diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/Android.bp b/keystore2/aidl/Android.bp
index 183096c..0db2f9d 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
         },
         ndk: {
             enabled: true,
+            apps_enabled: false,
         }
     },
 }
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@
         },
         ndk: {
             enabled: true,
+            apps_enabled: false,
         }
     },
 }
@@ -135,6 +137,7 @@
         },
         ndk: {
             enabled: true,
+            apps_enabled: false,
         }
     },
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl
index 86472eb..01616b1 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/authorization/IKeystoreAuthorization.aidl
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
  * provide keystore with the information required to enforce authorizations on key usage.
  * @hide
  */
+ @SensitiveData
 interface IKeystoreAuthorization {
 
     /**
diff --git a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.aidl b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.aidl
index 280500c..21ddd9b 100644
--- a/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.aidl
+++ b/keystore2/aidl/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.aidl
@@ -17,13 +17,12 @@
 import android.system.keystore2.Domain;
 import android.security.maintenance.UserState;
 
-// TODO: mark the interface with @SensitiveData when the annotation is ready (b/176110256).
-
 /**
  * IKeystoreMaintenance interface exposes the methods for adding/removing users and changing the
  * user's password.
  * @hide
  */
+ @SensitiveData
 interface IKeystoreMaintenance {
 
     /**
diff --git a/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs b/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs
index 4af7b5a..78b474e 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/crypto/zvec.rs
@@ -104,12 +104,16 @@
 impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for ZVec {
     type Error = Error;
 
-    fn try_from(v: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+    fn try_from(mut v: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        let len = v.len();
+        // into_boxed_slice calls shrink_to_fit, which may move the pointer.
+        // But sometimes the contents of the Vec are already sensitive and
+        // mustn't be copied. So ensure the shrink_to_fit call is a NOP.
+        v.resize(v.capacity(), 0);
         let b = v.into_boxed_slice();
         if !b.is_empty() {
             unsafe { mlock(b.as_ptr() as *const std::ffi::c_void, b.len()) }?;
         }
-        let len = b.len();
         Ok(Self { elems: b, len })
     }
 }
diff --git a/keystore2/src/database.rs b/keystore2/src/database.rs
index 174a928..6a07716 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/database.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/database.rs
@@ -3025,7 +3025,7 @@
     where
         F: Fn(&Uuid, &[u8]) -> Result<()> + Send + 'static,
     {
-        let super_key = Arc::new(SuperKeyManager::new());
+        let super_key: Arc<SuperKeyManager> = Default::default();
 
         let gc_db = KeystoreDB::new(path, None).expect("Failed to open test gc db_connection.");
         let gc = Gc::new_init_with(Default::default(), move || (Box::new(cb), gc_db, super_key));
diff --git a/keystore2/src/globals.rs b/keystore2/src/globals.rs
index 54f7dc7..58142a4 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/globals.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/globals.rs
@@ -278,8 +278,10 @@
     let secure_clock_available =
         secureclock_instances.as_vec()?.iter().any(|instance| *instance == "default");
 
+    let default_time_stamp_service_name = format!("{}/default", TIME_STAMP_SERVICE_NAME);
+
     let secureclock = if secure_clock_available {
-        map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface(TIME_STAMP_SERVICE_NAME))
+        map_binder_status_code(binder::get_interface(&default_time_stamp_service_name))
             .context("In connect_secureclock: Trying to connect to genuine secure clock service.")
     } else {
         // This is a no-op if it was called before.
diff --git a/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat_type_conversion.h b/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat_type_conversion.h
index c2b4669..e3240e9 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat_type_conversion.h
+++ b/keystore2/src/km_compat/km_compat_type_conversion.h
@@ -665,13 +665,19 @@
         }
         break;
     case KMV1::Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL:
-        // TODO This tag is missing from 4.0 keymaster_tags.h
+        if (auto v = KMV1::authorizationValue(KMV1::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, kp)) {
+            return V4_0::makeKeyParameter(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, v->get());
+        }
         break;
     case KMV1::Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI:
-        // TODO This tag is missing from 4.0 keymaster_tags.h
+        if (auto v = KMV1::authorizationValue(KMV1::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, kp)) {
+            return V4_0::makeKeyParameter(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, v->get());
+        }
         break;
     case KMV1::Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID:
-        // TODO This tag is missing from 4.0 keymaster_tags.h
+        if (auto v = KMV1::authorizationValue(KMV1::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, kp)) {
+            return V4_0::makeKeyParameter(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, v->get());
+        }
         break;
     case KMV1::Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER:
         if (auto v = KMV1::authorizationValue(KMV1::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, kp)) {
@@ -971,13 +977,19 @@
         }
         break;
     case V4_0::Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL:
-        // TODO This tag is missing from 4.0 keymaster_tags.h
+        if (auto v = unwrapper(V4_0::authorizationValue(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, kp))) {
+            return KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, v->get());
+        }
         break;
     case V4_0::Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI:
-        // TODO This tag is missing from 4.0 keymaster_tags.h
+        if (auto v = unwrapper(V4_0::authorizationValue(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, kp))) {
+            return KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, v->get());
+        }
         break;
     case V4_0::Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID:
-        // TODO This tag is missing from 4.0 keymaster_tags.h
+        if (auto v = unwrapper(V4_0::authorizationValue(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, kp))) {
+            return KMV1::makeKeyParameter(KMV1::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, v->get());
+        }
         break;
     case V4_0::Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER:
         if (auto v =
diff --git a/keystore2/src/legacy_blob.rs b/keystore2/src/legacy_blob.rs
index 7c8a909..c108b32 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/legacy_blob.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/legacy_blob.rs
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@
             CACERT_NON_AUTHBOUND,
         )?;
 
