diff --git a/init/init.c b/init/init.c
index d11db61..b2e39bd 100755
--- a/init/init.c
+++ b/init/init.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 
 #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
 struct selabel_handle *sehandle;
+struct selabel_handle *sehandle_prop;
 #endif
 
 static int property_triggers_enabled = 0;
@@ -755,9 +756,34 @@
 #endif
 
 #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+static const struct selinux_opt seopts_prop[] = {
+        { SELABEL_OPT_PATH, "/data/system/property_contexts" },
+        { SELABEL_OPT_PATH, "/property_contexts" },
+        { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+struct selabel_handle* selinux_android_prop_context_handle(void)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+    struct selabel_handle* sehandle = NULL;
+    while ((sehandle == NULL) && seopts_prop[i].value) {
+        sehandle = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_ANDROID_PROP, &seopts_prop[i], 1);
+        i++;
+    }
+
+    if (!sehandle) {
+        ERROR("SELinux:  Could not load property_contexts:  %s\n",
+              strerror(errno));
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    INFO("SELinux: Loaded property contexts from %s\n", seopts_prop[i - 1].value);
+    return sehandle;
+}
+
 void selinux_init_all_handles(void)
 {
     sehandle = selinux_android_file_context_handle();
+    sehandle_prop = selinux_android_prop_context_handle();
 }
 
 int selinux_reload_policy(void)
@@ -775,9 +801,19 @@
     if (sehandle)
         selabel_close(sehandle);
 
+    if (sehandle_prop)
+        selabel_close(sehandle_prop);
+
     selinux_init_all_handles();
     return 0;
 }
+
+int audit_callback(void *data, security_class_t cls, char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    snprintf(buf, len, "property=%s", !data ? "NULL" : (char *)data);
+    return 0;
+}
+
 #endif
 
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
@@ -831,6 +867,13 @@
     process_kernel_cmdline();
 
 #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+    union selinux_callback cb;
+    cb.func_log = klog_write;
+    selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, cb);
+
+    cb.func_audit = audit_callback;
+    selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_AUDIT, cb);
+
     INFO("loading selinux policy\n");
     if (selinux_enabled) {
         if (selinux_android_load_policy() < 0) {
diff --git a/init/init.h b/init/init.h
index e2d990e..b7e06c9 100644
--- a/init/init.h
+++ b/init/init.h
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@
 
 #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
 extern struct selabel_handle *sehandle;
+extern struct selabel_handle *sehandle_prop;
 extern int selinux_reload_policy(void);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/init/property_service.c b/init/property_service.c
index 471c3dc..5017375 100644
--- a/init/property_service.c
+++ b/init/property_service.c
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
 #include <sys/atomics.h>
 #include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
 
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/label.h>
+#endif
+
 #include "property_service.h"
 #include "init.h"
 #include "util.h"
@@ -192,23 +197,77 @@
     __futex_wake(&pi->serial, INT32_MAX);
 }
 
+static int check_mac_perms(const char *name, char *sctx)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+    if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    char *tctx = NULL;
+    const char *class = "property_service";
+    const char *perm = "set";
+    int result = 0;
+
+    if (!sctx)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!sehandle_prop)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (selabel_lookup(sehandle_prop, &tctx, name, 1) != 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (selinux_check_access(sctx, tctx, class, perm, name) == 0)
+        result = 1;
+
+    freecon(tctx);
+ err:
+    return result;
+
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_control_mac_perms(const char *name, char *sctx)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+
+    /*
+     *  Create a name prefix out of ctl.<service name>
+     *  The new prefix allows the use of the existing
+     *  property service backend labeling while avoiding
+     *  mislabels based on true property prefixes.
+     */
+    char ctl_name[PROP_VALUE_MAX+4];
+    int ret = snprintf(ctl_name, sizeof(ctl_name), "ctl.%s", name);
+
+    if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= sizeof(ctl_name))
+        return 0;
+
+    return check_mac_perms(ctl_name, sctx);
+
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * Checks permissions for starting/stoping system services.
  * AID_SYSTEM and AID_ROOT are always allowed.
  *
  * Returns 1 if uid allowed, 0 otherwise.
  */
-static int check_control_perms(const char *name, unsigned int uid, unsigned int gid) {
+static int check_control_perms(const char *name, unsigned int uid, unsigned int gid, char *sctx) {
+
     int i;
     if (uid == AID_SYSTEM || uid == AID_ROOT)
-        return 1;
+      return check_control_mac_perms(name, sctx);
 
     /* Search the ACL */
     for (i = 0; control_perms[i].service; i++) {
         if (strcmp(control_perms[i].service, name) == 0) {
             if ((uid && control_perms[i].uid == uid) ||
                 (gid && control_perms[i].gid == gid)) {
-                return 1;
+                return check_control_mac_perms(name, sctx);
             }
         }
     }
@@ -219,22 +278,22 @@
  * Checks permissions for setting system properties.
  * Returns 1 if uid allowed, 0 otherwise.
  */
-static int check_perms(const char *name, unsigned int uid, unsigned int gid)
+static int check_perms(const char *name, unsigned int uid, unsigned int gid, char *sctx)
 {
     int i;
-    if (uid == 0)
-        return 1;
-
     if(!strncmp(name, "ro.", 3))
         name +=3;
 
+    if (uid == 0)
+        return check_mac_perms(name, sctx);
+
     for (i = 0; property_perms[i].prefix; i++) {
-        int tmp;
         if (strncmp(property_perms[i].prefix, name,
                     strlen(property_perms[i].prefix)) == 0) {
             if ((uid && property_perms[i].uid == uid) ||
                 (gid && property_perms[i].gid == gid)) {
-                return 1;
+
+                return check_mac_perms(name, sctx);
             }
         }
     }
@@ -355,6 +414,7 @@
     struct sockaddr_un addr;
     socklen_t addr_size = sizeof(addr);
     socklen_t cr_size = sizeof(cr);
+    char * source_ctx = NULL;
 
     if ((s = accept(property_set_fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, &addr_size)) < 0) {
         return;
@@ -380,18 +440,22 @@
         msg.name[PROP_NAME_MAX-1] = 0;
         msg.value[PROP_VALUE_MAX-1] = 0;
 
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+        getpeercon(s, &source_ctx);
+#endif
+
         if(memcmp(msg.name,"ctl.",4) == 0) {
             // Keep the old close-socket-early behavior when handling
             // ctl.* properties.
             close(s);
-            if (check_control_perms(msg.value, cr.uid, cr.gid)) {
+            if (check_control_perms(msg.value, cr.uid, cr.gid, source_ctx)) {
                 handle_control_message((char*) msg.name + 4, (char*) msg.value);
             } else {
                 ERROR("sys_prop: Unable to %s service ctl [%s] uid:%d gid:%d pid:%d\n",
                         msg.name + 4, msg.value, cr.uid, cr.gid, cr.pid);
             }
         } else {
-            if (check_perms(msg.name, cr.uid, cr.gid)) {
+            if (check_perms(msg.name, cr.uid, cr.gid, source_ctx)) {
                 property_set((char*) msg.name, (char*) msg.value);
             } else {
                 ERROR("sys_prop: permission denied uid:%d  name:%s\n",
@@ -403,6 +467,10 @@
             // the property is written to memory.
             close(s);
         }
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+        freecon(source_ctx);
+#endif
+
         break;
 
     default: