diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/Android.bp b/microdroid/sepolicy/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9bb6408
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+system_policy_files = [
+    "system/private/security_classes",
+    "system/private/initial_sids",
+    "system/private/access_vectors",
+    "system/public/global_macros",
+    "system/public/neverallow_macros",
+    "system/private/mls_macros",
+    "system/private/mls_decl",
+    "system/private/mls",
+    "system/private/policy_capabilities",
+    "system/public/te_macros",
+    "system/public/attributes",
+    "system/private/attributes",
+    "system/public/ioctl_defines",
+    "system/public/ioctl_macros",
+    "system/public/*.te",
+    "system/private/*.te",
+    "system/private/roles_decl",
+    "system/public/roles",
+    "system/private/users",
+    "system/private/initial_sid_contexts",
+    "system/private/fs_use",
+    "system/private/genfs_contexts",
+    "system/private/port_contexts",
+]
+
+reqd_mask_files = [
+    "reqd_mask/security_classes",
+    "reqd_mask/initial_sids",
+    "reqd_mask/access_vectors",
+    "reqd_mask/mls_macros",
+    "reqd_mask/mls_decl",
+    "reqd_mask/mls",
+    "reqd_mask/reqd_mask.te",
+    "reqd_mask/roles_decl",
+    "reqd_mask/roles",
+    "reqd_mask/users",
+    "reqd_mask/initial_sid_contexts",
+]
+
+system_public_policy_files = [
+    "reqd_mask/security_classes",
+    "reqd_mask/initial_sids",
+    "reqd_mask/access_vectors",
+    "system/public/global_macros",
+    "system/public/neverallow_macros",
+    "reqd_mask/mls_macros",
+    "reqd_mask/mls_decl",
+    "reqd_mask/mls",
+    "system/public/te_macros",
+    "system/public/attributes",
+    "system/public/ioctl_defines",
+    "system/public/ioctl_macros",
+    "system/public/*.te",
+    "reqd_mask/reqd_mask.te",
+    "reqd_mask/roles_decl",
+    "reqd_mask/roles",
+    "system/public/roles",
+    "reqd_mask/users",
+    "reqd_mask/initial_sid_contexts",
+]
+
+vendor_policy_files = [
+    "reqd_mask/security_classes",
+    "reqd_mask/initial_sids",
+    "reqd_mask/access_vectors",
+    "system/public/global_macros",
+    "system/public/neverallow_macros",
+    "reqd_mask/mls_macros",
+    "reqd_mask/mls_decl",
+    "reqd_mask/mls",
+    "system/public/te_macros",
+    "system/public/attributes",
+    "system/public/ioctl_defines",
+    "system/public/ioctl_macros",
+    "system/public/*.te",
+    "reqd_mask/reqd_mask.te",
+    "vendor/*.te",
+    "reqd_mask/roles_decl",
+    "reqd_mask/roles",
+    "system/public/roles",
+    "reqd_mask/users",
+    "reqd_mask/initial_sid_contexts",
+]
+
+se_policy_conf {
+    name: "microdroid_reqd_policy_mask.conf",
+    srcs: reqd_mask_files,
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_policy_cil {
+    name: "microdroid_reqd_policy_mask.cil",
+    src: ":microdroid_reqd_policy_mask.conf",
+    secilc_check: false,
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_policy_conf {
+    name: "microdroid_plat_sepolicy.conf",
+    srcs: system_policy_files,
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_policy_cil {
+    name: "microdroid_plat_sepolicy.cil",
+    stem: "plat_sepolicy.cil",
+    src: ":microdroid_plat_sepolicy.conf",
+    additional_cil_files: ["system/private/technical_debt.cil"],
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_policy_conf {
+    name: "microdroid_plat_pub_policy.conf",
+    srcs: system_public_policy_files,
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_policy_cil {
+    name: "microdroid_plat_pub_policy.cil",
+    src: ":microdroid_plat_pub_policy.conf",
+    filter_out: [":microdroid_reqd_policy_mask.cil"],
+    secilc_check: false,
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_versioned_policy {
+    name: "microdroid_plat_mapping_file",
+    base: ":microdroid_plat_pub_policy.cil",
+    mapping: true,
+    version: "current",
+    relative_install_path: "mapping", // install to /system/etc/selinux/mapping
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_versioned_policy {
+    name: "microdroid_plat_pub_versioned.cil",
+    stem: "plat_pub_versioned.cil",
+    base: ":microdroid_plat_pub_policy.cil",
+    target_policy: ":microdroid_plat_pub_policy.cil",
+    version: "current",
+    dependent_cils: [
+        ":microdroid_plat_sepolicy.cil",
+        ":microdroid_plat_mapping_file",
+    ],
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_policy_conf {
+    name: "microdroid_vendor_sepolicy.conf",
+    srcs: vendor_policy_files,
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_policy_cil {
+    name: "microdroid_vendor_sepolicy.cil.raw",
+    src: ":microdroid_vendor_sepolicy.conf",
+    filter_out: [":microdroid_reqd_policy_mask.cil"],
+    secilc_check: false, // will be done in se_versioned_policy module
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_versioned_policy {
+    name: "microdroid_vendor_sepolicy.cil",
+    stem: "vendor_sepolicy.cil",
+    base: ":microdroid_plat_pub_policy.cil",
+    target_policy: ":microdroid_vendor_sepolicy.cil.raw",
+    version: "current", // microdroid is bundled to system
+    dependent_cils: [
+        ":microdroid_plat_sepolicy.cil",
+        ":microdroid_plat_pub_versioned.cil",
+        ":microdroid_plat_mapping_file",
+    ],
+    filter_out: [":microdroid_plat_pub_versioned.cil"],
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+sepolicy_vers {
+    name: "microdroid_plat_sepolicy_vers.txt",
+    version: "platform",
+    stem: "plat_sepolicy_vers.txt",
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+// sepolicy sha256 for vendor
+genrule {
+    name: "microdroid_plat_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256_gen",
+    srcs: [":microdroid_plat_sepolicy.cil", ":microdroid_plat_mapping_file"],
+    out: ["microdroid_plat_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256"],
+    cmd: "cat $(in) | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1 > $(out)",
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "microdroid_plat_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256",
+    src: ":microdroid_plat_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256_gen",
+    filename: "plat_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256",
+    relative_install_path: "selinux",
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "microdroid_precompiled_sepolicy.plat_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256",
+    src: ":microdroid_plat_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256_gen",
+    filename: "precompiled_sepolicy.plat_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256",
+    relative_install_path: "selinux",
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+genrule {
+    name: "microdroid_precompiled_sepolicy_gen",
+    tools: ["secilc"],
+    srcs: [
+        ":microdroid_plat_sepolicy.cil",
+        ":microdroid_plat_mapping_file",
+        ":microdroid_plat_pub_versioned.cil",
+        ":microdroid_vendor_sepolicy.cil",
+    ],
+    out: ["precompiled_sepolicy"],
+    cmd: "$(location secilc) -m -M true -G -c 30 $(in) -o $(out) -f /dev/null",
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "microdroid_precompiled_sepolicy",
+    src: ":microdroid_precompiled_sepolicy_gen",
+    filename: "precompiled_sepolicy",
+    relative_install_path: "selinux",
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+genrule {
+    name: "microdroid_file_contexts.gen",
+    srcs: ["system/private/file_contexts"],
+    tools: ["fc_sort"],
+    out: ["file_contexts"],
+    cmd: "sed -e 's/#.*$$//' -e '/^$$/d' $(in) > $(out).tmp && " +
+         "$(location fc_sort) -i $(out).tmp -o $(out)",
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "microdroid_file_contexts",
+    filename: "plat_file_contexts",
+    src: ":microdroid_file_contexts.gen",
+    relative_install_path: "selinux",
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+genrule {
+    name: "microdroid_vendor_file_contexts.gen",
+    srcs: ["vendor/file_contexts"],
+    tools: ["fc_sort"],
+    out: ["file_contexts"],
+    cmd: "sed -e 's/#.*$$//' -e '/^$$/d' $(in) > $(out).tmp && " +
+         "$(location fc_sort) -i $(out).tmp -o $(out)",
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "microdroid_hwservice_contexts",
+    filename: "plat_hwservice_contexts",
+    src: "system/private/hwservice_contexts",
+    relative_install_path: "selinux",
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "microdroid_property_contexts",
+    filename: "plat_property_contexts",
+    src: "system/private/property_contexts",
+    relative_install_path: "selinux",
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "microdroid_service_contexts",
+    filename: "plat_service_contexts",
+    src: "system/private/service_contexts",
+    relative_install_path: "selinux",
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "microdroid_keystore2_key_contexts",
+    filename: "plat_keystore2_key_contexts",
+    src: "system/private/keystore2_key_contexts",
+    relative_install_path: "selinux",
+    installable: false,
+}
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/access_vectors b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/access_vectors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22f2ffa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/access_vectors
@@ -0,0 +1,777 @@
+#
+# Define common prefixes for access vectors
+#
+# common common_name { permission_name ... }
+
+
+#
+# Define a common prefix for file access vectors.
