Merge changes Ic306bb27,I2aa154a9,Ie4e675ca into main am: f10613d8ae am: 2f1f0b1004
Original change: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/system/security/+/3296934
Change-Id: I6fcdb21b7953890fe4d8a857ba0a0c043d3f8489
Signed-off-by: Automerger Merge Worker <android-build-automerger-merge-worker@system.gserviceaccount.com>
diff --git a/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs b/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs
index a5e2d37..d086dd2 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/enforcements.rs
@@ -653,16 +653,12 @@
/// Check if the device is locked for the given user. If there's no entry yet for the user,
/// we assume that the device is locked
fn is_device_locked(&self, user_id: i32) -> bool {
- // unwrap here because there's no way this mutex guard can be poisoned and
- // because there's no way to recover, even if it is poisoned.
let set = self.device_unlocked_set.lock().unwrap();
!set.contains(&user_id)
}
/// Sets the device locked status for the user. This method is called externally.
pub fn set_device_locked(&self, user_id: i32, device_locked_status: bool) {
- // unwrap here because there's no way this mutex guard can be poisoned and
- // because there's no way to recover, even if it is poisoned.
let mut set = self.device_unlocked_set.lock().unwrap();
if device_locked_status {
set.remove(&user_id);
diff --git a/keystore2/test_utils/authorizations.rs b/keystore2/test_utils/authorizations.rs
index a96d994..d3d6fc4 100644
--- a/keystore2/test_utils/authorizations.rs
+++ b/keystore2/test_utils/authorizations.rs
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@
use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
Algorithm::Algorithm, BlockMode::BlockMode, Digest::Digest, EcCurve::EcCurve,
- KeyParameter::KeyParameter, KeyParameterValue::KeyParameterValue, KeyPurpose::KeyPurpose,
- PaddingMode::PaddingMode, Tag::Tag,
+ HardwareAuthenticatorType::HardwareAuthenticatorType, KeyParameter::KeyParameter,
+ KeyParameterValue::KeyParameterValue, KeyPurpose::KeyPurpose, PaddingMode::PaddingMode,
+ Tag::Tag,
};
/// Helper struct to create set of Authorizations.
@@ -369,6 +370,33 @@
});
self
}
+
+ /// Set user secure ID.
+ pub fn user_secure_id(mut self, sid: i64) -> Self {
+ self.0.push(KeyParameter {
+ tag: Tag::USER_SECURE_ID,
+ value: KeyParameterValue::LongInteger(sid),
+ });
+ self
+ }
+
+ /// Set user auth type.
+ pub fn user_auth_type(mut self, auth_type: HardwareAuthenticatorType) -> Self {
+ self.0.push(KeyParameter {
+ tag: Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE,
+ value: KeyParameterValue::HardwareAuthenticatorType(auth_type),
+ });
+ self
+ }
+
+ /// Set auth timeout.
+ pub fn auth_timeout(mut self, timeout_secs: i32) -> Self {
+ self.0.push(KeyParameter {
+ tag: Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT,
+ value: KeyParameterValue::Integer(timeout_secs),
+ });
+ self
+ }
}
impl Deref for AuthSetBuilder {
diff --git a/keystore2/test_utils/key_generations.rs b/keystore2/test_utils/key_generations.rs
index e63ee60..5e823c2 100644
--- a/keystore2/test_utils/key_generations.rs
+++ b/keystore2/test_utils/key_generations.rs
@@ -392,6 +392,30 @@
})
}
+/// Check for a specific KeyMint error.
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! expect_km_error {
+ { $result:expr, $want:expr } => {
+ match $result {
+ Ok(_) => return Err(format!(
+ "{}:{}: Expected KeyMint error {:?}, found success",
+ file!(),
+ line!(),
+ $want
+ ).into()),
+ Err(s) if s.exception_code() == ExceptionCode::SERVICE_SPECIFIC
+ && s.service_specific_error() == $want.0 => {}
+ Err(e) => return Err(format!(
+ "{}:{}: Expected KeyMint service-specific error {:?}, got {e:?}",
+ file!(),
+ line!(),
+ $want
+ ).into()),
+ }
+
+ };
+}
+
/// Get the value of the given system property, if the given system property doesn't exist
/// then returns an empty byte vector.
pub fn get_system_prop(name: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
diff --git a/keystore2/test_utils/run_as.rs b/keystore2/test_utils/run_as.rs
index 2cd9fec..14a72be 100644
--- a/keystore2/test_utils/run_as.rs
+++ b/keystore2/test_utils/run_as.rs
@@ -32,12 +32,104 @@
fork, pipe as nix_pipe, read as nix_read, setgid, setuid, write as nix_write, ForkResult, Gid,
Pid, Uid,
};
-use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, Serialize};
+use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use std::os::fd::AsRawFd;
use std::os::fd::OwnedFd;
+/// Newtype string error, which can be serialized and transferred out from a sub-process.
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct Error(pub String);
+
+/// Allow ergonomic use of [`anyhow::Error`].
+impl From<anyhow::Error> for Error {
+ fn from(err: anyhow::Error) -> Self {
+ // Use the debug format of [`anyhow::Error`] to include backtrace.
+ Self(format!("{:?}", err))
+ }
+}
+impl From<String> for Error {
+ fn from(val: String) -> Self {
+ Self(val)
+ }
+}
+impl From<&str> for Error {
+ fn from(val: &str) -> Self {
+ Self(val.to_string())
+ }
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for Error {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+ write!(f, "{}", self.0)
+ }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for Error {}
+
+/// Equivalent to the [`assert!`] macro which returns an [`Error`] rather than emitting a panic.
+/// This is useful for test code that is `run_as`, so failures are more accessible.
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! expect {
+ ($cond:expr $(,)?) => {{
+ let result = $cond;
+ if !result {
+ return Err($crate::run_as::Error(format!(
+ "{}:{}: check '{}' failed",
+ file!(),
+ line!(),
+ stringify!($cond)
+ )));
+ }
+ }};
+ ($cond:expr, $($arg:tt)+) => {{
+ let result = $cond;
+ if !result {
+ return Err($crate::run_as::Error(format!(
+ "{}:{}: check '{}' failed: {}",
+ file!(),
+ line!(),
+ stringify!($cond),
+ format_args!($($arg)+)
+ )));
+ }
+ }};
+}
+
+/// Equivalent to the [`assert_eq!`] macro which returns an [`Error`] rather than emitting a panic.
+/// This is useful for test code that is `run_as`, so failures are more accessible.
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! expect_eq {
+ ($left:expr, $right:expr $(,)?) => {{
+ let left = $left;
+ let right = $right;
+ if left != right {
+ return Err($crate::run_as::Error(format!(
+ "{}:{}: assertion {} == {} failed\n left: {left:?}\n right: {right:?}\n",
+ file!(),
+ line!(),
+ stringify!($left),
+ stringify!($right),
+ )));
+ }
+ }};
+ ($left:expr, $right:expr, $($arg:tt)+) => {{
+ let left = $left;
+ let right = $right;
+ if left != right {
+ return Err($crate::run_as::Error(format!(
+ "{}:{}: assertion {} == {} failed: {}\n left: {left:?}\n right: {right:?}\n",
+ file!(),
+ line!(),
+ stringify!($left),
+ stringify!($right),
+ format_args!($($arg)+)
+ )));
+ }
+ }};
+}
+
fn transition(se_context: selinux::Context, uid: Uid, gid: Gid) {
setgid(gid).expect("Failed to set GID. This test might need more privileges.");
setuid(uid).expect("Failed to set UID. This test might need more privileges.");
@@ -119,31 +211,48 @@
/// Receiving blocks until an object of type T has been read from the channel.
/// Panics if an error occurs during io or deserialization.
pub fn recv(&mut self) -> T {
+ match self.recv_err() {
+ Ok(val) => val,
+ Err(e) => panic!("{e}"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Receives a serializable object from the corresponding ChannelWriter.
+ /// Receiving blocks until an object of type T has been read from the channel.
+ pub fn recv_err(&mut self) -> Result<T, Error> {
let mut size_buffer = [0u8; std::mem::size_of::<usize>()];
match self.0.read(&mut size_buffer).expect("In ChannelReader::recv: Failed to read size.") {
r if r != size_buffer.len() => {
- panic!("In ChannelReader::recv: Failed to read size. Insufficient data: {}", r);
+ return Err(format!(
+ "In ChannelReader::recv: Failed to read size. Insufficient data: {}",
+ r
+ )
+ .into());
}
_ => {}
};
let size = usize::from_be_bytes(size_buffer);
let mut data_buffer = vec![0u8; size];
- match self
- .0
- .read(&mut data_buffer)
- .expect("In ChannelReader::recv: Failed to read serialized data.")
- {
- r if r != data_buffer.len() => {
- panic!(
+ match self.0.read(&mut data_buffer) {
+ Ok(r) if r != data_buffer.len() => {
+ return Err(format!(
"In ChannelReader::recv: Failed to read serialized data. Insufficient data: {}",
r
- );
+ )
+ .into());
}
- _ => {}
+ Ok(_) => {}
+ Err(e) => {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "In ChannelReader::recv: Failed to read serialized data: {e:?}"
+ )
+ .into())
+ }
};
- serde_cbor::from_slice(&data_buffer)
- .expect("In ChannelReader::recv: Failed to deserialize data.")
+ serde_cbor::from_slice(&data_buffer).map_err(|e| {
+ format!("In ChannelReader::recv: Failed to deserialize data: {e:?}").into()
+ })
}
}
@@ -186,6 +295,11 @@
/// Get child result. Panics if the child did not exit with status 0 or if a serialization
/// error occurred.
pub fn get_result(mut self) -> R {
+ self.get_death_result()
+ }
+
+ /// Get child result via a mutable reference.
+ fn get_death_result(&mut self) -> R {
let status =
waitpid(self.pid, None).expect("ChildHandle::wait: Failed while waiting for child.");
match status {
@@ -205,6 +319,31 @@
}
}
+impl<R, M> ChildHandle<Result<R, Error>, M>
+where
+ R: Serialize + DeserializeOwned,
+ M: Serialize + DeserializeOwned,
+{
+ /// Receive a response from the child. If the child has closed the response
+ /// channel, assume it has terminated and read the final result.
+ /// Panics on child failure, but will display the child error value.
+ pub fn recv_or_die(&mut self) -> M {
+ match self.response_reader.recv_err() {
+ Ok(v) => v,
+ Err(_e) => {
+ // We have failed to read from the `response_reader` channel.
+ // Assume this is because the child completed early with an error.
+ match self.get_death_result() {
+ Ok(_) => {
+ panic!("Child completed OK despite failure to read a response!")
+ }
+ Err(e) => panic!("Child failed with:\n{e}"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
impl<R: Serialize + DeserializeOwned, M: Serialize + DeserializeOwned> Drop for ChildHandle<R, M> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if self.exit_status.is_none() {
diff --git a/keystore2/tests/Android.bp b/keystore2/tests/Android.bp
index dbef46c..0406a71 100644
--- a/keystore2/tests/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore2/tests/Android.bp
@@ -42,12 +42,14 @@
test_config: "AndroidTest.xml",
rustlibs: [
+ "android.hardware.gatekeeper-V1-rust",
"android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-rust",
"android.security.authorization-rust",
"android.security.maintenance-rust",
"libaconfig_android_hardware_biometrics_rust",
"libandroid_logger",
"libandroid_security_flags_rust",
+ "libanyhow",
"libbinder_rs",
"libkeystore2_test_utils",
"liblog_rust",
diff --git a/keystore2/tests/keystore2_client_test_utils.rs b/keystore2/tests/keystore2_client_test_utils.rs
index f028a65..9029b97 100644
--- a/keystore2/tests/keystore2_client_test_utils.rs
+++ b/keystore2/tests/keystore2_client_test_utils.rs
@@ -51,10 +51,21 @@
OtherErr,
}
-/// This is used to notify the child or parent process that the expected state is reched.
+/// This is used to notify the child or parent process that the expected state is reached.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BarrierReached;
+/// This is used to notify the child or parent process that the expected state is reached,
+/// passing a value
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct BarrierReachedWithData<T: Send + Sync>(pub T);
+
+impl<T: Send + Sync> BarrierReachedWithData<T> {
+ pub fn new(val: T) -> Self {
+ Self(val)
+ }
+}
+
/// Forced operation.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ForcedOp(pub bool);
diff --git a/keystore2/tests/user_auth.rs b/keystore2/tests/user_auth.rs
index 4e3c692..336af4f 100644
--- a/keystore2/tests/user_auth.rs
+++ b/keystore2/tests/user_auth.rs
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
//! Tests for user authentication interactions (via `IKeystoreAuthorization`).
