Empty merge of Android 24Q2 Release (ab/11526283) to aosp-main-future
Bug: 337098550
Merged-In: I619784b71c0a87574dc633d641aec91da1fc3475
Change-Id: Ic602b2b32c98e650a405c15ce0454affe89adcf3
diff --git a/fsverity/fsverity_manifest_generator.py b/fsverity/fsverity_manifest_generator.py
index 181758a..ca7ac5c 100644
--- a/fsverity/fsverity_manifest_generator.py
+++ b/fsverity/fsverity_manifest_generator.py
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
return bytes(bytearray.fromhex(out))
if __name__ == '__main__':
- p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+ p = argparse.ArgumentParser(fromfile_prefix_chars='@')
p.add_argument(
'--output',
help='Path to the output manifest',
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
'inputs',
nargs='*',
help='input file for the build manifest')
- args = p.parse_args(sys.argv[1:])
+ args = p.parse_args()
digests = FSVerityDigests()
for f in sorted(args.inputs):
diff --git a/identity/Android.bp b/identity/Android.bp
index 6227bfe..a563532 100644
--- a/identity/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/Android.bp
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
"android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
"android.hardware.security.rkp-V3-cpp",
"android.security.rkp_aidl-cpp",
- "libcppbor_external",
+ "libcppbor",
"libcredstore_aidl",
"libkeymaster4support",
"librkp_support",
diff --git a/keystore2/Android.bp b/keystore2/Android.bp
index 7cb7c37..ed9cd88 100644
--- a/keystore2/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore2/Android.bp
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
defaults: [
"keymint_use_latest_hal_aidl_rust",
"keystore2_use_latest_aidl_rust",
+ "structured_log_rust_defaults",
],
rustlibs: [
@@ -54,7 +55,6 @@
"libkeystore2_selinux",
"liblazy_static",
"liblibc",
- "liblog_event_list",
"liblog_rust",
"libmessage_macro",
"librand",
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl
index a9de026..fd532f6 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl
@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@
import android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthenticatorType;
import android.security.authorization.AuthorizationTokens;
-// TODO: mark the interface with @SensitiveData when the annotation is ready (b/176110256).
-
/**
* IKeystoreAuthorization interface exposes the methods for other system components to
* provide keystore with the information required to enforce authorizations on key usage.
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.aidl
index abea958..50e9828 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.aidl
@@ -112,16 +112,6 @@
void earlyBootEnded();
/**
- * Informs Keystore 2.0 that the an off body event was detected.
- *
- * ## Error conditions:
- * `ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED` - if the caller does not have the `ReportOffBody`
- * permission.
- * `ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR` - if an unexpected error occurred.
- */
- void onDeviceOffBody();
-
- /**
* Migrate a key from one namespace to another. The caller must have use, grant, and delete
* permissions on the source namespace and rebind permissions on the destination namespace.
* The source may be specified by Domain::APP, Domain::SELINUX, or Domain::KEY_ID. The target
diff --git a/keystore2/src/audit_log.rs b/keystore2/src/audit_log.rs
index 0e5dfeb..8d9735e 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/audit_log.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/audit_log.rs
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
Domain::Domain, KeyDescriptor::KeyDescriptor,
};
use libc::uid_t;
-use log_event_list::{LogContext, LogContextError, LogIdSecurity};
+use structured_log::{structured_log, LOG_ID_SECURITY};
const TAG_KEY_GENERATED: u32 = 210024;
const TAG_KEY_IMPORTED: u32 = 210025;
@@ -58,30 +58,19 @@
/// Logs key integrity violation to NIAP audit log.
pub fn log_key_integrity_violation(key: &KeyDescriptor) {
- with_log_context(TAG_KEY_INTEGRITY_VIOLATION, |ctx| {
- let owner = key_owner(key.domain, key.nspace, key.nspace as i32);
- ctx.append_str(key.alias.as_ref().map_or("none", String::as_str))?.append_i32(owner)
- })
+ let owner = key_owner(key.domain, key.nspace, key.nspace as i32);
+ let alias = String::from(key.alias.as_ref().map_or("none", String::as_str));
+ LOGS_HANDLER.queue_lo(move |_| {
+ let _result =
+ structured_log!(log_id: LOG_ID_SECURITY, TAG_KEY_INTEGRITY_VIOLATION, alias, owner);
+ });
}
fn log_key_event(tag: u32, key: &KeyDescriptor, calling_app: uid_t, success: bool) {
- with_log_context(tag, |ctx| {
- let owner = key_owner(key.domain, key.nspace, calling_app as i32);
- ctx.append_i32(i32::from(success))?
- .append_str(key.alias.as_ref().map_or("none", String::as_str))?