-        let key_manager = crate::super_key::SuperKeyManager::new();
+        let key_manager: SuperKeyManager = Default::default();
         let mut db = crate::database::KeystoreDB::new(temp_dir.path(), None)?;
         let legacy_blob_loader = LegacyBlobLoader::new(temp_dir.path());
 
diff --git a/keystore2/src/metrics.rs b/keystore2/src/metrics.rs
index 9524cb2..c5dd582 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/metrics.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/metrics.rs
@@ -20,14 +20,16 @@
     Algorithm::Algorithm, BlockMode::BlockMode, Digest::Digest, EcCurve::EcCurve,
     HardwareAuthenticatorType::HardwareAuthenticatorType, KeyOrigin::KeyOrigin,
     KeyParameter::KeyParameter, KeyPurpose::KeyPurpose, PaddingMode::PaddingMode,
+    SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel,
 };
 use statslog_rust::keystore2_key_creation_event_reported::{
     Algorithm as StatsdAlgorithm, EcCurve as StatsdEcCurve, KeyOrigin as StatsdKeyOrigin,
-    Keystore2KeyCreationEventReported, UserAuthType as StatsdUserAuthType,
+    Keystore2KeyCreationEventReported, SecurityLevel as StatsdKeyCreationSecurityLevel,
+    UserAuthType as StatsdUserAuthType,
 };
-
 use statslog_rust::keystore2_key_operation_event_reported::{
     Keystore2KeyOperationEventReported, Outcome as StatsdOutcome, Purpose as StatsdKeyPurpose,
+    SecurityLevel as StatsdKeyOperationSecurityLevel,
 };
 
 fn create_default_key_creation_atom() -> Keystore2KeyCreationEventReported {
@@ -52,6 +54,7 @@
         // as per keystore2/ResponseCode.aidl, 1 is reserved for NO_ERROR
         error_code: 1,
         attestation_requested: false,
+        security_level: StatsdKeyCreationSecurityLevel::SecurityLevelUnspecified,
     }
 }
 
@@ -64,12 +67,18 @@
         outcome: StatsdOutcome::OutcomeUnspecified,
         error_code: 1,
         key_upgraded: false,
+        security_level: StatsdKeyOperationSecurityLevel::SecurityLevelUnspecified,
     }
 }
 
 /// Log key creation events via statsd API.
-pub fn log_key_creation_event_stats<U>(key_params: &[KeyParameter], result: &anyhow::Result<U>) {
-    let key_creation_event_stats = construct_key_creation_event_stats(key_params, result);
+pub fn log_key_creation_event_stats<U>(
+    sec_level: SecurityLevel,
+    key_params: &[KeyParameter],
+    result: &anyhow::Result<U>,
+) {
+    let key_creation_event_stats =
+        construct_key_creation_event_stats(sec_level, key_params, result);
 
     let logging_result = key_creation_event_stats.stats_write();
 
@@ -83,13 +92,19 @@
 
 /// Log key operation events via statsd API.
 pub fn log_key_operation_event_stats(
+    sec_level: SecurityLevel,
     key_purpose: KeyPurpose,
     op_params: &[KeyParameter],
     op_outcome: &Outcome,
     key_upgraded: bool,
 ) {
-    let key_operation_event_stats =
-        construct_key_operation_event_stats(key_purpose, op_params, op_outcome, key_upgraded);
+    let key_operation_event_stats = construct_key_operation_event_stats(
+        sec_level,
+        key_purpose,
+        op_params,
+        op_outcome,
+        key_upgraded,
+    );
 
     let logging_result = key_operation_event_stats.stats_write();
 
@@ -102,6 +117,7 @@
 }
 
 fn construct_key_creation_event_stats<U>(
+    sec_level: SecurityLevel,
     key_params: &[KeyParameter],
     result: &anyhow::Result<U>,
 ) -> Keystore2KeyCreationEventReported {
@@ -111,6 +127,16 @@
         key_creation_event_atom.error_code = get_error_code(e);
     }
 
+    key_creation_event_atom.security_level = match sec_level {
+        SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE => StatsdKeyCreationSecurityLevel::SecurityLevelSoftware,
+        SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT => {
+            StatsdKeyCreationSecurityLevel::SecurityLevelTrustedEnvironment
+        }
+        SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX => StatsdKeyCreationSecurityLevel::SecurityLevelStrongbox,
+        //KEYSTORE is not a valid variant here
+        _ => StatsdKeyCreationSecurityLevel::SecurityLevelUnspecified,
+    };
+
     for key_param in key_params.iter().map(KsKeyParamValue::from) {
         match key_param {
             KsKeyParamValue::Algorithm(a) => {
@@ -183,6 +209,7 @@
 }
 
 fn construct_key_operation_event_stats(
+    sec_level: SecurityLevel,
     key_purpose: KeyPurpose,
     op_params: &[KeyParameter],
     op_outcome: &Outcome,
@@ -190,6 +217,16 @@
 ) -> Keystore2KeyOperationEventReported {
     let mut key_operation_event_atom = create_default_key_operation_atom();
 
+    key_operation_event_atom.security_level = match sec_level {
+        SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE => StatsdKeyOperationSecurityLevel::SecurityLevelSoftware,
+        SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT => {
+            StatsdKeyOperationSecurityLevel::SecurityLevelTrustedEnvironment
+        }
+        SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX => StatsdKeyOperationSecurityLevel::SecurityLevelStrongbox,
+        //KEYSTORE is not a valid variant here
+        _ => StatsdKeyOperationSecurityLevel::SecurityLevelUnspecified,
+    };
+
     key_operation_event_atom.key_upgraded = key_upgraded;
 
     key_operation_event_atom.purpose = match key_purpose {
diff --git a/keystore2/src/operation.rs b/keystore2/src/operation.rs
index f71577b..c2539a7 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/operation.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/operation.rs
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@
 use crate::utils::Asp;
 use android_hardware_security_keymint::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::{
     IKeyMintOperation::IKeyMintOperation, KeyParameter::KeyParameter, KeyPurpose::KeyPurpose,
+    SecurityLevel::SecurityLevel,
 };
 use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::{
     IKeystoreOperation::BnKeystoreOperation, IKeystoreOperation::IKeystoreOperation,
@@ -181,6 +182,7 @@
 /// Keeps track of the information required for logging operations.
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct LoggingInfo {
+    sec_level: SecurityLevel,
     purpose: KeyPurpose,
     op_params: Vec<KeyParameter>,
     key_upgraded: bool,
@@ -189,11 +191,12 @@
 impl LoggingInfo {
     /// Constructor
     pub fn new(
+        sec_level: SecurityLevel,
         purpose: KeyPurpose,
         op_params: Vec<KeyParameter>,
         key_upgraded: bool,
     ) -> LoggingInfo {
-        Self { purpose, op_params, key_upgraded }
+        Self { sec_level, purpose, op_params, key_upgraded }
     }
 }
 
@@ -468,6 +471,7 @@
     fn drop(&mut self) {
         let guard = self.outcome.lock().expect("In drop.");
         log_key_operation_event_stats(
+            self.logging_info.sec_level,
             self.logging_info.purpose,
             &(self.logging_info.op_params),
             &guard,
diff --git a/keystore2/src/security_level.rs b/keystore2/src/security_level.rs
index ec6c4d7..50d697e 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/security_level.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/security_level.rs
@@ -326,7 +326,8 @@
         let operation = match begin_result.operation {
             Some(km_op) => {
                 self.operation_db.create_operation(km_op, caller_uid, auth_info, forced,
-                    LoggingInfo::new(purpose, op_params, upgraded_blob.is_some()))
+                    LoggingInfo::new(self.security_level, purpose, op_params,
+                         upgraded_blob.is_some()))
             },
             None => return Err(Error::sys()).context("In create_operation: Begin operation returned successfully, but did not return a valid operation."),
         };
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@
         if params.iter().any(|kp| kp.tag == Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID) {
             check_key_permission(KeyPerm::gen_unique_id(), key, &None).context(concat!(
                 "In add_certificate_parameters: ",
-                "Caller does not have the permission for device unique attestation."
+                "Caller does not have the permission to generate a unique ID"
             ))?;
         }
 
