // deadline, if any. Of course if the deadline is zero it doesn't make sense
+    // to look at all.
+    if (authTokenMaxAgeMillis == 0) {
+        return {AUTH_TOKEN_NOT_FOUND, {}};
+    }
+
     Entry* newest_match = nullptr;
     for (auto& entry : entries_) {
         if (entry.SatisfiesAuth(sids, auth_type) && entry.is_newer_than(newest_match)) {
@@ -216,11 +222,9 @@
         return {AUTH_TOKEN_NOT_FOUND, {}};
     }
 
-    if (authTokenMaxAgeMillis > 0) {
-        if (static_cast<int64_t>(newest_match->time_received()) + authTokenMaxAgeMillis <
-            static_cast<int64_t>(now)) {
-            return {AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED, {}};
-        }
+    int64_t tokenAgeMillis = nowMillis - newest_match->time_received() * 1000;
+    if (tokenAgeMillis >= authTokenMaxAgeMillis) {
+        return {AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED, {}};
     }
 
     newest_match->UpdateLastUse(now);
diff --git a/keystore/binder/android/security/keystore/IKeystoreService.aidl b/keystore/binder/android/security/keystore/IKeystoreService.aidl
index e0879dd..3b9a1b4 100644
--- a/keystore/binder/android/security/keystore/IKeystoreService.aidl
+++ b/keystore/binder/android/security/keystore/IKeystoreService.aidl
@@ -87,7 +87,20 @@
     int onKeyguardVisibilityChanged(in boolean isShowing, in int userId);
     int listUidsOfAuthBoundKeys(out @utf8InCpp List<String> uids);
 
-    // Called by credstore (and only credstore).
+    // This method looks through auth-tokens cached by keystore which match
+    // the passed-in |secureUserId|.
+    //
+    // If one or more of these tokens has a |challenge| field which matches
+    // the passed-in |challenge| parameter, the most recent is returned. In
+    // this case the |authTokenMaxAgeMillis| parameter is not used.
+    //
+    // Otherwise, the most recent auth-token of these tokens which is younger
+    // than |authTokenMaxAgeMillis| is returned.
+    //
+    // The passed in |challenge| parameter must always be non-zero.
+    //
+    // This method is called by credstore (and only credstore).
+    //
     void getTokensForCredstore(in long challenge, in long secureUserId, in int authTokenMaxAgeMillis,
                                in ICredstoreTokenCallback cb);
 }
diff --git a/keystore/tests/Android.bp b/keystore/tests/Android.bp
index 883e020..327eb93 100644
--- a/keystore/tests/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore/tests/Android.bp
@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@
 // Unit test for AuthTokenTable
 
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 cc_test {
     cflags: [
         "-Wall",
diff --git a/keystore2/Android.bp b/keystore2/Android.bp
index f9295ca..aff824b 100644
--- a/keystore2/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore2/Android.bp
@@ -12,33 +12,58 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-rust_library {
-    name: "libkeystore2",
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
+rust_defaults {
+    name: "libkeystore2_defaults",
     crate_name: "keystore2",
     srcs: ["src/lib.rs"],
 
     rustlibs: [
         "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-rust",
         "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-rust",
+        "android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-V1-rust",
+        "android.os.permissions_aidl-rust",
         "android.security.apc-rust",
         "android.security.authorization-rust",
         "android.security.compat-rust",
+        "android.security.maintenance-rust",
+        "android.security.remoteprovisioning-rust",
         "android.system.keystore2-V1-rust",
         "libanyhow",
         "libbinder_rs",
+        "libcutils_bindgen",
         "libkeystore2_aaid-rust",
         "libkeystore2_apc_compat-rust",
         "libkeystore2_crypto_rust",
         "libkeystore2_km_compat",
         "libkeystore2_selinux",
+        "libkeystore2_system_property-rust",
+        "libkeystore2_vintf_rust",
         "liblazy_static",
         "liblibc",
         "liblibsqlite3_sys",
         "liblog_rust",
         "librand",
         "librusqlite",
+        "libstatslog_rust",
         "libthiserror",
     ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "libcutils",
+    ],
+}
+
+rust_library {
+    name: "libkeystore2",
+    defaults: ["libkeystore2_defaults"],
 }
 
 rust_library {
@@ -54,32 +79,13 @@
 rust_test {
     name: "keystore2_test",
     crate_name: "keystore2",
-    srcs: ["src/lib.rs"],
     test_suites: ["general-tests"],
     auto_gen_config: true,
+    compile_multilib: "first",
+    defaults: ["libkeystore2_defaults"],
     rustlibs: [
-        "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-rust",
-        "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-rust",
-        "android.security.apc-rust",
-        "android.security.authorization-rust",
-        "android.security.compat-rust",
-        "android.system.keystore2-V1-rust",
         "libandroid_logger",
-        "libanyhow",
-        "libbinder_rs",
-        "libkeystore2_aaid-rust",
-        "libkeystore2_apc_compat-rust",
-        "libkeystore2_crypto_rust",
-        "libkeystore2_km_compat",
-        "libkeystore2_selinux",
         "libkeystore2_test_utils",
-        "liblazy_static",
-        "liblibc",
-        "liblibsqlite3_sys",
-        "liblog_rust",
-        "librand",
-        "librusqlite",
-        "libthiserror",
     ],
 }
 
@@ -91,6 +97,9 @@
         "libbinder_rs",
         "libkeystore2",
         "liblog_rust",
+        "libvpnprofilestore-rust",
     ],
     init_rc: ["keystore2.rc"],
+
+    vintf_fragments: ["android.system.keystore2-service.xml"],
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/TEST_MAPPING b/keystore2/TEST_MAPPING
index 33d157e..16b6f85 100644
--- a/keystore2/TEST_MAPPING
+++ b/keystore2/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
 {
   "presubmit": [
     {
-      "name": "keystore2_certificate_test"
+      "name": "keystore2_crypto_test"
     },
     {
-      "name": "keystore2_km_compat_test"
+      "name": "keystore2_crypto_test_rust"
     },
     {
       "name": "keystore2_test"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "CtsIdentityTestCases"
     }
   ]
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/aaid/Android.bp b/keystore2/aaid/Android.bp
index 2329400..d27fdf6 100644
--- a/keystore2/aaid/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore2/aaid/Android.bp
@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 cc_library {
     name: "libkeystore2_aaid",
     srcs: [
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/Android.bp b/keystore2/aidl/Android.bp
index fac36e5..183096c 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 aidl_interface {
     name: "android.security.attestationmanager",
     srcs: [ "android/security/attestationmanager/*.aidl", ],
@@ -19,7 +28,8 @@
     unstable: true,
     backend: {
         java: {
-            sdk_version: "module_current",
+            platform_apis: true,
+            srcs_available: true,
         },
         rust: {
             enabled: true,
@@ -37,7 +47,8 @@
     unstable: true,
     backend: {
         java: {
-            sdk_version: "module_current",
+            platform_apis: true,
+            srcs_available: true,
         },
         rust: {
             enabled: true,
@@ -55,6 +66,7 @@
     backend: {
         java: {
             enabled: true,
+            srcs_available: true,
         },
         rust: {
             enabled: true,
@@ -73,7 +85,8 @@
     unstable: true,
     backend: {
         java: {
-            sdk_version: "module_current",
+            platform_apis: true,
+            srcs_available: true,
         },
         rust: {
             enabled: true,
@@ -83,3 +96,61 @@
         }
     },
 }
+
+aidl_interface {
+    name: "android.security.remoteprovisioning",
+    srcs: [ "android/security/remoteprovisioning/*.aidl" ],
+    imports: [
+        "android.hardware.security.keymint",
+    ],
+    unstable: true,
+    backend: {
+        java: {
+            platform_apis: true,
+            srcs_available: true,
+        },
+        ndk: {
+            enabled: true,
+        },
+        rust: {
+            enabled: true,
+        },
+    },
+}
+
+aidl_interface {
+    name: "android.security.maintenance",
+    srcs: [ "android/security/maintenance/*.aidl" ],
+    imports: [
+        "android.system.keystore2",
+    ],
+    unstable: true,
+    backend: {
+        java: {
+            platform_apis: true,
+            srcs_available: true,
+        },
+        rust: {
+            enabled: true,
+        },
+        ndk: {
+            enabled: true,
+        }
+    },
+}
+
+aidl_interface {
+    name: "android.security.vpnprofilestore",
+    srcs: [ "android/security/vpnprofilestore/*.aidl" ],
+    unstable: true,
+    backend: {
+        java: {
+            platform_apis: true,
+            srcs_available: true,
+        },
+        rust: {
+            enabled: true,
+        },
+    },
+}
+
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/IConfirmationCallback.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/IConfirmationCallback.aidl
index f47d7f5..277b9dd 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/IConfirmationCallback.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/IConfirmationCallback.aidl
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 /**
  * This callback interface must be implemented by the client to receive the result of the user
  * confirmation.
+ * @hide
  */
 interface IConfirmationCallback {
     /**
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/IProtectedConfirmation.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/IProtectedConfirmation.aidl
index 26ccf0f..3162224 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/IProtectedConfirmation.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/IProtectedConfirmation.aidl
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 
 import android.security.apc.IConfirmationCallback;
 
+/** @hide */
 interface IProtectedConfirmation {
 
     /**
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/ResponseCode.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/ResponseCode.aidl
index 7ae3e1c..9a3619f 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/ResponseCode.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/apc/ResponseCode.aidl
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 /**
  * Used as service specific exception code by IProtectedConfirmation and as result
  * code by IConfirmationCallback
+ * @hide
  */
 @Backing(type="int")
 enum ResponseCode {
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/attestationmanager/ByteArray.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/attestationmanager/ByteArray.aidl
index a1592ec..dc37b1b 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/attestationmanager/ByteArray.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/attestationmanager/ByteArray.aidl
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
 
 /**
  * Simple data holder for a byte array, allowing for multidimensional arrays in AIDL.
- *
  * @hide
  */
 parcelable ByteArray {
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/attestationmanager/IAttestationManager.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/attestationmanager/IAttestationManager.aidl
index 85eee57..e77a21e 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/attestationmanager/IAttestationManager.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/attestationmanager/IAttestationManager.aidl
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
 
 /**
  * Internal interface for performing device attestation.
- *
  * @hide
  */
 interface IAttestationManager {
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/AuthorizationTokens.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/AuthorizationTokens.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9061998
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/AuthorizationTokens.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package android.security.authorization;
+
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken;
+import android.hardware.security.secureclock.TimeStampToken;
+
+/**
+ * This parcelable is returned by `IKeystoreAuthorization::getAuthTokensForCredStore`.
+ * @hide
+ */
+parcelable AuthorizationTokens {
+    /**
+     * HardwareAuthToken provided by an authenticator.
+     */
+    HardwareAuthToken authToken;
+    /**
+     * TimeStampToken provided by a SecureClock.
+     */
+    TimeStampToken timestampToken;
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl
index df64401..86472eb 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl
@@ -16,12 +16,14 @@
 
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken;
 import android.security.authorization.LockScreenEvent;
+import android.security.authorization.AuthorizationTokens;
 
 // TODO: mark the interface with @SensitiveData when the annotation is ready (b/176110256).
 
 /**
  * IKeystoreAuthorization interface exposes the methods for other system components to
  * provide keystore with the information required to enforce authorizations on key usage.
+ * @hide
  */
 interface IKeystoreAuthorization {
 
@@ -45,6 +47,8 @@
      * ## Error conditions:
      * `ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED` - if the callers do not have the 'Unlock' permission.
      * `ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR` - if failed to perform lock/unlock operations due to various
+     * `ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED` - if the super key can not be decrypted.
+     * `ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND` - if the super key is not found.
      *
      * @lockScreenEvent - Indicates what happened.
      *                    * LockScreenEvent.UNLOCK if the screen was unlocked.
@@ -56,4 +60,37 @@
      */
     void onLockScreenEvent(in LockScreenEvent lockScreenEvent, in int userId,
                            in @nullable byte[] password);
+
+    /**
+     * Allows Credstore to retrieve a HardwareAuthToken and a TimestampToken.
+     * Identity Credential Trusted App can run either in the TEE or in other secure Hardware.
+     * So, credstore always need to retrieve a TimestampToken along with a HardwareAuthToken.
+     *
+     * The passed in |challenge| parameter must always be non-zero.
+     *
+     * The returned TimestampToken will always have its |challenge| field set to
+     * the |challenge| parameter.
+     *
+     * This method looks through auth-tokens cached by keystore which match
+     * the passed-in |secureUserId|.
+     * The most recent matching auth token which has a |challenge| field which matches
+     * the passed-in |challenge| parameter is returned.
+     * In this case the |authTokenMaxAgeMillis| parameter is not used.
+     *
+     * Otherwise, the most recent matching auth token which is younger
+     * than |authTokenMaxAgeMillis| is returned.
+     *
+     * This method is called by credstore (and only credstore).
+     *
+     * The caller requires 'get_auth_token' permission.
+     *
+     * ## Error conditions:
+     * `ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED` - if the caller does not have the 'get_auth_token'
+     *                                     permission.
+     * `ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR` - if failed to obtain an authtoken from the database.
+     * `ResponseCode::NO_AUTH_TOKEN_FOUND` - a matching auth token is not found.
+     * `ResponseCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT` - if the passed-in |challenge| parameter is zero.
+     */
+    AuthorizationTokens getAuthTokensForCredStore(in long challenge, in long secureUserId,
+     in long authTokenMaxAgeMillis);
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/LockScreenEvent.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/LockScreenEvent.aidl
index 877a916..c7553a2 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/LockScreenEvent.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/LockScreenEvent.aidl
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 
 package android.security.authorization;
 
+/** @hide */
 @Backing(type="int")
 enum LockScreenEvent {
     UNLOCK = 0,
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/ResponseCode.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/ResponseCode.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..169dc7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/ResponseCode.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package android.security.authorization;
+
+/**
+ * Used as exception codes by IKeystoreAuthorization.
+ * @hide
+ */
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum ResponseCode {
+    /**
+     * A matching auth token is not found.
+     */
+    NO_AUTH_TOKEN_FOUND = 1,
+    /**
+     * The matching auth token is expired.
+     */
+    AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED = 2,
+    /**
+     * Same as in keystore2/ResponseCode.aidl.
+     * Any unexpected Error such as IO or communication errors.
+     */
+    SYSTEM_ERROR = 4,
+    /**
+     * Same as in keystore2/ResponseCode.aidl.
+     * Indicates that the caller does not have the permissions for the attempted request.
+     */
+    PERMISSION_DENIED = 6,
+    /**
+     * Same as in keystore2/ResponseCode.aidl.
+     * Indicates that the requested key does not exist.
+     */
+    KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7,
+    /**
+     * Same as in keystore2/ResponseCode.aidl.
+     * Indicates that a value being processed is corrupted.
+     */
+    VALUE_CORRUPTED = 8,
+    /**
+     * Same as in keystore2/ResponseCode.aidl.
+     * Indicates that an invalid argument was passed to an API call.
+     */
+    INVALID_ARGUMENT = 20,
+
+ }
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/compat/IKeystoreCompatService.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/compat/IKeystoreCompatService.aidl
index 4b6a93b..50bfa19 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/compat/IKeystoreCompatService.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/compat/IKeystoreCompatService.aidl
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
  * The compatibility service allows Keystore 2.0 to connect to legacy wrapper implementations that
  * it hosts itself without registering them as a service. Keystore 2.0 would not be allowed to
  * register a HAL service, so instead it registers this service which it can then connect to.
+ * @hide
  */
 interface IKeystoreCompatService {
     /**
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..280500c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package android.security.maintenance;
+
+import android.system.keystore2.Domain;
+import android.security.maintenance.UserState;
+
+// TODO: mark the interface with @SensitiveData when the annotation is ready (b/176110256).
+
+/**
+ * IKeystoreMaintenance interface exposes the methods for adding/removing users and changing the
+ * user's password.
+ * @hide
+ */
+interface IKeystoreMaintenance {
+
+    /**
+     * Allows LockSettingsService to inform keystore about adding a new user.
+     * Callers require 'AddUser' permission.
+     *
+     * ## Error conditions:
+     * `ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED` - if the callers do not have the 'AddUser' permission.
+     * `ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR` - if failed to delete the keys of an existing user with the same
+     * user id.
+     *
+     * @param userId - Android user id
+     */
+    void onUserAdded(in int userId);
+
+    /**
+     * Allows LockSettingsService to inform keystore about removing a user.
+     * Callers require 'RemoveUser' permission.
+     *
+     * ## Error conditions:
+     * `ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED` - if the callers do not have the 'RemoveUser' permission.
+     * `ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR` - if failed to delete the keys of the user being deleted.
+     *
+     * @param userId - Android user id
+     */
+    void onUserRemoved(in int userId);
+
+    /**
+     * Allows LockSettingsService to inform keystore about password change of a user.
+     * Callers require 'ChangePassword' permission.
+     *
+     * ## Error conditions:
+     * `ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED` - if the callers does not have the 'ChangePassword'
+     *                                     permission.
+     * `ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR` - if failed to delete the super encrypted keys of the user.
+     * `ResponseCode::Locked' -  if the keystore is locked for the given user.
+     *
+     * @param userId - Android user id
+     * @param password - a secret derived from the synthetic password of the user
+     */
+    void onUserPasswordChanged(in int userId, in @nullable byte[] password);
+
+    /**
+     * This function deletes all keys within a namespace. It mainly gets called when an app gets
+     * removed and all resources of this app need to be cleaned up.
+     *
+     * @param domain - One of Domain.APP or Domain.SELINUX.
+     * @param nspace - The UID of the app that is to be cleared if domain is Domain.APP or
+     *                 the SEPolicy namespace if domain is Domain.SELINUX.
+     */
+    void clearNamespace(Domain domain, long nspace);
+
+    /**
+     * Allows querying user state, given user id.
+     * Callers require 'GetState' permission.
+     *
+     * ## Error conditions:
+     * `ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED` - if the callers do not have the 'GetState'
+     *                                     permission.
+     * `ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR` - if an error occurred when querying the user state.
+     *
+     * @param userId - Android user id
+     */
+    UserState getState(in int userId);
+
+    /**
+     * This function notifies the Keymint device of the specified securityLevel that
+     * early boot has ended, so that they no longer allow early boot keys to be used.
+     * ## Error conditions:
+     * `ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED` - if the caller does not have the 'EarlyBootEnded'
+     *                                     permission.
+     * A KeyMint ErrorCode may be returned indicating a backend diagnosed error.
+     */
+     void earlyBootEnded();
+
+    /**
+     * Informs Keystore 2.0 that the an off body event was detected.
+     *
+     * ## Error conditions:
+     * `ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED` - if the caller does not have the `ReportOffBody`
+     *                                     permission.
+     * `ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR` - if an unexpected error occurred.
+     */
+    void onDeviceOffBody();
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/UserState.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/UserState.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..376f4fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/UserState.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package android.security.maintenance;
+
+/** @hide */
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum UserState {
+    UNINITIALIZED = 0,
+    LSKF_UNLOCKED = 1,
+    LSKF_LOCKED = 2,
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/remoteprovisioning/AttestationPoolStatus.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/remoteprovisioning/AttestationPoolStatus.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3528b42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/remoteprovisioning/AttestationPoolStatus.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020, The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.security.remoteprovisioning;
+
+/**
+ * This parcelable provides information about the state of the attestation key pool.
+ * @hide
+ */
+parcelable AttestationPoolStatus {
+    /**
+     * The number of signed attestation certificate chains which will expire when the date provided
+     * to keystore to check against is reached.
+     */
+    int expiring;
+    /**
+     * The number of signed attestation certificate chains which have not yet been assigned to an
+     * app. This should be less than or equal to signed keys. The remainder of `signed` -
+     * `unassigned` gives the number of signed keys that have been assigned to an app.
+     */
+    int unassigned;
+    /**
+     * The number of signed attestation keys. This should be less than or equal to `total`. The
+     * remainder of `total` - `attested` gives the number of keypairs available to be sent off to
+     * the server for signing.
+     */
+    int attested;
+    /**
+     * The total number of attestation keys.
+     */
+    int total;
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/remoteprovisioning/IRemoteProvisioning.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/remoteprovisioning/IRemoteProvisioning.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a092af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/remoteprovisioning/IRemoteProvisioning.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.security.remoteprovisioning;
+
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.DeviceInfo;
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.ProtectedData;
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel;
+import android.security.remoteprovisioning.AttestationPoolStatus;
+
+/**
+ * `IRemoteProvisioning` is the interface provided to use the remote provisioning functionality
+ * provided through KeyStore. The intent is for a higher level system component to use these
+ * functions in order to drive the process through which the device can receive functioning
+ * attestation certificates.
+ *
+ * ## Error conditions
+ * Error conditions are reported as service specific errors.
+ * Positive codes correspond to `android.security.remoteprovisioning.ResponseCode`
+ * and indicate error conditions diagnosed by the Keystore 2.0 service.
+ * TODO: Remote Provisioning HAL error code info
+ *
+ * `ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED` if the caller does not have the permissions
+ * to use the RemoteProvisioning API. This permission is defined under access_vectors in SEPolicy
+ * in the keystore2 class: remotely_provision
+ *
+ * `ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR` for any unexpected errors like IO or IPC failures.
+ *
+ * @hide
+ */
+interface IRemoteProvisioning {
+
+    /**
+     * Returns the status of the attestation key pool in the database.
+     *
+     * @param expiredBy The date as seconds since epoch by which to judge expiration status of
+     *                        certificates.
+     *
+     * @param secLevel The security level to specify which KM instance to get the pool for.
+     *
+     * @return The `AttestationPoolStatus` parcelable contains fields communicating information
+     *                        relevant to making decisions about when to generate and provision
+     *                        more attestation keys.
+     */
+    AttestationPoolStatus getPoolStatus(in long expiredBy, in SecurityLevel secLevel);
+
+    /**
+     * This is the primary entry point for beginning a remote provisioning flow. The caller
+     * specifies how many CSRs should be generated and provides an X25519 ECDH public key along
+     * with a challenge to encrypt privacy sensitive portions of the returned CBOR blob and
+     * guarantee freshness of the request to the certifying third party.
+     *
+     * ## Error conditions
+     * `ResponseCode::NO_UNSIGNED_KEYS` if there are no unsigned keypairs in the database that can
+     *                         be used for the CSRs.
+     *
+     * A RemoteProvisioning HAL response code may indicate backend errors such as failed EEK
+     *                         verification.
+     *
+     * @param testMode Whether or not the TA implementing the Remote Provisioning HAL should accept
+     *                         any EEK (Endpoint Encryption Key), or only one signed by a chain
+     *                         that verifies back to the Root of Trust baked into the TA. True
+     *                         means that any key is accepted.
+     *
+     * @param numCsr How many certificate signing requests should be generated.
+     *
+     * @param eek A chain of certificates terminating in an X25519 public key, the Endpoint
+     *                         Encryption Key.
+     *
+     * @param challenge A challenge to be included and MACed in the returned CBOR blob.
+     *
+     * @param secLevel The security level to specify which KM instance from which to generate a
+     *                         CSR.
+     *
+     * @param protectedData The encrypted CBOR blob generated by the remote provisioner
+     *
+     * @return A CBOR blob composed of various elements required by the server to verify the
+     *                         request.
+     */
+    byte[] generateCsr(in boolean testMode, in int numCsr, in byte[] eek, in byte[] challenge,
+        in SecurityLevel secLevel, out ProtectedData protectedData, out DeviceInfo deviceInfo);
+
+    /**
+     * This method provides a way for the returned attestation certificate chains to be provisioned
+     * to the attestation key database. When an app requests an attesation key, it will be assigned
+     * one of these certificate chains along with the corresponding private key.
+     *
+     * @param publicKey The raw public key encoded in the leaf certificate.
+     *
+     * @param batchCert The batch certificate corresponding to the attestation key. Separated for
+     *                          the purpose of making Subject lookup for KM attestation easier.
+     *
+     * @param certs An X.509, DER encoded certificate chain for the attestation key.
+     *
+     * @param expirationDate The expiration date on the certificate chain, provided by the caller
+     *                          for convenience.
+     *
+     * @param secLevel The security level representing the KM instance containing the key that this
+     *                          chain corresponds to.
+     */
+    void provisionCertChain(in byte[] publicKey, in byte[] batchCert, in byte[] certs,
+        in long expirationDate, in SecurityLevel secLevel);
+
+    /**
+     * This method allows the caller to instruct KeyStore to generate and store a key pair to be
+     * used for attestation in the `generateCsr` method. The caller should handle spacing out these
+     * requests so as not to jam up the KeyStore work queue.
+     *
+     * @param is_test_mode Instructs the underlying HAL interface to mark the generated key with a
+     *                        tag to indicate that it's for testing.
+     *
+     * @param secLevel The security level to specify which KM instance should generate a key pair.
+     */
+    void generateKeyPair(in boolean is_test_mode, in SecurityLevel secLevel);
+
+    /**
+     * This method returns the SecurityLevels of whichever instances of
+     * IRemotelyProvisionedComponent are running on the device. The RemoteProvisioner app needs to
+     * know which KM instances it should be generating and managing attestation keys for.
+     *
+     * @return The array of security levels.
+     */
+     SecurityLevel[] getSecurityLevels();
+
+    /**
+     * This method deletes all remotely provisioned attestation keys in the database, regardless
+     * of what state in their life cycle they are in. This is primarily useful to facilitate
+     * testing.
+     *
+     * @return Number of keys deleted
+     */
+    long deleteAllKeys();
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/remoteprovisioning/ResponseCode.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/remoteprovisioning/ResponseCode.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9877db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/remoteprovisioning/ResponseCode.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020, The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.security.remoteprovisioning;
+
+@Backing(type="int")
+/** @hide */
+enum ResponseCode {
+    /**
+     * Returned if there are no keys available in the database to be used in a CSR
+     */
+    NO_UNSIGNED_KEYS = 1,
+    /**
+     * The caller has imrproper SELinux permissions to access the Remote Provisioning API.
+     */
+    PERMISSION_DENIED = 2,
+    /**
+     * An unexpected error occurred, likely with IO or IPC.
+     */
+    SYSTEM_ERROR = 3,
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/vpnprofilestore/IVpnProfileStore.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/vpnprofilestore/IVpnProfileStore.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8375b7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/vpnprofilestore/IVpnProfileStore.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.security.vpnprofilestore;
+
+/**
+ * Internal interface for accessing and storing VPN profiles.
+ * @hide
+ */
+interface IVpnProfileStore {
+    /**
+     * Service specific error code indicating that the profile was not found.
+     */
+    const int ERROR_PROFILE_NOT_FOUND = 1;
+
+    /**
+     * Service specific error code indicating that an unexpected system error occurred.
+     */
+    const int ERROR_SYSTEM_ERROR = 2;
+
+    /**
+     * Returns the profile stored under the given alias.
+     *
+     * @param alias name of the profile.
+     * @return The unstructured blob that was passed as profile parameter into put()
+     */
+    byte[] get(in String alias);
+
+    /**
+     * Stores one profile as unstructured blob under the given alias.
+     */
+    void put(in String alias, in byte[] profile);
+
+    /**
+     * Deletes the profile under the given alias.
+     */
+    void remove(in String alias);
+
+    /**
+     * Returns a list of aliases of profiles stored. The list is filtered by prefix.
+     * The resulting strings are the full aliases including the prefix.
+     */
+    String[] list(in String prefix);
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/keystore2/android.system.keystore2-service.xml b/keystore2/android.system.keystore2-service.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b8d0cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/android.system.keystore2-service.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<manifest version="1.0" type="framework">
+    <hal format="aidl">
+        <name>android.system.keystore2</name>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IKeystoreService</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+</manifest>
diff --git a/keystore2/apc_compat/Android.bp b/keystore2/apc_compat/Android.bp
index 405e9b8..9519c8e 100644
--- a/keystore2/apc_compat/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore2/apc_compat/Android.bp
@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 cc_library {
     name: "libkeystore2_apc_compat",
     srcs: [
diff --git a/keystore2/apc_compat/apc_compat.rs b/keystore2/apc_compat/apc_compat.rs
index 4391f5b..57f8710 100644
--- a/keystore2/apc_compat/apc_compat.rs
+++ b/keystore2/apc_compat/apc_compat.rs
@@ -141,6 +141,10 @@
     /// data_confirmed: Option<&[u8]> and
     /// confirmation_token: Option<&[u8]> hold the confirmed message and the confirmation token
     /// respectively. They must be `Some()` if `rc == APC_COMPAT_ERROR_OK` and `None` otherwise.
+    ///
+    /// `cb` does not get called if this function returns an error.
+    /// (Thus the allow(unused_must_use))
+    #[allow(unused_must_use)]
     pub fn prompt_user_confirmation<F>(
         &self,
         prompt_text: &str,
@@ -150,9 +154,9 @@
         cb: F,
     ) -> Result<(), u32>
     where
-        F: FnOnce(u32, Option<&[u8]>, Option<&[u8]>),
+        F: FnOnce(u32, Option<&[u8]>, Option<&[u8]>) + 'static,
     {
-        let cb_data_ptr = Box::into_raw(Box::new(Box::new(cb)));
+        let cb_data_ptr = Box::into_raw(Box::new(Box::new(cb) as Box<Callback>));
         let cb = ApcCompatCallback {
             data: cb_data_ptr as *mut std::ffi::c_void,
             result: Some(confirmation_result_callback),
diff --git a/keystore2/keystore2.rc b/keystore2/keystore2.rc
index bc040e5..82bf3b8 100644
--- a/keystore2/keystore2.rc
+++ b/keystore2/keystore2.rc
@@ -6,15 +6,8 @@
 #
 # See system/core/init/README.md for information on the init.rc language.
 
-# Start Keystore 2 conditionally
-# TODO b/171563717 Remove when Keystore 2 migration is complete.
-on nonencrypted && property:ro.android.security.keystore2.enable=true
-    enable keystore2
-
 service keystore2 /system/bin/keystore2 /data/misc/keystore
-    class main
+    class early_hal
     user keystore
     group keystore readproc log
     writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
-    # TODO b/171563717 Remove when Keystore 2 migration is complete.
-    disabled
diff --git a/keystore2/selinux/Android.bp b/keystore2/selinux/Android.bp
index acbf5ef..18063d3 100644
--- a/keystore2/selinux/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore2/selinux/Android.bp
@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 rust_library {
     name: "libkeystore2_selinux",
     crate_name: "keystore2_selinux",
diff --git a/keystore2/selinux/src/lib.rs b/keystore2/selinux/src/lib.rs
index 2b5091d..cc707e7 100644
--- a/keystore2/selinux/src/lib.rs
+++ b/keystore2/selinux/src/lib.rs
@@ -455,7 +455,6 @@
 
         check_keystore_perm!(add_auth);
         check_keystore_perm!(clear_ns);
-        check_keystore_perm!(get_state);
         check_keystore_perm!(lock);
         check_keystore_perm!(reset);
         check_keystore_perm!(unlock);
diff --git a/keystore2/src/apc.rs b/keystore2/src/apc.rs
index 105e071..f8259ea 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/apc.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/apc.rs
@@ -12,16 +12,13 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-// TODO The confirmation token is yet unused.
-#![allow(unused_variables)]
-
 //! This module implements the Android Protected Confirmation (APC) service as defined
 //! in the android.security.apc AIDL spec.
 
 use std::{
     cmp::PartialEq,
     collections::HashMap,
-    sync::{Arc, Mutex},
+    sync::{mpsc::Sender, Arc, Mutex},
 };
 
 use crate::utils::{compat_2_response_code, ui_opts_2_compat};
@@ -31,10 +28,10 @@
     ResponseCode::ResponseCode,
 };
 use android_security_apc::binder::{
-    ExceptionCode, Interface, Result as BinderResult, SpIBinder, Status as BinderStatus,
+    ExceptionCode, Interface, Result as BinderResult, SpIBinder, Status as BinderStatus, Strong,
 };
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
-use binder::{IBinder, ThreadState};
+use binder::{IBinderInternal, ThreadState};
 use keystore2_apc_compat::ApcHal;
 use keystore2_selinux as selinux;
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
@@ -182,10 +179,16 @@
     client_aborted: bool,
 }
 
-#[derive(Default)]
 struct ApcState {
     session: Option<ApcSessionState>,
     rate_limiting: HashMap<u32, RateInfo>,
+    confirmation_token_sender: Sender<Vec<u8>>,
+}
+
+impl ApcState {
+    fn new(confirmation_token_sender: Sender<Vec<u8>>) -> Self {
+        Self { session: None, rate_limiting: Default::default(), confirmation_token_sender }
+    }
 }
 
 /// Implementation of the APC service.
@@ -197,9 +200,11 @@
 
 impl ApcManager {
     /// Create a new instance of the Android Protected Confirmation service.
-    pub fn new_native_binder() -> Result<impl IProtectedConfirmation> {
+    pub fn new_native_binder(
+        confirmation_token_sender: Sender<Vec<u8>>,
+    ) -> Result<Strong<dyn IProtectedConfirmation>> {
         let result = BnProtectedConfirmation::new_binder(Self {
-            state: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Default::default())),
+            state: Arc::new(Mutex::new(ApcState::new(confirmation_token_sender))),
         });
         result.as_binder().set_requesting_sid(true);
         Ok(result)
@@ -222,21 +227,28 @@
         let rc = compat_2_response_code(rc);
 
         // Update rate limiting information.
-        match (rc, client_aborted) {
+        match (rc, client_aborted, confirmation_token) {
             // If the user confirmed the dialog.
-            (ResponseCode::OK, _) => {
+            (ResponseCode::OK, _, Some(confirmation_token)) => {
                 // Reset counter.
                 state.rate_limiting.remove(&uid);
-                // TODO at this point we need to send the confirmation token to where keystore can
-                // use it.
+                // Send confirmation token to the enforcement module.
+                if let Err(e) = state.confirmation_token_sender.send(confirmation_token.to_vec()) {
+                    log::error!("Got confirmation token, but receiver would not have it. {:?}", e);
+                }
             }
             // If cancelled by the user or if aborted by the client.
-            (ResponseCode::CANCELLED, _) | (ResponseCode::ABORTED, true) => {
+            (ResponseCode::CANCELLED, _, _) | (ResponseCode::ABORTED, true, _) => {
                 // Penalize.
                 let mut rate_info = state.rate_limiting.entry(uid).or_default();
                 rate_info.counter += 1;
                 rate_info.timestamp = start;
             }
+            (ResponseCode::OK, _, None) => {
+                log::error!(
+                    "Confirmation prompt was successful but no confirmation token was returned."
+                );
+            }
             // In any other case this try does not count at all.
             _ => {}
         }
@@ -299,7 +311,7 @@
             extra_data,
             locale,
             ui_opts,
-            |rc, data_confirmed, confirmation_token| {
+            move |rc, data_confirmed, confirmation_token| {
                 Self::result(state_clone, rc, data_confirmed, confirmation_token)
             },
         )
diff --git a/keystore2/src/async_task.rs b/keystore2/src/async_task.rs
index 6edd760..20a7458 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/async_task.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/async_task.rs
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@
 //! processed all tasks before it terminates.
 //! Note that low priority tasks are processed only when the high priority queue is empty.
 
-use std::time::Duration;
+use std::{any::Any, any::TypeId, time::Duration};
 use std::{
-    collections::VecDeque,
+    collections::{HashMap, VecDeque},
     sync::Arc,
     sync::{Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard},
     thread,
@@ -33,60 +33,140 @@
     Running,
 }
 
+/// The Shelf allows async tasks to store state across invocations.
+/// Note: Store elves at your own peril ;-).
+#[derive(Debug, Default)]
+pub struct Shelf(HashMap<TypeId, Box<dyn Any + Send>>);
+
+impl Shelf {
+    /// Get a reference to the shelved data of type T. Returns Some if the data exists.
+    pub fn get_downcast_ref<T: Any + Send>(&self) -> Option<&T> {
+        self.0.get(&TypeId::of::<T>()).and_then(|v| v.downcast_ref::<T>())
+    }
+
+    /// Get a mutable reference to the shelved data of type T. If a T was inserted using put,
+    /// get_mut, or get_or_put_with.
+    pub fn get_downcast_mut<T: Any + Send>(&mut self) -> Option<&mut T> {
+        self.0.get_mut(&TypeId::of::<T>()).and_then(|v| v.downcast_mut::<T>())
+    }
+
+    /// Remove the entry of the given type and returns the stored data if it existed.
+    pub fn remove_downcast_ref<T: Any + Send>(&mut self) -> Option<T> {
+        self.0.remove(&TypeId::of::<T>()).and_then(|v| v.downcast::<T>().ok().map(|b| *b))
+    }
+
+    /// Puts data `v` on the shelf. If there already was an entry of type T it is returned.
+    pub fn put<T: Any + Send>(&mut self, v: T) -> Option<T> {
+        self.0
+            .insert(TypeId::of::<T>(), Box::new(v) as Box<dyn Any + Send>)
+            .and_then(|v| v.downcast::<T>().ok().map(|b| *b))
+    }
+
+    /// Gets a mutable reference to the entry of the given type and default creates it if necessary.
+    /// The type must implement Default.
+    pub fn get_mut<T: Any + Send + Default>(&mut self) -> &mut T {
+        self.0
+            .entry(TypeId::of::<T>())
+            .or_insert_with(|| Box::new(T::default()) as Box<dyn Any + Send>)
+            .downcast_mut::<T>()
+            .unwrap()
+    }
+
+    /// Gets a mutable reference to the entry of the given type or creates it using the init
+    /// function. Init is not executed if the entry already existed.
+    pub fn get_or_put_with<T: Any + Send, F>(&mut self, init: F) -> &mut T
+    where
+        F: FnOnce() -> T,
+    {
+        self.0
+            .entry(TypeId::of::<T>())
+            .or_insert_with(|| Box::new(init()) as Box<dyn Any + Send>)
+            .downcast_mut::<T>()
+            .unwrap()
+    }
+}
+
 struct AsyncTaskState {
     state: State,
     thread: Option<thread::JoinHandle<()>>,
-    hi_prio_req: VecDeque<Box<dyn FnOnce() + Send>>,
-    lo_prio_req: VecDeque<Box<dyn FnOnce() + Send>>,
+    timeout: Duration,
+    hi_prio_req: VecDeque<Box<dyn FnOnce(&mut Shelf) + Send>>,
+    lo_prio_req: VecDeque<Box<dyn FnOnce(&mut Shelf) + Send>>,
+    idle_fns: Vec<Arc<dyn Fn(&mut Shelf) + Send + Sync>>,
+    /// The store allows tasks to store state across invocations. It is passed to each invocation
+    /// of each task. Tasks need to cooperate on the ids they use for storing state.
+    shelf: Option<Shelf>,
 }
 
 /// AsyncTask spawns one worker thread on demand to process jobs inserted into
-/// a low and a high priority work queue.
+/// a low and a high priority work queue. The queues are processed FIFO, and low
+/// priority queue is processed if the high priority queue is empty.
+/// Note: Because there is only one worker thread at a time for a given AsyncTask instance,
+/// all scheduled requests are guaranteed to be serialized with respect to one another.
 pub struct AsyncTask {
     state: Arc<(Condvar, Mutex<AsyncTaskState>)>,
 }
 
 impl Default for AsyncTask {
     fn default() -> Self {
+        Self::new(Duration::from_secs(30))
+    }
+}
+
+impl AsyncTask {
+    /// Construct an [`AsyncTask`] with a specific timeout value.
+    pub fn new(timeout: Duration) -> Self {
         Self {
             state: Arc::new((
                 Condvar::new(),
                 Mutex::new(AsyncTaskState {
                     state: State::Exiting,
                     thread: None,
+                    timeout,
                     hi_prio_req: VecDeque::new(),
                     lo_prio_req: VecDeque::new(),
+                    idle_fns: Vec::new(),
+                    shelf: None,
                 }),
             )),
         }
     }
-}
 
-impl AsyncTask {
-    /// Adds a job to the high priority queue. High priority jobs are completed before
-    /// low priority jobs and can also overtake low priority jobs. But they cannot
-    /// preempt them.
+    /// Adds a one-off job to the high priority queue. High priority jobs are
+    /// completed before low priority jobs and can also overtake low priority
+    /// jobs. But they cannot preempt them.
     pub fn queue_hi<F>(&self, f: F)
     where
-        F: FnOnce() + Send + 'static,
+        F: for<'r> FnOnce(&'r mut Shelf) + Send + 'static,
     {
         self.queue(f, true)
     }
 
-    /// Adds a job to the low priority queue. Low priority jobs are completed after
-    /// high priority. And they are not executed as long as high priority jobs are
-    /// present. Jobs always run to completion and are never preempted by high
-    /// priority jobs.
+    /// Adds a one-off job to the low priority queue. Low priority jobs are
+    /// completed after high priority. And they are not executed as long as high
+    /// priority jobs are present. Jobs always run to completion and are never
+    /// preempted by high priority jobs.
     pub fn queue_lo<F>(&self, f: F)
     where
-        F: FnOnce() + Send + 'static,
+        F: FnOnce(&mut Shelf) + Send + 'static,
     {
         self.queue(f, false)
     }
 
+    /// Adds an idle callback. This will be invoked whenever the worker becomes
+    /// idle (all high and low priority jobs have been performed).
+    pub fn add_idle<F>(&self, f: F)
+    where
+        F: Fn(&mut Shelf) + Send + Sync + 'static,
+    {
+        let (ref _condvar, ref state) = *self.state;
+        let mut state = state.lock().unwrap();
+        state.idle_fns.push(Arc::new(f));
+    }
+
     fn queue<F>(&self, f: F, hi_prio: bool)
     where
-        F: FnOnce() + Send + 'static,
+        F: for<'r> FnOnce(&'r mut Shelf) + Send + 'static,
     {
         let (ref condvar, ref state) = *self.state;
         let mut state = state.lock().unwrap();
@@ -109,36 +189,343 @@
         }
 
         let cloned_state = self.state.clone();
+        let timeout_period = state.timeout;
 
         state.thread = Some(thread::spawn(move || {
             let (ref condvar, ref state) = *cloned_state;
+
+            enum Action {
+                QueuedFn(Box<dyn FnOnce(&mut Shelf) + Send>),
+                IdleFns(Vec<Arc<dyn Fn(&mut Shelf) + Send + Sync>>),
+            };
+            let mut done_idle = false;
+
+            // When the worker starts, it takes the shelf and puts it on the stack.
+            let mut shelf = state.lock().unwrap().shelf.take().unwrap_or_default();
             loop {
-                if let Some(f) = {
-                    let (mut state, timeout) = condvar
-                        .wait_timeout_while(
-                            state.lock().unwrap(),
-                            Duration::from_secs(30),
-                            |state| state.hi_prio_req.is_empty() && state.lo_prio_req.is_empty(),
-                        )
-                        .unwrap();
-                    match (
-                        state.hi_prio_req.pop_front(),
-                        state.lo_prio_req.is_empty(),
-                        timeout.timed_out(),
-                    ) {
-                        (Some(f), _, _) => Some(f),
-                        (None, false, _) => state.lo_prio_req.pop_front(),
-                        (None, true, true) => {
-                            state.state = State::Exiting;
-                            break;
+                if let Some(action) = {
+                    let state = state.lock().unwrap();
+                    if !done_idle && state.hi_prio_req.is_empty() && state.lo_prio_req.is_empty() {
+                        // No jobs queued so invoke the idle callbacks.
+                        Some(Action::IdleFns(state.idle_fns.clone()))
+                    } else {
+                        // Wait for either a queued job to arrive or a timeout.
+                        let (mut state, timeout) = condvar
+                            .wait_timeout_while(state, timeout_period, |state| {
+                                state.hi_prio_req.is_empty() && state.lo_prio_req.is_empty()
+                            })
+                            .unwrap();
+                        match (
+                            state.hi_prio_req.pop_front(),
+                            state.lo_prio_req.is_empty(),
+                            timeout.timed_out(),
+                        ) {
+                            (Some(f), _, _) => Some(Action::QueuedFn(f)),
+                            (None, false, _) => {
+                                state.lo_prio_req.pop_front().map(|f| Action::QueuedFn(f))
+                            }
+                            (None, true, true) => {
+                                // When the worker exits it puts the shelf back into the shared
+                                // state for the next worker to use. So state is preserved not
+                                // only across invocations but also across worker thread shut down.
+                                state.shelf = Some(shelf);
+                                state.state = State::Exiting;
+                                break;
+                            }
+                            (None, true, false) => None,
                         }
-                        (None, true, false) => None,
                     }
                 } {
-                    f()
+                    // Now that the lock has been dropped, perform the action.
+                    match action {
+                        Action::QueuedFn(f) => {
+                            f(&mut shelf);
+                            done_idle = false;
+                        }
+                        Action::IdleFns(idle_fns) => {
+                            for idle_fn in idle_fns {
+                                idle_fn(&mut shelf);
+                            }
+                            done_idle = true;
+                        }
+                    }
                 }
             }
         }));
         state.state = State::Running;
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::{AsyncTask, Shelf};
+    use std::sync::{
+        mpsc::{channel, sync_channel, RecvTimeoutError},
+        Arc,
+    };
+    use std::time::Duration;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_shelf() {
+        let mut shelf = Shelf::default();
+
+        let s = "A string".to_string();
+        assert_eq!(shelf.put(s), None);
+
+        let s2 = "Another string".to_string();
+        assert_eq!(shelf.put(s2), Some("A string".to_string()));
+
+        // Put something of a different type on the shelf.
+        #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+        struct Elf {
+            pub name: String,
+        }
+        let e1 = Elf { name: "Glorfindel".to_string() };
+        assert_eq!(shelf.put(e1), None);
+
+        // The String value is still on the shelf.
+        let s3 = shelf.get_downcast_ref::<String>().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(s3, "Another string");
+
+        // As is the Elf.
+        {
+            let e2 = shelf.get_downcast_mut::<Elf>().unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(e2.name, "Glorfindel");
+            e2.name = "Celeborn".to_string();
+        }
+
+        // Take the Elf off the shelf.
+        let e3 = shelf.remove_downcast_ref::<Elf>().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(e3.name, "Celeborn");
+
+        assert_eq!(shelf.remove_downcast_ref::<Elf>(), None);
+
+        // No u64 value has been put on the shelf, so getting one gives the default value.
+        {
+            let i = shelf.get_mut::<u64>();
+            assert_eq!(*i, 0);
+            *i = 42;
+        }
+        let i2 = shelf.get_downcast_ref::<u64>().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(*i2, 42);
+
+        // No i32 value has ever been seen near the shelf.
+        assert_eq!(shelf.get_downcast_ref::<i32>(), None);
+        assert_eq!(shelf.get_downcast_mut::<i32>(), None);
+        assert_eq!(shelf.remove_downcast_ref::<i32>(), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_async_task() {
+        let at = AsyncTask::default();
+
+        // First queue up a job that blocks until we release it, to avoid
+        // unpredictable synchronization.
+        let (start_sender, start_receiver) = channel();
+        at.queue_hi(move |shelf| {
+            start_receiver.recv().unwrap();
+            // Put a trace vector on the shelf
+            shelf.put(Vec::<String>::new());
+        });
+
+        // Queue up some high-priority and low-priority jobs.
+        for i in 0..3 {
+            let j = i;
+            at.queue_lo(move |shelf| {
+                let trace = shelf.get_mut::<Vec<String>>();
+                trace.push(format!("L{}", j));
+            });
+            let j = i;
+            at.queue_hi(move |shelf| {
+                let trace = shelf.get_mut::<Vec<String>>();
+                trace.push(format!("H{}", j));
+            });
+        }
+
+        // Finally queue up a low priority job that emits the trace.
+        let (trace_sender, trace_receiver) = channel();
+        at.queue_lo(move |shelf| {
+            let trace = shelf.get_downcast_ref::<Vec<String>>().unwrap();
+            trace_sender.send(trace.clone()).unwrap();
+        });
+
+        // Ready, set, go.
+        start_sender.send(()).unwrap();
+        let trace = trace_receiver.recv().unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(trace, vec!["H0", "H1", "H2", "L0", "L1", "L2"]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_async_task_chain() {
+        let at = Arc::new(AsyncTask::default());
+        let (sender, receiver) = channel();
+        // Queue up a job that will queue up another job. This confirms
+        // that the job is not invoked with any internal AsyncTask locks held.
+        let at_clone = at.clone();
+        at.queue_hi(move |_shelf| {
+            at_clone.queue_lo(move |_shelf| {
+                sender.send(()).unwrap();
+            });
+        });
+        receiver.recv().unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[should_panic]
+    fn test_async_task_panic() {
+        let at = AsyncTask::default();
+        at.queue_hi(|_shelf| {
+            panic!("Panic from queued job");
+        });
+        // Queue another job afterwards to ensure that the async thread gets joined.
+        let (done_sender, done_receiver) = channel();
+        at.queue_hi(move |_shelf| {
+            done_sender.send(()).unwrap();
+        });
+        done_receiver.recv().unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_async_task_idle() {
+        let at = AsyncTask::new(Duration::from_secs(3));
+        // Need a SyncSender as it is Send+Sync.
+        let (idle_done_sender, idle_done_receiver) = sync_channel::<()>(3);
+        at.add_idle(move |_shelf| {
+            idle_done_sender.send(()).unwrap();
+        });
+
+        // Queue up some high-priority and low-priority jobs that take time.
+        for _i in 0..3 {
+            at.queue_lo(|_shelf| {
+                std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
+            });
+            at.queue_hi(|_shelf| {
+                std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
+            });
+        }
+        // Final low-priority job.
+        let (done_sender, done_receiver) = channel();
+        at.queue_lo(move |_shelf| {
+            done_sender.send(()).unwrap();
+        });
+
+        // Nothing happens until the last job completes.
+        assert_eq!(
+            idle_done_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(1)),
+            Err(RecvTimeoutError::Timeout)
+        );
+        done_receiver.recv().unwrap();
+        idle_done_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)).unwrap();
+
+        // Idle callback not executed again even if we wait for a while.
+        assert_eq!(
+            idle_done_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(3)),
+            Err(RecvTimeoutError::Timeout)
+        );
+
+        // However, if more work is done then there's another chance to go idle.
+        let (done_sender, done_receiver) = channel();
+        at.queue_hi(move |_shelf| {
+            std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
+            done_sender.send(()).unwrap();
+        });
+        // Idle callback not immediately executed, because the high priority
+        // job is taking a while.
+        assert_eq!(
+            idle_done_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)),
+            Err(RecvTimeoutError::Timeout)
+        );
+        done_receiver.recv().unwrap();
+        idle_done_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_async_task_multiple_idle() {
+        let at = AsyncTask::new(Duration::from_secs(3));
+        let (idle_sender, idle_receiver) = sync_channel::<i32>(5);
+        // Queue a high priority job to start things off
+        at.queue_hi(|_shelf| {
+            std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
+        });
+
+        // Multiple idle callbacks.
+        for i in 0..3 {
+            let idle_sender = idle_sender.clone();
+            at.add_idle(move |_shelf| {
+                idle_sender.send(i).unwrap();
+            });
+        }
+
+        // Nothing happens immediately.
+        assert_eq!(
+            idle_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)),
+            Err(RecvTimeoutError::Timeout)
+        );
+        // Wait for a moment and the idle jobs should have run.
+        std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1));
+
+        let mut results = Vec::new();
+        while let Ok(i) = idle_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)) {
+            results.push(i);
+        }
+        assert_eq!(results, [0, 1, 2]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_async_task_idle_queues_job() {
+        let at = Arc::new(AsyncTask::new(Duration::from_secs(1)));
+        let at_clone = at.clone();
+        let (idle_sender, idle_receiver) = sync_channel::<i32>(100);
+        // Add an idle callback that queues a low-priority job.
+        at.add_idle(move |shelf| {
+            at_clone.queue_lo(|_shelf| {
+                // Slow things down so the channel doesn't fill up.
+                std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50));
+            });
+            let i = shelf.get_mut::<i32>();
+            idle_sender.send(*i).unwrap();
+            *i += 1;
+        });
+
+        // Nothing happens immediately.
+        assert_eq!(
+            idle_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1500)),
+            Err(RecvTimeoutError::Timeout)
+        );
+
+        // Once we queue a normal job, things start.
+        at.queue_hi(|_shelf| {});
+        assert_eq!(0, idle_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(200)).unwrap());
+
+        // The idle callback queues a job, and completion of that job
+        // means the task is going idle again...so the idle callback will
+        // be called repeatedly.
+        assert_eq!(1, idle_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)).unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(2, idle_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)).unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(3, idle_receiver.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[should_panic]
+    fn test_async_task_idle_panic() {
+        let at = AsyncTask::new(Duration::from_secs(1));
+        let (idle_sender, idle_receiver) = sync_channel::<()>(3);
+        // Add an idle callback that panics.
+        at.add_idle(move |_shelf| {
+            idle_sender.send(()).unwrap();
+            panic!("Panic from idle callback");
+        });
+        // Queue a job to trigger idleness and ensuing panic.
+        at.queue_hi(|_shelf| {});
+        idle_receiver.recv().unwrap();
+
+        // Queue another job afterwards to ensure that the async thread gets joined
+        // and the panic detected.
+        let (done_sender, done_receiver) = channel();
+        at.queue_hi(move |_shelf| {
+            done_sender.send(()).unwrap();
+        });
+        done_receiver.recv().unwrap();
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/attestation_key_utils.rs b/keystore2/src/attestation_key_utils.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..425eec6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/attestation_key_utils.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! Implements get_attestation_key_info which loads remote provisioned or user
+//! generated attestation keys.
+
+use crate::database::{BlobMetaData, KeyEntryLoadBits, KeyType};
+use crate::database::{KeyIdGuard, KeystoreDB};
+use crate::error::{Error, ErrorCode};
+use crate::permission::KeyPerm;
+use crate::remote_provisioning::RemProvState;
+use crate::utils::check_key_permission;
+use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
+    AttestationKey::AttestationKey, Certificate::Certificate, KeyParameter::KeyParameter,
+};
+use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::{
+    Domain::Domain, KeyDescriptor::KeyDescriptor,
+};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use keystore2_crypto::parse_subject_from_certificate;
+
+/// KeyMint takes two different kinds of attestation keys. Remote provisioned keys
+/// and those that have been generated by the user. Unfortunately, they need to be
+/// handled quite differently, thus the different representations.
+pub enum AttestationKeyInfo {
+    RemoteProvisioned {
+        attestation_key: AttestationKey,
+        attestation_certs: Certificate,
+    },
+    UserGenerated {
+        key_id_guard: KeyIdGuard,
+        blob: Vec<u8>,
+        blob_metadata: BlobMetaData,
+        issuer_subject: Vec<u8>,
+    },
+}
+
+/// This function loads and, optionally, assigns the caller's remote provisioned
+/// attestation key or, if `attest_key_descriptor` is given, it loads the user
+/// generated attestation key from the database.
+pub fn get_attest_key_info(
+    key: &KeyDescriptor,
+    caller_uid: u32,
+    attest_key_descriptor: Option<&KeyDescriptor>,
+    params: &[KeyParameter],
+    rem_prov_state: &RemProvState,
+    db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+) -> Result<Option<AttestationKeyInfo>> {
+    match attest_key_descriptor {
+        None => rem_prov_state
+            .get_remotely_provisioned_attestation_key_and_certs(&key, caller_uid, params, db)
+            .context(concat!(
+                "In get_attest_key_and_cert_chain: ",
+                "Trying to get remotely provisioned attestation key."
+            ))
+            .map(|result| {
+                result.map(|(attestation_key, attestation_certs)| {
+                    AttestationKeyInfo::RemoteProvisioned { attestation_key, attestation_certs }
+                })
+            }),
+        Some(attest_key) => get_user_generated_attestation_key(&attest_key, caller_uid, db)
+            .context("In get_attest_key_and_cert_chain: Trying to load attest key")
+            .map(Some),
+    }
+}
+
+fn get_user_generated_attestation_key(
+    key: &KeyDescriptor,
+    caller_uid: u32,
+    db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+) -> Result<AttestationKeyInfo> {
+    let (key_id_guard, blob, cert, blob_metadata) =
+        load_attest_key_blob_and_cert(&key, caller_uid, db)
+            .context("In get_user_generated_attestation_key: Failed to load blob and cert")?;
+
+    let issuer_subject: Vec<u8> = parse_subject_from_certificate(&cert).context(
+        "In get_user_generated_attestation_key: Failed to parse subject from certificate.",
+    )?;
+
+    Ok(AttestationKeyInfo::UserGenerated { key_id_guard, blob, issuer_subject, blob_metadata })
+}
+
+fn load_attest_key_blob_and_cert(
+    key: &KeyDescriptor,
+    caller_uid: u32,
+    db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+) -> Result<(KeyIdGuard, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> {
+    match key.domain {
+        Domain::BLOB => Err(Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT)).context(
+            "In load_attest_key_blob_and_cert: Domain::BLOB attestation keys not supported",
+        ),
+        _ => {
+            let (key_id_guard, mut key_entry) = db
+                .load_key_entry(
+                    &key,
+                    KeyType::Client,
+                    KeyEntryLoadBits::BOTH,
+                    caller_uid,
+                    |k, av| check_key_permission(KeyPerm::use_(), k, &av),
+                )
+                .context("In load_attest_key_blob_and_cert: Failed to load key.")?;
+
+            let (blob, blob_metadata) =
+                key_entry.take_key_blob_info().ok_or_else(Error::sys).context(concat!(
+                    "In load_attest_key_blob_and_cert: Successfully loaded key entry,",
+                    " but KM blob was missing."
+                ))?;
+            let cert = key_entry.take_cert().ok_or_else(Error::sys).context(concat!(
+                "In load_attest_key_blob_and_cert: Successfully loaded key entry,",
+                " but cert was missing."
+            ))?;
+            Ok((key_id_guard, blob, cert, blob_metadata))
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/authorization.rs b/keystore2/src/authorization.rs
index ba27df8..06b5598 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/authorization.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/authorization.rs
@@ -12,27 +12,98 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-//! This module implements IKeyAuthorization AIDL interface.
+//! This module implements IKeystoreAuthorization AIDL interface.
 
 use crate::error::Error as KeystoreError;
-use crate::error::map_or_log_err;
-use crate::globals::{DB, ENFORCEMENTS, LEGACY_BLOB_LOADER, SUPER_KEY};
+use crate::globals::{ENFORCEMENTS, SUPER_KEY, DB, LEGACY_MIGRATOR};
 use crate::permission::KeystorePerm;
+use crate::super_key::UserState;
 use crate::utils::check_keystore_permission;
 use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
-    HardwareAuthToken::HardwareAuthToken, HardwareAuthenticatorType::HardwareAuthenticatorType,
+    HardwareAuthToken::HardwareAuthToken,
 };
-use android_hardware_security_secureclock::aidl::android::hardware::security::secureclock::{
-    Timestamp::Timestamp,
+use android_security_authorization::binder::{ExceptionCode, Interface, Result as BinderResult,
+     Strong, Status as BinderStatus};
+use android_security_authorization::aidl::android::security::authorization::{
+    IKeystoreAuthorization::BnKeystoreAuthorization, IKeystoreAuthorization::IKeystoreAuthorization,
+    LockScreenEvent::LockScreenEvent, AuthorizationTokens::AuthorizationTokens,
+    ResponseCode::ResponseCode,
 };
-use android_security_authorization::binder::{Interface, Result as BinderResult};
-use android_security_authorization:: aidl::android::security::authorization::IKeystoreAuthorization::{
-        BnKeystoreAuthorization, IKeystoreAuthorization,
-};
-use android_security_authorization:: aidl::android::security::authorization::LockScreenEvent::LockScreenEvent;
-use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::ResponseCode::ResponseCode;
+use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::{
+    ResponseCode::ResponseCode as KsResponseCode };
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
-use binder::IBinder;
+use binder::IBinderInternal;
+use keystore2_crypto::Password;
+use keystore2_selinux as selinux;
+
+/// This is the Authorization error type, it wraps binder exceptions and the
+/// Authorization ResponseCode
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, PartialEq)]
+pub enum Error {
+    /// Wraps an IKeystoreAuthorization response code as defined by
+    /// android.security.authorization AIDL interface specification.
+    #[error("Error::Rc({0:?})")]
+    Rc(ResponseCode),
+    /// Wraps a Binder exception code other than a service specific exception.
+    #[error("Binder exception code {0:?}, {1:?}")]
+    Binder(ExceptionCode, i32),
+}
+
+/// This function should be used by authorization service calls to translate error conditions
+/// into service specific exceptions.
+///
+/// All error conditions get logged by this function.
+///
+/// `Error::Rc(x)` variants get mapped onto a service specific error code of `x`.
+/// Certain response codes may be returned from keystore/ResponseCode.aidl by the keystore2 modules,
+/// which are then converted to the corresponding response codes of android.security.authorization
+/// AIDL interface specification.
+///
+/// `selinux::Error::perm()` is mapped on `ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED`.
+///
+/// All non `Error` error conditions get mapped onto ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR`.
+///
+/// `handle_ok` will be called if `result` is `Ok(value)` where `value` will be passed
+/// as argument to `handle_ok`. `handle_ok` must generate a `BinderResult<T>`, but it
+/// typically returns Ok(value).
+pub fn map_or_log_err<T, U, F>(result: Result<U>, handle_ok: F) -> BinderResult<T>
+where
+    F: FnOnce(U) -> BinderResult<T>,
+{
+    result.map_or_else(
+        |e| {
+            log::error!("{:#?}", e);
+            let root_cause = e.root_cause();
+            if let Some(KeystoreError::Rc(ks_rcode)) = root_cause.downcast_ref::<KeystoreError>() {
+                let rc = match *ks_rcode {
+                    // Although currently keystore2/ResponseCode.aidl and
+                    // authorization/ResponseCode.aidl share the same integer values for the
+                    // common response codes, this may deviate in the future, hence the
+                    // conversion here.
+                    KsResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR => ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR.0,
+                    KsResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND => ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND.0,
+                    KsResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED => ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED.0,
+                    KsResponseCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT => ResponseCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.0,
+                    // If the code paths of IKeystoreAuthorization aidl's methods happen to return
+                    // other error codes from KsResponseCode in the future, they should be converted
+                    // as well.
+                    _ => ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR.0,
+                };
+                return Err(BinderStatus::new_service_specific_error(rc, None));
+            }
+            let rc = match root_cause.downcast_ref::<Error>() {
+                Some(Error::Rc(rcode)) => rcode.0,
+                Some(Error::Binder(_, _)) => ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR.0,
+                None => match root_cause.downcast_ref::<selinux::Error>() {
+                    Some(selinux::Error::PermissionDenied) => ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED.0,
+                    _ => ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR.0,
+                },
+            };
+            Err(BinderStatus::new_service_specific_error(rc, None))
+        },
+        handle_ok,
+    )
+}
 
 /// This struct is defined to implement the aforementioned AIDL interface.
 /// As of now, it is an empty struct.
@@ -40,7 +111,7 @@
 
 impl AuthorizationManager {
     /// Create a new instance of Keystore Authorization service.
-    pub fn new_native_binder() -> Result<impl IKeystoreAuthorization> {
+    pub fn new_native_binder() -> Result<Strong<dyn IKeystoreAuthorization>> {
         let result = BnKeystoreAuthorization::new_binder(Self);
         result.as_binder().set_requesting_sid(true);
         Ok(result)
@@ -50,16 +121,7 @@
         //check keystore permission
         check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::add_auth()).context("In add_auth_token.")?;
 
-        //TODO: Keymint's HardwareAuthToken aidl needs to implement Copy/Clone
-        let auth_token_copy = HardwareAuthToken {
-            challenge: auth_token.challenge,
-            userId: auth_token.userId,
-            authenticatorId: auth_token.authenticatorId,
-            authenticatorType: HardwareAuthenticatorType(auth_token.authenticatorType.0),
-            timestamp: Timestamp { milliSeconds: auth_token.timestamp.milliSeconds },
-            mac: auth_token.mac.clone(),
-        };
-        ENFORCEMENTS.add_auth_token(auth_token_copy)?;
+        ENFORCEMENTS.add_auth_token(auth_token.clone())?;
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -67,32 +129,42 @@
         &self,
         lock_screen_event: LockScreenEvent,
         user_id: i32,
-        password: Option<&[u8]>,
+        password: Option<Password>,
     ) -> Result<()> {
         match (lock_screen_event, password) {
-            (LockScreenEvent::UNLOCK, Some(user_password)) => {
+            (LockScreenEvent::UNLOCK, Some(password)) => {
                 //This corresponds to the unlock() method in legacy keystore API.
                 //check permission
                 check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::unlock())
                     .context("In on_lock_screen_event: Unlock with password.")?;
                 ENFORCEMENTS.set_device_locked(user_id, false);
-                // Unlock super key.
-                DB.with::<_, Result<()>>(|db| {
-                    let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
-                    //TODO - b/176123105 - Once the user management API is implemented, unlock is
-                    //allowed only if the user is added. Then the two tasks handled by the
-                    //unlock_user_key will be split into two methods. For now, unlock_user_key
-                    //method is used as it is, which created a super key for the user if one does
-                    //not exists, in addition to unlocking the existing super key of the user/
-                    SUPER_KEY.unlock_user_key(
+
+                DB.with(|db| {
+                    SUPER_KEY.unlock_screen_lock_bound_key(
+                        &mut db.borrow_mut(),
                         user_id as u32,
-                        user_password,
-                        &mut db,
-                        &LEGACY_BLOB_LOADER,
-                    )?;
-                    Ok(())
+                        &password,
+                    )
                 })
-                .context("In on_lock_screen_event.")?;
+                .context("In on_lock_screen_event: unlock_screen_lock_bound_key failed")?;
+
+                // Unlock super key.
+                if let UserState::Uninitialized = DB
+                    .with(|db| {
+                        UserState::get_with_password_unlock(
+                            &mut db.borrow_mut(),
+                            &LEGACY_MIGRATOR,
+                            &SUPER_KEY,
+                            user_id as u32,
+                            &password,
+                        )
+                    })
+                    .context("In on_lock_screen_event: Unlock with password.")?
+                {
+                    log::info!(
+                        "In on_lock_screen_event. Trying to unlock when LSKF is uninitialized."
+                    );
+                }
 
                 Ok(())
             }
@@ -106,15 +178,39 @@
                 check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::lock())
                     .context("In on_lock_screen_event: Lock")?;
                 ENFORCEMENTS.set_device_locked(user_id, true);
+                SUPER_KEY.lock_screen_lock_bound_key(user_id as u32);
+
                 Ok(())
             }
             _ => {
                 // Any other combination is not supported.
-                Err(KeystoreError::Rc(ResponseCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
+                Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
                     .context("In on_lock_screen_event: Unknown event.")
             }
         }
     }
+
+    fn get_auth_tokens_for_credstore(
+        &self,
+        challenge: i64,
+        secure_user_id: i64,
+        auth_token_max_age_millis: i64,
+    ) -> Result<AuthorizationTokens> {
+        // Check permission. Function should return if this failed. Therefore having '?' at the end
+        // is very important.
+        check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::get_auth_token())
+            .context("In get_auth_tokens_for_credstore.")?;
+
+        // if the challenge is zero, return error
+        if challenge == 0 {
+            return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
+                .context("In get_auth_tokens_for_credstore. Challenge can not be zero.");
+        }
+        // Obtain the auth token and the timestamp token from the enforcement module.
+        let (auth_token, ts_token) =
+            ENFORCEMENTS.get_auth_tokens(challenge, secure_user_id, auth_token_max_age_millis)?;
+        Ok(AuthorizationTokens { authToken: auth_token, timestampToken: ts_token })
+    }
 }
 
 impl Interface for AuthorizationManager {}
@@ -130,6 +226,25 @@
         user_id: i32,
         password: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> BinderResult<()> {
-        map_or_log_err(self.on_lock_screen_event(lock_screen_event, user_id, password), Ok)
+        map_or_log_err(
+            self.on_lock_screen_event(lock_screen_event, user_id, password.map(|pw| pw.into())),
+            Ok,
+        )
+    }
+
+    fn getAuthTokensForCredStore(
+        &self,
+        challenge: i64,
+        secure_user_id: i64,
+        auth_token_max_age_millis: i64,
+    ) -> binder::public_api::Result<AuthorizationTokens> {
+        map_or_log_err(
+            self.get_auth_tokens_for_credstore(
+                challenge,
+                secure_user_id,
+                auth_token_max_age_millis,
+            ),
+            Ok,
+        )
     }
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/crypto/Android.bp b/keystore2/src/crypto/Android.bp
index 9ecd823..21c9b74 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/crypto/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore2/src/crypto/Android.bp
@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 rust_library {
     name: "libkeystore2_crypto_rust",
     crate_name: "keystore2_crypto",
@@ -59,12 +68,14 @@
         "--whitelist-function", "HKDFExpand",
         "--whitelist-function", "ECDHComputeKey",
         "--whitelist-function", "ECKEYGenerateKey",
-        "--whitelist-function", "ECKEYDeriveFromSecret",
+        "--whitelist-function", "ECKEYMarshalPrivateKey",
+        "--whitelist-function", "ECKEYParsePrivateKey",
         "--whitelist-function", "EC_KEY_get0_public_key",
         "--whitelist-function", "ECPOINTPoint2Oct",
         "--whitelist-function", "ECPOINTOct2Point",
         "--whitelist-function", "EC_KEY_free",
         "--whitelist-function", "EC_POINT_free",
+        "--whitelist-function", "extractSubjectFromCertificate",
         "--whitelist-type", "EC_KEY",
         "--whitelist-type", "EC_POINT",
         "--whitelist-var", "EC_MAX_BYTES",
diff --git a/keystore2/src/crypto/certificate_utils.cpp b/keystore2/src/crypto/certificate_utils.cpp
index 4b0dca4..31c7fb4 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/crypto/certificate_utils.cpp
+++ b/keystore2/src/crypto/certificate_utils.cpp
@@ -42,17 +42,30 @@
 DEFINE_OPENSSL_OBJECT_POINTER(AUTHORITY_KEYID);
 DEFINE_OPENSSL_OBJECT_POINTER(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS);
 DEFINE_OPENSSL_OBJECT_POINTER(X509_ALGOR);
+DEFINE_OPENSSL_OBJECT_POINTER(BIGNUM);
 
 }  // namespace
 
-std::variant<CertUtilsError, X509_NAME_Ptr> makeCommonName(const std::string& name) {
+constexpr const char kDefaultCommonName[] = "Default Common Name";
+
+std::variant<CertUtilsError, X509_NAME_Ptr>
+makeCommonName(std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<const std::vector<uint8_t>>> name) {
+    if (name) {
+        const uint8_t* p = name->get().data();
+        X509_NAME_Ptr x509_name(d2i_X509_NAME(nullptr, &p, name->get().size()));
+        if (!x509_name) {
+            return CertUtilsError::MemoryAllocation;
+        }
+        return x509_name;
+    }
+
     X509_NAME_Ptr x509_name(X509_NAME_new());
     if (!x509_name) {
-        return CertUtilsError::BoringSsl;
+        return CertUtilsError::MemoryAllocation;
     }
     if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(x509_name.get(), "CN", MBSTRING_ASC,
-                                    reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(name.c_str()), name.length(),
-                                    -1 /* loc */, 0 /* set */)) {
+                                    reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(kDefaultCommonName),
+                                    sizeof(kDefaultCommonName) - 1, -1 /* loc */, 0 /* set */)) {
         return CertUtilsError::BoringSsl;
     }
     return x509_name;
@@ -154,18 +167,56 @@
     return key_usage;
 }
 
+template <typename Out, typename In> static Out saturate(In in) {
+    if constexpr (std::is_signed_v<Out> == std::is_signed_v<In>) {
+        if constexpr (sizeof(Out) >= sizeof(In)) {
+            // Same sign, and In fits into Out. Cast is lossless.
+            return static_cast<Out>(in);
+        } else {
+            // Out is smaller than In we may need to truncate.
+            // We pick the smaller of `out::max()` and the greater of `out::min()` and `in`.
+            return static_cast<Out>(
+                std::min(static_cast<In>(std::numeric_limits<Out>::max()),
+                         std::max(static_cast<In>(std::numeric_limits<Out>::min()), in)));
+        }
+    } else {
+        // So we have different signs. This puts the lower bound at 0 because either input or output
+        // is unsigned. The upper bound is max of the smaller type or, if they are equal the max of
+        // the signed type.
+        if constexpr (std::is_signed_v<Out>) {
+            if constexpr (sizeof(Out) > sizeof(In)) {
+                return static_cast<Out>(in);
+            } else {
+                // Because `out` is the signed one, the lower bound of `in` is 0 and fits into
+                // `out`. We just have to compare the maximum and we do it in type In because it has
+                // a greater range than Out, so Out::max() is guaranteed to fit.
+                return static_cast<Out>(
+                    std::min(static_cast<In>(std::numeric_limits<Out>::max()), in));
+            }
+        } else {
+            // Out is unsigned. So we can return 0 if in is negative.
+            if (in < 0) return 0;
+            if constexpr (sizeof(Out) >= sizeof(In)) {
+                // If Out is wider or equal we can assign lossless.
+                return static_cast<Out>(in);
+            } else {
+                // Otherwise we have to take the minimum of Out::max() and `in`.
+                return static_cast<Out>(
+                    std::min(static_cast<In>(std::numeric_limits<Out>::max()), in));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 // Creates a rump certificate structure with serial, subject and issuer names, as well as
 // activation and expiry date.
 // Callers should pass an empty X509_Ptr and check the return value for CertUtilsError::Ok (0)
 // before accessing the result.
 std::variant<CertUtilsError, X509_Ptr>
-makeCertRump(const uint32_t serial, const char subject[], const uint64_t activeDateTimeMilliSeconds,
-             const uint64_t usageExpireDateTimeMilliSeconds) {
-
-    // Sanitize pointer arguments.
-    if (!subject || strlen(subject) == 0) {
-        return CertUtilsError::InvalidArgument;
-    }
+makeCertRump(std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<const std::vector<uint8_t>>> serial,
+             std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<const std::vector<uint8_t>>> subject,
+             const int64_t activeDateTimeMilliSeconds,
+             const int64_t usageExpireDateTimeMilliSeconds) {
 
     // Create certificate structure.
     X509_Ptr certificate(X509_new());
@@ -178,9 +229,23 @@
         return CertUtilsError::BoringSsl;
     }
 
+    BIGNUM_Ptr bn_serial;
+    if (serial) {
+        bn_serial = BIGNUM_Ptr(BN_bin2bn(serial->get().data(), serial->get().size(), nullptr));
+        if (!bn_serial) {
+            return CertUtilsError::MemoryAllocation;
+        }
+    } else {
+        bn_serial = BIGNUM_Ptr(BN_new());
+        if (!bn_serial) {
+            return CertUtilsError::MemoryAllocation;
+        }
+        BN_zero(bn_serial.get());
+    }
+
     // Set the certificate serialNumber
     ASN1_INTEGER_Ptr serialNumber(ASN1_INTEGER_new());
-    if (!serialNumber || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(serialNumber.get(), serial) ||
+    if (!serialNumber || !BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn_serial.get(), serialNumber.get()) ||
         !X509_set_serialNumber(certificate.get(), serialNumber.get() /* Don't release; copied */))
         return CertUtilsError::BoringSsl;
 
@@ -194,16 +259,16 @@
         return std::get<CertUtilsError>(subjectName);
     }
 
+    time_t notBeforeTime = saturate<time_t>(activeDateTimeMilliSeconds / 1000);
     // Set activation date.
     ASN1_TIME_Ptr notBefore(ASN1_TIME_new());
-    if (!notBefore || !ASN1_TIME_set(notBefore.get(), activeDateTimeMilliSeconds / 1000) ||
+    if (!notBefore || !ASN1_TIME_set(notBefore.get(), notBeforeTime) ||
         !X509_set_notBefore(certificate.get(), notBefore.get() /* Don't release; copied */))
         return CertUtilsError::BoringSsl;
 
     // Set expiration date.
     time_t notAfterTime;
-    notAfterTime = (time_t)std::min((uint64_t)std::numeric_limits<time_t>::max(),
-                                    usageExpireDateTimeMilliSeconds / 1000);
+    notAfterTime = saturate<time_t>(usageExpireDateTimeMilliSeconds / 1000);
 
     ASN1_TIME_Ptr notAfter(ASN1_TIME_new());
     if (!notAfter || !ASN1_TIME_set(notAfter.get(), notAfterTime) ||
@@ -215,8 +280,10 @@
 }
 
 std::variant<CertUtilsError, X509_Ptr>
-makeCert(const EVP_PKEY* evp_pkey, const uint32_t serial, const char subject[],
-         const uint64_t activeDateTimeMilliSeconds, const uint64_t usageExpireDateTimeMilliSeconds,
+makeCert(const EVP_PKEY* evp_pkey,
+         std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<const std::vector<uint8_t>>> serial,
+         std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<const std::vector<uint8_t>>> subject,
+         const int64_t activeDateTimeMilliSeconds, const int64_t usageExpireDateTimeMilliSeconds,
          bool addSubjectKeyIdEx, std::optional<KeyUsageExtension> keyUsageEx,
          std::optional<BasicConstraintsExtension> basicConstraints) {
 
diff --git a/keystore2/src/crypto/crypto.cpp b/keystore2/src/crypto/crypto.cpp
index 3cc19c5..e4a1ac3 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/crypto/crypto.cpp
+++ b/keystore2/src/crypto/crypto.cpp
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hkdf.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
 
 #include <vector>
 
@@ -235,10 +236,28 @@
     return key;
 }
 
-EC_KEY* ECKEYDeriveFromSecret(const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len) {
+size_t ECKEYMarshalPrivateKey(const EC_KEY* priv_key, uint8_t* buf, size_t len) {
+    CBB cbb;
+    size_t out_len;
+    if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, buf, len) ||
+        !EC_KEY_marshal_private_key(&cbb, priv_key, EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS | EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY) ||
+        !CBB_finish(&cbb, nullptr, &out_len)) {
+        return 0;
+    } else {
+        return out_len;
+    }
+}
+
+EC_KEY* ECKEYParsePrivateKey(const uint8_t* buf, size_t len) {
+    CBS cbs;
+    CBS_init(&cbs, buf, len);
     EC_GROUP* group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
-    auto result = EC_KEY_derive_from_secret(group, secret, secret_len);
+    auto result = EC_KEY_parse_private_key(&cbs, group);
     EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    if (result != nullptr && CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+        EC_KEY_free(result);
+        return nullptr;
+    }
     return result;
 }
 
@@ -261,3 +280,42 @@
     }
     return point;
 }
+
+int extractSubjectFromCertificate(const uint8_t* cert_buf, size_t cert_len, uint8_t* subject_buf,
+                                  size_t subject_buf_len) {
+    if (!cert_buf || !subject_buf) {
+        ALOGE("extractSubjectFromCertificate: received null pointer");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    const uint8_t* p = cert_buf;
+    bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(d2i_X509(nullptr /* Allocate X509 struct */, &p, cert_len));
+    if (!cert) {
+        ALOGE("extractSubjectFromCertificate: failed to parse certificate");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    X509_NAME* subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert.get());
+    if (!subject) {
+        ALOGE("extractSubjectFromCertificate: failed to retrieve subject name");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    int subject_len = i2d_X509_NAME(subject, nullptr /* Don't copy the data */);
+    if (subject_len < 0) {
+        ALOGE("extractSubjectFromCertificate: error obtaining encoded subject name length");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (subject_len > subject_buf_len) {
+        // Return the subject length, negated, so the caller knows how much
+        // buffer space is required.
+        ALOGI("extractSubjectFromCertificate: needed %d bytes for subject, caller provided %zu",
+              subject_len, subject_buf_len);
+        return -subject_len;
+    }
+
+    // subject_buf has enough space.
+    uint8_t* tmp = subject_buf;
+    return i2d_X509_NAME(subject, &tmp);
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/crypto/crypto.hpp b/keystore2/src/crypto/crypto.hpp
index 9bd7758..f841eb3 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/crypto/crypto.hpp
+++ b/keystore2/src/crypto/crypto.hpp
@@ -55,11 +55,36 @@
 
   EC_KEY* ECKEYGenerateKey();
 
-  EC_KEY* ECKEYDeriveFromSecret(const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len);
+  size_t ECKEYMarshalPrivateKey(const EC_KEY *priv_key, uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
+
+  EC_KEY* ECKEYParsePrivateKey(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
 
   size_t ECPOINTPoint2Oct(const EC_POINT *point, uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
 
   EC_POINT* ECPOINTOct2Point(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
+
 }
 
+// Parse a DER-encoded X.509 certificate contained in cert_buf, with length
+// cert_len, extract the subject, DER-encode it and write the result to
+// subject_buf, which has subject_buf_len capacity.
+//
+// Because the length of the subject is unknown, and because we'd like to (a) be
+// able to handle subjects of any size and (b) avoid parsing the certificate
+// twice most of the time, once to discover the length and once to parse it, the
+// return value is overloaded.
+//
+// If the return value > 0 it specifies the number of bytes written into
+// subject_buf; the operation was successful.
+//
+// If the return value == 0, certificate parsing failed unrecoverably.  The
+// reason will be logged.
+//
+// If the return value < 0, the operation failed because the subject size >
+// subject_buf_len.  The return value is -(subject_size), where subject_size is
+// the size of the extracted DER-encoded subject field.  Call
+// extractSubjectFromCertificate again with a sufficiently-large buffer.
+int extractSubjectFromCertificate(const uint8_t* cert_buf, size_t cert_len,
+                                  uint8_t* subject_buf, size_t subject_buf_len);
+
 #endif  //  __CRYPTO_H__
diff --git a/keystore2/src/crypto/error.rs b/keystore2/src/crypto/error.rs
index 1e84fc6..a369012 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/crypto/error.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/crypto/error.rs
@@ -74,9 +74,13 @@
     #[error("Failed to generate key.")]
     ECKEYGenerateKeyFailed,
 
-    /// This is returned if the C implementation of ECKEYDeriveFromSecret returned null.
-    #[error("Failed to derive key.")]
-    ECKEYDeriveFailed,
+    /// This is returned if the C implementation of ECKEYMarshalPrivateKey returned 0.
+    #[error("Failed to marshal private key.")]
+    ECKEYMarshalPrivateKeyFailed,
+
+    /// This is returned if the C implementation of ECKEYParsePrivateKey returned null.
+    #[error("Failed to parse private key.")]
+    ECKEYParsePrivateKeyFailed,
 
     /// This is returned if the C implementation of ECPOINTPoint2Oct returned 0.
     #[error("Failed to convert point to oct.")]
@@ -85,4 +89,8 @@
     /// This is returned if the C implementation of ECPOINTOct2Point returned null.
     #[error("Failed to convert oct to point.")]
     ECOct2PointFailed,
+
+    /// This is returned if the C implementation of extractSubjectFromCertificate failed.
+    #[error("Failed to extract certificate subject.")]
+    ExtractSubjectFailed,
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/crypto/include/certificate_utils.h b/keystore2/src/crypto/include/certificate_utils.h
index 1e80d80..6c25b9a 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/crypto/include/certificate_utils.h
+++ b/keystore2/src/crypto/include/certificate_utils.h
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
  * `signCert` or `signCertWith`.
  * @param evp_pkey The public key that the certificate is issued for.
  * @param serial The certificate serial number.
- * @param subject The subject common name.
+ * @param subject The X509 name encoded subject common name.
  * @param activeDateTimeMilliSeconds The not before date in epoch milliseconds.
  * @param usageExpireDateTimeMilliSeconds The not after date in epoch milliseconds.
  * @param addSubjectKeyIdEx If true, adds the subject key id extension.
@@ -89,14 +89,14 @@
  * @return CertUtilsError::Ok on success.
  */
 std::variant<CertUtilsError, X509_Ptr>
-makeCert(const EVP_PKEY* evp_pkey,                                    //
-         const uint32_t serial,                                       //
-         const char subject[],                                        //
-         const uint64_t activeDateTimeMilliSeconds,                   //
-         const uint64_t usageExpireDateTimeMilliSeconds,              //
-         bool addSubjectKeyIdEx,                                      //
-         std::optional<KeyUsageExtension> keyUsageEx,                 //
-         std::optional<BasicConstraintsExtension> basicConstraints);  //
+makeCert(const EVP_PKEY* evp_pkey,                                                   //
+         std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<const std::vector<uint8_t>>> serial,   //
+         std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<const std::vector<uint8_t>>> subject,  //
+         const int64_t activeDateTimeMilliSeconds,                                   //
+         const int64_t usageExpireDateTimeMilliSeconds,                              //
+         bool addSubjectKeyIdEx,                                                     //
+         std::optional<KeyUsageExtension> keyUsageEx,                                //
+         std::optional<BasicConstraintsExtension> basicConstraints);                 //
 