- .append_i32(owner)
- })
-}
-
-fn with_log_context<F>(tag: u32, f: F)
-where
- F: Fn(LogContext) -> Result<LogContext, LogContextError>,
-{
- if let Some(ctx) = LogContext::new(LogIdSecurity, tag) {
- if let Ok(event) = f(ctx) {
- LOGS_HANDLER.queue_lo(move |_| {
- let _result = event.write();
- });
- }
- }
+ let owner = key_owner(key.domain, key.nspace, calling_app as i32);
+ let alias = String::from(key.alias.as_ref().map_or("none", String::as_str));
+ LOGS_HANDLER.queue_lo(move |_| {
+ let _result =
+ structured_log!(log_id: LOG_ID_SECURITY, tag, i32::from(success), alias, owner);
+ });
}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/authorization.rs b/keystore2/src/authorization.rs
index f956787..243abf1 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/authorization.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/authorization.rs
@@ -128,7 +128,8 @@
fn add_auth_token(&self, auth_token: &HardwareAuthToken) -> Result<()> {
// Check keystore permission.
- check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::AddAuth).context(ks_err!())?;
+ check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::AddAuth)
+ .context(ks_err!("caller missing AddAuth permissions"))?;
log::info!(
"add_auth_token(challenge={}, userId={}, authId={}, authType={:#x}, timestamp={}ms)",
@@ -149,7 +150,8 @@
user_id,
password.is_some(),
);
- check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::Unlock).context(ks_err!("Unlock."))?;
+ check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::Unlock)
+ .context(ks_err!("caller missing Unlock permissions"))?;
ENFORCEMENTS.set_device_locked(user_id, false);
let mut skm = SUPER_KEY.write().unwrap();
@@ -160,7 +162,7 @@
.context(ks_err!("Unlock with password."))
} else {
DB.with(|db| skm.try_unlock_user_with_biometric(&mut db.borrow_mut(), user_id as u32))
- .context(ks_err!("try_unlock_user_with_biometric failed"))
+ .context(ks_err!("try_unlock_user_with_biometric failed user_id={user_id}"))
}
}
@@ -179,7 +181,8 @@
if !android_security_flags::fix_unlocked_device_required_keys_v2() {
weak_unlock_enabled = false;
}
- check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::Lock).context(ks_err!("Lock"))?;
+ check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::Lock)
+ .context(ks_err!("caller missing Lock permission"))?;
ENFORCEMENTS.set_device_locked(user_id, true);
let mut skm = SUPER_KEY.write().unwrap();
DB.with(|db| {
@@ -198,7 +201,8 @@
if !android_security_flags::fix_unlocked_device_required_keys_v2() {
return Ok(());
}
- check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::Lock).context(ks_err!("Lock"))?;
+ check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::Lock)
+ .context(ks_err!("caller missing Lock permission"))?;
SUPER_KEY.write().unwrap().wipe_plaintext_unlocked_device_required_keys(user_id as u32);
Ok(())
}
@@ -208,7 +212,8 @@
if !android_security_flags::fix_unlocked_device_required_keys_v2() {
return Ok(());
}
- check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::Lock).context(ks_err!("Lock"))?;
+ check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::Lock)
+ .context(ks_err!("caller missing Lock permission"))?;
SUPER_KEY.write().unwrap().wipe_all_unlocked_device_required_keys(user_id as u32);
Ok(())
}
@@ -221,7 +226,8 @@
) -> Result<AuthorizationTokens> {
// Check permission. Function should return if this failed. Therefore having '?' at the end
// is very important.
- check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::GetAuthToken).context(ks_err!("GetAuthToken"))?;
+ check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::GetAuthToken)
+ .context(ks_err!("caller missing GetAuthToken permission"))?;
// If the challenge is zero, return error
if challenge == 0 {
@@ -240,7 +246,8 @@
auth_types: &[HardwareAuthenticatorType],
) -> Result<i64> {
// Check keystore permission.
- check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::GetLastAuthTime).context(ks_err!())?;
+ check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::GetLastAuthTime)
+ .context(ks_err!("caller missing GetLastAuthTime permission"))?;
let mut max_time: i64 = -1;
for auth_type in auth_types.iter() {
diff --git a/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs b/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs
index c917a89..00cbb1c 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
use std::fmt;
use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
use std::ptr::write_volatile;
+use std::ptr::NonNull;
/// A semi fixed size u8 vector that is zeroed when dropped. It can shrink in
/// size but cannot grow larger than the original size (and if it shrinks it
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@
let b = v.into_boxed_slice();
if size > 0 {
// SAFETY: The address range is part of our address space.