+#
+
+common file
+{
+	ioctl
+	read
+	write
+	create
+	getattr
+	setattr
+	lock
+	relabelfrom
+	relabelto
+	append
+	map
+	unlink
+	link
+	rename
+	execute
+	quotaon
+	mounton
+	audit_access
+	open
+	execmod
+	watch
+	watch_mount
+	watch_sb
+	watch_with_perm
+	watch_reads
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define a common prefix for socket access vectors.
+#
+
+common socket
+{
+# inherited from file
+	ioctl
+	read
+	write
+	create
+	getattr
+	setattr
+	lock
+	relabelfrom
+	relabelto
+	append
+	map
+# socket-specific
+	bind
+	connect
+	listen
+	accept
+	getopt
+	setopt
+	shutdown
+	recvfrom
+	sendto
+	name_bind
+}
+
+#
+# Define a common prefix for ipc access vectors.
+#
+
+common ipc
+{
+	create
+	destroy
+	getattr
+	setattr
+	read
+	write
+	associate
+	unix_read
+	unix_write
+}
+
+#
+# Define a common for capability access vectors.
+#
+common cap
+{
+	# The capabilities are defined in include/linux/capability.h
+	# Capabilities >= 32 are defined in the cap2 common.
+	# Care should be taken to ensure that these are consistent with
+	# those definitions. (Order matters)
+
+	chown
+	dac_override
+	dac_read_search
+	fowner
+	fsetid
+	kill
+	setgid
+	setuid
+	setpcap
+	linux_immutable
+	net_bind_service
+	net_broadcast
+	net_admin
+	net_raw
+	ipc_lock
+	ipc_owner
+	sys_module
+	sys_rawio
+	sys_chroot
+	sys_ptrace
+	sys_pacct
+	sys_admin
+	sys_boot
+	sys_nice
+	sys_resource
+	sys_time
+	sys_tty_config
+	mknod
+	lease
+	audit_write
+	audit_control
+	setfcap
+}
+
+common cap2
+{
+	mac_override	# unused by SELinux
+	mac_admin
+	syslog
+	wake_alarm
+	block_suspend
+	audit_read
+	perfmon
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vectors.
+#
+# class class_name [ inherits common_name ] { permission_name ... }
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for file-related objects.
+#
+
+class filesystem
+{
+	mount
+	remount
+	unmount
+	getattr
+	relabelfrom
+	relabelto
+	associate
+	quotamod
+	quotaget
+	watch
+}
+
+class dir
+inherits file
+{
+	add_name
+	remove_name
+	reparent
+	search
+	rmdir
+}
+
+class file
+inherits file
+{
+	execute_no_trans
+	entrypoint
+}
+
+class anon_inode
+inherits file
+
+class lnk_file
+inherits file
+
+class chr_file
+inherits file
+{
+	execute_no_trans
+	entrypoint
+}
+
+class blk_file
+inherits file
+
+class sock_file
+inherits file
+
+class fifo_file
+inherits file
+
+class fd
+{
+	use
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for network-related objects.
+#
+
+class socket
+inherits socket
+
+class tcp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+	name_connect
+}
+
+class udp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+}
+
+class rawip_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+}
+
+class node
+{
+	recvfrom
+	sendto
+}
+
+class netif
+{
+	ingress
+	egress
+}
+
+class netlink_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class packet_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class key_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class unix_stream_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	connectto
+}
+
+class unix_dgram_socket
+inherits socket
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for process-related objects
+#
+
+class process
+{
+	fork
+	transition
+	sigchld # commonly granted from child to parent
+	sigkill # cannot be caught or ignored
+	sigstop # cannot be caught or ignored
+	signull # for kill(pid, 0)
+	signal  # all other signals
+	ptrace
+	getsched
+	setsched
+	getsession
+	getpgid
+	setpgid
+	getcap
+	setcap
+	share
+	getattr
+	setexec
+	setfscreate
+	noatsecure
+	siginh
+	setrlimit
+	rlimitinh
+	dyntransition
+	setcurrent
+	execmem
+	execstack
+	execheap
+	setkeycreate
+	setsockcreate
+	getrlimit
+}
+
+class process2
+{
+	nnp_transition
+	nosuid_transition
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for ipc-related objects
+#
+
+class ipc
+inherits ipc
+
+class sem
+inherits ipc
+
+class msgq
+inherits ipc
+{
+	enqueue
+}
+
+class msg
+{
+	send
+	receive
+}
+
+class shm
+inherits ipc
+{
+	lock
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for the security server.
+#
+
+class security
+{
+	compute_av
+	compute_create
+	compute_member
+	check_context
+	load_policy
+	compute_relabel
+	compute_user
+	setenforce     # was avc_toggle in system class
+	setbool
+	setsecparam
+	setcheckreqprot
+	read_policy
+	validate_trans
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for system operations.
+#
+
+class system
+{
+	ipc_info
+	syslog_read
+	syslog_mod
+	syslog_console
+	module_request
+	module_load
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling capabilities
+#
+
+class capability
+inherits cap
+
+class capability2
+inherits cap2
+
+#
+# Extended Netlink classes
+#
+class netlink_route_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+	nlmsg_readpriv
+}
+
+class netlink_tcpdiag_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+}
+
+class netlink_nflog_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_xfrm_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+}
+
+class netlink_selinux_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_audit_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+	nlmsg_relay
+	nlmsg_readpriv
+	nlmsg_tty_audit
+}
+
+class netlink_dnrt_socket
+inherits socket
+
+# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling
+# access to IPSec network data by association
+#
+class association
+{
+	sendto
+	recvfrom
+	setcontext
+	polmatch
+}
+
+# Updated Netlink class for KOBJECT_UEVENT family.
+class netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class appletalk_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class packet
+{
+	send
+	recv
+	relabelto
+	forward_in
+	forward_out
+}
+
+class key
+{
+	view
+	read
+	write
+	search
+	link
+	setattr
+	create
+}
+
+class dccp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+	name_connect
+}
+
+class memprotect
+{
+	mmap_zero
+}
+
+# network peer labels
+class peer
+{
+	recv
+}
+
+class kernel_service
+{
+	use_as_override
+	create_files_as
+}
+
+class tun_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	attach_queue
+}
+
+class binder
+{
+	impersonate
+	call
+	set_context_mgr
+	transfer
+}
+
+class netlink_iscsi_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_fib_lookup_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_connector_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_netfilter_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_generic_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_scsitransport_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_rdma_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_crypto_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class infiniband_pkey
+{
+	access
+}
+
+class infiniband_endport
+{
+	manage_subnet
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling capabilities
+# in user namespaces
+#
+
+class cap_userns
+inherits cap
+
+class cap2_userns
+inherits cap2
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for the new socket classes
+# enabled by the extended_socket_class policy capability.