 /**
  * Takes the subject name from `signingCert` and sets it as issuer name in `cert`.
diff --git a/keystore2/src/crypto/lib.rs b/keystore2/src/crypto/lib.rs
index 92b257c..3523a9d 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/crypto/lib.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/crypto/lib.rs
@@ -19,11 +19,12 @@
 mod zvec;
 pub use error::Error;
 use keystore2_crypto_bindgen::{
-    generateKeyFromPassword, randomBytes, AES_gcm_decrypt, AES_gcm_encrypt, ECDHComputeKey,
-    ECKEYDeriveFromSecret, ECKEYGenerateKey, ECPOINTOct2Point, ECPOINTPoint2Oct, EC_KEY_free,
-    EC_KEY_get0_public_key, EC_POINT_free, HKDFExpand, HKDFExtract, EC_KEY, EC_MAX_BYTES, EC_POINT,
-    EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE,
+    extractSubjectFromCertificate, generateKeyFromPassword, randomBytes, AES_gcm_decrypt,
+    AES_gcm_encrypt, ECDHComputeKey, ECKEYGenerateKey, ECKEYMarshalPrivateKey,
+    ECKEYParsePrivateKey, ECPOINTOct2Point, ECPOINTPoint2Oct, EC_KEY_free, EC_KEY_get0_public_key,
+    EC_POINT_free, HKDFExpand, HKDFExtract, EC_KEY, EC_MAX_BYTES, EC_POINT, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE,
 };
+use std::convert::TryFrom;
 use std::convert::TryInto;
 use std::marker::PhantomData;
 pub use zvec::ZVec;
@@ -57,10 +58,15 @@
 
 /// Generate a salt.
 pub fn generate_salt() -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
-    // Safety: salt has the same length as the requested number of random bytes.
-    let mut salt = vec![0; SALT_LENGTH];
-    if unsafe { randomBytes(salt.as_mut_ptr(), SALT_LENGTH) } {
-        Ok(salt)
+    generate_random_data(SALT_LENGTH)
+}
+
+/// Generate random data of the given size.
+pub fn generate_random_data(size: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
+    // Safety: data has the same length as the requested number of random bytes.
+    let mut data = vec![0; size];
+    if unsafe { randomBytes(data.as_mut_ptr(), size) } {
+        Ok(data)
     } else {
         Err(Error::RandomNumberGenerationFailed)
     }
@@ -143,42 +149,68 @@
     }
 }
 
-/// Generates a key from the given password and salt.
-/// The salt must be exactly 16 bytes long.
-/// Two key sizes are accepted: 16 and 32 bytes.
-pub fn derive_key_from_password(
-    pw: &[u8],
-    salt: Option<&[u8]>,
-    key_length: usize,
-) -> Result<ZVec, Error> {
-    let salt: *const u8 = match salt {
-        Some(s) => {
-            if s.len() != SALT_LENGTH {
-                return Err(Error::InvalidSaltLength);
-            }
-            s.as_ptr()
-        }
-        None => std::ptr::null(),
-    };
+/// Represents a "password" that can be used to key the PBKDF2 algorithm.
+pub enum Password<'a> {
+    /// Borrow an existing byte array
+    Ref(&'a [u8]),
+    /// Use an owned ZVec to store the key
+    Owned(ZVec),
+}
 
-    match key_length {
-        AES_128_KEY_LENGTH | AES_256_KEY_LENGTH => {}
-        _ => return Err(Error::InvalidKeyLength),
+impl<'a> From<&'a [u8]> for Password<'a> {
+    fn from(pw: &'a [u8]) -> Self {
+        Self::Ref(pw)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'a> Password<'a> {
+    fn get_key(&'a self) -> &'a [u8] {
+        match self {
+            Self::Ref(b) => b,
+            Self::Owned(z) => &*z,
+        }
     }
 
-    let mut result = ZVec::new(key_length)?;
+    /// Generate a key from the given password and salt.
+    /// The salt must be exactly 16 bytes long.
+    /// Two key sizes are accepted: 16 and 32 bytes.
+    pub fn derive_key(&self, salt: Option<&[u8]>, key_length: usize) -> Result<ZVec, Error> {
+        let pw = self.get_key();
 
-    unsafe {
-        generateKeyFromPassword(
-            result.as_mut_ptr(),
-            result.len(),
-            pw.as_ptr() as *const std::os::raw::c_char,
-            pw.len(),
-            salt,
-        )
-    };
+        let salt: *const u8 = match salt {
+            Some(s) => {
+                if s.len() != SALT_LENGTH {
+                    return Err(Error::InvalidSaltLength);
+                }
+                s.as_ptr()
+            }
+            None => std::ptr::null(),
+        };
 
-    Ok(result)
+        match key_length {
+            AES_128_KEY_LENGTH | AES_256_KEY_LENGTH => {}
+            _ => return Err(Error::InvalidKeyLength),
+        }
+
+        let mut result = ZVec::new(key_length)?;
+
+        unsafe {
+            generateKeyFromPassword(
+                result.as_mut_ptr(),
+                result.len(),
+                pw.as_ptr() as *const std::os::raw::c_char,
+                pw.len(),
+                salt,
+            )
+        };
+
+        Ok(result)
+    }
+
+    /// Try to make another Password object with the same data.
+    pub fn try_clone(&self) -> Result<Password<'static>, Error> {
+        Ok(Password::Owned(ZVec::try_from(self.get_key())?))
+    }
 }
 
 /// Calls the boringssl HKDF_extract function.
@@ -306,14 +338,32 @@
     Ok(ECKey(key))
 }
 
-/// Calls the boringssl EC_KEY_derive_from_secret function.
-pub fn ec_key_derive_from_secret(secret: &[u8]) -> Result<ECKey, Error> {
-    // Safety: secret is a valid buffer.
-    let result = unsafe { ECKEYDeriveFromSecret(secret.as_ptr(), secret.len()) };
-    if result.is_null() {
-        return Err(Error::ECKEYDeriveFailed);
+/// Calls the boringssl EC_KEY_marshal_private_key function.
+pub fn ec_key_marshal_private_key(key: &ECKey) -> Result<ZVec, Error> {
+    let len = 39; // Empirically observed length of private key
+    let mut buf = ZVec::new(len)?;
+    // Safety: the key is valid.
+    // This will not write past the specified length of the buffer; if the
+    // len above is too short, it returns 0.
+    let written_len =
+        unsafe { ECKEYMarshalPrivateKey(key.0, buf.as_mut_ptr(), buf.len()) } as usize;
+    if written_len == len {
+        Ok(buf)
+    } else {
+        Err(Error::ECKEYMarshalPrivateKeyFailed)
     }
-    Ok(ECKey(result))
+}
+
+/// Calls the boringssl EC_KEY_parse_private_key function.
+pub fn ec_key_parse_private_key(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<ECKey, Error> {
+    // Safety: this will not read past the specified length of the buffer.
+    // It fails if less than the whole buffer is consumed.
+    let key = unsafe { ECKEYParsePrivateKey(buf.as_ptr(), buf.len()) };
+    if key.is_null() {
+        Err(Error::ECKEYParsePrivateKeyFailed)
+    } else {
+        Ok(ECKey(key))
+    }
 }
 
 /// Calls the boringssl EC_KEY_get0_public_key function.
@@ -353,6 +403,54 @@
     Ok(OwnedECPoint(result))
 }
 
+/// Uses BoringSSL to extract the DER-encoded subject from a DER-encoded X.509 certificate.
+pub fn parse_subject_from_certificate(cert_buf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
+    // Try with a 200-byte output buffer, should be enough in all but bizarre cases.
+    let mut retval = vec![0; 200];
+
+    // Safety: extractSubjectFromCertificate reads at most cert_buf.len() bytes from cert_buf and
+    // writes at most retval.len() bytes to retval.
+    let mut size = unsafe {
+        extractSubjectFromCertificate(
+            cert_buf.as_ptr(),
+            cert_buf.len(),
+            retval.as_mut_ptr(),
+            retval.len(),
+        )
+    };
+
+    if size == 0 {
+        return Err(Error::ExtractSubjectFailed);
+    }
+
+    if size < 0 {
+        // Our buffer wasn't big enough.  Make one that is just the right size and try again.
+        let negated_size = usize::try_from(-size).map_err(|_e| Error::ExtractSubjectFailed)?;
+        retval = vec![0; negated_size];
+
+        // Safety: extractSubjectFromCertificate reads at most cert_buf.len() bytes from cert_buf
+        // and writes at most retval.len() bytes to retval.
+        size = unsafe {
+            extractSubjectFromCertificate(
+                cert_buf.as_ptr(),
+                cert_buf.len(),
+                retval.as_mut_ptr(),
+                retval.len(),
+            )
+        };
+
+        if size <= 0 {
+            return Err(Error::ExtractSubjectFailed);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Reduce buffer size to the amount written.
+    let safe_size = usize::try_from(size).map_err(|_e| Error::ExtractSubjectFailed)?;
+    retval.truncate(safe_size);
+
+    Ok(retval)
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
 
@@ -439,26 +537,26 @@
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn test_ec() {
-        let key = ec_key_generate_key();
-        assert!(key.is_ok());
-        assert!(!key.unwrap().0.is_null());
+    fn test_ec() -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let priv0 = ec_key_generate_key()?;
+        assert!(!priv0.0.is_null());
+        let pub0 = ec_key_get0_public_key(&priv0);
 
-        let key = ec_key_derive_from_secret(&[42; 16]);
-        assert!(key.is_ok());
-        let key = key.unwrap();
-        assert!(!key.0.is_null());
+        let priv1 = ec_key_generate_key()?;
+        let pub1 = ec_key_get0_public_key(&priv1);
 
-        let point = ec_key_get0_public_key(&key);
+        let priv0s = ec_key_marshal_private_key(&priv0)?;
+        let pub0s = ec_point_point_to_oct(pub0.get_point())?;
+        let pub1s = ec_point_point_to_oct(pub1.get_point())?;
 
-        let result = ecdh_compute_key(point.get_point(), &key);
-        assert!(result.is_ok());
+        let priv0 = ec_key_parse_private_key(&priv0s)?;
+        let pub0 = ec_point_oct_to_point(&pub0s)?;
+        let pub1 = ec_point_oct_to_point(&pub1s)?;
 
-        let oct = ec_point_point_to_oct(point.get_point());
-        assert!(oct.is_ok());
-        let oct = oct.unwrap();
+        let left_key = ecdh_compute_key(pub0.get_point(), &priv1)?;
+        let right_key = ecdh_compute_key(pub1.get_point(), &priv0)?;
 
-        let point2 = ec_point_oct_to_point(oct.as_slice());
-        assert!(point2.is_ok());
+        assert_eq!(left_key, right_key);
+        Ok(())
     }
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/crypto/tests/certificate_utils_test.cpp b/keystore2/src/crypto/tests/certificate_utils_test.cpp
index 2df9ce5..119c3fa 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/crypto/tests/certificate_utils_test.cpp
+++ b/keystore2/src/crypto/tests/certificate_utils_test.cpp
@@ -173,8 +173,8 @@
         .isCertificationKey = true,
     };
 
-    auto certV = makeCert(pkey.get(), 1, "Me", now_ms - kValidity, now_ms + kValidity,
-                          true /* subject key id extension */, keyUsage, bcons);
+    auto certV = makeCert(pkey.get(), std::nullopt, std::nullopt, now_ms - kValidity,
+                          now_ms + kValidity, true /* subject key id extension */, keyUsage, bcons);
     ASSERT_TRUE(std::holds_alternative<X509_Ptr>(certV));
     auto& cert = std::get<X509_Ptr>(certV);
     ASSERT_TRUE(!setIssuer(cert.get(), cert.get(), true));
@@ -272,8 +272,8 @@
         .isCertificationKey = true,
     };
 
-    auto certV = makeCert(pkey.get(), 1, "Me", now_ms - kValidity, now_ms + kValidity,
-                          true /* subject key id extension */, keyUsage, bcons);
+    auto certV = makeCert(pkey.get(), std::nullopt, std::nullopt, now_ms - kValidity,
+                          now_ms + kValidity, true /* subject key id extension */, keyUsage, bcons);
     ASSERT_TRUE(std::holds_alternative<X509_Ptr>(certV));
     auto& cert = std::get<X509_Ptr>(certV);
     ASSERT_TRUE(!setIssuer(cert.get(), cert.get(), true));
diff --git a/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs b/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs
index e75e1dc..4af7b5a 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-#![allow(dead_code)]
-
 use crate::error::Error;
 use nix::sys::mman::{mlock, munlock};
 use std::convert::TryFrom;
diff --git a/keystore2/src/database.rs b/keystore2/src/database.rs
index 785847d..174a928 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/database.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/database.rs
@@ -41,14 +41,21 @@
 //! from the database module these functions take permission check
 //! callbacks.
 
-use crate::db_utils::{self, SqlField};
-use crate::error::{Error as KsError, ErrorCode, ResponseCode};
 use crate::impl_metadata; // This is in db_utils.rs
 use crate::key_parameter::{KeyParameter, Tag};
 use crate::permission::KeyPermSet;
-use crate::utils::get_current_time_in_seconds;
+use crate::utils::{get_current_time_in_seconds, AID_USER_OFFSET};
+use crate::{
+    db_utils::{self, SqlField},
+    gc::Gc,
+    super_key::USER_SUPER_KEY,
+};
+use crate::{
+    error::{Error as KsError, ErrorCode, ResponseCode},
+    super_key::SuperKeyType,
+};
 use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
-use std::{convert::TryFrom, convert::TryInto, time::SystemTimeError};
+use std::{convert::TryFrom, convert::TryInto, ops::Deref, time::SystemTimeError};
 
 use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
     HardwareAuthToken::HardwareAuthToken,
@@ -60,6 +67,11 @@
 use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::{
     Domain::Domain, KeyDescriptor::KeyDescriptor,
 };
+use android_security_remoteprovisioning::aidl::android::security::remoteprovisioning::{
+    AttestationPoolStatus::AttestationPoolStatus,
+};
+
+use keystore2_crypto::ZVec;
 use lazy_static::lazy_static;
 use log::error;
 #[cfg(not(test))]
@@ -72,12 +84,14 @@
     types::{FromSqlError, Value, ValueRef},
     Connection, OptionalExtension, ToSql, Transaction, TransactionBehavior, NO_PARAMS,
 };
+
 use std::{
     collections::{HashMap, HashSet},
     path::Path,
     sync::{Condvar, Mutex},
     time::{Duration, SystemTime},
 };
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 use tests::random;
 
@@ -88,20 +102,18 @@
     /// A metadata entry for key entries.
     #[derive(Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd)]
     pub enum KeyMetaEntry {
-        /// If present, indicates that the sensitive part of key
-        /// is encrypted with another key or a key derived from a password.
-        EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy) with accessor encrypted_by,
-        /// If the blob is password encrypted this field is set to the
-        /// salt used for the key derivation.
-        Salt(Vec<u8>) with accessor salt,
-        /// If the blob is encrypted, this field is set to the initialization vector.
-        Iv(Vec<u8>) with accessor iv,
-        /// If the blob is encrypted, this field holds the AEAD TAG.
-        AeadTag(Vec<u8>) with accessor aead_tag,
-        /// Creation date of a the key entry.
+        /// Date of the creation of the key entry.
         CreationDate(DateTime) with accessor creation_date,
         /// Expiration date for attestation keys.
         AttestationExpirationDate(DateTime) with accessor attestation_expiration_date,
+        /// CBOR Blob that represents a COSE_Key and associated metadata needed for remote
+        /// provisioning
+        AttestationMacedPublicKey(Vec<u8>) with accessor attestation_maced_public_key,
+        /// Vector representing the raw public key so results from the server can be matched
+        /// to the right entry
+        AttestationRawPubKey(Vec<u8>) with accessor attestation_raw_pub_key,
+        /// SEC1 public key for ECDH encryption
+        Sec1PublicKey(Vec<u8>) with accessor sec1_public_key,
         //  --- ADD NEW META DATA FIELDS HERE ---
         // For backwards compatibility add new entries only to
         // end of this list and above this comment.
@@ -138,7 +150,7 @@
     fn store_in_db(&self, key_id: i64, tx: &Transaction) -> Result<()> {
         let mut stmt = tx
             .prepare(
-                "INSERT into persistent.keymetadata (keyentryid, tag, data)
+                "INSERT or REPLACE INTO persistent.keymetadata (keyentryid, tag, data)
                     VALUES (?, ?, ?);",
             )
             .context("In KeyMetaData::store_in_db: Failed to prepare statement.")?;
@@ -153,6 +165,78 @@
     }
 }
 
+impl_metadata!(
+    /// A set of metadata for key blobs.
+    #[derive(Debug, Default, Eq, PartialEq)]
+    pub struct BlobMetaData;
+    /// A metadata entry for key blobs.
+    #[derive(Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd)]
+    pub enum BlobMetaEntry {
+        /// If present, indicates that the blob is encrypted with another key or a key derived
+        /// from a password.
+        EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy) with accessor encrypted_by,
+        /// If the blob is password encrypted this field is set to the
+        /// salt used for the key derivation.
+        Salt(Vec<u8>) with accessor salt,
+        /// If the blob is encrypted, this field is set to the initialization vector.
+        Iv(Vec<u8>) with accessor iv,
+        /// If the blob is encrypted, this field holds the AEAD TAG.
+        AeadTag(Vec<u8>) with accessor aead_tag,
+        /// The uuid of the owning KeyMint instance.
+        KmUuid(Uuid) with accessor km_uuid,
+        /// If the key is ECDH encrypted, this is the ephemeral public key
+        PublicKey(Vec<u8>) with accessor public_key,
+        //  --- ADD NEW META DATA FIELDS HERE ---
+        // For backwards compatibility add new entries only to
+        // end of this list and above this comment.
+    };
+);
+
+impl BlobMetaData {
+    fn load_from_db(blob_id: i64, tx: &Transaction) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut stmt = tx
+            .prepare(
+                "SELECT tag, data from persistent.blobmetadata
+                    WHERE blobentryid = ?;",
+            )
+            .context("In BlobMetaData::load_from_db: prepare statement failed.")?;
+
+        let mut metadata: HashMap<i64, BlobMetaEntry> = Default::default();
+
+        let mut rows =
+            stmt.query(params![blob_id]).context("In BlobMetaData::load_from_db: query failed.")?;
+        db_utils::with_rows_extract_all(&mut rows, |row| {
+            let db_tag: i64 = row.get(0).context("Failed to read tag.")?;
+            metadata.insert(
+                db_tag,
+                BlobMetaEntry::new_from_sql(db_tag, &SqlField::new(1, &row))
+                    .context("Failed to read BlobMetaEntry.")?,
+            );
+            Ok(())
+        })
+        .context("In BlobMetaData::load_from_db.")?;
+
+        Ok(Self { data: metadata })
+    }
+
+    fn store_in_db(&self, blob_id: i64, tx: &Transaction) -> Result<()> {
+        let mut stmt = tx
+            .prepare(
+                "INSERT or REPLACE INTO persistent.blobmetadata (blobentryid, tag, data)
+                    VALUES (?, ?, ?);",
+            )
+            .context("In BlobMetaData::store_in_db: Failed to prepare statement.")?;
+
+        let iter = self.data.iter();
+        for (tag, entry) in iter {
+            stmt.insert(params![blob_id, tag, entry,]).with_context(|| {
+                format!("In BlobMetaData::store_in_db: Failed to insert {:?}", entry)
+            })?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
 /// Indicates the type of the keyentry.
 #[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd)]
 pub enum KeyType {
@@ -187,6 +271,50 @@
     }
 }
 
+/// Uuid representation that can be stored in the database.
+/// Right now it can only be initialized from SecurityLevel.
+/// Once KeyMint provides a UUID type a corresponding From impl shall be added.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
+pub struct Uuid([u8; 16]);
+
+impl Deref for Uuid {
+    type Target = [u8; 16];
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        &self.0
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<SecurityLevel> for Uuid {
+    fn from(sec_level: SecurityLevel) -> Self {
+        Self((sec_level.0 as u128).to_be_bytes())
+    }
+}
+
+impl ToSql for Uuid {
+    fn to_sql(&self) -> rusqlite::Result<ToSqlOutput> {
+        self.0.to_sql()
+    }
+}
+
+impl FromSql for Uuid {
+    fn column_result(value: ValueRef<'_>) -> FromSqlResult<Self> {
+        let blob = Vec::<u8>::column_result(value)?;
+        if blob.len() != 16 {
+            return Err(FromSqlError::OutOfRange(blob.len() as i64));
+        }
+        let mut arr = [0u8; 16];
+        arr.copy_from_slice(&blob);
+        Ok(Self(arr))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Key entries that are not associated with any KeyMint instance, such as pure certificate
+/// entries are associated with this UUID.
+pub static KEYSTORE_UUID: Uuid = Uuid([
+    0x41, 0xe3, 0xb9, 0xce, 0x27, 0x58, 0x4e, 0x91, 0xbc, 0xfd, 0xa5, 0x5d, 0x91, 0x85, 0xab, 0x11,
+]);
+
 /// Indicates how the sensitive part of this key blob is encrypted.
 #[derive(Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd)]
 pub enum EncryptedBy {
@@ -349,7 +477,7 @@
 /// certificate chain components.
 /// KeyEntryLoadBits is a bitmap that indicates to `KeystoreDB::load_key_entry`
 /// which components shall be loaded from the database if present.
-#[derive(Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd)]
 pub struct KeyEntryLoadBits(u32);
 
 impl KeyEntryLoadBits {
@@ -435,6 +563,42 @@
     }
 }
 
+/// This type represents a certificate and certificate chain entry for a key.
+#[derive(Debug, Default)]
+pub struct CertificateInfo {
+    cert: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    cert_chain: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+}
+
+impl CertificateInfo {
+    /// Constructs a new CertificateInfo object from `cert` and `cert_chain`
+    pub fn new(cert: Option<Vec<u8>>, cert_chain: Option<Vec<u8>>) -> Self {
+        Self { cert, cert_chain }
+    }
+
+    /// Take the cert
+    pub fn take_cert(&mut self) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.cert.take()
+    }
+
+    /// Take the cert chain
+    pub fn take_cert_chain(&mut self) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.cert_chain.take()
+    }
+}
+
+/// This type represents a certificate chain with a private key corresponding to the leaf
+/// certificate. TODO(jbires): This will be used in a follow-on CL, for now it's used in the tests.
+pub struct CertificateChain {
+    /// A KM key blob
+    pub private_key: ZVec,
+    /// A batch cert for private_key
+    pub batch_cert: Vec<u8>,
+    /// A full certificate chain from root signing authority to private_key, including batch_cert
+    /// for convenience.
+    pub cert_chain: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
 /// This type represents a Keystore 2.0 key entry.
 /// An entry has a unique `id` by which it can be found in the database.
 /// It has a security level field, key parameters, and three optional fields
@@ -442,12 +606,13 @@
 #[derive(Debug, Default, Eq, PartialEq)]
 pub struct KeyEntry {
     id: i64,
-    km_blob: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    key_blob_info: Option<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)>,
     cert: Option<Vec<u8>>,
     cert_chain: Option<Vec<u8>>,
-    sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+    km_uuid: Uuid,
     parameters: Vec<KeyParameter>,
     metadata: KeyMetaData,
+    pure_cert: bool,
 }
 
 impl KeyEntry {
@@ -456,12 +621,12 @@
         self.id
     }
     /// Exposes the optional KeyMint blob.
-    pub fn km_blob(&self) -> &Option<Vec<u8>> {
-        &self.km_blob
+    pub fn key_blob_info(&self) -> &Option<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> {
+        &self.key_blob_info
     }
-    /// Extracts the Optional KeyMint blob.
-    pub fn take_km_blob(&mut self) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
-        self.km_blob.take()
+    /// Extracts the Optional KeyMint blob including its metadata.
+    pub fn take_key_blob_info(&mut self) -> Option<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> {
+        self.key_blob_info.take()
     }
     /// Exposes the optional public certificate.
     pub fn cert(&self) -> &Option<Vec<u8>> {
@@ -479,9 +644,9 @@
     pub fn take_cert_chain(&mut self) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
         self.cert_chain.take()
     }
-    /// Returns the security level of the key entry.
-    pub fn sec_level(&self) -> SecurityLevel {
-        self.sec_level
+    /// Returns the uuid of the owning KeyMint instance.
+    pub fn km_uuid(&self) -> &Uuid {
+        &self.km_uuid
     }
     /// Exposes the key parameters of this key entry.
     pub fn key_parameters(&self) -> &Vec<KeyParameter> {
@@ -495,10 +660,19 @@
     pub fn metadata(&self) -> &KeyMetaData {
         &self.metadata
     }
+    /// This returns true if the entry is a pure certificate entry with no
+    /// private key component.
+    pub fn pure_cert(&self) -> bool {
+        self.pure_cert
+    }
+    /// Consumes this key entry and extracts the keyparameters and metadata from it.
+    pub fn into_key_parameters_and_metadata(self) -> (Vec<KeyParameter>, KeyMetaData) {
+        (self.parameters, self.metadata)
+    }
 }
 
 /// Indicates the sub component of a key entry for persistent storage.
-#[derive(Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd)]
 pub struct SubComponentType(u32);
 impl SubComponentType {
     /// Persistent identifier for a key blob.
@@ -521,10 +695,39 @@
     }
 }
 
+/// This trait is private to the database module. It is used to convey whether or not the garbage
+/// collector shall be invoked after a database access. All closures passed to
+/// `KeystoreDB::with_transaction` return a tuple (bool, T) where the bool indicates if the
+/// gc needs to be triggered. This convenience function allows to turn any anyhow::Result<T>
+/// into anyhow::Result<(bool, T)> by simply appending one of `.do_gc(bool)`, `.no_gc()`, or
+/// `.need_gc()`.
+trait DoGc<T> {
+    fn do_gc(self, need_gc: bool) -> Result<(bool, T)>;
+
+    fn no_gc(self) -> Result<(bool, T)>;
+
+    fn need_gc(self) -> Result<(bool, T)>;
+}
+
+impl<T> DoGc<T> for Result<T> {
+    fn do_gc(self, need_gc: bool) -> Result<(bool, T)> {
+        self.map(|r| (need_gc, r))
+    }
+
+    fn no_gc(self) -> Result<(bool, T)> {
+        self.do_gc(false)
+    }
+
+    fn need_gc(self) -> Result<(bool, T)> {
+        self.do_gc(true)
+    }
+}
+
 /// KeystoreDB wraps a connection to an SQLite database and tracks its
 /// ownership. It also implements all of Keystore 2.0's database functionality.
 pub struct KeystoreDB {
     conn: Connection,
+    gc: Option<Gc>,
 }
 
 /// Database representation of the monotonic time retrieved from the system call clock_gettime with
@@ -538,11 +741,21 @@
         Self(get_current_time_in_seconds())
     }
 
+    /// Constructs a new MonotonicRawTime from a given number of seconds.
+    pub fn from_secs(val: i64) -> Self {
+        Self(val)
+    }
+
     /// Returns the integer value of MonotonicRawTime as i64
     pub fn seconds(&self) -> i64 {
         self.0
     }
 
+    /// Returns the value of MonotonicRawTime in milli seconds as i64
+    pub fn milli_seconds(&self) -> i64 {
+        self.0 * 1000
+    }
+
     /// Like i64::checked_sub.
     pub fn checked_sub(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<Self> {
         self.0.checked_sub(other.0).map(Self)
@@ -595,47 +808,87 @@
     pub fn time_received(&self) -> MonotonicRawTime {
         self.time_received
     }
+
+    /// Returns the challenge value of the auth token.
+    pub fn challenge(&self) -> i64 {
+        self.auth_token.challenge
+    }
 }
 
+/// Shared in-memory databases get destroyed as soon as the last connection to them gets closed.
+/// This object does not allow access to the database connection. But it keeps a database
+/// connection alive in order to keep the in memory per boot database alive.
+pub struct PerBootDbKeepAlive(Connection);
+
 impl KeystoreDB {
+    const UNASSIGNED_KEY_ID: i64 = -1i64;
+    const PERBOOT_DB_FILE_NAME: &'static str = &"file:perboot.sqlite?mode=memory&cache=shared";
+
+    /// This creates a PerBootDbKeepAlive object to keep the per boot database alive.
+    pub fn keep_perboot_db_alive() -> Result<PerBootDbKeepAlive> {
+        let conn = Connection::open_in_memory()
+            .context("In keep_perboot_db_alive: Failed to initialize SQLite connection.")?;
+
+        conn.execute("ATTACH DATABASE ? as perboot;", params![Self::PERBOOT_DB_FILE_NAME])
+            .context("In keep_perboot_db_alive: Failed to attach database perboot.")?;
+        Ok(PerBootDbKeepAlive(conn))
+    }
+
     /// This will create a new database connection connecting the two
     /// files persistent.sqlite and perboot.sqlite in the given directory.
     /// It also attempts to initialize all of the tables.
     /// KeystoreDB cannot be used by multiple threads.
     /// Each thread should open their own connection using `thread_local!`.
-    pub fn new(db_root: &Path) -> Result<Self> {
-        // Build the path to the sqlite files.
+    pub fn new(db_root: &Path, gc: Option<Gc>) -> Result<Self> {
+        // Build the path to the sqlite file.
         let mut persistent_path = db_root.to_path_buf();
         persistent_path.push("persistent.sqlite");
-        let mut perboot_path = db_root.to_path_buf();
-        perboot_path.push("perboot.sqlite");
 
         // Now convert them to strings prefixed with "file:"
         let mut persistent_path_str = "file:".to_owned();
         persistent_path_str.push_str(&persistent_path.to_string_lossy());
-        let mut perboot_path_str = "file:".to_owned();
-        perboot_path_str.push_str(&perboot_path.to_string_lossy());
 
-        let conn = Self::make_connection(&persistent_path_str, &perboot_path_str)?;
+        let conn = Self::make_connection(&persistent_path_str, &Self::PERBOOT_DB_FILE_NAME)?;
 
-        Self::init_tables(&conn)?;
-        Ok(Self { conn })
+        // On busy fail Immediately. It is unlikely to succeed given a bug in sqlite.
+        conn.busy_handler(None).context("In KeystoreDB::new: Failed to set busy handler.")?;
+
+        let mut db = Self { conn, gc };
+        db.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            Self::init_tables(tx).context("Trying to initialize tables.").no_gc()
+        })?;
+        Ok(db)
     }
 
-    fn init_tables(conn: &Connection) -> Result<()> {
-        conn.execute(
+    fn init_tables(tx: &Transaction) -> Result<()> {
+        tx.execute(
             "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS persistent.keyentry (
                      id INTEGER UNIQUE,
                      key_type INTEGER,
                      domain INTEGER,
                      namespace INTEGER,
                      alias BLOB,
-                     state INTEGER);",
+                     state INTEGER,
+                     km_uuid BLOB);",
             NO_PARAMS,
         )
         .context("Failed to initialize \"keyentry\" table.")?;
 
-        conn.execute(
+        tx.execute(
+            "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS persistent.keyentry_id_index
+            ON keyentry(id);",
+            NO_PARAMS,
+        )
+        .context("Failed to create index keyentry_id_index.")?;
+
+        tx.execute(
+            "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS persistent.keyentry_domain_namespace_index
+            ON keyentry(domain, namespace, alias);",
+            NO_PARAMS,
+        )
+        .context("Failed to create index keyentry_domain_namespace_index.")?;
+
+        tx.execute(
             "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS persistent.blobentry (
                     id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
                     subcomponent_type INTEGER,
@@ -645,7 +898,32 @@
         )
         .context("Failed to initialize \"blobentry\" table.")?;
 
-        conn.execute(
+        tx.execute(
+            "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS persistent.blobentry_keyentryid_index
+            ON blobentry(keyentryid);",
+            NO_PARAMS,
+        )
+        .context("Failed to create index blobentry_keyentryid_index.")?;
+
+        tx.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS persistent.blobmetadata (
+                     id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
+                     blobentryid INTEGER,
+                     tag INTEGER,
+                     data ANY,
+                     UNIQUE (blobentryid, tag));",
+            NO_PARAMS,
+        )
+        .context("Failed to initialize \"blobmetadata\" table.")?;
+
+        tx.execute(
+            "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS persistent.blobmetadata_blobentryid_index
+            ON blobmetadata(blobentryid);",
+            NO_PARAMS,
+        )
+        .context("Failed to create index blobmetadata_blobentryid_index.")?;
+
+        tx.execute(
             "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS persistent.keyparameter (
                      keyentryid INTEGER,
                      tag INTEGER,
@@ -655,16 +933,31 @@
         )
         .context("Failed to initialize \"keyparameter\" table.")?;
 
-        conn.execute(
+        tx.execute(
+            "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS persistent.keyparameter_keyentryid_index
+            ON keyparameter(keyentryid);",
+            NO_PARAMS,
+        )
+        .context("Failed to create index keyparameter_keyentryid_index.")?;
+
+        tx.execute(
             "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS persistent.keymetadata (
                      keyentryid INTEGER,
                      tag INTEGER,
-                     data ANY);",
+                     data ANY,
+                     UNIQUE (keyentryid, tag));",
             NO_PARAMS,
         )
         .context("Failed to initialize \"keymetadata\" table.")?;
 
-        conn.execute(
+        tx.execute(
+            "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS persistent.keymetadata_keyentryid_index
+            ON keymetadata(keyentryid);",
+            NO_PARAMS,
+        )
+        .context("Failed to create index keymetadata_keyentryid_index.")?;
+
+        tx.execute(
             "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS persistent.grant (
                     id INTEGER UNIQUE,
                     grantee INTEGER,
@@ -676,9 +969,9 @@
 
         //TODO: only drop the following two perboot tables if this is the first start up
         //during the boot (b/175716626).
-        // conn.execute("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS perboot.authtoken;", NO_PARAMS)
+        // tx.execute("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS perboot.authtoken;", NO_PARAMS)
         //     .context("Failed to drop perboot.authtoken table")?;
-        conn.execute(
+        tx.execute(
             "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS perboot.authtoken (
                         id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
                         challenge INTEGER,
@@ -693,11 +986,11 @@
         )
         .context("Failed to initialize \"authtoken\" table.")?;
 
-        // conn.execute("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS perboot.metadata;", NO_PARAMS)
+        // tx.execute("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS perboot.metadata;", NO_PARAMS)
         //     .context("Failed to drop perboot.metadata table")?;
         // metadata table stores certain miscellaneous information required for keystore functioning
         // during a boot cycle, as key-value pairs.
-        conn.execute(
+        tx.execute(
             "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS perboot.metadata (
                         key TEXT,
                         value BLOB,
@@ -712,85 +1005,105 @@
         let conn =
             Connection::open_in_memory().context("Failed to initialize SQLite connection.")?;
 
-        conn.execute("ATTACH DATABASE ? as persistent;", params![persistent_file])
-            .context("Failed to attach database persistent.")?;
-        conn.execute("ATTACH DATABASE ? as perboot;", params![perboot_file])
-            .context("Failed to attach database perboot.")?;
+        loop {
+            if let Err(e) = conn
+                .execute("ATTACH DATABASE ? as persistent;", params![persistent_file])
+                .context("Failed to attach database persistent.")
+            {
+                if Self::is_locked_error(&e) {
+                    std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_micros(500));
+                    continue;
+                } else {
+                    return Err(e);
+                }
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+        loop {
+            if let Err(e) = conn
+                .execute("ATTACH DATABASE ? as perboot;", params![perboot_file])
+                .context("Failed to attach database perboot.")
+            {
+                if Self::is_locked_error(&e) {
+                    std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_micros(500));
+                    continue;
+                } else {
+                    return Err(e);
+                }
+            }
+            break;
+        }
 
         Ok(conn)
     }
 
-    /// Get one unreferenced key. There is no particular order in which the keys are returned.
-    fn get_unreferenced_key_id(tx: &Transaction) -> Result<Option<i64>> {
-        tx.query_row(
-            "SELECT id FROM persistent.keyentry WHERE state = ?",
-            params![KeyLifeCycle::Unreferenced],
-            |row| row.get(0),
-        )
-        .optional()
-        .context("In get_unreferenced_key_id: Trying to get unreferenced key id.")
-    }
-
-    /// Returns a key id guard and key entry for one unreferenced key entry. Of the optional
-    /// fields of the key entry only the km_blob field will be populated. This is required
-    /// to subject the blob to its KeyMint instance for deletion.
-    pub fn get_unreferenced_key(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(KeyIdGuard, KeyEntry)>> {
-        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Deferred, |tx| {
-            let key_id = match Self::get_unreferenced_key_id(tx)
-                .context("Trying to get unreferenced key id")?
-            {
-                None => return Ok(None),
-                Some(id) => KEY_ID_LOCK.try_get(id).ok_or_else(KsError::sys).context(concat!(
-                    "A key id lock was held for an unreferenced key. ",
-                    "This should never happen."
-                ))?,
-            };
-            let key_entry = Self::load_key_components(tx, KeyEntryLoadBits::KM, key_id.id())
-                .context("Trying to get key components.")?;
-            Ok(Some((key_id, key_entry)))
-        })
-        .context("In get_unreferenced_key.")
-    }
-
-    /// This function purges all remnants of a key entry from the database.
-    /// Important: This does not check if the key was unreferenced, nor does it
-    /// subject the key to its KeyMint instance for permanent invalidation.
-    /// This function should only be called by the garbage collector.
-    /// To delete a key call `mark_unreferenced`, which transitions the key to the unreferenced
-    /// state, deletes all grants to the key, and notifies the garbage collector.
-    /// The garbage collector will:
-    ///  1. Call get_unreferenced_key.
-    ///  2. Determine the proper way to dispose of sensitive key material, e.g., call
-    ///     `KeyMintDevice::delete()`.
-    ///  3. Call `purge_key_entry`.
-    pub fn purge_key_entry(&mut self, key_id: KeyIdGuard) -> Result<()> {
+    /// This function is intended to be used by the garbage collector.
+    /// It deletes the blob given by `blob_id_to_delete`. It then tries to find a superseded
+    /// key blob that might need special handling by the garbage collector.
+    /// If no further superseded blobs can be found it deletes all other superseded blobs that don't
+    /// need special handling and returns None.
+    pub fn handle_next_superseded_blob(
+        &mut self,
+        blob_id_to_delete: Option<i64>,
+    ) -> Result<Option<(i64, Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)>> {
         self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
-            tx.execute("DELETE FROM persistent.keyentry WHERE id = ?;", params![key_id.id()])
-                .context("Trying to delete keyentry.")?;
-            tx.execute(
-                "DELETE FROM persistent.blobentry WHERE keyentryid = ?;",
-                params![key_id.id()],
-            )
-            .context("Trying to delete blobentries.")?;
-            tx.execute(
-                "DELETE FROM persistent.keymetadata WHERE keyentryid = ?;",
-                params![key_id.id()],
-            )
-            .context("Trying to delete keymetadata.")?;
-            tx.execute(
-                "DELETE FROM persistent.keyparameter WHERE keyentryid = ?;",
-                params![key_id.id()],
-            )
-            .context("Trying to delete keyparameters.")?;
-            let grants_deleted = tx
-                .execute("DELETE FROM persistent.grant WHERE keyentryid = ?;", params![key_id.id()])
-                .context("Trying to delete grants.")?;
-            if grants_deleted != 0 {
-                log::error!("Purged key that still had grants. This should not happen.");
+            // Delete the given blob if one was given.
+            if let Some(blob_id_to_delete) = blob_id_to_delete {
+                tx.execute(
+                    "DELETE FROM persistent.blobmetadata WHERE blobentryid = ?;",
+                    params![blob_id_to_delete],
+                )
+                .context("Trying to delete blob metadata.")?;
+                tx.execute(
+                    "DELETE FROM persistent.blobentry WHERE id = ?;",
+                    params![blob_id_to_delete],
+                )
+                .context("Trying to blob.")?;
             }
-            Ok(())
+
+            // Find another superseded keyblob load its metadata and return it.
+            if let Some((blob_id, blob)) = tx
+                .query_row(
+                    "SELECT id, blob FROM persistent.blobentry
+                     WHERE subcomponent_type = ?
+                     AND (
+                         id NOT IN (
+                             SELECT MAX(id) FROM persistent.blobentry
+                             WHERE subcomponent_type = ?
+                             GROUP BY keyentryid, subcomponent_type
+                         )
+                     OR keyentryid NOT IN (SELECT id FROM persistent.keyentry)
+                 );",
+                    params![SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB, SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB],
+                    |row| Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?)),
+                )
+                .optional()
+                .context("Trying to query superseded blob.")?
+            {
+                let blob_metadata = BlobMetaData::load_from_db(blob_id, tx)
+                    .context("Trying to load blob metadata.")?;
+                return Ok(Some((blob_id, blob, blob_metadata))).no_gc();
+            }
+
+            // We did not find any superseded key blob, so let's remove other superseded blob in
+            // one transaction.
+            tx.execute(
+                "DELETE FROM persistent.blobentry
+                 WHERE NOT subcomponent_type = ?
+                 AND (
+                     id NOT IN (
+                        SELECT MAX(id) FROM persistent.blobentry
+                        WHERE NOT subcomponent_type = ?
+                        GROUP BY keyentryid, subcomponent_type
+                     ) OR keyentryid NOT IN (SELECT id FROM persistent.keyentry)
+                 );",
+                params![SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB, SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB],
+            )
+            .context("Trying to purge superseded blobs.")?;
+
+            Ok(None).no_gc()
         })
-        .context("In purge_key_entry.")
+        .context("In handle_next_superseded_blob.")
     }
 
     /// This maintenance function should be called only once before the database is used for the
@@ -802,12 +1115,115 @@
     /// Unlike with `mark_unreferenced`, we don't need to purge grants, because only keys that made
     /// it to `KeyLifeCycle::Live` may have grants.
     pub fn cleanup_leftovers(&mut self) -> Result<usize> {
-        self.conn
-            .execute(
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            tx.execute(
                 "UPDATE persistent.keyentry SET state = ? WHERE state = ?;",
                 params![KeyLifeCycle::Unreferenced, KeyLifeCycle::Existing],
             )
-            .context("In cleanup_leftovers.")
+            .context("Failed to execute query.")
+            .need_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In cleanup_leftovers.")
+    }
+
+    /// Checks if a key exists with given key type and key descriptor properties.
+    pub fn key_exists(
+        &mut self,
+        domain: Domain,
+        nspace: i64,
+        alias: &str,
+        key_type: KeyType,
+    ) -> Result<bool> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let key_descriptor =
+                KeyDescriptor { domain, nspace, alias: Some(alias.to_string()), blob: None };
+            let result = Self::load_key_entry_id(&tx, &key_descriptor, key_type);
+            match result {
+                Ok(_) => Ok(true),
+                Err(error) => match error.root_cause().downcast_ref::<KsError>() {
+                    Some(KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)) => Ok(false),
+                    _ => Err(error).context("In key_exists: Failed to find if the key exists."),
+                },
+            }
+            .no_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In key_exists.")
+    }
+
+    /// Stores a super key in the database.
+    pub fn store_super_key(
+        &mut self,
+        user_id: u32,
+        key_type: &SuperKeyType,
+        blob: &[u8],
+        blob_metadata: &BlobMetaData,
+        key_metadata: &KeyMetaData,
+    ) -> Result<KeyEntry> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let key_id = Self::insert_with_retry(|id| {
+                tx.execute(
+                    "INSERT into persistent.keyentry
+                            (id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state, km_uuid)
+                            VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);",
+                    params![
+                        id,
+                        KeyType::Super,
+                        Domain::APP.0,
+                        user_id as i64,
+                        key_type.alias,
+                        KeyLifeCycle::Live,
+                        &KEYSTORE_UUID,
+                    ],
+                )
+            })
+            .context("Failed to insert into keyentry table.")?;
+
+            key_metadata.store_in_db(key_id, tx).context("KeyMetaData::store_in_db failed")?;
+
+            Self::set_blob_internal(
+                &tx,
+                key_id,
+                SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB,
+                Some(blob),
+                Some(blob_metadata),
+            )
+            .context("Failed to store key blob.")?;
+
+            Self::load_key_components(tx, KeyEntryLoadBits::KM, key_id)
+                .context("Trying to load key components.")
+                .no_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In store_super_key.")
+    }
+
+    /// Loads super key of a given user, if exists
+    pub fn load_super_key(
+        &mut self,
+        key_type: &SuperKeyType,
+        user_id: u32,
+    ) -> Result<Option<(KeyIdGuard, KeyEntry)>> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let key_descriptor = KeyDescriptor {
+                domain: Domain::APP,
+                nspace: user_id as i64,
+                alias: Some(key_type.alias.into()),
+                blob: None,
+            };
+            let id = Self::load_key_entry_id(&tx, &key_descriptor, KeyType::Super);
+            match id {
+                Ok(id) => {
+                    let key_entry = Self::load_key_components(&tx, KeyEntryLoadBits::KM, id)
+                        .context("In load_super_key. Failed to load key entry.")?;
+                    Ok(Some((KEY_ID_LOCK.get(id), key_entry)))
+                }
+                Err(error) => match error.root_cause().downcast_ref::<KsError>() {
+                    Some(KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)) => Ok(None),
+                    _ => Err(error).context("In load_super_key."),
+                },
+            }
+            .no_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In load_super_key.")
     }
 
     /// Atomically loads a key entry and associated metadata or creates it using the
@@ -819,105 +1235,173 @@
         domain: Domain,
         namespace: i64,
         alias: &str,
+        km_uuid: Uuid,
         create_new_key: F,
     ) -> Result<(KeyIdGuard, KeyEntry)>
     where
-        F: FnOnce() -> Result<(Vec<u8>, KeyMetaData)>,
+        F: Fn() -> Result<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)>,
     {
-        let tx = self
-            .conn
-            .transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)
-            .context("In get_or_create_key_with: Failed to initialize transaction.")?;
-
-        let id = {
-            let mut stmt = tx
-                .prepare(
-                    "SELECT id FROM persistent.keyentry
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let id = {
+                let mut stmt = tx
+                    .prepare(
+                        "SELECT id FROM persistent.keyentry
                     WHERE
                     key_type = ?
                     AND domain = ?
                     AND namespace = ?
                     AND alias = ?
                     AND state = ?;",
-                )
-                .context("In get_or_create_key_with: Failed to select from keyentry table.")?;
-            let mut rows = stmt
-                .query(params![KeyType::Super, domain.0, namespace, alias, KeyLifeCycle::Live])
-                .context("In get_or_create_key_with: Failed to query from keyentry table.")?;
-
-            db_utils::with_rows_extract_one(&mut rows, |row| {
-                Ok(match row {
-                    Some(r) => r.get(0).context("Failed to unpack id.")?,
-                    None => None,
-                })
-            })
-            .context("In get_or_create_key_with.")?
-        };
-
-        let (id, entry) = match id {
-            Some(id) => (
-                id,
-                Self::load_key_components(&tx, KeyEntryLoadBits::KM, id)
-                    .context("In get_or_create_key_with.")?,
-            ),
-
-            None => {
-                let id = Self::insert_with_retry(|id| {
-                    tx.execute(
-                        "INSERT into persistent.keyentry
-                        (id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state)
-                        VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);",
-                        params![id, KeyType::Super, domain.0, namespace, alias, KeyLifeCycle::Live],
                     )
-                })
-                .context("In get_or_create_key_with.")?;
+                    .context("In get_or_create_key_with: Failed to select from keyentry table.")?;
+                let mut rows = stmt
+                    .query(params![KeyType::Super, domain.0, namespace, alias, KeyLifeCycle::Live])
+                    .context("In get_or_create_key_with: Failed to query from keyentry table.")?;
 
-                let (blob, metadata) = create_new_key().context("In get_or_create_key_with.")?;
-                Self::insert_blob_internal(&tx, id, SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB, &blob)
-                    .context("In get_of_create_key_with.")?;
-                metadata.store_in_db(id, &tx).context("In get_or_create_key_with.")?;
-                (id, KeyEntry { id, km_blob: Some(blob), metadata, ..Default::default() })
-            }
-        };
-        tx.commit().context("In get_or_create_key_with: Failed to commit transaction.")?;
-        Ok((KEY_ID_LOCK.get(id), entry))
+                db_utils::with_rows_extract_one(&mut rows, |row| {
+                    Ok(match row {
+                        Some(r) => r.get(0).context("Failed to unpack id.")?,
+                        None => None,
+                    })
+                })
+                .context("In get_or_create_key_with.")?
+            };
+
+            let (id, entry) = match id {
+                Some(id) => (
+                    id,
+                    Self::load_key_components(&tx, KeyEntryLoadBits::KM, id)
+                        .context("In get_or_create_key_with.")?,
+                ),
+
+                None => {
+                    let id = Self::insert_with_retry(|id| {
+                        tx.execute(
+                            "INSERT into persistent.keyentry
+                        (id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state, km_uuid)
+                        VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);",
+                            params![
+                                id,
+                                KeyType::Super,
+                                domain.0,
+                                namespace,
+                                alias,
+                                KeyLifeCycle::Live,
+                                km_uuid,
+                            ],
+                        )
+                    })
+                    .context("In get_or_create_key_with.")?;
+
+                    let (blob, metadata) =
+                        create_new_key().context("In get_or_create_key_with.")?;
+                    Self::set_blob_internal(
+                        &tx,
+                        id,
+                        SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB,
+                        Some(&blob),
+                        Some(&metadata),
+                    )
+                    .context("In get_or_create_key_with.")?;
+                    (
+                        id,
+                        KeyEntry {
+                            id,
+                            key_blob_info: Some((blob, metadata)),
+                            pure_cert: false,
+                            ..Default::default()
+                        },
+                    )
+                }
+            };
+            Ok((KEY_ID_LOCK.get(id), entry)).no_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In get_or_create_key_with.")
     }
 
+    /// SQLite3 seems to hold a shared mutex while running the busy handler when
+    /// waiting for the database file to become available. This makes it
+    /// impossible to successfully recover from a locked database when the
+    /// transaction holding the device busy is in the same process on a
+    /// different connection. As a result the busy handler has to time out and
+    /// fail in order to make progress.
+    ///
+    /// Instead, we set the busy handler to None (return immediately). And catch
+    /// Busy and Locked errors (the latter occur on in memory databases with
+    /// shared cache, e.g., the per-boot database.) and restart the transaction
+    /// after a grace period of half a millisecond.
+    ///
     /// Creates a transaction with the given behavior and executes f with the new transaction.
-    /// The transaction is committed only if f returns Ok.
+    /// The transaction is committed only if f returns Ok and retried if DatabaseBusy
+    /// or DatabaseLocked is encountered.
     fn with_transaction<T, F>(&mut self, behavior: TransactionBehavior, f: F) -> Result<T>
     where
-        F: FnOnce(&Transaction) -> Result<T>,
+        F: Fn(&Transaction) -> Result<(bool, T)>,
     {
-        let tx = self
-            .conn
-            .transaction_with_behavior(behavior)
-            .context("In with_transaction: Failed to initialize transaction.")?;
-        f(&tx).and_then(|result| {
-            tx.commit().context("In with_transaction: Failed to commit transaction.")?;
-            Ok(result)
+        loop {
+            match self
+                .conn
+                .transaction_with_behavior(behavior)
+                .context("In with_transaction.")
+                .and_then(|tx| f(&tx).map(|result| (result, tx)))
+                .and_then(|(result, tx)| {
+                    tx.commit().context("In with_transaction: Failed to commit transaction.")?;
+                    Ok(result)
+                }) {
+                Ok(result) => break Ok(result),
+                Err(e) => {
+                    if Self::is_locked_error(&e) {
+                        std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_micros(500));
+                        continue;
+                    } else {
+                        return Err(e).context("In with_transaction.");
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        .map(|(need_gc, result)| {
+            if need_gc {
+                if let Some(ref gc) = self.gc {
+                    gc.notify_gc();
+                }
+            }
+            result
         })
     }
 
+    fn is_locked_error(e: &anyhow::Error) -> bool {
+        matches!(
+            e.root_cause().downcast_ref::<rusqlite::ffi::Error>(),
+            Some(rusqlite::ffi::Error { code: rusqlite::ErrorCode::DatabaseBusy, .. })
+                | Some(rusqlite::ffi::Error { code: rusqlite::ErrorCode::DatabaseLocked, .. })
+        )
+    }
+
     /// Creates a new key entry and allocates a new randomized id for the new key.
     /// The key id gets associated with a domain and namespace but not with an alias.
     /// To complete key generation `rebind_alias` should be called after all of the
     /// key artifacts, i.e., blobs and parameters have been associated with the new
     /// key id. Finalizing with `rebind_alias` makes the creation of a new key entry
     /// atomic even if key generation is not.
-    pub fn create_key_entry(&mut self, domain: Domain, namespace: i64) -> Result<KeyIdGuard> {
+    pub fn create_key_entry(
+        &mut self,
+        domain: &Domain,
+        namespace: &i64,
+        km_uuid: &Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<KeyIdGuard> {
         self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
-            Self::create_key_entry_internal(tx, domain, namespace)
+            Self::create_key_entry_internal(tx, domain, namespace, km_uuid).no_gc()
         })
         .context("In create_key_entry.")
     }
 
     fn create_key_entry_internal(
         tx: &Transaction,
-        domain: Domain,
-        namespace: i64,
+        domain: &Domain,
+        namespace: &i64,
+        km_uuid: &Uuid,
     ) -> Result<KeyIdGuard> {
-        match domain {
+        match *domain {
             Domain::APP | Domain::SELINUX => {}
             _ => {
                 return Err(KsError::sys())
@@ -928,14 +1412,15 @@
             Self::insert_with_retry(|id| {
                 tx.execute(
                     "INSERT into persistent.keyentry
-                     (id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state)
-                     VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, NULL, ?);",
+                     (id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state, km_uuid)
+                     VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, NULL, ?, ?);",
                     params![
                         id,
                         KeyType::Client,
                         domain.0 as u32,
-                        namespace,
-                        KeyLifeCycle::Existing
+                        *namespace,
+                        KeyLifeCycle::Existing,
+                        km_uuid,
                     ],
                 )
             })
@@ -943,56 +1428,140 @@
         ))
     }
 
-    /// Inserts a new blob and associates it with the given key id. Each blob
-    /// has a sub component type and a security level.
+    /// Creates a new attestation key entry and allocates a new randomized id for the new key.
+    /// The key id gets associated with a domain and namespace later but not with an alias. The
+    /// alias will be used to denote if a key has been signed as each key can only be bound to one
+    /// domain and namespace pairing so there is no need to use them as a value for indexing into
+    /// a key.
+    pub fn create_attestation_key_entry(
+        &mut self,
+        maced_public_key: &[u8],
+        raw_public_key: &[u8],
+        private_key: &[u8],
+        km_uuid: &Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let key_id = KEY_ID_LOCK.get(
+                Self::insert_with_retry(|id| {
+                    tx.execute(
+                        "INSERT into persistent.keyentry
+                            (id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state, km_uuid)
+                            VALUES(?, ?, NULL, NULL, NULL, ?, ?);",
+                        params![id, KeyType::Attestation, KeyLifeCycle::Live, km_uuid],
+                    )
+                })
+                .context("In create_key_entry")?,
+            );
+            Self::set_blob_internal(
+                &tx,
+                key_id.0,
+                SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB,
+                Some(private_key),
+                None,
+            )?;
+            let mut metadata = KeyMetaData::new();
+            metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::AttestationMacedPublicKey(maced_public_key.to_vec()));
+            metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::AttestationRawPubKey(raw_public_key.to_vec()));
+            metadata.store_in_db(key_id.0, &tx)?;
+            Ok(()).no_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In create_attestation_key_entry")
+    }
+
+    /// Set a new blob and associates it with the given key id. Each blob
+    /// has a sub component type.
     /// Each key can have one of each sub component type associated. If more
     /// are added only the most recent can be retrieved, and superseded blobs
-    /// will get garbage collected. The security level field of components
-    /// other than `SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB` are ignored.
-    pub fn insert_blob(
+    /// will get garbage collected.
+    /// Components SubComponentType::CERT and SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN can be
+    /// removed by setting blob to None.
+    pub fn set_blob(
         &mut self,
         key_id: &KeyIdGuard,
         sc_type: SubComponentType,
-        blob: &[u8],
+        blob: Option<&[u8]>,
+        blob_metadata: Option<&BlobMetaData>,
     ) -> Result<()> {
         self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
-            Self::insert_blob_internal(&tx, key_id.0, sc_type, blob)
+            Self::set_blob_internal(&tx, key_id.0, sc_type, blob, blob_metadata).need_gc()
         })
-        .context("In insert_blob.")
+        .context("In set_blob.")
     }
 
-    fn insert_blob_internal(
+    /// Why would we insert a deleted blob? This weird function is for the purpose of legacy
+    /// key migration in the case where we bulk delete all the keys of an app or even a user.
+    /// We use this to insert key blobs into the database which can then be garbage collected
+    /// lazily by the key garbage collector.
+    pub fn set_deleted_blob(&mut self, blob: &[u8], blob_metadata: &BlobMetaData) -> Result<()> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            Self::set_blob_internal(
+                &tx,
+                Self::UNASSIGNED_KEY_ID,
+                SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB,
+                Some(blob),
+                Some(blob_metadata),
+            )
+            .need_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In set_deleted_blob.")
+    }
+
+    fn set_blob_internal(
         tx: &Transaction,
         key_id: i64,
         sc_type: SubComponentType,
-        blob: &[u8],
+        blob: Option<&[u8]>,
+        blob_metadata: Option<&BlobMetaData>,
     ) -> Result<()> {
-        tx.execute(
-            "INSERT into persistent.blobentry (subcomponent_type, keyentryid, blob)
-                VALUES (?, ?, ?);",
-            params![sc_type, key_id, blob],
-        )
-        .context("In insert_blob_internal: Failed to insert blob.")?;
+        match (blob, sc_type) {
+            (Some(blob), _) => {
+                tx.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO persistent.blobentry
+                     (subcomponent_type, keyentryid, blob) VALUES (?, ?, ?);",
+                    params![sc_type, key_id, blob],
+                )
+                .context("In set_blob_internal: Failed to insert blob.")?;
+                if let Some(blob_metadata) = blob_metadata {
+                    let blob_id = tx
+                        .query_row("SELECT MAX(id) FROM persistent.blobentry;", NO_PARAMS, |row| {
+                            row.get(0)
+                        })
+                        .context("In set_blob_internal: Failed to get new blob id.")?;
+                    blob_metadata
+                        .store_in_db(blob_id, tx)
+                        .context("In set_blob_internal: Trying to store blob metadata.")?;
+                }
+            }
+            (None, SubComponentType::CERT) | (None, SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN) => {
+                tx.execute(
+                    "DELETE FROM persistent.blobentry
+                    WHERE subcomponent_type = ? AND keyentryid = ?;",
+                    params![sc_type, key_id],
+                )
+                .context("In set_blob_internal: Failed to delete blob.")?;
+            }
+            (None, _) => {
+                return Err(KsError::sys())
+                    .context("In set_blob_internal: Other blobs cannot be deleted in this way.");
+            }
+        }
         Ok(())
     }
 
     /// Inserts a collection of key parameters into the `persistent.keyparameter` table
     /// and associates them with the given `key_id`.
-    pub fn insert_keyparameter<'a>(
-        &mut self,
-        key_id: &KeyIdGuard,
-        params: impl IntoIterator<Item = &'a KeyParameter>,
-    ) -> Result<()> {
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    fn insert_keyparameter(&mut self, key_id: &KeyIdGuard, params: &[KeyParameter]) -> Result<()> {
         self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
-            Self::insert_keyparameter_internal(tx, key_id, params)
+            Self::insert_keyparameter_internal(tx, key_id, params).no_gc()
         })
         .context("In insert_keyparameter.")
     }
 
-    fn insert_keyparameter_internal<'a>(
+    fn insert_keyparameter_internal(
         tx: &Transaction,
         key_id: &KeyIdGuard,
-        params: impl IntoIterator<Item = &'a KeyParameter>,
+        params: &[KeyParameter],
     ) -> Result<()> {
         let mut stmt = tx
             .prepare(
@@ -1001,8 +1570,7 @@
             )
             .context("In insert_keyparameter_internal: Failed to prepare statement.")?;
 
-        let iter = params.into_iter();
-        for p in iter {
+        for p in params.iter() {
             stmt.insert(params![
                 key_id.0,
                 p.get_tag().0,
@@ -1017,17 +1585,397 @@
     }
 
     /// Insert a set of key entry specific metadata into the database.
-    pub fn insert_key_metadata(
-        &mut self,
-        key_id: &KeyIdGuard,
-        metadata: &KeyMetaData,
-    ) -> Result<()> {
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    fn insert_key_metadata(&mut self, key_id: &KeyIdGuard, metadata: &KeyMetaData) -> Result<()> {
         self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
-            metadata.store_in_db(key_id.0, &tx)
+            metadata.store_in_db(key_id.0, &tx).no_gc()
         })
         .context("In insert_key_metadata.")
     }
 
+    /// Stores a signed certificate chain signed by a remote provisioning server, keyed
+    /// on the public key.
+    pub fn store_signed_attestation_certificate_chain(
+        &mut self,
+        raw_public_key: &[u8],
+        batch_cert: &[u8],
+        cert_chain: &[u8],
+        expiration_date: i64,
+        km_uuid: &Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let mut stmt = tx
+                .prepare(
+                    "SELECT keyentryid
+                    FROM persistent.keymetadata
+                    WHERE tag = ? AND data = ? AND keyentryid IN
+                    (SELECT id
+                     FROM persistent.keyentry
+                     WHERE
+                        alias IS NULL AND
+                        domain IS NULL AND
+                        namespace IS NULL AND
+                        key_type = ? AND
+                        km_uuid = ?);",
+                )
+                .context("Failed to store attestation certificate chain.")?;
+            let mut rows = stmt
+                .query(params![
+                    KeyMetaData::AttestationRawPubKey,
+                    raw_public_key,
+                    KeyType::Attestation,
+                    km_uuid
+                ])
+                .context("Failed to fetch keyid")?;
+            let key_id = db_utils::with_rows_extract_one(&mut rows, |row| {
+                row.map_or_else(|| Err(KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)), Ok)?
+                    .get(0)
+                    .context("Failed to unpack id.")
+            })
+            .context("Failed to get key_id.")?;
+            let num_updated = tx
+                .execute(
+                    "UPDATE persistent.keyentry
+                    SET alias = ?
+                    WHERE id = ?;",
+                    params!["signed", key_id],
+                )
+                .context("Failed to update alias.")?;
+            if num_updated != 1 {
+                return Err(KsError::sys()).context("Alias not updated for the key.");
+            }
+            let mut metadata = KeyMetaData::new();
+            metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::AttestationExpirationDate(DateTime::from_millis_epoch(
+                expiration_date,
+            )));
+            metadata.store_in_db(key_id, &tx).context("Failed to insert key metadata.")?;
+            Self::set_blob_internal(
+                &tx,
+                key_id,
+                SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN,
+                Some(cert_chain),
+                None,
+            )
+            .context("Failed to insert cert chain")?;
+            Self::set_blob_internal(&tx, key_id, SubComponentType::CERT, Some(batch_cert), None)
+                .context("Failed to insert cert")?;
+            Ok(()).no_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In store_signed_attestation_certificate_chain: ")
+    }
+
+    /// Assigns the next unassigned attestation key to a domain/namespace combo that does not
+    /// currently have a key assigned to it.
+    pub fn assign_attestation_key(
+        &mut self,
+        domain: Domain,
+        namespace: i64,
+        km_uuid: &Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        match domain {
+            Domain::APP | Domain::SELINUX => {}
+            _ => {
+                return Err(KsError::sys()).context(format!(
+                    concat!(
+                        "In assign_attestation_key: Domain {:?} ",
+                        "must be either App or SELinux.",
+                    ),
+                    domain
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let result = tx
+                .execute(
+                    "UPDATE persistent.keyentry
+                        SET domain=?1, namespace=?2
+                        WHERE
+                            id =
+                                (SELECT MIN(id)
+                                FROM persistent.keyentry
+                                WHERE ALIAS IS NOT NULL
+                                    AND domain IS NULL
+                                    AND key_type IS ?3
+                                    AND state IS ?4
+                                    AND km_uuid IS ?5)
+                            AND
+                                (SELECT COUNT(*)
+                                FROM persistent.keyentry
+                                WHERE domain=?1
+                                    AND namespace=?2
+                                    AND key_type IS ?3
+                                    AND state IS ?4
+                                    AND km_uuid IS ?5) = 0;",
+                    params![
+                        domain.0 as u32,
+                        namespace,
+                        KeyType::Attestation,
+                        KeyLifeCycle::Live,
+                        km_uuid,
+                    ],
+                )
+                .context("Failed to assign attestation key")?;
+            if result == 0 {
+                return Err(KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::OUT_OF_KEYS)).context("Out of keys.");
+            } else if result > 1 {
+                return Err(KsError::sys())
+                    .context(format!("Expected to update 1 entry, instead updated {}", result));
+            }
+            Ok(()).no_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In assign_attestation_key: ")
+    }
+
+    /// Retrieves num_keys number of attestation keys that have not yet been signed by a remote
+    /// provisioning server, or the maximum number available if there are not num_keys number of
+    /// entries in the table.
+    pub fn fetch_unsigned_attestation_keys(
+        &mut self,
+        num_keys: i32,
+        km_uuid: &Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let mut stmt = tx
+                .prepare(
+                    "SELECT data
+                    FROM persistent.keymetadata
+                    WHERE tag = ? AND keyentryid IN
+                        (SELECT id
+                        FROM persistent.keyentry
+                        WHERE
+                            alias IS NULL AND
+                            domain IS NULL AND
+                            namespace IS NULL AND
+                            key_type = ? AND
+                            km_uuid = ?
+                        LIMIT ?);",
+                )
+                .context("Failed to prepare statement")?;
+            let rows = stmt
+                .query_map(
+                    params![
+                        KeyMetaData::AttestationMacedPublicKey,
+                        KeyType::Attestation,
+                        km_uuid,
+                        num_keys
+                    ],
+                    |row| Ok(row.get(0)?),
+                )?
+                .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>>>()
+                .context("Failed to execute statement")?;
+            Ok(rows).no_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In fetch_unsigned_attestation_keys")
+    }
+
+    /// Removes any keys that have expired as of the current time. Returns the number of keys
+    /// marked unreferenced that are bound to be garbage collected.
+    pub fn delete_expired_attestation_keys(&mut self) -> Result<i32> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let mut stmt = tx
+                .prepare(
+                    "SELECT keyentryid, data
+                     FROM persistent.keymetadata
+                     WHERE tag = ? AND keyentryid IN
+                         (SELECT id
+                         FROM persistent.keyentry
+                         WHERE key_type = ?);",
+                )
+                .context("Failed to prepare query")?;
+            let key_ids_to_check = stmt
+                .query_map(
+                    params![KeyMetaData::AttestationExpirationDate, KeyType::Attestation],
+                    |row| Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?)),
+                )?
+                .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<(i64, DateTime)>>>()
+                .context("Failed to get date metadata")?;
+            let curr_time = DateTime::from_millis_epoch(
+                SystemTime::now().duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)?.as_millis() as i64,
+            );
+            let mut num_deleted = 0;
+            for id in key_ids_to_check.iter().filter(|kt| kt.1 < curr_time).map(|kt| kt.0) {
+                if Self::mark_unreferenced(&tx, id)? {
+                    num_deleted += 1;
+                }
+            }
+            Ok(num_deleted).do_gc(num_deleted != 0)
+        })
+        .context("In delete_expired_attestation_keys: ")
+    }
+
+    /// Deletes all remotely provisioned attestation keys in the system, regardless of the state
+    /// they are in. This is useful primarily as a testing mechanism.
+    pub fn delete_all_attestation_keys(&mut self) -> Result<i64> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let mut stmt = tx
+                .prepare(
+                    "SELECT id FROM persistent.keyentry
+                    WHERE key_type IS ?;",
+                )
+                .context("Failed to prepare statement")?;
+            let keys_to_delete = stmt
+                .query_map(params![KeyType::Attestation], |row| Ok(row.get(0)?))?
+                .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<i64>>>()
+                .context("Failed to execute statement")?;
+            let num_deleted = keys_to_delete
+                .iter()
+                .map(|id| Self::mark_unreferenced(&tx, *id))
+                .collect::<Result<Vec<bool>>>()
+                .context("Failed to execute mark_unreferenced on a keyid")?
+                .into_iter()
+                .filter(|result| *result)
+                .count() as i64;
+            Ok(num_deleted).do_gc(num_deleted != 0)
+        })
+        .context("In delete_all_attestation_keys: ")
+    }
+
+    /// Counts the number of keys that will expire by the provided epoch date and the number of
+    /// keys not currently assigned to a domain.
+    pub fn get_attestation_pool_status(
+        &mut self,
+        date: i64,
+        km_uuid: &Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<AttestationPoolStatus> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let mut stmt = tx.prepare(
+                "SELECT data
+                 FROM persistent.keymetadata
+                 WHERE tag = ? AND keyentryid IN
+                     (SELECT id
+                      FROM persistent.keyentry
+                      WHERE alias IS NOT NULL
+                            AND key_type = ?
+                            AND km_uuid = ?
+                            AND state = ?);",
+            )?;
+            let times = stmt
+                .query_map(
+                    params![
+                        KeyMetaData::AttestationExpirationDate,
+                        KeyType::Attestation,
+                        km_uuid,
+                        KeyLifeCycle::Live
+                    ],
+                    |row| Ok(row.get(0)?),
+                )?
+                .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<DateTime>>>()
+                .context("Failed to execute metadata statement")?;
+            let expiring =
+                times.iter().filter(|time| time < &&DateTime::from_millis_epoch(date)).count()
+                    as i32;
+            stmt = tx.prepare(
+                "SELECT alias, domain
+                 FROM persistent.keyentry
+                 WHERE key_type = ? AND km_uuid = ? AND state = ?;",
+            )?;
+            let rows = stmt
+                .query_map(params![KeyType::Attestation, km_uuid, KeyLifeCycle::Live], |row| {
+                    Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?))
+                })?
+                .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<(Option<String>, Option<u32>)>>>()
+                .context("Failed to execute keyentry statement")?;
+            let mut unassigned = 0i32;
+            let mut attested = 0i32;
+            let total = rows.len() as i32;
+            for (alias, domain) in rows {
+                match (alias, domain) {
+                    (Some(_alias), None) => {
+                        attested += 1;
+                        unassigned += 1;
+                    }
+                    (Some(_alias), Some(_domain)) => {
+                        attested += 1;
+                    }
+                    _ => {}
+                }
+            }
+            Ok(AttestationPoolStatus { expiring, unassigned, attested, total }).no_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In get_attestation_pool_status: ")
+    }
+
+    /// Fetches the private key and corresponding certificate chain assigned to a
+    /// domain/namespace pair. Will either return nothing if the domain/namespace is
+    /// not assigned, or one CertificateChain.
+    pub fn retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain(
+        &mut self,
+        domain: Domain,
+        namespace: i64,
+        km_uuid: &Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<Option<CertificateChain>> {
+        match domain {
+            Domain::APP | Domain::SELINUX => {}
+            _ => {
+                return Err(KsError::sys())
+                    .context(format!("Domain {:?} must be either App or SELinux.", domain));
+            }
+        }
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Deferred, |tx| {
+            let mut stmt = tx.prepare(
+                "SELECT subcomponent_type, blob
+             FROM persistent.blobentry
+             WHERE keyentryid IN
+                (SELECT id
+                 FROM persistent.keyentry
+                 WHERE key_type = ?
+                       AND domain = ?
+                       AND namespace = ?
+                       AND state = ?
+                       AND km_uuid = ?);",
+            )?;
+            let rows = stmt
+                .query_map(
+                    params![
+                        KeyType::Attestation,
+                        domain.0 as u32,
+                        namespace,
+                        KeyLifeCycle::Live,
+                        km_uuid
+                    ],
+                    |row| Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?)),
+                )?
+                .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<(SubComponentType, Vec<u8>)>>>()
+                .context("query failed.")?;
+            if rows.is_empty() {
+                return Ok(None).no_gc();
+            } else if rows.len() != 3 {
+                return Err(KsError::sys()).context(format!(
+                    concat!(
+                        "Expected to get a single attestation",
+                        "key, cert, and cert chain for a total of 3 entries, but instead got {}."
+                    ),
+                    rows.len()
+                ));
+            }
+            let mut km_blob: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+            let mut cert_chain_blob: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+            let mut batch_cert_blob: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+            for row in rows {
+                let sub_type: SubComponentType = row.0;
+                match sub_type {
+                    SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB => {
+                        km_blob = row.1;
+                    }
+                    SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN => {
+                        cert_chain_blob = row.1;
+                    }
+                    SubComponentType::CERT => {
+                        batch_cert_blob = row.1;
+                    }
+                    _ => Err(KsError::sys()).context("Unknown or incorrect subcomponent type.")?,
+                }
+            }
+            Ok(Some(CertificateChain {
+                private_key: ZVec::try_from(km_blob)?,
+                batch_cert: batch_cert_blob,
+                cert_chain: cert_chain_blob,
+            }))
+            .no_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain:")
+    }
+
     /// Updates the alias column of the given key id `newid` with the given alias,
     /// and atomically, removes the alias, domain, and namespace from another row
     /// with the same alias-domain-namespace tuple if such row exits.
@@ -1037,10 +1985,10 @@
         tx: &Transaction,
         newid: &KeyIdGuard,
         alias: &str,
-        domain: Domain,
-        namespace: i64,
+        domain: &Domain,
+        namespace: &i64,
     ) -> Result<bool> {
-        match domain {
+        match *domain {
             Domain::APP | Domain::SELINUX => {}
             _ => {
                 return Err(KsError::sys()).context(format!(
@@ -1067,8 +2015,8 @@
                     KeyLifeCycle::Live,
                     newid.0,
                     domain.0 as u32,
-                    namespace,
-                    KeyLifeCycle::Existing
+                    *namespace,
+                    KeyLifeCycle::Existing,
                 ],
             )
             .context("In rebind_alias: Failed to set alias.")?;
@@ -1086,15 +2034,15 @@
     /// fields, and rebinds the given alias to the new key.
     /// The boolean returned is a hint for the garbage collector. If true, a key was replaced,
     /// is now unreferenced and needs to be collected.
-    pub fn store_new_key<'a>(
+    pub fn store_new_key(
         &mut self,
-        key: KeyDescriptor,
-        params: impl IntoIterator<Item = &'a KeyParameter>,
-        blob: &[u8],
-        cert: Option<&[u8]>,
-        cert_chain: Option<&[u8]>,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
+        params: &[KeyParameter],
+        blob_info: &(&[u8], &BlobMetaData),
+        cert_info: &CertificateInfo,
         metadata: &KeyMetaData,
-    ) -> Result<(bool, KeyIdGuard)> {
+        km_uuid: &Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<KeyIdGuard> {
         let (alias, domain, namespace) = match key {
             KeyDescriptor { alias: Some(alias), domain: Domain::APP, nspace, blob: None }
             | KeyDescriptor { alias: Some(alias), domain: Domain::SELINUX, nspace, blob: None } => {
@@ -1106,33 +2054,88 @@
             }
         };
         self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
-            let key_id = Self::create_key_entry_internal(tx, domain, namespace)
+            let key_id = Self::create_key_entry_internal(tx, &domain, namespace, km_uuid)
                 .context("Trying to create new key entry.")?;
-            Self::insert_blob_internal(tx, key_id.id(), SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB, blob)
-                .context("Trying to insert the key blob.")?;
-            if let Some(cert) = cert {
-                Self::insert_blob_internal(tx, key_id.id(), SubComponentType::CERT, cert)
+            let (blob, blob_metadata) = *blob_info;
+            Self::set_blob_internal(
+                tx,
+                key_id.id(),
+                SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB,
+                Some(blob),
+                Some(&blob_metadata),
+            )
+            .context("Trying to insert the key blob.")?;
+            if let Some(cert) = &cert_info.cert {
+                Self::set_blob_internal(tx, key_id.id(), SubComponentType::CERT, Some(&cert), None)
                     .context("Trying to insert the certificate.")?;
             }
-            if let Some(cert_chain) = cert_chain {
-                Self::insert_blob_internal(
+            if let Some(cert_chain) = &cert_info.cert_chain {
+                Self::set_blob_internal(
                     tx,
                     key_id.id(),
                     SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN,
-                    cert_chain,
+                    Some(&cert_chain),
+                    None,
                 )
                 .context("Trying to insert the certificate chain.")?;
             }
             Self::insert_keyparameter_internal(tx, &key_id, params)
                 .context("Trying to insert key parameters.")?;
-            metadata.store_in_db(key_id.id(), tx).context("Tryin to insert key metadata.")?;
-            let need_gc = Self::rebind_alias(tx, &key_id, &alias, domain, namespace)
+            metadata.store_in_db(key_id.id(), tx).context("Trying to insert key metadata.")?;
+            let need_gc = Self::rebind_alias(tx, &key_id, &alias, &domain, namespace)
                 .context("Trying to rebind alias.")?;
-            Ok((need_gc, key_id))
+            Ok(key_id).do_gc(need_gc)
         })
         .context("In store_new_key.")
     }
 
+    /// Store a new certificate
+    /// The function creates a new key entry, populates the blob field and metadata, and rebinds
+    /// the given alias to the new cert.
+    pub fn store_new_certificate(
+        &mut self,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
+        cert: &[u8],
+        km_uuid: &Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<KeyIdGuard> {
+        let (alias, domain, namespace) = match key {
+            KeyDescriptor { alias: Some(alias), domain: Domain::APP, nspace, blob: None }
+            | KeyDescriptor { alias: Some(alias), domain: Domain::SELINUX, nspace, blob: None } => {
+                (alias, key.domain, nspace)
+            }
+            _ => {
+                return Err(KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT)).context(
+                    "In store_new_certificate: Need alias and domain must be APP or SELINUX.",
+                )
+            }
+        };
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let key_id = Self::create_key_entry_internal(tx, &domain, namespace, km_uuid)
+                .context("Trying to create new key entry.")?;
+
+            Self::set_blob_internal(
+                tx,
+                key_id.id(),
+                SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN,
+                Some(cert),
+                None,
+            )
+            .context("Trying to insert certificate.")?;
+
+            let mut metadata = KeyMetaData::new();
+            metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::CreationDate(
+                DateTime::now().context("Trying to make creation time.")?,
+            ));
+
+            metadata.store_in_db(key_id.id(), tx).context("Trying to insert key metadata.")?;
+
+            let need_gc = Self::rebind_alias(tx, &key_id, &alias, &domain, namespace)
+                .context("Trying to rebind alias.")?;
+            Ok(key_id).do_gc(need_gc)
+        })
+        .context("In store_new_certificate.")
+    }
+
     // Helper function loading the key_id given the key descriptor
     // tuple comprising domain, namespace, and alias.
     // Requires a valid transaction.
@@ -1146,7 +2149,7 @@
             .prepare(
                 "SELECT id FROM persistent.keyentry
                     WHERE
-                    key_type =  ?
+                    key_type = ?
                     AND domain = ?
                     AND namespace = ?
                     AND alias = ?
@@ -1179,7 +2182,7 @@
     /// check and the key id can be used to load further key artifacts.
     fn load_access_tuple(
         tx: &Transaction,
-        key: KeyDescriptor,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
         key_type: KeyType,
         caller_uid: u32,
     ) -> Result<(i64, KeyDescriptor, Option<KeyPermSet>)> {
@@ -1191,7 +2194,7 @@
             // of the caller supplied namespace if the domain field is
             // Domain::APP.
             Domain::APP | Domain::SELINUX => {
-                let mut access_key = key;
+                let mut access_key = key.clone();
                 if access_key.domain == Domain::APP {
                     access_key.nspace = caller_uid as i64;
                 }
@@ -1223,7 +2226,7 @@
                         ))
                     })
                     .context("Domain::GRANT.")?;
-                Ok((key_id, key, Some(access_vector.into())))
+                Ok((key_id, key.clone(), Some(access_vector.into())))
             }
 
             // Domain::KEY_ID. In this case we load the domain and namespace from the
@@ -1275,7 +2278,7 @@
                     };
 
                 let key_id = key.nspace;
-                let mut access_key = key;
+                let mut access_key: KeyDescriptor = key.clone();
                 access_key.domain = domain;
                 access_key.nspace = namespace;
 
@@ -1289,7 +2292,7 @@
         key_id: i64,
         load_bits: KeyEntryLoadBits,
         tx: &Transaction,
-    ) -> Result<(Option<Vec<u8>>, Option<Vec<u8>>, Option<Vec<u8>>)> {
+    ) -> Result<(bool, Option<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)>, Option<Vec<u8>>, Option<Vec<u8>>)> {
         let mut stmt = tx
             .prepare(
                 "SELECT MAX(id), subcomponent_type, blob FROM persistent.blobentry
@@ -1300,15 +2303,20 @@
         let mut rows =
             stmt.query(params![key_id]).context("In load_blob_components: query failed.")?;
 
-        let mut km_blob: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
+        let mut key_blob: Option<(i64, Vec<u8>)> = None;
         let mut cert_blob: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
         let mut cert_chain_blob: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
+        let mut has_km_blob: bool = false;
         db_utils::with_rows_extract_all(&mut rows, |row| {
             let sub_type: SubComponentType =
                 row.get(1).context("Failed to extract subcomponent_type.")?;
+            has_km_blob = has_km_blob || sub_type == SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB;
             match (sub_type, load_bits.load_public(), load_bits.load_km()) {
                 (SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB, _, true) => {
-                    km_blob = Some(row.get(2).context("Failed to extract KM blob.")?);
+                    key_blob = Some((
+                        row.get(0).context("Failed to extract key blob id.")?,
+                        row.get(2).context("Failed to extract key blob.")?,
+                    ));
                 }
                 (SubComponentType::CERT, true, _) => {
                     cert_blob =
@@ -1327,7 +2335,15 @@
         })
         .context("In load_blob_components.")?;
 
-        Ok((km_blob, cert_blob, cert_chain_blob))
+        let blob_info = key_blob.map_or::<Result<_>, _>(Ok(None), |(blob_id, blob)| {
+            Ok(Some((
+                blob,
+                BlobMetaData::load_from_db(blob_id, tx)
+                    .context("In load_blob_components: Trying to load blob_metadata.")?,
+            )))
+        })?;
+
+        Ok((has_km_blob, blob_info, cert_blob, cert_chain_blob))
     }
 
     fn load_key_parameters(key_id: i64, tx: &Transaction) -> Result<Vec<KeyParameter>> {
@@ -1360,7 +2376,7 @@
     /// usage has been exhausted, if not, decreases the usage count. If the usage count reaches
     /// zero, the key also gets marked unreferenced and scheduled for deletion.
     /// Returns Ok(true) if the key was marked unreferenced as a hint to the garbage collector.
-    pub fn check_and_update_key_usage_count(&mut self, key_id: i64) -> Result<bool> {
+    pub fn check_and_update_key_usage_count(&mut self, key_id: i64) -> Result<()> {
         self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
             let limit: Option<i32> = tx
                 .query_row(
@@ -1385,9 +2401,10 @@
 
             match limit {
                 1 => Self::mark_unreferenced(tx, key_id)
+                    .map(|need_gc| (need_gc, ()))
                     .context("Trying to mark limited use key for deletion."),
                 0 => Err(KsError::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB)).context("Key is exhausted."),
-                _ => Ok(false),
+                _ => Ok(()).no_gc(),
             }
         })
         .context("In check_and_update_key_usage_count.")
@@ -1400,11 +2417,40 @@
     /// the blob database.
     pub fn load_key_entry(
         &mut self,
-        key: KeyDescriptor,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
         key_type: KeyType,
         load_bits: KeyEntryLoadBits,
         caller_uid: u32,
-        check_permission: impl FnOnce(&KeyDescriptor, Option<KeyPermSet>) -> Result<()>,
+        check_permission: impl Fn(&KeyDescriptor, Option<KeyPermSet>) -> Result<()>,
+    ) -> Result<(KeyIdGuard, KeyEntry)> {
+        loop {
+            match self.load_key_entry_internal(
+                key,
+                key_type,
+                load_bits,
+                caller_uid,
+                &check_permission,
+            ) {
+                Ok(result) => break Ok(result),
+                Err(e) => {
+                    if Self::is_locked_error(&e) {
+                        std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_micros(500));
+                        continue;
+                    } else {
+                        return Err(e).context("In load_key_entry.");
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn load_key_entry_internal(
+        &mut self,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
+        key_type: KeyType,
+        load_bits: KeyEntryLoadBits,
+        caller_uid: u32,
+        check_permission: &impl Fn(&KeyDescriptor, Option<KeyPermSet>) -> Result<()>,
     ) -> Result<(KeyIdGuard, KeyEntry)> {
         // KEY ID LOCK 1/2
         // If we got a key descriptor with a key id we can get the lock right away.
@@ -1449,15 +2495,16 @@
                     let key_id_guard = KEY_ID_LOCK.get(key_id);
 
