diff --git a/keystore2/src/database.rs b/keystore2/src/database.rs
index 3217857..f9710f9 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/database.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/database.rs
@@ -584,6 +584,7 @@
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 pub struct CertificateChain {
     private_key: ZVec,
+    batch_cert: ZVec,
     cert_chain: ZVec,
 }
 
@@ -1551,6 +1552,7 @@
     pub fn store_signed_attestation_certificate_chain(
         &mut self,
         raw_public_key: &[u8],
+        batch_cert: &[u8],
         cert_chain: &[u8],
         expiration_date: i64,
         km_uuid: &Uuid,
@@ -1609,6 +1611,8 @@
                 None,
             )
             .context("Failed to insert cert chain")?;
+            Self::set_blob_internal(&tx, key_id, SubComponentType::CERT, Some(batch_cert), None)
+                .context("Failed to insert cert")?;
             Ok(()).no_gc()
         })
         .context("In store_signed_attestation_certificate_chain: ")
@@ -1859,19 +1863,21 @@
                     |row| Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?)),
                 )?
                 .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<(SubComponentType, Vec<u8>)>>>()
-                .context("In retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain: query failed.")?;
+                .context("query failed.")?;
             if rows.is_empty() {
                 return Ok(None).no_gc();
-            } else if rows.len() != 2 {
+            } else if rows.len() != 3 {
                 return Err(KsError::sys()).context(format!(
                     concat!(
-                "In retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain: Expected to get a single attestation",
-                "key chain but instead got {}."),
+                        "Expected to get a single attestation",
+                        "key, cert, and cert chain for a total of 3 entries, but instead got {}."
+                    ),
                     rows.len()
                 ));
             }
             let mut km_blob: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
             let mut cert_chain_blob: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+            let mut batch_cert_blob: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
             for row in rows {
                 let sub_type: SubComponentType = row.0;
                 match sub_type {
@@ -1881,15 +1887,20 @@
                     SubComponentType::CERT_CHAIN => {
                         cert_chain_blob = row.1;
                     }
+                    SubComponentType::CERT => {
+                        batch_cert_blob = row.1;
+                    }
                     _ => Err(KsError::sys()).context("Unknown or incorrect subcomponent type.")?,
                 }
             }
             Ok(Some(CertificateChain {
                 private_key: ZVec::try_from(km_blob)?,
+                batch_cert: ZVec::try_from(batch_cert_blob)?,
                 cert_chain: ZVec::try_from(cert_chain_blob)?,
             }))
             .no_gc()
         })
+        .context("In retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain:")
     }
 
     /// Updates the alias column of the given key id `newid` with the given alias,
@@ -3133,8 +3144,9 @@
             db.retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain(Domain::APP, namespace, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
         assert_eq!(true, chain.is_some());
         let cert_chain = chain.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(cert_chain.private_key.to_vec(), loaded_values[2]);
-        assert_eq!(cert_chain.cert_chain.to_vec(), loaded_values[1]);
+        assert_eq!(cert_chain.private_key.to_vec(), loaded_values.priv_key);
+        assert_eq!(cert_chain.batch_cert.to_vec(), loaded_values.batch_cert);
+        assert_eq!(cert_chain.cert_chain.to_vec(), loaded_values.cert_chain);
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -3169,6 +3181,7 @@
         let private_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x04, 0x05, 0x06];
         let raw_public_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x07, 0x08, 0x09];
         let cert_chain: Vec<u8> = vec![0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c];
+        let batch_cert: Vec<u8> = vec![0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f];
         db.create_attestation_key_entry(
             &public_key,
             &raw_public_key,
@@ -3181,6 +3194,7 @@
         assert_eq!(status.total, 4);
         db.store_signed_attestation_certificate_chain(
             &raw_public_key,
+            &batch_cert,
             &cert_chain,
             20,
             &KEYSTORE_UUID,
@@ -3215,9 +3229,9 @@
             .conn
             .query_row("SELECT COUNT(id) FROM persistent.blobentry;", NO_PARAMS, |row| row.get(0))
             .expect("Failed to get blob entry row count.");
-        // We expect 6 rows here because there are two blobs per attestation key, i.e.,
-        // One key and one certificate.
-        assert_eq!(blob_entry_row_count, 6);
+        // We expect 9 rows here because there are three blobs per attestation key, i.e.,
+        // one key, one certificate chain, and one certificate.
+        assert_eq!(blob_entry_row_count, 9);
 
         assert_eq!(db.delete_expired_attestation_keys()?, 2);
 
@@ -3225,8 +3239,9 @@
             db.retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain(Domain::APP, namespace, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
         assert!(cert_chain.is_some());
         let value = cert_chain.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(entry_values[1], value.cert_chain.to_vec());
-        assert_eq!(entry_values[2], value.private_key.to_vec());
+        assert_eq!(entry_values.batch_cert, value.batch_cert.to_vec());
+        assert_eq!(entry_values.cert_chain, value.cert_chain.to_vec());
+        assert_eq!(entry_values.priv_key, value.private_key.to_vec());
 
         cert_chain = db.retrieve_attestation_key_and_cert_chain(
             Domain::APP,
@@ -3248,9 +3263,9 @@
             .conn
             .query_row("SELECT COUNT(id) FROM persistent.blobentry;", NO_PARAMS, |row| row.get(0))
             .expect("Failed to get blob entry row count.");
-        // There shound be 2 blob entries left, because we deleted two of the attestation
-        // key entries with two blobs each.
-        assert_eq!(blob_entry_row_count, 2);
+        // There shound be 3 blob entries left, because we deleted two of the attestation
+        // key entries with three blobs each.
+        assert_eq!(blob_entry_row_count, 3);
 
         Ok(())
     }
@@ -4323,30 +4338,33 @@
             .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()
     }
 
+    struct RemoteProvValues {
+        cert_chain: Vec<u8>,
+        priv_key: Vec<u8>,
+        batch_cert: Vec<u8>,
+    }
+
     fn load_attestation_key_pool(
         db: &mut KeystoreDB,
         expiration_date: i64,
         namespace: i64,
         base_byte: u8,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
-        let mut chain: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();
+    ) -> Result<RemoteProvValues> {
         let public_key: Vec<u8> = vec![base_byte, 0x02 * base_byte];
         let cert_chain: Vec<u8> = vec![0x03 * base_byte, 0x04 * base_byte];
         let priv_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x05 * base_byte, 0x06 * base_byte];
         let raw_public_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0x0b * base_byte, 0x0c * base_byte];
+        let batch_cert: Vec<u8> = vec![base_byte * 0x0d, base_byte * 0x0e];
         db.create_attestation_key_entry(&public_key, &raw_public_key, &priv_key, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
         db.store_signed_attestation_certificate_chain(
             &raw_public_key,
+            &batch_cert,
             &cert_chain,
             expiration_date,
             &KEYSTORE_UUID,
         )?;
         db.assign_attestation_key(Domain::APP, namespace, &KEYSTORE_UUID)?;
-        chain.push(public_key);
-        chain.push(cert_chain);
-        chain.push(priv_key);
-        chain.push(raw_public_key);
-        Ok(chain)
+        Ok(RemoteProvValues { cert_chain, priv_key, batch_cert })
     }
 
     // Note: The parameters and SecurityLevel associations are nonsensical. This
diff --git a/keystore2/src/error.rs b/keystore2/src/error.rs
index 7227f62..d67f5f4 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/error.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/error.rs
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@
     /// Wraps a Binder status code.
     #[error("Binder transaction error {0:?}")]
     BinderTransaction(StatusCode),
+    /// Wraps a Remote Provisioning ErrorCode as defined by the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent
+    /// AIDL interface spec.
+    #[error("Error::Rp({0:?})")]
+    Rp(ErrorCode),
 }
 