+#
+
+#
+# The next two classes were previously mapped to rawip_socket and therefore
+# have the same definition as rawip_socket (until further permissions
+# are defined).
+#
+class sctp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+	name_connect
+	association
+}
+
+class icmp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+}
+
+#
+# The remaining network socket classes were previously
+# mapped to the socket class and therefore have the
+# same definition as socket.
+#
+
+class ax25_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class ipx_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netrom_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class atmpvc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class x25_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class rose_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class decnet_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class atmsvc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class rds_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class irda_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class pppox_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class llc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class can_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class tipc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class bluetooth_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class iucv_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class rxrpc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class isdn_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class phonet_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class ieee802154_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class caif_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class alg_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class nfc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class vsock_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class kcm_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class qipcrtr_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class smc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class bpf
+{
+	map_create
+	map_read
+	map_write
+	prog_load
+	prog_run
+}
+
+class property_service
+{
+	set
+}
+
+class service_manager
+{
+	add
+	find
+	list
+}
+
+class hwservice_manager
+{
+	add
+	find
+	list
+}
+
+class keystore_key
+{
+	get_state
+	get
+	insert
+	delete
+	exist
+	list
+	reset
+	password
+	lock
+	unlock
+	is_empty
+	sign
+	verify
+	grant
+	duplicate
+	clear_uid
+	add_auth
+	user_changed
+	gen_unique_id
+}
+
+class keystore2
+{
+	add_auth
+	change_password
+	change_user
+	clear_ns
+	clear_uid
+	early_boot_ended
+	get_auth_token
+	get_state
+	list
+	lock
+	report_off_body
+	reset
+	unlock
+}
+
+class keystore2_key
+{
+	convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral
+	delete
+	gen_unique_id
+	get_info
+	grant
+	manage_blob
+	rebind
+	req_forced_op
+	update
+	use
+	use_dev_id
+}
+
+class drmservice {
+	consumeRights
+	setPlaybackStatus
+	openDecryptSession
+	closeDecryptSession
+	initializeDecryptUnit
+	decrypt
+	finalizeDecryptUnit
+	pread
+}
+
+class xdp_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class perf_event
+{
+	open
+	cpu
+	kernel
+	tracepoint
+	read
+	write
+}
+
+class lockdown
+{
+	integrity
+	confidentiality
+}
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/initial_sid_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/initial_sid_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa465cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/initial_sid_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sid reqd_mask u:r:reqd_mask_type:s0
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/initial_sids b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/initial_sids
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..366cfb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/initial_sids
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+sid reqd_mask
+
+# FLASK
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/keys.conf b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/keys.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce7166b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/keys.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# empty keys.conf file - used to generate an empty nonplat_mac_permissions.xml
+# on devices without any keys.conf or mac_permissions additions.
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mac_permissions.xml b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mac_permissions.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef9c6dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mac_permissions.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<policy>
+</policy>
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mls b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mls
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d276924
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mls
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+mlsconstrain binder { set_context_mgr } (l1 eq l2);
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mls_decl b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mls_decl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd53bea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mls_decl
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#########################################
+# MLS declarations
+#
+
+# Generate the desired number of sensitivities and categories.
+gen_sens(mls_num_sens)
+gen_cats(mls_num_cats)
+
+# Generate level definitions for each sensitivity and category.
+gen_levels(mls_num_sens,mls_num_cats)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mls_macros b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mls_macros
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83e0542
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/mls_macros
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+########################################
+#
+# gen_cats(N)
+#
+# declares categores c0 to c(N-1)
+#
+define(`decl_cats',`dnl
+category c$1;
+ifelse(`$1',`$2',,`decl_cats(incr($1),$2)')dnl
+')
+
+define(`gen_cats',`decl_cats(0,decr($1))')
+
+########################################
+#
+# gen_sens(N)
+#
+# declares sensitivites s0 to s(N-1) with dominance
+# in increasing numeric order with s0 lowest, s(N-1) highest
+#
+define(`decl_sens',`dnl
+sensitivity s$1;
+ifelse(`$1',`$2',,`decl_sens(incr($1),$2)')dnl
+')
+
+define(`gen_dominance',`s$1 ifelse(`$1',`$2',,`gen_dominance(incr($1),$2)')')
+
+define(`gen_sens',`
+# Each sensitivity has a name and zero or more aliases.
+decl_sens(0,decr($1))
+
+# Define the ordering of the sensitivity levels (least to greatest)
+dominance { gen_dominance(0,decr($1)) }
+')
+
+########################################
+#
+# gen_levels(N,M)
+#
+# levels from s0 to (N-1) with categories c0 to (M-1)
+#
+define(`decl_levels',`dnl
+level s$1:c0.c$3;
+ifelse(`$1',`$2',,`decl_levels(incr($1),$2,$3)')dnl
+')
+
+define(`gen_levels',`decl_levels(0,decr($1),decr($2))')
+
+########################################
+#
+# Basic level names for system low and high
+#
+define(`mls_systemlow',`s0')
+define(`mls_systemhigh',`s`'decr(mls_num_sens):c0.c`'decr(mls_num_cats)')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/property_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/property_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e0bdbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/property_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# empty property_contexts file - this file is used to generate an empty
+# non-platform property context for devices without any property_contexts
+# customizations.
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/reqd_mask.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/reqd_mask.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f77eef4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/reqd_mask.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type reqd_mask_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/roles b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/roles
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..926cb7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/roles
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+role r types reqd_mask_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/roles_decl b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/roles_decl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c84fcba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/roles_decl
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+role r;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/seapp_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/seapp_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f4e0ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/seapp_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# empty seapp_contexts file - used to generate an empty seapp_contexts for
+# devices without any non-platform seapp_contexts customizations.
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/security_classes b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/security_classes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..200b030
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/security_classes
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+# FLASK
+
+#
+# Define the security object classes
+#
+
+# Classes marked as userspace are classes
+# for userspace object managers
+
+class security
+class process
+class system
+class capability
+
+# file-related classes
+class filesystem
+class file
+class anon_inode
+class dir
+class fd
+class lnk_file
+class chr_file
+class blk_file
+class sock_file
+class fifo_file
+
+# network-related classes
+class socket
+class tcp_socket
+class udp_socket
+class rawip_socket
+class node
+class netif
+class netlink_socket
+class packet_socket
+class key_socket
+class unix_stream_socket
+class unix_dgram_socket
+
+# sysv-ipc-related classes
+class sem
+class msg
+class msgq
+class shm
+class ipc
+
+# extended netlink sockets
+class netlink_route_socket
+class netlink_tcpdiag_socket
+class netlink_nflog_socket
+class netlink_xfrm_socket
+class netlink_selinux_socket
+class netlink_audit_socket
+class netlink_dnrt_socket
+
+# IPSec association
+class association
+
+# Updated Netlink class for KOBJECT_UEVENT family.
+class netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
+
+class appletalk_socket
+
+class packet
+
+# Kernel access key retention
+class key
+
+class dccp_socket
+
+class memprotect
+
+# network peer labels
+class peer
+
+# Capabilities >= 32
+class capability2
+
+# kernel services that need to override task security, e.g. cachefiles
+class kernel_service
+
+class tun_socket
+
+class binder
+
+# Updated netlink classes for more recent netlink protocols.