- unsafe { mlock(b.as_ptr() as *const std::ffi::c_void, b.len()) }?;
+ unsafe { mlock(NonNull::from(&b).cast(), b.len()) }?;
}
Ok(Self { elems: b, len: size })
}
@@ -79,9 +80,7 @@
if let Err(e) =
// SAFETY: The address range is part of our address space, and was previously locked
// by `mlock` in `ZVec::new` or the `TryFrom<Vec<u8>>` implementation.
- unsafe {
- munlock(self.elems.as_ptr() as *const std::ffi::c_void, self.elems.len())
- }
+ unsafe { munlock(NonNull::from(&self.elems).cast(), self.elems.len()) }
{
log::error!("In ZVec::drop: `munlock` failed: {:?}.", e);
}
@@ -137,7 +136,7 @@
let b = v.into_boxed_slice();
if !b.is_empty() {
// SAFETY: The address range is part of our address space.
- unsafe { mlock(b.as_ptr() as *const std::ffi::c_void, b.len()) }?;
+ unsafe { mlock(NonNull::from(&b).cast(), b.len()) }?;
}
Ok(Self { elems: b, len })
}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/database.rs b/keystore2/src/database.rs
index 2757313..0cc982a 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/database.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/database.rs
@@ -842,11 +842,6 @@
}
}
-/// Shared in-memory databases get destroyed as soon as the last connection to them gets closed.
-/// This object does not allow access to the database connection. But it keeps a database
-/// connection alive in order to keep the in memory per boot database alive.
-pub struct PerBootDbKeepAlive(Connection);
-
impl KeystoreDB {
const UNASSIGNED_KEY_ID: i64 = -1i64;
const CURRENT_DB_VERSION: u32 = 1;
@@ -2864,26 +2859,11 @@
}
/// Find the newest auth token matching the given predicate.
- pub fn find_auth_token_entry<F>(&self, p: F) -> Option<(AuthTokenEntry, BootTime)>
+ pub fn find_auth_token_entry<F>(&self, p: F) -> Option<AuthTokenEntry>
where
F: Fn(&AuthTokenEntry) -> bool,
{
- self.perboot.find_auth_token_entry(p).map(|entry| (entry, self.get_last_off_body()))
- }
-
- /// Insert last_off_body into the metadata table at the initialization of auth token table
- pub fn insert_last_off_body(&self, last_off_body: BootTime) {
- self.perboot.set_last_off_body(last_off_body)
- }
-
- /// Update last_off_body when on_device_off_body is called
- pub fn update_last_off_body(&self, last_off_body: BootTime) {
- self.perboot.set_last_off_body(last_off_body)
- }
-
- /// Get last_off_body time when finding auth tokens
- fn get_last_off_body(&self) -> BootTime {
- self.perboot.get_last_off_body()
+ self.perboot.find_auth_token_entry(p)
}
/// Load descriptor of a key by key id
@@ -5033,7 +5013,7 @@
// This allows us to test repeated elements.
thread_local! {
- static RANDOM_COUNTER: RefCell<i64> = RefCell::new(0);
+ static RANDOM_COUNTER: RefCell<i64> = const { RefCell::new(0) };
}
fn reset_random() {
@@ -5051,23 +5031,6 @@
}
#[test]
- fn test_last_off_body() -> Result<()> {
- let mut db = new_test_db()?;
- db.insert_last_off_body(BootTime::now());
- let tx = db.conn.transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
- tx.commit()?;
- let last_off_body_1 = db.get_last_off_body();
- let one_second = Duration::from_secs(1);
- thread::sleep(one_second);
- db.update_last_off_body(BootTime::now());
- let tx2 = db.conn.transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
- tx2.commit()?;
- let last_off_body_2 = db.get_last_off_body();
- assert!(last_off_body_1 < last_off_body_2);
- Ok(())
- }
-
- #[test]
fn test_unbind_keys_for_user() -> Result<()> {
let mut db = new_test_db()?;
db.unbind_keys_for_user(1, false)?;
@@ -5491,7 +5454,7 @@
// All three entries are in the database
assert_eq!(db.perboot.auth_tokens_len(), 3);
// It selected the most recent timestamp
- assert_eq!(db.find_auth_token_entry(|_| true).unwrap().0.auth_token.mac, b"mac2".to_vec());
+ assert_eq!(db.find_auth_token_entry(|_| true).unwrap().auth_token.mac, b"mac2".to_vec());
Ok(())
}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/database/perboot.rs b/keystore2/src/database/perboot.rs
index 1b7c80d..4727015 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/database/perboot.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/database/perboot.rs
@@ -13,15 +13,14 @@
// limitations under the License.
//! This module implements a per-boot, shared, in-memory storage of auth tokens
-//! and last-time-on-body for the main Keystore 2.0 database module.
+//! for the main Keystore 2.0 database module.