-use crate::keystore2_client_test_utils::BarrierReached;
+use crate::keystore2_client_test_utils::{BarrierReached, BarrierReachedWithData};
use android_security_authorization::aidl::android::security::authorization::{
IKeystoreAuthorization::IKeystoreAuthorization
};
@@ -22,39 +22,52 @@
IKeystoreMaintenance,
};
use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
- Algorithm::Algorithm, Digest::Digest, EcCurve::EcCurve, HardwareAuthToken::HardwareAuthToken,
- HardwareAuthenticatorType::HardwareAuthenticatorType, SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel,
- KeyPurpose::KeyPurpose
+ Algorithm::Algorithm, Digest::Digest, EcCurve::EcCurve, ErrorCode::ErrorCode,
+ HardwareAuthToken::HardwareAuthToken, HardwareAuthenticatorType::HardwareAuthenticatorType,
+ KeyPurpose::KeyPurpose, SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel,
+};
+use android_hardware_gatekeeper::aidl::android::hardware::gatekeeper::{
+ IGatekeeper::IGatekeeper, IGatekeeper::ERROR_RETRY_TIMEOUT,
};
use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::{
CreateOperationResponse::CreateOperationResponse, Domain::Domain, KeyDescriptor::KeyDescriptor,
KeyMetadata::KeyMetadata,
};
+use android_system_keystore2::binder::{ExceptionCode, Result as BinderResult};
use android_hardware_security_secureclock::aidl::android::hardware::security::secureclock::{
Timestamp::Timestamp,
};
+use anyhow::Context;
use keystore2_test_utils::{
- get_keystore_service, run_as, authorizations::AuthSetBuilder,
+ authorizations::AuthSetBuilder, expect, get_keystore_service, run_as,
+ run_as::{ChannelReader, ChannelWriter}, expect_km_error,
};
use log::{warn, info};
use nix::unistd::{Gid, Uid};
use rustutils::users::AID_USER_OFFSET;
+use std::{time::Duration, thread::sleep};
+/// SELinux context.
+const CTX: &str = "u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c91,c256,c10,c20";
/// Test user ID.
const TEST_USER_ID: i32 = 100;
-/// Fake password blob.
-static PASSWORD: &[u8] = &[
+/// Corresponding uid value.
+const UID: u32 = TEST_USER_ID as u32 * AID_USER_OFFSET + 1001;
+/// Fake synthetic password blob.
+static SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD: &[u8] = &[
0x42, 0x39, 0x30, 0x37, 0x44, 0x37, 0x32, 0x37, 0x39, 0x39, 0x43, 0x42, 0x39, 0x41, 0x42, 0x30,
0x34, 0x31, 0x30, 0x38, 0x46, 0x44, 0x33, 0x45, 0x39, 0x42, 0x32, 0x38, 0x36, 0x35, 0x41, 0x36,
0x33, 0x44, 0x42, 0x42, 0x43, 0x36, 0x33, 0x42, 0x34, 0x39, 0x37, 0x33, 0x35, 0x45, 0x41, 0x41,
0x32, 0x45, 0x31, 0x35, 0x43, 0x43, 0x46, 0x32, 0x39, 0x36, 0x33, 0x34, 0x31, 0x32, 0x41, 0x39,
];
+/// Gatekeeper password.
+static GK_PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"correcthorsebatterystaple";
/// Fake SID value corresponding to Gatekeeper.
-static GK_SID: i64 = 123456;
+static GK_FAKE_SID: i64 = 123456;
/// Fake SID value corresponding to a biometric authenticator.
-static BIO_SID1: i64 = 345678;
+static BIO_FAKE_SID1: i64 = 345678;
/// Fake SID value corresponding to a biometric authenticator.
-static BIO_SID2: i64 = 456789;
+static BIO_FAKE_SID2: i64 = 456789;
const WEAK_UNLOCK_ENABLED: bool = true;
const WEAK_UNLOCK_DISABLED: bool = false;
@@ -68,6 +81,18 @@
binder::get_interface("android.security.maintenance").unwrap()
}
+/// Get the default Gatekeeper instance. This may fail on older devices where Gatekeeper is still a
+/// HIDL interface rather than AIDL.
+fn get_gatekeeper() -> Option<binder::Strong<dyn IGatekeeper>> {
+ binder::get_interface("android.hardware.gatekeeper.IGatekeeper/default").ok()
+}
+
+/// Indicate whether a Gatekeeper result indicates a delayed-retry is needed.
+fn is_gk_retry<T: std::fmt::Debug>(result: &BinderResult<T>) -> bool {
+ matches!(result, Err(s) if s.exception_code() == ExceptionCode::SERVICE_SPECIFIC
+ && s.service_specific_error() == ERROR_RETRY_TIMEOUT)
+}
+
fn abort_op(result: binder::Result<CreateOperationResponse>) {
if let Ok(rsp) = result {
if let Some(op) = rsp.iOperation {
@@ -86,117 +111,684 @@
struct TestUser {
id: i32,
maint: binder::Strong<dyn IKeystoreMaintenance>,
+ gk: Option<binder::Strong<dyn IGatekeeper>>,
+ gk_sid: Option<i64>,
+ gk_handle: Vec<u8>,
}
impl TestUser {
fn new() -> Self {
- Self::new_user(TEST_USER_ID, PASSWORD)
+ Self::new_user(TEST_USER_ID, SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD)
}
- fn new_user(user_id: i32, password: &[u8]) -> Self {
+ fn new_user(user_id: i32, sp: &[u8]) -> Self {
let maint = get_maintenance();
maint.onUserAdded(user_id).expect("failed to add test user");
maint
- .initUserSuperKeys(user_id, password, /* allowExisting= */ false)
+ .initUserSuperKeys(user_id, sp, /* allowExisting= */ false)
.expect("failed to init test user");
- Self { id: user_id, maint }
+ let gk = get_gatekeeper();
+ let (gk_sid, gk_handle) = if let Some(gk) = &gk {
+ // AIDL Gatekeeper is available, so enroll a password.