+class netlink_iscsi_socket
+class netlink_fib_lookup_socket
+class netlink_connector_socket
+class netlink_netfilter_socket
+class netlink_generic_socket
+class netlink_scsitransport_socket
+class netlink_rdma_socket
+class netlink_crypto_socket
+
+# Infiniband
+class infiniband_pkey
+class infiniband_endport
+
+# Capability checks when on a non-init user namespace
+class cap_userns
+class cap2_userns
+
+# New socket classes introduced by extended_socket_class policy capability.
+# These two were previously mapped to rawip_socket.
+class sctp_socket
+class icmp_socket
+# These were previously mapped to socket.
+class ax25_socket
+class ipx_socket
+class netrom_socket
+class atmpvc_socket
+class x25_socket
+class rose_socket
+class decnet_socket
+class atmsvc_socket
+class rds_socket
+class irda_socket
+class pppox_socket
+class llc_socket
+class can_socket
+class tipc_socket
+class bluetooth_socket
+class iucv_socket
+class rxrpc_socket
+class isdn_socket
+class phonet_socket
+class ieee802154_socket
+class caif_socket
+class alg_socket
+class nfc_socket
+class vsock_socket
+class kcm_socket
+class qipcrtr_socket
+class smc_socket
+
+class process2
+
+class bpf
+
+class xdp_socket
+
+class perf_event
+
+# Introduced in https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/59438b46471ae6cdfb761afc8c9beaf1e428a331
+class lockdown
+
+# Property service
+class property_service          # userspace
+
+# Service manager
+class service_manager           # userspace
+
+# hardware service manager      # userspace
+class hwservice_manager
+
+# Legacy Keystore key permissions
+class keystore_key              # userspace
+
+# Keystore 2.0 permissions
+class keystore2                 # userspace
+
+# Keystore 2.0 key permissions
+class keystore2_key             # userspace
+
+class drmservice                # userspace
+# FLASK
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/service_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/service_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..481967b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/service_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# empty service_contexts file - this file is used to generate an empty
+# non-platform service_context for devices without any service_contexts
+# customizations.
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/users b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/users
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51b7b57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/reqd_mask/users
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+user u roles { r } level s0 range s0 - mls_systemhigh;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/access_vectors b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/access_vectors
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22f2ffa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/access_vectors
@@ -0,0 +1,777 @@
+#
+# Define common prefixes for access vectors
+#
+# common common_name { permission_name ... }
+
+
+#
+# Define a common prefix for file access vectors.
+#
+
+common file
+{
+	ioctl
+	read
+	write
+	create
+	getattr
+	setattr
+	lock
+	relabelfrom
+	relabelto
+	append
+	map
+	unlink
+	link
+	rename
+	execute
+	quotaon
+	mounton
+	audit_access
+	open
+	execmod
+	watch
+	watch_mount
+	watch_sb
+	watch_with_perm
+	watch_reads
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define a common prefix for socket access vectors.
+#
+
+common socket
+{
+# inherited from file
+	ioctl
+	read
+	write
+	create
+	getattr
+	setattr
+	lock
+	relabelfrom
+	relabelto
+	append
+	map
+# socket-specific
+	bind
+	connect
+	listen
+	accept
+	getopt
+	setopt
+	shutdown
+	recvfrom
+	sendto
+	name_bind
+}
+
+#
+# Define a common prefix for ipc access vectors.
+#
+
+common ipc
+{
+	create
+	destroy
+	getattr
+	setattr
+	read
+	write
+	associate
+	unix_read
+	unix_write
+}
+
+#
+# Define a common for capability access vectors.
+#
+common cap
+{
+	# The capabilities are defined in include/linux/capability.h
+	# Capabilities >= 32 are defined in the cap2 common.
+	# Care should be taken to ensure that these are consistent with
+	# those definitions. (Order matters)
+
+	chown
+	dac_override
+	dac_read_search
+	fowner
+	fsetid
+	kill
+	setgid
+	setuid
+	setpcap
+	linux_immutable
+	net_bind_service
+	net_broadcast
+	net_admin
+	net_raw
+	ipc_lock
+	ipc_owner
+	sys_module
+	sys_rawio
+	sys_chroot
+	sys_ptrace
+	sys_pacct
+	sys_admin
+	sys_boot
+	sys_nice
+	sys_resource
+	sys_time
+	sys_tty_config
+	mknod
+	lease
+	audit_write
+	audit_control
+	setfcap
+}
+
+common cap2
+{
+	mac_override	# unused by SELinux
+	mac_admin
+	syslog
+	wake_alarm
+	block_suspend
+	audit_read
+	perfmon
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vectors.
+#
+# class class_name [ inherits common_name ] { permission_name ... }
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for file-related objects.
+#
+
+class filesystem
+{
+	mount
+	remount
+	unmount
+	getattr
+	relabelfrom
+	relabelto
+	associate
+	quotamod
+	quotaget
+	watch
+}
+
+class dir
+inherits file
+{
+	add_name
+	remove_name
+	reparent
+	search
+	rmdir
+}
+
+class file
+inherits file
+{
+	execute_no_trans
+	entrypoint
+}
+
+class anon_inode
+inherits file
+
+class lnk_file
+inherits file
+
+class chr_file
+inherits file
+{
+	execute_no_trans
+	entrypoint
+}
+
+class blk_file
+inherits file
+
+class sock_file
+inherits file
+
+class fifo_file
+inherits file
+
+class fd
+{
+	use
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for network-related objects.
+#
+
+class socket
+inherits socket
+
+class tcp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+	name_connect
+}
+
+class udp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+}
+
+class rawip_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+}
+
+class node
+{
+	recvfrom
+	sendto
+}
+
+class netif
+{
+	ingress
+	egress
+}
+
+class netlink_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class packet_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class key_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class unix_stream_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	connectto
+}
+
+class unix_dgram_socket
+inherits socket
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for process-related objects
+#
+
+class process
+{
+	fork
+	transition
+	sigchld # commonly granted from child to parent
+	sigkill # cannot be caught or ignored
+	sigstop # cannot be caught or ignored
+	signull # for kill(pid, 0)
+	signal  # all other signals
+	ptrace
+	getsched
+	setsched
+	getsession
+	getpgid
+	setpgid
+	getcap
+	setcap
+	share
+	getattr
+	setexec
+	setfscreate
+	noatsecure
+	siginh
+	setrlimit
+	rlimitinh
+	dyntransition
+	setcurrent
+	execmem
+	execstack
+	execheap
+	setkeycreate
+	setsockcreate
+	getrlimit
+}
+
+class process2
+{
+	nnp_transition
+	nosuid_transition
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for ipc-related objects
+#
+
+class ipc
+inherits ipc
+
+class sem
+inherits ipc
+
+class msgq
+inherits ipc
+{
+	enqueue
+}
+
+class msg
+{
+	send
+	receive
+}
+
+class shm
+inherits ipc
+{
+	lock
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for the security server.
+#
+
+class security
+{
+	compute_av
+	compute_create
+	compute_member
+	check_context
+	load_policy
+	compute_relabel
+	compute_user
+	setenforce     # was avc_toggle in system class
+	setbool
+	setsecparam
+	setcheckreqprot
+	read_policy
+	validate_trans
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for system operations.
+#
+
+class system
+{
+	ipc_info
+	syslog_read
+	syslog_mod
+	syslog_console
+	module_request
+	module_load
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling capabilities
+#
+
+class capability
+inherits cap
+
+class capability2
+inherits cap2
+
+#
+# Extended Netlink classes
+#
+class netlink_route_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+	nlmsg_readpriv
+}
+
+class netlink_tcpdiag_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+}
+
+class netlink_nflog_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_xfrm_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+}
+
+class netlink_selinux_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_audit_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+	nlmsg_relay
+	nlmsg_readpriv
+	nlmsg_tty_audit
+}
+
+class netlink_dnrt_socket
+inherits socket
+
+# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling
+# access to IPSec network data by association
+#
+class association
+{
+	sendto
+	recvfrom
+	setcontext
+	polmatch
+}
+
+# Updated Netlink class for KOBJECT_UEVENT family.
+class netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class appletalk_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class packet
+{
+	send
+	recv
+	relabelto
+	forward_in
+	forward_out
+}
+
+class key
+{
+	view
+	read
+	write
+	search
+	link
+	setattr
+	create
+}
+
+class dccp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+	name_connect
+}
+
+class memprotect
+{
+	mmap_zero
+}
+
+# network peer labels
+class peer
+{
+	recv
+}
+
+class kernel_service
+{
+	use_as_override
+	create_files_as
+}
+
+class tun_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	attach_queue
+}
+
+class binder
+{
+	impersonate
+	call
+	set_context_mgr
+	transfer
+}
+
+class netlink_iscsi_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_fib_lookup_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_connector_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_netfilter_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_generic_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_scsitransport_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_rdma_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_crypto_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class infiniband_pkey
+{
+	access
+}
+
+class infiniband_endport
+{
+	manage_subnet
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling capabilities
+# in user namespaces
+#
+
+class cap_userns
+inherits cap
+
+class cap2_userns
+inherits cap2
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for the new socket classes
+# enabled by the extended_socket_class policy capability.
+#
+
+#
+# The next two classes were previously mapped to rawip_socket and therefore
+# have the same definition as rawip_socket (until further permissions
+# are defined).
+#
+class sctp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+	name_connect
+	association
+}
+
+class icmp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+}
+
+#
+# The remaining network socket classes were previously
+# mapped to the socket class and therefore have the
+# same definition as socket.
+#
+
+class ax25_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class ipx_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netrom_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class atmpvc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class x25_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class rose_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class decnet_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class atmsvc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class rds_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class irda_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class pppox_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class llc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class can_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class tipc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class bluetooth_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class iucv_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class rxrpc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class isdn_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class phonet_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class ieee802154_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class caif_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class alg_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class nfc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class vsock_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class kcm_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class qipcrtr_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class smc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class bpf
+{
+	map_create
+	map_read
+	map_write
+	prog_load
+	prog_run
+}
+
+class property_service
+{
+	set
+}
+
+class service_manager
+{
+	add
+	find
+	list
+}
+
+class hwservice_manager
+{
+	add
+	find
+	list
+}
+
+class keystore_key
+{
+	get_state
+	get
+	insert
+	delete
+	exist
+	list
+	reset
+	password
+	lock
+	unlock
+	is_empty
+	sign
+	verify
+	grant
+	duplicate
+	clear_uid
+	add_auth
+	user_changed
+	gen_unique_id
+}
+
+class keystore2
+{
+	add_auth
+	change_password
+	change_user
+	clear_ns
+	clear_uid
+	early_boot_ended
+	get_auth_token
+	get_state
+	list
+	lock
+	report_off_body
+	reset
+	unlock
+}
+
+class keystore2_key
+{
+	convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral
+	delete
+	gen_unique_id
+	get_info
+	grant
+	manage_blob
+	rebind
+	req_forced_op
+	update
+	use
+	use_dev_id
+}
+
+class drmservice {
+	consumeRights
+	setPlaybackStatus
+	openDecryptSession
+	closeDecryptSession
+	initializeDecryptUnit
+	decrypt
+	finalizeDecryptUnit
+	pread
+}
+
+class xdp_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class perf_event
+{
+	open
+	cpu
+	kernel
+	tracepoint
+	read
+	write
+}
+
+class lockdown
+{
+	integrity
+	confidentiality
+}
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/adbd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/adbd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..52070cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/adbd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+### ADB daemon
+
+typeattribute adbd coredomain;
+typeattribute adbd mlstrustedsubject;
+
+init_daemon_domain(adbd)
+
+domain_auto_trans(adbd, shell_exec, shell)
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow adbd self:process setcurrent;
+  allow adbd su:process dyntransition;
+')
+
+# When 'adb shell' is executed in recovery mode, adbd explicitly
+# switches into shell domain using setcon() because the shell executable
+# is not labeled as shell but as rootfs.
+recovery_only(`
+  domain_trans(adbd, rootfs, shell)
+  allow adbd shell:process dyntransition;
+
+  # Allows reboot fastboot to enter fastboot directly
+  unix_socket_connect(adbd, recovery, recovery)
+')
+
+# Control Perfetto traced and obtain traces from it.
+# Needed to allow port forwarding directly to traced.
+unix_socket_connect(adbd, traced_consumer, traced)
+
+# Do not sanitize the environment or open fds of the shell. Allow signaling
+# created processes.
+allow adbd shell:process { noatsecure signal };
+
+# Set UID and GID to shell.  Set supplementary groups.
+allow adbd self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid };
+
+# Drop capabilities from bounding set on user builds.
+allow adbd self:global_capability_class_set setpcap;
+
+# ignore spurious denials for adbd when disk space is low.
+dontaudit adbd self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
+
+# adbd probes for vsock support. Do not generate denials when
+# this occurs. (b/123569840)
+dontaudit adbd self:{ socket vsock_socket } create;
+
+# Allow adbd inside vm to forward vm's vsock.
+allow adbd self:vsock_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl listen accept };
+
+# Create and use network sockets.
+net_domain(adbd)
+
+# Access /dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep0
+allow adbd functionfs:dir search;
+allow adbd functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm adbd functionfs:file ioctl {
+  FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_DESC
+  FUNCTIONFS_CLEAR_HALT
+};
+
+# Use a pseudo tty.
+allow adbd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# adb push/pull /data/local/tmp.
+allow adbd shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow adbd shell_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# adb pull /data/local/traces/*
+allow adbd trace_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd trace_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# adb pull /data/misc/profman.
+allow adbd profman_dump_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd profman_dump_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# adb push/pull sdcard.
+allow adbd tmpfs:dir search;
+allow adbd rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;  # /sdcard symlink
+allow adbd tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;   # /mnt/sdcard symlink
+allow adbd sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow adbd sdcard_type:file create_file_perms;
+
+# adb pull /data/anr/traces.txt
+allow adbd anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# adb pull /vendor/framework/*
+allow adbd vendor_framework_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd vendor_framework_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Set service.adb.*, sys.powerctl, and sys.usb.ffs.ready properties.
+set_prop(adbd, shell_prop)
+set_prop(adbd, powerctl_prop)
+get_prop(adbd, ffs_config_prop)
+set_prop(adbd, ffs_control_prop)
+
+# Set service.adb.tcp.port, service.adb.tls.port, persist.adb.wifi.* properties
+set_prop(adbd, adbd_prop)
+set_prop(adbd, adbd_config_prop)
+
+# Allow adbd start/stop mdnsd via ctl.start
+set_prop(adbd, ctl_mdnsd_prop)
+
+# Access device logging gating property
+get_prop(adbd, device_logging_prop)
+
+# Read device's serial number from system properties
+get_prop(adbd, serialno_prop)
+
+# Read whether or not Test Harness Mode is enabled
+get_prop(adbd, test_harness_prop)
+
+# Read persist.adb.tls_server.enable property
+get_prop(adbd, system_adbd_prop)
+
+# Read device's overlayfs related properties and files
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  get_prop(adbd, persistent_properties_ready_prop)
+  r_dir_file(adbd, sysfs_dt_firmware_android)
+')
+
+# Run /system/bin/bu
+allow adbd system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Perform binder IPC to surfaceflinger (screencap)
+# XXX Run screencap in a separate domain?
+binder_use(adbd)
+binder_call(adbd, surfaceflinger)
+binder_call(adbd, gpuservice)
+# b/13188914
+allow adbd gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow adbd ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(adbd, system_file)
+
+# Needed for various screenshots
+hal_client_domain(adbd, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+# Read /data/misc/adb/adb_keys.