-use super::{AuthTokenEntry, BootTime};
+use super::AuthTokenEntry;
use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
HardwareAuthToken::HardwareAuthToken, HardwareAuthenticatorType::HardwareAuthenticatorType,
};
use lazy_static::lazy_static;
use std::collections::HashSet;
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI64, Ordering};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::RwLock;
@@ -62,17 +61,13 @@
impl Eq for AuthTokenEntryWrap {}
-/// Per-boot state structure. Currently only used to track auth tokens and
-/// last-off-body.
+/// Per-boot state structure. Currently only used to track auth tokens.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct PerbootDB {
// We can use a .unwrap() discipline on this lock, because only panicking
// while holding a .write() lock will poison it. The only write usage is
// an insert call which inserts a pre-constructed pair.
auth_tokens: RwLock<HashSet<AuthTokenEntryWrap>>,
- // Ordering::Relaxed is appropriate for accessing this atomic, since it
- // does not currently need to be synchronized with anything else.
- last_off_body: AtomicI64,
}
lazy_static! {
@@ -102,14 +97,6 @@
matches.sort_by_key(|x| x.0.time_received);
matches.last().map(|x| x.0.clone())
}
- /// Get the last time the device was off the user's body
- pub fn get_last_off_body(&self) -> BootTime {
- BootTime(self.last_off_body.load(Ordering::Relaxed))
- }
- /// Set the last time the device was off the user's body
- pub fn set_last_off_body(&self, last_off_body: BootTime) {
- self.last_off_body.store(last_off_body.0, Ordering::Relaxed)
- }
/// Return how many auth tokens are currently tracked.
pub fn auth_tokens_len(&self) -> usize {
self.auth_tokens.read().unwrap().len()
diff --git a/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs b/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs
index 55c9591..95dd026 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs
@@ -476,7 +476,6 @@
let mut user_id: i32 = -1;
let mut user_secure_ids = Vec::<i64>::new();
let mut key_time_out: Option<i64> = None;
- let mut allow_while_on_body = false;
let mut unlocked_device_required = false;
let mut key_usage_limited: Option<i64> = None;
let mut confirmation_token_receiver: Option<Arc<Mutex<Option<Receiver<Vec<u8>>>>>> = None;
@@ -533,9 +532,6 @@
KeyParameterValue::UnlockedDeviceRequired => {
unlocked_device_required = true;
}
- KeyParameterValue::AllowWhileOnBody => {
- allow_while_on_body = true;
- }
KeyParameterValue::UsageCountLimit(_) => {
// We don't examine the limit here because this is enforced on finish.
// Instead, we store the key_id so that finish can look up the key
@@ -607,13 +603,12 @@
let (hat, state) = if user_secure_ids.is_empty() {
(None, DeferredAuthState::NoAuthRequired)
} else if let Some(key_time_out) = key_time_out {
- let (hat, last_off_body) =
- Self::find_auth_token(|hat: &AuthTokenEntry| match user_auth_type {
- Some(auth_type) => hat.satisfies(&user_secure_ids, auth_type),
- None => false, // not reachable due to earlier check
- })
- .ok_or(Error::Km(Ec::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED))
- .context(ks_err!("No suitable auth token found."))?;
+ let hat = Self::find_auth_token(|hat: &AuthTokenEntry| match user_auth_type {
+ Some(auth_type) => hat.satisfies(&user_secure_ids, auth_type),
+ None => false, // not reachable due to earlier check
+ })
+ .ok_or(Error::Km(Ec::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED))
+ .context(ks_err!("No suitable auth token found."))?;
let now = BootTime::now();
let token_age = now
.checked_sub(&hat.time_received())
@@ -623,9 +618,7 @@
Validity cannot be established."
))?;
- let on_body_extended = allow_while_on_body && last_off_body < hat.time_received();
-
- if token_age.seconds() > key_time_out && !on_body_extended {
+ if token_age.seconds() > key_time_out {
return Err(Error::Km(Ec::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED))
.context(ks_err!("matching auth token is expired."));
}
@@ -660,8 +653,8 @@
let need_auth_token = timeout_bound || unlocked_device_required;
- let hat_and_last_off_body = if need_auth_token {
- let hat_and_last_off_body = Self::find_auth_token(|hat: &AuthTokenEntry| {
+ let hat = if need_auth_token {
+ let hat = Self::find_auth_token(|hat: &AuthTokenEntry| {
if let (Some(auth_type), true) = (user_auth_type, timeout_bound) {
hat.satisfies(&user_secure_ids, auth_type)
} else {
@@ -669,8 +662,7 @@
}
});
Some(
- hat_and_last_off_body
- .ok_or(Error::Km(Ec::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED))
+ hat.ok_or(Error::Km(Ec::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED))
.context(ks_err!("No suitable auth token found."))?,
)
} else {
@@ -678,8 +670,8 @@
};
// Now check the validity of the auth token if the key is timeout bound.