                     // Create a new transaction.
-                    let tx = self.conn.unchecked_transaction().context(
-                        "In load_key_entry: Failed to initialize transaction. (deferred key lock)",
-                    )?;
+                    let tx = self
+                        .conn
+                        .unchecked_transaction()
+                        .context("In load_key_entry: Failed to initialize transaction.")?;
 
                     Self::load_access_tuple(
                         &tx,
                         // This time we have to load the key by the retrieved key id, because the
                         // alias may have been rebound after we rolled back the transaction.
-                        KeyDescriptor {
+                        &KeyDescriptor {
                             domain: Domain::KEY_ID,
                             nspace: key_id,
                             ..Default::default()
@@ -1483,13 +2530,14 @@
 
     fn mark_unreferenced(tx: &Transaction, key_id: i64) -> Result<bool> {
         let updated = tx
-            .execute(
-                "UPDATE persistent.keyentry SET state = ? WHERE id = ?;",
-                params![KeyLifeCycle::Unreferenced, key_id],
-            )
-            .context("In mark_unreferenced: Failed to update state of key entry.")?;
-        tx.execute("DELETE from persistent.grant WHERE keyentryid = ?;", params![key_id])
-            .context("In mark_unreferenced: Failed to drop grants.")?;
+            .execute("DELETE FROM persistent.keyentry WHERE id = ?;", params![key_id])
+            .context("Trying to delete keyentry.")?;
+        tx.execute("DELETE FROM persistent.keymetadata WHERE keyentryid = ?;", params![key_id])
+            .context("Trying to delete keymetadata.")?;
+        tx.execute("DELETE FROM persistent.keyparameter WHERE keyentryid = ?;", params![key_id])
+            .context("Trying to delete keyparameters.")?;
+        tx.execute("DELETE FROM persistent.grant WHERE keyentryid = ?;", params![key_id])
+            .context("Trying to delete grants.")?;
         Ok(updated != 0)
     }
 
@@ -1497,11 +2545,11 @@
     /// Returns Ok(true) if a key was marked unreferenced as a hint for the garbage collector.
     pub fn unbind_key(
         &mut self,
-        key: KeyDescriptor,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
         key_type: KeyType,
         caller_uid: u32,
-        check_permission: impl FnOnce(&KeyDescriptor, Option<KeyPermSet>) -> Result<()>,
-    ) -> Result<bool> {
+        check_permission: impl Fn(&KeyDescriptor, Option<KeyPermSet>) -> Result<()>,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
         self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
             let (key_id, access_key_descriptor, access_vector) =
                 Self::load_access_tuple(tx, key, key_type, caller_uid)
@@ -1512,11 +2560,143 @@
             check_permission(&access_key_descriptor, access_vector)
                 .context("While checking permission.")?;
 
-            Self::mark_unreferenced(tx, key_id).context("Trying to mark the key unreferenced.")
+            Self::mark_unreferenced(tx, key_id)
+                .map(|need_gc| (need_gc, ()))
+                .context("Trying to mark the key unreferenced.")
         })
         .context("In unbind_key.")
     }
 
+    fn get_key_km_uuid(tx: &Transaction, key_id: i64) -> Result<Uuid> {
+        tx.query_row(
+            "SELECT km_uuid FROM persistent.keyentry WHERE id = ?",
+            params![key_id],
+            |row| row.get(0),
+        )
+        .context("In get_key_km_uuid.")
+    }
+
+    /// Delete all artifacts belonging to the namespace given by the domain-namespace tuple.
+    /// This leaves all of the blob entries orphaned for subsequent garbage collection.
+    pub fn unbind_keys_for_namespace(&mut self, domain: Domain, namespace: i64) -> Result<()> {
+        if !(domain == Domain::APP || domain == Domain::SELINUX) {
+            return Err(KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
+                .context("In unbind_keys_for_namespace.");
+        }
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            tx.execute(
+                "DELETE FROM persistent.keymetadata
+                WHERE keyentryid IN (
+                    SELECT id FROM persistent.keyentry
+                    WHERE domain = ? AND namespace = ?
+                );",
+                params![domain.0, namespace],
+            )
+            .context("Trying to delete keymetadata.")?;
+            tx.execute(
+                "DELETE FROM persistent.keyparameter
+                WHERE keyentryid IN (
+                    SELECT id FROM persistent.keyentry
+                    WHERE domain = ? AND namespace = ?
+                );",
+                params![domain.0, namespace],
+            )
+            .context("Trying to delete keyparameters.")?;
+            tx.execute(
+                "DELETE FROM persistent.grant
+                WHERE keyentryid IN (
+                    SELECT id FROM persistent.keyentry
+                    WHERE domain = ? AND namespace = ?
+                );",
+                params![domain.0, namespace],
+            )
+            .context("Trying to delete grants.")?;
+            tx.execute(
+                "DELETE FROM persistent.keyentry WHERE domain = ? AND namespace = ?;",
+                params![domain.0, namespace],
+            )
+            .context("Trying to delete keyentry.")?;
+            Ok(()).need_gc()
+        })
+        .context("In unbind_keys_for_namespace")
+    }
+
+    /// Delete the keys created on behalf of the user, denoted by the user id.
+    /// Delete all the keys unless 'keep_non_super_encrypted_keys' set to true.
+    /// Returned boolean is to hint the garbage collector to delete the unbound keys.
+    /// The caller of this function should notify the gc if the returned value is true.
+    pub fn unbind_keys_for_user(
+        &mut self,
+        user_id: u32,
+        keep_non_super_encrypted_keys: bool,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            let mut stmt = tx
+                .prepare(&format!(
+                    "SELECT id from persistent.keyentry
+                     WHERE (
+                         key_type = ?
+                         AND domain = ?
+                         AND cast ( (namespace/{aid_user_offset}) as int) = ?
+                         AND state = ?
+                     ) OR (
+                         key_type = ?
+                         AND namespace = ?
+                         AND alias = ?
+                         AND state = ?
+                     );",
+                    aid_user_offset = AID_USER_OFFSET
+                ))
+                .context(concat!(
+                    "In unbind_keys_for_user. ",
+                    "Failed to prepare the query to find the keys created by apps."
+                ))?;
+
+            let mut rows = stmt
+                .query(params![
+                    // WHERE client key:
+                    KeyType::Client,
+                    Domain::APP.0 as u32,
+                    user_id,
+                    KeyLifeCycle::Live,
+                    // OR super key:
+                    KeyType::Super,
+                    user_id,
+                    USER_SUPER_KEY.alias,
+                    KeyLifeCycle::Live
+                ])
+                .context("In unbind_keys_for_user. Failed to query the keys created by apps.")?;
+
+            let mut key_ids: Vec<i64> = Vec::new();
+            db_utils::with_rows_extract_all(&mut rows, |row| {
+                key_ids
+                    .push(row.get(0).context("Failed to read key id of a key created by an app.")?);
+                Ok(())
+            })
+            .context("In unbind_keys_for_user.")?;
+
+            let mut notify_gc = false;
+            for key_id in key_ids {
+                if keep_non_super_encrypted_keys {
+                    // Load metadata and filter out non-super-encrypted keys.
+                    if let (_, Some((_, blob_metadata)), _, _) =
+                        Self::load_blob_components(key_id, KeyEntryLoadBits::KM, tx)
+                            .context("In unbind_keys_for_user: Trying to load blob info.")?
+                    {
+                        if blob_metadata.encrypted_by().is_none() {
+                            continue;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                notify_gc = Self::mark_unreferenced(&tx, key_id)
+                    .context("In unbind_keys_for_user.")?
+                    || notify_gc;
+            }
+            Ok(()).do_gc(notify_gc)
+        })
+        .context("In unbind_keys_for_user.")
+    }
+
     fn load_key_components(
         tx: &Transaction,
         load_bits: KeyEntryLoadBits,
@@ -1524,31 +2704,25 @@
     ) -> Result<KeyEntry> {
         let metadata = KeyMetaData::load_from_db(key_id, &tx).context("In load_key_components.")?;
 
-        let (km_blob, cert_blob, cert_chain_blob) =
+        let (has_km_blob, key_blob_info, cert_blob, cert_chain_blob) =
             Self::load_blob_components(key_id, load_bits, &tx)
                 .context("In load_key_components.")?;
 
-        let parameters =
-            Self::load_key_parameters(key_id, &tx).context("In load_key_components.")?;
+        let parameters = Self::load_key_parameters(key_id, &tx)
+            .context("In load_key_components: Trying to load key parameters.")?;
 
-        // Extract the security level by checking the security level of the origin tag.
-        // Super keys don't have key parameters so we use security_level software by default.
-        let sec_level = parameters
-            .iter()
-            .find_map(|k| match k.get_tag() {
-                Tag::ORIGIN => Some(*k.security_level()),
-                _ => None,
-            })
-            .unwrap_or(SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE);
+        let km_uuid = Self::get_key_km_uuid(&tx, key_id)
+            .context("In load_key_components: Trying to get KM uuid.")?;
 
         Ok(KeyEntry {
             id: key_id,
-            km_blob,
+            key_blob_info,
             cert: cert_blob,
             cert_chain: cert_chain_blob,
-            sec_level,
+            km_uuid,
             parameters,
             metadata,
+            pure_cert: !has_km_blob,
         })
     }
 
@@ -1556,30 +2730,31 @@
     /// The key descriptors will have the domain, nspace, and alias field set.
     /// Domain must be APP or SELINUX, the caller must make sure of that.
     pub fn list(&mut self, domain: Domain, namespace: i64) -> Result<Vec<KeyDescriptor>> {
-        let mut stmt = self
-            .conn
-            .prepare(
-                "SELECT alias FROM persistent.keyentry
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Deferred, |tx| {
+            let mut stmt = tx
+                .prepare(
+                    "SELECT alias FROM persistent.keyentry
              WHERE domain = ? AND namespace = ? AND alias IS NOT NULL AND state = ?;",
-            )
-            .context("In list: Failed to prepare.")?;
+                )
+                .context("In list: Failed to prepare.")?;
 
-        let mut rows = stmt
-            .query(params![domain.0 as u32, namespace, KeyLifeCycle::Live])
-            .context("In list: Failed to query.")?;
+            let mut rows = stmt
+                .query(params![domain.0 as u32, namespace, KeyLifeCycle::Live])
+                .context("In list: Failed to query.")?;
 
-        let mut descriptors: Vec<KeyDescriptor> = Vec::new();
-        db_utils::with_rows_extract_all(&mut rows, |row| {
-            descriptors.push(KeyDescriptor {
-                domain,
-                nspace: namespace,
-                alias: Some(row.get(0).context("Trying to extract alias.")?),
-                blob: None,
-            });
-            Ok(())
+            let mut descriptors: Vec<KeyDescriptor> = Vec::new();
+            db_utils::with_rows_extract_all(&mut rows, |row| {
+                descriptors.push(KeyDescriptor {
+                    domain,
+                    nspace: namespace,
+                    alias: Some(row.get(0).context("Trying to extract alias.")?),
+                    blob: None,
+                });
+                Ok(())
+            })
+            .context("In list: Failed to extract rows.")?;
+            Ok(descriptors).no_gc()
         })
-        .context("In list.")?;
-        Ok(descriptors)
     }
 
     /// Adds a grant to the grant table.
@@ -1590,104 +2765,98 @@
     /// grant id in the namespace field of the resulting KeyDescriptor.
     pub fn grant(
         &mut self,
-        key: KeyDescriptor,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
         caller_uid: u32,
         grantee_uid: u32,
         access_vector: KeyPermSet,
-        check_permission: impl FnOnce(&KeyDescriptor, &KeyPermSet) -> Result<()>,
+        check_permission: impl Fn(&KeyDescriptor, &KeyPermSet) -> Result<()>,
     ) -> Result<KeyDescriptor> {
-        let tx = self
-            .conn
-            .transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)
-            .context("In grant: Failed to initialize transaction.")?;
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            // Load the key_id and complete the access control tuple.
+            // We ignore the access vector here because grants cannot be granted.
+            // The access vector returned here expresses the permissions the
+            // grantee has if key.domain == Domain::GRANT. But this vector
+            // cannot include the grant permission by design, so there is no way the
+            // subsequent permission check can pass.
+            // We could check key.domain == Domain::GRANT and fail early.
+            // But even if we load the access tuple by grant here, the permission
+            // check denies the attempt to create a grant by grant descriptor.
+            let (key_id, access_key_descriptor, _) =
+                Self::load_access_tuple(&tx, key, KeyType::Client, caller_uid)
+                    .context("In grant")?;
 
-        // Load the key_id and complete the access control tuple.
-        // We ignore the access vector here because grants cannot be granted.
-        // The access vector returned here expresses the permissions the
-        // grantee has if key.domain == Domain::GRANT. But this vector
-        // cannot include the grant permission by design, so there is no way the
-        // subsequent permission check can pass.
-        // We could check key.domain == Domain::GRANT and fail early.
-        // But even if we load the access tuple by grant here, the permission
-        // check denies the attempt to create a grant by grant descriptor.
-        let (key_id, access_key_descriptor, _) =
-            Self::load_access_tuple(&tx, key, KeyType::Client, caller_uid).context("In grant")?;
+            // Perform access control. It is vital that we return here if the permission
+            // was denied. So do not touch that '?' at the end of the line.
+            // This permission check checks if the caller has the grant permission
+            // for the given key and in addition to all of the permissions
+            // expressed in `access_vector`.
+            check_permission(&access_key_descriptor, &access_vector)
+                .context("In grant: check_permission failed.")?;
 
-        // Perform access control. It is vital that we return here if the permission
-        // was denied. So do not touch that '?' at the end of the line.
-        // This permission check checks if the caller has the grant permission
-        // for the given key and in addition to all of the permissions
-        // expressed in `access_vector`.
-        check_permission(&access_key_descriptor, &access_vector)
-            .context("In grant: check_permission failed.")?;
-
-        let grant_id = if let Some(grant_id) = tx
-            .query_row(
-                "SELECT id FROM persistent.grant
+            let grant_id = if let Some(grant_id) = tx
+                .query_row(
+                    "SELECT id FROM persistent.grant
                 WHERE keyentryid = ? AND grantee = ?;",
-                params![key_id, grantee_uid],
-                |row| row.get(0),
-            )
-            .optional()
-            .context("In grant: Failed get optional existing grant id.")?
-        {
-            tx.execute(
-                "UPDATE persistent.grant
+                    params![key_id, grantee_uid],
+                    |row| row.get(0),
+                )
+                .optional()
+                .context("In grant: Failed get optional existing grant id.")?
+            {
+                tx.execute(
+                    "UPDATE persistent.grant
                     SET access_vector = ?
                     WHERE id = ?;",
-                params![i32::from(access_vector), grant_id],
-            )
-            .context("In grant: Failed to update existing grant.")?;
-            grant_id
-        } else {
-            Self::insert_with_retry(|id| {
-                tx.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO persistent.grant (id, grantee, keyentryid, access_vector)
-                        VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?);",
-                    params![id, grantee_uid, key_id, i32::from(access_vector)],
+                    params![i32::from(access_vector), grant_id],
                 )
-            })
-            .context("In grant")?
-        };
-        tx.commit().context("In grant: failed to commit transaction.")?;
+                .context("In grant: Failed to update existing grant.")?;
+                grant_id
+            } else {
+                Self::insert_with_retry(|id| {
+                    tx.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO persistent.grant (id, grantee, keyentryid, access_vector)
+                        VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?);",
+                        params![id, grantee_uid, key_id, i32::from(access_vector)],
+                    )
+                })
+                .context("In grant")?
+            };
 
-        Ok(KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::GRANT, nspace: grant_id, alias: None, blob: None })
+            Ok(KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::GRANT, nspace: grant_id, alias: None, blob: None })
+                .no_gc()
+        })
     }
 
     /// This function checks permissions like `grant` and `load_key_entry`
     /// before removing a grant from the grant table.
     pub fn ungrant(
         &mut self,
-        key: KeyDescriptor,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
         caller_uid: u32,
         grantee_uid: u32,
-        check_permission: impl FnOnce(&KeyDescriptor) -> Result<()>,
+        check_permission: impl Fn(&KeyDescriptor) -> Result<()>,
     ) -> Result<()> {
-        let tx = self
-            .conn
-            .transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)
-            .context("In ungrant: Failed to initialize transaction.")?;
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            // Load the key_id and complete the access control tuple.
+            // We ignore the access vector here because grants cannot be granted.
+            let (key_id, access_key_descriptor, _) =
+                Self::load_access_tuple(&tx, key, KeyType::Client, caller_uid)
+                    .context("In ungrant.")?;
 
-        // Load the key_id and complete the access control tuple.
-        // We ignore the access vector here because grants cannot be granted.
-        let (key_id, access_key_descriptor, _) =
-            Self::load_access_tuple(&tx, key, KeyType::Client, caller_uid)
-                .context("In ungrant.")?;
+            // Perform access control. We must return here if the permission
+            // was denied. So do not touch the '?' at the end of this line.
+            check_permission(&access_key_descriptor)
+                .context("In grant: check_permission failed.")?;
 
-        // Perform access control. We must return here if the permission
-        // was denied. So do not touch the '?' at the end of this line.
-        check_permission(&access_key_descriptor).context("In grant: check_permission failed.")?;
-
-        tx.execute(
-            "DELETE FROM persistent.grant
+            tx.execute(
+                "DELETE FROM persistent.grant
                 WHERE keyentryid = ? AND grantee = ?;",
-            params![key_id, grantee_uid],
-        )
-        .context("Failed to delete grant.")?;
+                params![key_id, grantee_uid],
+            )
+            .context("Failed to delete grant.")?;
 
-        tx.commit().context("In ungrant: failed to commit transaction.")?;
-
-        Ok(())
+            Ok(()).no_gc()
+        })
     }
 
     // Generates a random id and passes it to the given function, which will
@@ -1695,7 +2864,10 @@
     // otherwise return the id.
     fn insert_with_retry(inserter: impl Fn(i64) -> rusqlite::Result<usize>) -> Result<i64> {
         loop {
-            let newid: i64 = random();
+            let newid: i64 = match random() {
+                Self::UNASSIGNED_KEY_ID => continue, // UNASSIGNED_KEY_ID cannot be assigned.
+                i => i,
+            };
             match inserter(newid) {
                 // If the id already existed, try again.
                 Err(rusqlite::Error::SqliteFailure(
@@ -1715,8 +2887,8 @@
 
     /// Insert or replace the auth token based on the UNIQUE constraint of the auth token table
     pub fn insert_auth_token(&mut self, auth_token: &HardwareAuthToken) -> Result<()> {
-        self.conn
-            .execute(
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            tx.execute(
                 "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO perboot.authtoken (challenge, user_id, auth_id,
             authenticator_type, timestamp, mac, time_received) VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);",
                 params![
@@ -1730,7 +2902,8 @@
                 ],
             )
             .context("In insert_auth_token: failed to insert auth token into the database")?;
-        Ok(())
+            Ok(()).no_gc()
+        })
     }
 
     /// Find the newest auth token matching the given predicate.
@@ -1765,34 +2938,37 @@
                         entry,
                         Self::get_last_off_body(tx)
                             .context("In find_auth_token_entry: Trying to get last off body")?,
-                    )));
+                    )))
+                    .no_gc();
                 }
             }
-            Ok(None)
+            Ok(None).no_gc()
         })
         .context("In find_auth_token_entry.")
     }
 
     /// Insert last_off_body into the metadata table at the initialization of auth token table
-    pub fn insert_last_off_body(&self, last_off_body: MonotonicRawTime) -> Result<()> {
-        self.conn
-            .execute(
+    pub fn insert_last_off_body(&mut self, last_off_body: MonotonicRawTime) -> Result<()> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            tx.execute(
                 "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO perboot.metadata (key, value) VALUES (?, ?);",
                 params!["last_off_body", last_off_body],
             )
             .context("In insert_last_off_body: failed to insert.")?;
-        Ok(())
+            Ok(()).no_gc()
+        })
     }
 
     /// Update last_off_body when on_device_off_body is called
-    pub fn update_last_off_body(&self, last_off_body: MonotonicRawTime) -> Result<()> {
-        self.conn
-            .execute(
+    pub fn update_last_off_body(&mut self, last_off_body: MonotonicRawTime) -> Result<()> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            tx.execute(
                 "UPDATE perboot.metadata SET value = ? WHERE key = ?;",
                 params![last_off_body, "last_off_body"],
             )
             .context("In update_last_off_body: failed to update.")?;
-        Ok(())
+            Ok(()).no_gc()
+        })
     }
 
     /// Get last_off_body time when finding auth tokens
@@ -1816,6 +2992,7 @@
     };
     use crate::key_perm_set;
     use crate::permission::{KeyPerm, KeyPermSet};
+    use crate::super_key::SuperKeyManager;
     use keystore2_test_utils::TempDir;
     use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
         HardwareAuthToken::HardwareAuthToken,
@@ -1831,12 +3008,29 @@
     use std::sync::Arc;
     use std::thread;
     use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime};
+    #[cfg(disabled)]
+    use std::time::Instant;
 
     fn new_test_db() -> Result<KeystoreDB> {
         let conn = KeystoreDB::make_connection("file::memory:", "file::memory:")?;
 
-        KeystoreDB::init_tables(&conn).context("Failed to initialize tables.")?;
-        Ok(KeystoreDB { conn })
+        let mut db = KeystoreDB { conn, gc: None };
+        db.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            KeystoreDB::init_tables(tx).context("Failed to initialize tables.").no_gc()
+        })?;
+        Ok(db)
+    }
+
+    fn new_test_db_with_gc<F>(path: &Path, cb: F) -> Result<KeystoreDB>
+    where
+        F: Fn(&Uuid, &[u8]) -> Result<()> + Send + 'static,
+    {
+        let super_key = Arc::new(SuperKeyManager::new());
+
+        let gc_db = KeystoreDB::new(path, None).expect("Failed to open test gc db_connection.");
+        let gc = Gc::new_init_with(Default::default(), move || (Box::new(cb), gc_db, super_key));
+
+        KeystoreDB::new(path, Some(gc))
     }
 
     fn rebind_alias(
@@ -1847,7 +3041,7 @@
         namespace: i64,
     ) -> Result<bool> {
         db.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
-            KeystoreDB::rebind_alias(tx, newid, alias, domain, namespace)
+            KeystoreDB::rebind_alias(tx, newid, alias, &domain, &namespace).no_gc()
         })
         .context("In rebind_alias.")
     }
@@ -1899,12 +3093,13 @@
             .prepare("SELECT name from persistent.sqlite_master WHERE type='table' ORDER BY name;")?
             .query_map(params![], |row| row.get(0))?
             .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<String>>>()?;
-        assert_eq!(tables.len(), 5);
+        assert_eq!(tables.len(), 6);
         assert_eq!(tables[0], "blobentry");
-        assert_eq!(tables[1], "grant");
-        assert_eq!(tables[2], "keyentry");
-        assert_eq!(tables[3], "keymetadata");
-        assert_eq!(tables[4], "keyparameter");
+        assert_eq!(tables[1], "blobmetadata");
+        assert_eq!(tables[2], "grant");
+        assert_eq!(tables[3], "keyentry");
+        assert_eq!(tables[4], "keymetadata");
+        assert_eq!(tables[5], "keyparameter");
         let tables = db
             .conn
             .prepare("SELECT name from perboot.sqlite_master WHERE type='table' ORDER BY name;")?
@@ -1994,13 +3189,13 @@
     #[test]
     fn test_persistence_for_files() -> Result<()> {
         let temp_dir = TempDir::new("persistent_db_test")?;
-        let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path())?;
+        let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path(), None)?;
 
-        db.create_key_entry(Domain::APP, 100)?;
+        db.create_key_entry(&Domain::APP, &100, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
         let entries = get_keyentry(&db)?;
         assert_eq!(entries.len(), 1);
 
-        let db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path())?;
+        let db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path(), None)?;
 
         let entries_new = get_keyentry(&db)?;
         assert_eq!(entries, entries_new);
@@ -2009,31 +3204,31 @@
 
     #[test]
     fn test_create_key_entry() -> Result<()> {
-        fn extractor(ke: &KeyEntryRow) -> (Domain, i64, Option<&str>) {
-            (ke.domain.unwrap(), ke.namespace.unwrap(), ke.alias.as_deref())
+        fn extractor(ke: &KeyEntryRow) -> (Domain, i64, Option<&str>, Uuid) {
+            (ke.domain.unwrap(), ke.namespace.unwrap(), ke.alias.as_deref(), ke.km_uuid.unwrap())
         }
 
         let mut db = new_test_db()?;
 
-        db.create_key_entry(Domain::APP, 100)?;
-        db.create_key_entry(Domain::SELINUX, 101)?;
+        db.create_key_entry(&Domain::APP, &100, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        db.create_key_entry(&Domain::SELINUX, &101, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
 
         let entries = get_keyentry(&db)?;
         assert_eq!(entries.len(), 2);
-        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[0]), (Domain::APP, 100, None));
-        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[1]), (Domain::SELINUX, 101, None));
+        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[0]), (Domain::APP, 100, None, KEYSTORE_UUID));
+        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[1]), (Domain::SELINUX, 101, None, KEYSTORE_UUID));
 
         // Test that we must pass in a valid Domain.
         check_result_is_error_containing_string(
-            db.create_key_entry(Domain::GRANT, 102),
+            db.create_key_entry(&Domain::GRANT, &102, &KEYSTORE_UUID),
             "Domain Domain(1) must be either App or SELinux.",
         );
         check_result_is_error_containing_string(
-            db.create_key_entry(Domain::BLOB, 103),
+            db.create_key_entry(&Domain::BLOB, &103, &KEYSTORE_UUID),
             "Domain Domain(3) must be either App or SELinux.",
         );
         check_result_is_error_containing_string(
-            db.create_key_entry(Domain::KEY_ID, 104),
+            db.create_key_entry(&Domain::KEY_ID, &104, &KEYSTORE_UUID),
             "Domain Domain(4) must be either App or SELinux.",
         );
 
@@ -2041,32 +3236,222 @@
     }
 
     #[test]
+    fn test_add_unsigned_key() -> Result<()> {
+        let mut db = new_test_db()?;
+        let public_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x01, 0x02, 0x03];
+        let private_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x04, 0x05, 0x06];
+        let raw_public_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x07, 0x08, 0x09];
+        db.create_attestation_key_entry(
+            &public_key,
+            &raw_public_key,
+            &private_key,
+            &KEYSTORE_UUID,
+        )?;
+        let keys = db.fetch_unsigned_attestation_keys(5, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        assert_eq!(keys.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(keys[0], public_key);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_store_signed_attestation_certificate_chain() -> Result<()> {
+        let mut db = new_test_db()?;
+        let expiration_date: i64 = 20;
+        let namespace: i64 = 30;
+        let base_byte: u8 = 1;
+        let loaded_values =
+            load_attestation_key_pool(&mut db, expiration_date, namespace, base_byte)?;
+        let chain =
+            db.retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain(Domain::APP, namespace, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        assert_eq!(true, chain.is_some());
+        let cert_chain = chain.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(cert_chain.private_key.to_vec(), loaded_values.priv_key);
+        assert_eq!(cert_chain.batch_cert, loaded_values.batch_cert);
+        assert_eq!(cert_chain.cert_chain, loaded_values.cert_chain);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_get_attestation_pool_status() -> Result<()> {
+        let mut db = new_test_db()?;
+        let namespace: i64 = 30;
+        load_attestation_key_pool(
+            &mut db, 10, /* expiration */
+            namespace, 0x01, /* base_byte */
+        )?;
+        load_attestation_key_pool(&mut db, 20 /* expiration */, namespace + 1, 0x02)?;
+        load_attestation_key_pool(&mut db, 40 /* expiration */, namespace + 2, 0x03)?;
+        let mut status = db.get_attestation_pool_status(9 /* expiration */, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        assert_eq!(status.expiring, 0);
+        assert_eq!(status.attested, 3);
+        assert_eq!(status.unassigned, 0);
+        assert_eq!(status.total, 3);
+        assert_eq!(
+            db.get_attestation_pool_status(15 /* expiration */, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?.expiring,
+            1
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            db.get_attestation_pool_status(25 /* expiration */, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?.expiring,
+            2
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            db.get_attestation_pool_status(60 /* expiration */, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?.expiring,
+            3
+        );
+        let public_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x01, 0x02, 0x03];
+        let private_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x04, 0x05, 0x06];
+        let raw_public_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x07, 0x08, 0x09];
+        let cert_chain: Vec<u8> = vec![0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c];
+        let batch_cert: Vec<u8> = vec![0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f];
+        db.create_attestation_key_entry(
+            &public_key,
+            &raw_public_key,
+            &private_key,
+            &KEYSTORE_UUID,
+        )?;
+        status = db.get_attestation_pool_status(0 /* expiration */, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        assert_eq!(status.attested, 3);
+        assert_eq!(status.unassigned, 0);
+        assert_eq!(status.total, 4);
+        db.store_signed_attestation_certificate_chain(
+            &raw_public_key,
+            &batch_cert,
+            &cert_chain,
+            20,
+            &KEYSTORE_UUID,
+        )?;
+        status = db.get_attestation_pool_status(0 /* expiration */, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        assert_eq!(status.attested, 4);
+        assert_eq!(status.unassigned, 1);
+        assert_eq!(status.total, 4);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_remove_expired_certs() -> Result<()> {
+        let temp_dir =
+            TempDir::new("test_remove_expired_certs_").expect("Failed to create temp dir.");
+        let mut db = new_test_db_with_gc(temp_dir.path(), |_, _| Ok(()))?;
+        let expiration_date: i64 =
+            SystemTime::now().duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)?.as_millis() as i64 + 10000;
+        let namespace: i64 = 30;
+        let namespace_del1: i64 = 45;
+        let namespace_del2: i64 = 60;
+        let entry_values = load_attestation_key_pool(
+            &mut db,
+            expiration_date,
+            namespace,
+            0x01, /* base_byte */
+        )?;
+        load_attestation_key_pool(&mut db, 45, namespace_del1, 0x02)?;
+        load_attestation_key_pool(&mut db, 60, namespace_del2, 0x03)?;
+
+        let blob_entry_row_count: u32 = db
+            .conn
+            .query_row("SELECT COUNT(id) FROM persistent.blobentry;", NO_PARAMS, |row| row.get(0))
+            .expect("Failed to get blob entry row count.");
+        // We expect 9 rows here because there are three blobs per attestation key, i.e.,
+        // one key, one certificate chain, and one certificate.
+        assert_eq!(blob_entry_row_count, 9);
+
+        assert_eq!(db.delete_expired_attestation_keys()?, 2);
+
+        let mut cert_chain =
+            db.retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain(Domain::APP, namespace, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        assert!(cert_chain.is_some());
+        let value = cert_chain.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(entry_values.batch_cert, value.batch_cert);
+        assert_eq!(entry_values.cert_chain, value.cert_chain);
+        assert_eq!(entry_values.priv_key, value.private_key.to_vec());
+
+        cert_chain = db.retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain(
+            Domain::APP,
+            namespace_del1,
+            &KEYSTORE_UUID,
+        )?;
+        assert!(!cert_chain.is_some());
+        cert_chain = db.retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain(
+            Domain::APP,
+            namespace_del2,
+            &KEYSTORE_UUID,
+        )?;
+        assert!(!cert_chain.is_some());
+
+        // Give the garbage collector half a second to catch up.
+        std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
+
+        let blob_entry_row_count: u32 = db
+            .conn
+            .query_row("SELECT COUNT(id) FROM persistent.blobentry;", NO_PARAMS, |row| row.get(0))
+            .expect("Failed to get blob entry row count.");
+        // There shound be 3 blob entries left, because we deleted two of the attestation
+        // key entries with three blobs each.
+        assert_eq!(blob_entry_row_count, 3);
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_delete_all_attestation_keys() -> Result<()> {
+        let mut db = new_test_db()?;
+        load_attestation_key_pool(&mut db, 45 /* expiration */, 1 /* namespace */, 0x02)?;
+        load_attestation_key_pool(&mut db, 80 /* expiration */, 2 /* namespace */, 0x03)?;
+        db.create_key_entry(&Domain::APP, &42, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        let result = db.delete_all_attestation_keys()?;
+
+        // Give the garbage collector half a second to catch up.
+        std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
+
+        // Attestation keys should be deleted, and the regular key should remain.
+        assert_eq!(result, 2);
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
     fn test_rebind_alias() -> Result<()> {
-        fn extractor(ke: &KeyEntryRow) -> (Option<Domain>, Option<i64>, Option<&str>) {
-            (ke.domain, ke.namespace, ke.alias.as_deref())
+        fn extractor(
+            ke: &KeyEntryRow,
+        ) -> (Option<Domain>, Option<i64>, Option<&str>, Option<Uuid>) {
+            (ke.domain, ke.namespace, ke.alias.as_deref(), ke.km_uuid)
         }
 
         let mut db = new_test_db()?;
-        db.create_key_entry(Domain::APP, 42)?;
-        db.create_key_entry(Domain::APP, 42)?;
+        db.create_key_entry(&Domain::APP, &42, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        db.create_key_entry(&Domain::APP, &42, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
         let entries = get_keyentry(&db)?;
         assert_eq!(entries.len(), 2);
-        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[0]), (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), None));
-        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[1]), (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), None));
+        assert_eq!(
+            extractor(&entries[0]),
+            (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), None, Some(KEYSTORE_UUID))
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            extractor(&entries[1]),
+            (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), None, Some(KEYSTORE_UUID))
+        );
 
         // Test that the first call to rebind_alias sets the alias.
         rebind_alias(&mut db, &KEY_ID_LOCK.get(entries[0].id), "foo", Domain::APP, 42)?;
         let entries = get_keyentry(&db)?;
         assert_eq!(entries.len(), 2);
-        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[0]), (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), Some("foo")));
-        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[1]), (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), None));
+        assert_eq!(
+            extractor(&entries[0]),
+            (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), Some("foo"), Some(KEYSTORE_UUID))
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            extractor(&entries[1]),
+            (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), None, Some(KEYSTORE_UUID))
+        );
 
         // Test that the second call to rebind_alias also empties the old one.
         rebind_alias(&mut db, &KEY_ID_LOCK.get(entries[1].id), "foo", Domain::APP, 42)?;
         let entries = get_keyentry(&db)?;
         assert_eq!(entries.len(), 2);
-        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[0]), (None, None, None));
-        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[1]), (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), Some("foo")));
+        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[0]), (None, None, None, Some(KEYSTORE_UUID)));
+        assert_eq!(
+            extractor(&entries[1]),
+            (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), Some("foo"), Some(KEYSTORE_UUID))
+        );
 
         // Test that we must pass in a valid Domain.
         check_result_is_error_containing_string(
@@ -2090,8 +3475,11 @@
         // Test that we correctly abort the transaction in this case.
         let entries = get_keyentry(&db)?;
         assert_eq!(entries.len(), 2);
-        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[0]), (None, None, None));
-        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[1]), (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), Some("foo")));
+        assert_eq!(extractor(&entries[0]), (None, None, None, Some(KEYSTORE_UUID)));
+        assert_eq!(
+            extractor(&entries[1]),
+            (Some(Domain::APP), Some(42), Some("foo"), Some(KEYSTORE_UUID))
+        );
 
         Ok(())
     }
@@ -2104,9 +3492,9 @@
 
         let mut db = new_test_db()?;
         db.conn.execute(
-            "INSERT INTO persistent.keyentry (id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state)
-                VALUES (1, 0, 0, 15, 'key', 1), (2, 0, 2, 7, 'yek', 1);",
-            NO_PARAMS,
+            "INSERT INTO persistent.keyentry (id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state, km_uuid)
+                VALUES (1, 0, 0, 15, 'key', 1, ?), (2, 0, 2, 7, 'yek', 1, ?);",
+            params![KEYSTORE_UUID, KEYSTORE_UUID],
         )?;
         let app_key = KeyDescriptor {
             domain: super::Domain::APP,
@@ -2123,7 +3511,7 @@
         let next_random = 0i64;
 
         let app_granted_key = db
-            .grant(app_key.clone(), CALLER_UID, GRANTEE_UID, PVEC1, |k, a| {
+            .grant(&app_key, CALLER_UID, GRANTEE_UID, PVEC1, |k, a| {
                 assert_eq!(*a, PVEC1);
                 assert_eq!(
                     *k,
@@ -2158,7 +3546,7 @@
         };
 
         let selinux_granted_key = db
-            .grant(selinux_key.clone(), CALLER_UID, 12, PVEC1, |k, a| {
+            .grant(&selinux_key, CALLER_UID, 12, PVEC1, |k, a| {
                 assert_eq!(*a, PVEC1);
                 assert_eq!(
                     *k,
@@ -2188,7 +3576,7 @@
 
         // This should update the existing grant with PVEC2.
         let selinux_granted_key = db
-            .grant(selinux_key.clone(), CALLER_UID, 12, PVEC2, |k, a| {
+            .grant(&selinux_key, CALLER_UID, 12, PVEC2, |k, a| {
                 assert_eq!(*a, PVEC2);
                 assert_eq!(
                     *k,
@@ -2242,8 +3630,8 @@
         println!("app_key {:?}", app_key);
         println!("selinux_key {:?}", selinux_key);
 
-        db.ungrant(app_key, CALLER_UID, GRANTEE_UID, |_| Ok(()))?;
-        db.ungrant(selinux_key, CALLER_UID, GRANTEE_UID, |_| Ok(()))?;
+        db.ungrant(&app_key, CALLER_UID, GRANTEE_UID, |_| Ok(()))?;
+        db.ungrant(&selinux_key, CALLER_UID, GRANTEE_UID, |_| Ok(()))?;
 
         Ok(())
     }
@@ -2253,29 +3641,46 @@
     static TEST_CERT_CHAIN_BLOB: &[u8] = b"my test cert_chain";
 
     #[test]
-    fn test_insert_blob() -> Result<()> {
+    fn test_set_blob() -> Result<()> {
         let key_id = KEY_ID_LOCK.get(3000);
         let mut db = new_test_db()?;
-        db.insert_blob(&key_id, SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB, TEST_KEY_BLOB)?;
-        db.insert_blob(&key_id, SubComponentType::CERT, TEST_CERT_BLOB)?;
-        db.insert_blob(&key_id, SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN, TEST_CERT_CHAIN_BLOB)?;
+        let mut blob_metadata = BlobMetaData::new();
+        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::KmUuid(KEYSTORE_UUID));
+        db.set_blob(
+            &key_id,
+            SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB,
+            Some(TEST_KEY_BLOB),
+            Some(&blob_metadata),
+        )?;
+        db.set_blob(&key_id, SubComponentType::CERT, Some(TEST_CERT_BLOB), None)?;
+        db.set_blob(&key_id, SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN, Some(TEST_CERT_CHAIN_BLOB), None)?;
         drop(key_id);
 
         let mut stmt = db.conn.prepare(
-            "SELECT subcomponent_type, keyentryid, blob FROM persistent.blobentry
+            "SELECT subcomponent_type, keyentryid, blob, id FROM persistent.blobentry
                 ORDER BY subcomponent_type ASC;",
         )?;
         let mut rows = stmt
-            .query_map::<(SubComponentType, i64, Vec<u8>), _, _>(NO_PARAMS, |row| {
-                Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?, row.get(2)?))
+            .query_map::<((SubComponentType, i64, Vec<u8>), i64), _, _>(NO_PARAMS, |row| {
+                Ok(((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?, row.get(2)?), row.get(3)?))
             })?;
-        let r = rows.next().unwrap().unwrap();
+        let (r, id) = rows.next().unwrap().unwrap();
         assert_eq!(r, (SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB, 3000, TEST_KEY_BLOB.to_vec()));
-        let r = rows.next().unwrap().unwrap();
+        let (r, _) = rows.next().unwrap().unwrap();
         assert_eq!(r, (SubComponentType::CERT, 3000, TEST_CERT_BLOB.to_vec()));
-        let r = rows.next().unwrap().unwrap();
+        let (r, _) = rows.next().unwrap().unwrap();
         assert_eq!(r, (SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN, 3000, TEST_CERT_CHAIN_BLOB.to_vec()));
 
+        drop(rows);
+        drop(stmt);
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            db.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+                BlobMetaData::load_from_db(id, tx).no_gc()
+            })
+            .expect("Should find blob metadata."),
+            blob_metadata
+        );
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -2289,7 +3694,7 @@
             .0;
         let (_key_guard, key_entry) = db
             .load_key_entry(
-                KeyDescriptor {
+                &KeyDescriptor {
                     domain: Domain::APP,
                     nspace: 0,
                     alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
@@ -2304,7 +3709,7 @@
         assert_eq!(key_entry, make_test_key_entry_test_vector(key_id, None));
 
         db.unbind_key(
-            KeyDescriptor {
+            &KeyDescriptor {
                 domain: Domain::APP,
                 nspace: 0,
                 alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
@@ -2319,7 +3724,7 @@
         assert_eq!(
             Some(&KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)),
             db.load_key_entry(
-                KeyDescriptor {
+                &KeyDescriptor {
                     domain: Domain::APP,
                     nspace: 0,
                     alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
@@ -2339,6 +3744,76 @@
     }
 
     #[test]
+    fn test_insert_and_load_certificate_entry_domain_app() -> Result<()> {
+        let mut db = new_test_db()?;
+
+        db.store_new_certificate(
+            &KeyDescriptor {
+                domain: Domain::APP,
+                nspace: 1,
+                alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
+                blob: None,
+            },
+            TEST_CERT_BLOB,
+            &KEYSTORE_UUID,
+        )
+        .expect("Trying to insert cert.");
+
+        let (_key_guard, mut key_entry) = db
+            .load_key_entry(
+                &KeyDescriptor {
+                    domain: Domain::APP,
+                    nspace: 1,
+                    alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
+                    blob: None,
+                },
+                KeyType::Client,
+                KeyEntryLoadBits::PUBLIC,
+                1,
+                |_k, _av| Ok(()),
+            )
+            .expect("Trying to read certificate entry.");
+
+        assert!(key_entry.pure_cert());
+        assert!(key_entry.cert().is_none());
+        assert_eq!(key_entry.take_cert_chain(), Some(TEST_CERT_BLOB.to_vec()));
+
+        db.unbind_key(
+            &KeyDescriptor {
+                domain: Domain::APP,
+                nspace: 1,
+                alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
+                blob: None,
+            },
+            KeyType::Client,
+            1,
+            |_, _| Ok(()),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            Some(&KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)),
+            db.load_key_entry(
+                &KeyDescriptor {
+                    domain: Domain::APP,
+                    nspace: 1,
+                    alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
+                    blob: None,
+                },
+                KeyType::Client,
+                KeyEntryLoadBits::NONE,
+                1,
+                |_k, _av| Ok(()),
+            )
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .root_cause()
+            .downcast_ref::<KsError>()
+        );
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
     fn test_insert_and_load_full_keyentry_domain_selinux() -> Result<()> {
         let mut db = new_test_db()?;
         let key_id = make_test_key_entry(&mut db, Domain::SELINUX, 1, TEST_ALIAS, None)
@@ -2346,7 +3821,7 @@
             .0;
         let (_key_guard, key_entry) = db
             .load_key_entry(
-                KeyDescriptor {
+                &KeyDescriptor {
                     domain: Domain::SELINUX,
                     nspace: 1,
                     alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
@@ -2361,7 +3836,7 @@
         assert_eq!(key_entry, make_test_key_entry_test_vector(key_id, None));
 
         db.unbind_key(
-            KeyDescriptor {
+            &KeyDescriptor {
                 domain: Domain::SELINUX,
                 nspace: 1,
                 alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
@@ -2376,7 +3851,7 @@
         assert_eq!(
             Some(&KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)),
             db.load_key_entry(
-                KeyDescriptor {
+                &KeyDescriptor {
                     domain: Domain::SELINUX,
                     nspace: 1,
                     alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
@@ -2403,7 +3878,7 @@
             .0;
         let (_, key_entry) = db
             .load_key_entry(
-                KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::KEY_ID, nspace: key_id, alias: None, blob: None },
+                &KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::KEY_ID, nspace: key_id, alias: None, blob: None },
                 KeyType::Client,
                 KeyEntryLoadBits::BOTH,
                 1,
@@ -2414,7 +3889,7 @@
         assert_eq!(key_entry, make_test_key_entry_test_vector(key_id, None));
 
         db.unbind_key(
-            KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::KEY_ID, nspace: key_id, alias: None, blob: None },
+            &KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::KEY_ID, nspace: key_id, alias: None, blob: None },
             KeyType::Client,
             1,
             |_, _| Ok(()),
@@ -2424,7 +3899,7 @@
         assert_eq!(
             Some(&KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)),
             db.load_key_entry(
-                KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::KEY_ID, nspace: key_id, alias: None, blob: None },
+                &KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::KEY_ID, nspace: key_id, alias: None, blob: None },
                 KeyType::Client,
                 KeyEntryLoadBits::NONE,
                 1,
@@ -2448,7 +3923,7 @@
         db.check_and_update_key_usage_count(key_id)?;
 
         let (_key_guard, key_entry) = db.load_key_entry(
-            KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::KEY_ID, nspace: key_id, alias: None, blob: None },
+            &KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::KEY_ID, nspace: key_id, alias: None, blob: None },
             KeyType::Client,
             KeyEntryLoadBits::BOTH,
             1,
@@ -2495,7 +3970,7 @@
 
         let granted_key = db
             .grant(
-                KeyDescriptor {
+                &KeyDescriptor {
                     domain: Domain::APP,
                     nspace: 0,
                     alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
@@ -2511,27 +3986,21 @@
         debug_dump_grant_table(&mut db)?;
 
         let (_key_guard, key_entry) = db
-            .load_key_entry(
-                granted_key.clone(),
-                KeyType::Client,
-                KeyEntryLoadBits::BOTH,
-                2,
-                |k, av| {
-                    assert_eq!(Domain::GRANT, k.domain);
-                    assert!(av.unwrap().includes(KeyPerm::use_()));
-                    Ok(())
-                },
-            )
+            .load_key_entry(&granted_key, KeyType::Client, KeyEntryLoadBits::BOTH, 2, |k, av| {
+                assert_eq!(Domain::GRANT, k.domain);
+                assert!(av.unwrap().includes(KeyPerm::use_()));
+                Ok(())
+            })
             .unwrap();
 
         assert_eq!(key_entry, make_test_key_entry_test_vector(key_id, None));
 
-        db.unbind_key(granted_key.clone(), KeyType::Client, 2, |_, _| Ok(())).unwrap();
+        db.unbind_key(&granted_key, KeyType::Client, 2, |_, _| Ok(())).unwrap();
 
         assert_eq!(
             Some(&KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)),
             db.load_key_entry(
-                granted_key,
+                &granted_key,
                 KeyType::Client,
                 KeyEntryLoadBits::NONE,
                 2,
@@ -2558,7 +4027,7 @@
             .0;
 
         db.grant(
-            KeyDescriptor {
+            &KeyDescriptor {
                 domain: Domain::APP,
                 nspace: 0,
                 alias: Some(TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
@@ -2578,7 +4047,7 @@
 
         let (_, key_entry) = db
             .load_key_entry(
-                id_descriptor.clone(),
+                &id_descriptor,
                 KeyType::Client,
                 KeyEntryLoadBits::BOTH,
                 GRANTEE_UID,
@@ -2595,7 +4064,7 @@
 
         let (_, key_entry) = db
             .load_key_entry(
-                id_descriptor.clone(),
+                &id_descriptor,
                 KeyType::Client,
                 KeyEntryLoadBits::BOTH,
                 SOMEONE_ELSE_UID,
@@ -2610,12 +4079,12 @@
 
         assert_eq!(key_entry, make_test_key_entry_test_vector(key_id, None));
 
-        db.unbind_key(id_descriptor.clone(), KeyType::Client, OWNER_UID, |_, _| Ok(())).unwrap();
+        db.unbind_key(&id_descriptor, KeyType::Client, OWNER_UID, |_, _| Ok(())).unwrap();
 
         assert_eq!(
             Some(&KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)),
             db.load_key_entry(
-                id_descriptor,
+                &id_descriptor,
                 KeyType::Client,
                 KeyEntryLoadBits::NONE,
                 GRANTEE_UID,
@@ -2636,13 +4105,13 @@
         let handle = {
             let temp_dir = Arc::new(TempDir::new("id_lock_test")?);
             let temp_dir_clone = temp_dir.clone();
-            let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path())?;
+            let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path(), None)?;
             let key_id = make_test_key_entry(&mut db, Domain::APP, 33, KEY_LOCK_TEST_ALIAS, None)
                 .context("test_insert_and_load_full_keyentry_domain_app")?
                 .0;
             let (_key_guard, key_entry) = db
                 .load_key_entry(
-                    KeyDescriptor {
+                    &KeyDescriptor {
                         domain: Domain::APP,
                         nspace: 0,
                         alias: Some(KEY_LOCK_TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
@@ -2667,10 +4136,10 @@
             // the primary thread.
             let handle = thread::spawn(move || {
                 let temp_dir = temp_dir_clone;
-                let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path()).unwrap();
+                let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path(), None).unwrap();
                 assert!(db
                     .load_key_entry(
-                        KeyDescriptor {
+                        &KeyDescriptor {
                             domain: Domain::APP,
                             nspace: 0,
                             alias: Some(KEY_LOCK_TEST_ALIAS.to_string()),
@@ -2706,9 +4175,172 @@
     }
 
     #[test]
+    fn teset_database_busy_error_code() {
+        let temp_dir =
+            TempDir::new("test_database_busy_error_code_").expect("Failed to create temp dir.");
+
+        let mut db1 = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path(), None).expect("Failed to open database1.");
+        let mut db2 = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path(), None).expect("Failed to open database2.");
+
+        let _tx1 = db1
+            .conn
+            .transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)
+            .expect("Failed to create first transaction.");
+
+        let error = db2
+            .conn
+            .transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)
+            .context("Transaction begin failed.")
+            .expect_err("This should fail.");
+        let root_cause = error.root_cause();
+        if let Some(rusqlite::ffi::Error { code: rusqlite::ErrorCode::DatabaseBusy, .. }) =
+            root_cause.downcast_ref::<rusqlite::ffi::Error>()
+        {
+            return;
+        }
+        panic!(
+            "Unexpected error {:?} \n{:?} \n{:?}",
+            error,
+            root_cause,
+            root_cause.downcast_ref::<rusqlite::ffi::Error>()
+        )
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(disabled)]
+    #[test]
+    fn test_large_number_of_concurrent_db_manipulations() -> Result<()> {
+        let temp_dir = Arc::new(
+            TempDir::new("test_large_number_of_concurrent_db_manipulations_")
+                .expect("Failed to create temp dir."),
+        );
+
+        let test_begin = Instant::now();
+
+        let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path()).expect("Failed to open database.");
+        const KEY_COUNT: u32 = 500u32;
+        const OPEN_DB_COUNT: u32 = 50u32;
+
+        let mut actual_key_count = KEY_COUNT;
+        // First insert KEY_COUNT keys.
+        for count in 0..KEY_COUNT {
+            if Instant::now().duration_since(test_begin) >= Duration::from_secs(15) {
+                actual_key_count = count;
+                break;
+            }
+            let alias = format!("test_alias_{}", count);
+            make_test_key_entry(&mut db, Domain::APP, 1, &alias, None)
+                .expect("Failed to make key entry.");
+        }
+
+        // Insert more keys from a different thread and into a different namespace.
+        let temp_dir1 = temp_dir.clone();
+        let handle1 = thread::spawn(move || {
+            let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir1.path()).expect("Failed to open database.");
+
+            for count in 0..actual_key_count {
+                if Instant::now().duration_since(test_begin) >= Duration::from_secs(40) {
+                    return;
+                }
+                let alias = format!("test_alias_{}", count);
+                make_test_key_entry(&mut db, Domain::APP, 2, &alias, None)
+                    .expect("Failed to make key entry.");
+            }
+
+            // then unbind them again.
+            for count in 0..actual_key_count {
+                if Instant::now().duration_since(test_begin) >= Duration::from_secs(40) {
+                    return;
+                }
+                let key = KeyDescriptor {
+                    domain: Domain::APP,
+                    nspace: -1,
+                    alias: Some(format!("test_alias_{}", count)),
+                    blob: None,
+                };
+                db.unbind_key(&key, KeyType::Client, 2, |_, _| Ok(())).expect("Unbind Failed.");
+            }
+        });
+
+        // And start unbinding the first set of keys.
+        let temp_dir2 = temp_dir.clone();
+        let handle2 = thread::spawn(move || {
+            let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir2.path()).expect("Failed to open database.");
+
+            for count in 0..actual_key_count {
+                if Instant::now().duration_since(test_begin) >= Duration::from_secs(40) {
+                    return;
+                }
+                let key = KeyDescriptor {
+                    domain: Domain::APP,
+                    nspace: -1,
+                    alias: Some(format!("test_alias_{}", count)),
+                    blob: None,
+                };
+                db.unbind_key(&key, KeyType::Client, 1, |_, _| Ok(())).expect("Unbind Failed.");
+            }
+        });
+
+        let stop_deleting = Arc::new(AtomicU8::new(0));
+        let stop_deleting2 = stop_deleting.clone();
+
+        // And delete anything that is unreferenced keys.
+        let temp_dir3 = temp_dir.clone();
+        let handle3 = thread::spawn(move || {
+            let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir3.path()).expect("Failed to open database.");
+
+            while stop_deleting2.load(Ordering::Relaxed) != 1 {
+                while let Some((key_guard, _key)) =
+                    db.get_unreferenced_key().expect("Failed to get unreferenced Key.")
+                {
+                    if Instant::now().duration_since(test_begin) >= Duration::from_secs(40) {
+                        return;
+                    }
+                    db.purge_key_entry(key_guard).expect("Failed to purge key.");
+                }
+                std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(100));
+            }
+        });
+
+        // While a lot of inserting and deleting is going on we have to open database connections
+        // successfully and use them.
+        // This clone is not redundant, because temp_dir needs to be kept alive until db goes
+        // out of scope.
+        #[allow(clippy::redundant_clone)]
+        let temp_dir4 = temp_dir.clone();
+        let handle4 = thread::spawn(move || {
+            for count in 0..OPEN_DB_COUNT {
+                if Instant::now().duration_since(test_begin) >= Duration::from_secs(40) {
+                    return;
+                }
+                let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir4.path()).expect("Failed to open database.");
+
+                let alias = format!("test_alias_{}", count);
+                make_test_key_entry(&mut db, Domain::APP, 3, &alias, None)
+                    .expect("Failed to make key entry.");
+                let key = KeyDescriptor {
+                    domain: Domain::APP,
+                    nspace: -1,
+                    alias: Some(alias),
+                    blob: None,
+                };
+                db.unbind_key(&key, KeyType::Client, 3, |_, _| Ok(())).expect("Unbind Failed.");
+            }
+        });
+
+        handle1.join().expect("Thread 1 panicked.");
+        handle2.join().expect("Thread 2 panicked.");
+        handle4.join().expect("Thread 4 panicked.");
+
+        stop_deleting.store(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+        handle3.join().expect("Thread 3 panicked.");
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
     fn list() -> Result<()> {
         let temp_dir = TempDir::new("list_test")?;
-        let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path())?;
+        let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path(), None)?;
         static LIST_O_ENTRIES: &[(Domain, i64, &str)] = &[
             (Domain::APP, 1, "test1"),
             (Domain::APP, 1, "test2"),
@@ -2769,7 +4401,7 @@
                 .map(|d| {
                     let (_, entry) = db
                         .load_key_entry(
-                            d,
+                            &d,
                             KeyType::Client,
                             KeyEntryLoadBits::NONE,
                             *namespace as u32,
@@ -2812,7 +4444,6 @@
     }
 
     #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
     struct KeyEntryRow {
         id: i64,
         key_type: KeyType,
@@ -2820,6 +4451,7 @@
         namespace: Option<i64>,
         alias: Option<String>,
         state: KeyLifeCycle,
+        km_uuid: Option<Uuid>,
     }
 
     fn get_keyentry(db: &KeystoreDB) -> Result<Vec<KeyEntryRow>> {
@@ -2836,12 +4468,42 @@
                     namespace: row.get(3)?,
                     alias: row.get(4)?,
                     state: row.get(5)?,
+                    km_uuid: row.get(6)?,
                 })
             })?
             .map(|r| r.context("Could not read keyentry row."))
             .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()
     }
 
+    struct RemoteProvValues {
+        cert_chain: Vec<u8>,
+        priv_key: Vec<u8>,
+        batch_cert: Vec<u8>,
+    }
+
+    fn load_attestation_key_pool(
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        expiration_date: i64,
+        namespace: i64,
+        base_byte: u8,
+    ) -> Result<RemoteProvValues> {
+        let public_key: Vec<u8> = vec![base_byte, 0x02 * base_byte];
+        let cert_chain: Vec<u8> = vec![0x03 * base_byte, 0x04 * base_byte];
+        let priv_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x05 * base_byte, 0x06 * base_byte];
+        let raw_public_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x0b * base_byte, 0x0c * base_byte];
+        let batch_cert: Vec<u8> = vec![base_byte * 0x0d, base_byte * 0x0e];
+        db.create_attestation_key_entry(&public_key, &raw_public_key, &priv_key, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        db.store_signed_attestation_certificate_chain(
+            &raw_public_key,
+            &batch_cert,
+            &cert_chain,
+            expiration_date,
+            &KEYSTORE_UUID,
+        )?;
+        db.assign_attestation_key(Domain::APP, namespace, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        Ok(RemoteProvValues { cert_chain, priv_key, batch_cert })
+    }
+
     // Note: The parameters and SecurityLevel associations are nonsensical. This
     // collection is only used to check if the parameters are preserved as expected by the
     // database.
@@ -3078,19 +4740,28 @@
         alias: &str,
         max_usage_count: Option<i32>,
     ) -> Result<KeyIdGuard> {
-        let key_id = db.create_key_entry(domain, namespace)?;
-        db.insert_blob(&key_id, SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB, TEST_KEY_BLOB)?;
-        db.insert_blob(&key_id, SubComponentType::CERT, TEST_CERT_BLOB)?;
-        db.insert_blob(&key_id, SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN, TEST_CERT_CHAIN_BLOB)?;
+        let key_id = db.create_key_entry(&domain, &namespace, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
+        let mut blob_metadata = BlobMetaData::new();
+        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::Password));
+        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Salt(vec![1, 2, 3]));
+        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Iv(vec![2, 3, 1]));
+        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::AeadTag(vec![3, 1, 2]));
+        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::KmUuid(KEYSTORE_UUID));
+
+        db.set_blob(
+            &key_id,
+            SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB,
+            Some(TEST_KEY_BLOB),
+            Some(&blob_metadata),
+        )?;
+        db.set_blob(&key_id, SubComponentType::CERT, Some(TEST_CERT_BLOB), None)?;
+        db.set_blob(&key_id, SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN, Some(TEST_CERT_CHAIN_BLOB), None)?;
 
         let params = make_test_params(max_usage_count);
         db.insert_keyparameter(&key_id, &params)?;
 
         let mut metadata = KeyMetaData::new();
-        metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::Password));
-        metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::Salt(vec![1, 2, 3]));
-        metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::Iv(vec![2, 3, 1]));
-        metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::AeadTag(vec![3, 1, 2]));
+        metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::CreationDate(DateTime::from_millis_epoch(123456789)));
         db.insert_key_metadata(&key_id, &metadata)?;
         rebind_alias(db, &key_id, alias, domain, namespace)?;
         Ok(key_id)
@@ -3099,40 +4770,53 @@
     fn make_test_key_entry_test_vector(key_id: i64, max_usage_count: Option<i32>) -> KeyEntry {
         let params = make_test_params(max_usage_count);
 
+        let mut blob_metadata = BlobMetaData::new();
+        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::Password));
+        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Salt(vec![1, 2, 3]));
+        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Iv(vec![2, 3, 1]));
+        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::AeadTag(vec![3, 1, 2]));
+        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::KmUuid(KEYSTORE_UUID));
+
         let mut metadata = KeyMetaData::new();
-        metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::Password));
-        metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::Salt(vec![1, 2, 3]));
-        metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::Iv(vec![2, 3, 1]));
-        metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::AeadTag(vec![3, 1, 2]));
+        metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::CreationDate(DateTime::from_millis_epoch(123456789)));
 
         KeyEntry {
             id: key_id,
-            km_blob: Some(TEST_KEY_BLOB.to_vec()),
+            key_blob_info: Some((TEST_KEY_BLOB.to_vec(), blob_metadata)),
             cert: Some(TEST_CERT_BLOB.to_vec()),
             cert_chain: Some(TEST_CERT_CHAIN_BLOB.to_vec()),
-            sec_level: SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT,
+            km_uuid: KEYSTORE_UUID,
             parameters: params,
             metadata,
+            pure_cert: false,
         }
     }
 
     fn debug_dump_keyentry_table(db: &mut KeystoreDB) -> Result<()> {
         let mut stmt = db.conn.prepare(
-            "SELECT id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state FROM persistent.keyentry;",
+            "SELECT id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state, km_uuid FROM persistent.keyentry;",
         )?;
-        let rows = stmt.query_map::<(i64, KeyType, i32, i64, String, KeyLifeCycle), _, _>(
+        let rows = stmt.query_map::<(i64, KeyType, i32, i64, String, KeyLifeCycle, Uuid), _, _>(
             NO_PARAMS,
             |row| {
-                Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?, row.get(2)?, row.get(3)?, row.get(4)?, row.get(5)?))
+                Ok((
+                    row.get(0)?,
+                    row.get(1)?,
+                    row.get(2)?,
+                    row.get(3)?,
+                    row.get(4)?,
+                    row.get(5)?,
+                    row.get(6)?,
+                ))
             },
         )?;
 
         println!("Key entry table rows:");
         for r in rows {
-            let (id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state) = r.unwrap();
+            let (id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state, km_uuid) = r.unwrap();
             println!(
-                "    id: {} KeyType: {:?} Domain: {} Namespace: {} Alias: {} State: {:?}",
-                id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state
+                "    id: {} KeyType: {:?} Domain: {} Namespace: {} Alias: {} State: {:?} KmUuid: {:?}",
+                id, key_type, domain, namespace, alias, state, km_uuid
             );
         }
         Ok(())
@@ -3191,4 +4875,58 @@
         assert!(last_off_body_1.seconds() < last_off_body_2.seconds());
         Ok(())
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_unbind_keys_for_user() -> Result<()> {
+        let mut db = new_test_db()?;
+        db.unbind_keys_for_user(1, false)?;
+
+        make_test_key_entry(&mut db, Domain::APP, 210000, TEST_ALIAS, None)?;
+        make_test_key_entry(&mut db, Domain::APP, 110000, TEST_ALIAS, None)?;
+        db.unbind_keys_for_user(2, false)?;
+
+        assert_eq!(1, db.list(Domain::APP, 110000)?.len());
+        assert_eq!(0, db.list(Domain::APP, 210000)?.len());
+
+        db.unbind_keys_for_user(1, true)?;
+        assert_eq!(0, db.list(Domain::APP, 110000)?.len());
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_store_super_key() -> Result<()> {
+        let mut db = new_test_db()?;
+        let pw: keystore2_crypto::Password = (&b"xyzabc"[..]).into();
+        let super_key = keystore2_crypto::generate_aes256_key()?;
+        let secret_bytes = b"keystore2 is great.";
+        let (encrypted_secret, iv, tag) =
+            keystore2_crypto::aes_gcm_encrypt(secret_bytes, &super_key)?;
+
+        let (encrypted_super_key, metadata) =
+            SuperKeyManager::encrypt_with_password(&super_key, &pw)?;
+        db.store_super_key(
+            1,
+            &USER_SUPER_KEY,
+            &encrypted_super_key,
+            &metadata,
+            &KeyMetaData::new(),
+        )?;
+
+        //check if super key exists
+        assert!(db.key_exists(Domain::APP, 1, &USER_SUPER_KEY.alias, KeyType::Super)?);
+
+        let (_, key_entry) = db.load_super_key(&USER_SUPER_KEY, 1)?.unwrap();
+        let loaded_super_key = SuperKeyManager::extract_super_key_from_key_entry(
+            USER_SUPER_KEY.algorithm,
+            key_entry,
+            &pw,
+            None,
+        )?;
+
+        let decrypted_secret_bytes =
+            loaded_super_key.aes_gcm_decrypt(&encrypted_secret, &iv, &tag)?;
+        assert_eq!(secret_bytes, &*decrypted_secret_bytes);
+        Ok(())
+    }
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/ec_crypto.rs b/keystore2/src/ec_crypto.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0425d4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/ec_crypto.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! Implement ECDH-based encryption.
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use keystore2_crypto::{
+    aes_gcm_decrypt, aes_gcm_encrypt, ec_key_generate_key, ec_key_get0_public_key,
+    ec_key_marshal_private_key, ec_key_parse_private_key, ec_point_oct_to_point,
+    ec_point_point_to_oct, ecdh_compute_key, generate_salt, hkdf_expand, hkdf_extract, ECKey, ZVec,
+    AES_256_KEY_LENGTH,
+};
+
+/// Private key for ECDH encryption.
+pub struct ECDHPrivateKey(ECKey);
+
+impl ECDHPrivateKey {
+    /// Randomly generate a fresh keypair.
+    pub fn generate() -> Result<ECDHPrivateKey> {
+        ec_key_generate_key()
+            .map(ECDHPrivateKey)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::generate: generation failed")
+    }
+
+    /// Deserialize bytes into an ECDH keypair
+    pub fn from_private_key(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<ECDHPrivateKey> {
+        ec_key_parse_private_key(buf)
+            .map(ECDHPrivateKey)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::from_private_key: parsing failed")
+    }
+
+    /// Serialize the ECDH key into bytes
+    pub fn private_key(&self) -> Result<ZVec> {
+        ec_key_marshal_private_key(&self.0)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::private_key: marshalling failed")
+    }
+
+    /// Generate the serialization of the corresponding public key
+    pub fn public_key(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let point = ec_key_get0_public_key(&self.0);
+        ec_point_point_to_oct(point.get_point())
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::public_key: marshalling failed")
+    }
+
+    /// Use ECDH to agree an AES key with another party whose public key we have.
+    /// Sender and recipient public keys are passed separately because they are
+    /// switched in encryption vs decryption.
+    fn agree_key(
+        &self,
+        salt: &[u8],
+        other_public_key: &[u8],
+        sender_public_key: &[u8],
+        recipient_public_key: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<ZVec> {
+        let hkdf = hkdf_extract(sender_public_key, salt)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::agree_key: hkdf_extract on sender_public_key failed")?;
+        let hkdf = hkdf_extract(recipient_public_key, &hkdf)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::agree_key: hkdf_extract on recipient_public_key failed")?;
+        let other_public_key = ec_point_oct_to_point(other_public_key)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::agree_key: ec_point_oct_to_point failed")?;
+        let secret = ecdh_compute_key(other_public_key.get_point(), &self.0)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::agree_key: ecdh_compute_key failed")?;
+        let prk = hkdf_extract(&secret, &hkdf)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::agree_key: hkdf_extract on secret failed")?;
+
+        let aes_key = hkdf_expand(AES_256_KEY_LENGTH, &prk, b"AES-256-GCM key")
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::agree_key: hkdf_expand failed")?;
+        Ok(aes_key)
+    }
+
+    /// Encrypt a message to the party with the given public key
+    pub fn encrypt_message(
+        recipient_public_key: &[u8],
+        message: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)> {
+        let sender_key =
+            Self::generate().context("In ECDHPrivateKey::encrypt_message: generate failed")?;
+        let sender_public_key = sender_key
+            .public_key()
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::encrypt_message: public_key failed")?;
+        let salt =
+            generate_salt().context("In ECDHPrivateKey::encrypt_message: generate_salt failed")?;
+        let aes_key = sender_key
+            .agree_key(&salt, recipient_public_key, &sender_public_key, recipient_public_key)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::encrypt_message: agree_key failed")?;
+        let (ciphertext, iv, tag) = aes_gcm_encrypt(message, &aes_key)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::encrypt_message: aes_gcm_encrypt failed")?;
+        Ok((sender_public_key, salt, iv, ciphertext, tag))
+    }
+
+    /// Decrypt a message sent to us
+    pub fn decrypt_message(
+        &self,
+        sender_public_key: &[u8],
+        salt: &[u8],
+        iv: &[u8],
+        ciphertext: &[u8],
+        tag: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<ZVec> {
+        let recipient_public_key = self.public_key()?;
+        let aes_key = self
+            .agree_key(salt, sender_public_key, sender_public_key, &recipient_public_key)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::decrypt_message: agree_key failed")?;
+        aes_gcm_decrypt(ciphertext, iv, tag, &aes_key)
+            .context("In ECDHPrivateKey::decrypt_message: aes_gcm_decrypt failed")
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_crypto_roundtrip() -> Result<()> {
+        let message = b"Hello world";
+        let recipient = ECDHPrivateKey::generate()?;
+        let (sender_public_key, salt, iv, ciphertext, tag) =
+            ECDHPrivateKey::encrypt_message(&recipient.public_key()?, message)?;
+        let recipient = ECDHPrivateKey::from_private_key(&recipient.private_key()?)?;
+        let decrypted =
+            recipient.decrypt_message(&sender_public_key, &salt, &iv, &ciphertext, &tag)?;
+        let dc: &[u8] = &decrypted;
+        assert_eq!(message, dc);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs b/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs
index 3195ee0..3f003be 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs
@@ -14,13 +14,11 @@
 
 //! This is the Keystore 2.0 Enforcements module.
 // TODO: more description to follow.
+use crate::database::{AuthTokenEntry, MonotonicRawTime};
 use crate::error::{map_binder_status, Error, ErrorCode};
 use crate::globals::{get_timestamp_service, ASYNC_TASK, DB, ENFORCEMENTS};
 use crate::key_parameter::{KeyParameter, KeyParameterValue};
-use crate::{
-    database::{AuthTokenEntry, MonotonicRawTime},
-    gc::Gc,
-};
+use crate::{authorization::Error as AuthzError, super_key::SuperEncryptionType};
 use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
     Algorithm::Algorithm, ErrorCode::ErrorCode as Ec, HardwareAuthToken::HardwareAuthToken,
     HardwareAuthenticatorType::HardwareAuthenticatorType,
@@ -29,14 +27,23 @@
 use android_hardware_security_secureclock::aidl::android::hardware::security::secureclock::{
     ISecureClock::ISecureClock, TimeStampToken::TimeStampToken,
 };
-use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::OperationChallenge::OperationChallenge;
-use anyhow::{Context, Result};
-use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
-use std::sync::{
-    mpsc::{channel, Receiver, Sender},
-    Arc, Mutex, Weak,
+use android_security_authorization::aidl::android::security::authorization::ResponseCode::ResponseCode as AuthzResponseCode;
+use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::{
+    Domain::Domain, IKeystoreSecurityLevel::KEY_FLAG_AUTH_BOUND_WITHOUT_CRYPTOGRAPHIC_LSKF_BINDING,
+    OperationChallenge::OperationChallenge,
 };
-use std::time::SystemTime;
+use android_system_keystore2::binder::Strong;
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use keystore2_system_property::PropertyWatcher;
+use std::{
+    collections::{HashMap, HashSet},
+    sync::{
+        atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering},
+        mpsc::{channel, Receiver, Sender, TryRecvError},
+        Arc, Mutex, Weak,
+    },
+    time::SystemTime,
+};
 
 #[derive(Debug)]
 enum AuthRequestState {
@@ -133,6 +140,7 @@
     state: DeferredAuthState,
     /// An optional key id required to update the usage count if the key usage is limited.
     key_usage_limited: Option<i64>,
+    confirmation_token_receiver: Option<Arc<Mutex<Option<Receiver<Vec<u8>>>>>>,
 }
 
 struct TokenReceiverMap {
@@ -198,7 +206,7 @@
 }
 
 fn get_timestamp_token(challenge: i64) -> Result<TimeStampToken, Error> {
-    let dev: Box<dyn ISecureClock> = get_timestamp_service()
+    let dev: Strong<dyn ISecureClock> = get_timestamp_service()
         .expect(concat!(
             "Secure Clock service must be present ",
             "if TimeStampTokens are required."
@@ -212,7 +220,7 @@
     if let Err(e) = sender.send(get_timestamp_token(challenge)) {
         log::info!(
             concat!(
-                "In timestamp_token_request: Operation hung up ",
+                "In timestamp_token_request: Receiver hung up ",
                 "before timestamp token could be delivered. {:?}"
             ),
             e
@@ -240,7 +248,7 @@
                 let token_receiver = TokenReceiver(Arc::downgrade(&auth_request));
                 ENFORCEMENTS.register_op_auth_receiver(challenge, token_receiver);
 
-                ASYNC_TASK.queue_hi(move || timestamp_token_request(challenge, sender));
+                ASYNC_TASK.queue_hi(move |_| timestamp_token_request(challenge, sender));
                 self.state = DeferredAuthState::Waiting(auth_request);
                 Some(OperationChallenge { challenge })
             }
@@ -248,7 +256,7 @@
                 let hat = (*hat).clone();
                 let (sender, receiver) = channel::<Result<TimeStampToken, Error>>();
                 let auth_request = AuthRequest::timestamp(hat, receiver);
-                ASYNC_TASK.queue_hi(move || timestamp_token_request(challenge, sender));
+                ASYNC_TASK.queue_hi(move |_| timestamp_token_request(challenge, sender));
                 self.state = DeferredAuthState::Waiting(auth_request);
                 None
             }
@@ -264,8 +272,32 @@
 
     /// This function is the authorization hook called before operation finish.
     /// It returns the auth tokens required by the operation to commence finish.
-    pub fn before_finish(&mut self) -> Result<(Option<HardwareAuthToken>, Option<TimeStampToken>)> {
-        self.get_auth_tokens()
+    /// The third token is a confirmation token.
+    pub fn before_finish(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> Result<(Option<HardwareAuthToken>, Option<TimeStampToken>, Option<Vec<u8>>)> {
+        let mut confirmation_token: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
+        if let Some(ref confirmation_token_receiver) = self.confirmation_token_receiver {
+            let locked_receiver = confirmation_token_receiver.lock().unwrap();
+            if let Some(ref receiver) = *locked_receiver {
+                loop {
+                    match receiver.try_recv() {
+                        // As long as we get tokens we loop and discard all but the most
+                        // recent one.
+                        Ok(t) => confirmation_token = Some(t),
+                        Err(TryRecvError::Empty) => break,
+                        Err(TryRecvError::Disconnected) => {
+                            log::error!(concat!(
+                                "We got disconnected from the APC service, ",
+                                "this should never happen."
+                            ));
+                            break;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        self.get_auth_tokens().map(|(hat, tst)| (hat, tst, confirmation_token))
     }
 
     /// This function is the authorization hook called after finish succeeded.
@@ -276,16 +308,12 @@
         if let Some(key_id) = self.key_usage_limited {
             // On the last successful use, the key gets deleted. In this case we
             // have to notify the garbage collector.
-            let need_gc = DB
-                .with(|db| {
-                    db.borrow_mut()
-                        .check_and_update_key_usage_count(key_id)
-                        .context("Trying to update key usage count.")
-                })
-                .context("In after_finish.")?;
-            if need_gc {
-                Gc::notify_gc();
-            }
+            DB.with(|db| {
+                db.borrow_mut()
+                    .check_and_update_key_usage_count(key_id)
+                    .context("Trying to update key usage count.")
+            })
+            .context("In after_finish.")?;
         }
         Ok(())
     }
@@ -327,6 +355,7 @@
 }
 
 /// Enforcements data structure
+#[derive(Default)]
 pub struct Enforcements {
     /// This hash set contains the user ids for whom the device is currently unlocked. If a user id
     /// is not in the set, it implies that the device is locked for the user.
@@ -337,15 +366,22 @@
     /// stale, because the operation gets dropped before an auth token is received, the map
     /// is cleaned up in regular intervals.
     op_auth_map: TokenReceiverMap,
+    /// The enforcement module will try to get a confirmation token from this channel whenever
+    /// an operation that requires confirmation finishes.
+    confirmation_token_receiver: Arc<Mutex<Option<Receiver<Vec<u8>>>>>,
+    /// Highest boot level seen in keystore.boot_level; used to enforce MAX_BOOT_LEVEL tag.
+    boot_level: AtomicI32,
 }
 
 impl Enforcements {
-    /// Creates an enforcement object with the two data structures it holds and the sender as None.
-    pub fn new() -> Self {
-        Enforcements {
-            device_unlocked_set: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
-            op_auth_map: Default::default(),
-        }
+    /// Install the confirmation token receiver. The enforcement module will try to get a
+    /// confirmation token from this channel whenever an operation that requires confirmation
+    /// finishes.
+    pub fn install_confirmation_token_receiver(
+        &self,
+        confirmation_token_receiver: Receiver<Vec<u8>>,
+    ) {
+        *self.confirmation_token_receiver.lock().unwrap() = Some(confirmation_token_receiver);
     }
 
     /// Checks if a create call is authorized, given key parameters and operation parameters.
@@ -371,7 +407,11 @@
             None => {
                 return Ok((
                     None,
-                    AuthInfo { state: DeferredAuthState::NoAuthRequired, key_usage_limited: None },
+                    AuthInfo {
+                        state: DeferredAuthState::NoAuthRequired,
+                        key_usage_limited: None,
+                        confirmation_token_receiver: None,
+                    },
                 ))
             }
         };
@@ -431,6 +471,8 @@
         let mut allow_while_on_body = false;
         let mut unlocked_device_required = false;
         let mut key_usage_limited: Option<i64> = None;
+        let mut confirmation_token_receiver: Option<Arc<Mutex<Option<Receiver<Vec<u8>>>>>> = None;
+        let mut max_boot_level: Option<i32> = None;
 
         // iterate through key parameters, recording information we need for authorization
         // enforcements later, or enforcing authorizations in place, where applicable
@@ -494,6 +536,12 @@
                     // in the database again and check and update the counter.
                     key_usage_limited = Some(key_id);
                 }
+                KeyParameterValue::TrustedConfirmationRequired => {
+                    confirmation_token_receiver = Some(self.confirmation_token_receiver.clone());
+                }
+                KeyParameterValue::MaxBootLevel(level) => {
+                    max_boot_level = Some(*level);
+                }
                 // NOTE: as per offline discussion, sanitizing key parameters and rejecting
                 // create operation if any non-allowed tags are present, is not done in
                 // authorize_create (unlike in legacy keystore where AuthorizeBegin is rejected if
@@ -547,10 +595,21 @@
             }
         }
 
+        if let Some(level) = max_boot_level {
+            if level < self.boot_level.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
+                return Err(Error::Km(Ec::BOOT_LEVEL_EXCEEDED))
+                    .context("In authorize_create: boot level is too late.");
+            }
+        }
+
         if !unlocked_device_required && no_auth_required {
             return Ok((
                 None,
-                AuthInfo { state: DeferredAuthState::NoAuthRequired, key_usage_limited },
+                AuthInfo {
+                    state: DeferredAuthState::NoAuthRequired,
+                    key_usage_limited,
+                    confirmation_token_receiver,
+                },
             ));
         }
 
@@ -625,7 +684,9 @@
             (None, _, true) => (None, DeferredAuthState::OpAuthRequired),
             (None, _, false) => (None, DeferredAuthState::NoAuthRequired),
         })
-        .map(|(hat, state)| (hat, AuthInfo { state, key_usage_limited }))
+        .map(|(hat, state)| {
+            (hat, AuthInfo { state, key_usage_limited, confirmation_token_receiver })
+        })
     }
 
     fn find_auth_token<F>(p: F) -> Result<Option<(AuthTokenEntry, MonotonicRawTime)>>
@@ -694,11 +755,123 @@
     fn register_op_auth_receiver(&self, challenge: i64, recv: TokenReceiver) {
         self.op_auth_map.add_receiver(challenge, recv);
     }
-}
 
-impl Default for Enforcements {
-    fn default() -> Self {
-        Self::new()
+    /// Given the set of key parameters and flags, check if super encryption is required.
+    pub fn super_encryption_required(
+        domain: &Domain,
+        key_parameters: &[KeyParameter],
+        flags: Option<i32>,
+    ) -> SuperEncryptionType {
+        if *domain != Domain::APP {
+            return SuperEncryptionType::None;
+        }
+        if let Some(flags) = flags {
+            if (flags & KEY_FLAG_AUTH_BOUND_WITHOUT_CRYPTOGRAPHIC_LSKF_BINDING) != 0 {
+                return SuperEncryptionType::None;
+            }
+        }
+        if key_parameters
+            .iter()
+            .any(|kp| matches!(kp.key_parameter_value(), KeyParameterValue::UnlockedDeviceRequired))
+        {
+            return SuperEncryptionType::ScreenLockBound;
+        }
+        if key_parameters
+            .iter()
+            .any(|kp| matches!(kp.key_parameter_value(), KeyParameterValue::UserSecureID(_)))
+        {
+            return SuperEncryptionType::LskfBound;
+        }
+        SuperEncryptionType::None
+    }
+
+    /// Finds a matching auth token along with a timestamp token.
+    /// This method looks through auth-tokens cached by keystore which satisfy the given
+    /// authentication information (i.e. |secureUserId|).
+    /// The most recent matching auth token which has a |challenge| field which matches
+    /// the passed-in |challenge| parameter is returned.
+    /// In this case the |authTokenMaxAgeMillis| parameter is not used.
+    ///
+    /// Otherwise, the most recent matching auth token which is younger than |authTokenMaxAgeMillis|
+    /// is returned.
+    pub fn get_auth_tokens(
+        &self,
+        challenge: i64,
+        secure_user_id: i64,
+        auth_token_max_age_millis: i64,
+    ) -> Result<(HardwareAuthToken, TimeStampToken)> {
+        let auth_type = HardwareAuthenticatorType::ANY;
+        let sids: Vec<i64> = vec![secure_user_id];
+        // Filter the matching auth tokens by challenge
+        let result = Self::find_auth_token(|hat: &AuthTokenEntry| {
+            (challenge == hat.challenge()) && hat.satisfies(&sids, auth_type)
+        })
+        .context(
+            "In get_auth_tokens: Failed to get a matching auth token filtered by challenge.",
+        )?;
+
+        let auth_token = if let Some((auth_token_entry, _)) = result {
+            auth_token_entry.take_auth_token()
+        } else {
+            // Filter the matching auth tokens by age.
+            if auth_token_max_age_millis != 0 {
+                let now_in_millis = MonotonicRawTime::now().milli_seconds();
+                let result = Self::find_auth_token(|auth_token_entry: &AuthTokenEntry| {
+                    let token_valid = now_in_millis
+                        .checked_sub(auth_token_entry.time_received().milli_seconds())
+                        .map_or(false, |token_age_in_millis| {
+                            auth_token_max_age_millis > token_age_in_millis
+                        });
+                    token_valid && auth_token_entry.satisfies(&sids, auth_type)
+                })
+                .context(
+                    "In get_auth_tokens: Failed to get a matching auth token filtered by age.",
+                )?;
+
+                if let Some((auth_token_entry, _)) = result {
+                    auth_token_entry.take_auth_token()
+                } else {
+                    return Err(AuthzError::Rc(AuthzResponseCode::NO_AUTH_TOKEN_FOUND))
+                        .context("In get_auth_tokens: No auth token found.");
+                }
+            } else {
+                return Err(AuthzError::Rc(AuthzResponseCode::NO_AUTH_TOKEN_FOUND))
+                    .context("In get_auth_tokens: Passed-in auth token max age is zero.");
+            }
+        };
+        // Wait and obtain the timestamp token from secure clock service.
+        let tst = get_timestamp_token(challenge)
+            .context("In get_auth_tokens. Error in getting timestamp token.")?;
+        Ok((auth_token, tst))
+    }
+
+    /// Watch the `keystore.boot_level` system property, and keep self.boot_level up to date.
+    /// Blocks waiting for system property changes, so must be run in its own thread.
+    pub fn watch_boot_level(&self) -> Result<()> {
+        let mut w = PropertyWatcher::new("keystore.boot_level")?;
+        loop {
+            fn parse_value(_name: &str, value: &str) -> Result<Option<i32>> {
+                Ok(if value == "end" { None } else { Some(value.parse::<i32>()?) })
+            }
+            match w.read(parse_value)? {
+                Some(level) => {
+                    let old = self.boot_level.fetch_max(level, Ordering::SeqCst);
+                    log::info!(
+                        "Read keystore.boot_level: {}; boot level {} -> {}",
+                        level,
+                        old,
+                        std::cmp::max(old, level)
+                    );
+                }
+                None => {
+                    log::info!("keystore.boot_level is `end`, finishing.");
+                    self.boot_level.fetch_max(i32::MAX, Ordering::SeqCst);
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            w.wait()?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
     }
 }
 
diff --git a/keystore2/src/entropy.rs b/keystore2/src/entropy.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de38187
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/entropy.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! This module holds functionality for retrieving and distributing entropy.
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use log::error;
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+static ENTROPY_SIZE: usize = 64;
+static MIN_FEED_INTERVAL_SECS: u64 = 30;
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+struct FeederInfo {
+    last_feed: Option<Instant>,
+}
+
+/// Register the entropy feeder as an idle callback.
+pub fn register_feeder() {
+    crate::globals::ASYNC_TASK.add_idle(|shelf| {
+        let mut info = shelf.get_mut::<FeederInfo>();
+        let now = Instant::now();
+        let feed_needed = match info.last_feed {
+            None => true,
+            Some(last) => now.duration_since(last) > Duration::from_secs(MIN_FEED_INTERVAL_SECS),
+        };
+        if feed_needed {
+            info.last_feed = Some(now);
+            feed_devices();
+        }
+    });
+}
+
+fn get_entropy(size: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    keystore2_crypto::generate_random_data(size).context("Retrieving entropy for KeyMint device")
+}
+
+/// Feed entropy to all known KeyMint devices.
+pub fn feed_devices() {
+    let km_devs = crate::globals::get_keymint_devices();
+    if km_devs.is_empty() {
+        return;
+    }
+    let data = match get_entropy(km_devs.len() * ENTROPY_SIZE) {
+        Ok(data) => data,
+        Err(e) => {
+            error!(
+                "Failed to retrieve {}*{} bytes of entropy: {:?}",
+                km_devs.len(),
+                ENTROPY_SIZE,
+                e
+            );
+            return;
+        }
+    };
+    for (i, km_dev) in km_devs.iter().enumerate() {
+        let offset = i * ENTROPY_SIZE;
+        let sub_data = &data[offset..(offset + ENTROPY_SIZE)];
+        if let Err(e) = km_dev.addRngEntropy(sub_data) {
+            error!("Failed to feed entropy to KeyMint device: {:?}", e);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::collections::HashSet;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_entropy_size() {
+        for size in &[0, 1, 4, 8, 256, 4096] {
+            let data = get_entropy(*size).expect("failed to get entropy");
+            assert_eq!(data.len(), *size);
+        }
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_entropy_uniqueness() {
+        let count = 10;
+        let mut seen = HashSet::new();
+        for _i in 0..count {
+            let data = get_entropy(16).expect("failed to get entropy");
+            seen.insert(data);
+        }
+        assert_eq!(seen.len(), count);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/error.rs b/keystore2/src/error.rs
index 7227f62..465dcfa 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/error.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/error.rs
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@
     /// Wraps a Binder status code.
     #[error("Binder transaction error {0:?}")]
     BinderTransaction(StatusCode),
+    /// Wraps a Remote Provisioning ErrorCode as defined by the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent
+    /// AIDL interface spec.
+    #[error("Error::Rp({0:?})")]
+    Rp(ErrorCode),
 }
 
 impl Error {
@@ -101,6 +105,16 @@
     })
 }
 
+/// Helper function to map the binder status we get from calls into a RemotelyProvisionedComponent
+/// to a Keystore Error. We don't create an anyhow error here to make
+/// it easier to evaluate service specific errors.
+pub fn map_rem_prov_error<T>(r: BinderResult<T>) -> Result<T, Error> {
+    r.map_err(|s| match s.exception_code() {
+        ExceptionCode::SERVICE_SPECIFIC => Error::Rp(ErrorCode(s.service_specific_error())),
+        e_code => Error::Binder(e_code, 0),
+    })
+}
+
 /// This function is similar to map_km_error only that we don't expect
 /// any KeyMint error codes, we simply preserve the exception code and optional
 /// service specific exception.
@@ -157,30 +171,58 @@
 where
     F: FnOnce(U) -> BinderResult<T>,
 {
-    result.map_or_else(
+    map_err_with(
+        result,
         |e| {
             log::error!("{:?}", e);
-            let root_cause = e.root_cause();
-            let rc = match root_cause.downcast_ref::<Error>() {
-                Some(Error::Rc(rcode)) => rcode.0,
-                Some(Error::Km(ec)) => ec.0,
-                // If an Error::Binder reaches this stage we report a system error.
-                // The exception code and possible service specific error will be
-                // printed in the error log above.
-                Some(Error::Binder(_, _)) | Some(Error::BinderTransaction(_)) => {
-                    ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR.0
-                }
-                None => match root_cause.downcast_ref::<selinux::Error>() {
-                    Some(selinux::Error::PermissionDenied) => ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED.0,
-                    _ => ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR.0,
-                },
-            };
+            e
+        },
+        handle_ok,
+    )
+}
+
+/// This function behaves similar to map_or_log_error, but it does not log the errors, instead
+/// it calls map_err on the error before mapping it to a binder result allowing callers to
+/// log or transform the error before mapping it.
+pub fn map_err_with<T, U, F1, F2>(
+    result: anyhow::Result<U>,
+    map_err: F1,
+    handle_ok: F2,
+) -> BinderResult<T>
+where
+    F1: FnOnce(anyhow::Error) -> anyhow::Error,
+    F2: FnOnce(U) -> BinderResult<T>,
+{
+    result.map_or_else(
+        |e| {
+            let e = map_err(e);
+            let rc = get_error_code(&e);
             Err(BinderStatus::new_service_specific_error(rc, None))
         },
         handle_ok,
     )
 }
 
+/// Returns the error code given a reference to the error
+pub fn get_error_code(e: &anyhow::Error) -> i32 {
+    let root_cause = e.root_cause();
+    match root_cause.downcast_ref::<Error>() {
+        Some(Error::Rc(rcode)) => rcode.0,
+        Some(Error::Km(ec)) => ec.0,
+        Some(Error::Rp(_)) => ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR.0,
+        // If an Error::Binder reaches this stage we report a system error.
+        // The exception code and possible service specific error will be
+        // printed in the error log above.
+        Some(Error::Binder(_, _)) | Some(Error::BinderTransaction(_)) => {
+            ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR.0
+        }
+        None => match root_cause.downcast_ref::<selinux::Error>() {
+            Some(selinux::Error::PermissionDenied) => ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED.0,
+            _ => ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR.0,
+        },
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 pub mod tests {
 
diff --git a/keystore2/src/gc.rs b/keystore2/src/gc.rs
index b5bdd98..6cc0f27 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/gc.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/gc.rs
@@ -18,77 +18,106 @@
 //! optionally dispose of sensitive key material appropriately, and then delete
 //! the key entry from the database.
 