+allow adbd adb_keys_file:dir search;
+allow adbd adb_keys_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # Write debugging information to /data/adb
+  # when persist.adb.trace_mask is set
+  # https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=72895
+  allow adbd adb_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow adbd adb_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+')
+
+# ndk-gdb invokes adb forward to forward the gdbserver socket.
+allow adbd app_data_file:dir search;
+allow adbd app_data_file:sock_file write;
+allow adbd appdomain:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+# ndk-gdb invokes adb pull of app_process, linker, and libc.so.
+allow adbd zygote_exec:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd system_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow pulling the SELinux policy for CTS purposes
+allow adbd selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd kernel:security read_policy;
+allow adbd service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd sepolicy_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow pulling config.gz for CTS purposes
+allow adbd config_gz:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow adbd gpu_service:service_manager find;
+allow adbd surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+allow adbd bootchart_data_file:dir search;
+allow adbd bootchart_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
+# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
+allow adbd storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
+# accesses to the underlying FS.
+allow adbd media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow adbd media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(adbd, apk_data_file)
+
+allow adbd rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow killing child "perfetto" binary processes, which auto-transition to
+# their own domain. Allows propagating termination of "adb shell perfetto ..."
+# invocations.
+allow adbd perfetto:process signal;
+
+# Allow to pull Perfetto traces.
+allow adbd perfetto_traces_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd perfetto_traces_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow to push and manage configs in /data/misc/perfetto-configs.
+allow adbd perfetto_configs_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow adbd perfetto_configs_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Connect to shell and use a socket transferred from it.
+# Used for e.g. abb.
+allow adbd shell:unix_stream_socket { read write shutdown };
+allow adbd shell:fd use;
+
+# Allow pull /vendor/apex files for CTS tests
+allow adbd vendor_apex_file:dir search;
+allow adbd vendor_apex_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow adb pull of updated apex files in /data/apex/active.
+allow adbd apex_data_file:dir search;
+allow adbd staging_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# No transitions from adbd to non-shell, non-crash_dump domains. adbd only ever
+# transitions to the shell domain (except when it crashes). In particular, we
+# never want to see a transition from adbd to su (aka "adb root")
+neverallow adbd { domain -crash_dump -shell }:process transition;
+neverallow adbd { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') recovery_only(`-shell') }:process dyntransition;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/aidl_lazy_test_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/aidl_lazy_test_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33efde0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/aidl_lazy_test_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  typeattribute aidl_lazy_test_server coredomain;
+
+  init_daemon_domain(aidl_lazy_test_server)
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/apex_test_prepostinstall.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/apex_test_prepostinstall.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1bc214
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/apex_test_prepostinstall.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# APEX pre- & post-install test.
+#
+# Allow to run pre- and post-install hooks for APEX test modules
+# in debuggable builds.
+
+type apex_test_prepostinstall, domain, coredomain;
+type apex_test_prepostinstall_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # /dev/zero
+  allow apex_test_prepostinstall apexd:fd use;
+  # Logwrapper.
+  create_pty(apex_test_prepostinstall)
+  # Logwrapper executing sh.
+  allow apex_test_prepostinstall shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+  # Logwrapper exec.
+  allow apex_test_prepostinstall system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+  # Ls.
+  allow apex_test_prepostinstall toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/apexd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/apexd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6fff92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/apexd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+typeattribute apexd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(apexd)
+
+# Allow creating, reading and writing of APEX files/dirs in the APEX data dir
+allow apexd apex_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow apexd apex_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+# Allow relabeling file created in /data/apex/decompressed
+allow apexd apex_data_file:file relabelfrom;
+
+# Allow creating, reading and writing of APEX files/dirs in the APEX metadata dir
+allow apexd metadata_file:dir search;
+allow apexd apex_metadata_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow apexd apex_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow reserving space on /data/apex/ota_reserved for apex decompression
+allow apexd apex_ota_reserved_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow apexd apex_ota_reserved_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to create files and directories for snapshots of apex data
+allow apexd apex_appsearch_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_appsearch_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_art_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_art_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_permission_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_permission_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_module_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
+allow apexd apex_module_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
+allow apexd apex_rollback_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow apexd apex_rollback_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow apexd apex_scheduling_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_scheduling_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_wifi_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_wifi_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
+
+# Allow apexd to read directories under /data/misc_de in order to snapshot and
+# restore apex data for all users.
+allow apexd system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# allow apexd to create loop devices with /dev/loop-control
+allow apexd loop_control_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+# allow apexd to access loop devices
+allow apexd loop_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm apexd loop_device:blk_file ioctl {
+  LOOP_GET_STATUS64
+  LOOP_SET_STATUS64
+  LOOP_SET_FD
+  LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE
+  LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO
+  LOOP_CLR_FD
+  BLKFLSBUF
+  LOOP_CONFIGURE
+};
+# allow apexd to access /dev/block
+allow apexd block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+#allow apexd to access virtual disks
+allow apexd vd_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow apexd to access /dev/block/dm-* (device-mapper entries)
+allow apexd dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow apexd dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# sys_admin is required to access the device-mapper and mount
+# dac_override, chown, and fowner are needed for snapshot and restore
+allow apexd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_admin chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner };
+
+# Note: fsetid is deliberately not included above. fsetid checks are
+# triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by a group other
+# than one of the groups assigned to the current process to see if
+# the setgid bit should be cleared, regardless of whether the setgid
+# bit was even set.  We do not appear to truly need this capability
+# for apexd to operate.
+dontaudit apexd self:global_capability_class_set fsetid;
+
+# allow apexd to create a mount point in /apex
+allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:dir create_dir_perms;
+# allow apexd to mount in /apex
+allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:filesystem { mount unmount };
+allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:dir mounton;
+# allow apexd to create symlinks in /apex
+allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+# allow apexd to create /apex/apex-info-list.xml and relabel to apex_info_file
+allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom mounton };
+allow apexd apex_info_file:file relabelto;
+# allow apexd to unlink apex files in /data/apex/active
+# note that apexd won't be able to unlink files in /data/app-staging/session_XXXX,
+# because it doesn't have write permission for staging_data_file object.
+allow apexd staging_data_file:file unlink;
+
+# allow apexd to read files from /data/app-staging and hardlink them to /data/apex.
+allow apexd staging_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow apexd staging_data_file:file { r_file_perms link };
+# # Allow relabeling file created in /data/apex/decompressed
+allow apexd staging_data_file:file relabelto;
+
+# allow apexd to read files from /vendor/apex
+allow apexd vendor_apex_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow apexd vendor_apex_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Unmount and mount filesystems
+allow apexd labeledfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
+
+# /sys directory tree traversal
+allow apexd sysfs_type:dir search;
+# Configure read-ahead of dm-verity and loop devices
+# for dm-X
+allow apexd sysfs_dm:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow apexd sysfs_dm:file rw_file_perms;
+# for loopX
+allow apexd sysfs_loop:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow apexd sysfs_loop:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to log to the kernel.
+allow apexd kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to reboot device. Required for rollbacks of apexes that are
+# not covered by rollback manager.
+set_prop(apexd, powerctl_prop)
+
+# Allow apexd to stop itself
+set_prop(apexd, ctl_apexd_prop)
+
+# Find the vold service, and call into vold to manage FS checkpoints
+allow apexd vold_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(apexd, vold)
+
+# Apex pre- & post-install permission.
+
+# Allow self-execute for the fork mount helper.
+allow apexd apexd_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Unshare and make / private so that hooks cannot influence the
+# running system.
+allow apexd rootfs:dir mounton;
+
+# Allow to execute shell for pre- and postinstall scripts. A transition
+# rule is required, thus restricted to execute and not execute_no_trans.