- let hat = match (hat_and_last_off_body, key_time_out) {
- (Some((hat, last_off_body)), Some(key_time_out)) => {
+ let hat = match (hat, key_time_out) {
+ (Some(hat), Some(key_time_out)) => {
let now = BootTime::now();
let token_age = now
.checked_sub(&hat.time_received())
@@ -689,15 +681,13 @@
Validity cannot be established."
))?;
- let on_body_extended = allow_while_on_body && last_off_body < hat.time_received();
-
- if token_age.seconds() > key_time_out && !on_body_extended {
+ if token_age.seconds() > key_time_out {
return Err(Error::Km(Ec::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED))
.context(ks_err!("matching auth token is expired."));
}
Some(hat)
}
- (Some((hat, _)), None) => Some(hat),
+ (Some(hat), None) => Some(hat),
// If timeout_bound is true, above code must have retrieved a HAT or returned with
// KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED. This arm should not be reachable.
(None, Some(_)) => panic!("Logical error."),
@@ -728,7 +718,7 @@
})
}
- fn find_auth_token<F>(p: F) -> Option<(AuthTokenEntry, BootTime)>
+ fn find_auth_token<F>(p: F) -> Option<AuthTokenEntry>
where
F: Fn(&AuthTokenEntry) -> bool,
{
@@ -848,7 +838,7 @@
(challenge == hat.challenge()) && hat.satisfies(&sids, auth_type)
});
- let auth_token = if let Some((auth_token_entry, _)) = result {
+ let auth_token = if let Some(auth_token_entry) = result {
auth_token_entry.take_auth_token()
} else {
// Filter the matching auth tokens by age.
@@ -863,7 +853,7 @@
token_valid && auth_token_entry.satisfies(&sids, auth_type)
});
- if let Some((auth_token_entry, _)) = result {
+ if let Some(auth_token_entry) = result {
auth_token_entry.take_auth_token()
} else {
return Err(AuthzError::Rc(AuthzResponseCode::NO_AUTH_TOKEN_FOUND))
@@ -895,11 +885,7 @@
let result =
Self::find_auth_token(|entry: &AuthTokenEntry| entry.satisfies(&sids, auth_type));
- if let Some((auth_token_entry, _)) = result {
- Some(auth_token_entry.time_received())
- } else {
- None
- }
+ result.map(|auth_token_entry| auth_token_entry.time_received())
}
}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/globals.rs b/keystore2/src/globals.rs
index eb755a6..7ac1038 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/globals.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/globals.rs
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
//! database connections and connections to services that Keystore needs
//! to talk to.
+use crate::async_task::AsyncTask;
use crate::gc::Gc;
use crate::km_compat::{BacklevelKeyMintWrapper, KeyMintV1};
use crate::ks_err;
@@ -23,7 +24,6 @@
use crate::legacy_importer::LegacyImporter;
use crate::super_key::SuperKeyManager;
use crate::utils::watchdog as wd;
-use crate::{async_task::AsyncTask, database::BootTime};
use crate::{
database::KeystoreDB,
database::Uuid,
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@
DB_INIT.call_once(|| {
log::info!("Touching Keystore 2.0 database for this first time since boot.");
- db.insert_last_off_body(BootTime::now());
log::info!("Calling cleanup leftovers.");
let n = db.cleanup_leftovers().expect("Failed to cleanup database on startup.");
if n != 0 {
@@ -247,7 +246,11 @@
}
e => e,
})
- .context(ks_err!("Trying to get Legacy wrapper."))?,
+ .context(ks_err!(
+ "Trying to get Legacy wrapper. Attempt to get keystore \
+ compat service for security level {:?}",
+ *security_level
+ ))?,
None,
)
};
@@ -394,7 +397,7 @@
}
e => e,
})
- .context(ks_err!("Trying to get Legacy wrapper."))
+ .context(ks_err!("Failed attempt to get legacy secure clock."))
}?;
Ok(secureclock)
@@ -437,5 +440,5 @@
_ => None,
}
.ok_or(Error::Km(ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE))
- .context(ks_err!())
+ .context(ks_err!("Failed to get rpc for sec level {:?}", *security_level))
}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs b/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs
index 02a1f16..bd45207 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs
@@ -912,7 +912,8 @@
/// The time in seconds for which the key is authorized for use, after user authentication
#[key_param(tag = AUTH_TIMEOUT, field = Integer)]
AuthTimeout(i32),
- /// The key may be used after authentication timeout if device is still on-body
+ /// The key's authentication timeout, if it has one, is automatically expired when the device is
+ /// removed from the user's body. No longer implemented; this tag is no longer enforced.