+ loop {
+ let result = gk.enroll(user_id, &[], &[], GK_PASSWORD);
+ if is_gk_retry(&result) {
+ sleep(Duration::from_secs(1));
+ continue;
+ }
+ let rsp = result.expect("gk.enroll() failed");
+ info!("registered test user {user_id} as sid {} with GK", rsp.secureUserId);
+ break (Some(rsp.secureUserId), rsp.data);
+ }
+ } else {
+ (None, vec![])
+ };
+ Self { id: user_id, maint, gk, gk_sid, gk_handle }
+ }
+
+ /// Perform Gatekeeper verification, which will return a HAT on success.
+ fn gk_verify(&self, challenge: i64) -> Option<HardwareAuthToken> {
+ let Some(gk) = &self.gk else { return None };
+ loop {
+ let result = gk.verify(self.id, challenge, &self.gk_handle, GK_PASSWORD);
+ if is_gk_retry(&result) {
+ sleep(Duration::from_secs(1));
+ continue;
+ }
+ let rsp = result.expect("gk.verify failed");
+ break Some(rsp.hardwareAuthToken);
+ }
}
}
impl Drop for TestUser {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = self.maint.onUserRemoved(self.id);
+ if let Some(gk) = &self.gk {
+ info!("deregister test user {} with GK", self.id);
+ if let Err(e) = gk.deleteUser(self.id) {
+ warn!("failed to deregister test user {}: {e:?}", self.id);
+ }
+ }
}
}
#[test]
-fn keystore2_test_unlocked_device_required() {
+fn test_auth_bound_timeout_with_gk() {
+ type Barrier = BarrierReachedWithData<Option<i64>>;
android_logger::init_once(
android_logger::Config::default()
.with_tag("keystore2_client_tests")
.with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug),
);
- static CTX: &str = "u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c91,c256,c10,c20";
- const UID: u32 = TEST_USER_ID as u32 * AID_USER_OFFSET + 1001;
- // Safety: only one thread at this point, and nothing yet done with binder.
+ let child_fn = move |reader: &mut ChannelReader<Barrier>,
+ writer: &mut ChannelWriter<Barrier>|
+ -> Result<(), run_as::Error> {
+ // Now we're in a new process, wait to be notified before starting.
+ let gk_sid: i64 = match reader.recv().0 {
+ Some(sid) => sid,
+ None => {
+ // There is no AIDL Gatekeeper available, so abandon the test. It would be nice to
+ // know this before starting the child process, but finding it out requires Binder,
+ // which can't be used until after the child has forked.
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ };
+
+ // Action A: create a new auth-bound key which requires auth in the last 3 seconds,
+ // and fail to start an operation using it.
+ let ks2 = get_keystore_service();
+ let sec_level =
+ ks2.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT).context("no TEE")?;
+ let params = AuthSetBuilder::new()
+ .user_secure_id(gk_sid)
+ .user_secure_id(BIO_FAKE_SID1)
+ .user_secure_id(BIO_FAKE_SID2)
+ .user_auth_type(HardwareAuthenticatorType::ANY)
+ .auth_timeout(3)
+ .algorithm(Algorithm::EC)
+ .purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN)
+ .purpose(KeyPurpose::VERIFY)
+ .digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .ec_curve(EcCurve::P_256);
+
+ let KeyMetadata { key, .. } = sec_level
+ .generateKey(
+ &KeyDescriptor {
+ domain: Domain::APP,
+ nspace: -1,
+ alias: Some("auth-bound-timeout".to_string()),
+ blob: None,
+ },
+ None,
+ ¶ms,
+ 0,
+ b"entropy",
+ )
+ .context("key generation failed")?;
+ info!("A: created auth-timeout key {key:?}");
+
+ // No HATs so cannot create an operation using the key.
+ let params = AuthSetBuilder::new().purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN).digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
+ expect_km_error!(&result, ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED);
+ info!("A: failed auth-bound operation (no HAT) as expected {result:?}");
+
+ writer.send(&Barrier::new(None)); // A done.
+
+ // Action B: succeed when a valid HAT is available.
+ reader.recv();
+
+ let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
+ expect!(result.is_ok());
+ let op = result.unwrap().iOperation.context("no operation in result")?;
+ let result = op.finish(Some(b"data"), None);
+ expect!(result.is_ok());
+ info!("B: performed auth-bound operation (with valid GK HAT) as expected");
+
+ writer.send(&Barrier::new(None)); // B done.
+
+ // Action C: fail again when the HAT is old enough to not even be checked.
+ reader.recv();
+ info!("C: wait so that any HAT times out");
+ sleep(Duration::from_secs(4));
+ let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
+ info!("C: failed auth-bound operation (HAT is too old) as expected {result:?}");
+ writer.send(&Barrier::new(None)); // C done.
+
+ Ok(())
+ };
+
+ // Safety: only one thread at this point (enforced by `AndroidTest.xml` setting
+ // `--test-threads=1`), and nothing yet done with binder.
let mut child_handle = unsafe {
// Perform keystore actions while running as the test user.
- run_as::run_as_child(
- CTX,
- Uid::from_raw(UID),
- Gid::from_raw(UID),
- move |reader, writer| -> Result<(), String> {
- // Action A: create a new unlocked-device-required key (which thus requires
- // super-encryption), while the device is unlocked.
- let ks2 = get_keystore_service();
- if ks2.getInterfaceVersion().unwrap() < 4 {
- // Assuming `IKeystoreAuthorization::onDeviceLocked` and
- // `IKeystoreAuthorization::onDeviceUnlocked` APIs will be supported on devices
- // with `IKeystoreService` >= 4.
- return Ok(());
- }
+ run_as::run_as_child(CTX, Uid::from_raw(UID), Gid::from_raw(UID), child_fn)
+ }
+ .unwrap();
- // Now we're in a new process, wait to be notified before starting.
- reader.recv();
+ // Now that the separate process has been forked off, it's safe to use binder to setup a test
+ // user.
+ let _ks2 = get_keystore_service();
+ let user = TestUser::new();
+ if user.gk.is_none() {
+ // Can't run this test if there's no AIDL Gatekeeper.