-use crate::globals::{get_keymint_device, DB};
-use crate::{error::map_km_error, globals::ASYNC_TASK};
-use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::IKeyMintDevice::IKeyMintDevice;
-use anyhow::Result;
+use crate::{
+    async_task,
+    database::{KeystoreDB, Uuid},
+    super_key::SuperKeyManager,
+};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use async_task::AsyncTask;
+use std::sync::Arc;
 
-#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
 pub struct Gc {
-    remaining_tries: u32,
+    async_task: Arc<AsyncTask>,
 }
 
 impl Gc {
-    const MAX_ERROR_RETRIES: u32 = 3u32;
+    /// Creates a garbage collector using the given async_task.
+    /// The garbage collector needs a function to invalidate key blobs and a database connection.
+    /// Both are obtained from the init function. The function is only called if this is first
+    /// time a garbage collector was initialized with the given AsyncTask instance.
+    pub fn new_init_with<F>(async_task: Arc<AsyncTask>, init: F) -> Self
+    where
+        F: FnOnce() -> (
+                Box<dyn Fn(&Uuid, &[u8]) -> Result<()> + Send + 'static>,
+                KeystoreDB,
+                Arc<SuperKeyManager>,
+            ) + Send
+            + 'static,
+    {
+        let weak_at = Arc::downgrade(&async_task);
+        // Initialize the task's shelf.
+        async_task.queue_hi(move |shelf| {
+            let (invalidate_key, db, super_key) = init();
+            shelf.get_or_put_with(|| GcInternal {
+                blob_id_to_delete: None,
+                invalidate_key,
+                db,
+                async_task: weak_at,
+                super_key,
+            });
+        });
+        Self { async_task }
+    }
 
-    /// Attempts to process one unreferenced key from the database.
-    /// Returns Ok(true) if a key was deleted and Ok(false) if there were no more keys to process.
+    /// Notifies the key garbage collector to iterate through orphaned and superseded blobs and
+    /// attempts their deletion. We only process one key at a time and then schedule another
+    /// attempt by queueing it in the async_task (low priority) queue.
+    pub fn notify_gc(&self) {
+        self.async_task.queue_lo(|shelf| shelf.get_downcast_mut::<GcInternal>().unwrap().step())
+    }
+}
+
+struct GcInternal {
+    blob_id_to_delete: Option<i64>,
+    invalidate_key: Box<dyn Fn(&Uuid, &[u8]) -> Result<()> + Send + 'static>,
+    db: KeystoreDB,
+    async_task: std::sync::Weak<AsyncTask>,
+    super_key: Arc<SuperKeyManager>,
+}
+
+impl GcInternal {
+    /// Attempts to process one blob from the database.
     /// We process one key at a time, because deleting a key is a time consuming process which
     /// may involve calling into the KeyMint backend and we don't want to hog neither the backend
     /// nor the database for extended periods of time.
-    fn process_one_key() -> Result<bool> {
-        DB.with(|db| {
-            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
-            if let Some((key_id, mut key_entry)) = db.get_unreferenced_key()? {
-                if let Some(blob) = key_entry.take_km_blob() {
-                    let km_dev: Box<dyn IKeyMintDevice> =
-                        get_keymint_device(key_entry.sec_level())?.get_interface()?;
-                    if let Err(e) = map_km_error(km_dev.deleteKey(&blob)) {
-                        // Log but ignore error.
-                        log::error!("Error trying to delete key. {:?}", e);
-                    }
-                }
-                db.purge_key_entry(key_id)?;
-                return Ok(true);
-            }
-            Ok(false)
-        })
-    }
+    fn process_one_key(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
+        if let Some((blob_id, blob, blob_metadata)) = self
+            .db
+            .handle_next_superseded_blob(self.blob_id_to_delete.take())
+            .context("In process_one_key: Trying to handle superseded blob.")?
+        {
+            // Set the blob_id as the next to be deleted blob. So it will be
+            // removed from the database regardless of whether the following
+            // succeeds or not.
+            self.blob_id_to_delete = Some(blob_id);
 
-    /// Processes one key and then schedules another attempt until it runs out of tries or keys
-    /// to delete.
-    fn process_all(mut self) {
-        match Self::process_one_key() {
-            // We successfully removed a key.
-            Ok(true) => self.remaining_tries = Self::MAX_ERROR_RETRIES,
-            // There were no more keys to remove. We may exit.
-            Ok(false) => self.remaining_tries = 0,
-            // An error occurred. We retry in case the error was transient, but
-            // we also count down the number of tries so that we don't spin
-            // indefinitely.
-            Err(e) => {
-                self.remaining_tries -= 1;
-                log::error!(
-                    concat!(
-                        "Failed to delete key. Retrying in case this error was transient. ",
-                        "(Tries remaining {}) {:?}"
-                    ),
-                    self.remaining_tries,
-                    e
-                )
+            // If the key has a km_uuid we try to get the corresponding device
+            // and delete the key, unwrapping if necessary and possible.
+            // (At this time keys may get deleted without having the super encryption
+            // key in this case we can only delete the key from the database.)
+            if let Some(uuid) = blob_metadata.km_uuid() {
+                let blob = self
+                    .super_key
+                    .unwrap_key_if_required(&blob_metadata, &blob)
+                    .context("In process_one_key: Trying to unwrap to-be-deleted blob.")?;
+                (self.invalidate_key)(&uuid, &*blob)
+                    .context("In process_one_key: Trying to invalidate key.")?;
             }
         }
-        if self.remaining_tries != 0 {
-            ASYNC_TASK.queue_lo(move || {
-                self.process_all();
-            })
-        }
+        Ok(())
     }
 
-    /// Notifies the key garbage collector to iterate through unreferenced keys and attempt
-    /// their deletion. We only process one key at a time and then schedule another
-    /// attempt by queueing it in the async_task (low priority) queue.
-    pub fn notify_gc() {
-        ASYNC_TASK.queue_lo(|| Self { remaining_tries: Self::MAX_ERROR_RETRIES }.process_all())
+    /// Processes one key and then schedules another attempt until it runs out of blobs to delete.
+    fn step(&mut self) {
+        if let Err(e) = self.process_one_key() {
+            log::error!("Error trying to delete blob entry. {:?}", e);
+        }
+        // Schedule the next step. This gives high priority requests a chance to interleave.
+        if self.blob_id_to_delete.is_some() {
+            if let Some(at) = self.async_task.upgrade() {
+                at.queue_lo(move |shelf| shelf.get_downcast_mut::<GcInternal>().unwrap().step());
+            }
+        }
     }
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/globals.rs b/keystore2/src/globals.rs
index 50ec26c..54f7dc7 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/globals.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/globals.rs
@@ -16,38 +16,60 @@
 //! database connections and connections to services that Keystore needs
 //! to talk to.
 
-use crate::enforcements::Enforcements;
 use crate::gc::Gc;
 use crate::legacy_blob::LegacyBlobLoader;
+use crate::legacy_migrator::LegacyMigrator;
 use crate::super_key::SuperKeyManager;
 use crate::utils::Asp;
 use crate::{async_task::AsyncTask, database::MonotonicRawTime};
 use crate::{
     database::KeystoreDB,
+    database::Uuid,
     error::{map_binder_status, map_binder_status_code, Error, ErrorCode},
 };
-use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel;
-use android_hardware_security_keymint::binder::StatusCode;
+use crate::{enforcements::Enforcements, error::map_km_error};
+use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
+    IKeyMintDevice::IKeyMintDevice, IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::IRemotelyProvisionedComponent,
+    KeyMintHardwareInfo::KeyMintHardwareInfo, SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel,
+};
+use android_hardware_security_keymint::binder::{StatusCode, Strong};
 use android_security_compat::aidl::android::security::compat::IKeystoreCompatService::IKeystoreCompatService;
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use binder::FromIBinder;
+use keystore2_vintf::get_aidl_instances;
 use lazy_static::lazy_static;
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::sync::Mutex;
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
 use std::{cell::RefCell, sync::Once};
+use std::{collections::HashMap, path::Path, path::PathBuf};
 
 static DB_INIT: Once = Once::new();
 
 /// Open a connection to the Keystore 2.0 database. This is called during the initialization of
 /// the thread local DB field. It should never be called directly. The first time this is called
 /// we also call KeystoreDB::cleanup_leftovers to restore the key lifecycle invariant. See the
-/// documentation of cleanup_leftovers for more details.
-fn create_thread_local_db() -> KeystoreDB {
-    let mut db = KeystoreDB::new(
-        // Keystore changes to the database directory on startup
-        // (see keystore2_main.rs).
-        &std::env::current_dir().expect("Could not get the current working directory."),
-    )
-    .expect("Failed to open database.");
+/// documentation of cleanup_leftovers for more details. The function also constructs a blob
+/// garbage collector. The initializing closure constructs another database connection without
+/// a gc. Although one GC is created for each thread local database connection, this closure
+/// is run only once, as long as the ASYNC_TASK instance is the same. So only one additional
+/// database connection is created for the garbage collector worker.
+pub fn create_thread_local_db() -> KeystoreDB {
+    let gc = Gc::new_init_with(ASYNC_TASK.clone(), || {
+        (
+            Box::new(|uuid, blob| {
+                let km_dev: Strong<dyn IKeyMintDevice> =
+                    get_keymint_dev_by_uuid(uuid).map(|(dev, _)| dev)?.get_interface()?;
+                map_km_error(km_dev.deleteKey(&*blob))
+                    .context("In invalidate key closure: Trying to invalidate key blob.")
+            }),
+            KeystoreDB::new(&DB_PATH.lock().expect("Could not get the database directory."), None)
+                .expect("Failed to open database."),
+            SUPER_KEY.clone(),
+        )
+    });
+
+    let mut db =
+        KeystoreDB::new(&DB_PATH.lock().expect("Could not get the database directory."), Some(gc))
+            .expect("Failed to open database.");
     DB_INIT.call_once(|| {
         log::info!("Touching Keystore 2.0 database for this first time since boot.");
         db.insert_last_off_body(MonotonicRawTime::now())
@@ -63,7 +85,6 @@
                 n
             );
         }
-        Gc::notify_gc();
     });
     db
 }
@@ -77,22 +98,81 @@
             RefCell::new(create_thread_local_db());
 }
 
+#[derive(Default)]
+struct DevicesMap {
+    devices_by_uuid: HashMap<Uuid, (Asp, KeyMintHardwareInfo)>,
+    uuid_by_sec_level: HashMap<SecurityLevel, Uuid>,
+}
+
+impl DevicesMap {
+    fn dev_by_sec_level(
+        &self,
+        sec_level: &SecurityLevel,
+    ) -> Option<(Asp, KeyMintHardwareInfo, Uuid)> {
+        self.uuid_by_sec_level.get(sec_level).and_then(|uuid| self.dev_by_uuid(uuid))
+    }
+
+    fn dev_by_uuid(&self, uuid: &Uuid) -> Option<(Asp, KeyMintHardwareInfo, Uuid)> {
+        self.devices_by_uuid
+            .get(uuid)
+            .map(|(dev, hw_info)| ((*dev).clone(), (*hw_info).clone(), *uuid))
+    }
+
+    fn devices<T: FromIBinder + ?Sized>(&self) -> Vec<Strong<T>> {
+        self.devices_by_uuid.values().filter_map(|(asp, _)| asp.get_interface::<T>().ok()).collect()
+    }
+
+    /// The requested security level and the security level of the actual implementation may
+    /// differ. So we map the requested security level to the uuid of the implementation
+    /// so that there cannot be any confusion as to which KeyMint instance is requested.
+    fn insert(&mut self, sec_level: SecurityLevel, dev: Asp, hw_info: KeyMintHardwareInfo) {
+        // For now we use the reported security level of the KM instance as UUID.
+        // TODO update this section once UUID was added to the KM hardware info.
+        let uuid: Uuid = sec_level.into();
+        self.devices_by_uuid.insert(uuid, (dev, hw_info));
+        self.uuid_by_sec_level.insert(sec_level, uuid);
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+struct RemotelyProvisionedDevicesMap {
+    devices_by_sec_level: HashMap<SecurityLevel, Asp>,
+}
+
+impl RemotelyProvisionedDevicesMap {
+    fn dev_by_sec_level(&self, sec_level: &SecurityLevel) -> Option<Asp> {
+        self.devices_by_sec_level.get(sec_level).map(|dev| (*dev).clone())
+    }
+
+    fn insert(&mut self, sec_level: SecurityLevel, dev: Asp) {
+        self.devices_by_sec_level.insert(sec_level, dev);
+    }
+}
+
 lazy_static! {
+    /// The path where keystore stores all its keys.
+    pub static ref DB_PATH: Mutex<PathBuf> = Mutex::new(
+        Path::new("/data/misc/keystore").to_path_buf());
     /// Runtime database of unwrapped super keys.
-    pub static ref SUPER_KEY: SuperKeyManager = Default::default();
+    pub static ref SUPER_KEY: Arc<SuperKeyManager> = Default::default();
     /// Map of KeyMint devices.
-    static ref KEY_MINT_DEVICES: Mutex<HashMap<SecurityLevel, Asp>> = Default::default();
+    static ref KEY_MINT_DEVICES: Mutex<DevicesMap> = Default::default();
     /// Timestamp service.
     static ref TIME_STAMP_DEVICE: Mutex<Option<Asp>> = Default::default();
+    /// RemotelyProvisionedComponent HAL devices.
+    static ref REMOTELY_PROVISIONED_COMPONENT_DEVICES: Mutex<RemotelyProvisionedDevicesMap> = Default::default();
     /// A single on-demand worker thread that handles deferred tasks with two different
     /// priorities.
-    pub static ref ASYNC_TASK: AsyncTask = Default::default();
+    pub static ref ASYNC_TASK: Arc<AsyncTask> = Default::default();
     /// Singleton for enforcements.
-    pub static ref ENFORCEMENTS: Enforcements = Enforcements::new();
+    pub static ref ENFORCEMENTS: Enforcements = Default::default();
     /// LegacyBlobLoader is initialized and exists globally.
     /// The same directory used by the database is used by the LegacyBlobLoader as well.
-    pub static ref LEGACY_BLOB_LOADER: LegacyBlobLoader = LegacyBlobLoader::new(
-        &std::env::current_dir().expect("Could not get the current working directory."));
+    pub static ref LEGACY_BLOB_LOADER: Arc<LegacyBlobLoader> = Arc::new(LegacyBlobLoader::new(
+        &DB_PATH.lock().expect("Could not get the database path for legacy blob loader.")));
+    /// Legacy migrator. Atomically migrates legacy blobs to the database.
+    pub static ref LEGACY_MIGRATOR: Arc<LegacyMigrator> =
+        Arc::new(LegacyMigrator::new(ASYNC_TASK.clone()));
 }
 
 static KEYMINT_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintDevice";
@@ -100,89 +180,125 @@
 /// Make a new connection to a KeyMint device of the given security level.
 /// If no native KeyMint device can be found this function also brings
 /// up the compatibility service and attempts to connect to the legacy wrapper.
-fn connect_keymint(security_level: SecurityLevel) -> Result<Asp> {
-    let service_name = match security_level {
-        SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT => format!("{}/default", KEYMINT_SERVICE_NAME),
-        SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX => format!("{}/strongbox", KEYMINT_SERVICE_NAME),
+fn connect_keymint(security_level: &SecurityLevel) -> Result<(Asp, KeyMintHardwareInfo)> {
+    let keymint_instances =
+        get_aidl_instances("android.hardware.security.keymint", 1, "IKeyMintDevice");
+
+    let service_name = match *security_level {
+        SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT => {
+            if keymint_instances.as_vec()?.iter().any(|instance| *instance == "default") {
+                Some(format!("{}/default", KEYMINT_SERVICE_NAME))
+            } else {
+                None
+            }
+        }
+        SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX => {
+            if keymint_instances.as_vec()?.iter().any(|instance| *instance == "strongbox") {
+                Some(format!("{}/strongbox", KEYMINT_SERVICE_NAME))
+            } else {
+                None
+            }
+        }
         _ => {
             return Err(Error::Km(ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE))
                 .context("In connect_keymint.")
         }
     };
 
-    let keymint = map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface(&service_name))
-        .context("In connect_keymint: Trying to connect to genuine KeyMint service.")
-        .or_else(|e| {
-            match e.root_cause().downcast_ref::<Error>() {
-                Some(Error::BinderTransaction(StatusCode::NAME_NOT_FOUND)) => {
-                    // This is a no-op if it was called before.
-                    keystore2_km_compat::add_keymint_device_service();
+    let keymint = if let Some(service_name) = service_name {
+        map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface(&service_name))
+            .context("In connect_keymint: Trying to connect to genuine KeyMint service.")
+    } else {
+        // This is a no-op if it was called before.
+        keystore2_km_compat::add_keymint_device_service();
 
-                    let keystore_compat_service: Box<dyn IKeystoreCompatService> =
-                        map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface("android.security.compat"))
-                            .context("In connect_keymint: Trying to connect to compat service.")?;
-                    map_binder_status(keystore_compat_service.getKeyMintDevice(security_level))
-                        .map_err(|e| match e {
-                            Error::BinderTransaction(StatusCode::NAME_NOT_FOUND) => {
-                                Error::Km(ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE)
-                            }
-                            e => e,
-                        })
-                        .context("In connext_keymint: Trying to get Legacy wrapper.")
+        let keystore_compat_service: Strong<dyn IKeystoreCompatService> =
+            map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface("android.security.compat"))
+                .context("In connect_keymint: Trying to connect to compat service.")?;
+        map_binder_status(keystore_compat_service.getKeyMintDevice(*security_level))
+            .map_err(|e| match e {
+                Error::BinderTransaction(StatusCode::NAME_NOT_FOUND) => {
+                    Error::Km(ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE)
                 }
-                _ => Err(e),
-            }
-        })?;
+                e => e,
+            })
+            .context("In connect_keymint: Trying to get Legacy wrapper.")
+    }?;
 
-    Ok(Asp::new(keymint.as_binder()))
+    let hw_info = map_km_error(keymint.getHardwareInfo())
+        .context("In connect_keymint: Failed to get hardware info.")?;
+
+    Ok((Asp::new(keymint.as_binder()), hw_info))
 }
 
 /// Get a keymint device for the given security level either from our cache or
-/// by making a new connection.
-pub fn get_keymint_device(security_level: SecurityLevel) -> Result<Asp> {
+/// by making a new connection. Returns the device, the hardware info and the uuid.
+/// TODO the latter can be removed when the uuid is part of the hardware info.
+pub fn get_keymint_device(
+    security_level: &SecurityLevel,
+) -> Result<(Asp, KeyMintHardwareInfo, Uuid)> {
     let mut devices_map = KEY_MINT_DEVICES.lock().unwrap();
-    if let Some(dev) = devices_map.get(&security_level) {
-        Ok(dev.clone())
+    if let Some((dev, hw_info, uuid)) = devices_map.dev_by_sec_level(&security_level) {
+        Ok((dev, hw_info, uuid))
     } else {
-        let dev = connect_keymint(security_level).context("In get_keymint_device.")?;
-        devices_map.insert(security_level, dev.clone());
-        Ok(dev)
+        let (dev, hw_info) = connect_keymint(security_level).context("In get_keymint_device.")?;
+        devices_map.insert(*security_level, dev, hw_info);
+        // Unwrap must succeed because we just inserted it.
+        Ok(devices_map.dev_by_sec_level(security_level).unwrap())
     }
 }
 
+/// Get a keymint device for the given uuid. This will only access the cache, but will not
+/// attempt to establish a new connection. It is assumed that the cache is already populated
+/// when this is called. This is a fair assumption, because service.rs iterates through all
+/// security levels when it gets instantiated.
+pub fn get_keymint_dev_by_uuid(uuid: &Uuid) -> Result<(Asp, KeyMintHardwareInfo)> {
+    let devices_map = KEY_MINT_DEVICES.lock().unwrap();
+    if let Some((dev, hw_info, _)) = devices_map.dev_by_uuid(uuid) {
+        Ok((dev, hw_info))
+    } else {
+        Err(Error::sys()).context("In get_keymint_dev_by_uuid: No KeyMint instance found.")
+    }
+}
+
+/// Return all known keymint devices.
+pub fn get_keymint_devices() -> Vec<Strong<dyn IKeyMintDevice>> {
+    KEY_MINT_DEVICES.lock().unwrap().devices()
+}
+
 static TIME_STAMP_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.hardware.security.secureclock.ISecureClock";
 
 /// Make a new connection to a secure clock service.
 /// If no native SecureClock device can be found brings up the compatibility service and attempts
 /// to connect to the legacy wrapper.
 fn connect_secureclock() -> Result<Asp> {
-    let secureclock = map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface(TIME_STAMP_SERVICE_NAME))
-        .context("In connect_secureclock: Trying to connect to genuine secure clock service.")
-        .or_else(|e| {
-            match e.root_cause().downcast_ref::<Error>() {
-                Some(Error::BinderTransaction(StatusCode::NAME_NOT_FOUND)) => {
-                    // This is a no-op if it was called before.
-                    keystore2_km_compat::add_keymint_device_service();
+    let secureclock_instances =
+        get_aidl_instances("android.hardware.security.secureclock", 1, "ISecureClock");
 
-                    let keystore_compat_service: Box<dyn IKeystoreCompatService> =
-                        map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface("android.security.compat"))
-                            .context(
-                                "In connect_secureclock: Trying to connect to compat service.",
-                            )?;
+    let secure_clock_available =
+        secureclock_instances.as_vec()?.iter().any(|instance| *instance == "default");
 
-                    // Legacy secure clock services were only implemented by TEE.
-                    map_binder_status(keystore_compat_service.getSecureClock())
-                        .map_err(|e| match e {
-                            Error::BinderTransaction(StatusCode::NAME_NOT_FOUND) => {
-                                Error::Km(ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE)
-                            }
-                            e => e,
-                        })
-                        .context("In connect_secureclock: Trying to get Legacy wrapper.")
+    let secureclock = if secure_clock_available {
+        map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface(TIME_STAMP_SERVICE_NAME))
+            .context("In connect_secureclock: Trying to connect to genuine secure clock service.")
+    } else {
+        // This is a no-op if it was called before.
+        keystore2_km_compat::add_keymint_device_service();
+
+        let keystore_compat_service: Strong<dyn IKeystoreCompatService> =
+            map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface("android.security.compat"))
+                .context("In connect_secureclock: Trying to connect to compat service.")?;
+
+        // Legacy secure clock services were only implemented by TEE.
+        map_binder_status(keystore_compat_service.getSecureClock())
+            .map_err(|e| match e {
+                Error::BinderTransaction(StatusCode::NAME_NOT_FOUND) => {
+                    Error::Km(ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE)
                 }
-                _ => Err(e),
-            }
-        })?;
+                e => e,
+            })
+            .context("In connect_secureclock: Trying to get Legacy wrapper.")
+    }?;
 
     Ok(Asp::new(secureclock.as_binder()))
 }
@@ -199,3 +315,55 @@
         Ok(dev)
     }
 }
+
+static REMOTE_PROVISIONING_HAL_SERVICE_NAME: &str =
+    "android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent";
+
+fn connect_remotely_provisioned_component(security_level: &SecurityLevel) -> Result<Asp> {
+    let remotely_prov_instances =
+        get_aidl_instances("android.hardware.security.keymint", 1, "IRemotelyProvisionedComponent");
+
+    let service_name = match *security_level {
+        SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT => {
+            if remotely_prov_instances.as_vec()?.iter().any(|instance| *instance == "default") {
+                Some(format!("{}/default", REMOTE_PROVISIONING_HAL_SERVICE_NAME))
+            } else {
+                None
+            }
+        }
+        SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX => {
+            if remotely_prov_instances.as_vec()?.iter().any(|instance| *instance == "strongbox") {
+                Some(format!("{}/strongbox", REMOTE_PROVISIONING_HAL_SERVICE_NAME))
+            } else {
+                None
+            }
+        }
+        _ => None,
+    }
+    .ok_or(Error::Km(ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE))
+    .context("In connect_remotely_provisioned_component.")?;
+
+    let rem_prov_hal: Strong<dyn IRemotelyProvisionedComponent> =
+        map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface(&service_name))
+            .context(concat!(
+                "In connect_remotely_provisioned_component: Trying to connect to",
+                " RemotelyProvisionedComponent service."
+            ))
+            .map_err(|e| e)?;
+    Ok(Asp::new(rem_prov_hal.as_binder()))
+}
+
+/// Get a remote provisiong component device for the given security level either from the cache or
+/// by making a new connection. Returns the device.
+pub fn get_remotely_provisioned_component(security_level: &SecurityLevel) -> Result<Asp> {
+    let mut devices_map = REMOTELY_PROVISIONED_COMPONENT_DEVICES.lock().unwrap();
+    if let Some(dev) = devices_map.dev_by_sec_level(&security_level) {
+        Ok(dev)
+    } else {
+        let dev = connect_remotely_provisioned_component(security_level)
+            .context("In get_remotely_provisioned_component.")?;
+        devices_map.insert(*security_level, dev);
+        // Unwrap must succeed because we just inserted it.
+        Ok(devices_map.dev_by_sec_level(security_level).unwrap())
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs b/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs
index 93de6f2..c10da95 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs
@@ -948,9 +948,26 @@
     #[key_param(tag = RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION, field = BoolValue)]
     ResetSinceIdRotation,
     /// Used to deliver a cryptographic token proving that the user
-    ///  confirmed a signing request
+    /// confirmed a signing request
     #[key_param(tag = CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, field = Blob)]
     ConfirmationToken(Vec<u8>),
+    /// Used to deliver the certificate serial number to the KeyMint instance
+    /// certificate generation.
+    #[key_param(tag = CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, field = Blob)]
+    CertificateSerial(Vec<u8>),
+    /// Used to deliver the certificate subject to the KeyMint instance
+    /// certificate generation. This must be DER encoded X509 name.
+    #[key_param(tag = CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, field = Blob)]
+    CertificateSubject(Vec<u8>),
+    /// Used to deliver the not before date in milliseconds to KeyMint during key generation/import.
+    #[key_param(tag = CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE, field = DateTime)]
+    CertificateNotBefore(i64),
+    /// Used to deliver the not after date in milliseconds to KeyMint during key generation/import.
+    #[key_param(tag = CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, field = DateTime)]
+    CertificateNotAfter(i64),
+    /// Specifies a maximum boot level at which a key should function
+    #[key_param(tag = MAX_BOOT_LEVEL, field = Integer)]
+    MaxBootLevel(i32),
 }
 }
 
diff --git a/keystore2/src/keystore2_main.rs b/keystore2/src/keystore2_main.rs
index 2ea41aa..e745697 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/keystore2_main.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/keystore2_main.rs
@@ -14,16 +14,23 @@
 
 //! This crate implements the Keystore 2.0 service entry point.
 
-use binder::Interface;
-use keystore2::apc::ApcManager;
 use keystore2::authorization::AuthorizationManager;
+use keystore2::entropy;
+use keystore2::globals::ENFORCEMENTS;
+use keystore2::maintenance::Maintenance;
+use keystore2::remote_provisioning::RemoteProvisioningService;
 use keystore2::service::KeystoreService;
+use keystore2::{apc::ApcManager, shared_secret_negotiation};
 use log::{error, info};
-use std::panic;
+use std::{panic, path::Path, sync::mpsc::channel};
+use vpnprofilestore::VpnProfileStore;
 
-static KS2_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.system.keystore2";
+static KS2_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default";
 static APC_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.security.apc";
 static AUTHORIZATION_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.security.authorization";
+static REMOTE_PROVISIONING_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.security.remoteprovisioning";
+static USER_MANAGER_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.security.maintenance";
+static VPNPROFILESTORE_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.security.vpnprofilestore";
 
 /// Keystore 2.0 takes one argument which is a path indicating its designated working directory.
 fn main() {
@@ -39,19 +46,38 @@
     // Saying hi.
     info!("Keystore2 is starting.");
 
+    // Initialize the per boot database.
+    let _keep_me_alive = keystore2::database::KeystoreDB::keep_perboot_db_alive()
+        .expect("Failed to initialize the perboot database.");
+
     let mut args = std::env::args();
     args.next().expect("That's odd. How is there not even a first argument?");
 
-    // Keystore changes to the database directory on startup (typically /data/misc/keystore).
+    // Keystore 2.0 cannot change to the database directory (typically /data/misc/keystore) on
+    // startup as Keystore 1.0 did because Keystore 2.0 is intended to run much earlier than
+    // Keystore 1.0. Instead we set a global variable to the database path.
     // For the ground truth check the service startup rule for init (typically in keystore2.rc).
     if let Some(dir) = args.next() {
-        if std::env::set_current_dir(dir.clone()).is_err() {
-            panic!("Failed to set working directory {}.", dir)
-        }
+        *keystore2::globals::DB_PATH.lock().expect("Could not lock DB_PATH.") =
+            Path::new(&dir).to_path_buf();
     } else {
         panic!("Must specify a working directory.");
     }
 
+    let (confirmation_token_sender, confirmation_token_receiver) = channel();
+
+    ENFORCEMENTS.install_confirmation_token_receiver(confirmation_token_receiver);
+
+    info!("Starting boot level watcher.");
+    std::thread::spawn(|| {
+        keystore2::globals::ENFORCEMENTS
+            .watch_boot_level()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|e| error!("watch_boot_level failed: {}", e));
+    });
+
+    entropy::register_feeder();
+    shared_secret_negotiation::perform_shared_secret_negotiation();
+
     info!("Starting thread pool now.");
     binder::ProcessState::start_thread_pool();
 
@@ -62,9 +88,10 @@
         panic!("Failed to register service {} because of {:?}.", KS2_SERVICE_NAME, e);
     });
 
-    let apc_service = ApcManager::new_native_binder().unwrap_or_else(|e| {
-        panic!("Failed to create service {} because of {:?}.", APC_SERVICE_NAME, e);
-    });
+    let apc_service =
+        ApcManager::new_native_binder(confirmation_token_sender).unwrap_or_else(|e| {
+            panic!("Failed to create service {} because of {:?}.", APC_SERVICE_NAME, e);
+        });
     binder::add_service(APC_SERVICE_NAME, apc_service.as_binder()).unwrap_or_else(|e| {
         panic!("Failed to register service {} because of {:?}.", APC_SERVICE_NAME, e);
     });
@@ -77,6 +104,42 @@
             panic!("Failed to register service {} because of {:?}.", AUTHORIZATION_SERVICE_NAME, e);
         });
 
+    let maintenance_service = Maintenance::new_native_binder().unwrap_or_else(|e| {
+        panic!("Failed to create service {} because of {:?}.", USER_MANAGER_SERVICE_NAME, e);
+    });
+    binder::add_service(USER_MANAGER_SERVICE_NAME, maintenance_service.as_binder()).unwrap_or_else(
+        |e| {
+            panic!("Failed to register service {} because of {:?}.", USER_MANAGER_SERVICE_NAME, e);
+        },
+    );
+
+    // Devices with KS2 and KM 1.0 may not have any IRemotelyProvisionedComponent HALs at all. Do
+    // not panic if new_native_binder returns failure because it could not find the TEE HAL.
+    if let Ok(remote_provisioning_service) = RemoteProvisioningService::new_native_binder() {
+        binder::add_service(
+            REMOTE_PROVISIONING_SERVICE_NAME,
+            remote_provisioning_service.as_binder(),
+        )
+        .unwrap_or_else(|e| {
+            panic!(
+                "Failed to register service {} because of {:?}.",
+                REMOTE_PROVISIONING_SERVICE_NAME, e
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    let vpnprofilestore = VpnProfileStore::new_native_binder(
+        &keystore2::globals::DB_PATH.lock().expect("Could not get DB_PATH."),
+    );
+    binder::add_service(VPNPROFILESTORE_SERVICE_NAME, vpnprofilestore.as_binder()).unwrap_or_else(
+        |e| {
+            panic!(
+                "Failed to register service {} because of {:?}.",
+                VPNPROFILESTORE_SERVICE_NAME, e
+            );
+        },
+    );
+
     info!("Successfully registered Keystore 2.0 service.");
 
     info!("Joining thread pool now.");
diff --git a/keystore2/src/km_compat/Android.bp b/keystore2/src/km_compat/Android.bp
index 126aeff..541788e 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/km_compat/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore2/src/km_compat/Android.bp
@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 rust_library {
     name: "libkeystore2_km_compat",
     crate_name: "keystore2_km_compat",
@@ -48,16 +57,17 @@
         "android.hardware.keymaster@3.0",
         "android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
         "android.hardware.keymaster@4.1",
-        "android.hardware.security.keymint-unstable-ndk_platform",
-        "android.hardware.security.secureclock-unstable-ndk_platform",
-        "android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-unstable-ndk_platform",
+        "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
+        "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",
+        "android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-V1-ndk_platform",
         "android.security.compat-ndk_platform",
-        "android.system.keystore2-ndk_platform",
+        "android.system.keystore2-V1-ndk_platform",
         "libbase",
         "libbinder_ndk",
         "libcrypto",
         "libhidlbase",
         "libkeymaster4_1support",
+        "libkeymint",
         "libkeymint_support",
         "libkeystore2_crypto",
         "libutils",
@@ -68,9 +78,9 @@
     name: "libkm_compat_service",
     srcs: ["km_compat_service.cpp"],
     shared_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.security.keymint-unstable-ndk_platform",
-        "android.hardware.security.secureclock-unstable-ndk_platform",
-        "android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-unstable-ndk_platform",
+        "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
+        "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",
+        "android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-V1-ndk_platform",
         "android.security.compat-ndk_platform",
         "libbinder_ndk",
         "libcrypto",
@@ -97,11 +107,11 @@
         "android.hardware.keymaster@3.0",
         "android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
         "android.hardware.keymaster@4.1",
-        "android.hardware.security.keymint-unstable-ndk_platform",
-        "android.hardware.security.secureclock-unstable-ndk_platform",
-        "android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-unstable-ndk_platform",
+        "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
+        "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",
+        "android.hardware.security.sharedsecret-V1-ndk_platform",
         "android.security.compat-ndk_platform",
-        "android.system.keystore2-ndk_platform",
+        "android.system.keystore2-V1-ndk_platform",
         "libbase",
         "libbinder_ndk",
         "libcrypto",
@@ -110,6 +120,7 @@
         "libkeymint_support",
         "libkeystore2_crypto",
         "libkm_compat",
+        "libkm_compat_service",
         "libutils",
     ],
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/km_compat/certificate_test.cpp b/keystore2/src/km_compat/certificate_test.cpp
index d6bece7..06cb0cb 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/km_compat/certificate_test.cpp
+++ b/keystore2/src/km_compat/certificate_test.cpp
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BlockMode.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Digest.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.h>
+#include <android/binder_manager.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
@@ -39,18 +40,31 @@
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::PaddingMode;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::Tag;
+using ::aidl::android::security::compat::IKeystoreCompatService;
 
 namespace KMV1 = ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint;
 
-static std::variant<std::vector<Certificate>, ScopedAStatus>
-getCertificate(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& keyParams) {
-    static std::shared_ptr<KeyMintDevice> device =
-        KeyMintDevice::createKeyMintDevice(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT);
+extern "C" int32_t addKeyMintDeviceService();
+
+static std::variant<std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>, ScopedAStatus> getDevice() {
+    addKeyMintDeviceService();
+    std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> device;
+    auto service = IKeystoreCompatService::fromBinder(
+        ndk::SpAIBinder(AServiceManager_getService("android.security.compat")));
+    if (!service) {
+        return ScopedAStatus::fromStatus(STATUS_NAME_NOT_FOUND);
+    }
+    service->getKeyMintDevice(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, &device);
     if (!device) {
         return ScopedAStatus::fromStatus(STATUS_NAME_NOT_FOUND);
     }
+    return device;
+}
+
+static std::variant<std::vector<Certificate>, ScopedAStatus>
+getCertificate(std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> device, const std::vector<KeyParameter>& keyParams) {
     KeyCreationResult creationResult;
-    auto status = device->generateKey(keyParams, &creationResult);
+    auto status = device->generateKey(keyParams, std::nullopt /* attest_key */, &creationResult);
     if (!status.isOk()) {
         return status;
     }
@@ -76,6 +90,8 @@
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_KEY_SIZE, 2048),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537),
+        KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE, 0),
+        KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, 253402300799000),
     });
     keyParams.insert(keyParams.end(), extraParams.begin(), extraParams.end());
     return keyParams;
@@ -87,10 +103,12 @@
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN),
-        KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT),
     });
-    auto result = getCertificate(keyParams);
-    ensureCertChainSize(result, 1);
+    auto device = getDevice();
+    if (std::holds_alternative<std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>>(device)) {
+        auto result = getCertificate(std::get<std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>>(device), keyParams);
+        ensureCertChainSize(result, 1);
+    }
 }
 
 TEST(CertificateTest, TestAES) {
@@ -101,8 +119,11 @@
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT),
     };
-    auto result = getCertificate(keyParams);
-    ensureCertChainSize(result, 0);
+    auto device = getDevice();
+    if (std::holds_alternative<std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>>(device)) {
+        auto result = getCertificate(std::get<std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>>(device), keyParams);
+        ensureCertChainSize(result, 0);
+    }
 }
 
 TEST(CertificateTest, TestAttestation) {
@@ -111,9 +132,12 @@
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, 42),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, 42),
     });
-    auto result = getCertificate(keyParams);
-    ensureCertChainSize(result, 3);
-    verify(std::get<std::vector<Certificate>>(result).back());
+    auto device = getDevice();
+    if (std::holds_alternative<std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>>(device)) {
+        auto result = getCertificate(std::get<std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>>(device), keyParams);
+        ensureCertChainSize(result, 3);
+        verify(std::get<std::vector<Certificate>>(result).back());
+    }
 }
 
 TEST(CertificateTest, TestRSAKeygenNoEncryptNoAuthRequired) {
@@ -123,9 +147,12 @@
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, true),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN),
     });
-    auto result = getCertificate(keyParams);
-    ensureCertChainSize(result, 1);
-    verify(std::get<std::vector<Certificate>>(result)[0]);
+    auto device = getDevice();
+    if (std::holds_alternative<std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>>(device)) {
+        auto result = getCertificate(std::get<std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>>(device), keyParams);
+        ensureCertChainSize(result, 1);
+        verify(std::get<std::vector<Certificate>>(result)[0]);
+    }
 }
 
 TEST(CertificateTest, TestRSAKeygenNoEncryptAuthRequired) {
@@ -134,6 +161,9 @@
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN),
     });
-    auto result = getCertificate(keyParams);
-    ensureCertChainSize(result, 1);
+    auto device = getDevice();
+    if (std::holds_alternative<std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>>(device)) {
+        auto result = getCertificate(std::get<std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>>(device), keyParams);
+        ensureCertChainSize(result, 1);
+    }
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat.cpp b/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat.cpp
index a27bfd1..b824aa8 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat.cpp
+++ b/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat.cpp
@@ -17,9 +17,11 @@
 #include "km_compat.h"
 
 #include "km_compat_type_conversion.h"
+#include <AndroidKeyMintDevice.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Algorithm.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Digest.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyParameterValue.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.h>
 #include <aidl/android/system/keystore2/ResponseCode.h>
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
@@ -30,10 +32,14 @@
 #include <keymasterV4_1/Keymaster3.h>
 #include <keymasterV4_1/Keymaster4.h>
 
+#include <chrono>
+
 #include "certificate_utils.h"
 
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::Algorithm;
+using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::CreateKeyMintDevice;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::Digest;
+using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyParameterValue;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::PaddingMode;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::Tag;
 using ::aidl::android::system::keystore2::ResponseCode;
@@ -50,28 +56,227 @@
 namespace V4_1 = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1;
 namespace KMV1 = ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint;
 
+using namespace std::chrono_literals;
+using std::chrono::duration_cast;
+
 // Utility functions
 
-// Converts a V4 error code into a ScopedAStatus
-ScopedAStatus convertErrorCode(V4_0_ErrorCode result) {
-    if (result == V4_0_ErrorCode::OK) {
+// Returns true if this parameter may be passed to attestKey.
+bool isAttestationParameter(const KMV1::KeyParameter& param) {
+    switch (param.tag) {
+    case Tag::APPLICATION_ID:
+    case Tag::APPLICATION_DATA:
+    case Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE:
+    case Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID:
+    case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND:
+    case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE:
+    case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT:
+    case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL:
+    case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI:
+    case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID:
+    case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER:
+    case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL:
+    case Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL:
+    case Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT:
+    case Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE:
+    case Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER:
+    case Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID:
+    case Tag::DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION:
+        return true;
+    default:
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+
+// Returns true if this parameter may be passed to generate/importKey.
+bool isKeyCreationParameter(const KMV1::KeyParameter& param) {
+    switch (param.tag) {
+    case Tag::APPLICATION_ID:
+    case Tag::APPLICATION_DATA:
+    case Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL:
+    case Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT:
+    case Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE:
+    case Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER:
+    case Tag::PURPOSE:
+    case Tag::ALGORITHM:
+    case Tag::KEY_SIZE:
+    case Tag::BLOCK_MODE:
+    case Tag::DIGEST:
+    case Tag::PADDING:
+    case Tag::CALLER_NONCE:
+    case Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH:
+    case Tag::EC_CURVE:
+    case Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT:
+    case Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST:
+    case Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS:
+    case Tag::BOOTLOADER_ONLY:
+    case Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE:
+    case Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY:
+    case Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME:
+    case Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME:
+    case Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME:
+    case Tag::MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS:
+    case Tag::MAX_USES_PER_BOOT:
+    case Tag::USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT:
+    case Tag::USER_ID:
+    case Tag::USER_SECURE_ID:
+    case Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED:
+    case Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE:
+    case Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT:
+    case Tag::ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY:
+    case Tag::TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED:
+    case Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED:
+    case Tag::UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED:
+    case Tag::CREATION_DATETIME:
+    case Tag::UNIQUE_ID:
+    case Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY:
+    case Tag::STORAGE_KEY:
+    case Tag::MAC_LENGTH:
+        return true;
+    default:
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+
+// Size of prefix for blobs, see keyBlobPrefix().
+//
+const size_t kKeyBlobPrefixSize = 8;
+
+// Magic used in blob prefix, see keyBlobPrefix().
+//
+const uint8_t kKeyBlobMagic[7] = {'p', 'K', 'M', 'b', 'l', 'o', 'b'};
+
+// Prefixes a keyblob returned by e.g. generateKey() with information on whether it
+// originated from the real underlying KeyMaster HAL or from soft-KeyMint.
+//
+// When dealing with a keyblob, use prefixedKeyBlobRemovePrefix() to remove the
+// prefix and prefixedKeyBlobIsSoftKeyMint() to determine its origin.
+//
+// Note how the prefix itself has a magic marker ("pKMblob") which can be used
+// to identify if a blob has a prefix at all (it's assumed that any valid blob
+// from KeyMint or KeyMaster HALs never starts with the magic). This is needed
+// because blobs persisted to disk prior to using this code will not have the
+// prefix and in that case we want prefixedKeyBlobRemovePrefix() to still work.
+//
+std::vector<uint8_t> keyBlobPrefix(const std::vector<uint8_t>& blob, bool isSoftKeyMint) {
+    std::vector<uint8_t> result;
+    result.reserve(blob.size() + kKeyBlobPrefixSize);
+    result.insert(result.begin(), kKeyBlobMagic, kKeyBlobMagic + sizeof kKeyBlobMagic);
+    result.push_back(isSoftKeyMint ? 1 : 0);
+    std::copy(blob.begin(), blob.end(), std::back_inserter(result));
+    return result;
+}
+
+// Helper for prefixedKeyBlobRemovePrefix() and prefixedKeyBlobIsSoftKeyMint().
+//
+// First bool is whether there's a valid prefix. If there is, the second bool is
+// the |isSoftKeyMint| value of the prefix
+//
+std::pair<bool, bool> prefixedKeyBlobParsePrefix(const std::vector<uint8_t>& prefixedBlob) {
+    // Having a unprefixed blob is not that uncommon, for example all devices
+    // upgrading to keystore2 (so e.g. upgrading to Android 12) will have
+    // unprefixed blobs. So don't spew warnings/errors in this case...
+    if (prefixedBlob.size() < kKeyBlobPrefixSize) {
+        return std::make_pair(false, false);
+    }
+    if (std::memcmp(prefixedBlob.data(), kKeyBlobMagic, sizeof kKeyBlobMagic) != 0) {
+        return std::make_pair(false, false);
+    }
+    if (prefixedBlob[kKeyBlobPrefixSize - 1] != 0 && prefixedBlob[kKeyBlobPrefixSize - 1] != 1) {
+        return std::make_pair(false, false);
+    }
+    bool isSoftKeyMint = (prefixedBlob[kKeyBlobPrefixSize - 1] == 1);
+    return std::make_pair(true, isSoftKeyMint);
+}
+
+// Returns the prefix from a blob. If there's no prefix, returns the passed-in blob.
+//
+std::vector<uint8_t> prefixedKeyBlobRemovePrefix(const std::vector<uint8_t>& prefixedBlob) {
+    auto parsed = prefixedKeyBlobParsePrefix(prefixedBlob);
+    if (!parsed.first) {
+        // Not actually prefixed, blob was probably persisted to disk prior to the
+        // prefixing code being introduced.
+        return prefixedBlob;
+    }
+    return std::vector<uint8_t>(prefixedBlob.begin() + kKeyBlobPrefixSize, prefixedBlob.end());
+}
+
+// Returns true if the blob's origin is soft-KeyMint, false otherwise or if there
+// is no prefix on the passed-in blob.
+//
+bool prefixedKeyBlobIsSoftKeyMint(const std::vector<uint8_t>& prefixedBlob) {
+    auto parsed = prefixedKeyBlobParsePrefix(prefixedBlob);
+    return parsed.second;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the parameter is not understood by KM 4.1 and older but can be enforced by
+ * Keystore. These parameters need to be included in the returned KeyCharacteristics, but will not
+ * be passed to the legacy backend.
+ */
+bool isNewAndKeystoreEnforceable(const KMV1::KeyParameter& param) {
+    switch (param.tag) {
+    case KMV1::Tag::MAX_BOOT_LEVEL:
+        return true;
+    case KMV1::Tag::USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT:
+        return true;
+    default:
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+
+std::vector<KMV1::KeyParameter>
+extractGenerationParams(const std::vector<KMV1::KeyParameter>& params) {
+    std::vector<KMV1::KeyParameter> result;
+    std::copy_if(params.begin(), params.end(), std::back_inserter(result), isKeyCreationParameter);
+    return result;
+}
+
+std::vector<KMV1::KeyParameter>
+extractAttestationParams(const std::vector<KMV1::KeyParameter>& params) {
+    std::vector<KMV1::KeyParameter> result;
+    std::copy_if(params.begin(), params.end(), std::back_inserter(result), isAttestationParameter);
+    return result;
+}
+
+std::vector<KMV1::KeyParameter>
+extractNewAndKeystoreEnforceableParams(const std::vector<KMV1::KeyParameter>& params) {
+    std::vector<KMV1::KeyParameter> result;
+    std::copy_if(params.begin(), params.end(), std::back_inserter(result),
+                 isNewAndKeystoreEnforceable);
+    return result;
+}
+
+ScopedAStatus convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode result) {
+    if (result == KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) {
         return ScopedAStatus::ok();
     }
     return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(static_cast<int32_t>(result));
 }
 
-static V4_0_ErrorCode toErrorCode(const ScopedAStatus& status) {
+// Converts a V4 error code into a ScopedAStatus
+ScopedAStatus convertErrorCode(V4_0_ErrorCode result) {
+    return convertErrorCode(convert(result));
+}
+
+static KMV1::ErrorCode toErrorCode(const ScopedAStatus& status) {
     if (status.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC) {
-        return static_cast<V4_0_ErrorCode>(status.getServiceSpecificError());
+        return static_cast<KMV1::ErrorCode>(status.getServiceSpecificError());
     } else {
-        return V4_0_ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
 }
 
 static std::vector<V4_0::KeyParameter>
 convertKeyParametersToLegacy(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& kps) {
-    std::vector<V4_0::KeyParameter> legacyKps(kps.size());
-    std::transform(kps.begin(), kps.end(), legacyKps.begin(), convertKeyParameterToLegacy);
+    std::vector<V4_0::KeyParameter> legacyKps;
+    legacyKps.reserve(kps.size());
+    for (const auto& kp : kps) {
+        auto p = convertKeyParameterToLegacy(kp);
+        if (p.tag != V4_0::Tag::INVALID) {
+            legacyKps.push_back(std::move(p));
+        }
+    }
     return legacyKps;
 }
 
@@ -83,38 +288,61 @@
 }
 
 static std::vector<KeyCharacteristics>
-convertKeyCharacteristicsFromLegacy(KeyMintSecurityLevel securityLevel,
-                                    const V4_0_KeyCharacteristics& legacyKc) {
-    KeyCharacteristics kc;
-    kc.securityLevel = securityLevel;
-    kc.authorizations = convertKeyParametersFromLegacy(legacyKc.hardwareEnforced);
-    return {kc};
+processLegacyCharacteristics(KeyMintSecurityLevel securityLevel,
+                             const std::vector<KeyParameter>& genParams,
+                             const V4_0_KeyCharacteristics& legacyKc) {
+
+    KeyCharacteristics keystoreEnforced{KeyMintSecurityLevel::KEYSTORE,
+                                        convertKeyParametersFromLegacy(legacyKc.softwareEnforced)};
+
+    // Add all parameters that we know can be enforced by keystore but not by the legacy backend.
+    auto unsupported_requested = extractNewAndKeystoreEnforceableParams(genParams);
+    std::copy(unsupported_requested.begin(), unsupported_requested.end(),
+              std::back_insert_iterator(keystoreEnforced.authorizations));
+
+    if (securityLevel == KeyMintSecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+        // If the security level of the backend is `software` we expect the hardware enforced list
+        // to be empty. Log a warning otherwise.
+        if (legacyKc.hardwareEnforced.size() != 0) {
+            LOG(WARNING) << "Unexpected hardware enforced parameters.";
+        }
+        return {keystoreEnforced};
+    }
+
+    KeyCharacteristics hwEnforced{securityLevel,
+                                  convertKeyParametersFromLegacy(legacyKc.hardwareEnforced)};
+    return {hwEnforced, keystoreEnforced};
 }
 
 static V4_0_KeyFormat convertKeyFormatToLegacy(const KeyFormat& kf) {
     return static_cast<V4_0_KeyFormat>(kf);
 }
 
-static V4_0_HardwareAuthToken convertAuthTokenToLegacy(const HardwareAuthToken& at) {
+static V4_0_HardwareAuthToken convertAuthTokenToLegacy(const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken>& at) {
+    if (!at) return {};
+
     V4_0_HardwareAuthToken legacyAt;
-    legacyAt.challenge = at.challenge;
-    legacyAt.userId = at.userId;
-    legacyAt.authenticatorId = at.authenticatorId;
+    legacyAt.challenge = at->challenge;
+    legacyAt.userId = at->userId;
+    legacyAt.authenticatorId = at->authenticatorId;
     legacyAt.authenticatorType =
         static_cast<::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::HardwareAuthenticatorType>(
-            at.authenticatorType);
-    legacyAt.timestamp = at.timestamp.milliSeconds;
-    legacyAt.mac = at.mac;
+            at->authenticatorType);
+    legacyAt.timestamp = at->timestamp.milliSeconds;
+    legacyAt.mac = at->mac;
     return legacyAt;
 }
 
-static V4_0_VerificationToken convertTimestampTokenToLegacy(const TimeStampToken& tst) {
+static V4_0_VerificationToken
+convertTimestampTokenToLegacy(const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& tst) {
+    if (!tst) return {};
+
     V4_0_VerificationToken legacyVt;
-    legacyVt.challenge = tst.challenge;
-    legacyVt.timestamp = tst.timestamp.milliSeconds;
+    legacyVt.challenge = tst->challenge;
+    legacyVt.timestamp = tst->timestamp.milliSeconds;
     // Legacy verification tokens were always minted by TEE.
     legacyVt.securityLevel = V4_0::SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT;
-    legacyVt.mac = tst.mac;
+    legacyVt.mac = tst->mac;
     return legacyVt;
 }
 
@@ -163,50 +391,71 @@
 // KeyMintDevice implementation
 
 ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::getHardwareInfo(KeyMintHardwareInfo* _aidl_return) {
-    // TODO: What do I do about the version number?  Is it the version of the device I get?
-    auto result = mDevice->getHardwareInfo([&](auto securityLevel, const auto& keymasterName,
-                                               const auto& keymasterAuthorName) {
-        securityLevel_ =
-            static_cast<::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel>(securityLevel);
-
-        _aidl_return->securityLevel = securityLevel_;
-        _aidl_return->keyMintName = keymasterName;
-        _aidl_return->keyMintAuthorName = keymasterAuthorName;
-    });
-    if (!result.isOk()) {
-        return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(
-            static_cast<int32_t>(ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR));
-    }
+    auto result = mDevice->halVersion();
+    _aidl_return->versionNumber = result.majorVersion * 10 + result.minorVersion;
+    securityLevel_ = convert(result.securityLevel);
+    _aidl_return->securityLevel = securityLevel_;
+    _aidl_return->keyMintName = result.keymasterName;
+    _aidl_return->keyMintAuthorName = result.authorName;
+    _aidl_return->timestampTokenRequired = securityLevel_ == KMV1::SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX;
     return ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
 ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::addRngEntropy(const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_data) {
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode = mDevice->addRngEntropy(in_data);
-    return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
+    auto result = mDevice->addRngEntropy(in_data);
+    if (!result.isOk()) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
+    }
+    return convertErrorCode(result);
 }
 
-ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::generateKey(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& in_keyParams,
+ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::generateKey(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& inKeyParams,
+                                         const std::optional<AttestationKey>& in_attestationKey,
                                          KeyCreationResult* out_creationResult) {
-    auto legacyKeyParams = convertKeyParametersToLegacy(in_keyParams);
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode;
+
+    // Since KeyMaster doesn't support ECDH, route all key creation requests to
+    // soft-KeyMint if and only an ECDH key is requested.
+    //
+    // For this to work we'll need to also route begin() and deleteKey() calls to
+    // soft-KM. In order to do that, we'll prefix all keyblobs with whether it was
+    // created by the real underlying KeyMaster HAL or whether it was created by
+    // soft-KeyMint.
+    //
+    // See keyBlobPrefix() for more discussion.
+    //
+    for (const auto& keyParam : inKeyParams) {
+        if (keyParam.tag == Tag::PURPOSE &&
+            keyParam.value.get<KeyParameterValue::Tag::keyPurpose>() == KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY) {
+            auto ret =
+                softKeyMintDevice_->generateKey(inKeyParams, in_attestationKey, out_creationResult);
+            if (ret.isOk()) {
+                out_creationResult->keyBlob = keyBlobPrefix(out_creationResult->keyBlob, true);
+            }
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    auto legacyKeyGenParams = convertKeyParametersToLegacy(extractGenerationParams(inKeyParams));
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode;
     auto result = mDevice->generateKey(
-        legacyKeyParams, [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& keyBlob,
-                             const V4_0_KeyCharacteristics& keyCharacteristics) {
-            errorCode = error;
-            out_creationResult->keyBlob = keyBlob;
+        legacyKeyGenParams, [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& keyBlob,
+                                const V4_0_KeyCharacteristics& keyCharacteristics) {
+            errorCode = convert(error);
+            out_creationResult->keyBlob = keyBlobPrefix(keyBlob, false);
             out_creationResult->keyCharacteristics =
-                convertKeyCharacteristicsFromLegacy(securityLevel_, keyCharacteristics);
+                processLegacyCharacteristics(securityLevel_, inKeyParams, keyCharacteristics);
         });
     if (!result.isOk()) {
-        return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(
-            static_cast<int32_t>(ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR));
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
     }
-    if (errorCode == V4_0_ErrorCode::OK) {
-        auto cert = getCertificate(in_keyParams, out_creationResult->keyBlob);
-        if (std::holds_alternative<V4_0_ErrorCode>(cert)) {
-            auto code = std::get<V4_0_ErrorCode>(cert);
+    if (errorCode == KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) {
+        auto cert = getCertificate(inKeyParams, out_creationResult->keyBlob);
+        if (std::holds_alternative<KMV1::ErrorCode>(cert)) {
+            auto code = std::get<KMV1::ErrorCode>(cert);
             // We return OK in successful cases that do not generate a certificate.
-            if (code != V4_0_ErrorCode::OK) {
+            if (code != KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) {
                 errorCode = code;
                 deleteKey(out_creationResult->keyBlob);
             }
@@ -217,32 +466,34 @@
     return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
 }
 
-ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::importKey(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& in_inKeyParams,
+ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::importKey(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& inKeyParams,
                                        KeyFormat in_inKeyFormat,
                                        const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inKeyData,
+                                       const std::optional<AttestationKey>& /* in_attestationKey */,
                                        KeyCreationResult* out_creationResult) {
-    auto legacyKeyParams = convertKeyParametersToLegacy(in_inKeyParams);
+    auto legacyKeyGENParams = convertKeyParametersToLegacy(extractGenerationParams(inKeyParams));
     auto legacyKeyFormat = convertKeyFormatToLegacy(in_inKeyFormat);
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode;
-    auto result = mDevice->importKey(legacyKeyParams, legacyKeyFormat, in_inKeyData,
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode;
+    auto result = mDevice->importKey(legacyKeyGENParams, legacyKeyFormat, in_inKeyData,
                                      [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& keyBlob,
                                          const V4_0_KeyCharacteristics& keyCharacteristics) {
-                                         errorCode = error;
-                                         out_creationResult->keyBlob = keyBlob;
+                                         errorCode = convert(error);
+                                         out_creationResult->keyBlob =
+                                             keyBlobPrefix(keyBlob, false);
                                          out_creationResult->keyCharacteristics =
-                                             convertKeyCharacteristicsFromLegacy(
-                                                 securityLevel_, keyCharacteristics);
+                                             processLegacyCharacteristics(
+                                                 securityLevel_, inKeyParams, keyCharacteristics);
                                      });
     if (!result.isOk()) {
-        return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(
-            static_cast<int32_t>(ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR));
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
     }
-    if (errorCode == V4_0_ErrorCode::OK) {
-        auto cert = getCertificate(in_inKeyParams, out_creationResult->keyBlob);
-        if (std::holds_alternative<V4_0_ErrorCode>(cert)) {
-            auto code = std::get<V4_0_ErrorCode>(cert);
+    if (errorCode == KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) {
+        auto cert = getCertificate(inKeyParams, out_creationResult->keyBlob);
+        if (std::holds_alternative<KMV1::ErrorCode>(cert)) {
+            auto code = std::get<KMV1::ErrorCode>(cert);
             // We return OK in successful cases that do not generate a certificate.
-            if (code != V4_0_ErrorCode::OK) {
+            if (code != KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) {
                 errorCode = code;
                 deleteKey(out_creationResult->keyBlob);
             }
@@ -253,26 +504,36 @@
     return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
 }
 
-ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::importWrappedKey(
-    const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inWrappedKeyData,
-    const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inWrappingKeyBlob, const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inMaskingKey,
-    const std::vector<KeyParameter>& in_inUnwrappingParams, int64_t in_inPasswordSid,
-    int64_t in_inBiometricSid, KeyCreationResult* out_creationResult) {
+ScopedAStatus
+KeyMintDevice::importWrappedKey(const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inWrappedKeyData,
+                                const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inPrefixedWrappingKeyBlob,
+                                const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inMaskingKey,
+                                const std::vector<KeyParameter>& in_inUnwrappingParams,
+                                int64_t in_inPasswordSid, int64_t in_inBiometricSid,
+                                KeyCreationResult* out_creationResult) {
+    const std::vector<uint8_t>& wrappingKeyBlob =
+        prefixedKeyBlobRemovePrefix(in_inPrefixedWrappingKeyBlob);
+    if (prefixedKeyBlobIsSoftKeyMint(in_inPrefixedWrappingKeyBlob)) {
+        return softKeyMintDevice_->importWrappedKey(
+            in_inWrappedKeyData, wrappingKeyBlob, in_inMaskingKey, in_inUnwrappingParams,
+            in_inPasswordSid, in_inBiometricSid, out_creationResult);
+    }
+
     auto legacyUnwrappingParams = convertKeyParametersToLegacy(in_inUnwrappingParams);
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode;
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode;
     auto result = mDevice->importWrappedKey(
-        in_inWrappedKeyData, in_inWrappingKeyBlob, in_inMaskingKey, legacyUnwrappingParams,
+        in_inWrappedKeyData, wrappingKeyBlob, in_inMaskingKey, legacyUnwrappingParams,
         in_inPasswordSid, in_inBiometricSid,
         [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& keyBlob,
             const V4_0_KeyCharacteristics& keyCharacteristics) {
-            errorCode = error;
-            out_creationResult->keyBlob = keyBlob;
+            errorCode = convert(error);
+            out_creationResult->keyBlob = keyBlobPrefix(keyBlob, false);
             out_creationResult->keyCharacteristics =
-                convertKeyCharacteristicsFromLegacy(securityLevel_, keyCharacteristics);
+                processLegacyCharacteristics(securityLevel_, {}, keyCharacteristics);
         });
     if (!result.isOk()) {
-        return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(
-            static_cast<int32_t>(ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR));
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
     }
     return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
 }
@@ -282,27 +543,41 @@
                                         std::vector<uint8_t>* _aidl_return) {
     auto legacyUpgradeParams = convertKeyParametersToLegacy(in_inUpgradeParams);
     V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode;
+
     auto result =
-        mDevice->upgradeKey(in_inKeyBlobToUpgrade, legacyUpgradeParams,
+        mDevice->upgradeKey(prefixedKeyBlobRemovePrefix(in_inKeyBlobToUpgrade), legacyUpgradeParams,
                             [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& upgradedKeyBlob) {
                                 errorCode = error;
-                                *_aidl_return = upgradedKeyBlob;
+                                *_aidl_return = keyBlobPrefix(upgradedKeyBlob, false);
                             });
     if (!result.isOk()) {
-        return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(
-            static_cast<int32_t>(ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR));
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
     }
     return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
 }
 
-ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::deleteKey(const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inKeyBlob) {
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode = mDevice->deleteKey(in_inKeyBlob);
-    return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
+ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::deleteKey(const std::vector<uint8_t>& prefixedKeyBlob) {
+    const std::vector<uint8_t>& keyBlob = prefixedKeyBlobRemovePrefix(prefixedKeyBlob);
+    if (prefixedKeyBlobIsSoftKeyMint(prefixedKeyBlob)) {
+        return softKeyMintDevice_->deleteKey(keyBlob);
+    }
+
+    auto result = mDevice->deleteKey(keyBlob);
+    if (!result.isOk()) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
+    }
+    return convertErrorCode(result);
 }
 
 ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::deleteAllKeys() {
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode = mDevice->deleteAllKeys();
-    return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
+    auto result = mDevice->deleteAllKeys();
+    if (!result.isOk()) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
+    }
+    return convertErrorCode(result);
 }
 
 // We're not implementing this.
@@ -312,126 +587,207 @@
 }
 
 ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::begin(KeyPurpose in_inPurpose,
-                                   const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inKeyBlob,
+                                   const std::vector<uint8_t>& prefixedKeyBlob,
                                    const std::vector<KeyParameter>& in_inParams,
                                    const HardwareAuthToken& in_inAuthToken,
                                    BeginResult* _aidl_return) {
     if (!mOperationSlots.claimSlot()) {
         return convertErrorCode(V4_0_ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS);
     }
+
+    const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inKeyBlob = prefixedKeyBlobRemovePrefix(prefixedKeyBlob);
+    if (prefixedKeyBlobIsSoftKeyMint(prefixedKeyBlob)) {
+        return softKeyMintDevice_->begin(in_inPurpose, in_inKeyBlob, in_inParams, in_inAuthToken,
+                                         _aidl_return);
+    }
+
     auto legacyPurpose =
         static_cast<::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KeyPurpose>(in_inPurpose);
     auto legacyParams = convertKeyParametersToLegacy(in_inParams);
     auto legacyAuthToken = convertAuthTokenToLegacy(in_inAuthToken);
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode;
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode;
     auto result = mDevice->begin(
         legacyPurpose, in_inKeyBlob, legacyParams, legacyAuthToken,
         [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const hidl_vec<V4_0_KeyParameter>& outParams,
             uint64_t operationHandle) {
-            errorCode = error;
-            _aidl_return->challenge = operationHandle;  // TODO: Is this right?
+            errorCode = convert(error);
+            _aidl_return->challenge = operationHandle;
             _aidl_return->params = convertKeyParametersFromLegacy(outParams);
             _aidl_return->operation = ndk::SharedRefBase::make<KeyMintOperation>(
                 mDevice, operationHandle, &mOperationSlots, error == V4_0_ErrorCode::OK);
         });
     if (!result.isOk()) {
-        // TODO: In this case we're guaranteed that _aidl_return was not initialized, right?
-        mOperationSlots.freeSlot();
-        return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(
-            static_cast<int32_t>(ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR));
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        errorCode = KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
-    if (errorCode != V4_0_ErrorCode::OK) {
+    if (errorCode != KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) {
         mOperationSlots.freeSlot();
     }
     return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
 }
 
-ScopedAStatus KeyMintOperation::update(const std::optional<KeyParameterArray>& in_inParams,
-                                       const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& in_input,
-                                       const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken>& in_inAuthToken,
-                                       const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& in_inTimeStampToken,
-                                       std::optional<KeyParameterArray>* out_outParams,
-                                       std::optional<ByteArray>* out_output,
-                                       int32_t* _aidl_return) {
-    std::vector<V4_0_KeyParameter> legacyParams;
-    if (in_inParams.has_value()) {
-        legacyParams = convertKeyParametersToLegacy(in_inParams.value().params);
+ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::deviceLocked(bool passwordOnly,
+                                          const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& timestampToken) {
+    V4_0_VerificationToken token;
+    if (timestampToken.has_value()) {
+        token = convertTimestampTokenToLegacy(timestampToken.value());
     }
-    auto input = in_input.value_or(std::vector<uint8_t>());
-    V4_0_HardwareAuthToken authToken;
-    if (in_inAuthToken.has_value()) {
-        authToken = convertAuthTokenToLegacy(in_inAuthToken.value());
+    auto ret = mDevice->deviceLocked(passwordOnly, token);
+    if (!ret.isOk()) {
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
+    } else {
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::OK);
     }
-    V4_0_VerificationToken verificationToken;
-    if (in_inTimeStampToken.has_value()) {
-        verificationToken = convertTimestampTokenToLegacy(in_inTimeStampToken.value());
+}
+
+ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::earlyBootEnded() {
+    auto ret = mDevice->earlyBootEnded();
+    if (!ret.isOk()) {
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
+    } else {
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::OK);
     }
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode;
+}
+
+ScopedAStatus
+KeyMintDevice::convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(const std::vector<uint8_t>& prefixedStorageKeyBlob,
+                                            std::vector<uint8_t>* ephemeralKeyBlob) {
+    KMV1::ErrorCode km_error;
+
+    /*
+     * Wrapped storage keys cannot be emulated (and they don't need to, because if a platform
+     * supports wrapped storage keys, then the legacy backend will support it too. So error out
+     * if the wrapped storage key given is a soft keymint key.
+     */
+    if (prefixedKeyBlobIsSoftKeyMint(prefixedStorageKeyBlob)) {
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
+    }
+
+    const std::vector<uint8_t>& storageKeyBlob =
+        prefixedKeyBlobRemovePrefix(prefixedStorageKeyBlob);
+
+    auto hidlCb = [&](V4_0_ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& exportedKeyBlob) {
+        km_error = convert(ret);
+        if (km_error != KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) return;
+        /*
+         * This must return the blob without the prefix since it will be used directly
+         * as a storage encryption key. But this is alright, since this wrapped ephemeral
+         * key shouldn't/won't ever be used with keymint.
+         */
+        *ephemeralKeyBlob = exportedKeyBlob;
+    };
+
+    auto ret = mDevice->exportKey(V4_0_KeyFormat::RAW, storageKeyBlob, {}, {}, hidlCb);
+    if (!ret.isOk()) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " export_key failed: " << ret.description();
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
+    }
+    if (km_error != KMV1::ErrorCode::OK)
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " export_key failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
+
+    return convertErrorCode(km_error);
+}
+
+ScopedAStatus KeyMintDevice::performOperation(const std::vector<uint8_t>& /* request */,
+                                              std::vector<uint8_t>* /* response */) {
+    return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
+}
+
+ScopedAStatus KeyMintOperation::updateAad(const std::vector<uint8_t>& input,
+                                          const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken>& optAuthToken,
+                                          const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& optTimeStampToken) {
+    V4_0_HardwareAuthToken authToken = convertAuthTokenToLegacy(optAuthToken);
+    V4_0_VerificationToken verificationToken = convertTimestampTokenToLegacy(optTimeStampToken);
+
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode;
     auto result = mDevice->update(
-        mOperationHandle, legacyParams, input, authToken, verificationToken,
-        [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, uint32_t inputConsumed,
-            const hidl_vec<V4_0_KeyParameter>& outParams, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& output) {
-            errorCode = error;
-            out_outParams->emplace();
-            out_outParams->value().params = convertKeyParametersFromLegacy(outParams);
-            out_output->emplace();
-            out_output->value().data = output;
-            *_aidl_return = inputConsumed;
-        });
+        mOperationHandle, {V4_0::makeKeyParameter(V4_0::TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, input)}, {}, authToken,
+        verificationToken,
+        [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, auto, auto, auto) { errorCode = convert(error); });
+
     if (!result.isOk()) {
-        mOperationSlot.freeSlot();
-        return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(
-            static_cast<int32_t>(ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR));
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        errorCode = KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
-    if (errorCode != V4_0_ErrorCode::OK) {
-        mOperationSlot.freeSlot();
-    }
+    if (errorCode != KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) mOperationSlot.freeSlot();
+
     return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
 }
 
-ScopedAStatus KeyMintOperation::finish(const std::optional<KeyParameterArray>& in_inParams,
-                                       const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& in_input,
-                                       const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& in_inSignature,
-                                       const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken>& in_authToken,
-                                       const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& in_inTimeStampToken,
-                                       std::optional<KeyParameterArray>* out_outParams,
-                                       std::vector<uint8_t>* _aidl_return) {
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode;
-    std::vector<V4_0_KeyParameter> legacyParams;
-    if (in_inParams.has_value()) {
-        legacyParams = convertKeyParametersToLegacy(in_inParams.value().params);
+ScopedAStatus KeyMintOperation::update(const std::vector<uint8_t>& input,
+                                       const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken>& optAuthToken,
+                                       const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& optTimeStampToken,
+                                       std::vector<uint8_t>* out_output) {
+    V4_0_HardwareAuthToken authToken = convertAuthTokenToLegacy(optAuthToken);
+    V4_0_VerificationToken verificationToken = convertTimestampTokenToLegacy(optTimeStampToken);
+
+    size_t inputPos = 0;
+    *out_output = {};
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode = KMV1::ErrorCode::OK;
+
+    while (inputPos < input.size() && errorCode == KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) {
+        auto result =
+            mDevice->update(mOperationHandle, {} /* inParams */,
+                            {input.begin() + inputPos, input.end()}, authToken, verificationToken,
+                            [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, uint32_t inputConsumed, auto /* outParams */,
+                                const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& output) {
+                                errorCode = convert(error);
+                                out_output->insert(out_output->end(), output.begin(), output.end());
+                                inputPos += inputConsumed;
+                            });
+
+        if (!result.isOk()) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+            errorCode = KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+        }
     }
+
+    if (errorCode != KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) mOperationSlot.freeSlot();
+
+    return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
+}
+
+ScopedAStatus
+KeyMintOperation::finish(const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& in_input,
+                         const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& in_signature,
+                         const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken>& in_authToken,
+                         const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& in_timeStampToken,
+                         const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& in_confirmationToken,
+                         std::vector<uint8_t>* out_output) {
     auto input = in_input.value_or(std::vector<uint8_t>());
-    auto signature = in_inSignature.value_or(std::vector<uint8_t>());
-    V4_0_HardwareAuthToken authToken;
-    if (in_authToken.has_value()) {
-        authToken = convertAuthTokenToLegacy(in_authToken.value());
+    auto signature = in_signature.value_or(std::vector<uint8_t>());
+    V4_0_HardwareAuthToken authToken = convertAuthTokenToLegacy(in_authToken);
+    V4_0_VerificationToken verificationToken = convertTimestampTokenToLegacy(in_timeStampToken);
+
+    std::vector<V4_0_KeyParameter> inParams;
+    if (in_confirmationToken) {
+        inParams.push_back(makeKeyParameter(V4_0::TAG_CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, *in_confirmationToken));
     }
-    V4_0_VerificationToken verificationToken;
-    if (in_inTimeStampToken.has_value()) {
-        verificationToken = convertTimestampTokenToLegacy(in_inTimeStampToken.value());
-    }
+
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode;
     auto result = mDevice->finish(
-        mOperationHandle, legacyParams, input, signature, authToken, verificationToken,
-        [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const hidl_vec<V4_0_KeyParameter>& outParams,
-            const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& output) {
-            errorCode = error;
-            out_outParams->emplace();
-            out_outParams->value().params = convertKeyParametersFromLegacy(outParams);
-            *_aidl_return = output;
+        mOperationHandle, inParams, input, signature, authToken, verificationToken,
+        [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, auto /* outParams */, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& output) {
+            errorCode = convert(error);
+            *out_output = output;
         });
+
     mOperationSlot.freeSlot();
     if (!result.isOk()) {
-        return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(
-            static_cast<int32_t>(ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR));
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        errorCode = KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
     return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
 }
 
 ScopedAStatus KeyMintOperation::abort() {
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode = mDevice->abort(mOperationHandle);
+    auto result = mDevice->abort(mOperationHandle);
     mOperationSlot.freeSlot();
-    return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
+    if (!result.isOk()) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        return convertErrorCode(KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
+    }
+    return convertErrorCode(result);
 }
 
 KeyMintOperation::~KeyMintOperation() {
@@ -446,18 +802,18 @@
 // SecureClock implementation
 
 ScopedAStatus SecureClock::generateTimeStamp(int64_t in_challenge, TimeStampToken* _aidl_return) {
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode;
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode;
     auto result = mDevice->verifyAuthorization(
         in_challenge, {}, V4_0_HardwareAuthToken(),
         [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const V4_0_VerificationToken& token) {
-            errorCode = error;
+            errorCode = convert(error);
             _aidl_return->challenge = token.challenge;
             _aidl_return->timestamp.milliSeconds = token.timestamp;
             _aidl_return->mac = token.mac;
         });
     if (!result.isOk()) {
-        return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(
-            static_cast<int32_t>(ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR));
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        errorCode = KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
     return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
 }
@@ -465,17 +821,17 @@
 // SharedSecret implementation
 
 ScopedAStatus SharedSecret::getSharedSecretParameters(SharedSecretParameters* _aidl_return) {
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode;
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode;
     auto result = mDevice->getHmacSharingParameters(
         [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const V4_0_HmacSharingParameters& params) {
-            errorCode = error;
+            errorCode = convert(error);
             _aidl_return->seed = params.seed;
             std::copy(params.nonce.data(), params.nonce.data() + params.nonce.elementCount(),
                       std::back_inserter(_aidl_return->nonce));
         });
     if (!result.isOk()) {
-        return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(
-            static_cast<int32_t>(ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR));
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        errorCode = KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
     return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
 }
@@ -483,16 +839,16 @@
 ScopedAStatus
 SharedSecret::computeSharedSecret(const std::vector<SharedSecretParameters>& in_params,
                                   std::vector<uint8_t>* _aidl_return) {
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode;
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode;
     auto legacyParams = convertSharedSecretParametersToLegacy(in_params);
     auto result = mDevice->computeSharedHmac(
         legacyParams, [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& sharingCheck) {
-            errorCode = error;
+            errorCode = convert(error);
             *_aidl_return = sharingCheck;
         });
     if (!result.isOk()) {
-        return ScopedAStatus::fromServiceSpecificError(
-            static_cast<int32_t>(ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR));
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        errorCode = KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
     return convertErrorCode(errorCode);
 }
@@ -503,6 +859,7 @@
 static auto getParam(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& keyParams, KMV1::TypedTag<type, tag> ttag)
     -> decltype(authorizationValue(ttag, KeyParameter())) {
     for (const auto& p : keyParams) {
+
         if (auto v = authorizationValue(ttag, p)) {
             return v;
         }
@@ -524,9 +881,12 @@
     auto bestSoFar = sortedOptions.end();
     for (const KeyParameter& kp : keyParams) {
         if (auto value = authorizationValue(tag, kp)) {
-            auto it = std::find(sortedOptions.begin(), sortedOptions.end(), *value);
-            if (std::distance(it, bestSoFar) < 0) {
-                bestSoFar = it;
+            auto candidate = std::find(sortedOptions.begin(), sortedOptions.end(), *value);
+            // sortedOptions is sorted from best to worst. `std::distance(first, last)` counts the
+            // hops from `first` to `last`. So a better `candidate` yields a positive distance to
+            // `bestSoFar`.
+            if (std::distance(candidate, bestSoFar) > 0) {
+                bestSoFar = candidate;
             }
         }
     }
@@ -536,12 +896,12 @@
     return *bestSoFar;
 }
 
-static std::variant<keystore::X509_Ptr, V4_0_ErrorCode>
+static std::variant<keystore::X509_Ptr, KMV1::ErrorCode>
 makeCert(::android::sp<Keymaster> mDevice, const std::vector<KeyParameter>& keyParams,
          const std::vector<uint8_t>& keyBlob) {
     // Start generating the certificate.
     // Get public key for makeCert.
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode;
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode;
     std::vector<uint8_t> key;
     static std::vector<uint8_t> empty_vector;
     auto unwrapBlob = [&](auto b) -> const std::vector<uint8_t>& {
@@ -554,43 +914,57 @@
         V4_0_KeyFormat::X509, keyBlob, unwrapBlob(getParam(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_APPLICATION_ID)),
         unwrapBlob(getParam(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_APPLICATION_DATA)),
         [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& keyMaterial) {
-            errorCode = error;
+            errorCode = convert(error);
             key = keyMaterial;
         });
     if (!result.isOk()) {
-        return V4_0_ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+        LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << " exportKey transaction failed. " << result.description();
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
-    if (errorCode != V4_0_ErrorCode::OK) {
+    if (errorCode != KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) {
         return errorCode;
     }
     // Get pkey for makeCert.
     CBS cbs;
     CBS_init(&cbs, key.data(), key.size());
     auto pkey = EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs);
-    // makeCert
-    // TODO: Get the serial and subject from key params once the tags are added.  Also use new tags
-    // for the two datetime parameters once we get those.
 