 impl Error {
@@ -101,6 +105,16 @@
     })
 }
 
+/// Helper function to map the binder status we get from calls into a RemotelyProvisionedComponent
+/// to a Keystore Error. We don't create an anyhow error here to make
+/// it easier to evaluate service specific errors.
+pub fn map_rem_prov_error<T>(r: BinderResult<T>) -> Result<T, Error> {
+    r.map_err(|s| match s.exception_code() {
+        ExceptionCode::SERVICE_SPECIFIC => Error::Rp(ErrorCode(s.service_specific_error())),
+        e_code => Error::Binder(e_code, 0),
+    })
+}
+
 /// This function is similar to map_km_error only that we don't expect
 /// any KeyMint error codes, we simply preserve the exception code and optional
 /// service specific exception.
@@ -164,6 +178,7 @@
             let rc = match root_cause.downcast_ref::<Error>() {
                 Some(Error::Rc(rcode)) => rcode.0,
                 Some(Error::Km(ec)) => ec.0,
+                Some(Error::Rp(_)) => ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR.0,
                 // If an Error::Binder reaches this stage we report a system error.
                 // The exception code and possible service specific error will be
                 // printed in the error log above.
diff --git a/keystore2/src/globals.rs b/keystore2/src/globals.rs
index 8cc0106..9668ee3 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/globals.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/globals.rs
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@
 };
 use crate::{enforcements::Enforcements, error::map_km_error};
 use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
-    IKeyMintDevice::IKeyMintDevice, KeyMintHardwareInfo::KeyMintHardwareInfo,
-    SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel,
+    IKeyMintDevice::IKeyMintDevice, IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::IRemotelyProvisionedComponent,
+    KeyMintHardwareInfo::KeyMintHardwareInfo, SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel,
 };
 use android_hardware_security_keymint::binder::{StatusCode, Strong};
 use android_security_compat::aidl::android::security::compat::IKeystoreCompatService::IKeystoreCompatService;
@@ -128,6 +128,21 @@
     }
 }
 