@@ -832,7 +833,7 @@
         entropy: &[u8],
     ) -> binder::public_api::Result<KeyMetadata> {
         let result = self.generate_key(key, attestation_key, params, flags, entropy);
-        log_key_creation_event_stats(params, &result);
+        log_key_creation_event_stats(self.security_level, params, &result);
         map_or_log_err(result, Ok)
     }
     fn importKey(
@@ -844,7 +845,7 @@
         key_data: &[u8],
     ) -> binder::public_api::Result<KeyMetadata> {
         let result = self.import_key(key, attestation_key, params, flags, key_data);
-        log_key_creation_event_stats(params, &result);
+        log_key_creation_event_stats(self.security_level, params, &result);
         map_or_log_err(result, Ok)
     }
     fn importWrappedKey(
@@ -857,7 +858,7 @@
     ) -> binder::public_api::Result<KeyMetadata> {
         let result =
             self.import_wrapped_key(key, wrapping_key, masking_key, params, authenticators);
-        log_key_creation_event_stats(params, &result);
+        log_key_creation_event_stats(self.security_level, params, &result);
         map_or_log_err(result, Ok)
     }
     fn convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(
diff --git a/keystore2/src/super_key.rs b/keystore2/src/super_key.rs
index d490354..3fa4cf0 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/super_key.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/super_key.rs
@@ -92,22 +92,6 @@
     ScreenLockBound,
 }
 
-#[derive(Default)]
-struct UserSuperKeys {
-    /// The per boot key is used for LSKF binding of authentication bound keys. There is one
-    /// key per android user. The key is stored on flash encrypted with a key derived from a
-    /// secret, that is itself derived from the user's lock screen knowledge factor (LSKF).
-    /// When the user unlocks the device for the first time, this key is unlocked, i.e., decrypted,
-    /// and stays memory resident until the device reboots.
-    per_boot: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
-    /// The screen lock key works like the per boot key with the distinction that it is cleared
-    /// from memory when the screen lock is engaged.
-    screen_lock_bound: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
-    /// When the device is locked, screen-lock-bound keys can still be encrypted, using
-    /// ECDH public-key encryption. This field holds the decryption private key.
-    screen_lock_bound_private: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
-}
-
 pub struct SuperKey {
     algorithm: SuperEncryptionAlgorithm,
     key: ZVec,
@@ -130,10 +114,22 @@
             Err(Error::sys()).context("In aes_gcm_decrypt: Key is not an AES key")
         }
     }
+}
 
-    pub fn get_id(&self) -> i64 {
-        self.id
-    }
+#[derive(Default)]
+struct UserSuperKeys {
+    /// The per boot key is used for LSKF binding of authentication bound keys. There is one
+    /// key per android user. The key is stored on flash encrypted with a key derived from a
+    /// secret, that is itself derived from the user's lock screen knowledge factor (LSKF).
+    /// When the user unlocks the device for the first time, this key is unlocked, i.e., decrypted,
+    /// and stays memory resident until the device reboots.
+    per_boot: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
+    /// The screen lock key works like the per boot key with the distinction that it is cleared
+    /// from memory when the screen lock is engaged.
+    screen_lock_bound: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
+    /// When the device is locked, screen-lock-bound keys can still be encrypted, using
+    /// ECDH public-key encryption. This field holds the decryption private key.
+    screen_lock_bound_private: Option<Arc<SuperKey>>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Default)]
@@ -154,10 +150,6 @@
 }
 
 impl SuperKeyManager {
-    pub fn new() -> Self {
-        Default::default()
-    }
-
     pub fn forget_all_keys_for_user(&self, user: UserId) {
         let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap();
         data.user_keys.remove(&user);
@@ -169,7 +161,7 @@
         data.user_keys.entry(user).or_default().per_boot = Some(super_key);
     }
 
-    fn get_key(&self, key_id: &i64) -> Option<Arc<SuperKey>> {
+    fn lookup_key(&self, key_id: &i64) -> Option<Arc<SuperKey>> {
         self.data.lock().unwrap().key_index.get(key_id).and_then(|k| k.upgrade())
     }
 