#[key_param(tag = ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, field = BoolValue)]
AllowWhileOnBody,
/// The key must be unusable except when the user has provided proof of physical presence
diff --git a/keystore2/src/maintenance.rs b/keystore2/src/maintenance.rs
index 3e34cff..8780e9e 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/maintenance.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/maintenance.rs
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
//! This module implements IKeystoreMaintenance AIDL interface.
-use crate::database::{BootTime, KeyEntryLoadBits, KeyType};
+use crate::database::{KeyEntryLoadBits, KeyType};
use crate::error::map_km_error;
use crate::error::map_or_log_err;
use crate::error::Error;
@@ -224,14 +224,6 @@
Maintenance::call_on_all_security_levels("earlyBootEnded", |dev| dev.earlyBootEnded())
}
- fn on_device_off_body() -> Result<()> {
- // Security critical permission check. This statement must return on fail.
- check_keystore_permission(KeystorePerm::ReportOffBody).context(ks_err!())?;
-
- DB.with(|db| db.borrow_mut().update_last_off_body(BootTime::now()));
- Ok(())
- }
-
fn migrate_key_namespace(source: &KeyDescriptor, destination: &KeyDescriptor) -> Result<()> {
let calling_uid = ThreadState::get_calling_uid();
@@ -355,12 +347,6 @@
map_or_log_err(Self::early_boot_ended(), Ok)
}
- fn onDeviceOffBody(&self) -> BinderResult<()> {
- log::info!("onDeviceOffBody()");
- let _wp = wd::watch_millis("IKeystoreMaintenance::onDeviceOffBody", 500);
- map_or_log_err(Self::on_device_off_body(), Ok)
- }
-
fn migrateKeyNamespace(
&self,
source: &KeyDescriptor,
diff --git a/keystore2/src/permission.rs b/keystore2/src/permission.rs
index bc73744..982bc82 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/permission.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/permission.rs
@@ -137,10 +137,7 @@
/// Checked when earlyBootEnded() is called.
#[selinux(name = early_boot_ended)]
EarlyBootEnded,
- /// Checked when IKeystoreMaintenance::onDeviceOffBody is called.
- #[selinux(name = report_off_body)]
- ReportOffBody,
- /// Checked when IkeystoreMetrics::pullMetrics is called.
+ /// Checked when IKeystoreMetrics::pullMetrics is called.
#[selinux(name = pull_metrics)]
PullMetrics,
/// Checked when IKeystoreMaintenance::deleteAllKeys is called.
diff --git a/keystore2/src/super_key.rs b/keystore2/src/super_key.rs
index 44ce9ab..11ab734 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/super_key.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/super_key.rs
@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@
let mut errs = vec![];
for sid in &biometric.sids {
let sid = *sid;
- if let Some((auth_token_entry, _)) = db.find_auth_token_entry(|entry| {
+ if let Some(auth_token_entry) = db.find_auth_token_entry(|entry| {
entry.auth_token().userId == sid || entry.auth_token().authenticatorId == sid
}) {
let res: Result<(Arc<SuperKey>, Arc<SuperKey>)> = (|| {
diff --git a/keystore2/test_utils/run_as.rs b/keystore2/test_utils/run_as.rs
index be643b6..d39d069 100644
--- a/keystore2/test_utils/run_as.rs
+++ b/keystore2/test_utils/run_as.rs
@@ -29,13 +29,14 @@
use keystore2_selinux as selinux;
use nix::sys::wait::{waitpid, WaitStatus};
use nix::unistd::{
- close, fork, pipe as nix_pipe, read as nix_read, setgid, setuid, write as nix_write,
- ForkResult, Gid, Pid, Uid,
+ fork, pipe as nix_pipe, read as nix_read, setgid, setuid, write as nix_write, ForkResult, Gid,
+ Pid, Uid,
};
use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, Serialize};
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use std::marker::PhantomData;
-use std::os::unix::io::RawFd;
+use std::os::fd::AsRawFd;
+use std::os::fd::OwnedFd;
fn transition(se_context: selinux::Context, uid: Uid, gid: Gid) {
setgid(gid).expect("Failed to set GID. This test might need more privileges.");
@@ -48,35 +49,23 @@
/// PipeReader is a simple wrapper around raw pipe file descriptors.
/// It takes ownership of the file descriptor and closes it on drop. It provides `read_all`, which
/// reads from the pipe into an expending vector, until no more data can be read.
-struct PipeReader(RawFd);
+struct PipeReader(OwnedFd);
impl Read for PipeReader {
fn read(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> std::io::Result<usize> {
- let bytes = nix_read(self.0, buf)?;
+ let bytes = nix_read(self.0.as_raw_fd(), buf)?;
Ok(bytes)
}
}
-impl Drop for PipeReader {
- fn drop(&mut self) {
- close(self.0).expect("Failed to close reader pipe fd.");
- }
-}
-
/// PipeWriter is a simple wrapper around raw pipe file descriptors.