+#[derive(Default)]
+struct RemotelyProvisionedDevicesMap {
+    devices_by_sec_level: HashMap<SecurityLevel, Asp>,
+}
+
+impl RemotelyProvisionedDevicesMap {
+    fn dev_by_sec_level(&self, sec_level: &SecurityLevel) -> Option<Asp> {
+        self.devices_by_sec_level.get(sec_level).map(|dev| (*dev).clone())
+    }
+
+    fn insert(&mut self, sec_level: SecurityLevel, dev: Asp) {
+        self.devices_by_sec_level.insert(sec_level, dev);
+    }
+}
+
 lazy_static! {
     /// The path where keystore stores all its keys.
     pub static ref DB_PATH: Mutex<PathBuf> = Mutex::new(
@@ -138,6 +153,8 @@
     static ref KEY_MINT_DEVICES: Mutex<DevicesMap> = Default::default();
     /// Timestamp service.
     static ref TIME_STAMP_DEVICE: Mutex<Option<Asp>> = Default::default();
+    /// RemotelyProvisionedComponent HAL devices.
+    static ref REMOTELY_PROVISIONED_COMPONENT_DEVICES: Mutex<RemotelyProvisionedDevicesMap> = Default::default();
     /// A single on-demand worker thread that handles deferred tasks with two different
     /// priorities.
     pub static ref ASYNC_TASK: Arc<AsyncTask> = Default::default();
@@ -276,3 +293,45 @@
         Ok(dev)
     }
 }
+
+static REMOTE_PROVISIONING_HAL_SERVICE_NAME: &str =
+    "android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent";
+
+fn connect_remotely_provisioned_component(security_level: &SecurityLevel) -> Result<Asp> {
+    let service_name = match *security_level {
+        SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT => {
+            format!("{}/default", REMOTE_PROVISIONING_HAL_SERVICE_NAME)
+        }
+        SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX => format!("{}/strongbox", REMOTE_PROVISIONING_HAL_SERVICE_NAME),
+        _ => {
+            // Given the integration of IRemotelyProvisionedComponent with KeyMint, it is reasonable
+            // to return HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE as a Km error if it cannot be found.
+            return Err(Error::Km(ErrorCode::HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE))
+                .context("In connect_remotely_provisioned_component.");
+        }
+    };
+
+    let rem_prov_hal: Strong<dyn IRemotelyProvisionedComponent> =
+        map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface(&service_name))
+            .context(concat!(
+                "In connect_remotely_provisioned_component: Trying to connect to",
+                " RemotelyProvisionedComponent service."
+            ))
+            .map_err(|e| e)?;
+    Ok(Asp::new(rem_prov_hal.as_binder()))
+}
+
+/// Get a remote provisiong component device for the given security level either from the cache or
+/// by making a new connection. Returns the device.
+pub fn get_remotely_provisioned_component(security_level: &SecurityLevel) -> Result<Asp> {
+    let mut devices_map = REMOTELY_PROVISIONED_COMPONENT_DEVICES.lock().unwrap();
+    if let Some(dev) = devices_map.dev_by_sec_level(&security_level) {
+        Ok(dev)
+    } else {
+        let dev = connect_remotely_provisioned_component(security_level)
+            .context("In get_remotely_provisioned_component.")?;
+        devices_map.insert(*security_level, dev);
+        // Unwrap must succeed because we just inserted it.
+        Ok(devices_map.dev_by_sec_level(security_level).unwrap())
+    }
+}
diff --git a/keystore2/src/keystore2_main.rs b/keystore2/src/keystore2_main.rs
index 30e3e22..9dc59a2 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/keystore2_main.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/keystore2_main.rs
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 use keystore2::apc::ApcManager;
 use keystore2::authorization::AuthorizationManager;
 use keystore2::globals::ENFORCEMENTS;
+use keystore2::remote_provisioning::RemoteProvisioningService;
 use keystore2::service::KeystoreService;
 use keystore2::user_manager::UserManager;
 use log::{error, info};
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@
 static KS2_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.system.keystore2";
 static APC_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.security.apc";
 static AUTHORIZATION_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.security.authorization";
+static REMOTE_PROVISIONING_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.security.remoteprovisioning";
 static USER_MANAGER_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "android.security.usermanager";
 
 /// Keystore 2.0 takes one argument which is a path indicating its designated working directory.
@@ -98,6 +100,20 @@
         },
     );
 
+    // Devices with KS2 and KM 1.0 may not have any IRemotelyProvisionedComponent HALs at all. Do
+    // not panic if new_native_binder returns failure because it could not find the TEE HAL.
+    if let Ok(remote_provisioning_service) = RemoteProvisioningService::new_native_binder() {
+        binder::add_service(
+            REMOTE_PROVISIONING_SERVICE_NAME,
+            remote_provisioning_service.as_binder(),
+        )
+        .unwrap_or_else(|e| {
+            panic!(
+                "Failed to register service {} because of {:?}.",
+                REMOTE_PROVISIONING_SERVICE_NAME, e
+            );
+        });
+    }
     info!("Successfully registered Keystore 2.0 service.");
 
     info!("Joining thread pool now.");
diff --git a/keystore2/src/remote_provisioning.rs b/keystore2/src/remote_provisioning.rs
index fe38504..d606b6a 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/remote_provisioning.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/remote_provisioning.rs
@@ -19,28 +19,54 @@
 //! certificate chains signed by some root authority and stored in a keystore SQLite
 //! DB.
 
-use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
 
+use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
+    IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::IRemotelyProvisionedComponent, MacedPublicKey::MacedPublicKey,
+    ProtectedData::ProtectedData, SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel,
+};
 use android_security_remoteprovisioning::aidl::android::security::remoteprovisioning::{
     AttestationPoolStatus::AttestationPoolStatus, IRemoteProvisioning::BnRemoteProvisioning,
     IRemoteProvisioning::IRemoteProvisioning,
 };
 use android_security_remoteprovisioning::binder::Strong;
-use anyhow::Result;
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 
-use crate::error::map_or_log_err;
-use crate::globals::{get_keymint_device, DB};
+use crate::error::{self, map_or_log_err, map_rem_prov_error};
+use crate::globals::{get_keymint_device, get_remotely_provisioned_component, DB};
+use crate::utils::Asp;
 
