diff --git a/debuggerd/crasher/Android.bp b/debuggerd/crasher/Android.bp
index effd480..3af806b 100644
--- a/debuggerd/crasher/Android.bp
+++ b/debuggerd/crasher/Android.bp
@@ -19,10 +19,6 @@
     arch: {
         arm: {
             srcs: ["arm/crashglue.S"],
-
-            neon: {
-                asflags: ["-DHAS_VFP_D32"],
-            },
         },
         arm64: {
             srcs: ["arm64/crashglue.S"],
diff --git a/debuggerd/crasher/arm/crashglue.S b/debuggerd/crasher/arm/crashglue.S
index 4fbfd6e..8649056 100644
--- a/debuggerd/crasher/arm/crashglue.S
+++ b/debuggerd/crasher/arm/crashglue.S
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@
 	fconstd   d13, #13
 	fconstd   d14, #14
 	fconstd   d15, #15
-#if defined(HAS_VFP_D32)
 	fconstd   d16, #16
 	fconstd   d17, #17
 	fconstd   d18, #18
@@ -49,7 +48,6 @@
 	fconstd   d29, #29
 	fconstd   d30, #30
 	fconstd   d31, #31
-#endif
 
 	mov lr, #0
 	ldr lr, [lr]
diff --git a/debuggerd/debuggerd_test.cpp b/debuggerd/debuggerd_test.cpp
index c08721b..9c1b136 100644
--- a/debuggerd/debuggerd_test.cpp
+++ b/debuggerd/debuggerd_test.cpp
@@ -445,6 +445,8 @@
   ASSERT_MATCH(result, "memory near x0 \\(\\[anon:");
 #elif defined(__arm__)
   ASSERT_MATCH(result, "memory near r0 \\(\\[anon:");
+#elif defined(__riscv)
+  ASSERT_MATCH(result, "memory near a0 \\(\\[anon:");
 #elif defined(__x86_64__)
   ASSERT_MATCH(result, "memory near rdi \\(\\[anon:");
 #else
diff --git a/debuggerd/libdebuggerd/tombstone.cpp b/debuggerd/libdebuggerd/tombstone.cpp
index e5b4d74..375ed8a 100644
--- a/debuggerd/libdebuggerd/tombstone.cpp
+++ b/debuggerd/libdebuggerd/tombstone.cpp
@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@
     .registers = std::move(regs), .uid = uid, .tid = target_tid,
     .thread_name = std::move(thread_name), .pid = pid, .command_line = std::move(command_line),
     .selinux_label = std::move(selinux_label), .siginfo = siginfo,
-#if defined(__aarch64__)
     // Only supported on aarch64 for now.
-        .tagged_addr_ctrl = prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, 0, 0, 0, 0),
+#if defined(__aarch64__)
+    .tagged_addr_ctrl = prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, 0, 0, 0, 0),
     .pac_enabled_keys = prctl(PR_PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS, 0, 0, 0, 0),
 #endif
   };
@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@
         if (target_tid == tid) {
           return;
         }
-        async_safe_format_log(ANDROID_LOG_ERROR, LOG_TAG, "Adding thread %d", tid);
         threads[tid] = ThreadInfo{
             .uid = thread.uid,
             .tid = tid,
diff --git a/fs_mgr/fs_mgr_overlayfs.cpp b/fs_mgr/fs_mgr_overlayfs.cpp
index 6290057..5468fb8 100644
--- a/fs_mgr/fs_mgr_overlayfs.cpp
+++ b/fs_mgr/fs_mgr_overlayfs.cpp
@@ -462,6 +462,28 @@
     return true;
 }
 
+OverlayfsTeardownResult TeardownDataScratch(IImageManager* images,
+                                            const std::string& partition_name, bool was_mounted) {
+    if (!images) {
+        return OverlayfsTeardownResult::Error;
+    }
+    if (!images->DisableImage(partition_name)) {
+        return OverlayfsTeardownResult::Error;
+    }
+    if (was_mounted) {
+        // If overlayfs was mounted, don't bother trying to unmap since
+        // it'll fail and create error spam.
+        return OverlayfsTeardownResult::Busy;
+    }
+    if (!images->UnmapImageIfExists(partition_name)) {
+        return OverlayfsTeardownResult::Busy;
+    }
+    if (!images->DeleteBackingImage(partition_name)) {
+        return OverlayfsTeardownResult::Busy;
+    }
+    return OverlayfsTeardownResult::Ok;
+}
+
 OverlayfsTeardownResult fs_mgr_overlayfs_teardown_scratch(const std::string& overlay,
                                                           bool* change) {
     // umount and delete kScratchMountPoint storage if we have logical partitions
@@ -484,24 +506,9 @@
 
     auto images = IImageManager::Open("remount", 10s);
     if (images && images->BackingImageExists(partition_name)) {
-        if (!images->DisableImage(partition_name)) {
-            return OverlayfsTeardownResult::Error;
-        }
-        if (was_mounted) {
-            // If overlayfs was mounted, don't bother trying to unmap since
-            // it'll fail and create error spam.
-            return OverlayfsTeardownResult::Busy;
-        }
-        if (!images->UnmapImageIfExists(partition_name)) {
-            return OverlayfsTeardownResult::Busy;
-        }
-        if (!images->DeleteBackingImage(partition_name)) {
-            return OverlayfsTeardownResult::Busy;
-        }
-
         // No need to check super partition, if we knew we had a scratch device
         // in /data.
-        return OverlayfsTeardownResult::Ok;
+        return TeardownDataScratch(images.get(), partition_name, was_mounted);
     }
 