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(None));
+ assert_eq!(child_handle.get_result(), Ok(()), "child process failed");
+ return;
+ }
+ let user_id = user.id;
+ let auth_service = get_authorization();
- let sec_level = ks2.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT).unwrap();
- let params = AuthSetBuilder::new()
- .no_auth_required()
- .unlocked_device_required()
- .algorithm(Algorithm::EC)
- .purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN)
- .purpose(KeyPurpose::VERIFY)
- .digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
- .ec_curve(EcCurve::P_256);
+ // Lock and unlock to ensure super keys are already created.
+ auth_service
+ .onDeviceLocked(user_id, &[BIO_FAKE_SID1, BIO_FAKE_SID2], WEAK_UNLOCK_DISABLED)
+ .unwrap();
+ auth_service.onDeviceUnlocked(user_id, Some(SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD)).unwrap();
- let KeyMetadata { key, .. } = sec_level
- .generateKey(
- &KeyDescriptor {
- domain: Domain::APP,
- nspace: -1,
- alias: Some("unlocked-device-required".to_string()),
- blob: None,
- },
- None,
- ¶ms,
- 0,
- b"entropy",
- )
- .expect("key generation failed");
- info!("A: created unlocked-device-required key while unlocked {key:?}");
- writer.send(&BarrierReached {}); // A done.
+ info!("trigger child process action A and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(Some(user.gk_sid.unwrap())));
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
- // Action B: fail to use the unlocked-device-required key while locked.
- reader.recv();
- let params =
- AuthSetBuilder::new().purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN).digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
- let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
- info!("B: use unlocked-device-required key while locked => {result:?}");
- assert!(result.is_err());
- writer.send(&BarrierReached {}); // B done.
+ // Unlock with GK password to get a genuine auth token.
+ let real_hat = user.gk_verify(0).expect("failed to perform GK verify");
+ auth_service.addAuthToken(&real_hat).unwrap();
- // Action C: try to use the unlocked-device-required key while unlocked with a
- // password.
- reader.recv();
- let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
- info!("C: use unlocked-device-required key while lskf-unlocked => {result:?}");
- assert!(result.is_ok(), "failed with {result:?}");
- abort_op(result);
- writer.send(&BarrierReached {}); // C done.
+ info!("trigger child process action B and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(None));
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
- // Action D: try to use the unlocked-device-required key while unlocked with a weak
- // biometric.
- reader.recv();
- let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
- info!("D: use unlocked-device-required key while weak-locked => {result:?}");
- assert!(result.is_ok(), "createOperation failed: {result:?}");
- abort_op(result);
- writer.send(&BarrierReached {}); // D done.
+ info!("trigger child process action C and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(None));
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
- let _ = sec_level.deleteKey(&key);
- Ok(())
- },
- )
+ assert_eq!(child_handle.get_result(), Ok(()), "child process failed");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_auth_bound_timeout_failure() {
+ android_logger::init_once(
+ android_logger::Config::default()
+ .with_tag("keystore2_client_tests")
+ .with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug),
+ );
+
+ let child_fn = move |reader: &mut ChannelReader<BarrierReached>,
+ writer: &mut ChannelWriter<BarrierReached>|
+ -> Result<(), run_as::Error> {
+ // Now we're in a new process, wait to be notified before starting.
+ reader.recv();
+
+ // Action A: create a new auth-bound key which requires auth in the last 3 seconds,
+ // and fail to start an operation using it.
+ let ks2 = get_keystore_service();
+
+ let sec_level =
+ ks2.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT).context("no TEE")?;
+ let params = AuthSetBuilder::new()
+ .user_secure_id(BIO_FAKE_SID1)
+ .user_secure_id(BIO_FAKE_SID2)
+ .user_auth_type(HardwareAuthenticatorType::ANY)
+ .auth_timeout(3)
+ .algorithm(Algorithm::EC)
+ .purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN)
+ .purpose(KeyPurpose::VERIFY)
+ .digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .ec_curve(EcCurve::P_256);
+
+ let KeyMetadata { key, .. } = sec_level
+ .generateKey(
+ &KeyDescriptor {
+ domain: Domain::APP,
+ nspace: -1,
+ alias: Some("auth-bound-timeout".to_string()),
+ blob: None,
+ },
+ None,
+ ¶ms,
+ 0,
+ b"entropy",
+ )
+ .context("key generation failed")?;
+ info!("A: created auth-timeout key {key:?}");
+
+ // No HATs so cannot create an operation using the key.
+ let params = AuthSetBuilder::new().purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN).digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
+ expect_km_error!(&result, ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED);
+ info!("A: failed auth-bound operation (no HAT) as expected {result:?}");
+
+ writer.send(&BarrierReached {}); // A done.
+
+ // Action B: fail again when an invalid HAT is available.
+ reader.recv();
+
+ let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
+ expect_km_error!(&result, ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED);
+ info!("B: failed auth-bound operation (HAT is invalid) as expected {result:?}");
+
+ writer.send(&BarrierReached {}); // B done.
+
+ // Action C: fail again when the HAT is old enough to not even be checked.
+ reader.recv();
+ info!("C: wait so that any HAT times out");
+ sleep(Duration::from_secs(4));
+ let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
+ expect_km_error!(&result, ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED);
+ info!("C: failed auth-bound operation (HAT is too old) as expected {result:?}");
+ writer.send(&BarrierReached {}); // C done.
+
+ Ok(())
+ };
+
+ // Safety: only one thread at this point (enforced by `AndroidTest.xml` setting
+ // `--test-threads=1`), and nothing yet done with binder.
+ let mut child_handle = unsafe {
+ // Perform keystore actions while running as the test user.
+ run_as::run_as_child(CTX, Uid::from_raw(UID), Gid::from_raw(UID), child_fn)
+ }
+ .unwrap();
+
+ // Now that the separate process has been forked off, it's safe to use binder to setup a test
+ // user.
+ let _ks2 = get_keystore_service();
+ let user = TestUser::new();
+ let user_id = user.id;
+ let auth_service = get_authorization();
+
+ // Lock and unlock to ensure super keys are already created.