+allow apexd shell_exec:file { r_file_perms execute };
+
+# apexd is using bootstrap bionic
+allow apexd system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow apexd system_bootstrap_lib_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# Allow transition to test APEX preinstall domain.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  domain_auto_trans(apexd, apex_test_prepostinstall_exec, apex_test_prepostinstall)
+')
+
+# Allow transition to GKI update pre/post install domain
+domain_auto_trans(apexd, gki_apex_prepostinstall_exec, gki_apex_prepostinstall)
+
+# Allow apexd to be invoked with logwrapper from init during userspace reboot.
+allow apexd devpts:chr_file { read write };
+
+# Allow apexd to create pts files via logwrap_fork_exec for its own use, to pass to
+# other processes
+create_pty(apexd)
+
+# Allow apexd to read file contexts when performing restorecon of snapshots.
+allow apexd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to execute toybox for snapshot & restore
+allow apexd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to read ro.cold_boot_done prop.
+# apexd uses it to decide whether it needs to keep retrying polling for loop device.
+get_prop(apexd, cold_boot_done_prop)
+
+# Allow apexd to read per-device configuration properties.
+get_prop(apexd, apexd_config_prop)
+
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apex_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apex_metadata_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -kernel } apex_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -kernel } apex_metadata_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd } apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_module_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_module_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_rollback_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_rollback_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# only apexd can set apexd sysprop
+set_prop(apexd, apexd_prop)
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apexd_prop:property_service set;
+
+# only apexd can write apex-info-list.xml
+neverallow { domain -apexd } apex_info_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# Only apexd and init should be allowed to manage /apex mounts
+# A note on otapreopt_chroot. It used to mount APEXes during postainstall stage of A/B OTAs,
+# but starting from S it just calls into apexd to prepare /apex for otapreoprt. Once the sepolicies
+# around otapreopt_chroot are cleaned up we should be able to remove it from the lists below.
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:filesystem { mount unmount };
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:dir { mounton };
+
+# Allow for use in postinstall
+allow apexd otapreopt_chroot:fd use;
+allow apexd postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+allow apexd postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
+allow apexd proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b3554f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+# Allow apps to read the Test Harness Mode property. This property is used in
+# the implementation of ActivityManager.isDeviceInTestHarnessMode()
+get_prop(appdomain, test_harness_prop)
+
+get_prop(appdomain, boot_status_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, dalvik_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, media_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, packagemanager_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, radio_control_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, surfaceflinger_color_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, systemsound_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, telephony_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, userspace_reboot_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, vold_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, adbd_config_prop)
+
+# Allow ART to be configurable via device_config properties
+# (ART "runs" inside the app process)
+get_prop(appdomain, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`perfetto_producer({ appdomain })')
+
+# Prevent apps from causing presubmit failures.
+# Apps can cause selinux denials by accessing CE storage
+# and/or external storage. In either case, the selinux denial is
+# not the cause of the failure, but just a symptom that
+# storage isn't ready. Many apps handle the failure appropriately.
+#
+# Apps cannot access external storage before it becomes available.
+dontaudit appdomain storage_stub_file:dir getattr;
+# Attempts to write to system_data_file is generally a sign
+# that apps are attempting to access encrypted storage before
+# the ACTION_USER_UNLOCKED intent is delivered. Apps are not
+# allowed to write to CE storage before it's available.
+# Attempting to do so will be blocked by both selinux and unix
+# permissions.
+dontaudit appdomain system_data_file:dir write;
+# Apps should not be reading vendor-defined properties.
+dontaudit appdomain vendor_default_prop:file read;
+
+# Access to /mnt/media_rw/<vol> (limited by DAC to apps with external_storage gid)
+allow appdomain mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
+
+neverallow appdomain system_server:udp_socket {
+        accept append bind create ioctl listen lock name_bind
+        relabelfrom relabelto setattr shutdown };
+
+# Transition to a non-app domain.
+# Exception for the shell and su domains, can transition to runas, etc.
+# Exception for crash_dump to allow for app crash reporting.
+# Exception for renderscript binaries (/system/bin/bcc, /system/bin/ld.mc)
+# to allow renderscript to create privileged executable files.
+neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
+    { domain -appdomain -crash_dump -rs }:process { transition };
+neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
+    { domain -appdomain }:process { dyntransition };
+
+# Don't allow regular apps access to storage configuration properties.
+neverallow { appdomain -mediaprovider_app } storage_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow to read sendbug.preferred.domain
+get_prop(appdomain, sendbug_config_prop)
+
+# Allow to read graphics related properties.
+get_prop(appdomain, graphics_config_prop)
+
+# Allow to read persist.config.calibration_fac
+get_prop(appdomain, camera_calibration_prop)
+
+# Allow to read db.log.detailed, db.log.slow_query_threshold*
+get_prop(appdomain, sqlite_log_prop)
+
+# Allow font file read by apps.
+allow appdomain font_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow appdomain font_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Enter /data/misc/apexdata/
+allow appdomain apex_module_data_file:dir search;
+# Read /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art, execute signed AOT artifacts.
+allow appdomain apex_art_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain apex_art_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow access to tombstones if an fd to one is given to you.
+# This is restricted by unix permissions, so an app must go through system_server to get one.
+allow appdomain tombstone_data_file:file { getattr read };
+neverallow appdomain tombstone_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
+
+# Sensitive app domains are not allowed to execute from /data
+# to prevent persistence attacks and ensure all code is executed
+# from read-only locations.
+neverallow {
+  bluetooth
+  isolated_app
+  nfc
+  radio
+  shared_relro
+  system_app
+} {
+  data_file_type
+  -apex_art_data_file
+  -dalvikcache_data_file
+  -system_data_file # shared libs in apks
+  -apk_data_file
+}:file no_x_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/app_neverallows.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/app_neverallows.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..096a41b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+###
+### neverallow rules for untrusted app domains
+###
+
+define(`all_untrusted_apps',`{
+  ephemeral_app
+  isolated_app
+  mediaprovider
+  mediaprovider_app
+  untrusted_app
+  untrusted_app_25
+  untrusted_app_27
+  untrusted_app_29
+  untrusted_app_all
+}')
+# Receive or send uevent messages.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+
+# Receive or send generic netlink messages
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_socket *;
+
+# Read or write kernel printk buffer
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps kmsg_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
+# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps { debugfs_type -debugfs_kcov }:file read;
+neverallow {all_untrusted_apps userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')} debugfs_type:{ file lnk_file } read;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to register services.
+# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
+# services.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps service_manager_type:service_manager add;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to use VendorBinder
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps vndservice_manager_type:service_manager *;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to connect to the property service
+# or set properties. b/10243159
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } property_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } property_type:property_service set;
+
+# net.dns properties are not a public API. Disallow untrusted apps from reading this property.
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps } net_dns_prop:file read;
+
+# Shared libraries created by trusted components within an app home
+# directory can be dlopen()ed. To maintain the W^X property, these files
+# must never be writable to the app.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps app_exec_data_file:file
+  { append create link relabelfrom relabelto rename setattr write };
+
+# Block calling execve() on files in an apps home directory.
+# This is a W^X violation (loading executable code from a writable
+# home directory). For compatibility, allow for targetApi <= 28.
+# b/112357170
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+  -runas_app
+} { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to invoke dex2oat. This was historically required
+# by ART for compiling secondary dex files but has been removed in Q.
+# Exempt legacy apps (targetApi<=28) for compatibility.
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+} dex2oat_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
+# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
+# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
+# constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
+# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
+# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
+# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
+# and an untrusted app is allowed fork permission to itself.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to hard link to any files.