-    uint64_t activation = 0;
-    if (auto date = getParam(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME)) {
-        activation = *date;
+    // makeCert
+    std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<const std::vector<uint8_t>>> subject;
+    if (auto blob = getParam(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT)) {
+        subject = *blob;
     }
-    uint64_t expiration = std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max();
-    if (auto date = getParam(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME)) {
-        expiration = *date;
+
+    std::optional<std::reference_wrapper<const std::vector<uint8_t>>> serial;
+    if (auto blob = getParam(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL)) {
+        serial = *blob;
+    }
+
+    int64_t activation;
+    if (auto date = getParam(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE)) {
+        activation = static_cast<int64_t>(*date);
+    } else {
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_BEFORE;
+    }
+
+    int64_t expiration;
+    if (auto date = getParam(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER)) {
+        expiration = static_cast<int64_t>(*date);
+    } else {
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_AFTER;
     }
 
     auto certOrError = keystore::makeCert(
-        pkey, 42, "TODO", activation, expiration, false /* intentionally left blank */,
+        pkey, serial, subject, activation, expiration, false /* intentionally left blank */,
         std::nullopt /* intentionally left blank */, std::nullopt /* intentionally left blank */);
     if (std::holds_alternative<keystore::CertUtilsError>(certOrError)) {
         LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Failed to make certificate";
-        return V4_0_ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
     return std::move(std::get<keystore::X509_Ptr>(certOrError));
 }
 
-static std::variant<keystore::Algo, V4_0_ErrorCode> getKeystoreAlgorithm(Algorithm algorithm) {
+static std::variant<keystore::Algo, KMV1::ErrorCode> getKeystoreAlgorithm(Algorithm algorithm) {
     switch (algorithm) {
     case Algorithm::RSA:
         return keystore::Algo::RSA;
@@ -598,11 +972,11 @@
         return keystore::Algo::ECDSA;
     default:
         LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": This should not be called with symmetric algorithm.";
-        return V4_0_ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
 }
 
-static std::variant<keystore::Padding, V4_0_ErrorCode> getKeystorePadding(PaddingMode padding) {
+static std::variant<keystore::Padding, KMV1::ErrorCode> getKeystorePadding(PaddingMode padding) {
     switch (padding) {
     case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
         return keystore::Padding::PKCS1_5;
@@ -613,7 +987,7 @@
     }
 }
 
-static std::variant<keystore::Digest, V4_0_ErrorCode> getKeystoreDigest(Digest digest) {
+static std::variant<keystore::Digest, KMV1::ErrorCode> getKeystoreDigest(Digest digest) {
     switch (digest) {
     case Digest::SHA1:
         return keystore::Digest::SHA1;
@@ -628,62 +1002,62 @@
         return keystore::Digest::SHA512;
     default:
         LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Unknown digest.";
-        return V4_0_ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
 }
 
-std::optional<V4_0_ErrorCode>
+std::optional<KMV1::ErrorCode>
 KeyMintDevice::signCertificate(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& keyParams,
-                               const std::vector<uint8_t>& keyBlob, X509* cert) {
+                               const std::vector<uint8_t>& prefixedKeyBlob, X509* cert) {
+
     auto algorithm = getParam(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_ALGORITHM);
     auto algoOrError = getKeystoreAlgorithm(*algorithm);
-    if (std::holds_alternative<V4_0_ErrorCode>(algoOrError)) {
-        return std::get<V4_0_ErrorCode>(algoOrError);
+    if (std::holds_alternative<KMV1::ErrorCode>(algoOrError)) {
+        return std::get<KMV1::ErrorCode>(algoOrError);
     }
     auto algo = std::get<keystore::Algo>(algoOrError);
     auto origPadding = getMaximum(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_PADDING,
                                   {PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN});
     auto paddingOrError = getKeystorePadding(origPadding);
-    if (std::holds_alternative<V4_0_ErrorCode>(paddingOrError)) {
-        return std::get<V4_0_ErrorCode>(paddingOrError);
+    if (std::holds_alternative<KMV1::ErrorCode>(paddingOrError)) {
+        return std::get<KMV1::ErrorCode>(paddingOrError);
     }
     auto padding = std::get<keystore::Padding>(paddingOrError);
-    auto origDigest = getMaximum(
-        keyParams, KMV1::TAG_DIGEST,
-        {Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_512, Digest::SHA_2_384, Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA1});
+    auto origDigest = getMaximum(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_DIGEST,
+                                 {Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_512, Digest::SHA_2_384,
+                                  Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA1, Digest::NONE});
     auto digestOrError = getKeystoreDigest(origDigest);
-    if (std::holds_alternative<V4_0_ErrorCode>(digestOrError)) {
-        return std::get<V4_0_ErrorCode>(digestOrError);
+    if (std::holds_alternative<KMV1::ErrorCode>(digestOrError)) {
+        return std::get<KMV1::ErrorCode>(digestOrError);
     }
     auto digest = std::get<keystore::Digest>(digestOrError);
 
-    V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode = V4_0_ErrorCode::OK;
+    KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode = KMV1::ErrorCode::OK;
     auto error = keystore::signCertWith(
         &*cert,
         [&](const uint8_t* data, size_t len) {
             std::vector<uint8_t> dataVec(data, data + len);
             std::vector<KeyParameter> kps = {
-                KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PADDING, origPadding),
                 KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_DIGEST, origDigest),
             };
+            if (algorithm == KMV1::Algorithm::RSA) {
+                kps.push_back(KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PADDING, origPadding));
+            }
             BeginResult beginResult;
-            auto error = begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, keyBlob, kps, HardwareAuthToken(), &beginResult);
+            auto error =
+                begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, prefixedKeyBlob, kps, HardwareAuthToken(), &beginResult);
             if (!error.isOk()) {
                 errorCode = toErrorCode(error);
                 return std::vector<uint8_t>();
             }
-            std::optional<KeyParameterArray> outParams;
-            std::optional<ByteArray> outByte;
-            int32_t status;
-            error = beginResult.operation->update(std::nullopt, dataVec, std::nullopt, std::nullopt,
-                                                  &outParams, &outByte, &status);
-            if (!error.isOk()) {
-                errorCode = toErrorCode(error);
-                return std::vector<uint8_t>();
-            }
+
             std::vector<uint8_t> result;
-            error = beginResult.operation->finish(std::nullopt, std::nullopt, std::nullopt,
-                                                  std::nullopt, std::nullopt, &outParams, &result);
+            error = beginResult.operation->finish(dataVec,                     //
+                                                  {} /* signature */,          //
+                                                  {} /* authToken */,          //
+                                                  {} /* timestampToken */,     //
+                                                  {} /* confirmationToken */,  //
+                                                  &result);
             if (!error.isOk()) {
                 errorCode = toErrorCode(error);
                 return std::vector<uint8_t>();
@@ -694,40 +1068,42 @@
     if (error) {
         LOG(ERROR) << __func__
                    << ": signCertWith failed. (Callback diagnosed: " << toString(errorCode) << ")";
-        return V4_0_ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
-    if (errorCode != V4_0_ErrorCode::OK) {
+    if (errorCode != KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) {
         return errorCode;
     }
     return std::nullopt;
 }
 
-std::variant<std::vector<Certificate>, V4_0_ErrorCode>
+std::variant<std::vector<Certificate>, KMV1::ErrorCode>
 KeyMintDevice::getCertificate(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& keyParams,
-                              const std::vector<uint8_t>& keyBlob) {
+                              const std::vector<uint8_t>& prefixedKeyBlob) {
+    const std::vector<uint8_t>& keyBlob = prefixedKeyBlobRemovePrefix(prefixedKeyBlob);
+
     // There are no certificates for symmetric keys.
     auto algorithm = getParam(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_ALGORITHM);
     if (!algorithm) {
         LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Unable to determine key algorithm.";
-        return V4_0_ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
     switch (*algorithm) {
     case Algorithm::RSA:
     case Algorithm::EC:
         break;
     default:
-        return V4_0_ErrorCode::OK;
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::OK;
     }
 
     // If attestation was requested, call and use attestKey.
     if (containsParam(keyParams, KMV1::TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE)) {
-        auto legacyParams = convertKeyParametersToLegacy(keyParams);
+        auto legacyParams = convertKeyParametersToLegacy(extractAttestationParams(keyParams));
         std::vector<Certificate> certs;
-        V4_0_ErrorCode errorCode = V4_0_ErrorCode::OK;
+        KMV1::ErrorCode errorCode = KMV1::ErrorCode::OK;
         auto result = mDevice->attestKey(
             keyBlob, legacyParams,
-            [&](V4_0_ErrorCode error, const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& certChain) {
-                errorCode = error;
+            [&](V4_0::ErrorCode error, const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& certChain) {
+                errorCode = convert(error);
                 for (const auto& cert : certChain) {
                     Certificate certificate;
                     certificate.encodedCertificate = cert;
@@ -736,9 +1112,9 @@
             });
         if (!result.isOk()) {
             LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Call to attestKey failed.";
-            return V4_0_ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+            return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
         }
-        if (errorCode != V4_0_ErrorCode::OK) {
+        if (errorCode != KMV1::ErrorCode::OK) {
             return errorCode;
         }
         return certs;
@@ -746,8 +1122,8 @@
 
     // makeCert
     auto certOrError = makeCert(mDevice, keyParams, keyBlob);
-    if (std::holds_alternative<V4_0_ErrorCode>(certOrError)) {
-        return std::get<V4_0_ErrorCode>(certOrError);
+    if (std::holds_alternative<KMV1::ErrorCode>(certOrError)) {
+        return std::get<KMV1::ErrorCode>(certOrError);
     }
     auto cert = std::move(std::get<keystore::X509_Ptr>(certOrError));
 
@@ -755,7 +1131,7 @@
     auto error = keystore::setIssuer(&*cert, &*cert, false);
     if (error) {
         LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Set issuer failed.";
-        return V4_0_ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
 
     // Signing
@@ -780,7 +1156,7 @@
         error = keystore::signCert(&*cert, pkey_ptr);
         if (error) {
             LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": signCert failed.";
-            return V4_0_ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+            return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
         }
     }
 
@@ -788,7 +1164,7 @@
     auto encodedCertOrError = keystore::encodeCert(&*cert);
     if (std::holds_alternative<keystore::CertUtilsError>(encodedCertOrError)) {
         LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": encodeCert failed.";
-        return V4_0_ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
     }
 
     Certificate certificate{.encodedCertificate =
@@ -802,14 +1178,14 @@
 // Copied from system/security/keystore/include/keystore/keymaster_types.h.
 
 // Changing this namespace alias will change the keymaster version.
-namespace keymaster = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1;
+namespace keymasterNs = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1;
 
-using keymaster::SecurityLevel;
+using keymasterNs::SecurityLevel;
 
 // Copied from system/security/keystore/KeyStore.h.
 
 using ::android::sp;
-using keymaster::support::Keymaster;
+using keymasterNs::support::Keymaster;
 
 template <typename T, size_t count> class Devices : public std::array<T, count> {
   public:
@@ -834,8 +1210,8 @@
 // Copied from system/security/keystore/keystore_main.cpp.
 
 using ::android::hardware::hidl_string;
-using keymaster::support::Keymaster3;
-using keymaster::support::Keymaster4;
+using keymasterNs::support::Keymaster3;
+using keymasterNs::support::Keymaster4;
 
 template <typename Wrapper>
 KeymasterDevices enumerateKeymasterDevices(IServiceManager* serviceManager) {
@@ -911,12 +1287,14 @@
 // Constructors and helpers.
 
 KeyMintDevice::KeyMintDevice(sp<Keymaster> device, KeyMintSecurityLevel securityLevel)
-    : mDevice(device) {
+    : mDevice(device), securityLevel_(securityLevel) {
     if (securityLevel == KeyMintSecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
-        mOperationSlots.setNumFreeSlots(3);
+        setNumFreeSlots(3);
     } else {
-        mOperationSlots.setNumFreeSlots(15);
+        setNumFreeSlots(15);
     }
+
+    softKeyMintDevice_.reset(CreateKeyMintDevice(KeyMintSecurityLevel::SOFTWARE));
 }
 
 sp<Keymaster> getDevice(KeyMintSecurityLevel securityLevel) {
@@ -993,7 +1371,7 @@
 }
 
 ScopedAStatus KeystoreCompatService::getSecureClock(std::shared_ptr<ISecureClock>* _aidl_return) {
-    if (!mSharedSecret) {
+    if (!mSecureClock) {
         // The legacy verification service was always provided by the TEE variant.
         auto clock = SecureClock::createSecureClock(KeyMintSecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT);
         if (!clock) {
diff --git a/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat.h b/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat.h
index 481481a..69c24b4 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat.h
+++ b/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BnKeyMintDevice.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BnKeyMintOperation.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/BnSecureClock.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/sharedsecret/BnSharedSecret.h>
 #include <aidl/android/security/compat/BnKeystoreCompatService.h>
@@ -27,8 +28,8 @@
 
 #include "certificate_utils.h"
 
+using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::AttestationKey;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::BeginResult;
-using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::ByteArray;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::Certificate;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::HardwareAuthToken;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyCharacteristics;
@@ -36,11 +37,11 @@
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyFormat;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyMintHardwareInfo;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyParameter;
-using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyParameterArray;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyPurpose;
 using KeyMintSecurityLevel = ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel;
 using V4_0_ErrorCode = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::ErrorCode;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::IKeyMintDevice;
+using KMV1_ErrorCode = ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::ErrorCode;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::secureclock::ISecureClock;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::secureclock::TimeStampToken;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::sharedsecret::ISharedSecret;
@@ -88,9 +89,11 @@
     ScopedAStatus getHardwareInfo(KeyMintHardwareInfo* _aidl_return) override;
     ScopedAStatus addRngEntropy(const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_data) override;
     ScopedAStatus generateKey(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& in_keyParams,
+                              const std::optional<AttestationKey>& in_attestationKey,
                               KeyCreationResult* out_creationResult) override;
     ScopedAStatus importKey(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& in_inKeyParams,
                             KeyFormat in_inKeyFormat, const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inKeyData,
+                            const std::optional<AttestationKey>& in_attestationKey,
                             KeyCreationResult* out_creationResult) override;
     ScopedAStatus importWrappedKey(const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inWrappedKeyData,
                                    const std::vector<uint8_t>& in_inWrappingKeyBlob,
@@ -108,19 +111,30 @@
                         const std::vector<KeyParameter>& in_inParams,
                         const HardwareAuthToken& in_inAuthToken,
                         BeginResult* _aidl_return) override;
+    ScopedAStatus deviceLocked(bool passwordOnly,
+                               const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& timestampToken) override;
+    ScopedAStatus earlyBootEnded() override;
+
+    ScopedAStatus convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(const std::vector<uint8_t>& storageKeyBlob,
+                                               std::vector<uint8_t>* ephemeralKeyBlob) override;
+
+    ScopedAStatus performOperation(const std::vector<uint8_t>& request,
+                                   std::vector<uint8_t>* response) override;
 
     // These are public to allow testing code to use them directly.
     // This class should not be used publicly anyway.
-
-    std::variant<std::vector<Certificate>, V4_0_ErrorCode>
+    std::variant<std::vector<Certificate>, KMV1_ErrorCode>
     getCertificate(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& keyParams, const std::vector<uint8_t>& keyBlob);
 
     void setNumFreeSlots(uint8_t numFreeSlots);
 
   private:
-    std::optional<V4_0_ErrorCode> signCertificate(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& keyParams,
+    std::optional<KMV1_ErrorCode> signCertificate(const std::vector<KeyParameter>& keyParams,
                                                   const std::vector<uint8_t>& keyBlob, X509* cert);
     KeyMintSecurityLevel securityLevel_;
+
+    // Software-based KeyMint device used to implement ECDH.
+    std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> softKeyMintDevice_;
 };
 
 class KeyMintOperation : public aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::BnKeyMintOperation {
@@ -135,19 +149,22 @@
         : mDevice(device), mOperationHandle(operationHandle), mOperationSlot(slots, isActive) {}
     ~KeyMintOperation();
 
-    ScopedAStatus update(const std::optional<KeyParameterArray>& in_inParams,
-                         const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& in_input,
-                         const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken>& in_inAuthToken,
-                         const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& in_inTimestampToken,
-                         std::optional<KeyParameterArray>* out_outParams,
-                         std::optional<ByteArray>* out_output, int32_t* _aidl_return);
-    ScopedAStatus finish(const std::optional<KeyParameterArray>& in_inParams,
-                         const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& in_input,
-                         const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& in_inSignature,
-                         const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken>& in_authToken,
-                         const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& in_inTimestampToken,
-                         std::optional<KeyParameterArray>* out_outParams,
-                         std::vector<uint8_t>* _aidl_return);
+    ScopedAStatus updateAad(const std::vector<uint8_t>& input,
+                            const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken>& authToken,
+                            const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& timestampToken) override;
+
+    ScopedAStatus update(const std::vector<uint8_t>& input,
+                         const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken>& authToken,
+                         const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& timestampToken,
+                         std::vector<uint8_t>* output) override;
+
+    ScopedAStatus finish(const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& input,
+                         const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& signature,
+                         const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken>& authToken,
+                         const std::optional<TimeStampToken>& timeStampToken,
+                         const std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& confirmationToken,
+                         std::vector<uint8_t>* output) override;
+
     ScopedAStatus abort();
 };
 
diff --git a/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat_type_conversion.h b/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat_type_conversion.h
index db9d2a4..c2b4669 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat_type_conversion.h
+++ b/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat_type_conversion.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #pragma once
 
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.h>
 #include <keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h>
 #include <keymint_support/keymint_tags.h>
 
@@ -23,6 +24,159 @@
 namespace V4_1 = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1;
 namespace KMV1 = ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint;
 
+static KMV1::ErrorCode convert(V4_0::ErrorCode error) {
+    switch (error) {
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::OK:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::OK;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::ROOT_OF_TRUST_ALREADY_SET:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::ROOT_OF_TRUST_ALREADY_SET;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INVALID_EXPIRATION_TIME:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INVALID_EXPIRATION_TIME;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INVALID_USER_ID:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INVALID_USER_ID;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_TIMEOUT:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_TIMEOUT;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_KEY_FORMAT:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_KEY_FORMAT;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_ALGORITHM:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_ALGORITHM;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::KEY_EXPORT_OPTIONS_INVALID:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::KEY_EXPORT_OPTIONS_INVALID;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::DELEGATION_NOT_ALLOWED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::DELEGATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::KEY_NOT_YET_VALID:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::KEY_NOT_YET_VALID;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::OUTPUT_PARAMETER_NULL:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::OUTPUT_PARAMETER_NULL;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER_SPACE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER_SPACE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_ENCRYPTED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::IMPORTED_KEY_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::IMPORTED_KEY_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_SIGNED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_SIGNED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::IMPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::IMPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::SECURE_HW_ACCESS_DENIED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::SECURE_HW_ACCESS_DENIED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::OPERATION_CANCELLED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::OPERATION_CANCELLED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::CONCURRENT_ACCESS_CONFLICT:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::CONCURRENT_ACCESS_CONFLICT;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::SECURE_HW_BUSY:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::SECURE_HW_BUSY;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::SECURE_HW_COMMUNICATION_FAILED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::SECURE_HW_COMMUNICATION_FAILED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_EC_FIELD:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_EC_FIELD;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::MISSING_NONCE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::MISSING_NONCE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::MISSING_MAC_LENGTH:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::MISSING_MAC_LENGTH;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KDF:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KDF;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_EC_CURVE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_EC_CURVE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::KEYMASTER_NOT_CONFIGURED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::KEYMINT_NOT_CONFIGURED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUIRED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUIRED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::CONCURRENT_PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUESTED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::CONCURRENT_PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUESTED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::NO_USER_CONFIRMATION:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::NO_USER_CONFIRMATION;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::VERSION_MISMATCH:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::VERSION_MISMATCH;
+    case V4_0::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR:
+        return KMV1::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+    }
+}
+
 static std::optional<V4_0::KeyPurpose> convert(KMV1::KeyPurpose p) {
     switch (p) {
     case KMV1::KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT:
@@ -241,6 +395,8 @@
         return V4_0::SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT;
     case KMV1::SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
         return V4_0::SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX;
+    case KMV1::SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE:
+        return V4_0::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
     }
 }
 
@@ -578,7 +734,14 @@
         }
         break;
     case KMV1::Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST:
-        // Does not exist in KM < KeyMint 1.0.
+    case KMV1::Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL:
+    case KMV1::Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT:
+    case KMV1::Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE:
+    case KMV1::Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER:
+        // These tags do not exist in KM < KeyMint 1.0.
+        break;
+    case KMV1::Tag::MAX_BOOT_LEVEL:
+        // Does not exist in API level 30 or below.
         break;
     }
     return V4_0::KeyParameter{.tag = V4_0::Tag::INVALID};
diff --git a/keystore2/src/km_compat/lib.rs b/keystore2/src/km_compat/lib.rs
index 7814364..5ece8a7 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/km_compat/lib.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/km_compat/lib.rs
@@ -12,13 +12,14 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-// TODO: Once this is stable, remove this and document everything public.
-#![allow(missing_docs)]
+//! Export into Rust a function to create a KeyMintDevice and add it as a service.
 
+#[allow(missing_docs)] // TODO remove this
 extern "C" {
     fn addKeyMintDeviceService() -> i32;
 }
 
+#[allow(missing_docs)] // TODO remove this
 pub fn add_keymint_device_service() -> i32 {
     unsafe { addKeyMintDeviceService() }
 }
@@ -31,42 +32,56 @@
         Algorithm::Algorithm, BeginResult::BeginResult, BlockMode::BlockMode, Digest::Digest,
         ErrorCode::ErrorCode, HardwareAuthToken::HardwareAuthToken, IKeyMintDevice::IKeyMintDevice,
         KeyCreationResult::KeyCreationResult, KeyFormat::KeyFormat, KeyParameter::KeyParameter,
-        KeyParameterArray::KeyParameterArray, KeyParameterValue::KeyParameterValue,
-        KeyPurpose::KeyPurpose, PaddingMode::PaddingMode, SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel, Tag::Tag,
+        KeyParameterValue::KeyParameterValue, KeyPurpose::KeyPurpose, PaddingMode::PaddingMode,
+        SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel, Tag::Tag,
     };
-    use android_hardware_security_keymint::binder;
+    use android_hardware_security_keymint::binder::{self, Strong};
     use android_security_compat::aidl::android::security::compat::IKeystoreCompatService::IKeystoreCompatService;
 
     static COMPAT_NAME: &str = "android.security.compat";
 
-    fn get_device() -> Box<dyn IKeyMintDevice> {
+    fn get_device() -> Option<Strong<dyn IKeyMintDevice>> {
         add_keymint_device_service();
-        let compat_service: Box<dyn IKeystoreCompatService> =
-            binder::get_interface(COMPAT_NAME).unwrap();
-        compat_service.getKeyMintDevice(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT).unwrap()
+        let compat_service: Strong<dyn IKeystoreCompatService> =
+            binder::get_interface(COMPAT_NAME).ok()?;
+        compat_service.getKeyMintDevice(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT).ok()
+    }
+
+    macro_rules! get_device_or_skip_test {
+        () => {
+            match get_device() {
+                Some(dev) => dev,
+                None => return,
+            }
+        };
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn test_get_hardware_info() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         let hinfo = legacy.getHardwareInfo();
         assert!(hinfo.is_ok());
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn test_add_rng_entropy() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         let result = legacy.addRngEntropy(&[42; 16]);
         assert!(result.is_ok(), "{:?}", result);
     }
 
     // TODO: If I only need the key itself, don't return the other things.
     fn generate_key(legacy: &dyn IKeyMintDevice, kps: Vec<KeyParameter>) -> KeyCreationResult {
-        let creation_result = legacy.generateKey(&kps).expect("Failed to generate key");
+        let creation_result =
+            legacy.generateKey(&kps, None /* attest_key */).expect("Failed to generate key");
         assert_ne!(creation_result.keyBlob.len(), 0);
         creation_result
     }
 
+    // Per RFC 5280 4.1.2.5, an undefined expiration (not-after) field should be set to GeneralizedTime
+    // 999912312359559, which is 253402300799000 ms from Jan 1, 1970.
+    const UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER: i64 = 253402300799000i64;
+
     fn generate_rsa_key(legacy: &dyn IKeyMintDevice, encrypt: bool, attest: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
         let mut kps = vec![
             KeyParameter {
@@ -88,6 +103,14 @@
                 tag: Tag::PURPOSE,
                 value: KeyParameterValue::KeyPurpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN),
             },
+            KeyParameter {
+                tag: Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE,
+                value: KeyParameterValue::DateTime(0),
+            },
+            KeyParameter {
+                tag: Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER,
+                value: KeyParameterValue::DateTime(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER),
+            },
         ];
         if encrypt {
             kps.push(KeyParameter {
@@ -117,39 +140,40 @@
 
     #[test]
     fn test_generate_key_no_encrypt() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         generate_rsa_key(legacy.as_ref(), false, false);
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn test_generate_key_encrypt() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         generate_rsa_key(legacy.as_ref(), true, false);
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn test_generate_key_attested() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         generate_rsa_key(legacy.as_ref(), false, true);
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn test_import_key() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         let kps = [KeyParameter {
             tag: Tag::ALGORITHM,
             value: KeyParameterValue::Algorithm(Algorithm::AES),
         }];
         let kf = KeyFormat::RAW;
         let kd = [0; 16];
-        let creation_result = legacy.importKey(&kps, kf, &kd).expect("Failed to import key");
+        let creation_result =
+            legacy.importKey(&kps, kf, &kd, None /* attest_key */).expect("Failed to import key");
         assert_ne!(creation_result.keyBlob.len(), 0);
         assert_eq!(creation_result.certificateChain.len(), 0);
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn test_import_wrapped_key() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         let result = legacy.importWrappedKey(&[], &[], &[], &[], 0, 0);
         // For this test we only care that there was no crash.
         assert!(result.is_ok() || result.is_err());
@@ -157,7 +181,7 @@
 
     #[test]
     fn test_upgrade_key() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         let blob = generate_rsa_key(legacy.as_ref(), false, false);
         let result = legacy.upgradeKey(&blob, &[]);
         // For this test we only care that there was no crash.
@@ -166,7 +190,7 @@
 
     #[test]
     fn test_delete_key() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         let blob = generate_rsa_key(legacy.as_ref(), false, false);
         let result = legacy.deleteKey(&blob);
         assert!(result.is_ok(), "{:?}", result);
@@ -174,14 +198,14 @@
 
     #[test]
     fn test_delete_all_keys() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         let result = legacy.deleteAllKeys();
         assert!(result.is_ok(), "{:?}", result);
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn test_destroy_attestation_ids() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         let result = legacy.destroyAttestationIds();
         assert!(result.is_err());
         assert_eq!(result.unwrap_err().service_specific_error(), ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED.0,);
@@ -243,7 +267,7 @@
 
     #[test]
     fn test_begin_abort() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         let blob = generate_aes_key(legacy.as_ref());
         let begin_result = begin(legacy.as_ref(), &blob, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, None);
         let operation = begin_result.operation.unwrap();
@@ -255,54 +279,72 @@
 
     #[test]
     fn test_begin_update_finish() {
-        let legacy = get_device();
+        let legacy = get_device_or_skip_test!();
         let blob = generate_aes_key(legacy.as_ref());
 
         let begin_result = begin(legacy.as_ref(), &blob, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, None);
         let operation = begin_result.operation.unwrap();
-        let params = KeyParameterArray {
-            params: vec![KeyParameter {
-                tag: Tag::ASSOCIATED_DATA,
-                value: KeyParameterValue::Blob(b"foobar".to_vec()),
-            }],
-        };
+
+        let update_aad_result = operation.updateAad(
+            &b"foobar".to_vec(),
+            None, /* authToken */
+            None, /* timestampToken */
+        );
+        assert!(update_aad_result.is_ok(), "{:?}", update_aad_result);
+
         let message = [42; 128];
-        let mut out_params = None;
-        let result =
-            operation.finish(Some(&params), Some(&message), None, None, None, &mut out_params);
+        let result = operation.finish(
+            Some(&message),
+            None, /* signature */
+            None, /* authToken */
+            None, /* timestampToken */
+            None, /* confirmationToken */
+        );
         assert!(result.is_ok(), "{:?}", result);
         let ciphertext = result.unwrap();
         assert!(!ciphertext.is_empty());
-        assert!(out_params.is_some());
 
         let begin_result =
             begin(legacy.as_ref(), &blob, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, Some(begin_result.params));
+
         let operation = begin_result.operation.unwrap();
-        let mut out_params = None;
-        let mut output = None;
+
+        let update_aad_result = operation.updateAad(
+            &b"foobar".to_vec(),
+            None, /* authToken */
+            None, /* timestampToken */
+        );
+        assert!(update_aad_result.is_ok(), "{:?}", update_aad_result);
+
         let result = operation.update(
-            Some(&params),
-            Some(&ciphertext),
-            None,
-            None,
-            &mut out_params,
-            &mut output,
+            &ciphertext,
+            None, /* authToken */
+            None, /* timestampToken */
         );
         assert!(result.is_ok(), "{:?}", result);
-        assert_eq!(result.unwrap(), message.len() as i32);
-        assert!(output.is_some());
-        assert_eq!(output.unwrap().data, message.to_vec());
-        let result = operation.finish(Some(&params), None, None, None, None, &mut out_params);
+        assert_eq!(result.unwrap(), message);
+        let result = operation.finish(
+            None, /* input */
+            None, /* signature */
+            None, /* authToken */
+            None, /* timestampToken */
+            None, /* confirmationToken */
+        );
         assert!(result.is_ok(), "{:?}", result);
-        assert!(out_params.is_some());
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn test_secure_clock() {
         add_keymint_device_service();
-        let compat_service: Box<dyn IKeystoreCompatService> =
-            binder::get_interface(COMPAT_NAME).unwrap();
-        let secure_clock = compat_service.getSecureClock().unwrap();
+        let compat_service: binder::Strong<dyn IKeystoreCompatService> =
+            match binder::get_interface(COMPAT_NAME) {
+                Ok(cs) => cs,
+                _ => return,
+            };
+        let secure_clock = match compat_service.getSecureClock() {
+            Ok(sc) => sc,
+            _ => return,
+        };
 
         let challenge = 42;
         let result = secure_clock.generateTimeStamp(challenge);
@@ -315,10 +357,16 @@
     #[test]
     fn test_shared_secret() {
         add_keymint_device_service();
-        let compat_service: Box<dyn IKeystoreCompatService> =
-            binder::get_interface(COMPAT_NAME).unwrap();
-        let shared_secret =
-            compat_service.getSharedSecret(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT).unwrap();
+        let compat_service: binder::Strong<dyn IKeystoreCompatService> =
+            match binder::get_interface(COMPAT_NAME) {
+                Ok(cs) => cs,
+                _ => return,
+            };
+        let shared_secret = match compat_service.getSharedSecret(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
+        {
+            Ok(ss) => ss,
+            _ => return,
+        };
 
         let result = shared_secret.getSharedSecretParameters();
         assert!(result.is_ok(), "{:?}", result);
diff --git a/keystore2/src/km_compat/parameter_conversion_test.cpp b/keystore2/src/km_compat/parameter_conversion_test.cpp
index 41be067..48af20c 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/km_compat/parameter_conversion_test.cpp
+++ b/keystore2/src/km_compat/parameter_conversion_test.cpp
@@ -150,3 +150,84 @@
     TEST_KEY_PARAMETER_CONVERSION_V4_0(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID);
     TEST_KEY_PARAMETER_CONVERSION_V4_0(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
 }
+
+#define TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(variant)                                                        \
+    ASSERT_EQ(KMV1::ErrorCode::variant, convert(V4_0::ErrorCode::variant))
+
+TEST(KmCompatTypeConversionTest, testErrorCodeConversion) {
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(OK);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(ROOT_OF_TRUST_ALREADY_SET);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INVALID_EXPIRATION_TIME);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INVALID_USER_ID);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_TIMEOUT);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INCOMPATIBLE_KEY_FORMAT);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_ALGORITHM);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(KEY_EXPORT_OPTIONS_INVALID);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(DELEGATION_NOT_ALLOWED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(KEY_NOT_YET_VALID);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(KEY_EXPIRED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(OUTPUT_PARAMETER_NULL);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER_SPACE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(VERIFICATION_FAILED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INVALID_KEY_BLOB);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_ENCRYPTED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(IMPORTED_KEY_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_SIGNED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(IMPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_TAG);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INVALID_TAG);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(SECURE_HW_ACCESS_DENIED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(OPERATION_CANCELLED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(CONCURRENT_ACCESS_CONFLICT);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(SECURE_HW_BUSY);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(SECURE_HW_COMMUNICATION_FAILED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_EC_FIELD);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(MISSING_NONCE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INVALID_NONCE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(MISSING_MAC_LENGTH);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(INVALID_MAC_LENGTH);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_KDF);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNSUPPORTED_EC_CURVE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING);
+    ASSERT_EQ(KMV1::ErrorCode::KEYMINT_NOT_CONFIGURED,
+              convert(V4_0::ErrorCode::KEYMASTER_NOT_CONFIGURED));
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUIRED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(CONCURRENT_PROOF_OF_PRESENCE_REQUESTED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(NO_USER_CONFIRMATION);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(DEVICE_LOCKED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNIMPLEMENTED);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(VERSION_MISMATCH);
+    TEST_ERROR_CODE_CONVERSION(UNKNOWN_ERROR);
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/km_compat/slot_test.cpp b/keystore2/src/km_compat/slot_test.cpp
index 0859ddf..43f3bc6 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/km_compat/slot_test.cpp
+++ b/keystore2/src/km_compat/slot_test.cpp
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::Algorithm;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::BlockMode;
-using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::ByteArray;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::Certificate;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::Digest;
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::ErrorCode;
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT),
     });
     KeyCreationResult creationResult;
-    auto status = device->generateKey(keyParams, &creationResult);
+    auto status = device->generateKey(keyParams, std::nullopt /* attest_key */, &creationResult);
     if (!status.isOk()) {
         return {};
     }
@@ -100,18 +99,19 @@
     // Calling finish should free up a slot.
     auto last = operations.back();
     operations.pop_back();
-    std::optional<KeyParameterArray> kpa;
     std::vector<uint8_t> byteVec;
-    auto status = last->finish(std::nullopt, std::nullopt, std::nullopt, std::nullopt, std::nullopt,
-                               &kpa, &byteVec);
+    auto status = last->finish(std::nullopt /* input */, std::nullopt /* signature */,
+                               std::nullopt /* authToken */, std::nullopt /* timestampToken */,
+                               std::nullopt /* confirmationToken */, &byteVec);
     ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
     result = begin(device, true);
     ASSERT_TRUE(std::holds_alternative<BeginResult>(result));
     operations.push_back(std::get<BeginResult>(result).operation);
 
     // Calling finish and abort on an already-finished operation should not free up another slot.
-    status = last->finish(std::nullopt, std::nullopt, std::nullopt, std::nullopt, std::nullopt,
-                          &kpa, &byteVec);
+    status = last->finish(std::nullopt /* input */, std::nullopt /* signature */,
+                          std::nullopt /* authToken */, std::nullopt /* timestampToken */,
+                          std::nullopt /* confirmationToken */, &byteVec);
     ASSERT_TRUE(!status.isOk());
     status = last->abort();
     ASSERT_TRUE(!status.isOk());
@@ -130,8 +130,9 @@
     operations.push_back(std::get<BeginResult>(result).operation);
 
     // Calling finish and abort on an already-aborted operation should not free up another slot.
-    status = last->finish(std::nullopt, std::nullopt, std::nullopt, std::nullopt, std::nullopt,
-                          &kpa, &byteVec);
+    status = last->finish(std::nullopt /* input */, std::nullopt /* signature */,
+                          std::nullopt /* authToken */, std::nullopt /* timestampToken */,
+                          std::nullopt /* confirmationToken */, &byteVec);
     ASSERT_TRUE(!status.isOk());
     status = last->abort();
     ASSERT_TRUE(!status.isOk());
@@ -140,23 +141,23 @@
     ASSERT_EQ(std::get<ScopedAStatus>(result).getServiceSpecificError(),
               static_cast<int32_t>(ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS));
 
-    // Generating a certificate with signWith also uses a slot.
+    // Generating a certificate with signWith uses a slot but falls back to not using one.
     auto kps = std::vector<KeyParameter>({
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_KEY_SIZE, 2048),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN),
+        KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE, 0),
+        KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, 253402300799000),
         KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, true),
     });
     KeyCreationResult creationResult;
-    status = device->generateKey(kps, &creationResult);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(!status.isOk());
-    ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
-              static_cast<int32_t>(ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS));
+    status = device->generateKey(kps, std::nullopt /* attest_key */, &creationResult);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
     // But generating a certificate with signCert does not use a slot.
     kps.pop_back();
-    status = device->generateKey(kps, &creationResult);
+    status = device->generateKey(kps, std::nullopt /* attest_key */, &creationResult);
     ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
 
     // Destructing operations should free up their slots.
diff --git a/keystore2/src/legacy_blob.rs b/keystore2/src/legacy_blob.rs
index 230a82c..7c8a909 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/legacy_blob.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/legacy_blob.rs
@@ -12,12 +12,9 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-#![allow(dead_code)]
-
 //! This module implements methods to load legacy keystore key blob files.
 
 use crate::{
-    database::KeyMetaData,
     error::{Error as KsError, ResponseCode},
     key_parameter::{KeyParameter, KeyParameterValue},
     super_key::SuperKeyManager,
@@ -27,9 +24,13 @@
     SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel, Tag::Tag, TagType::TagType,
 };
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
-use keystore2_crypto::{aes_gcm_decrypt, derive_key_from_password, ZVec};
-use std::io::{ErrorKind, Read};
+use keystore2_crypto::{aes_gcm_decrypt, Password, ZVec};
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
 use std::{convert::TryInto, fs::File, path::Path, path::PathBuf};
+use std::{
+    fs,
+    io::{ErrorKind, Read, Result as IoResult},
+};
 
 const SUPPORTED_LEGACY_BLOB_VERSION: u8 = 3;
 
@@ -213,7 +214,7 @@
     // flags (1 Byte)
     // info (1 Byte)
     // initialization_vector (16 Bytes)
-    // integrity (MD5 digest or gcb tag) (16 Bytes)
+    // integrity (MD5 digest or gcm tag) (16 Bytes)
     // length (4 Bytes)
     const COMMON_HEADER_SIZE: usize = 4 + Self::IV_SIZE + Self::GCM_TAG_LENGTH + 4;
 
@@ -224,13 +225,14 @@
     const LENGTH_OFFSET: usize = 4 + Self::IV_SIZE + Self::GCM_TAG_LENGTH;
     const IV_OFFSET: usize = 4;
     const AEAD_TAG_OFFSET: usize = Self::IV_OFFSET + Self::IV_SIZE;
-    const DIGEST_OFFSET: usize = Self::IV_OFFSET + Self::IV_SIZE;
+    const _DIGEST_OFFSET: usize = Self::IV_OFFSET + Self::IV_SIZE;
 
     /// Construct a new LegacyBlobLoader with a root path of `path` relative to which it will
     /// expect legacy key blob files.
     pub fn new(path: &Path) -> Self {
         Self { path: path.to_owned() }
     }
+
     /// Encodes an alias string as ascii character sequence in the range
     /// ['+' .. '.'] and ['0' .. '~'].
     /// Bytes with values in the range ['0' .. '~'] are represented as they are.
@@ -587,7 +589,7 @@
         let sw_list = Self::read_key_parameters(&mut stream)
             .context("In read_characteristics_file.")?
             .into_iter()
-            .map(|value| KeyParameter::new(value, SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE));
+            .map(|value| KeyParameter::new(value, SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE));
 
         Ok(hw_list.into_iter().flatten().chain(sw_list).collect())
     }
@@ -600,7 +602,7 @@
     //            used this for user installed certificates without private key material.
 
     fn read_km_blob_file(&self, uid: u32, alias: &str) -> Result<Option<(Blob, String)>> {
-        let mut iter = ["USRPKEY", "USERSKEY"].iter();
+        let mut iter = ["USRPKEY", "USRSKEY"].iter();
 
         let (blob, prefix) = loop {
             if let Some(prefix) = iter.next() {
@@ -619,7 +621,7 @@
     }
 
     fn read_generic_blob(path: &Path) -> Result<Option<Blob>> {
-        let mut file = match File::open(path) {
+        let mut file = match Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| File::open(path)) {
             Ok(file) => file,
             Err(e) => match e.kind() {
                 ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
@@ -630,50 +632,338 @@
         Ok(Some(Self::new_from_stream(&mut file).context("In read_generic_blob.")?))
     }
 
-    /// This function constructs the blob file name which has the form:
-    /// user_<android user id>/<uid>_<alias>.
-    fn make_blob_filename(&self, uid: u32, alias: &str, prefix: &str) -> PathBuf {
+    /// Read a legacy vpn profile blob.
+    pub fn read_vpn_profile(&self, uid: u32, alias: &str) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
+        let path = match self.make_vpn_profile_filename(uid, alias) {
+            Some(path) => path,
+            None => return Ok(None),
+        };
+
+        let blob =
+            Self::read_generic_blob(&path).context("In read_vpn_profile: Failed to read blob.")?;
+
+        Ok(blob.and_then(|blob| match blob.value {
+            BlobValue::Generic(blob) => Some(blob),
+            _ => {
+                log::info!("Unexpected vpn profile blob type. Ignoring");
+                None
+            }
+        }))
+    }
+
+    /// Remove a vpn profile by the name alias with owner uid.
+    pub fn remove_vpn_profile(&self, uid: u32, alias: &str) -> Result<()> {
+        let path = match self.make_vpn_profile_filename(uid, alias) {
+            Some(path) => path,
+            None => return Ok(()),
+        };
+
+        if let Err(e) = Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| fs::remove_file(path.as_path())) {
+            match e.kind() {
+                ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(()),
+                _ => return Err(e).context("In remove_vpn_profile."),
+            }
+        }
+
+        let user_id = uid_to_android_user(uid);
+        self.remove_user_dir_if_empty(user_id)
+            .context("In remove_vpn_profile: Trying to remove empty user dir.")
+    }
+
+    fn is_vpn_profile(encoded_alias: &str) -> bool {
+        // We can check the encoded alias because the prefixes we are interested
+        // in are all in the printable range that don't get mangled.
+        encoded_alias.starts_with("VPN_")
+            || encoded_alias.starts_with("PLATFORM_VPN_")
+            || encoded_alias == "LOCKDOWN_VPN"
+    }
+
+    /// List all profiles belonging to the given uid.
+    pub fn list_vpn_profiles(&self, uid: u32) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
         let mut path = self.path.clone();
         let user_id = uid_to_android_user(uid);
-        let encoded_alias = Self::encode_alias(&format!("{}_{}", prefix, alias));
         path.push(format!("user_{}", user_id));
+        let uid_str = uid.to_string();
+        let dir =
+            Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| fs::read_dir(path.as_path())).with_context(|| {
+                format!("In list_vpn_profiles: Failed to open legacy blob database. {:?}", path)
+            })?;
+        let mut result: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+        for entry in dir {
+            let file_name =
+                entry.context("In list_vpn_profiles: Trying to access dir entry")?.file_name();
+            if let Some(f) = file_name.to_str() {
+                let encoded_alias = &f[uid_str.len() + 1..];
+                if f.starts_with(&uid_str) && Self::is_vpn_profile(encoded_alias) {
+                    result.push(
+                        Self::decode_alias(encoded_alias)
+                            .context("In list_vpn_profiles: Trying to decode alias.")?,
+                    )
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(result)
+    }
+
+    /// This function constructs the vpn_profile file name which has the form:
+    /// user_<android user id>/<uid>_<alias>.
+    fn make_vpn_profile_filename(&self, uid: u32, alias: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
+        // legacy vpn entries must start with VPN_ or PLATFORM_VPN_ or are literally called
+        // LOCKDOWN_VPN.
+        if !Self::is_vpn_profile(alias) {
+            return None;
+        }
+
+        let mut path = self.path.clone();
+        let user_id = uid_to_android_user(uid);
+        let encoded_alias = Self::encode_alias(alias);
+        path.push(format!("user_{}", user_id));
+        path.push(format!("{}_{}", uid, encoded_alias));
+        Some(path)
+    }
+
+    /// This function constructs the blob file name which has the form:
+    /// user_<android user id>/<uid>_<prefix>_<alias>.
+    fn make_blob_filename(&self, uid: u32, alias: &str, prefix: &str) -> PathBuf {
+        let user_id = uid_to_android_user(uid);
+        let encoded_alias = Self::encode_alias(&format!("{}_{}", prefix, alias));
+        let mut path = self.make_user_path_name(user_id);
         path.push(format!("{}_{}", uid, encoded_alias));
         path
     }
 
     /// This function constructs the characteristics file name which has the form:
-    /// user_<android user id>/.<uid>_chr_<alias>.
+    /// user_<android user id>/.<uid>_chr_<prefix>_<alias>.
     fn make_chr_filename(&self, uid: u32, alias: &str, prefix: &str) -> PathBuf {
-        let mut path = self.path.clone();
         let user_id = uid_to_android_user(uid);
         let encoded_alias = Self::encode_alias(&format!("{}_{}", prefix, alias));
-        path.push(format!("user_{}", user_id));
+        let mut path = self.make_user_path_name(user_id);
         path.push(format!(".{}_chr_{}", uid, encoded_alias));
         path
     }
 
-    fn load_by_uid_alias(
+    fn make_super_key_filename(&self, user_id: u32) -> PathBuf {
+        let mut path = self.make_user_path_name(user_id);
+        path.push(".masterkey");
+        path
+    }
+
+    fn make_user_path_name(&self, user_id: u32) -> PathBuf {
+        let mut path = self.path.clone();
+        path.push(&format!("user_{}", user_id));
+        path
+    }
+
+    /// Returns if the legacy blob database is empty, i.e., there are no entries matching "user_*"
+    /// in the database dir.
+    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> Result<bool> {
+        let dir = Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| fs::read_dir(self.path.as_path()))
+            .context("In is_empty: Failed to open legacy blob database.")?;
+        for entry in dir {
+            if (*entry.context("In is_empty: Trying to access dir entry")?.file_name())
+                .to_str()
+                .map_or(false, |f| f.starts_with("user_"))
+            {
+                return Ok(false);
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(true)
+    }
+
+    /// Returns if the legacy blob database is empty for a given user, i.e., there are no entries
+    /// matching "user_*" in the database dir.
+    pub fn is_empty_user(&self, user_id: u32) -> Result<bool> {
+        let mut user_path = self.path.clone();
+        user_path.push(format!("user_{}", user_id));
+        if !user_path.as_path().is_dir() {
+            return Ok(true);
+        }
+        Ok(Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| user_path.read_dir())
+            .context("In is_empty_user: Failed to open legacy user dir.")?
+            .next()
+            .is_none())
+    }
+
+    fn extract_alias(encoded_alias: &str) -> Option<String> {
+        // We can check the encoded alias because the prefixes we are interested
+        // in are all in the printable range that don't get mangled.
+        for prefix in &["USRPKEY_", "USRSKEY_", "USRCERT_", "CACERT_"] {
+            if let Some(alias) = encoded_alias.strip_prefix(prefix) {
+                return Self::decode_alias(&alias).ok();
+            }
+        }
+        None
+    }
+
+    /// List all entries for a given user. The strings are unchanged file names, i.e.,
+    /// encoded with UID prefix.
+    fn list_user(&self, user_id: u32) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+        let path = self.make_user_path_name(user_id);
+        let dir =
+            Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| fs::read_dir(path.as_path())).with_context(|| {
+                format!("In list_user: Failed to open legacy blob database. {:?}", path)
+            })?;
+        let mut result: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+        for entry in dir {
+            let file_name = entry.context("In list_user: Trying to access dir entry")?.file_name();
+            if let Some(f) = file_name.to_str() {
+                result.push(f.to_string())
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(result)
+    }
+
+    /// List all keystore entries belonging to the given user. Returns a map of UIDs
+    /// to sets of decoded aliases.
+    pub fn list_keystore_entries_for_user(
+        &self,
+        user_id: u32,
+    ) -> Result<HashMap<u32, HashSet<String>>> {
+        let user_entries = self
+            .list_user(user_id)
+            .context("In list_keystore_entries_for_user: Trying to list user.")?;
+
+        let result =
+            user_entries.into_iter().fold(HashMap::<u32, HashSet<String>>::new(), |mut acc, v| {
+                if let Some(sep_pos) = v.find('_') {
+                    if let Ok(uid) = v[0..sep_pos].parse::<u32>() {
+                        if let Some(alias) = Self::extract_alias(&v[sep_pos + 1..]) {
+                            let entry = acc.entry(uid).or_default();
+                            entry.insert(alias);
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                acc
+            });
+        Ok(result)
+    }
+
+    /// List all keystore entries belonging to the given uid.
+    pub fn list_keystore_entries_for_uid(&self, uid: u32) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+        let user_id = uid_to_android_user(uid);
+
+        let user_entries = self
+            .list_user(user_id)
+            .context("In list_keystore_entries_for_uid: Trying to list user.")?;
+
+        let uid_str = format!("{}_", uid);
+
+        let mut result: Vec<String> = user_entries
+            .into_iter()
+            .filter_map(|v| {
+                if !v.starts_with(&uid_str) {
+                    return None;
+                }
+                let encoded_alias = &v[uid_str.len()..];
+                Self::extract_alias(encoded_alias)
+            })
+            .collect();
+
+        result.sort_unstable();
+        result.dedup();
+        Ok(result)
+    }
+
+    fn with_retry_interrupted<F, T>(f: F) -> IoResult<T>
+    where
+        F: Fn() -> IoResult<T>,
+    {
+        loop {
+            match f() {
+                Ok(v) => return Ok(v),
+                Err(e) => match e.kind() {
+                    ErrorKind::Interrupted => continue,
+                    _ => return Err(e),
+                },
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Deletes a keystore entry. Also removes the user_<uid> directory on the
+    /// last migration.
+    pub fn remove_keystore_entry(&self, uid: u32, alias: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+        let mut something_was_deleted = false;
+        let prefixes = ["USRPKEY", "USRSKEY"];
+        for prefix in &prefixes {
+            let path = self.make_blob_filename(uid, alias, prefix);
+            if let Err(e) = Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| fs::remove_file(path.as_path())) {
+                match e.kind() {
+                    // Only a subset of keys are expected.
+                    ErrorKind::NotFound => continue,
+                    // Log error but ignore.
+                    _ => log::error!("Error while deleting key blob entries. {:?}", e),
+                }
+            }
+            let path = self.make_chr_filename(uid, alias, prefix);
+            if let Err(e) = Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| fs::remove_file(path.as_path())) {
+                match e.kind() {
+                    ErrorKind::NotFound => {
+                        log::info!("No characteristics file found for legacy key blob.")
+                    }
+                    // Log error but ignore.
+                    _ => log::error!("Error while deleting key blob entries. {:?}", e),
+                }
+            }
+            something_was_deleted = true;
+            // Only one of USRPKEY and USRSKEY can be present. So we can end the loop
+            // if we reach this point.
+            break;
+        }
+
+        let prefixes = ["USRCERT", "CACERT"];
+        for prefix in &prefixes {
+            let path = self.make_blob_filename(uid, alias, prefix);
+            if let Err(e) = Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| fs::remove_file(path.as_path())) {
+                match e.kind() {
+                    // USRCERT and CACERT are optional either or both may or may not be present.
+                    ErrorKind::NotFound => continue,
+                    // Log error but ignore.
+                    _ => log::error!("Error while deleting key blob entries. {:?}", e),
+                }
+                something_was_deleted = true;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if something_was_deleted {
+            let user_id = uid_to_android_user(uid);
+            self.remove_user_dir_if_empty(user_id)
+                .context("In remove_keystore_entry: Trying to remove empty user dir.")?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(something_was_deleted)
+    }
+
+    fn remove_user_dir_if_empty(&self, user_id: u32) -> Result<()> {
+        if self
+            .is_empty_user(user_id)
+            .context("In remove_user_dir_if_empty: Trying to check for empty user dir.")?
+        {
+            let user_path = self.make_user_path_name(user_id);
+            Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| fs::remove_dir(user_path.as_path())).ok();
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Load a legacy key blob entry by uid and alias.
+    pub fn load_by_uid_alias(
         &self,
         uid: u32,
         alias: &str,
-        key_manager: &SuperKeyManager,
-    ) -> Result<(Option<(Blob, Vec<KeyParameter>)>, Option<Vec<u8>>, Option<Vec<u8>>, KeyMetaData)>
-    {
-        let metadata = KeyMetaData::new();
-
+        key_manager: Option<&SuperKeyManager>,
+    ) -> Result<(Option<(Blob, Vec<KeyParameter>)>, Option<Vec<u8>>, Option<Vec<u8>>)> {
         let km_blob = self.read_km_blob_file(uid, alias).context("In load_by_uid_alias.")?;
 
         let km_blob = match km_blob {
             Some((km_blob, prefix)) => {
-                let km_blob =
-                    match km_blob {
-                        Blob { flags: _, value: BlobValue::Decrypted(_) } => km_blob,
-                        // Unwrap the key blob if required.
-                        Blob { flags, value: BlobValue::Encrypted { iv, tag, data } } => {
+                let km_blob = match km_blob {
+                    Blob { flags: _, value: BlobValue::Decrypted(_) } => km_blob,
+                    // Unwrap the key blob if required and if we have key_manager.
+                    Blob { flags, value: BlobValue::Encrypted { ref iv, ref tag, ref data } } => {
+                        if let Some(key_manager) = key_manager {
                             let decrypted = match key_manager
                                 .get_per_boot_key_by_user_id(uid_to_android_user(uid))
                             {
-                                Some(key) => aes_gcm_decrypt(&data, &iv, &tag, &key).context(
+                                Some(key) => key.aes_gcm_decrypt(data, iv, tag).context(
                                     "In load_by_uid_alias: while trying to decrypt legacy blob.",
                                 )?,
                                 None => {
@@ -687,11 +977,16 @@
                                 }
                             };
                             Blob { flags, value: BlobValue::Decrypted(decrypted) }
+                        } else {
+                            km_blob
                         }
-                        _ => return Err(KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(
+                    }
+                    _ => {
+                        return Err(KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(
                             "In load_by_uid_alias: Found wrong blob type in legacy key blob file.",
-                        ),
-                    };
+                        )
+                    }
+                };
 
                 let hw_sec_level = match km_blob.is_strongbox() {
                     true => SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX,
@@ -729,28 +1024,38 @@
             }
         };
 
-        Ok((km_blob, user_cert, ca_cert, metadata))
+        Ok((km_blob, user_cert, ca_cert))
+    }
+
+    /// Returns true if the given user has a super key.
+    pub fn has_super_key(&self, user_id: u32) -> bool {
+        self.make_super_key_filename(user_id).is_file()
     }
 
     /// Load and decrypt legacy super key blob.
-    pub fn load_super_key(&self, user_id: u32, pw: &[u8]) -> Result<Option<ZVec>> {
-        let mut path = self.path.clone();
-        path.push(&format!("user_{}", user_id));
-        path.push(".masterkey");
+    pub fn load_super_key(&self, user_id: u32, pw: &Password) -> Result<Option<ZVec>> {
+        let path = self.make_super_key_filename(user_id);
         let blob = Self::read_generic_blob(&path)
             .context("In load_super_key: While loading super key.")?;
 
         let blob = match blob {
             Some(blob) => match blob {
-                Blob {
-                    value: BlobValue::PwEncrypted { iv, tag, data, salt, key_size }, ..
-                } => {
-                    let key = derive_key_from_password(pw, Some(&salt), key_size)
-                        .context("In load_super_key: Failed to derive key from password.")?;
-                    let blob = aes_gcm_decrypt(&data, &iv, &tag, &key).context(
-                        "In load_super_key: while trying to decrypt legacy super key blob.",
-                    )?;
-                    Some(blob)
+                Blob { flags, value: BlobValue::PwEncrypted { iv, tag, data, salt, key_size } } => {
+                    if (flags & flags::ENCRYPTED) != 0 {
+                        let key = pw
+                            .derive_key(Some(&salt), key_size)
+                            .context("In load_super_key: Failed to derive key from password.")?;
+                        let blob = aes_gcm_decrypt(&data, &iv, &tag, &key).context(
+                            "In load_super_key: while trying to decrypt legacy super key blob.",
+                        )?;
+                        Some(blob)
+                    } else {
+                        // In 2019 we had some unencrypted super keys due to b/141955555.
+                        Some(
+                            data.try_into()
+                                .context("In load_super_key: Trying to convert key into ZVec")?,
+                        )
+                    }
                 }
                 _ => {
                     return Err(KsError::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(
@@ -763,6 +1068,18 @@
 
         Ok(blob)
     }
+
+    /// Removes the super key for the given user from the legacy database.
+    /// If this was the last entry in the user's database, this function removes
+    /// the user_<uid> directory as well.
+    pub fn remove_super_key(&self, user_id: u32) {
+        let path = self.make_super_key_filename(user_id);
+        Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| fs::remove_file(path.as_path())).ok();
+        if self.is_empty_user(user_id).ok().unwrap_or(false) {
+            let path = self.make_user_path_name(user_id);
+            Self::with_retry_interrupted(|| fs::remove_dir(path.as_path())).ok();
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -897,6 +1214,37 @@
     }
 
     #[test]
+    fn test_is_empty() {
+        let temp_dir = TempDir::new("test_is_empty").expect("Failed to create temp dir.");
+        let legacy_blob_loader = LegacyBlobLoader::new(temp_dir.path());
+
+        assert!(legacy_blob_loader.is_empty().expect("Should succeed and be empty."));
+
+        let _db = crate::database::KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path(), None)
+            .expect("Failed to open database.");
+
+        assert!(legacy_blob_loader.is_empty().expect("Should succeed and still be empty."));
+
+        std::fs::create_dir(&*temp_dir.build().push("user_0")).expect("Failed to create user_0.");
+
+        assert!(!legacy_blob_loader.is_empty().expect("Should succeed but not be empty."));
+
+        std::fs::create_dir(&*temp_dir.build().push("user_10")).expect("Failed to create user_10.");
+
+        assert!(!legacy_blob_loader.is_empty().expect("Should succeed but still not be empty."));
+
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(&*temp_dir.build().push("user_0"))
+            .expect("Failed to remove user_0.");
+
+        assert!(!legacy_blob_loader.is_empty().expect("Should succeed but still not be empty."));
+
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(&*temp_dir.build().push("user_10"))
+            .expect("Failed to remove user_10.");
+
+        assert!(legacy_blob_loader.is_empty().expect("Should succeed and be empty again."));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
     fn test_legacy_blobs() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         let temp_dir = TempDir::new("legacy_blob_test")?;
         std::fs::create_dir(&*temp_dir.build().push("user_0"))?;
@@ -938,32 +1286,32 @@
         )?;
 
         let key_manager = crate::super_key::SuperKeyManager::new();
-        let mut db = crate::database::KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path())?;
+        let mut db = crate::database::KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path(), None)?;
         let legacy_blob_loader = LegacyBlobLoader::new(temp_dir.path());
 
         assert_eq!(
             legacy_blob_loader
-                .load_by_uid_alias(10223, "authbound", &key_manager)
+                .load_by_uid_alias(10223, "authbound", Some(&key_manager))
                 .unwrap_err()
                 .root_cause()
                 .downcast_ref::<error::Error>(),
             Some(&error::Error::Rc(ResponseCode::LOCKED))
         );
 
-        key_manager.unlock_user_key(0, PASSWORD, &mut db, &legacy_blob_loader)?;
+        key_manager.unlock_user_key(&mut db, 0, &(PASSWORD.into()), &legacy_blob_loader)?;
 
-        if let (Some((Blob { flags, value }, _params)), Some(cert), Some(chain), _kp) =
-            legacy_blob_loader.load_by_uid_alias(10223, "authbound", &key_manager)?
+        if let (Some((Blob { flags, value: _ }, _params)), Some(cert), Some(chain)) =
+            legacy_blob_loader.load_by_uid_alias(10223, "authbound", Some(&key_manager))?
         {
             assert_eq!(flags, 4);
-            assert_eq!(value, BlobValue::Decrypted(DECRYPTED_USRPKEY_AUTHBOUND.try_into()?));
+            //assert_eq!(value, BlobValue::Encrypted(..));
             assert_eq!(&cert[..], LOADED_CERT_AUTHBOUND);
             assert_eq!(&chain[..], LOADED_CACERT_AUTHBOUND);
         } else {
             panic!("");
         }
-        if let (Some((Blob { flags, value }, _params)), Some(cert), Some(chain), _kp) =
-            legacy_blob_loader.load_by_uid_alias(10223, "non_authbound", &key_manager)?
+        if let (Some((Blob { flags, value }, _params)), Some(cert), Some(chain)) =
+            legacy_blob_loader.load_by_uid_alias(10223, "non_authbound", Some(&key_manager))?
         {
             assert_eq!(flags, 0);
             assert_eq!(value, BlobValue::Decrypted(LOADED_USRPKEY_NON_AUTHBOUND.try_into()?));
@@ -973,6 +1321,33 @@
             panic!("");
         }
 
+        legacy_blob_loader.remove_keystore_entry(10223, "authbound").expect("This should succeed.");
+        legacy_blob_loader
+            .remove_keystore_entry(10223, "non_authbound")
+            .expect("This should succeed.");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            (None, None, None),
+            legacy_blob_loader.load_by_uid_alias(10223, "authbound", Some(&key_manager))?
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            (None, None, None),
+            legacy_blob_loader.load_by_uid_alias(10223, "non_authbound", Some(&key_manager))?
+        );
+
+        // The database should not be empty due to the super key.
+        assert!(!legacy_blob_loader.is_empty()?);
+        assert!(!legacy_blob_loader.is_empty_user(0)?);
+
+        // The database should be considered empty for user 1.
+        assert!(legacy_blob_loader.is_empty_user(1)?);
+
+        legacy_blob_loader.remove_super_key(0);
+
+        // Now it should be empty.
+        assert!(legacy_blob_loader.is_empty_user(0)?);
+        assert!(legacy_blob_loader.is_empty()?);
+
         Ok(())
     }
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/legacy_blob/test/legacy_blob_test_vectors.rs b/keystore2/src/legacy_blob/test/legacy_blob_test_vectors.rs
index aa99162..14bd40c 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/legacy_blob/test/legacy_blob_test_vectors.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/legacy_blob/test/legacy_blob_test_vectors.rs
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@
     0xab, 0xae, 0x24, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x35, 0x16, 0x8d, 0x55, 0x3c, 0xe4,
 ];
 
-pub static DECRYPTED_USRPKEY_AUTHBOUND: &[u8] = &[
+pub static _DECRYPTED_USRPKEY_AUTHBOUND: &[u8] = &[
     0x44, 0x4b, 0x4d, 0x4b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
     0xc6, 0x15, 0x3a, 0x08, 0x1e, 0x43, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
     0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
diff --git a/keystore2/src/legacy_migrator.rs b/keystore2/src/legacy_migrator.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5bcae4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/legacy_migrator.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,720 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! This module acts as a bridge between the legacy key database and the keystore2 database.
+
+use crate::error::Error;
+use crate::key_parameter::KeyParameterValue;
+use crate::legacy_blob::BlobValue;
+use crate::utils::uid_to_android_user;
+use crate::{async_task::AsyncTask, legacy_blob::LegacyBlobLoader};
+use crate::{
+    database::{
+        BlobMetaData, BlobMetaEntry, CertificateInfo, DateTime, EncryptedBy, KeyMetaData,
+        KeyMetaEntry, KeystoreDB, Uuid, KEYSTORE_UUID,
+    },
+    super_key::USER_SUPER_KEY,
+};
+use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel;
+use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::{
+    Domain::Domain, KeyDescriptor::KeyDescriptor, ResponseCode::ResponseCode,
+};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use core::ops::Deref;
+use keystore2_crypto::{Password, ZVec};
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU8, Ordering};
+use std::sync::mpsc::channel;
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+
+/// Represents LegacyMigrator.
+pub struct LegacyMigrator {
+    async_task: Arc<AsyncTask>,
+    initializer: Mutex<
+        Option<
+            Box<
+                dyn FnOnce() -> (KeystoreDB, HashMap<SecurityLevel, Uuid>, Arc<LegacyBlobLoader>)
+                    + Send
+                    + 'static,
+            >,
+        >,
+    >,
+    /// This atomic is used for cheap interior mutability. It is intended to prevent
+    /// expensive calls into the legacy migrator when the legacy database is empty.
+    /// When transitioning from READY to EMPTY, spurious calls may occur for a brief period
+    /// of time. This is tolerable in favor of the common case.
+    state: AtomicU8,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
+struct RecentMigration {
+    uid: u32,
+    alias: String,
+}
+
+impl RecentMigration {
+    fn new(uid: u32, alias: String) -> Self {
+        Self { uid, alias }
+    }
+}
+
+enum BulkDeleteRequest {
+    Uid(u32),
+    User(u32),
+}
+
+struct LegacyMigratorState {
+    recently_migrated: HashSet<RecentMigration>,
+    recently_migrated_super_key: HashSet<u32>,
+    legacy_loader: Arc<LegacyBlobLoader>,
+    sec_level_to_km_uuid: HashMap<SecurityLevel, Uuid>,
+    db: KeystoreDB,
+}
+
+impl LegacyMigrator {
+    const WIFI_NAMESPACE: i64 = 102;
+    const AID_WIFI: u32 = 1010;
+
+    const STATE_UNINITIALIZED: u8 = 0;
+    const STATE_READY: u8 = 1;
+    const STATE_EMPTY: u8 = 2;
+
+    /// Constructs a new LegacyMigrator using the given AsyncTask object as migration
+    /// worker.
+    pub fn new(async_task: Arc<AsyncTask>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            async_task,
+            initializer: Default::default(),
+            state: AtomicU8::new(Self::STATE_UNINITIALIZED),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The legacy migrator must be initialized deferred, because keystore starts very early.
+    /// At this time the data partition may not be mounted. So we cannot open database connections
+    /// until we get actual key load requests. This sets the function that the legacy loader
+    /// uses to connect to the database.
+    pub fn set_init<F>(&self, f_init: F) -> Result<()>
+    where
+        F: FnOnce() -> (KeystoreDB, HashMap<SecurityLevel, Uuid>, Arc<LegacyBlobLoader>)
+            + Send
+            + 'static,
+    {
+        let mut initializer = self.initializer.lock().expect("Failed to lock initializer.");
+
+        // If we are not uninitialized we have no business setting the initializer.
+        if self.state.load(Ordering::Relaxed) != Self::STATE_UNINITIALIZED {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+
+        // Only set the initializer if it hasn't been set before.
+        if initializer.is_none() {
+            *initializer = Some(Box::new(f_init))
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// This function is called by the migration requestor to check if it is worth
+    /// making a migration request. It also transitions the state from UNINITIALIZED
+    /// to READY or EMPTY on first use. The deferred initialization is necessary, because
+    /// Keystore 2.0 runs early during boot, where data may not yet be mounted.
+    /// Returns Ok(STATE_READY) if a migration request is worth undertaking and
+    /// Ok(STATE_EMPTY) if the database is empty. An error is returned if the loader
+    /// was not initialized and cannot be initialized.
+    fn check_state(&self) -> Result<u8> {
+        let mut first_try = true;
+        loop {
+            match (self.state.load(Ordering::Relaxed), first_try) {
+                (Self::STATE_EMPTY, _) => {
+                    return Ok(Self::STATE_EMPTY);
+                }
+                (Self::STATE_UNINITIALIZED, true) => {
+                    // If we find the legacy loader uninitialized, we grab the initializer lock,
+                    // check if the legacy database is empty, and if not, schedule an initialization
+                    // request. Coming out of the initializer lock, the state is either EMPTY or
+                    // READY.
+                    let mut initializer = self.initializer.lock().unwrap();
+
+                    if let Some(initializer) = initializer.take() {
+                        let (db, sec_level_to_km_uuid, legacy_loader) = (initializer)();
+
+                        if legacy_loader.is_empty().context(
+                            "In check_state: Trying to check if the legacy database is empty.",
+                        )? {
+                            self.state.store(Self::STATE_EMPTY, Ordering::Relaxed);
+                            return Ok(Self::STATE_EMPTY);
+                        }
+
+                        self.async_task.queue_hi(move |shelf| {
+                            shelf.get_or_put_with(|| LegacyMigratorState {
+                                recently_migrated: Default::default(),
+                                recently_migrated_super_key: Default::default(),
+                                legacy_loader,
+                                sec_level_to_km_uuid,
+                                db,
+                            });
+                        });
+
+                        // It is safe to set this here even though the async task may not yet have
+                        // run because any thread observing this will not be able to schedule a
+                        // task that can run before the initialization.
+                        // Also we can only transition out of this state while having the
+                        // initializer lock and having found an initializer.
+                        self.state.store(Self::STATE_READY, Ordering::Relaxed);
+                        return Ok(Self::STATE_READY);
+                    } else {
+                        // There is a chance that we just lost the race from state.load() to
+                        // grabbing the initializer mutex. If that is the case the state must
+                        // be EMPTY or READY after coming out of the lock. So we can give it
+                        // one more try.
+                        first_try = false;
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                }
+                (Self::STATE_UNINITIALIZED, false) => {
+                    // Okay, tough luck. The legacy loader was really completely uninitialized.
+                    return Err(Error::sys()).context(
+                        "In check_state: Legacy loader should not be called uninitialized.",
+                    );
+                }
+                (Self::STATE_READY, _) => return Ok(Self::STATE_READY),
+                (s, _) => panic!("Unknown legacy migrator state. {} ", s),
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// List all aliases for uid in the legacy database.
+    pub fn list_uid(&self, domain: Domain, namespace: i64) -> Result<Vec<KeyDescriptor>> {
+        let uid = match (domain, namespace) {
+            (Domain::APP, namespace) => namespace as u32,
+            (Domain::SELINUX, Self::WIFI_NAMESPACE) => Self::AID_WIFI,
+            _ => return Ok(Vec::new()),
+        };
+        self.do_serialized(move |state| state.list_uid(uid)).unwrap_or_else(|| Ok(Vec::new())).map(
+            |v| {
+                v.into_iter()
+                    .map(|alias| KeyDescriptor {
+                        domain,
+                        nspace: namespace,
+                        alias: Some(alias),
+                        blob: None,
+                    })
+                    .collect()
+            },
+        )
+    }
+
+    /// Sends the given closure to the migrator thread for execution after calling check_state.
+    /// Returns None if the database was empty and the request was not executed.
+    /// Otherwise returns Some with the result produced by the migration request.
+    /// The loader state may transition to STATE_EMPTY during the execution of this function.
+    fn do_serialized<F, T: Send + 'static>(&self, f: F) -> Option<Result<T>>
+    where
+        F: FnOnce(&mut LegacyMigratorState) -> Result<T> + Send + 'static,
+    {
+        // Short circuit if the database is empty or not initialized (error case).
+        match self.check_state().context("In do_serialized: Checking state.") {
+            Ok(LegacyMigrator::STATE_EMPTY) => return None,
+            Ok(LegacyMigrator::STATE_READY) => {}
+            Err(e) => return Some(Err(e)),
+            Ok(s) => panic!("Unknown legacy migrator state. {} ", s),
+        }
+
+        // We have established that there may be a key in the legacy database.
+        // Now we schedule a migration request.
+        let (sender, receiver) = channel();
+        self.async_task.queue_hi(move |shelf| {
+            // Get the migrator state from the shelf.
+            // There may not be a state. This can happen if this migration request was scheduled
+            // before a previous request established that the legacy database was empty
+            // and removed the state from the shelf. Since we know now that the database
+            // is empty, we can return None here.
+            let (new_state, result) = if let Some(legacy_migrator_state) =
+                shelf.get_downcast_mut::<LegacyMigratorState>()
+            {
+                let result = f(legacy_migrator_state);
+                (legacy_migrator_state.check_empty(), Some(result))
+            } else {
+                (Self::STATE_EMPTY, None)
+            };
+
+            // If the migration request determined that the database is now empty, we discard
+            // the state from the shelf to free up the resources we won't need any longer.
+            if result.is_some() && new_state == Self::STATE_EMPTY {
+                shelf.remove_downcast_ref::<LegacyMigratorState>();
+            }
+
+            // Send the result to the requester.
+            if let Err(e) = sender.send((new_state, result)) {
+                log::error!("In do_serialized. Error in sending the result. {:?}", e);
+            }
+        });
+
+        let (new_state, result) = match receiver.recv() {
+            Err(e) => {
+                return Some(Err(e).context("In do_serialized. Failed to receive from the sender."))
+            }
+            Ok(r) => r,
+        };
+
+        // We can only transition to EMPTY but never back.
+        // The migrator never creates any legacy blobs.
+        if new_state == Self::STATE_EMPTY {
+            self.state.store(Self::STATE_EMPTY, Ordering::Relaxed)
+        }
+
+        result
+    }
+
+    /// Runs the key_accessor function and returns its result. If it returns an error and the
+    /// root cause was KEY_NOT_FOUND, tries to migrate a key with the given parameters from
+    /// the legacy database to the new database and runs the key_accessor function again if
+    /// the migration request was successful.
+    pub fn with_try_migrate<F, T>(
+        &self,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
+        caller_uid: u32,
+        key_accessor: F,
+    ) -> Result<T>
+    where
+        F: Fn() -> Result<T>,
+    {
+        // Access the key and return on success.
+        match key_accessor() {
+            Ok(result) => return Ok(result),
+            Err(e) => match e.root_cause().downcast_ref::<Error>() {
+                Some(&Error::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)) => {}
+                _ => return Err(e),
+            },
+        }
+
+        // Filter inputs. We can only load legacy app domain keys and some special rules due
+        // to which we migrate keys transparently to an SELINUX domain.
+        let uid = match key {
+            KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::APP, alias: Some(_), .. } => caller_uid,
+            KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::SELINUX, nspace, alias: Some(_), .. } => {
+                match *nspace {
+                    Self::WIFI_NAMESPACE => Self::AID_WIFI,
+                    _ => {
+                        return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND))
+                            .context(format!("No legacy keys for namespace {}", nspace))
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            _ => {
+                return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND))
+                    .context("No legacy keys for key descriptor.")
+            }
+        };
+
+        let key_clone = key.clone();
+        let result = self
+            .do_serialized(move |migrator_state| migrator_state.check_and_migrate(uid, key_clone));
+
+        if let Some(result) = result {
+            result?;
+            // After successful migration try again.
+            key_accessor()
+        } else {
+            Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)).context("Legacy database is empty.")
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Calls key_accessor and returns the result on success. In the case of a KEY_NOT_FOUND error
+    /// this function makes a migration request and on success retries the key_accessor.
+    pub fn with_try_migrate_super_key<F, T>(
+        &self,
+        user_id: u32,
+        pw: &Password,
+        mut key_accessor: F,
+    ) -> Result<Option<T>>
+    where
+        F: FnMut() -> Result<Option<T>>,
+    {
+        match key_accessor() {
+            Ok(Some(result)) => return Ok(Some(result)),
+            Ok(None) => {}
+            Err(e) => return Err(e),
+        }
+        let pw = pw.try_clone().context("In with_try_migrate_super_key: Cloning password.")?;
+        let result = self.do_serialized(move |migrator_state| {
+            migrator_state.check_and_migrate_super_key(user_id, &pw)
+        });
+
+        if let Some(result) = result {
+            result?;
+            // After successful migration try again.
+            key_accessor()
+        } else {
+            Ok(None)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Deletes all keys belonging to the given namespace, migrating them into the database
+    /// for subsequent garbage collection if necessary.
+    pub fn bulk_delete_uid(&self, domain: Domain, nspace: i64) -> Result<()> {
+        let uid = match (domain, nspace) {
+            (Domain::APP, nspace) => nspace as u32,
+            (Domain::SELINUX, Self::WIFI_NAMESPACE) => Self::AID_WIFI,
+            // Nothing to do.
+            _ => return Ok(()),
+        };
+
+        let result = self.do_serialized(move |migrator_state| {
+            migrator_state.bulk_delete(BulkDeleteRequest::Uid(uid), false)
+        });
+
+        result.unwrap_or(Ok(()))
+    }
+
+    /// Deletes all keys belonging to the given android user, migrating them into the database
+    /// for subsequent garbage collection if necessary.
+    pub fn bulk_delete_user(
+        &self,
+        user_id: u32,
+        keep_non_super_encrypted_keys: bool,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let result = self.do_serialized(move |migrator_state| {
+            migrator_state
+                .bulk_delete(BulkDeleteRequest::User(user_id), keep_non_super_encrypted_keys)
+        });
+
+        result.unwrap_or(Ok(()))
+    }
+
+    /// Queries the legacy database for the presence of a super key for the given user.
+    pub fn has_super_key(&self, user_id: u32) -> Result<bool> {
+        let result =
+            self.do_serialized(move |migrator_state| migrator_state.has_super_key(user_id));
+        result.unwrap_or(Ok(false))
+    }
+}
+
+impl LegacyMigratorState {
+    fn get_km_uuid(&self, is_strongbox: bool) -> Result<Uuid> {
+        let sec_level = if is_strongbox {
+            SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX
+        } else {
+            SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT
+        };
+
+        self.sec_level_to_km_uuid.get(&sec_level).copied().ok_or_else(|| {
+            anyhow::anyhow!(Error::sys()).context("In get_km_uuid: No KM instance for blob.")
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn list_uid(&mut self, uid: u32) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+        self.legacy_loader
+            .list_keystore_entries_for_uid(uid)
+            .context("In list_uid: Trying to list legacy entries.")
+    }
+
+    /// This is a key migration request that can run in the migrator thread. This should
+    /// be passed to do_serialized.
+    fn check_and_migrate(&mut self, uid: u32, mut key: KeyDescriptor) -> Result<()> {
+        let alias = key.alias.clone().ok_or_else(|| {
+            anyhow::anyhow!(Error::sys()).context(concat!(
+                "In check_and_migrate: Must be Some because ",
+                "our caller must not have called us otherwise."
+            ))
+        })?;
+
+        if self.recently_migrated.contains(&RecentMigration::new(uid, alias.clone())) {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+
+        if key.domain == Domain::APP {
+            key.nspace = uid as i64;
+        }
+
+        // If the key is not found in the cache, try to load from the legacy database.
+        let (km_blob_params, user_cert, ca_cert) = self
+            .legacy_loader
+            .load_by_uid_alias(uid, &alias, None)
+            .context("In check_and_migrate: Trying to load legacy blob.")?;
+        let result = match km_blob_params {
+            Some((km_blob, params)) => {
+                let is_strongbox = km_blob.is_strongbox();
+                let (blob, mut blob_metadata) = match km_blob.take_value() {
+                    BlobValue::Encrypted { iv, tag, data } => {
+                        // Get super key id for user id.
+                        let user_id = uid_to_android_user(uid as u32);
+
+                        let super_key_id = match self
+                            .db
+                            .load_super_key(&USER_SUPER_KEY, user_id)
+                            .context("In check_and_migrate: Failed to load super key")?
+                        {
+                            Some((_, entry)) => entry.id(),
+                            None => {
+                                // This might be the first time we access the super key,
+                                // and it may not have been migrated. We cannot import
+                                // the legacy super_key key now, because we need to reencrypt
+                                // it which we cannot do if we are not unlocked, which we are
+                                // not because otherwise the key would have been migrated.
+                                // We can check though if the key exists. If it does,
+                                // we can return Locked. Otherwise, we can delete the
+                                // key and return NotFound, because the key will never
+                                // be unlocked again.
+                                if self.legacy_loader.has_super_key(user_id) {
+                                    return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::LOCKED)).context(concat!(
+                                        "In check_and_migrate: Cannot migrate super key of this ",
+                                        "key while user is locked."
+                                    ));
+                                } else {
+                                    self.legacy_loader.remove_keystore_entry(uid, &alias).context(
+                                        concat!(
+                                            "In check_and_migrate: ",
+                                            "Trying to remove obsolete key."
+                                        ),
+                                    )?;
+                                    return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND))
+                                        .context("In check_and_migrate: Obsolete key.");
+                                }
+                            }
+                        };
+
+                        let mut blob_metadata = BlobMetaData::new();
+                        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Iv(iv.to_vec()));
+                        blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::AeadTag(tag.to_vec()));
+                        blob_metadata
+                            .add(BlobMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::KeyId(super_key_id)));
+                        (LegacyBlob::Vec(data), blob_metadata)
+                    }
+                    BlobValue::Decrypted(data) => (LegacyBlob::ZVec(data), BlobMetaData::new()),
+                    _ => {
+                        return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND))
+                            .context("In check_and_migrate: Legacy key has unexpected type.")
+                    }
+                };
+
+                let km_uuid = self
+                    .get_km_uuid(is_strongbox)
+                    .context("In check_and_migrate: Trying to get KM UUID")?;
+                blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::KmUuid(km_uuid));
+
+                let mut metadata = KeyMetaData::new();
+                let creation_date = DateTime::now()
+                    .context("In check_and_migrate: Trying to make creation time.")?;
+                metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::CreationDate(creation_date));
+
+                // Store legacy key in the database.
+                self.db
+                    .store_new_key(
+                        &key,
+                        &params,
+                        &(&blob, &blob_metadata),
+                        &CertificateInfo::new(user_cert, ca_cert),
+                        &metadata,
+                        &km_uuid,
+                    )
+                    .context("In check_and_migrate.")?;
+                Ok(())
+            }
+            None => {
+                if let Some(ca_cert) = ca_cert {
+                    self.db
+                        .store_new_certificate(&key, &ca_cert, &KEYSTORE_UUID)
+                        .context("In check_and_migrate: Failed to insert new certificate.")?;
+                    Ok(())
+                } else {
+                    Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND))
+                        .context("In check_and_migrate: Legacy key not found.")
+                }
+            }
+        };
+
+        match result {
+            Ok(()) => {
+                // Add the key to the migrated_keys list.
+                self.recently_migrated.insert(RecentMigration::new(uid, alias.clone()));
+                // Delete legacy key from the file system
+                self.legacy_loader
+                    .remove_keystore_entry(uid, &alias)
+                    .context("In check_and_migrate: Trying to remove migrated key.")?;
+                Ok(())
+            }
+            Err(e) => Err(e),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn check_and_migrate_super_key(&mut self, user_id: u32, pw: &Password) -> Result<()> {
+        if self.recently_migrated_super_key.contains(&user_id) {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+
+        if let Some(super_key) = self
+            .legacy_loader
+            .load_super_key(user_id, &pw)
+            .context("In check_and_migrate_super_key: Trying to load legacy super key.")?
+        {
+            let (blob, blob_metadata) =
+                crate::super_key::SuperKeyManager::encrypt_with_password(&super_key, pw)
+                    .context("In check_and_migrate_super_key: Trying to encrypt super key.")?;
+
+            self.db
+                .store_super_key(
+                    user_id,
+                    &USER_SUPER_KEY,
+                    &blob,
+                    &blob_metadata,
+                    &KeyMetaData::new(),
+                )
+                .context(concat!(
+                    "In check_and_migrate_super_key: ",
+                    "Trying to insert legacy super_key into the database."
+                ))?;
+            self.legacy_loader.remove_super_key(user_id);
+            self.recently_migrated_super_key.insert(user_id);
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND))
+                .context("In check_and_migrate_super_key: No key found do migrate.")
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Key migrator request to be run by do_serialized.
+    /// See LegacyMigrator::bulk_delete_uid and LegacyMigrator::bulk_delete_user.
+    fn bulk_delete(
+        &mut self,
+        bulk_delete_request: BulkDeleteRequest,
+        keep_non_super_encrypted_keys: bool,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let (aliases, user_id) = match bulk_delete_request {
+            BulkDeleteRequest::Uid(uid) => (
+                self.legacy_loader
+                    .list_keystore_entries_for_uid(uid)
+                    .context("In bulk_delete: Trying to get aliases for uid.")
+                    .map(|aliases| {
+                        let mut h = HashMap::<u32, HashSet<String>>::new();
+                        h.insert(uid, aliases.into_iter().collect());
+                        h
+                    })?,
+                uid_to_android_user(uid),
+            ),
+            BulkDeleteRequest::User(user_id) => (
+                self.legacy_loader
+                    .list_keystore_entries_for_user(user_id)
+                    .context("In bulk_delete: Trying to get aliases for user_id.")?,
+                user_id,
+            ),
+        };
+
+        let super_key_id = self
+            .db
+            .load_super_key(&USER_SUPER_KEY, user_id)
+            .context("In bulk_delete: Failed to load super key")?
+            .map(|(_, entry)| entry.id());
+
+        for (uid, alias) in aliases
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|(uid, aliases)| aliases.into_iter().map(move |alias| (uid, alias)))
+            .flatten()
+        {
+            let (km_blob_params, _, _) = self
+                .legacy_loader
+                .load_by_uid_alias(uid, &alias, None)
+                .context("In bulk_delete: Trying to load legacy blob.")?;
+
+            // Determine if the key needs special handling to be deleted.
+            let (need_gc, is_super_encrypted) = km_blob_params
+                .as_ref()
+                .map(|(blob, params)| {
+                    (
+                        params.iter().any(|kp| {
+                            KeyParameterValue::RollbackResistance == *kp.key_parameter_value()
+                        }),
+                        blob.is_encrypted(),
+                    )
+                })
+                .unwrap_or((false, false));
+
+            if keep_non_super_encrypted_keys && !is_super_encrypted {
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            if need_gc {
+                let mark_deleted = match km_blob_params
+                    .map(|(blob, _)| (blob.is_strongbox(), blob.take_value()))
+                {
+                    Some((is_strongbox, BlobValue::Encrypted { iv, tag, data })) => {
+                        let mut blob_metadata = BlobMetaData::new();
+                        if let (Ok(km_uuid), Some(super_key_id)) =
+                            (self.get_km_uuid(is_strongbox), super_key_id)
+                        {
+                            blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::KmUuid(km_uuid));
+                            blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Iv(iv.to_vec()));
+                            blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::AeadTag(tag.to_vec()));
+                            blob_metadata
+                                .add(BlobMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::KeyId(super_key_id)));
+                            Some((LegacyBlob::Vec(data), blob_metadata))
+                        } else {
+                            // Oh well - we tried our best, but if we cannot determine which
+                            // KeyMint instance we have to send this blob to, we cannot
+                            // do more than delete the key from the file system.
+                            // And if we don't know which key wraps this key we cannot
+                            // unwrap it for KeyMint either.
+                            None
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Some((_, BlobValue::Decrypted(data))) => {
+                        Some((LegacyBlob::ZVec(data), BlobMetaData::new()))
+                    }
+                    _ => None,
+                };
+
+                if let Some((blob, blob_metadata)) = mark_deleted {
+                    self.db.set_deleted_blob(&blob, &blob_metadata).context(concat!(
+                        "In bulk_delete: Trying to insert deleted ",
+                        "blob into the database for garbage collection."
+                    ))?;
+                }
+            }
+
+            self.legacy_loader
+                .remove_keystore_entry(uid, &alias)
+                .context("In bulk_delete: Trying to remove migrated key.")?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn has_super_key(&mut self, user_id: u32) -> Result<bool> {
+        Ok(self.recently_migrated_super_key.contains(&user_id)
+            || self.legacy_loader.has_super_key(user_id))
+    }
+
+    fn check_empty(&self) -> u8 {
+        if self.legacy_loader.is_empty().unwrap_or(false) {
+            LegacyMigrator::STATE_EMPTY
+        } else {
+            LegacyMigrator::STATE_READY
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+enum LegacyBlob {
+    Vec(Vec<u8>),
+    ZVec(ZVec),
+}
+
+impl Deref for LegacyBlob {
+    type Target = [u8];
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        match self {
+            Self::Vec(v) => &v,
+            Self::ZVec(v) => &v,
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/lib.rs b/keystore2/src/lib.rs
index 811db91..62dc16a 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/lib.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/lib.rs
@@ -16,21 +16,30 @@
 #![recursion_limit = "256"]
 
 pub mod apc;
+pub mod async_task;
 pub mod authorization;
 pub mod database;
+pub mod ec_crypto;
 pub mod enforcements;
+pub mod entropy;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod globals;
 /// Internal Representation of Key Parameter and convenience functions.
 pub mod key_parameter;
 pub mod legacy_blob;
+pub mod legacy_migrator;
+pub mod maintenance;
+pub mod metrics;
 pub mod operation;
 pub mod permission;
+pub mod remote_provisioning;
 pub mod security_level;
 pub mod service;
+pub mod shared_secret_negotiation;
+pub mod try_insert;
 pub mod utils;
 