 /// Implementation of the IRemoteProvisioning service.
+#[derive(Default)]
 pub struct RemoteProvisioningService {
-    // TODO(b/179222809): Add the remote provisioner hal aidl interface when available
+    device_by_sec_level: HashMap<SecurityLevel, Asp>,
 }
 
 impl RemoteProvisioningService {
+    fn get_dev_by_sec_level(
+        &self,
+        sec_level: &SecurityLevel,
+    ) -> Result<Strong<dyn IRemotelyProvisionedComponent>> {
+        if let Some(dev) = self.device_by_sec_level.get(sec_level) {
+            dev.get_interface().context("In get_dev_by_sec_level.")
+        } else {
+            Err(error::Error::sys()).context(concat!(
+                "In get_dev_by_sec_level: Remote instance for requested security level",
+                " not found."
+            ))
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Creates a new instance of the remote provisioning service
     pub fn new_native_binder() -> Result<Strong<dyn IRemoteProvisioning>> {
-        let result = BnRemoteProvisioning::new_binder(Self {});
-        Ok(result)
+        let mut result: Self = Default::default();
+        let dev = get_remotely_provisioned_component(&SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
+            .context("In new_native_binder: Failed to get TEE Remote Provisioner instance.")?;
+        result.device_by_sec_level.insert(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, dev);
+        if let Ok(dev) = get_remotely_provisioned_component(&SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+            result.device_by_sec_level.insert(SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX, dev);
+        }
+        Ok(BnRemoteProvisioning::new_binder(result))
     }
 
     /// Populates the AttestationPoolStatus parcelable with information about how many
@@ -54,6 +80,11 @@
         let (_, _, uuid) = get_keymint_device(&sec_level)?;
         DB.with::<_, Result<AttestationPoolStatus>>(|db| {
             let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
+            // delete_expired_attestation_keys is always safe to call, and will remove anything
+            // older than the date at the time of calling. No work should be done on the
+            // attestation keys unless the pool status is checked first, so this call should be
+            // enough to routinely clean out expired keys.
+            db.delete_expired_attestation_keys()?;
             Ok(db.get_attestation_pool_status(expired_by, &uuid)?)
         })
     }
@@ -68,15 +99,34 @@
     /// baked in root of trust in the underlying IRemotelyProvisionedComponent instance.
     pub fn generate_csr(
         &self,
-        _test_mode: bool,
-        _num_csr: i32,
-        _eek: &[u8],
-        _challenge: &[u8],
-        _sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+        test_mode: bool,
+        num_csr: i32,
+        eek: &[u8],
+        challenge: &[u8],
+        sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+        protected_data: &mut ProtectedData,
     ) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-        // TODO(b/179222809): implement with actual remote provisioner AIDL when available. For now
-        //       it isnice to have some junk values
-        Ok(vec![0, 1, 3, 3])
+        let dev = self.get_dev_by_sec_level(&sec_level)?;
+        let (_, _, uuid) = get_keymint_device(&sec_level)?;
+        let keys_to_sign = DB.with::<_, Result<Vec<MacedPublicKey>>>(|db| {
+            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
+            Ok(db
+                .fetch_unsigned_attestation_keys(num_csr, &uuid)?
+                .iter()
+                .map(|key| MacedPublicKey { macedKey: key.to_vec() })
+                .collect())
+        })?;
+        let mut mac = Vec::<u8>::with_capacity(32);
+        map_rem_prov_error(dev.generateCertificateRequest(
+            test_mode,
+            &keys_to_sign,
+            eek,
+            challenge,
+            &mut mac,
+            protected_data,
+        ))
+        .context("In generate_csr: Failed to generate csr")?;
+        Ok(mac)
     }
 