@@ -225,23 +217,25 @@
 
     /// Unwraps an encrypted key blob given metadata identifying the encryption key.
     /// The function queries `metadata.encrypted_by()` to determine the encryption key.
-    /// It then check if the required key is memory resident, and if so decrypts the
+    /// It then checks if the required key is memory resident, and if so decrypts the
     /// blob.
     pub fn unwrap_key<'a>(&self, blob: &'a [u8], metadata: &BlobMetaData) -> Result<KeyBlob<'a>> {
-        match metadata.encrypted_by() {
-            Some(EncryptedBy::KeyId(key_id)) => match self.get_key(key_id) {
-                Some(super_key) => Ok(KeyBlob::Sensitive {
-                    key: Self::unwrap_key_with_key(blob, metadata, &super_key)
-                        .context("In unwrap_key: unwrap_key_with_key failed")?,
-                    reencrypt_with: super_key.reencrypt_with.as_ref().unwrap_or(&super_key).clone(),
-                    force_reencrypt: super_key.reencrypt_with.is_some(),
-                }),
-                None => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::LOCKED))
-                    .context("In unwrap_key: Required super decryption key is not in memory."),
-            },
-            _ => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED))
-                .context("In unwrap_key: Cannot determined wrapping key."),
-        }
+        let key_id = if let Some(EncryptedBy::KeyId(key_id)) = metadata.encrypted_by() {
+            key_id
+        } else {
+            return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED))
+                .context("In unwrap_key: Cannot determine wrapping key.");
+        };
+        let super_key = self
+            .lookup_key(&key_id)
+            .ok_or(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::LOCKED))
+            .context("In unwrap_key: Required super decryption key is not in memory.")?;
+        Ok(KeyBlob::Sensitive {
+            key: Self::unwrap_key_with_key(blob, metadata, &super_key)
+                .context("In unwrap_key: unwrap_key_with_key failed")?,
+            reencrypt_with: super_key.reencrypt_with.as_ref().unwrap_or(&super_key).clone(),
+            force_reencrypt: super_key.reencrypt_with.is_some(),
+        })
     }
 
     /// Unwraps an encrypted key blob given an encryption key.
@@ -427,9 +421,9 @@
                     return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(format!(
                         concat!(
                         "In extract_super_key_from_key_entry: Super key has incomplete metadata.",
-                        "Present: encrypted_by: {}, salt: {}, iv: {}, aead_tag: {}."
+                        "encrypted_by: {:?}; Present: salt: {}, iv: {}, aead_tag: {}."
                     ),
-                        enc_by.is_some(),
+                        enc_by,
                         salt.is_some(),
                         iv.is_some(),
                         tag.is_some()
@@ -523,19 +517,19 @@
     ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> {
         match Enforcements::super_encryption_required(domain, key_parameters, flags) {
             SuperEncryptionType::None => Ok((key_blob.to_vec(), BlobMetaData::new())),
-            SuperEncryptionType::LskfBound => {
-                self.super_encrypt_on_key_init(db, legacy_migrator, user_id, &key_blob).context(
-                    "In handle_super_encryption_on_key_init.
-                         Failed to super encrypt the key.",
-                )
-            }
+            SuperEncryptionType::LskfBound => self
+                .super_encrypt_on_key_init(db, legacy_migrator, user_id, &key_blob)
+                .context(concat!(
+                    "In handle_super_encryption_on_key_init. ",
+                    "Failed to super encrypt with LskfBound key."
+                )),
             SuperEncryptionType::ScreenLockBound => {
                 let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap();
                 let entry = data.user_keys.entry(user_id).or_default();
                 if let Some(super_key) = entry.screen_lock_bound.as_ref() {
                     Self::encrypt_with_aes_super_key(key_blob, &super_key).context(concat!(
                         "In handle_super_encryption_on_key_init. ",
-                        "Failed to encrypt the key with screen_lock_bound key."
+                        "Failed to encrypt with ScreenLockBound key."
                     ))
                 } else {
                     // Symmetric key is not available, use public key encryption
diff --git a/keystore2/src/utils.rs b/keystore2/src/utils.rs
index 7b58205..48e9bfb 100644
--- a/keystore2/src/utils.rs
+++ b/keystore2/src/utils.rs
@@ -91,7 +91,13 @@
 
 /// This function checks whether a given tag corresponds to the access of device identifiers.
 pub fn is_device_id_attestation_tag(tag: Tag) -> bool {
-    matches!(tag, Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI | Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID | Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL)
+    matches!(
+        tag,
+        Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI
+            | Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID
+            | Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL
+            | Tag::DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION
+    )
 }
 
 /// This function checks whether the calling app has the Android permissions needed to attest device