+ auth_service
+ .onDeviceLocked(user_id, &[BIO_FAKE_SID1, BIO_FAKE_SID2], WEAK_UNLOCK_DISABLED)
+ .unwrap();
+ auth_service.onDeviceUnlocked(user_id, Some(SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD)).unwrap();
+ auth_service.addAuthToken(&fake_lskf_token(GK_FAKE_SID)).unwrap();
+
+ info!("trigger child process action A and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&BarrierReached {});
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
+
+ // Unlock with password and a fake auth token that matches the key
+ auth_service.onDeviceUnlocked(user_id, Some(SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD)).unwrap();
+ auth_service.addAuthToken(&fake_bio_lskf_token(GK_FAKE_SID, BIO_FAKE_SID1)).unwrap();
+
+ info!("trigger child process action B and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&BarrierReached {});
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
+
+ info!("trigger child process action C and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&BarrierReached {});
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
+
+ assert_eq!(child_handle.get_result(), Ok(()), "child process failed");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_auth_bound_per_op_with_gk() {
+ type Barrier = BarrierReachedWithData<Option<i64>>;
+ android_logger::init_once(
+ android_logger::Config::default()
+ .with_tag("keystore2_client_tests")
+ .with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug),
+ );
+
+ let child_fn = move |reader: &mut ChannelReader<Barrier>,
+ writer: &mut ChannelWriter<Barrier>|
+ -> Result<(), run_as::Error> {
+ // Now we're in a new process, wait to be notified before starting.
+ let gk_sid: i64 = match reader.recv().0 {
+ Some(sid) => sid,
+ None => {
+ // There is no AIDL Gatekeeper available, so abandon the test. It would be nice to
+ // know this before starting the child process, but finding it out requires Binder,
+ // which can't be used until after the child has forked.
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ };
+
+ // Action A: create a new auth-bound key which requires auth-per-operation (because
+ // AUTH_TIMEOUT is not specified), and fail to finish an operation using it.
+ let ks2 = get_keystore_service();
+ let sec_level =
+ ks2.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT).context("no TEE")?;
+ let params = AuthSetBuilder::new()
+ .user_secure_id(gk_sid)
+ .user_secure_id(BIO_FAKE_SID1)
+ .user_auth_type(HardwareAuthenticatorType::ANY)
+ .algorithm(Algorithm::EC)
+ .purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN)
+ .purpose(KeyPurpose::VERIFY)
+ .digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .ec_curve(EcCurve::P_256);
+
+ let KeyMetadata { key, .. } = sec_level
+ .generateKey(
+ &KeyDescriptor {
+ domain: Domain::APP,
+ nspace: -1,
+ alias: Some("auth-per-op".to_string()),
+ blob: None,
+ },
+ None,
+ ¶ms,
+ 0,
+ b"entropy",
+ )
+ .context("key generation failed")?;
+ info!("A: created auth-per-op key {key:?}");
+
+ // We can create an operation using the key...
+ let params = AuthSetBuilder::new().purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN).digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ let result = sec_level
+ .createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED)
+ .expect("failed to create auth-per-op operation");
+ let op = result.iOperation.context("no operation in result")?;
+ info!("A: created auth-per-op operation, got challenge {:?}", result.operationChallenge);
+
+ // .. but attempting to finish the operation fails because Keystore can't find a HAT.
+ let result = op.finish(Some(b"data"), None);
+ expect_km_error!(&result, ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED);
+ info!("A: failed auth-per-op op (no HAT) as expected {result:?}");
+
+ writer.send(&Barrier::new(None)); // A done.
+
+ // Action B: start an operation and pass out the challenge
+ reader.recv();
+ let result = sec_level
+ .createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED)
+ .expect("failed to create auth-per-op operation");
+ let op = result.iOperation.context("no operation in result")?;
+ info!("B: created auth-per-op operation, got challenge {:?}", result.operationChallenge);
+ writer.send(&Barrier::new(Some(result.operationChallenge.unwrap().challenge))); // B done.
+
+ // Action C: finishing the operation succeeds now there's a per-op HAT.
+ reader.recv();
+ let result = op.finish(Some(b"data"), None);
+ expect!(result.is_ok());
+ info!("C: performed auth-per-op op expected");
+ writer.send(&Barrier::new(None)); // D done.
+
+ Ok(())
+ };
+
+ // Safety: only one thread at this point (enforced by `AndroidTest.xml` setting
+ // `--test-threads=1`), and nothing yet done with binder.
+ let mut child_handle = unsafe {
+ // Perform keystore actions while running as the test user.
+ run_as::run_as_child(CTX, Uid::from_raw(UID), Gid::from_raw(UID), child_fn)
+ }
+ .unwrap();
+
+ // Now that the separate process has been forked off, it's safe to use binder to setup a test
+ // user.
+ let _ks2 = get_keystore_service();
+ let user = TestUser::new();
+ if user.gk.is_none() {
+ // Can't run this test if there's no AIDL Gatekeeper.
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(None));
+ assert_eq!(child_handle.get_result(), Ok(()), "child process failed");
+ return;
+ }
+ let user_id = user.id;
+ let auth_service = get_authorization();
+
+ // Lock and unlock to ensure super keys are already created.
+ auth_service
+ .onDeviceLocked(user_id, &[BIO_FAKE_SID1, BIO_FAKE_SID2], WEAK_UNLOCK_DISABLED)
+ .unwrap();
+ auth_service.onDeviceUnlocked(user_id, Some(SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD)).unwrap();
+
+ info!("trigger child process action A and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(Some(user.gk_sid.unwrap())));
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
+
+ info!("trigger child process action B and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(None));
+ let challenge = child_handle.recv_or_die().0.expect("no challenge");
+
+ // Unlock with GK and the challenge to get a genuine per-op auth token
+ let real_hat = user.gk_verify(challenge).expect("failed to perform GK verify");
+ auth_service.addAuthToken(&real_hat).unwrap();
+
+ info!("trigger child process action C and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(None));
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
+
+ assert_eq!(child_handle.get_result(), Ok(()), "child process failed");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_auth_bound_per_op_failure() {
+ type Barrier = BarrierReachedWithData<i64>;
+ android_logger::init_once(
+ android_logger::Config::default()
+ .with_tag("keystore2_client_tests")
+ .with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug),
+ );
+
+ let child_fn = move |reader: &mut ChannelReader<Barrier>,
+ writer: &mut ChannelWriter<Barrier>|
+ -> Result<(), run_as::Error> {
+ // Now we're in a new process, wait to be notified before starting.