     /// Provisions a certificate chain for a key whose CSR was included in generate_csr. The
@@ -87,6 +137,7 @@
     pub fn provision_cert_chain(
         &self,
         public_key: &[u8],
+        batch_cert: &[u8],
         certs: &[u8],
         expiration_date: i64,
         sec_level: SecurityLevel,
@@ -96,6 +147,7 @@
             let (_, _, uuid) = get_keymint_device(&sec_level)?;
             Ok(db.store_signed_attestation_certificate_chain(
                 public_key,
+                batch_cert,
                 certs, /* DER encoded certificate chain */
                 expiration_date,
                 &uuid,
@@ -107,8 +159,35 @@
     /// `is_test_mode` indicates whether or not the returned public key should be marked as being
     /// for testing in order to differentiate them from private keys. If the call is successful,
     /// the key pair is then added to the database.
-    pub fn generate_key_pair(&self, _is_test_mode: bool, _sec_level: SecurityLevel) -> Result<()> {
-        Ok(())
+    pub fn generate_key_pair(&self, is_test_mode: bool, sec_level: SecurityLevel) -> Result<()> {
+        let (_, _, uuid) = get_keymint_device(&sec_level)?;
+        let dev = self.get_dev_by_sec_level(&sec_level)?;
+        let mut maced_key = MacedPublicKey { macedKey: Vec::new() };
+        let priv_key =
+            map_rem_prov_error(dev.generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(is_test_mode, &mut maced_key))
+                .context("In generate_key_pair: Failed to generated ECDSA keypair.")?;
+        // TODO(b/180392379): This is a brittle hack that relies on the consistent formatting of
+        //                    the returned CBOR blob in order to extract the public key.
+        let data = &maced_key.macedKey;
+        if data.len() < 85 {
+            return Err(error::Error::sys()).context(concat!(
+                "In generate_key_pair: CBOR blob returned from",
+                "RemotelyProvisionedComponent is definitely malformatted or empty."
+            ));
+        }
+        let mut raw_key: Vec<u8> = vec![0; 64];
+        raw_key[0..32].clone_from_slice(&data[18..18 + 32]);
+        raw_key[32..64].clone_from_slice(&data[53..53 + 32]);
+        DB.with::<_, Result<()>>(|db| {
+            let mut db = db.borrow_mut();
+            Ok(db.create_attestation_key_entry(&maced_key.macedKey, &raw_key, &priv_key, &uuid)?)
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Checks the security level of each available IRemotelyProvisionedComponent hal and returns
+    /// all levels in an array to the caller.
+    pub fn get_security_levels(&self) -> Result<Vec<SecurityLevel>> {
+        Ok(self.device_by_sec_level.keys().cloned().collect())
     }
 }
 
@@ -132,18 +211,26 @@
         eek: &[u8],
         challenge: &[u8],
         sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+        protected_data: &mut ProtectedData,
     ) -> binder::public_api::Result<Vec<u8>> {
-        map_or_log_err(self.generate_csr(test_mode, num_csr, eek, challenge, sec_level), Ok)
+        map_or_log_err(
+            self.generate_csr(test_mode, num_csr, eek, challenge, sec_level, protected_data),
+            Ok,
+        )
     }
 
     fn provisionCertChain(
         &self,
         public_key: &[u8],
+        batch_cert: &[u8],
         certs: &[u8],
         expiration_date: i64,
         sec_level: SecurityLevel,
     ) -> binder::public_api::Result<()> {
-        map_or_log_err(self.provision_cert_chain(public_key, certs, expiration_date, sec_level), Ok)
+        map_or_log_err(
+            self.provision_cert_chain(public_key, batch_cert, certs, expiration_date, sec_level),
+            Ok,
+        )
     }
 
     fn generateKeyPair(
@@ -153,4 +240,8 @@
     ) -> binder::public_api::Result<()> {
         map_or_log_err(self.generate_key_pair(is_test_mode, sec_level), Ok)
     }
+
+    fn getSecurityLevels(&self) -> binder::public_api::Result<Vec<SecurityLevel>> {
+        map_or_log_err(self.get_security_levels(), Ok)
+    }
 }