/// It takes ownership of the file descriptor and closes it on drop. It provides `write`, which
/// writes the given buffer into the pipe, returning the number of bytes written.
-struct PipeWriter(RawFd);
-
-impl Drop for PipeWriter {
- fn drop(&mut self) {
- close(self.0).expect("Failed to close writer pipe fd.");
- }
-}
+struct PipeWriter(OwnedFd);
impl Write for PipeWriter {
fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<usize> {
- let written = nix_write(self.0, buf)?;
+ let written = nix_write(&self.0, buf)?;
Ok(written)
}
diff --git a/keystore2/tests/AndroidTest.xml b/keystore2/tests/AndroidTest.xml
index 7db36f7..dde18a9 100644
--- a/keystore2/tests/AndroidTest.xml
+++ b/keystore2/tests/AndroidTest.xml
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
limitations under the License.
-->
<configuration description="Config to run keystore2_client_tests device tests.">
+ <option name="config-descriptor:metadata" key="parameter" value="not_multi_abi" />
<target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer">
</target_preparer>
diff --git a/keystore2/tests/keystore2_client_test_utils.rs b/keystore2/tests/keystore2_client_test_utils.rs
index f270297..7534da3 100644
--- a/keystore2/tests/keystore2_client_test_utils.rs
+++ b/keystore2/tests/keystore2_client_test_utils.rs
@@ -95,14 +95,11 @@
// only system update and not vendor update, newly added attestation properties
// (ro.product.*_for_attestation) reading logic would not be available for such devices
// hence skipping this test for such scenario.
- let api_level = std::str::from_utf8(&get_system_prop("ro.board.first_api_level"))
- .unwrap()
- .parse::<i32>()
- .unwrap();
- // This file is only present on GSI builds.
- let path_buf = PathBuf::from("/system/system_ext/etc/init/init.gsi.rc");
- api_level < 34 && path_buf.as_path().is_file()
+ // This file is only present on GSI builds.
+ let gsi_marker = PathBuf::from("/system/system_ext/etc/init/init.gsi.rc");
+
+ get_vsr_api_level() < 34 && gsi_marker.as_path().is_file()
}
#[macro_export]
@@ -514,15 +511,38 @@
}
}
+fn get_integer_system_prop(name: &str) -> Option<i32> {
+ let val = get_system_prop(name);
+ if val.is_empty() {
+ return None;
+ }
+ let val = std::str::from_utf8(&val).ok()?;
+ val.parse::<i32>().ok()
+}
+
+pub fn get_vsr_api_level() -> i32 {
+ if let Some(api_level) = get_integer_system_prop("ro.vendor.api_level") {
+ return api_level;
+ }
+
+ let vendor_api_level = get_integer_system_prop("ro.board.api_level")
+ .or_else(|| get_integer_system_prop("ro.board.first_api_level"));
+ let product_api_level = get_integer_system_prop("ro.product.first_api_level")
+ .or_else(|| get_integer_system_prop("ro.build.version.sdk"));
+
+ match (vendor_api_level, product_api_level) {
+ (Some(v), Some(p)) => std::cmp::min(v, p),
+ (Some(v), None) => v,
+ (None, Some(p)) => p,
+ _ => panic!("Could not determine VSR API level"),
+ }
+}
+
/// Determines whether the SECOND-IMEI can be used as device attest-id.
pub fn is_second_imei_id_attestation_required(
keystore2: &binder::Strong<dyn IKeystoreService>,
) -> bool {
- let api_level = std::str::from_utf8(&get_system_prop("ro.vendor.api_level"))
- .unwrap()
- .parse::<i32>()
- .unwrap();
- keystore2.getInterfaceVersion().unwrap() >= 3 && api_level > 33
+ keystore2.getInterfaceVersion().unwrap() >= 3 && get_vsr_api_level() > 33
}
/// Run a service command and collect the output.
diff --git a/keystore2/tests/legacy_blobs/keystore2_legacy_blob_tests.rs b/keystore2/tests/legacy_blobs/keystore2_legacy_blob_tests.rs
index 0335159..3be99ee 100644
--- a/keystore2/tests/legacy_blobs/keystore2_legacy_blob_tests.rs
+++ b/keystore2/tests/legacy_blobs/keystore2_legacy_blob_tests.rs
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@
static AUTH_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.security.authorization";
const SELINUX_SHELL_NAMESPACE: i64 = 1;
+fn rkp_only() -> bool {
+ matches!(rustutils::system_properties::read("remote_provisioning.tee.rkp_only"), Ok(Some(v)) if v == "1")
+}
+
fn get_maintenance() -> binder::Strong<dyn IKeystoreMaintenance> {
binder::get_interface(USER_MANAGER_SERVICE_NAME).unwrap()
}
@@ -162,13 +166,13 @@
.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
.unwrap();
// Generate Key BLOB and prepare legacy keystore blob files.