+ reader.recv();
+
+ // Action A: create a new auth-bound key which requires auth-per-operation (because
+ // AUTH_TIMEOUT is not specified), and fail to finish an operation using it.
+ let ks2 = get_keystore_service();
+
+ let sec_level =
+ ks2.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT).context("no TEE")?;
+ let params = AuthSetBuilder::new()
+ .user_secure_id(GK_FAKE_SID)
+ .user_secure_id(BIO_FAKE_SID1)
+ .user_auth_type(HardwareAuthenticatorType::ANY)
+ .algorithm(Algorithm::EC)
+ .purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN)
+ .purpose(KeyPurpose::VERIFY)
+ .digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .ec_curve(EcCurve::P_256);
+
+ let KeyMetadata { key, .. } = sec_level
+ .generateKey(
+ &KeyDescriptor {
+ domain: Domain::APP,
+ nspace: -1,
+ alias: Some("auth-per-op".to_string()),
+ blob: None,
+ },
+ None,
+ ¶ms,
+ 0,
+ b"entropy",
+ )
+ .context("key generation failed")?;
+ info!("A: created auth-per-op key {key:?}");
+
+ // We can create an operation using the key...
+ let params = AuthSetBuilder::new().purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN).digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ let result = sec_level
+ .createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED)
+ .expect("failed to create auth-per-op operation");
+ let op = result.iOperation.context("no operation in result")?;
+ info!("A: created auth-per-op operation, got challenge {:?}", result.operationChallenge);
+
+ // .. but attempting to finish the operation fails because Keystore can't find a HAT.
+ let result = op.finish(Some(b"data"), None);
+ expect_km_error!(&result, ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED);
+ info!("A: failed auth-per-op op (no HAT) as expected {result:?}");
+
+ writer.send(&Barrier::new(0)); // A done.
+
+ // Action B: fail again when an irrelevant HAT is available.
+ reader.recv();
+
+ let result = sec_level
+ .createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED)
+ .expect("failed to create auth-per-op operation");
+ let op = result.iOperation.context("no operation in result")?;
+ info!("B: created auth-per-op operation, got challenge {:?}", result.operationChallenge);
+ // The operation fails because the HAT that Keystore received is not related to the
+ // challenge.
+ let result = op.finish(Some(b"data"), None);
+ expect_km_error!(&result, ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED);
+ info!("B: failed auth-per-op op (HAT is not per-op) as expected {result:?}");
+
+ writer.send(&Barrier::new(0)); // B done.
+
+ // Action C: start an operation and pass out the challenge
+ reader.recv();
+ let result = sec_level
+ .createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED)
+ .expect("failed to create auth-per-op operation");
+ let op = result.iOperation.context("no operation in result")?;
+ info!("C: created auth-per-op operation, got challenge {:?}", result.operationChallenge);
+ writer.send(&Barrier::new(result.operationChallenge.unwrap().challenge)); // C done.
+
+ // Action D: finishing the operation still fails because the per-op HAT
+ // is invalid (the HMAC signature is faked and so the secure world
+ // rejects the HAT).
+ reader.recv();
+ let result = op.finish(Some(b"data"), None);
+ expect_km_error!(&result, ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED);
+ info!("D: failed auth-per-op op (HAT is per-op but invalid) as expected {result:?}");
+ writer.send(&Barrier::new(0)); // D done.
+
+ Ok(())
+ };
+
+ // Safety: only one thread at this point (enforced by `AndroidTest.xml` setting
+ // `--test-threads=1`), and nothing yet done with binder.
+ let mut child_handle = unsafe {
+ // Perform keystore actions while running as the test user.
+ run_as::run_as_child(CTX, Uid::from_raw(UID), Gid::from_raw(UID), child_fn)
+ }
+ .unwrap();
+
+ // Now that the separate process has been forked off, it's safe to use binder to setup a test
+ // user.
+ let _ks2 = get_keystore_service();
+ let user = TestUser::new();
+ let user_id = user.id;
+ let auth_service = get_authorization();
+
+ // Lock and unlock to ensure super keys are already created.
+ auth_service
+ .onDeviceLocked(user_id, &[BIO_FAKE_SID1, BIO_FAKE_SID2], WEAK_UNLOCK_DISABLED)
+ .unwrap();
+ auth_service.onDeviceUnlocked(user_id, Some(SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD)).unwrap();
+ auth_service.addAuthToken(&fake_lskf_token(GK_FAKE_SID)).unwrap();
+
+ info!("trigger child process action A and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(0));
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
+
+ // Unlock with password and a fake auth token.
+ auth_service.onDeviceUnlocked(user_id, Some(SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD)).unwrap();
+ auth_service.addAuthToken(&fake_lskf_token(GK_FAKE_SID)).unwrap();
+
+ info!("trigger child process action B and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(0));
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
+
+ info!("trigger child process action C and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(0));
+ let challenge = child_handle.recv_or_die().0;
+
+ // Add a fake auth token with the challenge value.
+ auth_service.addAuthToken(&fake_lskf_token_with_challenge(GK_FAKE_SID, challenge)).unwrap();
+
+ info!("trigger child process action D and wait for completion");
+ child_handle.send(&Barrier::new(0));
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
+
+ assert_eq!(child_handle.get_result(), Ok(()), "child process failed");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_unlocked_device_required() {
+ android_logger::init_once(
+ android_logger::Config::default()
+ .with_tag("keystore2_client_tests")
+ .with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug),
+ );
+
+ let child_fn = move |reader: &mut ChannelReader<BarrierReached>,
+ writer: &mut ChannelWriter<BarrierReached>|
+ -> Result<(), run_as::Error> {
+ let ks2 = get_keystore_service();
+ if ks2.getInterfaceVersion().unwrap() < 4 {
+ // Assuming `IKeystoreAuthorization::onDeviceLocked` and
+ // `IKeystoreAuthorization::onDeviceUnlocked` APIs will be supported on devices
+ // with `IKeystoreService` >= 4.
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+
+ // Now we're in a new process, wait to be notified before starting.
+ reader.recv();
+
+ // Action A: create a new unlocked-device-required key (which thus requires
+ // super-encryption), while the device is unlocked.