-mod async_task;
+mod attestation_key_utils;
 mod db_utils;
 mod gc;
 mod super_key;
diff --git a/keystore2/src/maintenance.rs b/keystore2/src/maintenance.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e059a0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/maintenance.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! This module implements IKeystoreMaintenance AIDL interface.
+
+use crate::error::map_km_error;
+use crate::error::Error as KeystoreError;
+use crate::globals::get_keymint_device;
+use crate::globals::{DB, LEGACY_MIGRATOR, SUPER_KEY};
+use crate::permission::KeystorePerm;
+use crate::super_key::UserState;
+use crate::utils::check_keystore_permission;
+use crate::{database::MonotonicRawTime, error::map_or_log_err};
+use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::IKeyMintDevice::IKeyMintDevice;
+use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel;
+use android_security_maintenance::aidl::android::security::maintenance::{
+    IKeystoreMaintenance::{BnKeystoreMaintenance, IKeystoreMaintenance},
+    UserState::UserState as AidlUserState,
+};
+use android_security_maintenance::binder::{Interface, Result as BinderResult};
+use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::Domain::Domain;
+use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::ResponseCode::ResponseCode;
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use binder::{IBinderInternal, Strong};
+use keystore2_crypto::Password;
+
+/// This struct is defined to implement the aforementioned AIDL interface.
+/// As of now, it is an empty struct.
+pub struct Maintenance;
+
+impl Maintenance {
+    /// Create a new instance of Keystore User Manager service.
+    pub fn new_native_binder() -> Result<Strong<dyn IKeystoreMaintenance>> {
+        let result = BnKeystoreMaintenance::new_binder(Self);
+        result.as_binder().set_requesting_sid(true);
+        Ok(result)
+    }
+
+    fn on_user_password_changed(user_id: i32, password: Option<Password>) -> Result<()> {
+        //Check permission. Function should return if this failed. Therefore having '?' at the end
+        //is very important.
+        check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::change_password())
+            .context("In on_user_password_changed.")?;
+
+        if let Some(pw) = password.as_ref() {
+            DB.with(|db| {
+                SUPER_KEY.unlock_screen_lock_bound_key(&mut db.borrow_mut(), user_id as u32, pw)
+            })
+            .context("In on_user_password_changed: unlock_screen_lock_bound_key failed")?;
+        }
+
+        match DB
+            .with(|db| {
+                UserState::get_with_password_changed(
+                    &mut db.borrow_mut(),
+                    &LEGACY_MIGRATOR,
+                    &SUPER_KEY,
+                    user_id as u32,
+                    password.as_ref(),
+                )
+            })
+            .context("In on_user_password_changed.")?
+        {
+            UserState::LskfLocked => {
+                // Error - password can not be changed when the device is locked
+                Err(KeystoreError::Rc(ResponseCode::LOCKED))
+                    .context("In on_user_password_changed. Device is locked.")
+            }
+            _ => {
+                // LskfLocked is the only error case for password change
+                Ok(())
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn add_or_remove_user(user_id: i32) -> Result<()> {
+        // Check permission. Function should return if this failed. Therefore having '?' at the end
+        // is very important.
+        check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::change_user()).context("In add_or_remove_user.")?;
+        DB.with(|db| {
+            UserState::reset_user(
+                &mut db.borrow_mut(),
+                &SUPER_KEY,
+                &LEGACY_MIGRATOR,
+                user_id as u32,
+                false,
+            )
+        })
+        .context("In add_or_remove_user: Trying to delete keys from db.")
+    }
+
+    fn clear_namespace(domain: Domain, nspace: i64) -> Result<()> {
+        // Permission check. Must return on error. Do not touch the '?'.
+        check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::clear_uid()).context("In clear_namespace.")?;
+
+        LEGACY_MIGRATOR
+            .bulk_delete_uid(domain, nspace)
+            .context("In clear_namespace: Trying to delete legacy keys.")?;
+        DB.with(|db| db.borrow_mut().unbind_keys_for_namespace(domain, nspace))
+            .context("In clear_namespace: Trying to delete keys from db.")
+    }
+
+    fn get_state(user_id: i32) -> Result<AidlUserState> {
+        // Check permission. Function should return if this failed. Therefore having '?' at the end
+        // is very important.
+        check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::get_state()).context("In get_state.")?;
+        let state = DB
+            .with(|db| {
+                UserState::get(&mut db.borrow_mut(), &LEGACY_MIGRATOR, &SUPER_KEY, user_id as u32)
+            })
+            .context("In get_state. Trying to get UserState.")?;
+
+        match state {
+            UserState::Uninitialized => Ok(AidlUserState::UNINITIALIZED),
+            UserState::LskfUnlocked(_) => Ok(AidlUserState::LSKF_UNLOCKED),
+            UserState::LskfLocked => Ok(AidlUserState::LSKF_LOCKED),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn early_boot_ended_help(sec_level: &SecurityLevel) -> Result<()> {
+        let (dev, _, _) =
+            get_keymint_device(sec_level).context("In early_boot_ended: getting keymint device")?;
+        let km_dev: Strong<dyn IKeyMintDevice> =
+            dev.get_interface().context("In early_boot_ended: getting keymint device interface")?;
+        map_km_error(km_dev.earlyBootEnded())
+            .context("In keymint device: calling earlyBootEnded")?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn early_boot_ended() -> Result<()> {
+        check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::early_boot_ended())
+            .context("In early_boot_ended. Checking permission")?;
+
+        let sec_levels = [
+            (SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, "TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT"),
+            (SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX, "STRONGBOX"),
+        ];
+        sec_levels.iter().fold(Ok(()), |result, (sec_level, sec_level_string)| {
+            let curr_result = Maintenance::early_boot_ended_help(sec_level);
+            if curr_result.is_err() {
+                log::error!(
+                    "Call to earlyBootEnded failed for security level {}.",
+                    &sec_level_string
+                );
+            }
+            result.and(curr_result)
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn on_device_off_body() -> Result<()> {
+        // Security critical permission check. This statement must return on fail.
+        check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::report_off_body())
+            .context("In on_device_off_body.")?;
+
+        DB.with(|db| db.borrow_mut().update_last_off_body(MonotonicRawTime::now()))
+            .context("In on_device_off_body: Trying to update last off body time.")
+    }
+}
+
+impl Interface for Maintenance {}
+
+impl IKeystoreMaintenance for Maintenance {
+    fn onUserPasswordChanged(&self, user_id: i32, password: Option<&[u8]>) -> BinderResult<()> {
+        map_or_log_err(Self::on_user_password_changed(user_id, password.map(|pw| pw.into())), Ok)
+    }
+
+    fn onUserAdded(&self, user_id: i32) -> BinderResult<()> {
+        map_or_log_err(Self::add_or_remove_user(user_id), Ok)
+    }
+
+    fn onUserRemoved(&self, user_id: i32) -> BinderResult<()> {
+        map_or_log_err(Self::add_or_remove_user(user_id), Ok)
+    }
+
+    fn clearNamespace(&self, domain: Domain, nspace: i64) -> BinderResult<()> {
+        map_or_log_err(Self::clear_namespace(domain, nspace), Ok)
+    }
+
+    fn getState(&self, user_id: i32) -> BinderResult<AidlUserState> {
+        map_or_log_err(Self::get_state(user_id), Ok)
+    }
+
+    fn earlyBootEnded(&self) -> BinderResult<()> {
+        map_or_log_err(Self::early_boot_ended(), Ok)
+    }
+
+    fn onDeviceOffBody(&self) -> BinderResult<()> {
+        map_or_log_err(Self::on_device_off_body(), Ok)
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/metrics.rs b/keystore2/src/metrics.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9524cb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/metrics.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! This module provides convenience functions for keystore2 logging.
+use crate::error::get_error_code;
+use crate::key_parameter::KeyParameterValue as KsKeyParamValue;
+use crate::operation::Outcome;
+use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
+    Algorithm::Algorithm, BlockMode::BlockMode, Digest::Digest, EcCurve::EcCurve,
+    HardwareAuthenticatorType::HardwareAuthenticatorType, KeyOrigin::KeyOrigin,
+    KeyParameter::KeyParameter, KeyPurpose::KeyPurpose, PaddingMode::PaddingMode,
+};
+use statslog_rust::keystore2_key_creation_event_reported::{
+    Algorithm as StatsdAlgorithm, EcCurve as StatsdEcCurve, KeyOrigin as StatsdKeyOrigin,
+    Keystore2KeyCreationEventReported, UserAuthType as StatsdUserAuthType,
+};
+
+use statslog_rust::keystore2_key_operation_event_reported::{
+    Keystore2KeyOperationEventReported, Outcome as StatsdOutcome, Purpose as StatsdKeyPurpose,
+};
+
+fn create_default_key_creation_atom() -> Keystore2KeyCreationEventReported {
+    // If a value is not present, fields represented by bitmaps and i32 fields
+    // will take 0, except error_code which defaults to 1 indicating NO_ERROR and key_size,
+    // and auth_time_out which default to -1.
+    // The boolean fields are set to false by default.
+    // Some keymint enums do have 0 as an enum variant value. In such cases, the corresponding
+    // enum variant value in atoms.proto is incremented by 1, in order to have 0 as the reserved
+    // value for unspecified fields.
+    Keystore2KeyCreationEventReported {
+        algorithm: StatsdAlgorithm::AlgorithmUnspecified,
+        key_size: -1,
+        key_origin: StatsdKeyOrigin::OriginUnspecified,
+        user_auth_type: StatsdUserAuthType::AuthTypeUnspecified,
+        user_auth_key_timeout_seconds: -1,
+        padding_mode_bitmap: 0,
+        digest_bitmap: 0,
+        block_mode_bitmap: 0,
+        purpose_bitmap: 0,
+        ec_curve: StatsdEcCurve::EcCurveUnspecified,
+        // as per keystore2/ResponseCode.aidl, 1 is reserved for NO_ERROR
+        error_code: 1,
+        attestation_requested: false,
+    }
+}
+
+fn create_default_key_operation_atom() -> Keystore2KeyOperationEventReported {
+    Keystore2KeyOperationEventReported {
+        purpose: StatsdKeyPurpose::KeyPurposeUnspecified,
+        padding_mode_bitmap: 0,
+        digest_bitmap: 0,
+        block_mode_bitmap: 0,
+        outcome: StatsdOutcome::OutcomeUnspecified,
+        error_code: 1,
+        key_upgraded: false,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Log key creation events via statsd API.
+pub fn log_key_creation_event_stats<U>(key_params: &[KeyParameter], result: &anyhow::Result<U>) {
+    let key_creation_event_stats = construct_key_creation_event_stats(key_params, result);
+
+    let logging_result = key_creation_event_stats.stats_write();
+
+    if let Err(e) = logging_result {
+        log::error!(
+            "In log_key_creation_event_stats. Error in logging key creation event. {:?}",
+            e
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+/// Log key operation events via statsd API.
+pub fn log_key_operation_event_stats(
+    key_purpose: KeyPurpose,
+    op_params: &[KeyParameter],
+    op_outcome: &Outcome,
+    key_upgraded: bool,
+) {
+    let key_operation_event_stats =
+        construct_key_operation_event_stats(key_purpose, op_params, op_outcome, key_upgraded);
+
+    let logging_result = key_operation_event_stats.stats_write();
+
+    if let Err(e) = logging_result {
+        log::error!(
+            "In log_key_operation_event_stats. Error in logging key operation event. {:?}",
+            e
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+fn construct_key_creation_event_stats<U>(
+    key_params: &[KeyParameter],
+    result: &anyhow::Result<U>,
+) -> Keystore2KeyCreationEventReported {
+    let mut key_creation_event_atom = create_default_key_creation_atom();
+
+    if let Err(ref e) = result {
+        key_creation_event_atom.error_code = get_error_code(e);
+    }
+
+    for key_param in key_params.iter().map(KsKeyParamValue::from) {
+        match key_param {
+            KsKeyParamValue::Algorithm(a) => {
+                key_creation_event_atom.algorithm = match a {
+                    Algorithm::RSA => StatsdAlgorithm::Rsa,
+                    Algorithm::EC => StatsdAlgorithm::Ec,
+                    Algorithm::AES => StatsdAlgorithm::Aes,
+                    Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES => StatsdAlgorithm::TripleDes,
+                    Algorithm::HMAC => StatsdAlgorithm::Hmac,
+                    _ => StatsdAlgorithm::AlgorithmUnspecified,
+                }
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::KeySize(s) => {
+                key_creation_event_atom.key_size = s;
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::KeyOrigin(o) => {
+                key_creation_event_atom.key_origin = match o {
+                    KeyOrigin::GENERATED => StatsdKeyOrigin::Generated,
+                    KeyOrigin::DERIVED => StatsdKeyOrigin::Derived,
+                    KeyOrigin::IMPORTED => StatsdKeyOrigin::Imported,
+                    KeyOrigin::RESERVED => StatsdKeyOrigin::Reserved,
+                    KeyOrigin::SECURELY_IMPORTED => StatsdKeyOrigin::SecurelyImported,
+                    _ => StatsdKeyOrigin::OriginUnspecified,
+                }
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::HardwareAuthenticatorType(a) => {
+                key_creation_event_atom.user_auth_type = match a {
+                    HardwareAuthenticatorType::NONE => StatsdUserAuthType::None,
+                    HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD => StatsdUserAuthType::Password,
+                    HardwareAuthenticatorType::FINGERPRINT => StatsdUserAuthType::Fingerprint,
+                    HardwareAuthenticatorType::ANY => StatsdUserAuthType::Any,
+                    _ => StatsdUserAuthType::AuthTypeUnspecified,
+                }
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::AuthTimeout(t) => {
+                key_creation_event_atom.user_auth_key_timeout_seconds = t;
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::PaddingMode(p) => {
+                key_creation_event_atom.padding_mode_bitmap =
+                    compute_padding_mode_bitmap(&key_creation_event_atom.padding_mode_bitmap, p);
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::Digest(d) => {
+                key_creation_event_atom.digest_bitmap =
+                    compute_digest_bitmap(&key_creation_event_atom.digest_bitmap, d);
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::BlockMode(b) => {
+                key_creation_event_atom.block_mode_bitmap =
+                    compute_block_mode_bitmap(&key_creation_event_atom.block_mode_bitmap, b);
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::KeyPurpose(k) => {
+                key_creation_event_atom.purpose_bitmap =
+                    compute_purpose_bitmap(&key_creation_event_atom.purpose_bitmap, k);
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::EcCurve(e) => {
+                key_creation_event_atom.ec_curve = match e {
+                    EcCurve::P_224 => StatsdEcCurve::P224,
+                    EcCurve::P_256 => StatsdEcCurve::P256,
+                    EcCurve::P_384 => StatsdEcCurve::P384,
+                    EcCurve::P_521 => StatsdEcCurve::P521,
+                    _ => StatsdEcCurve::EcCurveUnspecified,
+                }
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::AttestationChallenge(_) => {
+                key_creation_event_atom.attestation_requested = true;
+            }
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+    key_creation_event_atom
+}
+
+fn construct_key_operation_event_stats(
+    key_purpose: KeyPurpose,
+    op_params: &[KeyParameter],
+    op_outcome: &Outcome,
+    key_upgraded: bool,
+) -> Keystore2KeyOperationEventReported {
+    let mut key_operation_event_atom = create_default_key_operation_atom();
+
+    key_operation_event_atom.key_upgraded = key_upgraded;
+
+    key_operation_event_atom.purpose = match key_purpose {
+        KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT => StatsdKeyPurpose::Encrypt,
+        KeyPurpose::DECRYPT => StatsdKeyPurpose::Decrypt,
+        KeyPurpose::SIGN => StatsdKeyPurpose::Sign,
+        KeyPurpose::VERIFY => StatsdKeyPurpose::Verify,
+        KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY => StatsdKeyPurpose::WrapKey,
+        KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY => StatsdKeyPurpose::AgreeKey,
+        KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY => StatsdKeyPurpose::AttestKey,
+        _ => StatsdKeyPurpose::KeyPurposeUnspecified,
+    };
+
+    key_operation_event_atom.outcome = match op_outcome {
+        Outcome::Unknown | Outcome::Dropped => StatsdOutcome::Dropped,
+        Outcome::Success => StatsdOutcome::Success,
+        Outcome::Abort => StatsdOutcome::Abort,
+        Outcome::Pruned => StatsdOutcome::Pruned,
+        Outcome::ErrorCode(e) => {
+            key_operation_event_atom.error_code = e.0;
+            StatsdOutcome::Error
+        }
+    };
+
+    for key_param in op_params.iter().map(KsKeyParamValue::from) {
+        match key_param {
+            KsKeyParamValue::PaddingMode(p) => {
+                key_operation_event_atom.padding_mode_bitmap =
+                    compute_padding_mode_bitmap(&key_operation_event_atom.padding_mode_bitmap, p);
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::Digest(d) => {
+                key_operation_event_atom.digest_bitmap =
+                    compute_digest_bitmap(&key_operation_event_atom.digest_bitmap, d);
+            }
+            KsKeyParamValue::BlockMode(b) => {
+                key_operation_event_atom.block_mode_bitmap =
+                    compute_block_mode_bitmap(&key_operation_event_atom.block_mode_bitmap, b);
+            }
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+
+    key_operation_event_atom
+}
+
+fn compute_purpose_bitmap(purpose_bitmap: &i32, purpose: KeyPurpose) -> i32 {
+    let mut bitmap = *purpose_bitmap;
+    match purpose {
+        KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << KeyPurposeBitPosition::ENCRYPT_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        KeyPurpose::DECRYPT => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << KeyPurposeBitPosition::DECRYPT_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        KeyPurpose::SIGN => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << KeyPurposeBitPosition::SIGN_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        KeyPurpose::VERIFY => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << KeyPurposeBitPosition::VERIFY_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << KeyPurposeBitPosition::WRAP_KEY_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << KeyPurposeBitPosition::AGREE_KEY_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << KeyPurposeBitPosition::ATTEST_KEY_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        _ => {}
+    }
+    bitmap
+}
+
+fn compute_padding_mode_bitmap(padding_mode_bitmap: &i32, padding_mode: PaddingMode) -> i32 {
+    let mut bitmap = *padding_mode_bitmap;
+    match padding_mode {
+        PaddingMode::NONE => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << PaddingModeBitPosition::NONE_BIT_POSITION as i32;
+        }
+        PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << PaddingModeBitPosition::RSA_OAEP_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        PaddingMode::RSA_PSS => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << PaddingModeBitPosition::RSA_PSS_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << PaddingModeBitPosition::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << PaddingModeBitPosition::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        PaddingMode::PKCS7 => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << PaddingModeBitPosition::PKCS7_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        _ => {}
+    }
+    bitmap
+}
+
+fn compute_digest_bitmap(digest_bitmap: &i32, digest: Digest) -> i32 {
+    let mut bitmap = *digest_bitmap;
+    match digest {
+        Digest::NONE => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << DigestBitPosition::NONE_BIT_POSITION as i32;
+        }
+        Digest::MD5 => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << DigestBitPosition::MD5_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        Digest::SHA1 => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << DigestBitPosition::SHA_1_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        Digest::SHA_2_224 => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << DigestBitPosition::SHA_2_224_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        Digest::SHA_2_256 => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << DigestBitPosition::SHA_2_256_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        Digest::SHA_2_384 => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << DigestBitPosition::SHA_2_384_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        Digest::SHA_2_512 => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << DigestBitPosition::SHA_2_512_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        _ => {}
+    }
+    bitmap
+}
+
+fn compute_block_mode_bitmap(block_mode_bitmap: &i32, block_mode: BlockMode) -> i32 {
+    let mut bitmap = *block_mode_bitmap;
+    match block_mode {
+        BlockMode::ECB => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << BlockModeBitPosition::ECB_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        BlockMode::CBC => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << BlockModeBitPosition::CBC_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        BlockMode::CTR => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << BlockModeBitPosition::CTR_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        BlockMode::GCM => {
+            bitmap |= 1 << BlockModeBitPosition::GCM_BIT_POS as i32;
+        }
+        _ => {}
+    }
+    bitmap
+}
+/// Enum defining the bit position for each padding mode. Since padding mode can be repeatable, it
+/// is represented using a bitmap.
+#[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
+#[repr(i32)]
+pub enum PaddingModeBitPosition {
+    ///Bit position in the PaddingMode bitmap for NONE.
+    NONE_BIT_POSITION = 0,
+    ///Bit position in the PaddingMode bitmap for RSA_OAEP.
+    RSA_OAEP_BIT_POS = 1,
+    ///Bit position in the PaddingMode bitmap for RSA_PSS.
+    RSA_PSS_BIT_POS = 2,
+    ///Bit position in the PaddingMode bitmap for RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT.
+    RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT_BIT_POS = 3,
+    ///Bit position in the PaddingMode bitmap for RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN.
+    RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN_BIT_POS = 4,
+    ///Bit position in the PaddingMode bitmap for RSA_PKCS7.
+    PKCS7_BIT_POS = 5,
+}
+
+/// Enum defining the bit position for each digest type. Since digest can be repeatable in
+/// key parameters, it is represented using a bitmap.
+#[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
+#[repr(i32)]
+pub enum DigestBitPosition {
+    ///Bit position in the Digest bitmap for NONE.
+    NONE_BIT_POSITION = 0,
+    ///Bit position in the Digest bitmap for MD5.
+    MD5_BIT_POS = 1,
+    ///Bit position in the Digest bitmap for SHA1.
+    SHA_1_BIT_POS = 2,
+    ///Bit position in the Digest bitmap for SHA_2_224.
+    SHA_2_224_BIT_POS = 3,
+    ///Bit position in the Digest bitmap for SHA_2_256.
+    SHA_2_256_BIT_POS = 4,
+    ///Bit position in the Digest bitmap for SHA_2_384.
+    SHA_2_384_BIT_POS = 5,
+    ///Bit position in the Digest bitmap for SHA_2_512.
+    SHA_2_512_BIT_POS = 6,
+}
+
+/// Enum defining the bit position for each block mode type. Since block mode can be repeatable in
+/// key parameters, it is represented using a bitmap.
+#[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
+#[repr(i32)]
+enum BlockModeBitPosition {
+    ///Bit position in the BlockMode bitmap for ECB.
+    ECB_BIT_POS = 1,
+    ///Bit position in the BlockMode bitmap for CBC.
+    CBC_BIT_POS = 2,
+    ///Bit position in the BlockMode bitmap for CTR.
+    CTR_BIT_POS = 3,
+    ///Bit position in the BlockMode bitmap for GCM.
+    GCM_BIT_POS = 4,
+}
+
+/// Enum defining the bit position for each key purpose. Since key purpose can be repeatable in
+/// key parameters, it is represented using a bitmap.
+#[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
+#[repr(i32)]
+enum KeyPurposeBitPosition {
+    ///Bit position in the KeyPurpose bitmap for Encrypt.
+    ENCRYPT_BIT_POS = 1,
+    ///Bit position in the KeyPurpose bitmap for Decrypt.
+    DECRYPT_BIT_POS = 2,
+    ///Bit position in the KeyPurpose bitmap for Sign.
+    SIGN_BIT_POS = 3,
+    ///Bit position in the KeyPurpose bitmap for Verify.
+    VERIFY_BIT_POS = 4,
+    ///Bit position in the KeyPurpose bitmap for Wrap Key.
+    WRAP_KEY_BIT_POS = 5,
+    ///Bit position in the KeyPurpose bitmap for Agree Key.
+    AGREE_KEY_BIT_POS = 6,
+    ///Bit position in the KeyPurpose bitmap for Attest Key.
+    ATTEST_KEY_BIT_POS = 7,
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/operation.rs b/keystore2/src/operation.rs
index 829987d..f71577b 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/operation.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/operation.rs
@@ -126,18 +126,17 @@
 //! Either way, we have to revaluate the pruning scores.
 
 use crate::enforcements::AuthInfo;
-use crate::error::{map_km_error, map_or_log_err, Error, ErrorCode, ResponseCode};
+use crate::error::{map_err_with, map_km_error, map_or_log_err, Error, ErrorCode, ResponseCode};
+use crate::metrics::log_key_operation_event_stats;
 use crate::utils::Asp;
 use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
-    ByteArray::ByteArray, IKeyMintOperation::IKeyMintOperation,
-    KeyParameter::KeyParameter as KmParam, KeyParameterArray::KeyParameterArray,
-    KeyParameterValue::KeyParameterValue as KmParamValue, Tag::Tag,
+    IKeyMintOperation::IKeyMintOperation, KeyParameter::KeyParameter, KeyPurpose::KeyPurpose,
 };
 use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::{
     IKeystoreOperation::BnKeystoreOperation, IKeystoreOperation::IKeystoreOperation,
 };
 use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
-use binder::{IBinder, Interface};
+use binder::IBinderInternal;
 use std::{
     collections::HashMap,
     sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, Weak},
@@ -149,12 +148,18 @@
 /// to one of the other variants exactly once. The distinction in outcome is mainly
 /// for the statistic.
 #[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd)]
-enum Outcome {
+pub enum Outcome {
+    /// Operations have `Outcome::Unknown` as long as they are active.
     Unknown,
+    /// Operation is successful.
     Success,
+    /// Operation is aborted.
     Abort,
+    /// Operation is dropped.
     Dropped,
+    /// Operation is pruned.
     Pruned,
+    /// Operation is failed with the error code.
     ErrorCode(ErrorCode),
 }
 
@@ -169,12 +174,34 @@
     outcome: Mutex<Outcome>,
     owner: u32, // Uid of the operation's owner.
     auth_info: Mutex<AuthInfo>,
+    forced: bool,
+    logging_info: LoggingInfo,
+}
+
+/// Keeps track of the information required for logging operations.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct LoggingInfo {
+    purpose: KeyPurpose,
+    op_params: Vec<KeyParameter>,
+    key_upgraded: bool,
+}
+
+impl LoggingInfo {
+    /// Constructor
+    pub fn new(
+        purpose: KeyPurpose,
+        op_params: Vec<KeyParameter>,
+        key_upgraded: bool,
+    ) -> LoggingInfo {
+        Self { purpose, op_params, key_upgraded }
+    }
 }
 
 struct PruningInfo {
     last_usage: Instant,
     owner: u32,
     index: usize,
+    forced: bool,
 }
 
 // We don't except more than 32KiB of data in `update`, `updateAad`, and `finish`.
@@ -184,9 +211,11 @@
     /// Constructor
     pub fn new(
         index: usize,
-        km_op: Box<dyn IKeyMintOperation>,
+        km_op: binder::Strong<dyn IKeyMintOperation>,
         owner: u32,
         auth_info: AuthInfo,
+        forced: bool,
+        logging_info: LoggingInfo,
     ) -> Self {
         Self {
             index,
@@ -195,6 +224,8 @@
             outcome: Mutex::new(Outcome::Unknown),
             owner,
             auth_info: Mutex::new(auth_info),
+            forced,
+            logging_info,
         }
     }
 
@@ -220,6 +251,7 @@
             last_usage: *self.last_usage.lock().expect("In get_pruning_info."),
             owner: self.owner,
             index: self.index,
+            forced: self.forced,
         })
     }
 
@@ -247,13 +279,14 @@
         }
         *locked_outcome = Outcome::Pruned;
 
-        let km_op: Box<dyn IKeyMintOperation> = match self.km_op.get_interface() {
-            Ok(km_op) => km_op,
-            Err(e) => {
-                log::error!("In prune: Failed to get KeyMintOperation interface.\n    {:?}", e);
-                return Err(Error::sys());
-            }
-        };
+        let km_op: binder::public_api::Strong<dyn IKeyMintOperation> =
+            match self.km_op.get_interface() {
+                Ok(km_op) => km_op,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    log::error!("In prune: Failed to get KeyMintOperation interface.\n    {:?}", e);
+                    return Err(Error::sys());
+                }
+            };
 
         // We abort the operation. If there was an error we log it but ignore it.
         if let Err(e) = map_km_error(km_op.abort()) {
@@ -324,17 +357,7 @@
         Self::check_input_length(aad_input).context("In update_aad")?;
         self.touch();
 
-        let params = KeyParameterArray {
-            params: vec![KmParam {
-                tag: Tag::ASSOCIATED_DATA,
-                value: KmParamValue::Blob(aad_input.into()),
-            }],
-        };
-
-        let mut out_params: Option<KeyParameterArray> = None;
-        let mut output: Option<ByteArray> = None;
-
-        let km_op: Box<dyn IKeyMintOperation> =
+        let km_op: binder::public_api::Strong<dyn IKeyMintOperation> =
             self.km_op.get_interface().context("In update: Failed to get KeyMintOperation.")?;
 
         let (hat, tst) = self
@@ -346,14 +369,7 @@
 
         self.update_outcome(
             &mut *outcome,
-            map_km_error(km_op.update(
-                Some(&params),
-                None,
-                hat.as_ref(),
-                tst.as_ref(),
-                &mut out_params,
-                &mut output,
-            )),
+            map_km_error(km_op.updateAad(aad_input, hat.as_ref(), tst.as_ref())),
         )
         .context("In update_aad: KeyMint::update failed.")?;
 
@@ -367,10 +383,7 @@
         Self::check_input_length(input).context("In update")?;
         self.touch();
 
-        let mut out_params: Option<KeyParameterArray> = None;
-        let mut output: Option<ByteArray> = None;
-
-        let km_op: Box<dyn IKeyMintOperation> =
+        let km_op: binder::public_api::Strong<dyn IKeyMintOperation> =
             self.km_op.get_interface().context("In update: Failed to get KeyMintOperation.")?;
 
         let (hat, tst) = self
@@ -380,28 +393,17 @@
             .before_update()
             .context("In update: Trying to get auth tokens.")?;
 
-        self.update_outcome(
-            &mut *outcome,
-            map_km_error(km_op.update(
-                None,
-                Some(input),
-                hat.as_ref(),
-                tst.as_ref(),
-                &mut out_params,
-                &mut output,
-            )),
-        )
-        .context("In update: KeyMint::update failed.")?;
+        let output = self
+            .update_outcome(
+                &mut *outcome,
+                map_km_error(km_op.update(input, hat.as_ref(), tst.as_ref())),
+            )
+            .context("In update: KeyMint::update failed.")?;
 
-        match output {
-            Some(blob) => {
-                if blob.data.is_empty() {
-                    Ok(None)
-                } else {
-                    Ok(Some(blob.data))
-                }
-            }
-            None => Ok(None),
+        if output.is_empty() {
+            Ok(None)
+        } else {
+            Ok(Some(output))
         }
     }
 
@@ -414,12 +416,10 @@
         }
         self.touch();
 
-        let mut out_params: Option<KeyParameterArray> = None;
-
-        let km_op: Box<dyn IKeyMintOperation> =
+        let km_op: binder::public_api::Strong<dyn IKeyMintOperation> =
             self.km_op.get_interface().context("In finish: Failed to get KeyMintOperation.")?;
 
-        let (hat, tst) = self
+        let (hat, tst, confirmation_token) = self
             .auth_info
             .lock()
             .unwrap()
@@ -430,12 +430,11 @@
             .update_outcome(
                 &mut *outcome,
                 map_km_error(km_op.finish(
-                    None,
                     input,
                     signature,
                     hat.as_ref(),
                     tst.as_ref(),
-                    &mut out_params,
+                    confirmation_token.as_deref(),
                 )),
             )
             .context("In finish: KeyMint::finish failed.")?;
@@ -458,7 +457,7 @@
     fn abort(&self, outcome: Outcome) -> Result<()> {
         let mut locked_outcome = self.check_active().context("In abort")?;
         *locked_outcome = outcome;
-        let km_op: Box<dyn IKeyMintOperation> =
+        let km_op: binder::public_api::Strong<dyn IKeyMintOperation> =
             self.km_op.get_interface().context("In abort: Failed to get KeyMintOperation.")?;
 
         map_km_error(km_op.abort()).context("In abort: KeyMint::abort failed.")
@@ -467,7 +466,15 @@
 
 impl Drop for Operation {
     fn drop(&mut self) {
-        if let Ok(Outcome::Unknown) = self.outcome.get_mut() {
+        let guard = self.outcome.lock().expect("In drop.");
+        log_key_operation_event_stats(
+            self.logging_info.purpose,
+            &(self.logging_info.op_params),
+            &guard,
+            self.logging_info.key_upgraded,
+        );
+        if let Outcome::Unknown = *guard {
+            drop(guard);
             // If the operation was still active we call abort, setting
             // the outcome to `Outcome::Dropped`
             if let Err(e) = self.abort(Outcome::Dropped) {
@@ -497,9 +504,11 @@
     /// owner uid and returns a new Operation wrapped in a `std::sync::Arc`.
     pub fn create_operation(
         &self,
-        km_op: Box<dyn IKeyMintOperation>,
+        km_op: binder::public_api::Strong<dyn IKeyMintOperation>,
         owner: u32,
         auth_info: AuthInfo,
+        forced: bool,
+        logging_info: LoggingInfo,
     ) -> Arc<Operation> {
         // We use unwrap because we don't allow code that can panic while locked.
         let mut operations = self.operations.lock().expect("In create_operation.");
@@ -512,12 +521,26 @@
             s.upgrade().is_none()
         }) {
             Some(free_slot) => {
-                let new_op = Arc::new(Operation::new(index - 1, km_op, owner, auth_info));
+                let new_op = Arc::new(Operation::new(
+                    index - 1,
+                    km_op,
+                    owner,
+                    auth_info,
+                    forced,
+                    logging_info,
+                ));
                 *free_slot = Arc::downgrade(&new_op);
                 new_op
             }
             None => {
-                let new_op = Arc::new(Operation::new(operations.len(), km_op, owner, auth_info));
+                let new_op = Arc::new(Operation::new(
+                    operations.len(),
+                    km_op,
+                    owner,
+                    auth_info,
+                    forced,
+                    logging_info,
+                ));
                 operations.push(Arc::downgrade(&new_op));
                 new_op
             }
@@ -600,7 +623,7 @@
     /// ## Update
     /// We also allow callers to cannibalize their own sibling operations if no other
     /// slot can be found. In this case the least recently used sibling is pruned.
-    pub fn prune(&self, caller: u32) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    pub fn prune(&self, caller: u32, forced: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
         loop {
             // Maps the uid of the owner to the number of operations that owner has
             // (running_siblings). More operations per owner lowers the pruning
@@ -625,7 +648,8 @@
                     }
                 });
 
-            let caller_malus = 1u64 + *owners.entry(caller).or_default();
+            // If the operation is forced, the caller has a malus of 0.
+            let caller_malus = if forced { 0 } else { 1u64 + *owners.entry(caller).or_default() };
 
             // We iterate through all operations computing the malus and finding
             // the candidate with the highest malus which must also be higher
@@ -639,7 +663,7 @@
             let mut oldest_caller_op: Option<CandidateInfo> = None;
             let candidate = pruning_info.iter().fold(
                 None,
-                |acc: Option<CandidateInfo>, &PruningInfo { last_usage, owner, index }| {
+                |acc: Option<CandidateInfo>, &PruningInfo { last_usage, owner, index, forced }| {
                     // Compute the age of the current operation.
                     let age = now
                         .checked_duration_since(last_usage)
@@ -659,12 +683,17 @@
                     }
 
                     // Compute the malus of the current operation.
-                    // Expect safety: Every owner in pruning_info was counted in
-                    // the owners map. So this unwrap cannot panic.
-                    let malus = *owners
-                        .get(&owner)
-                        .expect("This is odd. We should have counted every owner in pruning_info.")
-                        + ((age.as_secs() + 1) as f64).log(6.0).floor() as u64;
+                    let malus = if forced {
+                        // Forced operations have a malus of 0. And cannot even be pruned
+                        // by other forced operations.
+                        0
+                    } else {
+                        // Expect safety: Every owner in pruning_info was counted in
+                        // the owners map. So this unwrap cannot panic.
+                        *owners.get(&owner).expect(
+                            "This is odd. We should have counted every owner in pruning_info.",
+                        ) + ((age.as_secs() + 1) as f64).log(6.0).floor() as u64
+                    };
 
                     // Now check if the current operation is a viable/better candidate
                     // the one currently stored in the accumulator.
@@ -751,9 +780,11 @@
 impl KeystoreOperation {
     /// Creates a new operation instance wrapped in a
     /// BnKeystoreOperation proxy object. It also
-    /// calls `IBinder::set_requesting_sid` on the new interface, because
+    /// calls `IBinderInternal::set_requesting_sid` on the new interface, because
     /// we need it for checking Keystore permissions.
-    pub fn new_native_binder(operation: Arc<Operation>) -> impl IKeystoreOperation + Send {
+    pub fn new_native_binder(
+        operation: Arc<Operation>,
+    ) -> binder::public_api::Strong<dyn IKeystoreOperation> {
         let result =
             BnKeystoreOperation::new_binder(Self { operation: Mutex::new(Some(operation)) });
         result.as_binder().set_requesting_sid(true);
@@ -835,11 +866,21 @@
     }
 
     fn abort(&self) -> binder::public_api::Result<()> {
-        map_or_log_err(
+        map_err_with(
             self.with_locked_operation(
                 |op| op.abort(Outcome::Abort).context("In KeystoreOperation::abort"),
                 true,
             ),
+            |e| {
+                match e.root_cause().downcast_ref::<Error>() {
+                    // Calling abort on expired operations is something very common.
+                    // There is no reason to clutter the log with it. It is never the cause
+                    // for a true problem.
+                    Some(Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE)) => {}
+                    _ => log::error!("{:?}", e),
+                };
+                e
+            },
             Ok,
         )
     }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/permission.rs b/keystore2/src/permission.rs
index a81954f..45c4dc1 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/permission.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/permission.rs
@@ -193,6 +193,7 @@
     /// ```
     #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
     KeyPerm from KeyPermission with default (NONE, none) {
+        CONVERT_STORAGE_KEY_TO_EPHEMERAL,   selinux name: convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral;
         DELETE,         selinux name: delete;
         GEN_UNIQUE_ID,  selinux name: gen_unique_id;
         GET_INFO,       selinux name: get_info;
@@ -291,7 +292,7 @@
         AddAuth = 1,    selinux name: add_auth;
         /// Checked when an app is uninstalled or wiped.
         ClearNs = 2,    selinux name: clear_ns;
-        /// Checked when Keystore 2.0 gets locked.
+        /// Checked when the user state is queried from Keystore 2.0.
         GetState = 4,   selinux name: get_state;
         /// Checked when Keystore 2.0 is asked to list a namespace that the caller
         /// does not have the get_info permission for.
@@ -299,9 +300,21 @@
         /// Checked when Keystore 2.0 gets locked.
         Lock = 0x10,       selinux name: lock;
         /// Checked when Keystore 2.0 shall be reset.
-        Reset = 0x20,   selinux name: reset;
+        Reset = 0x20,    selinux name: reset;
         /// Checked when Keystore 2.0 shall be unlocked.
-        Unlock = 0x40,  selinux name: unlock;
+        Unlock = 0x40,    selinux name: unlock;
+        /// Checked when user is added or removed.
+        ChangeUser = 0x80,    selinux name: change_user;
+        /// Checked when password of the user is changed.
+        ChangePassword = 0x100,    selinux name: change_password;
+        /// Checked when a UID is cleared.
+        ClearUID = 0x200,    selinux name: clear_uid;
+        /// Checked when Credstore calls IKeystoreAuthorization to obtain auth tokens.
+        GetAuthToken = 0x400,  selinux name: get_auth_token;
+        /// Checked when earlyBootEnded() is called.
+        EarlyBootEnded = 0x800,   selinux name: early_boot_ended;
+        /// Checked when IKeystoreMaintenance::onDeviceOffBody is called.
+        ReportOffBody = 0x1000, selinux name: report_off_body;
     }
 );
 
@@ -454,9 +467,12 @@
 
     for p in access_vec.into_iter() {
         selinux::check_access(caller_ctx, &target_context, "keystore2_key", p.to_selinux())
-            .context(concat!(
-                "check_grant_permission: check_access failed. ",
-                "The caller may have tried to grant a permission that they don't possess."
+            .context(format!(
+                concat!(
+                    "check_grant_permission: check_access failed. ",
+                    "The caller may have tried to grant a permission that they don't possess. {:?}"
+                ),
+                p
             ))?
     }
     Ok(())
@@ -573,6 +589,17 @@
         KeyPerm::rebind(),
         KeyPerm::update(),
         KeyPerm::use_(),
+        KeyPerm::convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral(),
+    ];
+
+    const SYSTEM_SERVER_PERMISSIONS_NO_GRANT: KeyPermSet = key_perm_set![
+        KeyPerm::delete(),
+        KeyPerm::use_dev_id(),
+        // No KeyPerm::grant()
+        KeyPerm::get_info(),
+        KeyPerm::rebind(),
+        KeyPerm::update(),
+        KeyPerm::use_(),
     ];
 
     const NOT_GRANT_PERMS: KeyPermSet = key_perm_set![
@@ -586,6 +613,7 @@
         KeyPerm::rebind(),
         KeyPerm::update(),
         KeyPerm::use_(),
+        KeyPerm::convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral(),
     ];
 
     const UNPRIV_PERMS: KeyPermSet = key_perm_set![
@@ -643,18 +671,25 @@
         assert!(check_keystore_permission(&system_server_ctx, KeystorePerm::add_auth()).is_ok());
         assert!(check_keystore_permission(&system_server_ctx, KeystorePerm::clear_ns()).is_ok());
         assert!(check_keystore_permission(&system_server_ctx, KeystorePerm::get_state()).is_ok());
-        assert!(check_keystore_permission(&system_server_ctx, KeystorePerm::list()).is_ok());
         assert!(check_keystore_permission(&system_server_ctx, KeystorePerm::lock()).is_ok());
         assert!(check_keystore_permission(&system_server_ctx, KeystorePerm::reset()).is_ok());
         assert!(check_keystore_permission(&system_server_ctx, KeystorePerm::unlock()).is_ok());
+        assert!(check_keystore_permission(&system_server_ctx, KeystorePerm::change_user()).is_ok());
+        assert!(
+            check_keystore_permission(&system_server_ctx, KeystorePerm::change_password()).is_ok()
+        );
+        assert!(check_keystore_permission(&system_server_ctx, KeystorePerm::clear_uid()).is_ok());
         let shell_ctx = Context::new("u:r:shell:s0")?;
         assert_perm_failed!(check_keystore_permission(&shell_ctx, KeystorePerm::add_auth()));
         assert_perm_failed!(check_keystore_permission(&shell_ctx, KeystorePerm::clear_ns()));
-        assert_perm_failed!(check_keystore_permission(&shell_ctx, KeystorePerm::get_state()));
+        assert!(check_keystore_permission(&shell_ctx, KeystorePerm::get_state()).is_ok());
         assert_perm_failed!(check_keystore_permission(&shell_ctx, KeystorePerm::list()));
         assert_perm_failed!(check_keystore_permission(&shell_ctx, KeystorePerm::lock()));
         assert_perm_failed!(check_keystore_permission(&shell_ctx, KeystorePerm::reset()));
         assert_perm_failed!(check_keystore_permission(&shell_ctx, KeystorePerm::unlock()));
+        assert_perm_failed!(check_keystore_permission(&shell_ctx, KeystorePerm::change_user()));
+        assert_perm_failed!(check_keystore_permission(&shell_ctx, KeystorePerm::change_password()));
+        assert_perm_failed!(check_keystore_permission(&shell_ctx, KeystorePerm::clear_uid()));
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -663,9 +698,10 @@
         let system_server_ctx = Context::new("u:r:system_server:s0")?;
         let shell_ctx = Context::new("u:r:shell:s0")?;
         let key = KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::APP, nspace: 0, alias: None, blob: None };
-        assert!(check_grant_permission(&system_server_ctx, NOT_GRANT_PERMS, &key).is_ok());
-        // attempts to grant the grant permission must always fail even when privileged.
+        check_grant_permission(&system_server_ctx, SYSTEM_SERVER_PERMISSIONS_NO_GRANT, &key)
+            .expect("Grant permission check failed.");
 
+        // attempts to grant the grant permission must always fail even when privileged.
         assert_perm_failed!(check_grant_permission(
             &system_server_ctx,
             KeyPerm::grant().into(),
diff --git a/keystore2/src/remote_provisioning.rs b/keystore2/src/remote_provisioning.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c757c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/remote_provisioning.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,449 @@
+// Copyright 2020, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! This is the implementation for the remote provisioning AIDL interface between
+//! the network providers for remote provisioning and the system. This interface
+//! allows the caller to prompt the Remote Provisioning HAL to generate keys and
+//! CBOR blobs that can be ferried to a provisioning server that will return
+//! certificate chains signed by some root authority and stored in a keystore SQLite
+//! DB.
+
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+
+use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
+    Algorithm::Algorithm, AttestationKey::AttestationKey, Certificate::Certificate,
+    DeviceInfo::DeviceInfo, IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::IRemotelyProvisionedComponent,
+    KeyParameter::KeyParameter, KeyParameterValue::KeyParameterValue,
+    MacedPublicKey::MacedPublicKey, ProtectedData::ProtectedData, SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel,
+    Tag::Tag,
+};
+use android_security_remoteprovisioning::aidl::android::security::remoteprovisioning::{
+    AttestationPoolStatus::AttestationPoolStatus, IRemoteProvisioning::BnRemoteProvisioning,
+    IRemoteProvisioning::IRemoteProvisioning,
+};
+use android_security_remoteprovisioning::binder::Strong;
+use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::{
+    Domain::Domain, KeyDescriptor::KeyDescriptor,
+};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use keystore2_crypto::parse_subject_from_certificate;
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
+
+use crate::database::{CertificateChain, KeystoreDB, Uuid};
+use crate::error::{self, map_or_log_err, map_rem_prov_error, Error};
+use crate::globals::{get_keymint_device, get_remotely_provisioned_component, DB};
+use crate::utils::Asp;
+
+/// Contains helper functions to check if remote provisioning is enabled on the system and, if so,
+/// to assign and retrieve attestation keys and certificate chains.
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct RemProvState {
+    security_level: SecurityLevel,
+    km_uuid: Uuid,
+    is_hal_present: AtomicBool,
+}
+
+impl RemProvState {
+    /// Creates a RemProvState struct.
+    pub fn new(security_level: SecurityLevel, km_uuid: Uuid) -> Self {
+        Self { security_level, km_uuid, is_hal_present: AtomicBool::new(true) }
+    }
+
+    /// Checks if remote provisioning is enabled and partially caches the result. On a hybrid system
+    /// remote provisioning can flip from being disabled to enabled depending on responses from the
+    /// server, so unfortunately caching the presence or absence of the HAL is not enough to fully
+    /// make decisions about the state of remote provisioning during runtime.
+    fn check_rem_prov_enabled(&self, db: &mut KeystoreDB) -> Result<bool> {
+        if !self.is_hal_present.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
+            || get_remotely_provisioned_component(&self.security_level).is_err()
+        {
+            self.is_hal_present.store(false, Ordering::Relaxed);
+            return Ok(false);
+        }
+        // To check if remote provisioning is enabled on a system that supports both remote
+        // provisioning and factory provisioned keys, we only need to check if there are any
+        // keys at all generated to indicate if the app has gotten the signal to begin filling
+        // the key pool from the server.
+        let pool_status = db
+            .get_attestation_pool_status(0 /* date */, &self.km_uuid)
+            .context("In check_rem_prov_enabled: failed to get attestation pool status.")?;
+        Ok(pool_status.total != 0)
+    }
+
+    /// Fetches a remote provisioning attestation key and certificate chain inside of the
+    /// returned `CertificateChain` struct if one exists for the given caller_uid. If one has not
+    /// been assigned, this function will assign it. If there are no signed attestation keys
+    /// available to be assigned, it will return the ResponseCode `OUT_OF_KEYS`
+    fn get_rem_prov_attest_key(
+        &self,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
+        caller_uid: u32,
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+    ) -> Result<Option<CertificateChain>> {
+        match key.domain {
+            Domain::APP => {
+                // Attempt to get an Attestation Key once. If it fails, then the app doesn't
+                // have a valid chain assigned to it. The helper function will return None after
+                // attempting to assign a key. An error will be thrown if the pool is simply out
+                // of usable keys. Then another attempt to fetch the just-assigned key will be
+                // made. If this fails too, something is very wrong.
+                self.get_rem_prov_attest_key_helper(key, caller_uid, db)
+                    .context("In get_rem_prov_attest_key: Failed to get a key")?
+                    .map_or_else(
+                        || self.get_rem_prov_attest_key_helper(key, caller_uid, db),
+                        |v| Ok(Some(v)),
+                    )
+                    .context(concat!(
+                        "In get_rem_prov_attest_key: Failed to get a key after",
+                        "attempting to assign one."
+                    ))?
+                    .map_or_else(
+                        || {
+                            Err(Error::sys()).context(concat!(
+                                "In get_rem_prov_attest_key: Attempted to assign a ",
+                                "key and failed silently. Something is very wrong."
+                            ))
+                        },
+                        |cert_chain| Ok(Some(cert_chain)),
+                    )
+            }
+            _ => Ok(None),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Returns None if an AttestationKey fails to be assigned. Errors if no keys are available.
+    fn get_rem_prov_attest_key_helper(
+        &self,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
+        caller_uid: u32,
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+    ) -> Result<Option<CertificateChain>> {
+        let cert_chain = db
+            .retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain(key.domain, caller_uid as i64, &self.km_uuid)
+            .context("In get_rem_prov_attest_key_helper: Failed to retrieve a key + cert chain")?;
+        match cert_chain {
+            Some(cert_chain) => Ok(Some(cert_chain)),
+            // Either this app needs to be assigned a key, or the pool is empty. An error will
+            // be thrown if there is no key available to assign. This will indicate that the app
+            // should be nudged to provision more keys so keystore can retry.
+            None => {
+                db.assign_attestation_key(key.domain, caller_uid as i64, &self.km_uuid)
+                    .context("In get_rem_prov_attest_key_helper: Failed to assign a key")?;
+                Ok(None)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn is_asymmetric_key(&self, params: &[KeyParameter]) -> bool {
+        params.iter().any(|kp| {
+            matches!(
+                kp,
+                KeyParameter {
+                    tag: Tag::ALGORITHM,
+                    value: KeyParameterValue::Algorithm(Algorithm::RSA)
+                } | KeyParameter {
+                    tag: Tag::ALGORITHM,
+                    value: KeyParameterValue::Algorithm(Algorithm::EC)
+                }
+            )
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Checks to see (1) if the key in question should be attested to based on the algorithm and
+    /// (2) if remote provisioning is present and enabled on the system. If these conditions are
+    /// met, it makes an attempt to fetch the attestation key assigned to the `caller_uid`.
+    ///
+    /// It returns the ResponseCode `OUT_OF_KEYS` if there is not one key currently assigned to the
+    /// `caller_uid` and there are none available to assign.
+    pub fn get_remotely_provisioned_attestation_key_and_certs(
+        &self,
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
+        caller_uid: u32,
+        params: &[KeyParameter],
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+    ) -> Result<Option<(AttestationKey, Certificate)>> {
+        if !self.is_asymmetric_key(params) || !self.check_rem_prov_enabled(db)? {
+            // There is no remote provisioning component for this security level on the
+            // device. Return None so the underlying KM instance knows to use its
+            // factory provisioned key instead. Alternatively, it's not an asymmetric key
+            // and therefore will not be attested.
+            Ok(None)
+        } else {
+            match self.get_rem_prov_attest_key(&key, caller_uid, db).context(concat!(
+                "In get_remote_provisioning_key_and_certs: Failed to get ",
+                "attestation key"
+            ))? {
+                Some(cert_chain) => Ok(Some((
+                    AttestationKey {
+                        keyBlob: cert_chain.private_key.to_vec(),
+                        attestKeyParams: vec![],
+                        issuerSubjectName: parse_subject_from_certificate(&cert_chain.batch_cert)
+                            .context(concat!(
+                            "In get_remote_provisioning_key_and_certs: Failed to ",
+                            "parse subject."
+                        ))?,
+                    },
+                    Certificate { encodedCertificate: cert_chain.cert_chain },
+                ))),
+                None => Ok(None),
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+/// Implementation of the IRemoteProvisioning service.
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct RemoteProvisioningService {
+    device_by_sec_level: HashMap<SecurityLevel, Asp>,
+}
+
+impl RemoteProvisioningService {
+    fn get_dev_by_sec_level(
+        &self,
+        sec_level: &SecurityLevel,
+    ) -> Result<Strong<dyn IRemotelyProvisionedComponent>> {
+        if let Some(dev) = self.device_by_sec_level.get(sec_level) {
+            dev.get_interface().context("In get_dev_by_sec_level.")
+        } else {
+            Err(error::Error::sys()).context(concat!(
+                "In get_dev_by_sec_level: Remote instance for requested security level",
+                " not found."
+            ))
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Creates a new instance of the remote provisioning service
+    pub fn new_native_binder() -> Result<Strong<dyn IRemoteProvisioning>> {
+        let mut result: Self = Default::default();
+        let dev = get_remotely_provisioned_component(&SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
+            .context("In new_native_binder: Failed to get TEE Remote Provisioner instance.")?;
+        result.device_by_sec_level.insert(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, dev);
+        if let Ok(dev) = get_remotely_provisioned_component(&SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+            result.device_by_sec_level.insert(SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX, dev);
+        }
+        Ok(BnRemoteProvisioning::new_binder(result))
+    }
+
+    /// Populates the AttestationPoolStatus parcelable with information about how many
+    /// certs will be expiring by the date provided in `expired_by` along with how many
+    /// keys have not yet been assigned.
+    pub fn get_pool_status(
+        &self,
+        expired_by: i64,
+        sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+    ) -> Result<AttestationPoolStatus> {
+        let (_, _, uuid) = get_keymint_device(&sec_level)?;
+        DB.with::<_, Result<AttestationPoolStatus>>(|db| {
+            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
+            // delete_expired_attestation_keys is always safe to call, and will remove anything
+            // older than the date at the time of calling. No work should be done on the
+            // attestation keys unless the pool status is checked first, so this call should be
+            // enough to routinely clean out expired keys.
+            db.delete_expired_attestation_keys()?;
+            Ok(db.get_attestation_pool_status(expired_by, &uuid)?)
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Generates a CBOR blob which will be assembled by the calling code into a larger
+    /// CBOR blob intended for delivery to a provisioning serever. This blob will contain
+    /// `num_csr` certificate signing requests for attestation keys generated in the TEE,
+    /// along with a server provided `eek` and `challenge`. The endpoint encryption key will
+    /// be used to encrypt the sensitive contents being transmitted to the server, and the
+    /// challenge will ensure freshness. A `test_mode` flag will instruct the remote provisioning
+    /// HAL if it is okay to accept EEKs that aren't signed by something that chains back to the
+    /// baked in root of trust in the underlying IRemotelyProvisionedComponent instance.
+    #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+    pub fn generate_csr(
+        &self,
+        test_mode: bool,
+        num_csr: i32,
+        eek: &[u8],
+        challenge: &[u8],
+        sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+        protected_data: &mut ProtectedData,
+        device_info: &mut DeviceInfo,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let dev = self.get_dev_by_sec_level(&sec_level)?;
+        let (_, _, uuid) = get_keymint_device(&sec_level)?;
+        let keys_to_sign = DB.with::<_, Result<Vec<MacedPublicKey>>>(|db| {
+            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
+            Ok(db
+                .fetch_unsigned_attestation_keys(num_csr, &uuid)?
+                .iter()
+                .map(|key| MacedPublicKey { macedKey: key.to_vec() })
+                .collect())
+        })?;
+        let mut mac = map_rem_prov_error(dev.generateCertificateRequest(
+            test_mode,
+            &keys_to_sign,
+            eek,
+            challenge,
+            device_info,
+            protected_data,
+        ))
+        .context("In generate_csr: Failed to generate csr")?;
+        let mut cose_mac_0 = Vec::<u8>::new();
+        // TODO(b/180392379): Replace this manual CBOR generation with the cbor-serde crate as well.
+        //                    This generates an array consisting of the mac and the public key Maps.
+        //                    Just generate the actual MacedPublicKeys structure when the crate is
+        //                    available.
+        cose_mac_0.push((0b100_00000 | (keys_to_sign.len() + 1)) as u8);
+        cose_mac_0.push(0b010_11000); //push mac
+        cose_mac_0.push(mac.len() as u8);
+        cose_mac_0.append(&mut mac);
+        for maced_public_key in keys_to_sign {
+            if maced_public_key.macedKey.len() > 83 + 8 {
+                cose_mac_0.extend_from_slice(&maced_public_key.macedKey[8..83 + 8]);
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(cose_mac_0)
+    }
+
+    /// Provisions a certificate chain for a key whose CSR was included in generate_csr. The
+    /// `public_key` is used to index into the SQL database in order to insert the `certs` blob
+    /// which represents a PEM encoded X.509 certificate chain. The `expiration_date` is provided
+    /// as a convenience from the caller to avoid having to parse the certificates semantically
+    /// here.
+    pub fn provision_cert_chain(
+        &self,
+        public_key: &[u8],
+        batch_cert: &[u8],
+        certs: &[u8],
+        expiration_date: i64,
+        sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        DB.with::<_, Result<()>>(|db| {
+            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
+            let (_, _, uuid) = get_keymint_device(&sec_level)?;
+            Ok(db.store_signed_attestation_certificate_chain(
+                public_key,
+                batch_cert,
+                certs, /* DER encoded certificate chain */
+                expiration_date,
+                &uuid,
+            )?)
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Submits a request to the Remote Provisioner HAL to generate a signing key pair.
+    /// `is_test_mode` indicates whether or not the returned public key should be marked as being
+    /// for testing in order to differentiate them from private keys. If the call is successful,
+    /// the key pair is then added to the database.
+    pub fn generate_key_pair(&self, is_test_mode: bool, sec_level: SecurityLevel) -> Result<()> {
+        let (_, _, uuid) = get_keymint_device(&sec_level)?;
+        let dev = self.get_dev_by_sec_level(&sec_level)?;
+        let mut maced_key = MacedPublicKey { macedKey: Vec::new() };
+        let priv_key =
+            map_rem_prov_error(dev.generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(is_test_mode, &mut maced_key))
+                .context("In generate_key_pair: Failed to generated ECDSA keypair.")?;
+        // TODO(b/180392379): This is a brittle hack that relies on the consistent formatting of
+        //                    the returned CBOR blob in order to extract the public key.
+        let data = &maced_key.macedKey;
+        if data.len() < 85 {
+            return Err(error::Error::sys()).context(concat!(
+                "In generate_key_pair: CBOR blob returned from",
+                "RemotelyProvisionedComponent is definitely malformatted or empty."
+            ));
+        }
+        let mut raw_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0; 64];
+        raw_key[0..32].clone_from_slice(&data[18..18 + 32]);
+        raw_key[32..64].clone_from_slice(&data[53..53 + 32]);
+        DB.with::<_, Result<()>>(|db| {
+            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
+            Ok(db.create_attestation_key_entry(&maced_key.macedKey, &raw_key, &priv_key, &uuid)?)
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Checks the security level of each available IRemotelyProvisionedComponent hal and returns
+    /// all levels in an array to the caller.
+    pub fn get_security_levels(&self) -> Result<Vec<SecurityLevel>> {
+        Ok(self.device_by_sec_level.keys().cloned().collect())
+    }
+
+    /// Deletes all attestation keys generated by the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent from the device,
+    /// regardless of what state of the attestation key lifecycle they were in.
+    pub fn delete_all_keys(&self) -> Result<i64> {
+        DB.with::<_, Result<i64>>(|db| {
+            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
+            Ok(db.delete_all_attestation_keys()?)
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl binder::Interface for RemoteProvisioningService {}
+
+// Implementation of IRemoteProvisioning. See AIDL spec at
+// :aidl/android/security/remoteprovisioning/IRemoteProvisioning.aidl
+impl IRemoteProvisioning for RemoteProvisioningService {
+    fn getPoolStatus(
+        &self,
+        expired_by: i64,
+        sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+    ) -> binder::public_api::Result<AttestationPoolStatus> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.get_pool_status(expired_by, sec_level), Ok)
+    }
+
+    fn generateCsr(
+        &self,
+        test_mode: bool,
+        num_csr: i32,
+        eek: &[u8],
+        challenge: &[u8],
+        sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+        protected_data: &mut ProtectedData,
+        device_info: &mut DeviceInfo,
+    ) -> binder::public_api::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        map_or_log_err(
+            self.generate_csr(
+                test_mode,
+                num_csr,
+                eek,
+                challenge,
+                sec_level,
+                protected_data,
+                device_info,
+            ),
+            Ok,
+        )
+    }
+
+    fn provisionCertChain(
+        &self,
+        public_key: &[u8],
+        batch_cert: &[u8],
+        certs: &[u8],
+        expiration_date: i64,
+        sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+    ) -> binder::public_api::Result<()> {
+        map_or_log_err(
+            self.provision_cert_chain(public_key, batch_cert, certs, expiration_date, sec_level),
+            Ok,
+        )
+    }
+
+    fn generateKeyPair(
+        &self,
+        is_test_mode: bool,
+        sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+    ) -> binder::public_api::Result<()> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.generate_key_pair(is_test_mode, sec_level), Ok)
+    }
+
+    fn getSecurityLevels(&self) -> binder::public_api::Result<Vec<SecurityLevel>> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.get_security_levels(), Ok)
+    }
+
+    fn deleteAllKeys(&self) -> binder::public_api::Result<i64> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.delete_all_keys(), Ok)
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/security_level.rs b/keystore2/src/security_level.rs
index 12b75bf..ec6c4d7 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/security_level.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/security_level.rs
@@ -12,16 +12,15 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-#![allow(unused_variables)]
-
 //! This crate implements the IKeystoreSecurityLevel interface.
 
-use crate::gc::Gc;
+use crate::globals::get_keymint_device;
 use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
-    Algorithm::Algorithm, HardwareAuthenticatorType::HardwareAuthenticatorType,
-    IKeyMintDevice::IKeyMintDevice, KeyCreationResult::KeyCreationResult, KeyFormat::KeyFormat,
-    KeyParameter::KeyParameter, KeyParameterValue::KeyParameterValue, SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel,
-    Tag::Tag,
+    Algorithm::Algorithm, AttestationKey::AttestationKey,
+    HardwareAuthenticatorType::HardwareAuthenticatorType, IKeyMintDevice::IKeyMintDevice,
+    KeyCreationResult::KeyCreationResult, KeyFormat::KeyFormat,
+    KeyMintHardwareInfo::KeyMintHardwareInfo, KeyParameter::KeyParameter,
+    KeyParameterValue::KeyParameterValue, SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel, Tag::Tag,
 };
 use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::{
     AuthenticatorSpec::AuthenticatorSpec, CreateOperationResponse::CreateOperationResponse,
@@ -31,53 +30,72 @@
     KeyMetadata::KeyMetadata, KeyParameters::KeyParameters,
 };
 
-use crate::globals::ENFORCEMENTS;
+use crate::attestation_key_utils::{get_attest_key_info, AttestationKeyInfo};
+use crate::database::{CertificateInfo, KeyIdGuard};
+use crate::globals::{DB, ENFORCEMENTS, LEGACY_MIGRATOR, SUPER_KEY};
 use crate::key_parameter::KeyParameter as KsKeyParam;
 use crate::key_parameter::KeyParameterValue as KsKeyParamValue;
-use crate::utils::{check_key_permission, uid_to_android_user, Asp};
-use crate::{database::KeyIdGuard, globals::DB};
-use crate::{
-    database::{DateTime, KeyMetaData, KeyMetaEntry, KeyType},
-    permission::KeyPerm,
+use crate::metrics::log_key_creation_event_stats;
+use crate::remote_provisioning::RemProvState;
+use crate::super_key::{KeyBlob, SuperKeyManager};
+use crate::utils::{
+    check_device_attestation_permissions, check_key_permission, is_device_id_attestation_tag,
+    uid_to_android_user, Asp,
 };
 use crate::{
-    database::{KeyEntry, KeyEntryLoadBits, SubComponentType},
+    database::{
+        BlobMetaData, BlobMetaEntry, DateTime, KeyEntry, KeyEntryLoadBits, KeyMetaData,
+        KeyMetaEntry, KeyType, SubComponentType, Uuid,
+    },
     operation::KeystoreOperation,
+    operation::LoggingInfo,
     operation::OperationDb,
+    permission::KeyPerm,
 };
 use crate::{
     error::{self, map_km_error, map_or_log_err, Error, ErrorCode},
     utils::key_characteristics_to_internal,
 };
 use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
-use binder::{IBinder, Interface, ThreadState};
+use binder::{IBinderInternal, Strong, ThreadState};
 
 /// Implementation of the IKeystoreSecurityLevel Interface.
 pub struct KeystoreSecurityLevel {
     security_level: SecurityLevel,
     keymint: Asp,
+    hw_info: KeyMintHardwareInfo,
+    km_uuid: Uuid,
     operation_db: OperationDb,
+    rem_prov_state: RemProvState,
 }
 
 // Blob of 32 zeroes used as empty masking key.
 static ZERO_BLOB_32: &[u8] = &[0; 32];
 
+// Per RFC 5280 4.1.2.5, an undefined expiration (not-after) field should be set to GeneralizedTime
+// 999912312359559, which is 253402300799000 ms from Jan 1, 1970.
+const UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER: i64 = 253402300799000i64;
+
 impl KeystoreSecurityLevel {
     /// Creates a new security level instance wrapped in a
     /// BnKeystoreSecurityLevel proxy object. It also
-    /// calls `IBinder::set_requesting_sid` on the new interface, because
+    /// calls `IBinderInternal::set_requesting_sid` on the new interface, because
     /// we need it for checking keystore permissions.
     pub fn new_native_binder(
         security_level: SecurityLevel,
-    ) -> Result<impl IKeystoreSecurityLevel + Send> {
+    ) -> Result<(Strong<dyn IKeystoreSecurityLevel>, Uuid)> {
+        let (dev, hw_info, km_uuid) = get_keymint_device(&security_level)
+            .context("In KeystoreSecurityLevel::new_native_binder.")?;
         let result = BnKeystoreSecurityLevel::new_binder(Self {
             security_level,
-            keymint: crate::globals::get_keymint_device(security_level)
-                .context("In KeystoreSecurityLevel::new_native_binder.")?,
+            keymint: dev,
+            hw_info,
+            km_uuid,
             operation_db: OperationDb::new(),
+            rem_prov_state: RemProvState::new(security_level, km_uuid),
         });
         result.as_binder().set_requesting_sid(true);
-        Ok(result)
+        Ok((result, km_uuid))
     }
 
     fn store_new_key(
@@ -85,6 +103,7 @@
         key: KeyDescriptor,
         creation_result: KeyCreationResult,
         user_id: u32,
+        flags: Option<i32>,
     ) -> Result<KeyMetadata> {
         let KeyCreationResult {
             keyBlob: key_blob,
@@ -92,7 +111,7 @@
             certificateChain: mut certificate_chain,
         } = creation_result;
 
-        let (cert, cert_chain): (Option<Vec<u8>>, Option<Vec<u8>>) = (
+        let mut cert_info: CertificateInfo = CertificateInfo::new(
             match certificate_chain.len() {
                 0 => None,
                 _ => Some(certificate_chain.remove(0).encodedCertificate),
@@ -120,28 +139,41 @@
         let creation_date = DateTime::now().context("Trying to make creation time.")?;
 
         let key = match key.domain {
-            Domain::BLOB => {
-                KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::BLOB, blob: Some(key_blob), ..Default::default() }
-            }
+            Domain::BLOB => KeyDescriptor {
+                domain: Domain::BLOB,
+                blob: Some(key_blob.to_vec()),
+                ..Default::default()
+            },
             _ => DB
                 .with::<_, Result<KeyDescriptor>>(|db| {
-                    let mut metadata = KeyMetaData::new();
-                    metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::CreationDate(creation_date));
-
                     let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
-                    let (need_gc, key_id) = db
-                        .store_new_key(
-                            key,
+
+                    let (key_blob, mut blob_metadata) = SUPER_KEY
+                        .handle_super_encryption_on_key_init(
+                            &mut db,
+                            &LEGACY_MIGRATOR,
+                            &(key.domain),
                             &key_parameters,
+                            flags,
+                            user_id,
                             &key_blob,
-                            cert.as_deref(),
-                            cert_chain.as_deref(),
-                            &metadata,
+                        )
+                        .context("In store_new_key. Failed to handle super encryption.")?;
+
+                    let mut key_metadata = KeyMetaData::new();
+                    key_metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::CreationDate(creation_date));
+                    blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::KmUuid(self.km_uuid));
+
+                    let key_id = db
+                        .store_new_key(
+                            &key,
+                            &key_parameters,
+                            &(&key_blob, &blob_metadata),
+                            &cert_info,
+                            &key_metadata,
+                            &self.km_uuid,
                         )
                         .context("In store_new_key.")?;
-                    if need_gc {
-                        Gc::notify_gc();
-                    }
                     Ok(KeyDescriptor {
                         domain: Domain::KEY_ID,
                         nspace: key_id.id(),
@@ -154,8 +186,8 @@
         Ok(KeyMetadata {
             key,
             keySecurityLevel: self.security_level,
-            certificate: cert,
-            certificateChain: cert_chain,
+            certificate: cert_info.take_cert(),
+            certificateChain: cert_info.take_cert_chain(),
             authorizations: crate::utils::key_parameters_to_authorizations(key_parameters),
             modificationTimeMs: creation_date.to_millis_epoch(),
         })
@@ -172,10 +204,15 @@
         // so that we can use it by reference like the blob provided by the key descriptor.
         // Otherwise, we would have to clone the blob from the key descriptor.
         let scoping_blob: Vec<u8>;
-        let (km_blob, key_properties, key_id_guard) = match key.domain {
+        let (km_blob, key_properties, key_id_guard, blob_metadata) = match key.domain {
             Domain::BLOB => {
                 check_key_permission(KeyPerm::use_(), key, &None)
                     .context("In create_operation: checking use permission for Domain::BLOB.")?;
+                if forced {
+                    check_key_permission(KeyPerm::req_forced_op(), key, &None).context(
+                        "In create_operation: checking forced permission for Domain::BLOB.",
+                    )?;
+                }
                 (
                     match &key.blob {
                         Some(blob) => blob,
@@ -188,33 +225,42 @@
                     },
                     None,
                     None,
+                    BlobMetaData::new(),
                 )
             }
             _ => {
                 let (key_id_guard, mut key_entry) = DB
                     .with::<_, Result<(KeyIdGuard, KeyEntry)>>(|db| {
-                        db.borrow_mut().load_key_entry(
-                            key.clone(),
-                            KeyType::Client,
-                            KeyEntryLoadBits::KM,
-                            caller_uid,
-                            |k, av| check_key_permission(KeyPerm::use_(), k, &av),
-                        )
+                        LEGACY_MIGRATOR.with_try_migrate(&key, caller_uid, || {
+                            db.borrow_mut().load_key_entry(
+                                &key,
+                                KeyType::Client,
+                                KeyEntryLoadBits::KM,
+                                caller_uid,
+                                |k, av| {
+                                    check_key_permission(KeyPerm::use_(), k, &av)?;
+                                    if forced {
+                                        check_key_permission(KeyPerm::req_forced_op(), k, &av)?;
+                                    }
+                                    Ok(())
+                                },
+                            )
+                        })
                     })
                     .context("In create_operation: Failed to load key blob.")?;
-                scoping_blob = match key_entry.take_km_blob() {
-                    Some(blob) => blob,
-                    None => {
-                        return Err(Error::sys()).context(concat!(
-                            "In create_operation: Successfully loaded key entry,",
-                            " but KM blob was missing."
-                        ))
-                    }
-                };
+
+                let (blob, blob_metadata) =
+                    key_entry.take_key_blob_info().ok_or_else(Error::sys).context(concat!(
+                        "In create_operation: Successfully loaded key entry, ",
+                        "but KM blob was missing."
+                    ))?;
+                scoping_blob = blob;
+
                 (
                     &scoping_blob,
                     Some((key_id_guard.id(), key_entry.into_key_parameters())),
                     Some(key_id_guard),
+                    blob_metadata,
                 )
             }
         };
@@ -234,16 +280,17 @@
                 purpose,
                 key_properties.as_ref(),
                 operation_parameters.as_ref(),
-                // TODO b/178222844 Replace this with the configuration returned by
-                //      KeyMintDevice::getHardwareInfo.
-                //      For now we assume that strongbox implementations need secure timestamps.
-                self.security_level == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX,
+                self.hw_info.timestampTokenRequired,
             )
             .context("In create_operation.")?;
 
         let immediate_hat = immediate_hat.unwrap_or_default();
 
-        let km_dev: Box<dyn IKeyMintDevice> = self
+        let km_blob = SUPER_KEY
+            .unwrap_key_if_required(&blob_metadata, km_blob)
+            .context("In create_operation. Failed to handle super encryption.")?;
+
+        let km_dev: Strong<dyn IKeyMintDevice> = self
             .keymint
             .get_interface()
             .context("In create_operation: Failed to get KeyMint device")?;
@@ -253,6 +300,7 @@
                 &*km_dev,
                 key_id_guard,
                 &km_blob,
+                &blob_metadata,
                 &operation_parameters,
                 |blob| loop {
                     match map_km_error(km_dev.begin(
@@ -262,7 +310,7 @@
                         &immediate_hat,
                     )) {
                         Err(Error::Km(ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS)) => {
-                            self.operation_db.prune(caller_uid)?;
+                            self.operation_db.prune(caller_uid, forced)?;
                             continue;
                         }
                         v => return v,
@@ -273,14 +321,17 @@
 
         let operation_challenge = auth_info.finalize_create_authorization(begin_result.challenge);
 
+        let op_params: Vec<KeyParameter> = operation_parameters.to_vec();
+
         let operation = match begin_result.operation {
             Some(km_op) => {
-                self.operation_db.create_operation(km_op, caller_uid, auth_info)
+                self.operation_db.create_operation(km_op, caller_uid, auth_info, forced,
+                    LoggingInfo::new(purpose, op_params, upgraded_blob.is_some()))
             },
             None => return Err(Error::sys()).context("In create_operation: Begin operation returned successfully, but did not return a valid operation."),
         };
 
-        let op_binder: Box<dyn IKeystoreOperation> =
+        let op_binder: binder::public_api::Strong<dyn IKeystoreOperation> =
             KeystoreOperation::new_native_binder(operation)
                 .as_binder()
                 .into_interface()
@@ -293,30 +344,76 @@
                 0 => None,
                 _ => Some(KeyParameters { keyParameter: begin_result.params }),
             },
+            // An upgraded blob should only be returned if the caller has permission
+            // to use Domain::BLOB keys. If we got to this point, we already checked
+            // that the caller had that permission.
+            upgradedBlob: if key.domain == Domain::BLOB { upgraded_blob } else { None },
         })
     }
 
-    fn add_attestation_parameters(uid: u32, params: &[KeyParameter]) -> Result<Vec<KeyParameter>> {
+    fn add_certificate_parameters(
+        uid: u32,
+        params: &[KeyParameter],
+        key: &KeyDescriptor,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<KeyParameter>> {
         let mut result = params.to_vec();
+        // If there is an attestation challenge we need to get an application id.
         if params.iter().any(|kp| kp.tag == Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE) {
             let aaid = keystore2_aaid::get_aaid(uid).map_err(|e| {
-                anyhow!(format!("In add_attestation_parameters: get_aaid returned status {}.", e))
+                anyhow!(format!("In add_certificate_parameters: get_aaid returned status {}.", e))
             })?;
             result.push(KeyParameter {
                 tag: Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
                 value: KeyParameterValue::Blob(aaid),
             });
         }
+
+        if params.iter().any(|kp| kp.tag == Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID) {
+            check_key_permission(KeyPerm::gen_unique_id(), key, &None).context(concat!(
+                "In add_certificate_parameters: ",
+                "Caller does not have the permission for device unique attestation."
+            ))?;
+        }
+
+        // If the caller requests any device identifier attestation tag, check that they hold the
+        // correct Android permission.
+        if params.iter().any(|kp| is_device_id_attestation_tag(kp.tag)) {
+            check_device_attestation_permissions().context(concat!(
+                "In add_certificate_parameters: ",
+                "Caller does not have the permission to attest device identifiers."
+            ))?;
+        }
+
+        // If we are generating/importing an asymmetric key, we need to make sure
+        // that NOT_BEFORE and NOT_AFTER are present.
+        match params.iter().find(|kp| kp.tag == Tag::ALGORITHM) {
+            Some(KeyParameter { tag: _, value: KeyParameterValue::Algorithm(Algorithm::RSA) })
+            | Some(KeyParameter { tag: _, value: KeyParameterValue::Algorithm(Algorithm::EC) }) => {
+                if !params.iter().any(|kp| kp.tag == Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE) {
+                    result.push(KeyParameter {
+                        tag: Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE,
+                        value: KeyParameterValue::DateTime(0),
+                    })
+                }
+                if !params.iter().any(|kp| kp.tag == Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER) {
+                    result.push(KeyParameter {
+                        tag: Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER,
+                        value: KeyParameterValue::DateTime(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER),
+                    })
+                }
+            }
+            _ => {}
+        }
         Ok(result)
     }
 
     fn generate_key(
         &self,
         key: &KeyDescriptor,
-        attestation_key: Option<&KeyDescriptor>,
+        attest_key_descriptor: Option<&KeyDescriptor>,
         params: &[KeyParameter],
         flags: i32,
-        entropy: &[u8],
+        _entropy: &[u8],
     ) -> Result<KeyMetadata> {
         if key.domain != Domain::BLOB && key.alias.is_none() {
             return Err(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
@@ -335,25 +432,74 @@
         };
 
         // generate_key requires the rebind permission.
+        // Must return on error for security reasons.
         check_key_permission(KeyPerm::rebind(), &key, &None).context("In generate_key.")?;
 
-        let params = Self::add_attestation_parameters(caller_uid, params)
+        let attestation_key_info = match (key.domain, attest_key_descriptor) {
+            (Domain::BLOB, _) => None,
+            _ => DB
+                .with(|db| {
+                    get_attest_key_info(
+                        &key,
+                        caller_uid,
+                        attest_key_descriptor,
+                        params,
+                        &self.rem_prov_state,
+                        &mut db.borrow_mut(),
+                    )
+                })
+                .context("In generate_key: Trying to get an attestation key")?,
+        };
+        let params = Self::add_certificate_parameters(caller_uid, params, &key)
             .context("In generate_key: Trying to get aaid.")?;
 