     auto slot_number = fs_mgr_overlayfs_slot_number();
@@ -1103,6 +1110,8 @@
     }
     if (!images->MapImageDevice(partition_name, 10s, scratch_device)) {
         LERROR << "could not map scratch image";
+        // If we cannot use this image, then remove it.
+        TeardownDataScratch(images.get(), partition_name, false /* was_mounted */);
         return false;
     }
     return true;
@@ -1136,6 +1145,7 @@
         if (CreateScratchOnData(scratch_device, partition_exists)) {
             return true;
         }
+        LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to allocate scratch on /data, fallback to use free space on super";
     }
     // If that fails, see if we can land on super.
     if (CanUseSuperPartition(fstab)) {
diff --git a/init/init.cpp b/init/init.cpp
index 57397b5..540e2ca 100644
--- a/init/init.cpp
+++ b/init/init.cpp
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@
 }
 
 static Result<void> DoLoadApex(const std::string& apex_name) {
-    if(auto result = ParseApexConfigs(apex_name); !result.ok()) {
+    if (auto result = ParseApexConfigs(apex_name); !result.ok()) {
         return result.error();
     }
 
diff --git a/init/security.cpp b/init/security.cpp
index 0e9f6c2..2ecf687 100644
--- a/init/security.cpp
+++ b/init/security.cpp
@@ -116,6 +116,13 @@
     if (SetMmapRndBitsMin(33, 24, false) && (!Has32BitAbi() || SetMmapRndBitsMin(16, 16, true))) {
         return {};
     }
+#elif defined(__riscv)
+    // TODO: sv48 and sv57 were both added to the kernel this year, so we
+    // probably just need some kernel fixes to enable higher ASLR randomization,
+    // but for now 24 is the maximum that the kernel supports.
+    if (SetMmapRndBitsMin(24, 18, false)) {
+        return {};
+    }
 #elif defined(__x86_64__)
     // x86_64 supports 28 - 32 rnd bits, but Android wants to ensure that the
     // theoretical maximum of 32 bits is always supported and used.
diff --git a/rootdir/init.rc b/rootdir/init.rc
index 123148e..1eec061 100644
--- a/rootdir/init.rc
+++ b/rootdir/init.rc
@@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@
 # controlling access. On older kernels, the paranoid value is the only means of
 # controlling access. It is normally 3 (allow only root), but the shell user
 # can lower it to 1 (allowing thread-scoped pofiling) via security.perf_harden.
-on property:sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks=1
+on load_bpf_programs && property:sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks=1
     write /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid -1
 on property:security.perf_harden=0 && property:sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks=""
     write /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid 1
diff --git a/trusty/confirmationui/Android.bp b/trusty/confirmationui/Android.bp
index 29ef3c0..c5c5012 100644
--- a/trusty/confirmationui/Android.bp
+++ b/trusty/confirmationui/Android.bp
@@ -53,6 +53,24 @@
     ],
 }
 
+cc_fuzz {
+    name: "android.hardware.confirmationui-service.trusty_fuzzer",
+    defaults: ["service_fuzzer_defaults"],
+    vendor: true,
+    shared_libs: [
+        "android.hardware.confirmationui-V1-ndk",
+        "android.hardware.confirmationui.not-so-secure-input",
+        "android.hardware.confirmationui-lib.trusty",
+        "liblog",
+    ],
+    srcs: ["fuzzer.cpp"],
+    fuzz_config: {
+        cc: [
+            "nyamagoud@google.com",
+        ],
+    },
+}
+
 cc_library {
     name: "android.hardware.confirmationui-lib.trusty",
     defaults: [
diff --git a/trusty/confirmationui/fuzzer.cpp b/trusty/confirmationui/fuzzer.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4446b79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/trusty/confirmationui/fuzzer.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+#include <TrustyConfirmationuiHal.h>
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <fuzzbinder/libbinder_ndk_driver.h>
+#include <fuzzer/FuzzedDataProvider.h>
+
+using aidl::android::hardware::confirmationui::createTrustyConfirmationUI;
+using aidl::android::hardware::confirmationui::IConfirmationUI;
+using android::fuzzService;
+
+extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
+    auto confirmationui = createTrustyConfirmationUI();
+
+    fuzzService(confirmationui->asBinder().get(), FuzzedDataProvider(data, size));
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/trusty/storage/proxy/rpmb.c b/trusty/storage/proxy/rpmb.c
index f059935..b1b8232 100644
--- a/trusty/storage/proxy/rpmb.c
+++ b/trusty/storage/proxy/rpmb.c
@@ -322,9 +322,9 @@
 }
 
 static int send_mmc_rpmb_req(int mmc_fd, const struct storage_rpmb_send_req* req) {
-    struct {
+    union {
         struct mmc_ioc_multi_cmd multi;
-        struct mmc_ioc_cmd cmd_buf[3];
+        uint8_t raw[sizeof(struct mmc_ioc_multi_cmd) + sizeof(struct mmc_ioc_cmd) * 3];
     } mmc = {};
     struct mmc_ioc_cmd* cmd = mmc.multi.cmds;
     int rc;