+ let sec_level =
+ ks2.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT).context("no TEE")?;
+ let params = AuthSetBuilder::new()
+ .no_auth_required()
+ .unlocked_device_required()
+ .algorithm(Algorithm::EC)
+ .purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN)
+ .purpose(KeyPurpose::VERIFY)
+ .digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .ec_curve(EcCurve::P_256);
+
+ let KeyMetadata { key, .. } = sec_level
+ .generateKey(
+ &KeyDescriptor {
+ domain: Domain::APP,
+ nspace: -1,
+ alias: Some("unlocked-device-required".to_string()),
+ blob: None,
+ },
+ None,
+ ¶ms,
+ 0,
+ b"entropy",
+ )
+ .context("key generation failed")?;
+ info!("A: created unlocked-device-required key while unlocked {key:?}");
+ writer.send(&BarrierReached {}); // A done.
+
+ // Action B: fail to use the unlocked-device-required key while locked.
+ reader.recv();
+ let params = AuthSetBuilder::new().purpose(KeyPurpose::SIGN).digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
+ info!("B: use unlocked-device-required key while locked => {result:?}");
+ expect_km_error!(&result, ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED);
+ writer.send(&BarrierReached {}); // B done.
+
+ // Action C: try to use the unlocked-device-required key while unlocked with a
+ // password.
+ reader.recv();
+ let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
+ info!("C: use unlocked-device-required key while lskf-unlocked => {result:?}");
+ expect!(result.is_ok(), "failed with {result:?}");
+ abort_op(result);
+ writer.send(&BarrierReached {}); // C done.
+
+ // Action D: try to use the unlocked-device-required key while unlocked with a weak
+ // biometric.
+ reader.recv();
+ let result = sec_level.createOperation(&key, ¶ms, UNFORCED);
+ info!("D: use unlocked-device-required key while weak-locked => {result:?}");
+ expect!(result.is_ok(), "createOperation failed: {result:?}");
+ abort_op(result);
+ writer.send(&BarrierReached {}); // D done.
+
+ Ok(())
+ };
+
+ // Safety: only one thread at this point (enforced by `AndroidTest.xml` setting
+ // `--test-threads=1`), and nothing yet done with binder.
+ let mut child_handle = unsafe {
+ // Perform keystore actions while running as the test user.
+ run_as::run_as_child(CTX, Uid::from_raw(UID), Gid::from_raw(UID), child_fn)
}
.unwrap();
@@ -214,46 +806,69 @@
let auth_service = get_authorization();
// Lock and unlock to ensure super keys are already created.
- auth_service.onDeviceLocked(user_id, &[BIO_SID1, BIO_SID2], WEAK_UNLOCK_DISABLED).unwrap();
- auth_service.onDeviceUnlocked(user_id, Some(PASSWORD)).unwrap();
- auth_service.addAuthToken(&fake_lskf_token(GK_SID)).unwrap();
+ auth_service
+ .onDeviceLocked(user_id, &[BIO_FAKE_SID1, BIO_FAKE_SID2], WEAK_UNLOCK_DISABLED)
+ .unwrap();
+ auth_service.onDeviceUnlocked(user_id, Some(SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD)).unwrap();
+ auth_service.addAuthToken(&fake_lskf_token(GK_FAKE_SID)).unwrap();
info!("trigger child process action A while unlocked and wait for completion");
child_handle.send(&BarrierReached {});
- child_handle.recv();
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
// Move to locked and don't allow weak unlock, so super keys are wiped.
- auth_service.onDeviceLocked(user_id, &[BIO_SID1, BIO_SID2], WEAK_UNLOCK_DISABLED).unwrap();
+ auth_service
+ .onDeviceLocked(user_id, &[BIO_FAKE_SID1, BIO_FAKE_SID2], WEAK_UNLOCK_DISABLED)
+ .unwrap();
info!("trigger child process action B while locked and wait for completion");
child_handle.send(&BarrierReached {});
- child_handle.recv();
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
// Unlock with password => loads super key from database.
- auth_service.onDeviceUnlocked(user_id, Some(PASSWORD)).unwrap();
- auth_service.addAuthToken(&fake_lskf_token(GK_SID)).unwrap();
+ auth_service.onDeviceUnlocked(user_id, Some(SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD)).unwrap();
+ auth_service.addAuthToken(&fake_lskf_token(GK_FAKE_SID)).unwrap();
info!("trigger child process action C while lskf-unlocked and wait for completion");
child_handle.send(&BarrierReached {});
- child_handle.recv();
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
// Move to locked and allow weak unlock, then do a weak unlock.
- auth_service.onDeviceLocked(user_id, &[BIO_SID1, BIO_SID2], WEAK_UNLOCK_ENABLED).unwrap();
+ auth_service
+ .onDeviceLocked(user_id, &[BIO_FAKE_SID1, BIO_FAKE_SID2], WEAK_UNLOCK_ENABLED)
+ .unwrap();
auth_service.onDeviceUnlocked(user_id, None).unwrap();
info!("trigger child process action D while weak-unlocked and wait for completion");
child_handle.send(&BarrierReached {});
- child_handle.recv();
+ child_handle.recv_or_die();
assert_eq!(child_handle.get_result(), Ok(()), "child process failed");
}
/// Generate a fake [`HardwareAuthToken`] for the given sid.
fn fake_lskf_token(gk_sid: i64) -> HardwareAuthToken {
+ fake_lskf_token_with_challenge(gk_sid, 0)
+}
+
+/// Generate a fake [`HardwareAuthToken`] for the given sid and challenge.
+fn fake_lskf_token_with_challenge(gk_sid: i64, challenge: i64) -> HardwareAuthToken {
+ HardwareAuthToken {
+ challenge,
+ userId: gk_sid,
+ authenticatorId: 0,
+ authenticatorType: HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD,
+ timestamp: Timestamp { milliSeconds: 123 },
+ mac: vec![1, 2, 3],
+ }
+}
+
+/// Generate a fake [`HardwareAuthToken`] for the given sids
+fn fake_bio_lskf_token(gk_sid: i64, bio_sid: i64) -> HardwareAuthToken {
HardwareAuthToken {
challenge: 0,
userId: gk_sid,
- authenticatorId: 0,
+ authenticatorId: bio_sid,
authenticatorType: HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD,
timestamp: Timestamp { milliSeconds: 123 },
mac: vec![1, 2, 3],