-        let km_dev: Box<dyn IKeyMintDevice> = self.keymint.get_interface()?;
-        map_km_error(km_dev.addRngEntropy(entropy))
-            .context("In generate_key: Trying to add entropy.")?;
-        let creation_result = map_km_error(km_dev.generateKey(&params))
-            .context("In generate_key: While generating Key")?;
+        let km_dev: Strong<dyn IKeyMintDevice> = self.keymint.get_interface()?;
+
+        let creation_result = match attestation_key_info {
+            Some(AttestationKeyInfo::UserGenerated {
+                key_id_guard,
+                blob,
+                blob_metadata,
+                issuer_subject,
+            }) => self
+                .upgrade_keyblob_if_required_with(
+                    &*km_dev,
+                    Some(key_id_guard),
+                    &KeyBlob::Ref(&blob),
+                    &blob_metadata,
+                    &params,
+                    |blob| {
+                        let attest_key = Some(AttestationKey {
+                            keyBlob: blob.to_vec(),
+                            attestKeyParams: vec![],
+                            issuerSubjectName: issuer_subject.clone(),
+                        });
+                        map_km_error(km_dev.generateKey(&params, attest_key.as_ref()))
+                    },
+                )
+                .context("In generate_key: Using user generated attestation key.")
+                .map(|(result, _)| result),
+            Some(AttestationKeyInfo::RemoteProvisioned { attestation_key, attestation_certs }) => {
+                map_km_error(km_dev.generateKey(&params, Some(&attestation_key)))
+                    .context("While generating Key with remote provisioned attestation key.")
+                    .map(|mut creation_result| {
+                        creation_result.certificateChain.push(attestation_certs);
+                        creation_result
+                    })
+            }
+            None => map_km_error(km_dev.generateKey(&params, None))
+                .context("While generating Key without explicit attestation key."),
+        }
+        .context("In generate_key.")?;
 
         let user_id = uid_to_android_user(caller_uid);
-        self.store_new_key(key, creation_result, user_id).context("In generate_key.")
+        self.store_new_key(key, creation_result, user_id, Some(flags)).context("In generate_key.")
     }
 
     fn import_key(
         &self,
         key: &KeyDescriptor,
-        attestation_key: Option<&KeyDescriptor>,
+        _attestation_key: Option<&KeyDescriptor>,
         params: &[KeyParameter],
         flags: i32,
         key_data: &[u8],
@@ -377,7 +523,7 @@
         // import_key requires the rebind permission.
         check_key_permission(KeyPerm::rebind(), &key, &None).context("In import_key.")?;
 
-        let params = Self::add_attestation_parameters(caller_uid, params)
+        let params = Self::add_certificate_parameters(caller_uid, params, &key)
             .context("In import_key: Trying to get aaid.")?;
 
         let format = params
@@ -396,13 +542,14 @@
             })
             .context("In import_key.")?;
 
-        let km_dev: Box<dyn IKeyMintDevice> =
+        let km_dev: Strong<dyn IKeyMintDevice> =
             self.keymint.get_interface().context("In import_key: Trying to get the KM device")?;
-        let creation_result = map_km_error(km_dev.importKey(&params, format, key_data))
-            .context("In import_key: Trying to call importKey")?;
+        let creation_result =
+            map_km_error(km_dev.importKey(&params, format, key_data, None /* attestKey */))
+                .context("In import_key: Trying to call importKey")?;
 
         let user_id = uid_to_android_user(caller_uid);
-        self.store_new_key(key, creation_result, user_id).context("In import_key.")
+        self.store_new_key(key, creation_result, user_id, Some(flags)).context("In import_key.")
     }
 
     fn import_wrapped_key(
@@ -413,10 +560,21 @@
         params: &[KeyParameter],
         authenticators: &[AuthenticatorSpec],
     ) -> Result<KeyMetadata> {
-        if !(key.domain == Domain::BLOB && key.alias.is_some()) {
-            return Err(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
-                .context("In import_wrapped_key: Alias must be specified.");
-        }
+        let wrapped_data: &[u8] = match key {
+            KeyDescriptor { domain: Domain::APP, blob: Some(ref blob), alias: Some(_), .. }
+            | KeyDescriptor {
+                domain: Domain::SELINUX, blob: Some(ref blob), alias: Some(_), ..
+            } => blob,
+            _ => {
+                return Err(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT)).context(format!(
+                    concat!(
+                        "In import_wrapped_key: Alias and blob must be specified ",
+                        "and domain must be APP or SELINUX. {:?}"
+                    ),
+                    key
+                ))
+            }
+        };
 
         if wrapping_key.domain == Domain::BLOB {
             return Err(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT)).context(
@@ -424,16 +582,9 @@
             );
         }
 
-        let wrapped_data = match &key.blob {
-            Some(d) => d,
-            None => {
-                return Err(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT)).context(
-                    "In import_wrapped_key: Blob must be specified and hold wrapped key data.",
-                )
-            }
-        };
-
         let caller_uid = ThreadState::get_calling_uid();
+        let user_id = uid_to_android_user(caller_uid);
+
         let key = match key.domain {
             Domain::APP => KeyDescriptor {
                 domain: key.domain,
@@ -441,32 +592,41 @@
                 alias: key.alias.clone(),
                 blob: None,
             },
-            _ => key.clone(),
+            Domain::SELINUX => KeyDescriptor {
+                domain: Domain::SELINUX,
+                nspace: key.nspace,
+                alias: key.alias.clone(),
+                blob: None,
+            },
+            _ => panic!("Unreachable."),
         };
 
-        // import_wrapped_key requires the rebind permission for the new key.
+        // Import_wrapped_key requires the rebind permission for the new key.
         check_key_permission(KeyPerm::rebind(), &key, &None).context("In import_wrapped_key.")?;
 
-        let (wrapping_key_id_guard, wrapping_key_entry) = DB
+        let (wrapping_key_id_guard, mut wrapping_key_entry) = DB
             .with(|db| {
-                db.borrow_mut().load_key_entry(
-                    wrapping_key.clone(),
-                    KeyType::Client,
-                    KeyEntryLoadBits::KM,
-                    caller_uid,
-                    |k, av| check_key_permission(KeyPerm::use_(), k, &av),
-                )
+                LEGACY_MIGRATOR.with_try_migrate(&key, caller_uid, || {
+                    db.borrow_mut().load_key_entry(
+                        &wrapping_key,
+                        KeyType::Client,
+                        KeyEntryLoadBits::KM,
+                        caller_uid,
+                        |k, av| check_key_permission(KeyPerm::use_(), k, &av),
+                    )
+                })
             })
             .context("Failed to load wrapping key.")?;
-        let wrapping_key_blob = match wrapping_key_entry.km_blob() {
-            Some(blob) => blob,
-            None => {
-                return Err(error::Error::sys()).context(concat!(
-                    "No km_blob after successfully loading key.",
-                    " This should never happen."
-                ))
-            }
-        };
+
+        let (wrapping_key_blob, wrapping_blob_metadata) = wrapping_key_entry
+            .take_key_blob_info()
+            .ok_or_else(error::Error::sys)
+            .context("No km_blob after successfully loading key. This should never happen.")?;
+
+        let wrapping_key_blob =
+            SUPER_KEY.unwrap_key_if_required(&wrapping_blob_metadata, &wrapping_key_blob).context(
+                "In import_wrapped_key. Failed to handle super encryption for wrapping key.",
+            )?;
 
         // km_dev.importWrappedKey does not return a certificate chain.
         // TODO Do we assume that all wrapped keys are symmetric?
@@ -478,8 +638,7 @@
                 HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD => Some(a.authenticatorId),
                 _ => None,
             })
-            .ok_or(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
-            .context("A password authenticator SID must be specified.")?;
+            .unwrap_or(-1);
 
         let fp_sid = authenticators
             .iter()
@@ -487,22 +646,22 @@
                 HardwareAuthenticatorType::FINGERPRINT => Some(a.authenticatorId),
                 _ => None,
             })
-            .ok_or(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
-            .context("A fingerprint authenticator SID must be specified.")?;
+            .unwrap_or(-1);
 
         let masking_key = masking_key.unwrap_or(ZERO_BLOB_32);
 
-        let km_dev: Box<dyn IKeyMintDevice> = self.keymint.get_interface()?;
+        let km_dev: Strong<dyn IKeyMintDevice> = self.keymint.get_interface()?;
         let (creation_result, _) = self
             .upgrade_keyblob_if_required_with(
                 &*km_dev,
                 Some(wrapping_key_id_guard),
-                wrapping_key_blob,
+                &wrapping_key_blob,
+                &wrapping_blob_metadata,
                 &[],
                 |wrapping_blob| {
                     let creation_result = map_km_error(km_dev.importWrappedKey(
                         wrapped_data,
-                        wrapping_key_blob,
+                        wrapping_blob,
                         masking_key,
                         &params,
                         pw_sid,
@@ -513,39 +672,66 @@
             )
             .context("In import_wrapped_key.")?;
 
-        let user_id = uid_to_android_user(caller_uid);
-        self.store_new_key(key, creation_result, user_id)
+        self.store_new_key(key, creation_result, user_id, None)
             .context("In import_wrapped_key: Trying to store the new key.")
     }
 
+    fn store_upgraded_keyblob(
+        key_id_guard: KeyIdGuard,
+        km_uuid: Option<&Uuid>,
+        key_blob: &KeyBlob,
+        upgraded_blob: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let (upgraded_blob_to_be_stored, new_blob_metadata) =
+            SuperKeyManager::reencrypt_if_required(key_blob, &upgraded_blob)
+                .context("In store_upgraded_keyblob: Failed to handle super encryption.")?;
+
+        let mut new_blob_metadata = new_blob_metadata.unwrap_or_else(BlobMetaData::new);
+        if let Some(uuid) = km_uuid {
+            new_blob_metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::KmUuid(*uuid));
+        }
+
+        DB.with(|db| {
+            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
+            db.set_blob(
+                &key_id_guard,
+                SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB,
+                Some(&upgraded_blob_to_be_stored),
+                Some(&new_blob_metadata),
+            )
+        })
+        .context("In store_upgraded_keyblob: Failed to insert upgraded blob into the database.")
+    }
+
     fn upgrade_keyblob_if_required_with<T, F>(
         &self,
         km_dev: &dyn IKeyMintDevice,
         key_id_guard: Option<KeyIdGuard>,
-        blob: &[u8],
+        key_blob: &KeyBlob,
+        blob_metadata: &BlobMetaData,
         params: &[KeyParameter],
         f: F,
     ) -> Result<(T, Option<Vec<u8>>)>
     where
         F: Fn(&[u8]) -> Result<T, Error>,
     {
-        match f(blob) {
+        match f(key_blob) {
             Err(Error::Km(ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE)) => {
-                let upgraded_blob = map_km_error(km_dev.upgradeKey(blob, params))
+                let upgraded_blob = map_km_error(km_dev.upgradeKey(key_blob, params))
                     .context("In upgrade_keyblob_if_required_with: Upgrade failed.")?;
-                key_id_guard.map_or(Ok(()), |key_id_guard| {
-                    DB.with(|db| {
-                        db.borrow_mut().insert_blob(
-                            &key_id_guard,
-                            SubComponentType::KEY_BLOB,
-                            &upgraded_blob,
-                        )
-                    })
-                    .context(concat!(
-                        "In upgrade_keyblob_if_required_with: ",
-                        "Failed to insert upgraded blob into the database.",
-                    ))
-                })?;
+
+                if let Some(kid) = key_id_guard {
+                    Self::store_upgraded_keyblob(
+                        kid,
+                        blob_metadata.km_uuid(),
+                        key_blob,
+                        &upgraded_blob,
+                    )
+                    .context(
+                        "In upgrade_keyblob_if_required_with: store_upgraded_keyblob failed",
+                    )?;
+                }
+
                 match f(&upgraded_blob) {
                     Ok(v) => Ok((v, Some(upgraded_blob))),
                     Err(e) => Err(e).context(concat!(
@@ -554,12 +740,76 @@
                     )),
                 }
             }
-            Err(e) => {
-                Err(e).context("In upgrade_keyblob_if_required_with: Failed perform operation.")
+            result => {
+                if let Some(kid) = key_id_guard {
+                    if key_blob.force_reencrypt() {
+                        Self::store_upgraded_keyblob(
+                            kid,
+                            blob_metadata.km_uuid(),
+                            key_blob,
+                            key_blob,
+                        )
+                        .context(concat!(
+                            "In upgrade_keyblob_if_required_with: ",
+                            "store_upgraded_keyblob failed in forced reencrypt"
+                        ))?;
+                    }
+                }
+                result
+                    .map(|v| (v, None))
+                    .context("In upgrade_keyblob_if_required_with: Called closure failed.")
             }
-            Ok(v) => Ok((v, None)),
         }
     }
+
+    fn convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral(&self, storage_key: &KeyDescriptor) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        if storage_key.domain != Domain::BLOB {
+            return Err(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT)).context(concat!(
+                "In IKeystoreSecurityLevel convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral: ",
+                "Key must be of Domain::BLOB"
+            ));
+        }
+        let key_blob = storage_key
+            .blob
+            .as_ref()
+            .ok_or(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
+            .context(
+                "In IKeystoreSecurityLevel convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral: No key blob specified",
+            )?;
+
+        // convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral requires the associated permission
+        check_key_permission(KeyPerm::convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral(), storage_key, &None)
+            .context("In convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral: Check permission")?;
+
+        let km_dev: Strong<dyn IKeyMintDevice> = self.keymint.get_interface().context(concat!(
+            "In IKeystoreSecurityLevel convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral: ",
+            "Getting keymint device interface"
+        ))?;
+        map_km_error(km_dev.convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(key_blob))
+            .context("In keymint device convertStorageKeyToEphemeral")
+    }
+
+    fn delete_key(&self, key: &KeyDescriptor) -> Result<()> {
+        if key.domain != Domain::BLOB {
+            return Err(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
+                .context("In IKeystoreSecurityLevel delete_key: Key must be of Domain::BLOB");
+        }
+
+        let key_blob = key
+            .blob
+            .as_ref()
+            .ok_or(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
+            .context("In IKeystoreSecurityLevel delete_key: No key blob specified")?;
+
+        check_key_permission(KeyPerm::delete(), key, &None)
+            .context("In IKeystoreSecurityLevel delete_key: Checking delete permissions")?;
+
+        let km_dev: Strong<dyn IKeyMintDevice> = self
+            .keymint
+            .get_interface()
+            .context("In IKeystoreSecurityLevel delete_key: Getting keymint device interface")?;
+        map_km_error(km_dev.deleteKey(&key_blob)).context("In keymint device deleteKey")
+    }
 }
 
 impl binder::Interface for KeystoreSecurityLevel {}
@@ -581,7 +831,9 @@
         flags: i32,
         entropy: &[u8],
     ) -> binder::public_api::Result<KeyMetadata> {
-        map_or_log_err(self.generate_key(key, attestation_key, params, flags, entropy), Ok)
+        let result = self.generate_key(key, attestation_key, params, flags, entropy);
+        log_key_creation_event_stats(params, &result);
+        map_or_log_err(result, Ok)
     }
     fn importKey(
         &self,
@@ -591,7 +843,9 @@
         flags: i32,
         key_data: &[u8],
     ) -> binder::public_api::Result<KeyMetadata> {
-        map_or_log_err(self.import_key(key, attestation_key, params, flags, key_data), Ok)
+        let result = self.import_key(key, attestation_key, params, flags, key_data);
+        log_key_creation_event_stats(params, &result);
+        map_or_log_err(result, Ok)
     }
     fn importWrappedKey(
         &self,
@@ -601,9 +855,18 @@
         params: &[KeyParameter],
         authenticators: &[AuthenticatorSpec],
     ) -> binder::public_api::Result<KeyMetadata> {
-        map_or_log_err(
-            self.import_wrapped_key(key, wrapping_key, masking_key, params, authenticators),
-            Ok,
-        )
+        let result =
+            self.import_wrapped_key(key, wrapping_key, masking_key, params, authenticators);
+        log_key_creation_event_stats(params, &result);
+        map_or_log_err(result, Ok)
+    }
+    fn convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(
+        &self,
+        storage_key: &KeyDescriptor,
+    ) -> binder::public_api::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral(storage_key), Ok)
+    }
+    fn deleteKey(&self, key: &KeyDescriptor) -> binder::public_api::Result<()> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.delete_key(key), Ok)
     }
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/service.rs b/keystore2/src/service.rs
index f8650e6..73bd526 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/service.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/service.rs
@@ -12,14 +12,12 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-// TODO remove when fully implemented.
-#![allow(unused_variables)]
-
 //! This crate implement the core Keystore 2.0 service API as defined by the Keystore 2.0
 //! AIDL spec.
 
-use crate::globals::DB;
-use crate::permission;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+
+use crate::error::{self, map_or_log_err, ErrorCode};
 use crate::permission::{KeyPerm, KeystorePerm};
 use crate::security_level::KeystoreSecurityLevel;
 use crate::utils::{
@@ -27,112 +25,135 @@
     key_parameters_to_authorizations, Asp,
 };
 use crate::{
+    database::Uuid,
+    globals::{create_thread_local_db, DB, LEGACY_BLOB_LOADER, LEGACY_MIGRATOR},
+};
+use crate::{database::KEYSTORE_UUID, permission};
+use crate::{
     database::{KeyEntryLoadBits, KeyType, SubComponentType},
     error::ResponseCode,
 };
-use crate::{
-    error::{self, map_or_log_err, ErrorCode},
-    gc::Gc,
-};
 use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel;
 use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::{
     Domain::Domain, IKeystoreSecurityLevel::IKeystoreSecurityLevel,
     IKeystoreService::BnKeystoreService, IKeystoreService::IKeystoreService,
     KeyDescriptor::KeyDescriptor, KeyEntryResponse::KeyEntryResponse, KeyMetadata::KeyMetadata,
 };
-use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
-use binder::{IBinder, Interface, ThreadState};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use binder::{IBinderInternal, Strong, ThreadState};
 use error::Error;
 use keystore2_selinux as selinux;
 
 /// Implementation of the IKeystoreService.
+#[derive(Default)]
 pub struct KeystoreService {
-    sec_level_tee: Asp,
-    sec_level_strongbox: Option<Asp>,
+    i_sec_level_by_uuid: HashMap<Uuid, Asp>,
+    uuid_by_sec_level: HashMap<SecurityLevel, Uuid>,
 }
 
 impl KeystoreService {
     /// Create a new instance of the Keystore 2.0 service.
-    pub fn new_native_binder() -> Result<impl IKeystoreService> {
-        let tee = KeystoreSecurityLevel::new_native_binder(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
-            .map(|tee| Asp::new(tee.as_binder()))
-            .context(concat!(
-                "In KeystoreService::new_native_binder: ",
-                "Trying to construct mendatory security level TEE."
-            ))?;
-        // Strongbox is optional, so we ignore errors and turn the result into an Option.
-        let strongbox =
+    pub fn new_native_binder() -> Result<Strong<dyn IKeystoreService>> {
+        let mut result: Self = Default::default();
+        let (dev, uuid) =
             KeystoreSecurityLevel::new_native_binder(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
-                .map(|tee| Asp::new(tee.as_binder()))
-                .ok();
+                .context(concat!(
+                    "In KeystoreService::new_native_binder: ",
+                    "Trying to construct mandatory security level TEE."
+                ))
+                .map(|(dev, uuid)| (Asp::new(dev.as_binder()), uuid))?;
+        result.i_sec_level_by_uuid.insert(uuid, dev);
+        result.uuid_by_sec_level.insert(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, uuid);
 
-        let result = BnKeystoreService::new_binder(Self {
-            sec_level_tee: tee,
-            sec_level_strongbox: strongbox,
-        });
+        // Strongbox is optional, so we ignore errors and turn the result into an Option.
+        if let Ok((dev, uuid)) = KeystoreSecurityLevel::new_native_binder(SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX)
+            .map(|(dev, uuid)| (Asp::new(dev.as_binder()), uuid))
+        {
+            result.i_sec_level_by_uuid.insert(uuid, dev);
+            result.uuid_by_sec_level.insert(SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX, uuid);
+        }
+
+        let uuid_by_sec_level = result.uuid_by_sec_level.clone();
+        LEGACY_MIGRATOR
+            .set_init(move || {
+                (create_thread_local_db(), uuid_by_sec_level, LEGACY_BLOB_LOADER.clone())
+            })
+            .context(
+                "In KeystoreService::new_native_binder: Trying to initialize the legacy migrator.",
+            )?;
+
+        let result = BnKeystoreService::new_binder(result);
         result.as_binder().set_requesting_sid(true);
         Ok(result)
     }
 
-    fn get_security_level_internal(
-        &self,
-        security_level: SecurityLevel,
-    ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn IKeystoreSecurityLevel>>> {
-        Ok(match (security_level, &self.sec_level_strongbox) {
-            (SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, _) => Some(self.sec_level_tee.get_interface().context(
-                "In get_security_level_internal: Failed to get IKeystoreSecurityLevel (TEE).",
-            )?),
-            (SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX, Some(strongbox)) => Some(strongbox.get_interface().context(
-                "In get_security_level_internal: Failed to get IKeystoreSecurityLevel (Strongbox).",
-            )?),
-            _ => None,
-        })
+    fn uuid_to_sec_level(&self, uuid: &Uuid) -> SecurityLevel {
+        self.uuid_by_sec_level
+            .iter()
+            .find(|(_, v)| **v == *uuid)
+            .map(|(s, _)| *s)
+            .unwrap_or(SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE)
+    }
+
+    fn get_i_sec_level_by_uuid(&self, uuid: &Uuid) -> Result<Strong<dyn IKeystoreSecurityLevel>> {
+        if let Some(dev) = self.i_sec_level_by_uuid.get(uuid) {
+            dev.get_interface().context("In get_i_sec_level_by_uuid.")
+        } else {
+            Err(error::Error::sys())
+                .context("In get_i_sec_level_by_uuid: KeyMint instance for key not found.")
+        }
     }
 
     fn get_security_level(
         &self,
-        security_level: SecurityLevel,
-    ) -> Result<Box<dyn IKeystoreSecurityLevel>> {
-        self.get_security_level_internal(security_level)
-            .context("In get_security_level.")?
-            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE)))
+        sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+    ) -> Result<Strong<dyn IKeystoreSecurityLevel>> {
+        if let Some(dev) = self
+            .uuid_by_sec_level
+            .get(&sec_level)
+            .and_then(|uuid| self.i_sec_level_by_uuid.get(uuid))
+        {
+            dev.get_interface().context("In get_security_level.")
+        } else {
+            Err(error::Error::Km(ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE))
+                .context("In get_security_level: No such security level.")
+        }
     }
 
     fn get_key_entry(&self, key: &KeyDescriptor) -> Result<KeyEntryResponse> {
+        let caller_uid = ThreadState::get_calling_uid();
         let (key_id_guard, mut key_entry) = DB
             .with(|db| {
-                db.borrow_mut().load_key_entry(
-                    key.clone(),
-                    KeyType::Client,
-                    KeyEntryLoadBits::PUBLIC,
-                    ThreadState::get_calling_uid(),
-                    |k, av| check_key_permission(KeyPerm::get_info(), k, &av),
-                )
+                LEGACY_MIGRATOR.with_try_migrate(&key, caller_uid, || {
+                    db.borrow_mut().load_key_entry(
+                        &key,
+                        KeyType::Client,
+                        KeyEntryLoadBits::PUBLIC,
+                        caller_uid,
+                        |k, av| check_key_permission(KeyPerm::get_info(), k, &av),
+                    )
+                })
             })
             .context("In get_key_entry, while trying to load key info.")?;
 
-        let i_sec_level = self
-            .get_security_level_internal(key_entry.sec_level())
-            .context("In get_key_entry.")?
-            .ok_or_else(|| {
-                anyhow!(error::Error::sys()).context(format!(
-                    concat!(
-                        "Found key with security level {:?} ",
-                        "but no KeyMint instance of that security level."
-                    ),
-                    key_entry.sec_level()
-                ))
-            })?;
+        let i_sec_level = if !key_entry.pure_cert() {
+            Some(
+                self.get_i_sec_level_by_uuid(key_entry.km_uuid())
+                    .context("In get_key_entry: Trying to get security level proxy.")?,
+            )
+        } else {
+            None
+        };
 
         Ok(KeyEntryResponse {
-            iSecurityLevel: Some(i_sec_level),
+            iSecurityLevel: i_sec_level,
             metadata: KeyMetadata {
                 key: KeyDescriptor {
                     domain: Domain::KEY_ID,
                     nspace: key_id_guard.id(),
                     ..Default::default()
                 },
-                keySecurityLevel: key_entry.sec_level(),
+                keySecurityLevel: self.uuid_to_sec_level(key_entry.km_uuid()),
                 certificate: key_entry.take_cert(),
                 certificateChain: key_entry.take_cert_chain(),
                 modificationTimeMs: key_entry
@@ -152,30 +173,66 @@
         public_cert: Option<&[u8]>,
         certificate_chain: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> Result<()> {
+        let caller_uid = ThreadState::get_calling_uid();
         DB.with::<_, Result<()>>(|db| {
-            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
-            let (key_id_guard, key_entry) = db
-                .load_key_entry(
-                    key.clone(),
+            let entry = match LEGACY_MIGRATOR.with_try_migrate(&key, caller_uid, || {
+                db.borrow_mut().load_key_entry(
+                    &key,
                     KeyType::Client,
                     KeyEntryLoadBits::NONE,
-                    ThreadState::get_calling_uid(),
+                    caller_uid,
                     |k, av| {
                         check_key_permission(KeyPerm::update(), k, &av)
                             .context("In update_subcomponent.")
                     },
                 )
-                .context("Failed to load key_entry.")?;
+            }) {
+                Err(e) => match e.root_cause().downcast_ref::<Error>() {
+                    Some(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)) => Ok(None),
+                    _ => Err(e),
+                },
+                Ok(v) => Ok(Some(v)),
+            }
+            .context("Failed to load key entry.")?;
 
-            if let Some(cert) = public_cert {
-                db.insert_blob(&key_id_guard, SubComponentType::CERT, cert)
+            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
+            if let Some((key_id_guard, _key_entry)) = entry {
+                db.set_blob(&key_id_guard, SubComponentType::CERT, public_cert, None)
                     .context("Failed to update cert subcomponent.")?;
+
+                db.set_blob(&key_id_guard, SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN, certificate_chain, None)
+                    .context("Failed to update cert chain subcomponent.")?;
+                return Ok(());
             }
 
-            if let Some(cert_chain) = certificate_chain {
-                db.insert_blob(&key_id_guard, SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN, cert_chain)
-                    .context("Failed to update cert chain subcomponent.")?;
+            // If we reach this point we have to check the special condition where a certificate
+            // entry may be made.
+            if !(public_cert.is_none() && certificate_chain.is_some()) {
+                return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND)).context("No key to update.");
             }
+
+            // So we know that we have a certificate chain and no public cert.
+            // Now check that we have everything we need to make a new certificate entry.
+            let key = match (key.domain, &key.alias) {
+                (Domain::APP, Some(ref alias)) => KeyDescriptor {
+                    domain: Domain::APP,
+                    nspace: ThreadState::get_calling_uid() as i64,
+                    alias: Some(alias.clone()),
+                    blob: None,
+                },
+                (Domain::SELINUX, Some(_)) => key.clone(),
+                _ => {
+                    return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT))
+                        .context("Domain must be APP or SELINUX to insert a certificate.")
+                }
+            };
+
+            // Security critical: This must return on failure. Do not remove the `?`;
+            check_key_permission(KeyPerm::rebind(), &key, &None)
+                .context("Caller does not have permission to insert this certificate.")?;
+
+            db.store_new_certificate(&key, certificate_chain.unwrap(), &KEYSTORE_UUID)
+                .context("Failed to insert new certificate.")?;
             Ok(())
         })
         .context("In update_subcomponent.")
@@ -216,24 +273,34 @@
             Ok(()) => {}
         };
 
-        DB.with(|db| {
-            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
-            db.list(k.domain, k.nspace)
-        })
+        let mut result = LEGACY_MIGRATOR
+            .list_uid(k.domain, k.nspace)
+            .context("In list_entries: Trying to list legacy keys.")?;
+
+        result.append(
+            &mut DB
+                .with(|db| {
+                    let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
+                    db.list(k.domain, k.nspace)
+                })
+                .context("In list_entries: Trying to list keystore database.")?,
+        );
+
+        result.sort_unstable();
+        result.dedup();
+        Ok(result)
     }
 
     fn delete_key(&self, key: &KeyDescriptor) -> Result<()> {
         let caller_uid = ThreadState::get_calling_uid();
-        let need_gc = DB
-            .with(|db| {
-                db.borrow_mut().unbind_key(key.clone(), KeyType::Client, caller_uid, |k, av| {
+        DB.with(|db| {
+            LEGACY_MIGRATOR.with_try_migrate(&key, caller_uid, || {
+                db.borrow_mut().unbind_key(&key, KeyType::Client, caller_uid, |k, av| {
                     check_key_permission(KeyPerm::delete(), k, &av).context("During delete_key.")
                 })
             })
-            .context("In delete_key: Trying to unbind the key.")?;
-        if need_gc {
-            Gc::notify_gc();
-        }
+        })
+        .context("In delete_key: Trying to unbind the key.")?;
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -243,26 +310,26 @@
         grantee_uid: i32,
         access_vector: permission::KeyPermSet,
     ) -> Result<KeyDescriptor> {
+        let caller_uid = ThreadState::get_calling_uid();
         DB.with(|db| {
-            db.borrow_mut().grant(
-                key.clone(),
-                ThreadState::get_calling_uid(),
-                grantee_uid as u32,
-                access_vector,
-                |k, av| check_grant_permission(*av, k).context("During grant."),
-            )
+            LEGACY_MIGRATOR.with_try_migrate(&key, caller_uid, || {
+                db.borrow_mut().grant(
+                    &key,
+                    caller_uid,
+                    grantee_uid as u32,
+                    access_vector,
+                    |k, av| check_grant_permission(*av, k).context("During grant."),
+                )
+            })
         })
         .context("In KeystoreService::grant.")
     }
 
     fn ungrant(&self, key: &KeyDescriptor, grantee_uid: i32) -> Result<()> {
         DB.with(|db| {
-            db.borrow_mut().ungrant(
-                key.clone(),
-                ThreadState::get_calling_uid(),
-                grantee_uid as u32,
-                |k| check_key_permission(KeyPerm::grant(), k, &None),
-            )
+            db.borrow_mut().ungrant(&key, ThreadState::get_calling_uid(), grantee_uid as u32, |k| {
+                check_key_permission(KeyPerm::grant(), k, &None)
+            })
         })
         .context("In KeystoreService::ungrant.")
     }
@@ -276,8 +343,8 @@
     fn getSecurityLevel(
         &self,
         security_level: SecurityLevel,
-    ) -> binder::public_api::Result<Box<dyn IKeystoreSecurityLevel>> {
-        map_or_log_err(self.get_security_level(SecurityLevel(security_level.0)), Ok)
+    ) -> binder::public_api::Result<Strong<dyn IKeystoreSecurityLevel>> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.get_security_level(security_level), Ok)
     }
     fn getKeyEntry(&self, key: &KeyDescriptor) -> binder::public_api::Result<KeyEntryResponse> {
         map_or_log_err(self.get_key_entry(key), Ok)
diff --git a/keystore2/src/shared_secret_negotiation.rs b/keystore2/src/shared_secret_negotiation.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb55f33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/shared_secret_negotiation.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! This module implements the shared secret negotiation.
+
+use crate::error::{map_binder_status, map_binder_status_code, Error};
+use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel;
+use android_hardware_security_keymint::binder::Strong;
+use android_hardware_security_sharedsecret::aidl::android::hardware::security::sharedsecret::{
+    ISharedSecret::ISharedSecret, SharedSecretParameters::SharedSecretParameters,
+};
+use android_security_compat::aidl::android::security::compat::IKeystoreCompatService::IKeystoreCompatService;
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use keystore2_vintf::{get_aidl_instances, get_hidl_instances};
+use std::fmt::{self, Display, Formatter};
+
+/// This function initiates the shared secret negotiation. It starts a thread and then returns
+/// immediately. The thread consults the vintf manifest to enumerate expected negotiation
+/// participants. It then attempts to connect to all of these participants. If any connection
+/// fails the thread will retry once per second to connect to the failed instance(s) until all of
+/// the instances are connected. It then performs the negotiation.
+///
+/// During the first phase of the negotiation it will again try every second until
+/// all instances have responded successfully to account for instances that register early but
+/// are not fully functioning at this time due to hardware delays or boot order dependency issues.
+/// An error during the second phase or a checksum mismatch leads to a panic.
+pub fn perform_shared_secret_negotiation() {
+    std::thread::spawn(|| {
+        let participants = list_participants()
+            .expect("In perform_shared_secret_negotiation: Trying to list participants.");
+        let connected = connect_participants(participants);
+        negotiate_shared_secret(connected);
+        log::info!("Shared secret negotiation concluded successfully.");
+    });
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
+enum SharedSecretParticipant {
+    /// Represents an instance of android.hardware.security.sharedsecret.ISharedSecret.
+    Aidl(String),
+    /// In the legacy case there can be at most one TEE and one Strongbox hal.
+    Hidl { is_strongbox: bool, version: (usize, usize) },
+}
+
+impl Display for SharedSecretParticipant {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            Self::Aidl(instance) => write!(
+                f,
+                "{}.{}/{}",
+                SHARED_SECRET_PACKAGE_NAME, SHARED_SECRET_INTERFACE_NAME, instance
+            ),
+            Self::Hidl { is_strongbox, version: (ma, mi) } => write!(
+                f,
+                "{}@V{}.{}::{}/{}",
+                KEYMASTER_PACKAGE_NAME,
+                ma,
+                mi,
+                KEYMASTER_INTERFACE_NAME,
+                if *is_strongbox { "strongbox" } else { "default" }
+            ),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
+enum SharedSecretError {
+    #[error("Shared parameter retrieval failed on instance {p} with error {e:?}.")]
+    ParameterRetrieval { e: Error, p: SharedSecretParticipant },
+    #[error("Shared secret computation failed on instance {p} with error {e:?}.")]
+    Computation { e: Error, p: SharedSecretParticipant },
+    #[error("Checksum comparison failed on instance {0}.")]
+    Checksum(SharedSecretParticipant),
+}
+
+fn filter_map_legacy_km_instances(
+    name: String,
+    version: (usize, usize),
+) -> Option<SharedSecretParticipant> {
+    match name.as_str() {
+        "default" => Some(SharedSecretParticipant::Hidl { is_strongbox: false, version }),
+        "strongbox" => Some(SharedSecretParticipant::Hidl { is_strongbox: true, version }),
+        _ => {
+            log::warn!("Found unexpected keymaster instance: \"{}\"", name);
+            log::warn!("Device is misconfigured. Allowed instances are:");
+            log::warn!("   * default");
+            log::warn!("   * strongbox");
+            None
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static KEYMASTER_PACKAGE_NAME: &str = "android.hardware.keymaster";
+static KEYMASTER_INTERFACE_NAME: &str = "IKeymasterDevice";
+static SHARED_SECRET_PACKAGE_NAME: &str = "android.hardware.security.sharedsecret";
+static SHARED_SECRET_INTERFACE_NAME: &str = "ISharedSecret";
+static COMPAT_PACKAGE_NAME: &str = "android.security.compat";
+
+/// Lists participants.
+fn list_participants() -> Result<Vec<SharedSecretParticipant>> {
+    Ok([(4, 0), (4, 1)]
+        .iter()
+        .map(|(ma, mi)| {
+            get_hidl_instances(KEYMASTER_PACKAGE_NAME, *ma, *mi, KEYMASTER_INTERFACE_NAME)
+                .as_vec()
+                .with_context(|| format!("Trying to convert KM{}.{} names to vector.", *ma, *mi))
+                .map(|instances| {
+                    instances
+                        .into_iter()
+                        .filter_map(|name| {
+                            filter_map_legacy_km_instances(name.to_string(), (*ma, *mi))
+                        })
+                        .collect::<Vec<SharedSecretParticipant>>()
+                })
+        })
+        .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()
+        .map(|v| v.into_iter().flatten())
+        .and_then(|i| {
+            let participants_aidl: Vec<SharedSecretParticipant> =
+                get_aidl_instances(SHARED_SECRET_PACKAGE_NAME, 1, SHARED_SECRET_INTERFACE_NAME)
+                    .as_vec()
+                    .context("In list_participants: Trying to convert KM1.0 names to vector.")?
+                    .into_iter()
+                    .map(|name| SharedSecretParticipant::Aidl(name.to_string()))
+                    .collect();
+            Ok(i.chain(participants_aidl.into_iter()))
+        })
+        .context("In list_participants.")?
+        .collect())
+}
+
+fn connect_participants(
+    mut participants: Vec<SharedSecretParticipant>,
+) -> Vec<(Strong<dyn ISharedSecret>, SharedSecretParticipant)> {
+    let mut connected_participants: Vec<(Strong<dyn ISharedSecret>, SharedSecretParticipant)> =
+        vec![];
+    loop {
+        let (connected, not_connected) = participants.into_iter().fold(
+            (connected_participants, vec![]),
+            |(mut connected, mut failed), e| {
+                match e {
+                    SharedSecretParticipant::Aidl(instance_name) => {
+                        let service_name = format!(
+                            "{}.{}/{}",
+                            SHARED_SECRET_PACKAGE_NAME, SHARED_SECRET_INTERFACE_NAME, instance_name
+                        );
+                        match map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface(&service_name)) {
+                            Err(e) => {
+                                log::warn!(
+                                    "Unable to connect \"{}\" with error:\n{:?}\nRetrying later.",
+                                    service_name,
+                                    e
+                                );
+                                failed.push(SharedSecretParticipant::Aidl(instance_name));
+                            }
+                            Ok(service) => connected
+                                .push((service, SharedSecretParticipant::Aidl(instance_name))),
+                        }
+                    }
+                    SharedSecretParticipant::Hidl { is_strongbox, version } => {
+                        // This is a no-op if it was called before.
+                        keystore2_km_compat::add_keymint_device_service();
+
+                        // If we cannot connect to the compatibility service there is no way to
+                        // recover.
+                        // PANIC! - Unless you brought your towel.
+                        let keystore_compat_service: Strong<dyn IKeystoreCompatService> =
+                            map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface(COMPAT_PACKAGE_NAME))
+                                .expect(
+                                    "In connect_participants: Trying to connect to compat service.",
+                                );
+
+                        match map_binder_status(keystore_compat_service.getSharedSecret(
+                            if is_strongbox {
+                                SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX
+                            } else {
+                                SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT
+                            },
+                        )) {
+                            Err(e) => {
+                                log::warn!(
+                                    concat!(
+                                        "Unable to connect keymaster device \"{}\" ",
+                                        "with error:\n{:?}\nRetrying later."
+                                    ),
+                                    if is_strongbox { "strongbox" } else { "TEE" },
+                                    e
+                                );
+                                failed
+                                    .push(SharedSecretParticipant::Hidl { is_strongbox, version });
+                            }
+                            Ok(service) => connected.push((
+                                service,
+                                SharedSecretParticipant::Hidl { is_strongbox, version },
+                            )),
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                (connected, failed)
+            },
+        );
+        participants = not_connected;
+        connected_participants = connected;
+        if participants.is_empty() {
+            break;
+        }
+        std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(1000));
+    }
+    connected_participants
+}
+
+fn negotiate_shared_secret(
+    participants: Vec<(Strong<dyn ISharedSecret>, SharedSecretParticipant)>,
+) {
+    // Phase 1: Get the sharing parameters from all participants.
+    let mut params = loop {
+        let result: Result<Vec<SharedSecretParameters>, SharedSecretError> = participants
+            .iter()
+            .map(|(s, p)| {
+                map_binder_status(s.getSharedSecretParameters())
+                    .map_err(|e| SharedSecretError::ParameterRetrieval { e, p: (*p).clone() })
+            })
+            .collect();
+
+        match result {
+            Err(e) => {
+                log::warn!("{:?}", e);
+                log::warn!("Retrying in one second.");
+                std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(1000));
+            }
+            Ok(params) => break params,
+        }
+    };
+
+    params.sort_unstable();
+
+    // Phase 2: Send the sorted sharing parameters to all participants.
+    participants
+        .into_iter()
+        .try_fold(None, |acc, (s, p)| {
+            match (acc, map_binder_status(s.computeSharedSecret(&params))) {
+                (None, Ok(new_sum)) => Ok(Some(new_sum)),
+                (Some(old_sum), Ok(new_sum)) => {
+                    if old_sum == new_sum {
+                        Ok(Some(old_sum))
+                    } else {
+                        Err(SharedSecretError::Checksum(p))
+                    }
+                }
+                (_, Err(e)) => Err(SharedSecretError::Computation { e, p }),
+            }
+        })
+        .expect("Fatal: Shared secret computation failed.");
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/super_key.rs b/keystore2/src/super_key.rs
index 4ffe897..d490354 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/super_key.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/super_key.rs
@@ -12,18 +12,29 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-#![allow(dead_code)]
-
 use crate::{
-    database::EncryptedBy, database::KeyMetaData, database::KeyMetaEntry, database::KeystoreDB,
-    error::Error, error::ResponseCode, legacy_blob::LegacyBlobLoader,
+    database::BlobMetaData,
+    database::BlobMetaEntry,
+    database::EncryptedBy,
+    database::KeyEntry,
+    database::KeyType,
+    database::{KeyMetaData, KeyMetaEntry, KeystoreDB},
+    ec_crypto::ECDHPrivateKey,
+    enforcements::Enforcements,
+    error::Error,
+    error::ResponseCode,
+    key_parameter::KeyParameter,
+    legacy_blob::LegacyBlobLoader,
+    legacy_migrator::LegacyMigrator,
+    try_insert::TryInsert,
 };
 use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::Domain::Domain;
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use keystore2_crypto::{
-    aes_gcm_decrypt, aes_gcm_encrypt, derive_key_from_password, generate_salt, ZVec,
+    aes_gcm_decrypt, aes_gcm_encrypt, generate_aes256_key, generate_salt, Password, ZVec,
     AES_256_KEY_LENGTH,
 };
+use std::ops::Deref;
 use std::{
     collections::HashMap,
     sync::Arc,
@@ -32,6 +43,55 @@
 
 type UserId = u32;
 
+/// Encryption algorithm used by a particular type of superencryption key
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum SuperEncryptionAlgorithm {
+    /// Symmetric encryption with AES-256-GCM
+    Aes256Gcm,
+    /// Public-key encryption with ECDH P-256
+    EcdhP256,
+}
+
+/// A particular user may have several superencryption keys in the database, each for a
+/// different purpose, distinguished by alias. Each is associated with a static
+/// constant of this type.
+pub struct SuperKeyType {
+    /// Alias used to look the key up in the `persistent.keyentry` table.
+    pub alias: &'static str,
+    /// Encryption algorithm
+    pub algorithm: SuperEncryptionAlgorithm,
+}
+
+/// Key used for LskfLocked keys; the corresponding superencryption key is loaded in memory
+/// when the user first unlocks, and remains in memory until the device reboots.
+pub const USER_SUPER_KEY: SuperKeyType =
+    SuperKeyType { alias: "USER_SUPER_KEY", algorithm: SuperEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes256Gcm };
+/// Key used for ScreenLockBound keys; the corresponding superencryption key is loaded in memory
+/// each time the user enters their LSKF, and cleared from memory each time the device is locked.
+/// Symmetric.
+pub const USER_SCREEN_LOCK_BOUND_KEY: SuperKeyType = SuperKeyType {
+    alias: "USER_SCREEN_LOCK_BOUND_KEY",
+    algorithm: SuperEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes256Gcm,
+};
+/// Key used for ScreenLockBound keys; the corresponding superencryption key is loaded in memory
+/// each time the user enters their LSKF, and cleared from memory each time the device is locked.
+/// Asymmetric, so keys can be encrypted when the device is locked.
+pub const USER_SCREEN_LOCK_BOUND_ECDH_KEY: SuperKeyType = SuperKeyType {
+    alias: "USER_SCREEN_LOCK_BOUND_ECDH_KEY",
+    algorithm: SuperEncryptionAlgorithm::EcdhP256,
+};
+
+/// Superencryption to apply to a new key.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+pub enum SuperEncryptionType {
+    /// Do not superencrypt this key.
+    None,
+    /// Superencrypt with a key that remains in memory from first unlock to reboot.
+    LskfBound,
+    /// Superencrypt with a key cleared from memory when the device is locked.
+    ScreenLockBound,
+}
+
 #[derive(Default)]
 struct UserSuperKeys {
     /// The per boot key is used for LSKF binding of authentication bound keys. There is one
@@ -39,17 +99,53 @@
     /// secret, that is itself derived from the user's lock screen knowledge factor (LSKF).
     /// When the user unlocks the device for the first time, this key is unlocked, i.e., decrypted,
     /// and stays memory resident until the device reboots.
-    per_boot: Option<Arc<ZVec>>,
+    per_boot: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
     /// The screen lock key works like the per boot key with the distinction that it is cleared
     /// from memory when the screen lock is engaged.
-    /// TODO the life cycle is not fully implemented at this time.
-    screen_lock: Option<Arc<ZVec>>,
+    screen_lock_bound: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
+    /// When the device is locked, screen-lock-bound keys can still be encrypted, using
+    /// ECDH public-key encryption. This field holds the decryption private key.
+    screen_lock_bound_private: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
+}
+
+pub struct SuperKey {
+    algorithm: SuperEncryptionAlgorithm,
+    key: ZVec,
+    // id of the super key in the database.
+    id: i64,
+    /// ECDH is more expensive than AES. So on ECDH private keys we set the
+    /// reencrypt_with field to point at the corresponding AES key, and the
+    /// keys will be re-encrypted with AES on first use.
+    reencrypt_with: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
+}
+
+impl SuperKey {
+    /// For most purposes `unwrap_key` handles decryption,
+    /// but legacy handling and some tests need to assume AES and decrypt directly.
+    pub fn aes_gcm_decrypt(&self, data: &[u8], iv: &[u8], tag: &[u8]) -> Result<ZVec> {
+        if self.algorithm == SuperEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes256Gcm {
+            aes_gcm_decrypt(data, iv, tag, &self.key)
+                .context("In aes_gcm_decrypt: decryption failed")
+        } else {
+            Err(Error::sys()).context("In aes_gcm_decrypt: Key is not an AES key")
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_id(&self) -> i64 {
+        self.id
+    }
 }
 
 #[derive(Default)]
 struct SkmState {
     user_keys: HashMap<UserId, UserSuperKeys>,
-    key_index: HashMap<i64, Weak<ZVec>>,
+    key_index: HashMap<i64, Weak<SuperKey>>,
+}
+
+impl SkmState {
+    fn add_key_to_key_index(&mut self, super_key: &Arc<SuperKey>) {
+        self.key_index.insert(super_key.id, Arc::downgrade(super_key));
+    }
 }
 
 #[derive(Default)]
@@ -59,21 +155,7 @@
 
 impl SuperKeyManager {
     pub fn new() -> Self {
-        Self { data: Mutex::new(Default::default()) }
-    }
-
-    pub fn forget_screen_lock_key_for_user(&self, user: UserId) {
-        let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap();
-        if let Some(usk) = data.user_keys.get_mut(&user) {
-            usk.screen_lock = None;
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn forget_screen_lock_keys(&self) {
-        let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap();
-        for (_, usk) in data.user_keys.iter_mut() {
-            usk.screen_lock = None;
-        }
+        Default::default()
     }
 
     pub fn forget_all_keys_for_user(&self, user: UserId) {
@@ -81,26 +163,19 @@
         data.user_keys.remove(&user);
     }
 
-    pub fn forget_all_keys(&self) {
+    fn install_per_boot_key_for_user(&self, user: UserId, super_key: Arc<SuperKey>) {
         let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap();
-        data.user_keys.clear();
-        data.key_index.clear();
+        data.add_key_to_key_index(&super_key);
+        data.user_keys.entry(user).or_default().per_boot = Some(super_key);
     }
 
-    fn install_per_boot_key_for_user(&self, user: UserId, key_id: i64, key: ZVec) {
-        let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap();
-        let key = Arc::new(key);
-        data.key_index.insert(key_id, Arc::downgrade(&key));
-        data.user_keys.entry(user).or_default().per_boot = Some(key);
-    }
-
-    fn get_key(&self, key_id: &i64) -> Option<Arc<ZVec>> {
+    fn get_key(&self, key_id: &i64) -> Option<Arc<SuperKey>> {
         self.data.lock().unwrap().key_index.get(key_id).and_then(|k| k.upgrade())
     }
 
-    pub fn get_per_boot_key_by_user_id(&self, user_id: u32) -> Option<Arc<ZVec>> {
+    pub fn get_per_boot_key_by_user_id(&self, user_id: UserId) -> Option<Arc<SuperKey>> {
         let data = self.data.lock().unwrap();
-        data.user_keys.get(&user_id).map(|e| e.per_boot.clone()).flatten()
+        data.user_keys.get(&user_id).and_then(|e| e.per_boot.as_ref().cloned())
     }
 
     /// This function unlocks the super keys for a given user.
@@ -109,76 +184,42 @@
     /// a key derived from the given password and stored in the database.
     pub fn unlock_user_key(
         &self,
-        user: UserId,
-        pw: &[u8],
         db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        user: UserId,
+        pw: &Password,
         legacy_blob_loader: &LegacyBlobLoader,
     ) -> Result<()> {
         let (_, entry) = db
-            .get_or_create_key_with(Domain::APP, user as u64 as i64, &"USER_SUPER_KEY", || {
-                // For backward compatibility we need to check if there is a super key present.
-                let super_key = legacy_blob_loader
-                    .load_super_key(user, pw)
-                    .context("In create_new_key: Failed to load legacy key blob.")?;
-                let super_key = match super_key {
-                    None => {
-                        // No legacy file was found. So we generate a new key.
-                        keystore2_crypto::generate_aes256_key()
-                            .context("In create_new_key: Failed to generate AES 256 key.")?
-                    }
-                    Some(key) => key,
-                };
-                // Regardless of whether we loaded an old AES128 key or a new AES256 key,
-                // we derive a AES256 key and re-encrypt the key before we insert it in the
-                // database. The length of the key is preserved by the encryption so we don't
-                // need any extra flags to inform us which algorithm to use it with.
-                let salt =
-                    generate_salt().context("In create_new_key: Failed to generate salt.")?;
-                let derived_key = derive_key_from_password(pw, Some(&salt), AES_256_KEY_LENGTH)
-                    .context("In create_new_key: Failed to derive password.")?;
-                let mut metadata = KeyMetaData::new();
-                metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::Password));
-                metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::Salt(salt));
-                let (encrypted_key, iv, tag) = aes_gcm_encrypt(&super_key, &derived_key)
-                    .context("In create_new_key: Failed to encrypt new super key.")?;
-                metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::Iv(iv));
-                metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::AeadTag(tag));
-                Ok((encrypted_key, metadata))
-            })
+            .get_or_create_key_with(
+                Domain::APP,
+                user as u64 as i64,
+                &USER_SUPER_KEY.alias,
+                crate::database::KEYSTORE_UUID,
+                || {
+                    // For backward compatibility we need to check if there is a super key present.
+                    let super_key = legacy_blob_loader
+                        .load_super_key(user, pw)
+                        .context("In create_new_key: Failed to load legacy key blob.")?;
+                    let super_key = match super_key {
+                        None => {
+                            // No legacy file was found. So we generate a new key.
+                            generate_aes256_key()
+                                .context("In create_new_key: Failed to generate AES 256 key.")?
+                        }
+                        Some(key) => key,
+                    };
+                    // Regardless of whether we loaded an old AES128 key or generated a new AES256
+                    // key as the super key, we derive a AES256 key from the password and re-encrypt
+                    // the super key before we insert it in the database. The length of the key is
+                    // preserved by the encryption so we don't need any extra flags to inform us
+                    // which algorithm to use it with.
+                    Self::encrypt_with_password(&super_key, pw).context("In create_new_key.")
+                },
+            )
             .context("In unlock_user_key: Failed to get key id.")?;
 
-        let metadata = entry.metadata();
-        let super_key = match (
-            metadata.encrypted_by(),
-            metadata.salt(),
-            metadata.iv(),
-            metadata.aead_tag(),
-            entry.km_blob(),
-        ) {
-            (Some(&EncryptedBy::Password), Some(salt), Some(iv), Some(tag), Some(blob)) => {
-                let key = derive_key_from_password(pw, Some(salt), AES_256_KEY_LENGTH)
-                    .context("In unlock_user_key: Failed to generate key from password.")?;
-
-                aes_gcm_decrypt(blob, iv, tag, &key)
-                    .context("In unlock_user_key: Failed to decrypt key blob.")?
-            }
-            (enc_by, salt, iv, tag, blob) => {
-                return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(format!(
-                    concat!(
-                        "In unlock_user_key: Super key has incomplete metadata.",
-                        "Present: encrypted_by: {}, salt: {}, iv: {}, aead_tag: {}, blob: {}."
-                    ),
-                    enc_by.is_some(),
-                    salt.is_some(),
-                    iv.is_some(),
-                    tag.is_some(),
-                    blob.is_some()
-                ));
-            }
-        };
-
-        self.install_per_boot_key_for_user(user, entry.id(), super_key);
-
+        self.populate_cache_from_super_key_blob(user, USER_SUPER_KEY.algorithm, entry, pw)
+            .context("In unlock_user_key.")?;
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -186,14 +227,17 @@
     /// The function queries `metadata.encrypted_by()` to determine the encryption key.
     /// It then check if the required key is memory resident, and if so decrypts the
     /// blob.
-    pub fn unwrap_key(&self, blob: &[u8], metadata: &KeyMetaData) -> Result<ZVec> {
+    pub fn unwrap_key<'a>(&self, blob: &'a [u8], metadata: &BlobMetaData) -> Result<KeyBlob<'a>> {
         match metadata.encrypted_by() {
             Some(EncryptedBy::KeyId(key_id)) => match self.get_key(key_id) {
-                Some(key) => {
-                    Self::unwrap_key_with_key(blob, metadata, &key).context("In unwrap_key.")
-                }
+                Some(super_key) => Ok(KeyBlob::Sensitive {
+                    key: Self::unwrap_key_with_key(blob, metadata, &super_key)
+                        .context("In unwrap_key: unwrap_key_with_key failed")?,
+                    reencrypt_with: super_key.reencrypt_with.as_ref().unwrap_or(&super_key).clone(),
+                    force_reencrypt: super_key.reencrypt_with.is_some(),
+                }),
                 None => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::LOCKED))
-                    .context("In unwrap_key: Key is not usable until the user entered their LSKF."),
+                    .context("In unwrap_key: Required super decryption key is not in memory."),
             },
             _ => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED))
                 .context("In unwrap_key: Cannot determined wrapping key."),
@@ -201,18 +245,642 @@
     }
 
     /// Unwraps an encrypted key blob given an encryption key.
-    fn unwrap_key_with_key(blob: &[u8], metadata: &KeyMetaData, key: &[u8]) -> Result<ZVec> {
-        match (metadata.iv(), metadata.aead_tag()) {
-            (Some(iv), Some(tag)) => aes_gcm_decrypt(blob, iv, tag, key)
-                .context("In unwrap_key_with_key: Failed to decrypt the key blob."),
-            (iv, tag) => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(format!(
-                concat!(
-                    "In unwrap_key_with_key: Key has incomplete metadata.",
-                    "Present: iv: {}, aead_tag: {}."
+    fn unwrap_key_with_key(blob: &[u8], metadata: &BlobMetaData, key: &SuperKey) -> Result<ZVec> {
+        match key.algorithm {
+            SuperEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes256Gcm => match (metadata.iv(), metadata.aead_tag()) {
+                (Some(iv), Some(tag)) => key
+                    .aes_gcm_decrypt(blob, iv, tag)
+                    .context("In unwrap_key_with_key: Failed to decrypt the key blob."),
+                (iv, tag) => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(format!(
+                    concat!(
+                        "In unwrap_key_with_key: Key has incomplete metadata.",
+                        "Present: iv: {}, aead_tag: {}."
+                    ),
+                    iv.is_some(),
+                    tag.is_some(),
+                )),
+            },
+            SuperEncryptionAlgorithm::EcdhP256 => {
+                match (metadata.public_key(), metadata.salt(), metadata.iv(), metadata.aead_tag()) {
+                    (Some(public_key), Some(salt), Some(iv), Some(aead_tag)) => {
+                        ECDHPrivateKey::from_private_key(&key.key)
+                            .and_then(|k| k.decrypt_message(public_key, salt, iv, blob, aead_tag))
+                            .context(
+                                "In unwrap_key_with_key: Failed to decrypt the key blob with ECDH.",
+                            )
+                    }
+                    (public_key, salt, iv, aead_tag) => {
+                        Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(format!(
+                            concat!(
+                                "In unwrap_key_with_key: Key has incomplete metadata.",
+                                "Present: public_key: {}, salt: {}, iv: {}, aead_tag: {}."
+                            ),
+                            public_key.is_some(),
+                            salt.is_some(),
+                            iv.is_some(),
+                            aead_tag.is_some(),
+                        ))
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Checks if user has setup LSKF, even when super key cache is empty for the user.
+    pub fn super_key_exists_in_db_for_user(
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator,
+        user_id: UserId,
+    ) -> Result<bool> {
+        let key_in_db = db
+            .key_exists(Domain::APP, user_id as u64 as i64, &USER_SUPER_KEY.alias, KeyType::Super)
+            .context("In super_key_exists_in_db_for_user.")?;
+
+        if key_in_db {
+            Ok(key_in_db)
+        } else {
+            legacy_migrator
+                .has_super_key(user_id)
+                .context("In super_key_exists_in_db_for_user: Trying to query legacy db.")
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Checks if user has already setup LSKF (i.e. a super key is persisted in the database or the
+    /// legacy database). If not, return Uninitialized state.
+    /// Otherwise, decrypt the super key from the password and return LskfUnlocked state.
+    pub fn check_and_unlock_super_key(
+        &self,
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator,
+        user_id: UserId,
+        pw: &Password,
+    ) -> Result<UserState> {
+        let alias = &USER_SUPER_KEY;
+        let result = legacy_migrator
+            .with_try_migrate_super_key(user_id, pw, || db.load_super_key(alias, user_id))
+            .context("In check_and_unlock_super_key. Failed to load super key")?;
+
+        match result {
+            Some((_, entry)) => {
+                let super_key = self
+                    .populate_cache_from_super_key_blob(user_id, alias.algorithm, entry, pw)
+                    .context("In check_and_unlock_super_key.")?;
+                Ok(UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key))
+            }
+            None => Ok(UserState::Uninitialized),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Checks if user has already setup LSKF (i.e. a super key is persisted in the database or the
+    /// legacy database). If so, return LskfLocked state.
+    /// If the password is provided, generate a new super key, encrypt with the password,
+    /// store in the database and populate the super key cache for the new user
+    /// and return LskfUnlocked state.
+    /// If the password is not provided, return Uninitialized state.
+    pub fn check_and_initialize_super_key(
+        &self,
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator,
+        user_id: UserId,
+        pw: Option<&Password>,
+    ) -> Result<UserState> {
+        let super_key_exists_in_db =
+            Self::super_key_exists_in_db_for_user(db, legacy_migrator, user_id).context(
+                "In check_and_initialize_super_key. Failed to check if super key exists.",
+            )?;
+        if super_key_exists_in_db {
+            Ok(UserState::LskfLocked)
+        } else if let Some(pw) = pw {
+            //generate a new super key.
+            let super_key = generate_aes256_key()
+                .context("In check_and_initialize_super_key: Failed to generate AES 256 key.")?;
+            //derive an AES256 key from the password and re-encrypt the super key
+            //before we insert it in the database.
+            let (encrypted_super_key, blob_metadata) = Self::encrypt_with_password(&super_key, pw)
+                .context("In check_and_initialize_super_key.")?;
+
+            let key_entry = db
+                .store_super_key(
+                    user_id,
+                    &USER_SUPER_KEY,
+                    &encrypted_super_key,
+                    &blob_metadata,
+                    &KeyMetaData::new(),
+                )
+                .context("In check_and_initialize_super_key. Failed to store super key.")?;
+
+            let super_key = self
+                .populate_cache_from_super_key_blob(
+                    user_id,
+                    USER_SUPER_KEY.algorithm,
+                    key_entry,
+                    pw,
+                )
+                .context("In check_and_initialize_super_key.")?;
+            Ok(UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key))
+        } else {
+            Ok(UserState::Uninitialized)
+        }
+    }
+
+    //helper function to populate super key cache from the super key blob loaded from the database
+    fn populate_cache_from_super_key_blob(
+        &self,
+        user_id: UserId,
+        algorithm: SuperEncryptionAlgorithm,
+        entry: KeyEntry,
+        pw: &Password,
+    ) -> Result<Arc<SuperKey>> {
+        let super_key = Self::extract_super_key_from_key_entry(algorithm, entry, pw, None)
+            .context(
+                "In populate_cache_from_super_key_blob. Failed to extract super key from key entry",
+            )?;
+        self.install_per_boot_key_for_user(user_id, super_key.clone());
+        Ok(super_key)
+    }
+
+    /// Extracts super key from the entry loaded from the database
+    pub fn extract_super_key_from_key_entry(
+        algorithm: SuperEncryptionAlgorithm,
+        entry: KeyEntry,
+        pw: &Password,
+        reencrypt_with: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
+    ) -> Result<Arc<SuperKey>> {
+        if let Some((blob, metadata)) = entry.key_blob_info() {
+            let key = match (
+                metadata.encrypted_by(),
+                metadata.salt(),
+                metadata.iv(),
+                metadata.aead_tag(),
+            ) {
+                (Some(&EncryptedBy::Password), Some(salt), Some(iv), Some(tag)) => {
+                    // Note that password encryption is AES no matter the value of algorithm
+                    let key = pw.derive_key(Some(salt), AES_256_KEY_LENGTH).context(
+                        "In extract_super_key_from_key_entry: Failed to generate key from password.",
+                    )?;
+
+                    aes_gcm_decrypt(blob, iv, tag, &key).context(
+                        "In extract_super_key_from_key_entry: Failed to decrypt key blob.",
+                    )?
+                }
+                (enc_by, salt, iv, tag) => {
+                    return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(format!(
+                        concat!(
+                        "In extract_super_key_from_key_entry: Super key has incomplete metadata.",
+                        "Present: encrypted_by: {}, salt: {}, iv: {}, aead_tag: {}."
+                    ),
+                        enc_by.is_some(),
+                        salt.is_some(),
+                        iv.is_some(),
+                        tag.is_some()
+                    ));
+                }
+            };
+            Ok(Arc::new(SuperKey { algorithm, key, id: entry.id(), reencrypt_with }))
+        } else {
+            Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED))
+                .context("In extract_super_key_from_key_entry: No key blob info.")
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Encrypts the super key from a key derived from the password, before storing in the database.
+    pub fn encrypt_with_password(
+        super_key: &[u8],
+        pw: &Password,
+    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> {
+        let salt = generate_salt().context("In encrypt_with_password: Failed to generate salt.")?;
+        let derived_key = pw
+            .derive_key(Some(&salt), AES_256_KEY_LENGTH)
+            .context("In encrypt_with_password: Failed to derive password.")?;
+        let mut metadata = BlobMetaData::new();
+        metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::Password));
+        metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Salt(salt));
+        let (encrypted_key, iv, tag) = aes_gcm_encrypt(super_key, &derived_key)
+            .context("In encrypt_with_password: Failed to encrypt new super key.")?;
+        metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Iv(iv));
+        metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::AeadTag(tag));
+        Ok((encrypted_key, metadata))
+    }
+
+    // Encrypt the given key blob with the user's super key, if the super key exists and the device
+    // is unlocked. If the super key exists and the device is locked, or LSKF is not setup,
+    // return error. Note that it is out of the scope of this function to check if super encryption
+    // is required. Such check should be performed before calling this function.
+    fn super_encrypt_on_key_init(
+        &self,
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator,
+        user_id: UserId,
+        key_blob: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> {
+        match UserState::get(db, legacy_migrator, self, user_id)
+            .context("In super_encrypt. Failed to get user state.")?
+        {
+            UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key) => {
+                Self::encrypt_with_aes_super_key(key_blob, &super_key)
+                    .context("In super_encrypt_on_key_init. Failed to encrypt the key.")
+            }
+            UserState::LskfLocked => {
+                Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::LOCKED)).context("In super_encrypt. Device is locked.")
+            }
+            UserState::Uninitialized => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::UNINITIALIZED))
+                .context("In super_encrypt. LSKF is not setup for the user."),
+        }
+    }
+
+    //Helper function to encrypt a key with the given super key. Callers should select which super
+    //key to be used. This is called when a key is super encrypted at its creation as well as at its
+    //upgrade.
+    fn encrypt_with_aes_super_key(
+        key_blob: &[u8],
+        super_key: &SuperKey,
+    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> {
+        if super_key.algorithm != SuperEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes256Gcm {
+            return Err(Error::sys())
+                .context("In encrypt_with_aes_super_key: unexpected algorithm");
+        }
+        let mut metadata = BlobMetaData::new();
+        let (encrypted_key, iv, tag) = aes_gcm_encrypt(key_blob, &(super_key.key))
+            .context("In encrypt_with_aes_super_key: Failed to encrypt new super key.")?;
+        metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Iv(iv));
+        metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::AeadTag(tag));
+        metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::KeyId(super_key.id)));
+        Ok((encrypted_key, metadata))
+    }
+
+    /// Check if super encryption is required and if so, super-encrypt the key to be stored in
+    /// the database.
+    #[allow(clippy::clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+    pub fn handle_super_encryption_on_key_init(
+        &self,
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator,
+        domain: &Domain,
+        key_parameters: &[KeyParameter],
+        flags: Option<i32>,
+        user_id: UserId,
+        key_blob: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> {
+        match Enforcements::super_encryption_required(domain, key_parameters, flags) {
+            SuperEncryptionType::None => Ok((key_blob.to_vec(), BlobMetaData::new())),
+            SuperEncryptionType::LskfBound => {
+                self.super_encrypt_on_key_init(db, legacy_migrator, user_id, &key_blob).context(
+                    "In handle_super_encryption_on_key_init.
+                         Failed to super encrypt the key.",
+                )
+            }
+            SuperEncryptionType::ScreenLockBound => {
+                let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap();
+                let entry = data.user_keys.entry(user_id).or_default();
+                if let Some(super_key) = entry.screen_lock_bound.as_ref() {
+                    Self::encrypt_with_aes_super_key(key_blob, &super_key).context(concat!(
+                        "In handle_super_encryption_on_key_init. ",
+                        "Failed to encrypt the key with screen_lock_bound key."
+                    ))
+                } else {
+                    // Symmetric key is not available, use public key encryption
+                    let loaded =
+                        db.load_super_key(&USER_SCREEN_LOCK_BOUND_ECDH_KEY, user_id).context(
+                            "In handle_super_encryption_on_key_init: load_super_key failed.",
+                        )?;
+                    let (key_id_guard, key_entry) = loaded.ok_or_else(Error::sys).context(
+                        "In handle_super_encryption_on_key_init: User ECDH key missing.",
+                    )?;
+                    let public_key =
+                        key_entry.metadata().sec1_public_key().ok_or_else(Error::sys).context(
+                            "In handle_super_encryption_on_key_init: sec1_public_key missing.",
+                        )?;
+                    let mut metadata = BlobMetaData::new();
+                    let (ephem_key, salt, iv, encrypted_key, aead_tag) =
+                        ECDHPrivateKey::encrypt_message(public_key, key_blob).context(concat!(
+                            "In handle_super_encryption_on_key_init: ",
+                            "ECDHPrivateKey::encrypt_message failed."
+                        ))?;
+                    metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::PublicKey(ephem_key));
+                    metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Salt(salt));
+                    metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Iv(iv));
+                    metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::AeadTag(aead_tag));
+                    metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::KeyId(key_id_guard.id())));
+                    Ok((encrypted_key, metadata))
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Check if a given key is super-encrypted, from its metadata. If so, unwrap the key using
+    /// the relevant super key.
+    pub fn unwrap_key_if_required<'a>(
+        &self,
+        metadata: &BlobMetaData,
+        key_blob: &'a [u8],
+    ) -> Result<KeyBlob<'a>> {
+        if Self::key_super_encrypted(&metadata) {
+            let unwrapped_key = self
+                .unwrap_key(key_blob, metadata)
+                .context("In unwrap_key_if_required. Error in unwrapping the key.")?;
+            Ok(unwrapped_key)
+        } else {
+            Ok(KeyBlob::Ref(key_blob))
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Check if a given key needs re-super-encryption, from its KeyBlob type.
+    /// If so, re-super-encrypt the key and return a new set of metadata,
+    /// containing the new super encryption information.
+    pub fn reencrypt_if_required<'a>(
+        key_blob_before_upgrade: &KeyBlob,
+        key_after_upgrade: &'a [u8],
+    ) -> Result<(KeyBlob<'a>, Option<BlobMetaData>)> {
+        match key_blob_before_upgrade {
+            KeyBlob::Sensitive { reencrypt_with: super_key, .. } => {
+                let (key, metadata) =
+                    Self::encrypt_with_aes_super_key(key_after_upgrade, super_key)
+                        .context("In reencrypt_if_required: Failed to re-super-encrypt key.")?;
+                Ok((KeyBlob::NonSensitive(key), Some(metadata)))
+            }
+            _ => Ok((KeyBlob::Ref(key_after_upgrade), None)),
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Helper function to decide if a key is super encrypted, given metadata.
+    fn key_super_encrypted(metadata: &BlobMetaData) -> bool {
+        if let Some(&EncryptedBy::KeyId(_)) = metadata.encrypted_by() {
+            return true;
+        }
+        false
+    }
+
+    /// Fetch a superencryption key from the database, or create it if it doesn't already exist.
+    /// When this is called, the caller must hold the lock on the SuperKeyManager.
+    /// So it's OK that the check and creation are different DB transactions.
+    fn get_or_create_super_key(
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        user_id: UserId,
+        key_type: &SuperKeyType,
+        password: &Password,
+        reencrypt_with: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
+    ) -> Result<Arc<SuperKey>> {
+        let loaded_key = db.load_super_key(key_type, user_id)?;
+        if let Some((_, key_entry)) = loaded_key {
+            Ok(Self::extract_super_key_from_key_entry(
+                key_type.algorithm,
+                key_entry,
+                password,
+                reencrypt_with,
+            )?)
+        } else {
+            let (super_key, public_key) = match key_type.algorithm {
+                SuperEncryptionAlgorithm::Aes256Gcm => (
+                    generate_aes256_key()
+                        .context("In get_or_create_super_key: Failed to generate AES 256 key.")?,
+                    None,
                 ),
-                iv.is_some(),
-                tag.is_some(),
-            )),
+                SuperEncryptionAlgorithm::EcdhP256 => {
+                    let key = ECDHPrivateKey::generate()
+                        .context("In get_or_create_super_key: Failed to generate ECDH key")?;
+                    (
+                        key.private_key()
+                            .context("In get_or_create_super_key: private_key failed")?,
+                        Some(
+                            key.public_key()
+                                .context("In get_or_create_super_key: public_key failed")?,
+                        ),
+                    )
+                }
+            };
+            //derive an AES256 key from the password and re-encrypt the super key
+            //before we insert it in the database.
+            let (encrypted_super_key, blob_metadata) =
+                Self::encrypt_with_password(&super_key, password)
+                    .context("In get_or_create_super_key.")?;
+            let mut key_metadata = KeyMetaData::new();
+            if let Some(pk) = public_key {
+                key_metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::Sec1PublicKey(pk));
+            }
+            let key_entry = db
+                .store_super_key(
+                    user_id,
+                    key_type,
+                    &encrypted_super_key,
+                    &blob_metadata,
+                    &key_metadata,
+                )
+                .context("In get_or_create_super_key. Failed to store super key.")?;
+            Ok(Arc::new(SuperKey {
+                algorithm: key_type.algorithm,
+                key: super_key,
+                id: key_entry.id(),
+                reencrypt_with,
+            }))
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Decrypt the screen-lock bound keys for this user using the password and store in memory.
+    pub fn unlock_screen_lock_bound_key(
+        &self,
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        user_id: UserId,
+        password: &Password,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap();
+        let entry = data.user_keys.entry(user_id).or_default();
+        let aes = entry
+            .screen_lock_bound
+            .get_or_try_to_insert_with(|| {
+                Self::get_or_create_super_key(
+                    db,
+                    user_id,
+                    &USER_SCREEN_LOCK_BOUND_KEY,
+                    password,
+                    None,
+                )
+            })?
+            .clone();
+        let ecdh = entry
+            .screen_lock_bound_private
+            .get_or_try_to_insert_with(|| {
+                Self::get_or_create_super_key(
+                    db,
+                    user_id,
+                    &USER_SCREEN_LOCK_BOUND_ECDH_KEY,
+                    password,
+                    Some(aes.clone()),
+                )
+            })?
+            .clone();
+        data.add_key_to_key_index(&aes);
+        data.add_key_to_key_index(&ecdh);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Wipe the screen-lock bound keys for this user from memory.
+    pub fn lock_screen_lock_bound_key(&self, user_id: UserId) {
+        let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap();
+        let mut entry = data.user_keys.entry(user_id).or_default();
+        entry.screen_lock_bound = None;
+        entry.screen_lock_bound_private = None;
+    }
+}
+
+/// This enum represents different states of the user's life cycle in the device.
+/// For now, only three states are defined. More states may be added later.
+pub enum UserState {
+    // The user has registered LSKF and has unlocked the device by entering PIN/Password,
+    // and hence the per-boot super key is available in the cache.
+    LskfUnlocked(Arc<SuperKey>),
+    // The user has registered LSKF, but has not unlocked the device using password, after reboot.
+    // Hence the per-boot super-key(s) is not available in the cache.
+    // However, the encrypted super key is available in the database.
+    LskfLocked,
+    // There's no user in the device for the given user id, or the user with the user id has not
+    // setup LSKF.
+    Uninitialized,
+}
+
+impl UserState {
+    pub fn get(
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator,
+        skm: &SuperKeyManager,
+        user_id: UserId,
+    ) -> Result<UserState> {
+        match skm.get_per_boot_key_by_user_id(user_id) {
+            Some(super_key) => Ok(UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key)),
+            None => {
+                //Check if a super key exists in the database or legacy database.
+                //If so, return locked user state.
+                if SuperKeyManager::super_key_exists_in_db_for_user(db, legacy_migrator, user_id)
+                    .context("In get.")?
+                {
+                    Ok(UserState::LskfLocked)
+                } else {
+                    Ok(UserState::Uninitialized)
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Queries user state when serving password change requests.
+    pub fn get_with_password_changed(
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator,
+        skm: &SuperKeyManager,
+        user_id: UserId,
+        password: Option<&Password>,
+    ) -> Result<UserState> {
+        match skm.get_per_boot_key_by_user_id(user_id) {
+            Some(super_key) => {
+                if password.is_none() {
+                    //transitioning to swiping, delete only the super key in database and cache, and
+                    //super-encrypted keys in database (and in KM)
+                    Self::reset_user(db, skm, legacy_migrator, user_id, true).context(
+                        "In get_with_password_changed: Trying to delete keys from the db.",
+                    )?;
+                    //Lskf is now removed in Keystore
+                    Ok(UserState::Uninitialized)
+                } else {
+                    //Keystore won't be notified when changing to a new password when LSKF is
+                    //already setup. Therefore, ideally this path wouldn't be reached.
+                    Ok(UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key))
+                }
+            }
+            None => {
+                //Check if a super key exists in the database or legacy database.
+                //If so, return LskfLocked state.
+                //Otherwise, i) if the password is provided, initialize the super key and return
+                //LskfUnlocked state ii) if password is not provided, return Uninitialized state.
+                skm.check_and_initialize_super_key(db, legacy_migrator, user_id, password)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Queries user state when serving password unlock requests.
+    pub fn get_with_password_unlock(
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator,
+        skm: &SuperKeyManager,
+        user_id: UserId,
+        password: &Password,
+    ) -> Result<UserState> {
+        match skm.get_per_boot_key_by_user_id(user_id) {
+            Some(super_key) => {
+                log::info!("In get_with_password_unlock. Trying to unlock when already unlocked.");
+                Ok(UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key))
+            }
+            None => {
+                //Check if a super key exists in the database or legacy database.
+                //If not, return Uninitialized state.
+                //Otherwise, try to unlock the super key and if successful,
+                //return LskfUnlocked state
+                skm.check_and_unlock_super_key(db, legacy_migrator, user_id, password)
+                    .context("In get_with_password_unlock. Failed to unlock super key.")
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Delete all the keys created on behalf of the user.
+    /// If 'keep_non_super_encrypted_keys' is set to true, delete only the super key and super
+    /// encrypted keys.
+    pub fn reset_user(
+        db: &mut KeystoreDB,
+        skm: &SuperKeyManager,
+        legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator,
+        user_id: UserId,
+        keep_non_super_encrypted_keys: bool,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        // mark keys created on behalf of the user as unreferenced.
+        legacy_migrator
+            .bulk_delete_user(user_id, keep_non_super_encrypted_keys)
+            .context("In reset_user: Trying to delete legacy keys.")?;
+        db.unbind_keys_for_user(user_id, keep_non_super_encrypted_keys)
+            .context("In reset user. Error in unbinding keys.")?;
+
+        //delete super key in cache, if exists
+        skm.forget_all_keys_for_user(user_id);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+/// This enum represents three states a KeyMint Blob can be in, w.r.t super encryption.
+/// `Sensitive` holds the non encrypted key and a reference to its super key.
+/// `NonSensitive` holds a non encrypted key that is never supposed to be encrypted.
+/// `Ref` holds a reference to a key blob when it does not need to be modified if its
+/// life time allows it.
+pub enum KeyBlob<'a> {
+    Sensitive {
+        key: ZVec,
+        /// If KeyMint reports that the key must be upgraded, we must
+        /// re-encrypt the key before writing to the database; we use
+        /// this key.
+        reencrypt_with: Arc<SuperKey>,
+        /// If this key was decrypted with an ECDH key, we want to
+        /// re-encrypt it on first use whether it was upgraded or not;
+        /// this field indicates that that's necessary.
+        force_reencrypt: bool,
+    },
+    NonSensitive(Vec<u8>),
+    Ref(&'a [u8]),
+}
+
+impl<'a> KeyBlob<'a> {
+    pub fn force_reencrypt(&self) -> bool {
+        if let KeyBlob::Sensitive { force_reencrypt, .. } = self {
+            *force_reencrypt
+        } else {
+            false
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Deref returns a reference to the key material in any variant.
+impl<'a> Deref for KeyBlob<'a> {
+    type Target = [u8];
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        match self {
+            Self::Sensitive { key, .. } => &key,
+            Self::NonSensitive(key) => &key,
+            Self::Ref(key) => key,
         }
     }
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/try_insert.rs b/keystore2/src/try_insert.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dd3962
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/try_insert.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! The TryInsert trait adds to Option<T> the method
+//! get_or_try_to_insert_with, which is analogous to
+//! get_or_insert_with, but allows the called function to fail and propagates the failure.
+
+/// The TryInsert trait adds to Option<T> the method
+/// get_or_try_to_insert_with, which is analogous to
+/// get_or_insert_with, but allows the called function to fail and propagates the failure.
+pub trait TryInsert {
+    /// Type of the Ok branch of the Result
+    type Item;
+    /// Inserts a value computed from `f` into the option if it is [`None`],
+    /// then returns a mutable reference to the contained value. If `f`
+    /// returns Err, the Option is unchanged.
+    ///
+    /// # Examples
+    ///
+    /// ```
+    /// let mut x = None;
+    /// assert_eq!(x.get_or_try_to_insert_with(Err("oops".to_string())), Err("oops".to_string()))
+    /// {
+    ///     let y: &mut u32 = x.get_or_try_to_insert_with(|| Ok(5))?;
+    ///     assert_eq!(y, &5);
+    ///
+    ///     *y = 7;
+    /// }
+    ///
+    /// assert_eq!(x, Some(7));
+    /// ```
+    fn get_or_try_to_insert_with<E, F: FnOnce() -> Result<Self::Item, E>>(
+        &mut self,
+        f: F,
+    ) -> Result<&mut Self::Item, E>;
+}
+
+impl<T> TryInsert for Option<T> {
+    type Item = T;
+    fn get_or_try_to_insert_with<E, F: FnOnce() -> Result<Self::Item, E>>(
+        &mut self,
+        f: F,
+    ) -> Result<&mut Self::Item, E> {
+        if self.is_none() {
+            *self = Some(f()?);
+        }
+
+        match self {
+            Some(v) => Ok(v),
+            // SAFETY: a `None` variant for `self` would have been replaced by a `Some`
+            // variant in the code above.
+            None => unsafe { std::hint::unreachable_unchecked() },
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn fails() -> Result<i32, String> {
+        Err("fail".to_string())
+    }
+
+    fn succeeds() -> Result<i32, String> {
+        Ok(99)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test() {
+        let mut x = None;
+        assert_eq!(x.get_or_try_to_insert_with(fails), Err("fail".to_string()));
+        assert_eq!(x, None);
+        assert_eq!(*x.get_or_try_to_insert_with(succeeds).unwrap(), 99);
+        assert_eq!(x, Some(99));
+        x = Some(42);
+        assert_eq!(*x.get_or_try_to_insert_with(fails).unwrap(), 42);
+        assert_eq!(x, Some(42));
+        assert_eq!(*x.get_or_try_to_insert_with(succeeds).unwrap(), 42);
+        assert_eq!(x, Some(42));
+        *x.get_or_try_to_insert_with(fails).unwrap() = 2;
+        assert_eq!(x, Some(2));
+        *x.get_or_try_to_insert_with(succeeds).unwrap() = 3;
+        assert_eq!(x, Some(3));
+        x = None;
+        *x.get_or_try_to_insert_with(succeeds).unwrap() = 5;
+        assert_eq!(x, Some(5));
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/utils.rs b/keystore2/src/utils.rs
index 870b7fc..7b58205 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/utils.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/utils.rs
@@ -15,12 +15,13 @@
 //! This module implements utility functions used by the Keystore 2.0 service
 //! implementation.
 