- let att_challenge: &[u8] = b"foo";
+ let att_challenge: Option<&[u8]> = if rkp_only() { None } else { Some(b"foo") };
let key_metadata = key_generations::generate_ec_p256_signing_key(
&sec_level,
Domain::BLOB,
SELINUX_SHELL_NAMESPACE,
None,
- Some(att_challenge),
+ att_challenge,
)
.expect("Failed to generate key blob");
@@ -212,14 +216,12 @@
.unwrap();
}
- let mut path_buf = PathBuf::from("/data/misc/keystore/user_99");
- path_buf.push("9910001_CACERT_authbound");
- if !path_buf.as_path().is_file() {
- make_cert_blob_file(
- path_buf.as_path(),
- key_metadata.certificateChain.as_ref().unwrap(),
- )
- .unwrap();
+ if let Some(chain) = key_metadata.certificateChain.as_ref() {
+ let mut path_buf = PathBuf::from("/data/misc/keystore/user_99");
+ path_buf.push("9910001_CACERT_authbound");
+ if !path_buf.as_path().is_file() {
+ make_cert_blob_file(path_buf.as_path(), chain).unwrap();
+ }
}
// Keystore2 disables the legacy importer when it finds the legacy database empty.
@@ -246,7 +248,7 @@
KeygenResult {
cert: key_metadata.certificate.unwrap(),
- cert_chain: key_metadata.certificateChain.unwrap(),
+ cert_chain: key_metadata.certificateChain.unwrap_or_default(),
key_parameters: key_params,
}
})
@@ -275,7 +277,7 @@
gen_key_result.cert
);
assert_eq!(
- key_entry_response.metadata.certificateChain.unwrap(),
+ key_entry_response.metadata.certificateChain.unwrap_or_default(),
gen_key_result.cert_chain
);
assert_eq!(key_entry_response.metadata.key.domain, Domain::KEY_ID);
@@ -415,13 +417,13 @@
.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
.unwrap();
// Generate Key BLOB and prepare legacy keystore blob files.
- let att_challenge: &[u8] = b"foo";
+ let att_challenge: Option<&[u8]> = if rkp_only() { None } else { Some(b"foo") };
let key_metadata = key_generations::generate_ec_p256_signing_key(
&sec_level,
Domain::BLOB,
SELINUX_SHELL_NAMESPACE,
None,
- Some(att_challenge),
+ att_challenge,
)
.expect("Failed to generate key blob");
@@ -468,15 +470,12 @@
.unwrap();
}
- let mut path_buf = PathBuf::from("/data/misc/keystore/user_98");
- path_buf.push("9810001_CACERT_authboundcertenc");
- if !path_buf.as_path().is_file() {
- make_encrypted_ca_cert_file(
- path_buf.as_path(),
- &super_key,
- key_metadata.certificateChain.as_ref().unwrap(),
- )
- .unwrap();
+ if let Some(chain) = key_metadata.certificateChain.as_ref() {
+ let mut path_buf = PathBuf::from("/data/misc/keystore/user_98");
+ path_buf.push("9810001_CACERT_authboundcertenc");
+ if !path_buf.as_path().is_file() {
+ make_encrypted_ca_cert_file(path_buf.as_path(), &super_key, chain).unwrap();
+ }
}
// Keystore2 disables the legacy importer when it finds the legacy database empty.
@@ -503,7 +502,7 @@
KeygenResult {
cert: key_metadata.certificate.unwrap(),
- cert_chain: key_metadata.certificateChain.unwrap(),
+ cert_chain: key_metadata.certificateChain.unwrap_or_default(),
key_parameters: key_params,
}
})
@@ -532,7 +531,7 @@
gen_key_result.cert
);
assert_eq!(
- key_entry_response.metadata.certificateChain.unwrap(),
+ key_entry_response.metadata.certificateChain.unwrap_or_default(),
gen_key_result.cert_chain
);
diff --git a/provisioner/Android.bp b/provisioner/Android.bp
index d0c934d..ede1ae6 100644
--- a/provisioner/Android.bp
+++ b/provisioner/Android.bp
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
"android.hardware.drm-V1-ndk",
"android.hardware.security.rkp-V3-ndk",
"libbase",
- "libcppbor_external",
+ "libcppbor",
"libcppcose_rkp",
"libjsoncpp",
"libkeymint_remote_prov_support",