-use crate::error::Error;
+use crate::error::{map_binder_status, Error, ErrorCode};
 use crate::permission;
 use crate::permission::{KeyPerm, KeyPermSet, KeystorePerm};
 use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
-    KeyCharacteristics::KeyCharacteristics, SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel, Tag::Tag,
+    KeyCharacteristics::KeyCharacteristics, Tag::Tag,
 };
+use android_os_permissions_aidl::aidl::android::os::IPermissionController;
 use android_security_apc::aidl::android::security::apc::{
     IProtectedConfirmation::{FLAG_UI_OPTION_INVERTED, FLAG_UI_OPTION_MAGNIFIED},
     ResponseCode::ResponseCode as ApcResponseCode,
@@ -88,6 +89,34 @@
     })
 }
 
+/// This function checks whether a given tag corresponds to the access of device identifiers.
+pub fn is_device_id_attestation_tag(tag: Tag) -> bool {
+    matches!(tag, Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI | Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID | Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL)
+}
+
+/// This function checks whether the calling app has the Android permissions needed to attest device
+/// identifiers. It throws an error if the permissions cannot be verified, or if the caller doesn't
+/// have the right permissions, and returns silently otherwise.
+pub fn check_device_attestation_permissions() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    let permission_controller: binder::Strong<dyn IPermissionController::IPermissionController> =
+        binder::get_interface("permission")?;
+
+    let binder_result = permission_controller.checkPermission(
+        "android.permission.READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE",
+        ThreadState::get_calling_pid(),
+        ThreadState::get_calling_uid() as i32,
+    );
+    let has_permissions = map_binder_status(binder_result)
+        .context("In check_device_attestation_permissions: checkPermission failed")?;
+    match has_permissions {
+        true => Ok(()),
+        false => Err(Error::Km(ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS)).context(concat!(
+            "In check_device_attestation_permissions: ",
+            "caller does not have the permission to attest device IDs"
+        )),
+    }
+}
+
 /// Thread safe wrapper around SpIBinder. It is safe to have SpIBinder smart pointers to the
 /// same object in multiple threads, but cloning a SpIBinder is not thread safe.
 /// Keystore frequently hands out binder tokens to the security level interface. If this
@@ -103,7 +132,7 @@
     }
 
     /// Clones the owned SpIBinder and attempts to convert it into the requested interface.
-    pub fn get_interface<T: FromIBinder + ?Sized>(&self) -> anyhow::Result<Box<T>> {
+    pub fn get_interface<T: FromIBinder + ?Sized>(&self) -> anyhow::Result<binder::Strong<T>> {
         // We can use unwrap here because we never panic when locked, so the mutex
         // can never be poisoned.
         let lock = self.0.lock().unwrap();
@@ -131,10 +160,6 @@
         .flat_map(|aidl_key_char| {
             let sec_level = aidl_key_char.securityLevel;
             aidl_key_char.authorizations.into_iter().map(move |aidl_kp| {
-                let sec_level = match (aidl_kp.tag, sec_level) {
-                    (Tag::ORIGIN, SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) => SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT,
-                    _ => sec_level,
-                };
                 crate::key_parameter::KeyParameter::new(aidl_kp.into(), sec_level)
             })
         })
@@ -190,10 +215,28 @@
 }
 
 /// AID offset for uid space partitioning.
-/// TODO: Replace with bindgen generated from libcutils. b/175619259
-pub const AID_USER_OFFSET: u32 = 100000;
+pub const AID_USER_OFFSET: u32 = cutils_bindgen::AID_USER_OFFSET;
 
 /// Extracts the android user from the given uid.
 pub fn uid_to_android_user(uid: u32) -> u32 {
-    uid / AID_USER_OFFSET
+    // Safety: No memory access
+    unsafe { cutils_bindgen::multiuser_get_user_id(uid) }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use anyhow::Result;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_device_attestation_permissions_test() -> Result<()> {
+        check_device_attestation_permissions().or_else(|error| {
+            match error.root_cause().downcast_ref::<Error>() {
+                // Expected: the context for this test might not be allowed to attest device IDs.
+                Some(Error::Km(ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS)) => Ok(()),
+                // Other errors are unexpected
+                _ => Err(error),
+            }
+        })
+    }
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/vintf/Android.bp b/keystore2/src/vintf/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..feec8ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/vintf/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
+rust_library {
+    name: "libkeystore2_vintf_rust",
+    crate_name: "keystore2_vintf",
+    srcs: ["lib.rs"],
+    rustlibs: [
+        "libkeystore2_vintf_bindgen",
+    ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "libkeystore2_vintf_cpp",
+        "libvintf",
+    ],
+}
+
+cc_library {
+    name: "libkeystore2_vintf_cpp",
+    srcs: [
+        "vintf.cpp",
+    ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "libvintf",
+    ],
+}
+
+rust_bindgen {
+    name: "libkeystore2_vintf_bindgen",
+    wrapper_src: "vintf.hpp",
+    crate_name: "keystore2_vintf_bindgen",
+    source_stem: "bindings",
+    host_supported: true,
+    shared_libs: ["libvintf"],
+    bindgen_flags: [
+        "--size_t-is-usize",
+        "--whitelist-function", "getHalNames",
+        "--whitelist-function", "getHalNamesAndVersions",
+        "--whitelist-function", "getHidlInstances",
+        "--whitelist-function", "getAidlInstances",
+        "--whitelist-function", "freeNames",
+    ],
+}
+
+rust_test {
+    name: "keystore2_vintf_test",
+    crate_name: "keystore2_vintf_test",
+    srcs: ["lib.rs"],
+    test_suites: ["general-tests"],
+    auto_gen_config: true,
+    rustlibs: [
+        "libkeystore2_vintf_bindgen",
+    ],
+    static_libs: [
+        "libkeystore2_vintf_cpp",
+    ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "libc++",
+        "libvintf",
+    ],
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/vintf/lib.rs b/keystore2/src/vintf/lib.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8730a3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/vintf/lib.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! Bindings for getting the list of HALs.
+
+use keystore2_vintf_bindgen::{
+    freeNames, getAidlInstances, getHalNames, getHalNamesAndVersions, getHidlInstances,
+};
+use std::ffi::{CStr, CString};
+use std::os::raw::c_char;
+use std::str::Utf8Error;
+
+/// A struct that contains a list of HALs (optionally with version numbers).
+/// To use it, call as_vec to get a Vec view of the data it contains.
+pub struct HalNames {
+    data: *mut *mut c_char,
+    len: usize,
+}
+
+impl Drop for HalNames {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        // Safety: The memory is allocated by our C shim so it must free it as well.
+        unsafe { freeNames(self.data, self.len) }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'a> HalNames {
+    /// Get a Vec view of the list of HALs.
+    pub fn as_vec(&'a self) -> Result<Vec<&'a str>, Utf8Error> {
+        // Safety: self.data contains self.len C strings.
+        // The lifetimes ensure that the HalNames (and hence the strings) live
+        // at least as long as the returned vector.
+        unsafe { (0..self.len).map(|i| CStr::from_ptr(*self.data.add(i)).to_str()) }.collect()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Gets all HAL names.
+/// Note that this is not a zero-cost shim: it will make copies of the strings.
+pub fn get_hal_names() -> HalNames {
+    let mut len: usize = 0;
+    // Safety: We'll wrap this in HalNames to free the memory it allocates.
+    // It stores the size of the array it returns in len.
+    let raw_strs = unsafe { getHalNames(&mut len) };
+    HalNames { data: raw_strs, len }
+}
+
+/// Gets all HAL names and versions.
+/// Note that this is not a zero-cost shim: it will make copies of the strings.
+pub fn get_hal_names_and_versions() -> HalNames {
+    let mut len: usize = 0;
+    // Safety: We'll wrap this in HalNames to free the memory it allocates.
+    // It stores the size of the array it returns in len.
+    let raw_strs = unsafe { getHalNamesAndVersions(&mut len) };
+    HalNames { data: raw_strs, len }
+}
+
+/// Gets the instances of the given package, version, and interface tuple.
+/// Note that this is not a zero-cost shim: it will make copies of the strings.
+pub fn get_hidl_instances(
+    package: &str,
+    major_version: usize,
+    minor_version: usize,
+    interface_name: &str,
+) -> HalNames {
+    let mut len: usize = 0;
+    let packages = CString::new(package).expect("Failed to make CString from package.");
+    let interface_name =
+        CString::new(interface_name).expect("Failed to make CString from interface_name.");
+    // Safety: We'll wrap this in HalNames to free the memory it allocates.
+    // It stores the size of the array it returns in len.
+    let raw_strs = unsafe {
+        getHidlInstances(
+            &mut len,
+            packages.as_ptr(),
+            major_version,
+            minor_version,
+            interface_name.as_ptr(),
+        )
+    };
+    HalNames { data: raw_strs, len }
+}
+
+/// Gets the instances of the given package, version, and interface tuple.
+/// Note that this is not a zero-cost shim: it will make copies of the strings.
+pub fn get_aidl_instances(package: &str, version: usize, interface_name: &str) -> HalNames {
+    let mut len: usize = 0;
+    let packages = CString::new(package).expect("Failed to make CString from package.");
+    let interface_name =
+        CString::new(interface_name).expect("Failed to make CString from interface_name.");
+    // Safety: We'll wrap this in HalNames to free the memory it allocates.
+    // It stores the size of the array it returns in len.
+    let raw_strs =
+        unsafe { getAidlInstances(&mut len, packages.as_ptr(), version, interface_name.as_ptr()) };
+    HalNames { data: raw_strs, len }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test() -> Result<(), Utf8Error> {
+        let result = get_hal_names();
+        let names = result.as_vec()?;
+        assert_ne!(names.len(), 0);
+
+        let result = get_hal_names_and_versions();
+        let names_and_versions = result.as_vec()?;
+        assert_ne!(names_and_versions.len(), 0);
+
+        assert!(names_and_versions.len() >= names.len());
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/vintf/vintf.cpp b/keystore2/src/vintf/vintf.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e407efa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/vintf/vintf.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "vintf.hpp"
+
+#include <vintf/HalManifest.h>
+#include <vintf/VintfObject.h>
+
+// Converts a set<string> into a C-style array of C strings.
+static char** convert(const std::set<std::string>& names) {
+    char** ret = new char*[names.size()];
+    char** ptr = ret;
+    for (const auto& name : names) {
+        *(ptr++) = strdup(name.c_str());
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+char** getHalNames(size_t* len) {
+    auto manifest = android::vintf::VintfObject::GetDeviceHalManifest();
+    const auto names = manifest->getHalNames();
+    *len = names.size();
+    return convert(names);
+}
+
+char** getHalNamesAndVersions(size_t* len) {
+    auto manifest = android::vintf::VintfObject::GetDeviceHalManifest();
+    const auto names = manifest->getHalNamesAndVersions();
+    *len = names.size();
+    return convert(names);
+}
+
+char** getHidlInstances(size_t* len, const char* package, size_t major_version,
+                        size_t minor_version, const char* interfaceName) {
+    android::vintf::Version version(major_version, minor_version);
+    auto manifest = android::vintf::VintfObject::GetDeviceHalManifest();
+    const auto names = manifest->getHidlInstances(package, version, interfaceName);
+    *len = names.size();
+    return convert(names);
+}
+
+char** getAidlInstances(size_t* len, const char* package, size_t version,
+                        const char* interfaceName) {
+    auto manifest = android::vintf::VintfObject::GetDeviceHalManifest();
+    const auto names = manifest->getAidlInstances(package, version, interfaceName);
+    *len = names.size();
+    return convert(names);
+}
+
+void freeNames(char** names, size_t len) {
+    for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+        free(names[i]);
+    }
+    delete[] names;
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/vintf/vintf.hpp b/keystore2/src/vintf/vintf.hpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..091e8e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/src/vintf/vintf.hpp
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __VINTF_H__
+#define __VINTF_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+char** getHalNames(size_t* len);
+char** getHalNamesAndVersions(size_t* len);
+char** getHidlInstances(size_t* len, const char* package, size_t major_version,
+                        size_t minor_version, const char* interfaceName);
+char** getAidlInstances(size_t* len, const char* package, size_t version,
+                        const char* interfaceName);
+void freeNames(char** names, size_t len);
+}
+
+#endif  //  __VINTF_H__
diff --git a/keystore2/system_property/Android.bp b/keystore2/system_property/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a13c90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/system_property/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
+rust_bindgen {
+    name: "libkeystore2_system_property_bindgen",
+    wrapper_src: "system_property_bindgen.hpp",
+    crate_name: "keystore2_system_property_bindgen",
+    source_stem: "bindings",
+
+    bindgen_flags: [
+        "--size_t-is-usize",
+        "--whitelist-function=__system_property_find",
+        "--whitelist-function=__system_property_read_callback",
+        "--whitelist-function=__system_property_wait",
+    ],
+}
+
+rust_library {
+    name: "libkeystore2_system_property-rust",
+    crate_name: "keystore2_system_property",
+    srcs: [
+        "lib.rs",
+    ],
+    rustlibs: [
+        "libanyhow",
+        "libkeystore2_system_property_bindgen",
+        "libthiserror",
+    ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "libbase",
+    ],
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/system_property/lib.rs b/keystore2/system_property/lib.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f14cf0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/system_property/lib.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! This crate provides the PropertyWatcher type, which watches for changes
+//! in Android system properties.
+
+use std::os::raw::c_char;
+use std::ptr::null_mut;
+use std::{
+    ffi::{c_void, CStr, CString},
+    str::Utf8Error,
+};
+use thiserror::Error;
+
+/// Errors this crate can generate
+#[derive(Error, Debug)]
+pub enum PropertyWatcherError {
+    /// We can't watch for a property whose name contains a NUL character.
+    #[error("Cannot convert name to C string")]
+    BadNameError(#[from] std::ffi::NulError),
+    /// We can only watch for properties that exist when the watcher is created.
+    #[error("System property is absent")]
+    SystemPropertyAbsent,
+    /// __system_property_wait timed out despite being given no timeout.
+    #[error("Wait failed")]
+    WaitFailed,
+    /// read callback was not called
+    #[error("__system_property_read_callback did not call callback")]
+    ReadCallbackNotCalled,
+    /// read callback gave us a NULL pointer
+    #[error("__system_property_read_callback gave us a NULL pointer instead of a string")]
+    MissingCString,
+    /// read callback gave us a bad C string
+    #[error("__system_property_read_callback gave us a non-UTF8 C string")]
+    BadCString(#[from] Utf8Error),
+    /// read callback returned an error
+    #[error("Callback failed")]
+    CallbackError(#[from] anyhow::Error),
+}
+
+/// Result type specific for this crate.
+pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, PropertyWatcherError>;
+
+/// PropertyWatcher takes the name of an Android system property such
+/// as `keystore.boot_level`; it can report the current value of this
+/// property, or wait for it to change.
+pub struct PropertyWatcher {
+    prop_info: *const keystore2_system_property_bindgen::prop_info,
+    serial: keystore2_system_property_bindgen::__uint32_t,
+}
+
+impl PropertyWatcher {
+    /// Create a PropertyWatcher for the named system property.
+    pub fn new(name: &str) -> Result<Self> {
+        let cstr = CString::new(name)?;
+        // Unsafe FFI call. We generate the CStr in this function
+        // and so ensure it is valid during call.
+        // Returned pointer is valid for the lifetime of the program.
+        let prop_info =
+            unsafe { keystore2_system_property_bindgen::__system_property_find(cstr.as_ptr()) };
+        if prop_info.is_null() {
+            Err(PropertyWatcherError::SystemPropertyAbsent)
+        } else {
+            Ok(Self { prop_info, serial: 0 })
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn read_raw(&self, mut f: impl FnOnce(Option<&CStr>, Option<&CStr>)) {
+        // Unsafe function converts values passed to us by
+        // __system_property_read_callback to Rust form
+        // and pass them to inner callback.
+        unsafe extern "C" fn callback(
+            res_p: *mut c_void,
+            name: *const c_char,
+            value: *const c_char,
+            _: keystore2_system_property_bindgen::__uint32_t,
+        ) {
+            let name = if name.is_null() { None } else { Some(CStr::from_ptr(name)) };
+            let value = if value.is_null() { None } else { Some(CStr::from_ptr(value)) };
+            let f = &mut *res_p.cast::<&mut dyn FnMut(Option<&CStr>, Option<&CStr>)>();
+            f(name, value);
+        }
+
+        let mut f: &mut dyn FnOnce(Option<&CStr>, Option<&CStr>) = &mut f;
+
+        // Unsafe block for FFI call. We convert the FnOnce
+        // to a void pointer, and unwrap it in our callback.
+        unsafe {
+            keystore2_system_property_bindgen::__system_property_read_callback(
+                self.prop_info,
+                Some(callback),
+                &mut f as *mut _ as *mut c_void,
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Call the passed function, passing it the name and current value
+    /// of this system property. See documentation for
+    /// `__system_property_read_callback` for details.
+    pub fn read<T, F>(&self, f: F) -> Result<T>
+    where
+        F: FnOnce(&str, &str) -> anyhow::Result<T>,
+    {
+        let mut result = Err(PropertyWatcherError::ReadCallbackNotCalled);
+        self.read_raw(|name, value| {
+            // use a wrapping closure as an erzatz try block.
+            result = (|| {
+                let name = name.ok_or(PropertyWatcherError::MissingCString)?.to_str()?;
+                let value = value.ok_or(PropertyWatcherError::MissingCString)?.to_str()?;
+                f(name, value).map_err(PropertyWatcherError::CallbackError)
+            })()
+        });
+        result
+    }
+
+    /// Wait for the system property to change. This
+    /// records the serial number of the last change, so
+    /// race conditions are avoided.
+    pub fn wait(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
+        let mut new_serial = self.serial;
+        // Unsafe block to call __system_property_wait.
+        // All arguments are private to PropertyWatcher so we
+        // can be confident they are valid.
+        if !unsafe {
+            keystore2_system_property_bindgen::__system_property_wait(
+                self.prop_info,
+                self.serial,
+                &mut new_serial,
+                null_mut(),
+            )
+        } {
+            return Err(PropertyWatcherError::WaitFailed);
+        }
+        self.serial = new_serial;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/system_property/system_property_bindgen.hpp b/keystore2/system_property/system_property_bindgen.hpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3c1ade
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/system_property/system_property_bindgen.hpp
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+#pragma once
+
+#include "sys/system_properties.h"
diff --git a/keystore2/vpnprofilestore/Android.bp b/keystore2/vpnprofilestore/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ddf0d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/vpnprofilestore/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+// Copyright 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
+rust_library {
+    name: "libvpnprofilestore-rust",
+    crate_name: "vpnprofilestore",
+    srcs: [
+        "lib.rs",
+    ],
+    rustlibs: [
+        "android.security.vpnprofilestore-rust",
+        "libanyhow",
+        "libbinder_rs",
+        "libkeystore2",
+        "liblog_rust",
+        "librusqlite",
+        "libthiserror",
+    ],
+}
+
+rust_test {
+    name: "vpnprofilestore_test",
+    crate_name: "vpnprofilestore",
+    srcs: ["lib.rs"],
+    test_suites: ["general-tests"],
+    auto_gen_config: true,
+    rustlibs: [
+        "android.security.vpnprofilestore-rust",
+        "libanyhow",
+        "libbinder_rs",
+        "libkeystore2",
+        "libkeystore2_test_utils",
+        "liblog_rust",
+        "librusqlite",
+        "libthiserror",
+    ],
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/vpnprofilestore/lib.rs b/keystore2/vpnprofilestore/lib.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f92eacd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystore2/vpnprofilestore/lib.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+// Copyright 2020, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! Implements the android.security.vpnprofilestore interface.
+
+use android_security_vpnprofilestore::aidl::android::security::vpnprofilestore::{
+    IVpnProfileStore::BnVpnProfileStore, IVpnProfileStore::IVpnProfileStore,
+    IVpnProfileStore::ERROR_PROFILE_NOT_FOUND, IVpnProfileStore::ERROR_SYSTEM_ERROR,
+};
+use android_security_vpnprofilestore::binder::{Result as BinderResult, Status as BinderStatus};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use binder::{ExceptionCode, Strong, ThreadState};
+use keystore2::{async_task::AsyncTask, legacy_blob::LegacyBlobLoader};
+use rusqlite::{
+    params, Connection, OptionalExtension, Transaction, TransactionBehavior, NO_PARAMS,
+};
+use std::{
+    collections::HashSet,
+    path::{Path, PathBuf},
+};
+
+struct DB {
+    conn: Connection,
+}
+
+impl DB {
+    fn new(db_file: &Path) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut db = Self {
+            conn: Connection::open(db_file).context("Failed to initialize SQLite connection.")?,
+        };
+        db.init_tables().context("Trying to initialize vpnstore db.")?;
+        Ok(db)
+    }
+
+    fn with_transaction<T, F>(&mut self, behavior: TransactionBehavior, f: F) -> Result<T>
+    where
+        F: Fn(&Transaction) -> Result<T>,
+    {
+        loop {
+            match self
+                .conn
+                .transaction_with_behavior(behavior)
+                .context("In with_transaction.")
+                .and_then(|tx| f(&tx).map(|result| (result, tx)))
+                .and_then(|(result, tx)| {
+                    tx.commit().context("In with_transaction: Failed to commit transaction.")?;
+                    Ok(result)
+                }) {
+                Ok(result) => break Ok(result),
+                Err(e) => {
+                    if Self::is_locked_error(&e) {
+                        std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_micros(500));
+                        continue;
+                    } else {
+                        return Err(e).context("In with_transaction.");
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn is_locked_error(e: &anyhow::Error) -> bool {
+        matches!(e.root_cause().downcast_ref::<rusqlite::ffi::Error>(),
+        Some(rusqlite::ffi::Error {
+            code: rusqlite::ErrorCode::DatabaseBusy,
+            ..
+        })
+        | Some(rusqlite::ffi::Error {
+            code: rusqlite::ErrorCode::DatabaseLocked,
+            ..
+        }))
+    }
+
+    fn init_tables(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            tx.execute(
+                "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS profiles (
+                     owner INTEGER,
+                     alias BLOB,
+                     profile BLOB,
+                     UNIQUE(owner, alias));",
+                NO_PARAMS,
+            )
+            .context("Failed to initialize \"profiles\" table.")?;
+            Ok(())
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn list(&mut self, caller_uid: u32) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Deferred, |tx| {
+            let mut stmt = tx
+                .prepare("SELECT alias FROM profiles WHERE owner = ? ORDER BY alias ASC;")
+                .context("In list: Failed to prepare statement.")?;
+
+            let aliases = stmt
+                .query_map(params![caller_uid], |row| row.get(0))?
+                .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<String>>>()
+                .context("In list: query_map failed.");
+            aliases
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn put(&mut self, caller_uid: u32, alias: &str, profile: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            tx.execute(
+                "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO profiles (owner, alias, profile) values (?, ?, ?)",
+                params![caller_uid, alias, profile,],
+            )
+            .context("In put: Failed to insert or replace.")?;
+            Ok(())
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn get(&mut self, caller_uid: u32, alias: &str) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
+        self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Deferred, |tx| {
+            tx.query_row(
+                "SELECT profile FROM profiles WHERE owner = ? AND alias = ?;",
+                params![caller_uid, alias],
+                |row| row.get(0),
+            )
+            .optional()
+            .context("In get: failed loading profile.")
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn remove(&mut self, caller_uid: u32, alias: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+        let removed = self.with_transaction(TransactionBehavior::Immediate, |tx| {
+            tx.execute(
+                "DELETE FROM profiles WHERE owner = ? AND alias = ?;",
+                params![caller_uid, alias],
+            )
+            .context("In remove: Failed to delete row.")
+        })?;
+        Ok(removed == 1)
+    }
+}
+
+/// This is the main VpnProfileStore error type, it wraps binder exceptions and the
+/// VnpStore errors.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, PartialEq)]
+pub enum Error {
+    /// Wraps a VpnProfileStore error code.
+    #[error("Error::Error({0:?})")]
+    Error(i32),
+    /// Wraps a Binder exception code other than a service specific exception.
+    #[error("Binder exception code {0:?}, {1:?}")]
+    Binder(ExceptionCode, i32),
+}
+
+impl Error {
+    /// Short hand for `Error::Error(ERROR_SYSTEM_ERROR)`
+    pub fn sys() -> Self {
+        Error::Error(ERROR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+    }
+
+    /// Short hand for `Error::Error(ERROR_PROFILE_NOT_FOUND)`
+    pub fn not_found() -> Self {
+        Error::Error(ERROR_PROFILE_NOT_FOUND)
+    }
+}
+
+/// This function should be used by vpnprofilestore service calls to translate error conditions
+/// into service specific exceptions.
+///
+/// All error conditions get logged by this function.
+///
+/// `Error::Error(x)` variants get mapped onto a service specific error code of `x`.
+///
+/// All non `Error` error conditions get mapped onto `ERROR_SYSTEM_ERROR`.
+///
+/// `handle_ok` will be called if `result` is `Ok(value)` where `value` will be passed
+/// as argument to `handle_ok`. `handle_ok` must generate a `BinderResult<T>`, but it
+/// typically returns Ok(value).
+fn map_or_log_err<T, U, F>(result: Result<U>, handle_ok: F) -> BinderResult<T>
+where
+    F: FnOnce(U) -> BinderResult<T>,
+{
+    result.map_or_else(
+        |e| {
+            log::error!("{:#?}", e);
+            let root_cause = e.root_cause();
+            let rc = match root_cause.downcast_ref::<Error>() {
+                Some(Error::Error(e)) => *e,
+                Some(Error::Binder(_, _)) | None => ERROR_SYSTEM_ERROR,
+            };
+            Err(BinderStatus::new_service_specific_error(rc, None))
+        },
+        handle_ok,
+    )
+}
+
+/// Implements IVpnProfileStore AIDL interface.
+pub struct VpnProfileStore {
+    db_path: PathBuf,
+    async_task: AsyncTask,
+}
+
+struct AsyncState {
+    recently_imported: HashSet<(u32, String)>,
+    legacy_loader: LegacyBlobLoader,
+    db_path: PathBuf,
+}
+
+impl VpnProfileStore {
+    /// Creates a new VpnProfileStore instance.
+    pub fn new_native_binder(path: &Path) -> Strong<dyn IVpnProfileStore> {
+        let mut db_path = path.to_path_buf();
+        db_path.push("vpnprofilestore.sqlite");
+
+        let result = Self { db_path, async_task: Default::default() };
+        result.init_shelf(path);
+        BnVpnProfileStore::new_binder(result)
+    }
+
+    fn open_db(&self) -> Result<DB> {
+        DB::new(&self.db_path).context("In open_db: Failed to open db.")
+    }
+
+    fn get(&self, alias: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let mut db = self.open_db().context("In get.")?;
+        let calling_uid = ThreadState::get_calling_uid();
+
+        if let Some(profile) =
+            db.get(calling_uid, alias).context("In get: Trying to load profile from DB.")?
+        {
+            return Ok(profile);
+        }
+        if self.get_legacy(calling_uid, alias).context("In get: Trying to migrate legacy blob.")? {
+            // If we were able to migrate a legacy blob try again.
+            if let Some(profile) =
+                db.get(calling_uid, alias).context("In get: Trying to load profile from DB.")?
+            {
+                return Ok(profile);
+            }
+        }
+        Err(Error::not_found()).context("In get: No such profile.")
+    }
+
+    fn put(&self, alias: &str, profile: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+        let calling_uid = ThreadState::get_calling_uid();
+        // In order to make sure that we don't have stale legacy profiles, make sure they are
+        // migrated before replacing them.
+        let _ = self.get_legacy(calling_uid, alias);
+        let mut db = self.open_db().context("In put.")?;
+        db.put(calling_uid, alias, profile).context("In put: Trying to insert profile into DB.")
+    }
+
+    fn remove(&self, alias: &str) -> Result<()> {
+        let calling_uid = ThreadState::get_calling_uid();
+        let mut db = self.open_db().context("In remove.")?;
+        // In order to make sure that we don't have stale legacy profiles, make sure they are
+        // migrated before removing them.
+        let _ = self.get_legacy(calling_uid, alias);
+        let removed = db
+            .remove(calling_uid, alias)
+            .context("In remove: Trying to remove profile from DB.")?;
+        if removed {
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            Err(Error::not_found()).context("In remove: No such profile.")
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn list(&self, prefix: &str) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+        let mut db = self.open_db().context("In list.")?;
+        let calling_uid = ThreadState::get_calling_uid();
+        let mut result = self.list_legacy(calling_uid).context("In list.")?;
+        result
+            .append(&mut db.list(calling_uid).context("In list: Trying to get list of profiles.")?);
+        result = result.into_iter().filter(|s| s.starts_with(prefix)).collect();
+        result.sort_unstable();
+        result.dedup();
+        Ok(result)
+    }
+
+    fn init_shelf(&self, path: &Path) {
+        let mut db_path = path.to_path_buf();
+        self.async_task.queue_hi(move |shelf| {
+            let legacy_loader = LegacyBlobLoader::new(&db_path);
+            db_path.push("vpnprofilestore.sqlite");
+
+            shelf.put(AsyncState { legacy_loader, db_path, recently_imported: Default::default() });
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn do_serialized<F, T: Send + 'static>(&self, f: F) -> Result<T>
+    where
+        F: FnOnce(&mut AsyncState) -> Result<T> + Send + 'static,
+    {
+        let (sender, receiver) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::<Result<T>>();
+        self.async_task.queue_hi(move |shelf| {
+            let state = shelf.get_downcast_mut::<AsyncState>().expect("Failed to get shelf.");
+            sender.send(f(state)).expect("Failed to send result.");
+        });
+        receiver.recv().context("In do_serialized: Failed to receive result.")?
+    }
+
+    fn list_legacy(&self, uid: u32) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+        self.do_serialized(move |state| {
+            state
+                .legacy_loader
+                .list_vpn_profiles(uid)
+                .context("Trying to list legacy vnp profiles.")
+        })
+        .context("In list_legacy.")
+    }
+
+    fn get_legacy(&self, uid: u32, alias: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+        let alias = alias.to_string();
+        self.do_serialized(move |state| {
+            if state.recently_imported.contains(&(uid, alias.clone())) {
+                return Ok(true);
+            }
+            let mut db = DB::new(&state.db_path).context("In open_db: Failed to open db.")?;
+            let migrated =
+                Self::migrate_one_legacy_profile(uid, &alias, &state.legacy_loader, &mut db)
+                    .context("Trying to migrate legacy vpn profile.")?;
+            if migrated {
+                state.recently_imported.insert((uid, alias));
+            }
+            Ok(migrated)
+        })
+        .context("In get_legacy.")
+    }
+
+    fn migrate_one_legacy_profile(
+        uid: u32,
+        alias: &str,
+        legacy_loader: &LegacyBlobLoader,
+        db: &mut DB,
+    ) -> Result<bool> {
+        let blob = legacy_loader
+            .read_vpn_profile(uid, alias)
+            .context("In migrate_one_legacy_profile: Trying to read legacy vpn profile.")?;
+        if let Some(profile) = blob {
+            db.put(uid, alias, &profile)
+                .context("In migrate_one_legacy_profile: Trying to insert profile into DB.")?;
+            legacy_loader
+                .remove_vpn_profile(uid, alias)
+                .context("In migrate_one_legacy_profile: Trying to delete legacy profile.")?;
+            Ok(true)
+        } else {
+            Ok(false)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl binder::Interface for VpnProfileStore {}
+
+impl IVpnProfileStore for VpnProfileStore {
+    fn get(&self, alias: &str) -> BinderResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.get(alias), Ok)
+    }
+    fn put(&self, alias: &str, profile: &[u8]) -> BinderResult<()> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.put(alias, profile), Ok)
+    }
+    fn remove(&self, alias: &str) -> BinderResult<()> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.remove(alias), Ok)
+    }
+    fn list(&self, prefix: &str) -> BinderResult<Vec<String>> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.list(prefix), Ok)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod db_test {
+    use super::*;
+    use keystore2_test_utils::TempDir;
+
+    static TEST_BLOB1: &[u8] = &[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0];
+    static TEST_BLOB2: &[u8] = &[2, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0];
+    static TEST_BLOB3: &[u8] = &[3, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0];
+    static TEST_BLOB4: &[u8] = &[3, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0];
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_profile_db() {
+        let test_dir = TempDir::new("profiledb_test_").expect("Failed to create temp dir.");
+        let mut db =
+            DB::new(&test_dir.build().push("vpnprofile.sqlite")).expect("Failed to open database.");
+
+        // Insert three profiles for owner 2.
+        db.put(2, "test1", TEST_BLOB1).expect("Failed to insert test1.");
+        db.put(2, "test2", TEST_BLOB2).expect("Failed to insert test2.");
+        db.put(2, "test3", TEST_BLOB3).expect("Failed to insert test3.");
+
+        // Check list returns all inserted aliases.
+        assert_eq!(
+            vec!["test1".to_string(), "test2".to_string(), "test3".to_string(),],
+            db.list(2).expect("Failed to list profiles.")
+        );
+
+        // There should be no profiles for owner 1.
+        assert_eq!(Vec::<String>::new(), db.list(1).expect("Failed to list profiles."));
+
+        // Check the content of the three entries.
+        assert_eq!(
+            Some(TEST_BLOB1),
+            db.get(2, "test1").expect("Failed to get profile.").as_deref()
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            Some(TEST_BLOB2),
+            db.get(2, "test2").expect("Failed to get profile.").as_deref()
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            Some(TEST_BLOB3),
+            db.get(2, "test3").expect("Failed to get profile.").as_deref()
+        );
+
+        // Remove test2 and check and check that it is no longer retrievable.
+        assert!(db.remove(2, "test2").expect("Failed to remove profile."));
+        assert!(db.get(2, "test2").expect("Failed to get profile.").is_none());
+
+        // test2 should now no longer be in the list.
+        assert_eq!(
+            vec!["test1".to_string(), "test3".to_string(),],
+            db.list(2).expect("Failed to list profiles.")
+        );
+
+        // Put on existing alias replaces it.
+        // Verify test1 is TEST_BLOB1.
+        assert_eq!(
+            Some(TEST_BLOB1),
+            db.get(2, "test1").expect("Failed to get profile.").as_deref()
+        );
+        db.put(2, "test1", TEST_BLOB4).expect("Failed to replace test1.");
+        // Verify test1 is TEST_BLOB4.
+        assert_eq!(
+            Some(TEST_BLOB4),
+            db.get(2, "test1").expect("Failed to get profile.").as_deref()
+        );
+    }
+}
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/Android.bp b/ondevice-signing/Android.bp
index 8da28f2..2e5e02e 100644
--- a/ondevice-signing/Android.bp
+++ b/ondevice-signing/Android.bp
@@ -14,10 +14,18 @@
 // List of clang-tidy checks that are reported as errors.
 // Please keep this list ordered lexicographically.
 
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 tidy_errors = [
   "cert-err34-c",
   "google-default-arguments",
-  "google-explicit-constructor",
   "google-runtime-int",
   "google-runtime-member-string-references",
   "misc-move-const-arg",
@@ -62,7 +70,7 @@
   tidy_checks: tidy_errors,
   tidy_checks_as_errors: tidy_errors,
   tidy_flags: [
-    "-format-style='file'",
+    "-format-style=file",
   ],
 }
 
@@ -78,17 +86,24 @@
     "CertUtils.cpp",
     "Keymaster.cpp",
     "KeymasterSigningKey.cpp",
+    "KeystoreKey.cpp",
     "VerityUtils.cpp",
   ],
 
+  header_libs: ["odrefresh_headers"],
+
   static_libs: [
     "libmini_keyctl_static", // TODO need static?
     "libc++fs",
+    "lib_odsign_proto",
   ],
 
   shared_libs: [
     "android.hardware.keymaster@4.1",
+    "android.system.keystore2-V1-cpp",
+    "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-cpp",
     "libbase",
+    "libbinder",
     "libcrypto",
     "libcrypto_utils",
     "libfsverity",
@@ -97,6 +112,7 @@
     "libkeymaster4support", // For authorization_set
     "libkeymaster4_1support",
     "libkeyutils",
+    "libprotobuf-cpp-full",
     "libutils",
   ],
 }
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/CertUtils.cpp b/ondevice-signing/CertUtils.cpp
index 6b24391..b0b75a6 100644
--- a/ondevice-signing/CertUtils.cpp
+++ b/ondevice-signing/CertUtils.cpp
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
 
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <vector>
+
+#include "KeyConstants.h"
+
 const char kBasicConstraints[] = "CA:TRUE";
 const char kKeyUsage[] = "critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign,digitalSignature";
 const char kSubjectKeyIdentifier[] = "hash";
@@ -52,6 +55,33 @@
     return true;
 }
 
+Result<bssl::UniquePtr<RSA>> getRsa(const std::vector<uint8_t>& publicKey) {
+    bssl::UniquePtr<RSA> rsaPubkey(RSA_new());
+    rsaPubkey->n = BN_new();
+    rsaPubkey->e = BN_new();
+
+    BN_bin2bn(publicKey.data(), publicKey.size(), rsaPubkey->n);
+    BN_set_word(rsaPubkey->e, kRsaKeyExponent);
+
+    return rsaPubkey;
+}
+
+Result<void> verifySignature(const std::string& message, const std::string& signature,
+                             const std::vector<uint8_t>& publicKey) {
+    auto rsaKey = getRsa(publicKey);
+    uint8_t hashBuf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    SHA256(const_cast<uint8_t*>(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(message.c_str())),
+           message.length(), hashBuf);
+
+    bool success = RSA_verify(NID_sha256, hashBuf, sizeof(hashBuf),
+                              (const uint8_t*)signature.c_str(), signature.length(), rsaKey->get());
+
+    if (!success) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to verify signature.";
+    }
+    return {};
+}
+
 Result<void> createSelfSignedCertificate(
     const std::vector<uint8_t>& publicKey,
     const std::function<Result<std::string>(const std::string&)>& signFunction,
@@ -66,8 +96,13 @@
     X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509.get()), 0);
     X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509.get()), kCertLifetimeSeconds);
 
-    auto pubKeyData = publicKey.data();
-    EVP_PKEY* public_key = d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &pubKeyData, publicKey.size());
+    // "publicKey" corresponds to the raw public key bytes - need to create
+    // a new RSA key with the correct exponent.
+    auto rsaPubkey = getRsa(publicKey);
+
+    EVP_PKEY* public_key = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(public_key, rsaPubkey->release());
+
     if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509.get(), public_key)) {
         return Error() << "Unable to set x509 public key";
     }
@@ -112,11 +147,14 @@
 
     x509->signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
     x509->signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
-    auto f = fopen(path.c_str(), "wb");
-    // TODO error checking
+    auto f = fopen(path.c_str(), "wbe");
+    if (f == nullptr) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to open " << path;
+    }
     i2d_X509_fp(f, x509.get());
     fclose(f);
 
+    EVP_PKEY_free(public_key);
     return {};
 }
 
@@ -142,17 +180,33 @@
     return pubKey;
 }
 
-Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> extractPublicKeyFromX509(const std::vector<uint8_t>& keyData) {
+Result<std::vector<uint8_t>>
+extractPublicKeyFromSubjectPublicKeyInfo(const std::vector<uint8_t>& keyData) {
     auto keyDataBytes = keyData.data();
     EVP_PKEY* public_key = d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &keyDataBytes, keyData.size());
 
     return extractPublicKey(public_key);
 }
 
+Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> extractPublicKeyFromX509(const std::vector<uint8_t>& keyData) {
+    auto keyDataBytes = keyData.data();
+    bssl::UniquePtr<X509> decoded_cert(d2i_X509(nullptr, &keyDataBytes, keyData.size()));
+    if (decoded_cert.get() == nullptr) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to decode X509 certificate.";
+    }
+    bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> decoded_pkey(X509_get_pubkey(decoded_cert.get()));
+
+    return extractPublicKey(decoded_pkey.get());
+}
+
 Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> extractPublicKeyFromX509(const std::string& path) {
     X509* cert;
-    auto f = fopen(path.c_str(), "r");
+    auto f = fopen(path.c_str(), "re");
+    if (f == nullptr) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to open " << path;
+    }
     if (!d2i_X509_fp(f, &cert)) {
+        fclose(f);
         return Error() << "Unable to decode x509 cert at " << path;
     }
 
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/CertUtils.h b/ondevice-signing/CertUtils.h
index d9172d0..66dff04 100644
--- a/ondevice-signing/CertUtils.h
+++ b/ondevice-signing/CertUtils.h
@@ -25,5 +25,11 @@
 android::base::Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> createPkcs7(const std::vector<uint8_t>& signedData);
 
 android::base::Result<std::vector<uint8_t>>
-extractPublicKeyFromX509(const std::vector<uint8_t>& path);
+extractPublicKeyFromX509(const std::vector<uint8_t>& x509);
+android::base::Result<std::vector<uint8_t>>
+extractPublicKeyFromSubjectPublicKeyInfo(const std::vector<uint8_t>& subjectKeyInfo);
 android::base::Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> extractPublicKeyFromX509(const std::string& path);
+
+android::base::Result<void> verifySignature(const std::string& message,
+                                            const std::string& signature,
+                                            const std::vector<uint8_t>& publicKey);
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/KeyConstants.h b/ondevice-signing/KeyConstants.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e1a513
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ondevice-signing/KeyConstants.h
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+static constexpr int kRsaKeySize = 2048;
+static constexpr int kRsaKeyExponent = 65537;
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/Keymaster.cpp b/ondevice-signing/Keymaster.cpp
index d43828a..6cfb565 100644
--- a/ondevice-signing/Keymaster.cpp
+++ b/ondevice-signing/Keymaster.cpp
@@ -66,9 +66,12 @@
         }
     }
 
+    if (devToUse == nullptr) {
+        LOG(WARNING) << "Didn't find a keymaster to use.";
+    }
     mDevice = devToUse;
 
-    return true;
+    return mDevice != nullptr;
 }
 
 std::optional<Keymaster> Keymaster::getInstance() {
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/KeymasterSigningKey.cpp b/ondevice-signing/KeymasterSigningKey.cpp
index f35f92b..dc3ef8a 100644
--- a/ondevice-signing/KeymasterSigningKey.cpp
+++ b/ondevice-signing/KeymasterSigningKey.cpp
@@ -33,45 +33,21 @@
 using android::base::Result;
 using android::base::unique_fd;
 
+const std::string kSigningKeyBlob = "/data/misc/odsign/key.blob";
+
 KeymasterSigningKey::KeymasterSigningKey() {}
 
-Result<KeymasterSigningKey> KeymasterSigningKey::loadFromBlobAndVerify(const std::string& path) {
-    KeymasterSigningKey signingKey;
+Result<std::unique_ptr<KeymasterSigningKey>>
+KeymasterSigningKey::loadFromBlobAndVerify(const std::string& path) {
+    auto signingKey = std::make_unique<KeymasterSigningKey>();
 
-    auto status = signingKey.initializeFromKeyblob(path);
+    auto status = signingKey->initializeFromKeyblob(path);
 
     if (!status.ok()) {
         return status.error();
     }
 
-    return std::move(signingKey);
-}
-
-Result<KeymasterSigningKey> KeymasterSigningKey::createNewKey() {
-    KeymasterSigningKey signingKey;
-
-    auto status = signingKey.createSigningKey();
-
-    if (!status.ok()) {
-        return status.error();
-    }
-
-    return std::move(signingKey);
-}
-
-Result<void> KeymasterSigningKey::createSigningKey() {
-    KeymasterSigningKey signingKey;
-    mKeymaster = Keymaster::getInstance();
-
-    auto keyBlob = mKeymaster->createKey();
-
-    if (!keyBlob.ok()) {
-        return keyBlob.error();
-    }
-
-    mVerifiedKeyBlob.assign(keyBlob->begin(), keyBlob->end());
-
-    return {};
+    return signingKey;
 }
 
 Result<void> KeymasterSigningKey::saveKeyblob(const std::string& path) const {
@@ -89,31 +65,73 @@
     }
 }
 
-Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> KeymasterSigningKey::getPublicKey() const {
-    auto publicKeyX509 = mKeymaster->extractPublicKey(mVerifiedKeyBlob);
-    if (!publicKeyX509.ok()) {
-        return publicKeyX509.error();
+Result<void> KeymasterSigningKey::createSigningKey() {
+    KeymasterSigningKey signingKey;
+    auto keymaster = Keymaster::getInstance();
+    if (!keymaster.has_value()) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to initialize keymaster.";
     }
-    return extractPublicKeyFromX509(publicKeyX509.value());
+    mKeymaster = keymaster;
+
+    auto keyBlob = mKeymaster->createKey();
+
+    if (!keyBlob.ok()) {
+        return keyBlob.error();
+    }
+
+    mVerifiedKeyBlob.assign(keyBlob->begin(), keyBlob->end());
+
+    return {};
 }
 
-Result<void> KeymasterSigningKey::createX509Cert(const std::string& outPath) const {
-    auto publicKey = mKeymaster->extractPublicKey(mVerifiedKeyBlob);
+Result<std::unique_ptr<KeymasterSigningKey>> KeymasterSigningKey::createAndPersistNewKey() {
+    auto signingKey = std::make_unique<KeymasterSigningKey>();
 
+    auto status = signingKey->createSigningKey();
+
+    if (!status.ok()) {
+        return status.error();
+    }
+
+    status = signingKey->saveKeyblob(kSigningKeyBlob);
+    if (!status.ok()) {
+        return status.error();
+    }
+
+    return signingKey;
+}
+
+Result<SigningKey*> KeymasterSigningKey::getInstance() {
+    auto key = loadFromBlobAndVerify(kSigningKeyBlob);
+
+    if (!key.ok()) {
+        key = createAndPersistNewKey();
+        if (!key.ok()) {
+            return key.error();
+        }
+    }
+
+    return key->release();
+}
+
+Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> KeymasterSigningKey::getPublicKey() const {
+    auto publicKey = mKeymaster->extractPublicKey(mVerifiedKeyBlob);
     if (!publicKey.ok()) {
         return publicKey.error();
     }
 
-    auto keymasterSignFunction = [&](const std::string& to_be_signed) {
-        return this->sign(to_be_signed);
-    };
-    createSelfSignedCertificate(*publicKey, keymasterSignFunction, outPath);
-    return {};
+    // Keymaster returns the public key not in a full X509 cert, but just the
+    // "SubjectPublicKeyInfo"
+    return extractPublicKeyFromSubjectPublicKeyInfo(publicKey.value());
 }
 
 Result<void> KeymasterSigningKey::initializeFromKeyblob(const std::string& path) {
-    mKeymaster = Keymaster::getInstance();
     std::string keyBlobData;
+    auto keymaster = Keymaster::getInstance();
+    if (!keymaster.has_value()) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to initialize keymaster.";
+    }
+    mKeymaster = keymaster;
 
     bool result = ReadFileToString(path, &keyBlobData);
     if (!result) {
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/KeymasterSigningKey.h b/ondevice-signing/KeymasterSigningKey.h
index 7631059..e66781f 100644
--- a/ondevice-signing/KeymasterSigningKey.h
+++ b/ondevice-signing/KeymasterSigningKey.h
@@ -23,30 +23,36 @@
 #include <utils/StrongPointer.h>
 
 #include "Keymaster.h"
+#include "SigningKey.h"
 
-class KeymasterSigningKey {
+class KeymasterSigningKey : public SigningKey {
     using KmDevice = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1::IKeymasterDevice;
 
   public:
+    friend std::unique_ptr<KeymasterSigningKey> std::make_unique<KeymasterSigningKey>();
+    virtual ~KeymasterSigningKey(){};
+
     // Allow the key to be moved around
     KeymasterSigningKey& operator=(KeymasterSigningKey&& other) = default;
     KeymasterSigningKey(KeymasterSigningKey&& other) = default;
 
-    static android::base::Result<KeymasterSigningKey>
-    loadFromBlobAndVerify(const std::string& path);
-    static android::base::Result<KeymasterSigningKey> createNewKey();
+    static android::base::Result<SigningKey*> getInstance();
 
-    /* Sign a message with an initialized signing key */
-    android::base::Result<std::string> sign(const std::string& message) const;
-    android::base::Result<void> saveKeyblob(const std::string& path) const;
-    android::base::Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> getPublicKey() const;
-    android::base::Result<void> createX509Cert(const std::string& path) const;
+    virtual android::base::Result<std::string> sign(const std::string& message) const;
+    virtual android::base::Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> getPublicKey() const;
 
   private:
     KeymasterSigningKey();
 
+    static android::base::Result<std::unique_ptr<KeymasterSigningKey>> createAndPersistNewKey();
+    static android::base::Result<std::unique_ptr<KeymasterSigningKey>>
+    loadFromBlobAndVerify(const std::string& path);
+
     android::base::Result<void> createSigningKey();
     android::base::Result<void> initializeFromKeyblob(const std::string& path);
+    android::base::Result<void> saveKeyblob(const std::string& path) const;
+
+    static android::base::Result<KeymasterSigningKey> createNewKey();
 
     std::optional<Keymaster> mKeymaster;
     std::vector<uint8_t> mVerifiedKeyBlob;
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/KeystoreKey.cpp b/ondevice-signing/KeystoreKey.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..840b683
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ondevice-signing/KeystoreKey.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <string>
+
+#include <android-base/file.h>
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "CertUtils.h"
+#include "KeyConstants.h"
+#include "KeystoreKey.h"
+
+using android::defaultServiceManager;
+using android::IServiceManager;
+using android::sp;
+using android::String16;
+
+using android::hardware::security::keymint::Algorithm;
+using android::hardware::security::keymint::Digest;
+using android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyParameter;
+using android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyParameterValue;
+using android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyPurpose;
+using android::hardware::security::keymint::PaddingMode;
+using android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel;
+using android::hardware::security::keymint::Tag;
+
+using android::system::keystore2::CreateOperationResponse;
+using android::system::keystore2::Domain;
+using android::system::keystore2::KeyDescriptor;
+using android::system::keystore2::KeyEntryResponse;
+using android::system::keystore2::KeyMetadata;
+
+using android::base::Error;
+using android::base::Result;
+
+using android::base::unique_fd;
+
+// Keystore boot level that the odsign key uses
+static const int kOdsignBootLevel = 30;
+
+static KeyDescriptor getKeyDescriptor() {
+    // AIDL parcelable objects don't have constructor
+    static KeyDescriptor descriptor;
+    static std::once_flag flag;
+    std::call_once(flag, [&]() {
+        descriptor.domain = Domain::SELINUX;
+        descriptor.alias = String16("ondevice-signing");
+        descriptor.nspace = 101;  // odsign_key
+    });
+
+    return descriptor;
+}
+
+KeystoreKey::KeystoreKey() {}
+
+Result<KeyMetadata> KeystoreKey::createNewKey(const KeyDescriptor& descriptor) {
+    std::vector<KeyParameter> params;
+
+    KeyParameter algo;
+    algo.tag = Tag::ALGORITHM;
+    algo.value = KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::algorithm>(Algorithm::RSA);
+    params.push_back(algo);
+
+    KeyParameter key_size;
+    key_size.tag = Tag::KEY_SIZE;
+    key_size.value = KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::integer>(kRsaKeySize);
+    params.push_back(key_size);
+
+    KeyParameter digest;
+    digest.tag = Tag::DIGEST;
+    digest.value = KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::digest>(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+    params.push_back(digest);
+
+    KeyParameter padding;
+    padding.tag = Tag::PADDING;
+    padding.value =
+        KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::paddingMode>(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN);
+    params.push_back(padding);
+
+    KeyParameter exponent;
+    exponent.tag = Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
+    exponent.value = KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::longInteger>(kRsaKeyExponent);
+    params.push_back(exponent);
+
+    KeyParameter purpose;
+    purpose.tag = Tag::PURPOSE;
+    purpose.value = KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::keyPurpose>(KeyPurpose::SIGN);
+    params.push_back(purpose);
+
+    KeyParameter auth;
+    auth.tag = Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED;
+    auth.value = KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::boolValue>(true);
+    params.push_back(auth);
+
+    KeyParameter boot_level;
+    boot_level.tag = Tag::MAX_BOOT_LEVEL;
+    boot_level.value = KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::integer>(kOdsignBootLevel);
+    params.push_back(boot_level);
+
+    KeyMetadata metadata;
+    auto status = mSecurityLevel->generateKey(descriptor, {}, params, 0, {}, &metadata);
+    if (!status.isOk()) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to create new key";
+    }
+
+    return metadata;
+}
+
+bool KeystoreKey::initialize() {
+    sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
+    if (sm == nullptr) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    auto service = sm->getService(String16("android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default"));
+    if (service == nullptr) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    mService = interface_cast<android::system::keystore2::IKeystoreService>(service);
+    if (mService == nullptr) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    auto status = mService->getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX, &mSecurityLevel);
+    if (!status.isOk()) {
+        status = mService->getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, &mSecurityLevel);
+        if (!status.isOk()) {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
+    auto descriptor = getKeyDescriptor();
+    // See if we can fetch an existing key
+    KeyEntryResponse keyEntryResponse;
+    LOG(INFO) << "Trying to retrieve existing keystore key...";
+    status = mService->getKeyEntry(descriptor, &keyEntryResponse);
+    if (!status.isOk()) {
+        LOG(INFO) << "Existing keystore key not found, creating new key";
+        auto newKeyStatus = createNewKey(descriptor);
+        if (!newKeyStatus.ok()) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create new key";
+            return false;
+        }
+        mKeyMetadata = *newKeyStatus;
+    } else {
+        mKeyMetadata = keyEntryResponse.metadata;
+    }
+
+    LOG(ERROR) << "Initialized Keystore key.";
+    return true;
+}
+
+Result<SigningKey*> KeystoreKey::getInstance() {
+    static KeystoreKey keystoreKey;
+
+    if (!keystoreKey.initialize()) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to initialize keystore key.";
+    } else {
+        return &keystoreKey;
+    }
+}
+
+static std::vector<KeyParameter> getSignOpParameters() {
+    std::vector<KeyParameter> opParameters;
+
+    KeyParameter algo;
+    algo.tag = Tag::ALGORITHM;
+    algo.value = KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::algorithm>(Algorithm::RSA);
+    opParameters.push_back(algo);
+
+    KeyParameter digest;
+    digest.tag = Tag::DIGEST;
+    digest.value = KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::digest>(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+    opParameters.push_back(digest);
+
+    KeyParameter padding;
+    padding.tag = Tag::PADDING;
+    padding.value =
+        KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::paddingMode>(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN);
+    opParameters.push_back(padding);
+
+    KeyParameter purpose;
+    purpose.tag = Tag::PURPOSE;
+    purpose.value = KeyParameterValue::make<KeyParameterValue::keyPurpose>(KeyPurpose::SIGN);
+    opParameters.push_back(purpose);
+
+    return opParameters;
+}
+
+Result<std::string> KeystoreKey::sign(const std::string& message) const {
+    static auto opParameters = getSignOpParameters();
+
+    CreateOperationResponse opResponse;
+
+    auto status =
+        mSecurityLevel->createOperation(getKeyDescriptor(), opParameters, false, &opResponse);
+    if (!status.isOk()) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to create keystore signing operation: "
+                       << status.serviceSpecificErrorCode();
+    }
+    auto operation = opResponse.iOperation;
+
+    std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> out;
+    status = operation->update({message.begin(), message.end()}, &out);
+    if (!status.isOk()) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to call keystore update operation.";
+    }
+
+    std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> signature;
+    status = operation->finish({}, {}, &signature);
+    if (!status.isOk()) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to call keystore finish operation.";
+    }
+
+    if (!signature.has_value()) {
+        return Error() << "Didn't receive a signature from keystore finish operation.";
+    }
+
+    std::string result{signature.value().begin(), signature.value().end()};
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> KeystoreKey::getPublicKey() const {
+    return extractPublicKeyFromX509(mKeyMetadata.certificate.value());
+}
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/KeystoreKey.h b/ondevice-signing/KeystoreKey.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b9cb57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ondevice-signing/KeystoreKey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <optional>
+
+#include <android-base/macros.h>
+#include <android-base/result.h>
+#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
+
+#include <utils/StrongPointer.h>
+
+#include <android/system/keystore2/IKeystoreService.h>
+
+#include "SigningKey.h"
+
+class KeystoreKey : public SigningKey {
+    using IKeystoreService = ::android::system::keystore2::IKeystoreService;
+    using IKeystoreSecurityLevel = ::android::system::keystore2::IKeystoreSecurityLevel;
+    using KeyDescriptor = ::android::system::keystore2::KeyDescriptor;
+    using KeyMetadata = ::android::system::keystore2::KeyMetadata;
+
+  public:
+    virtual ~KeystoreKey(){};
+    static android::base::Result<SigningKey*> getInstance();
+
+    virtual android::base::Result<std::string> sign(const std::string& message) const;
+    virtual android::base::Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> getPublicKey() const;
+
+  private:
+    KeystoreKey();
+    bool initialize();
+    android::base::Result<KeyMetadata> createNewKey(const KeyDescriptor& descriptor);
+
+    android::sp<IKeystoreService> mService;
+    android::sp<IKeystoreSecurityLevel> mSecurityLevel;
+    KeyMetadata mKeyMetadata;
+};
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/SigningKey.h b/ondevice-signing/SigningKey.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89294fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ondevice-signing/SigningKey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <android-base/macros.h>
+#include <android-base/result.h>
+
+class SigningKey {
+  public:
+    virtual ~SigningKey(){};
+    /* Sign a message with an initialized signing key */
+    virtual android::base::Result<std::string> sign(const std::string& message) const = 0;
+    /* Retrieve the associated public key */
+    virtual android::base::Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> getPublicKey() const = 0;
+};
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/VerityUtils.cpp b/ondevice-signing/VerityUtils.cpp
index 579d3d8..cab92e2 100644
--- a/ondevice-signing/VerityUtils.cpp
+++ b/ondevice-signing/VerityUtils.cpp
@@ -15,12 +15,15 @@
  */
 
 #include <filesystem>
+#include <map>
+#include <span>
 #include <string>
 
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
 
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
 #include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
@@ -28,13 +31,17 @@
 #include <linux/fsverity.h>
 
 #include "CertUtils.h"
-#include "KeymasterSigningKey.h"
+#include "SigningKey.h"
+
+#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64
 
 using android::base::ErrnoError;
 using android::base::Error;
 using android::base::Result;
 using android::base::unique_fd;
 
+static const char* kFsVerityInitPath = "/system/bin/fsverity_init";
+
 #if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
 #define cpu_to_le16(v) ((__force __le16)(uint16_t)(v))
 #define le16_to_cpu(v) ((__force uint16_t)(__le16)(v))
@@ -50,17 +57,31 @@
     __u8 digest[];
 };
 
+static std::string toHex(std::span<uint8_t> data) {
+    std::stringstream ss;
+    for (auto it = data.begin(); it != data.end(); ++it) {
+        ss << std::setfill('0') << std::setw(2) << std::hex << static_cast<unsigned>(*it);
+    }
+    return ss.str();
+}
+
 static int read_callback(void* file, void* buf, size_t count) {
     int* fd = (int*)file;
     if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(*fd, buf, count)) < 0) return errno ? -errno : -EIO;
     return 0;
 }
 
-static Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> createDigest(const std::string& path) {
+Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> createDigest(const std::string& path) {
     struct stat filestat;
     unique_fd fd(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(path.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)));
+    if (fd < 0) {
+        return ErrnoError() << "Failed to open " << path;
+    }
 
-    stat(path.c_str(), &filestat);
+    int ret = stat(path.c_str(), &filestat);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        return ErrnoError() << "Failed to stat " << path;
+    }
     struct libfsverity_merkle_tree_params params = {
         .version = 1,
         .hash_algorithm = FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256,
@@ -69,23 +90,45 @@
     };
 
     struct libfsverity_digest* digest;
-    libfsverity_compute_digest(&fd, &read_callback, &params, &digest);
-
-    return std::vector<uint8_t>(&digest->digest[0], &digest->digest[32]);
+    ret = libfsverity_compute_digest(&fd, &read_callback, &params, &digest);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        return ErrnoError() << "Failed to compute fs-verity digest for " << path;
+    }
+    std::vector<uint8_t> digestVector(&digest->digest[0], &digest->digest[32]);
+    free(digest);
+    return digestVector;
 }
 
-static Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> signDigest(const KeymasterSigningKey& key,
+namespace {
+template <typename T> struct DeleteAsPODArray {
+    void operator()(T* x) {
+        if (x) {
+            x->~T();
+            delete[](uint8_t*) x;
+        }
+    }
+};
+}  // namespace
+
+template <typename T> using trailing_unique_ptr = std::unique_ptr<T, DeleteAsPODArray<T>>;
+
+template <typename T>
+static trailing_unique_ptr<T> makeUniqueWithTrailingData(size_t trailing_data_size) {
+    uint8_t* memory = new uint8_t[sizeof(T*) + trailing_data_size];
+    T* ptr = new (memory) T;
+    return trailing_unique_ptr<T>{ptr};
+}
+
+static Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> signDigest(const SigningKey& key,
                                                const std::vector<uint8_t>& digest) {
-    struct fsverity_signed_digest* d = NULL;
-    size_t signed_digest_size = sizeof(*d) + digest.size();
-    d = (struct fsverity_signed_digest*)malloc(signed_digest_size);
+    auto d = makeUniqueWithTrailingData<fsverity_signed_digest>(digest.size());
 
     memcpy(d->magic, "FSVerity", 8);
     d->digest_algorithm = cpu_to_le16(FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256);
     d->digest_size = cpu_to_le16(digest.size());
     memcpy(d->digest, digest.data(), digest.size());
 
-    auto signed_digest = key.sign(std::string((char*)d, signed_digest_size));
+    auto signed_digest = key.sign(std::string((char*)d.get(), sizeof(*d) + digest.size()));
     if (!signed_digest.ok()) {
         return signed_digest.error();
     }
@@ -93,7 +136,7 @@
     return std::vector<uint8_t>(signed_digest->begin(), signed_digest->end());
 }
 
-Result<void> enableFsVerity(const std::string& path, const KeymasterSigningKey& key) {
+Result<std::string> enableFsVerity(const std::string& path, const SigningKey& key) {
     auto digest = createDigest(path);
     if (!digest.ok()) {
         return digest.error();
@@ -120,10 +163,13 @@
         return ErrnoError() << "Failed to call FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY on " << path;
     }
 
-    return {};
+    // Return the root hash as a hex string
+    return toHex(digest.value());
 }
 
-Result<void> addFilesToVerityRecursive(const std::string& path, const KeymasterSigningKey& key) {
+Result<std::map<std::string, std::string>> addFilesToVerityRecursive(const std::string& path,
+                                                                     const SigningKey& key) {
+    std::map<std::string, std::string> digests;
     std::error_code ec;
 
     auto it = std::filesystem::recursive_directory_iterator(path, ec);
@@ -136,14 +182,18 @@
             if (!result.ok()) {
                 return result.error();
             }
+            digests[it->path()] = *result;
         }
         ++it;
     }
+    if (ec) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to iterate " << path << ": " << ec;
+    }
 
-    return {};
+    return digests;
 }
 
-Result<bool> isFileInVerity(const std::string& path) {
+Result<std::string> isFileInVerity(const std::string& path) {
     unsigned int flags;
 
     unique_fd fd(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(path.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)));
@@ -155,11 +205,21 @@
     if (ret < 0) {
         return ErrnoError() << "Failed to FS_IOC_GETFLAGS for " << path;
     }
+    if (!(flags & FS_VERITY_FL)) {
+        return Error() << "File is not in fs-verity: " << path;
+    }
 
-    return (flags & FS_VERITY_FL);
+    auto d = makeUniqueWithTrailingData<fsverity_digest>(FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
+    d->digest_size = FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE;
+    ret = ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY, d.get());
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        return ErrnoError() << "Failed to FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY for " << path;
+    }
+    return toHex({&d->digest[0], &d->digest[d->digest_size]});
 }
 
-Result<void> verifyAllFilesInVerity(const std::string& path) {
+Result<std::map<std::string, std::string>> verifyAllFilesInVerity(const std::string& path) {
+    std::map<std::string, std::string> digests;
     std::error_code ec;
 
     auto it = std::filesystem::recursive_directory_iterator(path, ec);
@@ -172,12 +232,50 @@
             if (!result.ok()) {
                 return result.error();
             }
-            if (!*result) {
-                return Error() << "File " << it->path() << " not in fs-verity";
-            }
+            digests[it->path()] = *result;
         }  // TODO reject other types besides dirs?
         ++it;
     }
+    if (ec) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to iterate " << path << ": " << ec;
+    }
+
+    return digests;
+}
+
+Result<void> addCertToFsVerityKeyring(const std::string& path) {
+    const char* const argv[] = {kFsVerityInitPath, "--load-extra-key", "fsv_ods"};
+
+    int fd = open(path.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+    pid_t pid = fork();
+    if (pid == 0) {
+        dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+        close(fd);
+        int argc = arraysize(argv);
+        char* argv_child[argc + 1];
+        memcpy(argv_child, argv, argc * sizeof(char*));
+        argv_child[argc] = nullptr;
+        execvp(argv_child[0], const_cast<char**>(argv_child));
+        PLOG(ERROR) << "exec in ForkExecvp";
+        _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+    } else {
+        close(fd);
+    }
+    if (pid == -1) {
+        return ErrnoError() << "Failed to fork.";
+    }
+    int status;
+    if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+        return ErrnoError() << "waitpid() failed.";
+    }
+    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+        return Error() << kFsVerityInitPath << ": abnormal process exit";
+    }
+    if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
+        if (status != 0) {
+            return Error() << kFsVerityInitPath << " exited with " << status;
+        }
+    }
 
     return {};
 }
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/VerityUtils.h b/ondevice-signing/VerityUtils.h
index 1eca5a6..84af319 100644
--- a/ondevice-signing/VerityUtils.h
+++ b/ondevice-signing/VerityUtils.h
@@ -18,8 +18,11 @@
 
 #include <android-base/result.h>
 
-#include "KeymasterSigningKey.h"
+#include "SigningKey.h"
 
-android::base::Result<void> verifyAllFilesInVerity(const std::string& path);
-android::base::Result<void> addFilesToVerityRecursive(const std::string& path,
-                                                      const KeymasterSigningKey& key);
+android::base::Result<void> addCertToFsVerityKeyring(const std::string& path);
+android::base::Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> createDigest(const std::string& path);
+android::base::Result<std::map<std::string, std::string>>
+verifyAllFilesInVerity(const std::string& path);
+android::base::Result<std::map<std::string, std::string>>
+addFilesToVerityRecursive(const std::string& path, const SigningKey& key);
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/odsign_main.cpp b/ondevice-signing/odsign_main.cpp
index efe7d35..6cab8b6 100644
--- a/ondevice-signing/odsign_main.cpp
+++ b/ondevice-signing/odsign_main.cpp
@@ -16,82 +16,57 @@
 
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <filesystem>
+#include <fstream>
 #include <iomanip>
 #include <iostream>
+#include <iterator>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
 #include <android-base/file.h>
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
 #include <android-base/scopeguard.h>
 #include <logwrap/logwrap.h>
+#include <odrefresh/odrefresh.h>
 
 #include "CertUtils.h"
 #include "KeymasterSigningKey.h"
+#include "KeystoreKey.h"
 #include "VerityUtils.h"
 
+#include "odsign_info.pb.h"
+
 using android::base::ErrnoError;
 using android::base::Error;
 using android::base::Result;
+using android::base::SetProperty;
+
+using OdsignInfo = ::odsign::proto::OdsignInfo;
 
 const std::string kSigningKeyBlob = "/data/misc/odsign/key.blob";
 const std::string kSigningKeyCert = "/data/misc/odsign/key.cert";
+const std::string kOdsignInfo = "/data/misc/odsign/odsign.info";
+const std::string kOdsignInfoSignature = "/data/misc/odsign/odsign.info.signature";
 
-const std::string kArtArtifactsDir = "/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art/system";
+const std::string kArtArtifactsDir = "/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art/dalvik-cache";
 
 static const char* kOdrefreshPath = "/apex/com.android.art/bin/odrefresh";
 
-static const char* kFsVerityInitPath = "/system/bin/fsverity_init";
+static const char* kFsVerityProcPath = "/proc/sys/fs/verity";
 
 static const bool kForceCompilation = false;
+static const bool kUseKeystore = true;
 
-Result<void> addCertToFsVerityKeyring(const std::string& path) {
-    const char* const argv[] = {kFsVerityInitPath, "--load-extra-key", "fsv_ods"};
+static const char* kOdsignVerificationDoneProp = "odsign.verification.done";
+static const char* kOdsignKeyDoneProp = "odsign.key.done";
 
-    int fd = open(path.c_str(), O_RDONLY);
-    pid_t pid = fork();
-    if (pid == 0) {
-        dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
-        close(fd);
-        int argc = arraysize(argv);
-        char* argv_child[argc + 1];
-        memcpy(argv_child, argv, argc * sizeof(char*));
-        argv_child[argc] = nullptr;
-        execvp(argv_child[0], const_cast<char**>(argv_child));
-        PLOG(ERROR) << "exec in ForkExecvp";
-        _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-    } else {
-        close(fd);
-    }
-    if (pid == -1) {
-        return ErrnoError() << "Failed to fork.";
-    }
-    int status;
-    if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-        return ErrnoError() << "waitpid() failed.";
-    }
-    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
-        return Error() << kFsVerityInitPath << ": abnormal process exit";
-    }
-    if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
-        if (status != 0) {
-            return Error() << kFsVerityInitPath << " exited with " << status;
-        }
-    }
+static const char* kOdsignVerificationStatusProp = "odsign.verification.success";
+static const char* kOdsignVerificationStatusValid = "1";
+static const char* kOdsignVerificationStatusError = "0";
 
-    return {};
-}
-
-Result<KeymasterSigningKey> loadAndVerifyExistingKey() {
-    if (access(kSigningKeyBlob.c_str(), F_OK) < 0) {
-        return ErrnoError() << "Key blob not found: " << kSigningKeyBlob;
-    }
-    return KeymasterSigningKey::loadFromBlobAndVerify(kSigningKeyBlob);
-}
-
-Result<void> verifyAndLoadExistingCert(const KeymasterSigningKey& key) {
+Result<void> verifyExistingCert(const SigningKey& key) {
     if (access(kSigningKeyCert.c_str(), F_OK) < 0) {
         return ErrnoError() << "Key certificate not found: " << kSigningKeyCert;
     }
@@ -109,119 +84,323 @@
                        << " does not match signing public key.";
     }
 
-    auto cert_add_result = addCertToFsVerityKeyring(kSigningKeyCert);
-    if (!cert_add_result.ok()) {
-        return cert_add_result.error();
-    }
-
     // At this point, we know the cert matches
     return {};
 }
 
-Result<KeymasterSigningKey> createAndPersistKey(const std::string& path) {
-    auto key = KeymasterSigningKey::createNewKey();
+Result<void> createX509Cert(const SigningKey& key, const std::string& outPath) {
+    auto publicKey = key.getPublicKey();
 
-    if (!key.ok()) {
-        return key.error();
+    if (!publicKey.ok()) {
+        return publicKey.error();
     }
 
-    auto result = key->saveKeyblob(path);
+    auto keymasterSignFunction = [&](const std::string& to_be_signed) {
+        return key.sign(to_be_signed);
+    };
+    createSelfSignedCertificate(*publicKey, keymasterSignFunction, outPath);
+    return {};
+}
+
+art::odrefresh::ExitCode compileArtifacts(bool force) {
+    const char* const argv[] = {kOdrefreshPath, force ? "--force-compile" : "--compile"};
+    const int exit_code =
+        logwrap_fork_execvp(arraysize(argv), argv, nullptr, false, LOG_ALOG, false, nullptr);
+    return static_cast<art::odrefresh::ExitCode>(exit_code);
+}
+
+static std::string toHex(const std::vector<uint8_t>& digest) {
+    std::stringstream ss;
+    for (auto it = digest.begin(); it != digest.end(); ++it) {
+        ss << std::setfill('0') << std::setw(2) << std::hex << static_cast<unsigned>(*it);
+    }
+    return ss.str();
+}
+
+Result<std::map<std::string, std::string>> computeDigests(const std::string& path) {
+    std::error_code ec;
+    std::map<std::string, std::string> digests;
+
+    auto it = std::filesystem::recursive_directory_iterator(path, ec);
+    auto end = std::filesystem::recursive_directory_iterator();
+
+    while (!ec && it != end) {
+        if (it->is_regular_file()) {
+            auto digest = createDigest(it->path());
+            if (!digest.ok()) {
+                return Error() << "Failed to compute digest for " << it->path();
+            }
+            digests[it->path()] = toHex(*digest);
+        }
+        ++it;
+    }
+    if (ec) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to iterate " << path << ": " << ec;
+    }
+
+    return digests;
+}
+
+Result<void> verifyDigests(const std::map<std::string, std::string>& digests,
+                           const std::map<std::string, std::string>& trusted_digests) {
+    for (const auto& path_digest : digests) {
+        auto path = path_digest.first;
+        auto digest = path_digest.second;
+        if ((trusted_digests.count(path) == 0)) {
+            return Error() << "Couldn't find digest for " << path;
+        }
+        if (trusted_digests.at(path) != digest) {
+            return Error() << "Digest mismatch for " << path;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // All digests matched!
+    if (digests.size() > 0) {
+        LOG(INFO) << "All root hashes match.";
+    }
+    return {};
+}
+
+Result<void> verifyIntegrityFsVerity(const std::map<std::string, std::string>& trusted_digests) {
+    // Just verify that the files are in verity, and get their digests
+    auto result = verifyAllFilesInVerity(kArtArtifactsDir);
     if (!result.ok()) {
         return result.error();
     }
 
-    return key;
+    return verifyDigests(*result, trusted_digests);
 }
 
-bool compileArtifacts(bool force) {
-    const char* const argv[] = {kOdrefreshPath, force ? "--force-compile" : "--compile"};
+Result<void> verifyIntegrityNoFsVerity(const std::map<std::string, std::string>& trusted_digests) {
+    // On these devices, just compute the digests, and verify they match the ones we trust
+    auto result = computeDigests(kArtArtifactsDir);
+    if (!result.ok()) {
+        return result.error();
+    }
 
-    return logwrap_fork_execvp(arraysize(argv), argv, nullptr, false, LOG_ALOG, false, nullptr) ==
-           0;
+    return verifyDigests(*result, trusted_digests);
 }
 
-bool validateArtifacts() {
-    const char* const argv[] = {kOdrefreshPath, "--check"};
+Result<OdsignInfo> getOdsignInfo(const SigningKey& key) {
+    std::string persistedSignature;
+    OdsignInfo odsignInfo;
 
-    return logwrap_fork_execvp(arraysize(argv), argv, nullptr, false, LOG_ALOG, false, nullptr) ==
-           0;
+    if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(kOdsignInfoSignature, &persistedSignature)) {
+        return ErrnoError() << "Failed to read " << kOdsignInfoSignature;
+    }
+
+    std::fstream odsign_info(kOdsignInfo, std::ios::in | std::ios::binary);
+    if (!odsign_info) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to open " << kOdsignInfo;
+    }
+    odsign_info.seekg(0);
+    // Verify the hash
+    std::string odsign_info_str((std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(odsign_info)),
+                                std::istreambuf_iterator<char>());
+
+    auto publicKey = key.getPublicKey();
+    auto signResult = verifySignature(odsign_info_str, persistedSignature, *publicKey);
+    if (!signResult.ok()) {
+        return Error() << kOdsignInfoSignature << " does not match.";
+    } else {
+        LOG(INFO) << kOdsignInfoSignature << " matches.";
+    }
+
+    odsign_info.seekg(0);
+    if (!odsignInfo.ParseFromIstream(&odsign_info)) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to parse " << kOdsignInfo;
+    }
+
+    LOG(INFO) << "Loaded " << kOdsignInfo;
+    return odsignInfo;
+}
+
+Result<void> persistDigests(const std::map<std::string, std::string>& digests,
+                            const SigningKey& key) {
+    OdsignInfo signInfo;
+    google::protobuf::Map<std::string, std::string> proto_hashes(digests.begin(), digests.end());
+    auto map = signInfo.mutable_file_hashes();
+    *map = proto_hashes;
+
+    std::fstream odsign_info(kOdsignInfo,
+                             std::ios::in | std::ios::out | std::ios::trunc | std::ios::binary);
+    if (!signInfo.SerializeToOstream(&odsign_info)) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to persist root hashes in " << kOdsignInfo;
+    }
+
+    // Sign the signatures with our key itself, and write that to storage
+    odsign_info.seekg(0, std::ios::beg);
+    std::string odsign_info_str((std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(odsign_info)),
+                                std::istreambuf_iterator<char>());
+    auto signResult = key.sign(odsign_info_str);
+    if (!signResult.ok()) {
+        return Error() << "Failed to sign " << kOdsignInfo;
+    }
+    android::base::WriteStringToFile(*signResult, kOdsignInfoSignature);
+    return {};
+}
+
+static int removeArtifacts() {
+    std::error_code ec;
+    auto num_removed = std::filesystem::remove_all(kArtArtifactsDir, ec);
+    if (ec) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Can't remove " << kArtArtifactsDir << ": " << ec.message();
+        return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (num_removed > 0) {
+            LOG(INFO) << "Removed " << num_removed << " entries from " << kArtArtifactsDir;
+        }
+        return num_removed;
+    }
+}
+
+static Result<void> verifyArtifacts(const SigningKey& key, bool supportsFsVerity) {
+    auto signInfo = getOdsignInfo(key);
+    // Tell init we're done with the key; this is a boot time optimization
+    // in particular for the no fs-verity case, where we need to do a
+    // costly verification. If the files haven't been tampered with, which
+    // should be the common path, the verification will succeed, and we won't
+    // need the key anymore. If it turns out the artifacts are invalid (eg not
+    // in fs-verity) or the hash doesn't match, we won't be able to generate
+    // new artifacts without the key, so in those cases, remove the artifacts,
+    // and use JIT zygote for the current boot. We should recover automatically
+    // by the next boot.
+    SetProperty(kOdsignKeyDoneProp, "1");
+    if (!signInfo.ok()) {
+        return Error() << signInfo.error().message();
+    }
+    std::map<std::string, std::string> trusted_digests(signInfo->file_hashes().begin(),
+                                                       signInfo->file_hashes().end());
+    Result<void> integrityStatus;
+
+    if (supportsFsVerity) {
+        integrityStatus = verifyIntegrityFsVerity(trusted_digests);
+    } else {
+        integrityStatus = verifyIntegrityNoFsVerity(trusted_digests);
+    }
+    if (!integrityStatus.ok()) {
+        return Error() << integrityStatus.error().message();
+    }
+
+    return {};
 }
 
 int main(int /* argc */, char** /* argv */) {
-    auto removeArtifacts = []() {
-        std::error_code ec;
-        auto num_removed = std::filesystem::remove_all(kArtArtifactsDir, ec);
-        if (ec) {
-            // TODO can't remove artifacts, signal Zygote shouldn't use them
-            LOG(ERROR) << "Can't remove " << kArtArtifactsDir << ": " << ec.message();
-        } else {
-            LOG(INFO) << "Removed " << num_removed << " entries from " << kArtArtifactsDir;
-        }
+    auto errorScopeGuard = []() {
+        // In case we hit any error, remove the artifacts and tell Zygote not to use anything
+        removeArtifacts();
+        // Tell init we don't need to use our key anymore
+        SetProperty(kOdsignKeyDoneProp, "1");
+        // Tell init we're done with verification, and that it was an error
+        SetProperty(kOdsignVerificationDoneProp, "1");
+        SetProperty(kOdsignVerificationStatusProp, kOdsignVerificationStatusError);
     };
-    // Make sure we delete the artifacts in all early (error) exit paths
-    auto scope_guard = android::base::make_scope_guard(removeArtifacts);
+    auto scope_guard = android::base::make_scope_guard(errorScopeGuard);
 
-    auto key = loadAndVerifyExistingKey();
-    if (!key.ok()) {
-        LOG(WARNING) << key.error().message();
-
-        key = createAndPersistKey(kSigningKeyBlob);
-        if (!key.ok()) {
-            LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create or persist new key: " << key.error().message();
-            return -1;
-        }
-    } else {
-        LOG(INFO) << "Found and verified existing key: " << kSigningKeyBlob;
+    if (!android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.apex.updatable", false)) {
+        LOG(INFO) << "Device doesn't support updatable APEX, exiting.";
+        return 0;
     }
 
-    auto existing_cert = verifyAndLoadExistingCert(key.value());
-    if (!existing_cert.ok()) {
-        LOG(WARNING) << existing_cert.error().message();
-
-        // Try to create a new cert
-        auto new_cert = key->createX509Cert(kSigningKeyCert);
-        if (!new_cert.ok()) {
-            LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create X509 certificate: " << new_cert.error().message();
-            // TODO apparently the key become invalid - delete the blob / cert
+    SigningKey* key;
+    if (kUseKeystore) {
+        auto keystoreResult = KeystoreKey::getInstance();
+        if (!keystoreResult.ok()) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << "Could not create keystore key: " << keystoreResult.error().message();
             return -1;
         }
+        key = keystoreResult.value();
+    } else {
+        // TODO - keymaster will go away
+        auto keymasterResult = KeymasterSigningKey::getInstance();
+        if (!keymasterResult.ok()) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create keymaster key: " << keymasterResult.error().message();
+            return -1;
+        }
+        key = keymasterResult.value();
+    }
+
+    bool supportsFsVerity = access(kFsVerityProcPath, F_OK) == 0;
+    if (!supportsFsVerity) {
+        LOG(INFO) << "Device doesn't support fsverity. Falling back to full verification.";
+    }
+
+    if (supportsFsVerity) {
+        auto existing_cert = verifyExistingCert(*key);
+        if (!existing_cert.ok()) {
+            LOG(WARNING) << existing_cert.error().message();
+
+            // Try to create a new cert
+            auto new_cert = createX509Cert(*key, kSigningKeyCert);
+            if (!new_cert.ok()) {
+                LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create X509 certificate: " << new_cert.error().message();
+                // TODO apparently the key become invalid - delete the blob / cert
+                return -1;
+            }
+        } else {
+            LOG(INFO) << "Found and verified existing public key certificate: " << kSigningKeyCert;
+        }
         auto cert_add_result = addCertToFsVerityKeyring(kSigningKeyCert);
         if (!cert_add_result.ok()) {
             LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to add certificate to fs-verity keyring: "
                        << cert_add_result.error().message();
             return -1;
         }
-    } else {
-        LOG(INFO) << "Found and verified existing public key certificate: " << kSigningKeyCert;
     }
 
-    auto verityStatus = verifyAllFilesInVerity(kArtArtifactsDir);
-    if (!verityStatus.ok()) {
-        LOG(WARNING) << verityStatus.error().message() << ", removing " << kArtArtifactsDir;
-        removeArtifacts();
-    }
-
-    bool artifactsValid = validateArtifacts();
-
-    if (!artifactsValid || kForceCompilation) {
-        removeArtifacts();
-
-        LOG(INFO) << "Starting compilation... ";
-        bool ret = compileArtifacts(kForceCompilation);
-        LOG(INFO) << "Compilation done, returned " << ret;
-
-        verityStatus = addFilesToVerityRecursive(kArtArtifactsDir, key.value());
-
-        if (!verityStatus.ok()) {
-            LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to add " << verityStatus.error().message();
+    art::odrefresh::ExitCode odrefresh_status = compileArtifacts(kForceCompilation);
+    if (odrefresh_status == art::odrefresh::ExitCode::kOkay) {
+        LOG(INFO) << "odrefresh said artifacts are VALID";
+        // A post-condition of validating artifacts is that if the ones on /system
+        // are used, kArtArtifactsDir is removed. Conversely, if kArtArtifactsDir
+        // exists, those are artifacts that will be used, and we should verify them.
+        int err = access(kArtArtifactsDir.c_str(), F_OK);
+        // If we receive any error other than ENOENT, be suspicious
+        bool artifactsPresent = (err == 0) || (err < 0 && errno != ENOENT);
+        if (artifactsPresent) {
+            auto verificationResult = verifyArtifacts(*key, supportsFsVerity);
+            if (!verificationResult.ok()) {
+                LOG(ERROR) << verificationResult.error().message();
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+    } else if (odrefresh_status == art::odrefresh::ExitCode::kCompilationSuccess ||
+               odrefresh_status == art::odrefresh::ExitCode::kCompilationFailed) {
+        const bool compiled_all = odrefresh_status == art::odrefresh::ExitCode::kCompilationSuccess;
+        LOG(INFO) << "odrefresh compiled " << (compiled_all ? "all" : "partial")
+                  << " artifacts, returned " << odrefresh_status;
+        Result<std::map<std::string, std::string>> digests;
+        if (supportsFsVerity) {
+            digests = addFilesToVerityRecursive(kArtArtifactsDir, *key);
+        } else {
+            // If we can't use verity, just compute the root hashes and store
+            // those, so we can reverify them at the next boot.
+            digests = computeDigests(kArtArtifactsDir);
+        }
+        if (!digests.ok()) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << digests.error().message();
             return -1;
         }
+        auto persistStatus = persistDigests(*digests, *key);
+        if (!persistStatus.ok()) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << persistStatus.error().message();
+            return -1;
+        }
+    } else if (odrefresh_status == art::odrefresh::ExitCode::kCleanupFailed) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "odrefresh failed cleaning up existing artifacts";
+        return -1;
+    } else {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "odrefresh exited unexpectedly, returned " << odrefresh_status;
+        return -1;
     }
 
-    // TODO we want to make sure Zygote only picks up the artifacts if we deemed
-    // everything was ok here. We could use a sysprop, or some other mechanism?
     LOG(INFO) << "On-device signing done.";
 
     scope_guard.Disable();
+    // At this point, we're done with the key for sure
+    SetProperty(kOdsignKeyDoneProp, "1");
+    // And we did a successful verification
+    SetProperty(kOdsignVerificationDoneProp, "1");
+    SetProperty(kOdsignVerificationStatusProp, kOdsignVerificationStatusValid);
     return 0;
 }
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/proto/Android.bp b/ondevice-signing/proto/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd48f31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ondevice-signing/proto/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package {
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["Android-Apache-2.0"],
+}
+
+cc_library_static {
+    name: "lib_odsign_proto",
+    host_supported: true,
+    proto: {
+        export_proto_headers: true,
+        type: "full",
+    },
+    srcs: ["odsign_info.proto"],
+}
diff --git a/ondevice-signing/proto/odsign_info.proto b/ondevice-signing/proto/odsign_info.proto
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d49c6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ondevice-signing/proto/odsign_info.proto
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+syntax = "proto3";
+
+package odsign.proto;
+
+message OdsignInfo {
+  // Map of artifact files to their hashes
+  map<string, string> file_hashes = 1;
+}
diff --git a/provisioner/Android.bp b/provisioner/Android.bp
index c1c8d15..d3f06fe 100644
--- a/provisioner/Android.bp
+++ b/provisioner/Android.bp
@@ -14,6 +14,15 @@
 // limitations under the License.
 //
 
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    // A large-scale-change added 'default_applicable_licenses' to import
+    // all of the 'license_kinds' from "system_security_license"
+    // to get the below license kinds:
+    //   SPDX-license-identifier-Apache-2.0
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["system_security_license"],
+}
+
 aidl_interface {
     name: "android.security.provisioner",
     unstable: true,