+# In particular, if an untrusted app links to other app data
+# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
+# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
+# bugs, so we want to ensure untrusted apps never have this
+# capability.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps file_type:file link;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to access network MAC address file
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs_net:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Do not allow any write access to files in /sys
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs_type:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Apps may never access the default sysfs label.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Restrict socket ioctls. Either 1. disallow privileged ioctls, 2. disallow the
+# ioctl permission, or 3. disallow the socket class.
+neverallowxperm all_untrusted_apps domain:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:{
+  socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket appletalk_socket
+  netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket
+  netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
+  netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket
+  netlink_iscsi_socket netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket
+  netlink_netfilter_socket netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket
+  netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket
+  ax25_socket ipx_socket netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket
+  atmsvc_socket rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket
+  bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket ieee802154_socket caif_socket
+  alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
+} *;
+
+# Disallow sending RTM_GETLINK messages on netlink sockets.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps access to /cache
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to create/unlink files outside of its sandbox,
+# internal storage or sdcard.
+# World accessible data locations allow application to fill the device
+# with unaccounted for data. This data will not get removed during
+# application un-installation.
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } {
+  fs_type
+  -sdcard_type
+  file_type
+  -app_data_file            # The apps sandbox itself
+  -privapp_data_file
+  -app_exec_data_file       # stored within the app sandbox directory
+  -media_rw_data_file       # Internal storage. Known that apps can
+                            # leave artfacts here after uninstall.
+  -user_profile_data_file   # Access to profile files
+  userdebug_or_eng(`
+    -method_trace_data_file # only on ro.debuggable=1
+    -coredump_file          # userdebug/eng only
+  ')
+}:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
+
+# No untrusted component except mediaprovider_app should be touching /dev/fuse
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider_app } fuse_device:chr_file *;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to directly open the tun_device
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps tun_device:chr_file open;
+# The tun_device ioctls below are not allowed, to prove equivalence
+# to the kernel patch at
+# https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/11cee2be0c2062ba88f04eb51196506f870a3b5d%5E%21
+neverallowxperm all_untrusted_apps tun_device:chr_file ioctl ~{ FIOCLEX FIONCLEX TUNGETIFF };
+
+# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps anr_data_file:dir ~search;
+
+# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
+# Create a more specific label if needed
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
+  proc
+  proc_asound
+  proc_kmsg
+  proc_loadavg
+  proc_mounts
+  proc_pagetypeinfo
+  proc_slabinfo
+  proc_stat
+  proc_swaps
+  proc_uptime
+  proc_version
+  proc_vmallocinfo
+  proc_vmstat
+}:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# /proc/filesystems is accessible to mediaprovider_app only since it handles
+# external storage
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps - mediaprovider_app } proc_filesystems:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Avoid all access to kernel configuration
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps config_gz:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps access to preloads data files
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps preloads_data_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Locking of files on /system could lead to denial of service attacks
+# against privileged system components
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps system_file:file lock;
+
+# Do not permit untrusted apps to perform actions on HwBinder service_manager
+# other than find actions for services listed below
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:hwservice_manager ~find;
+
+# Do not permit access from apps which host arbitrary code to the protected services
+# The two main reasons for this are:
+# 1. Protected HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because
+#    vendor code does not have a way to understand apps or their relation to
+#    caller UID information and, even if it did, those services either operate
+#    at a level below that of apps (e.g., HALs) or must not rely on app identity
+#    for authorization. Thus, to be safe, the default assumption for all added
+#    vendor services is that they treat all their clients as equally authorized
+#    to perform operations offered by the service.
+# 2. HAL servers contain code with higher incidence rate of security issues
+#    than system/core components and have access to lower layes of the stack
+#    (all the way down to hardware) thus increasing opportunities for bypassing
+#    the Android security model.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps protected_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps protected_service:service_manager find;
+
+# SELinux is not an API for untrusted apps to use
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps selinuxfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /proc/tty/drivers, to allow apps to determine if they
+# are running in an emulated environment.
+# b/33214085 b/33814662 b/33791054 b/33211769
+# https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator/blob/master/AntiEmulator/src/diff/strazzere/anti/emulator/FindEmulator.java
+# This will go away in a future Android release
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -untrusted_app_25 } proc_tty_drivers:file r_file_perms;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps proc_tty_drivers:file ~r_file_perms;
+
+# Untrusted apps are not allowed to use cgroups.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup:file *;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup_v2:file *;
+
+# /mnt/sdcard symlink was supposed to have been removed in Gingerbread. Apps
+# must not use it.
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+} mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file *;
+
+# Only privileged apps may find the incident service
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps incident_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/app_zygote.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/app_zygote.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ee3af7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/app_zygote.te
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+typeattribute app_zygote coredomain;
+
+######
+###### Policy below is different from regular zygote-spawned apps
+######
+
+# Allow access to temporary files, which is normally permitted through
+# a domain macro.
+tmpfs_domain(app_zygote);
+
+# Set the UID/GID of the process.
+# This will be further limited to a range of isolated UIDs with seccomp.
+allow app_zygote self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid };
+# Drop capabilities from bounding set.
+allow app_zygote self:global_capability_class_set setpcap;
+# Switch SELinux context to isolated app domain.
+allow app_zygote self:process setcurrent;
+allow app_zygote isolated_app:process dyntransition;
+
+# For JIT
+allow app_zygote self:process execmem;
+
+# Allow app_zygote to stat the files that it opens. It must
+# be able to inspect them so that it can reopen them on fork
+# if necessary: b/30963384.
+allow app_zygote debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
+
+# get system_server process group
+allow app_zygote system_server:process getpgid;
+
+# Interaction between the app_zygote and its children.
+allow app_zygote isolated_app:process setpgid;
+
+# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
+dontaudit app_zygote mnt_expand_file:dir getattr;
+
+# Get seapp_contexts
+allow app_zygote seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+# Check validity of SELinux context before use.
+selinux_check_context(app_zygote)
+# Check SELinux permissions.
+selinux_check_access(app_zygote)
+
+######
+###### Policy below is shared with regular zygote-spawned apps
+######
+
+# Child of zygote.
+allow app_zygote zygote:fd use;
+allow app_zygote zygote:process sigchld;
+
+# For ART (read /data/dalvik-cache).
+r_dir_file(app_zygote, dalvikcache_data_file);
+allow app_zygote dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
+
+# Read /data/misc/apexdata/ to (get to com.android.art/dalvik-cache).
+allow app_zygote apex_module_data_file:dir search;
+# For ART APEX (read /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art/dalvik-cache).
+r_dir_file(app_zygote, apex_art_data_file)
+
+# Allow reading/executing installed binaries to enable preloading
+# application data
+allow app_zygote apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow app_zygote apk_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
+
+# /oem accesses.
+allow app_zygote oemfs:dir search;
+
+# Allow app_zygote access to /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(app_zygote, vendor_overlay_file)
+
+allow app_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow app_zygote system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
+
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(app_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
+# Allow the app_zygote to access the runtime feature flag properties.
+get_prop(app_zygote, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(app_zygote, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+#####
+##### Neverallow
+#####
+
+# Only permit transition to isolated_app.
+neverallow app_zygote { domain -isolated_app }:process dyntransition;
+
+# Only setcon() transitions, no exec() based transitions, except for crash_dump.
+neverallow app_zygote { domain -crash_dump }:process transition;
+
+# Must not exec() a program without changing domains.
+# Having said that, exec() above is not allowed.
+neverallow app_zygote *:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The only way to enter this domain is for the zygote to fork a new
+# app_zygote child.
+neverallow { domain -zygote } app_zygote:process dyntransition;
+
+# Disallow write access to properties.
+neverallow app_zygote property_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow app_zygote property_type:property_service set;
+
+# Should not have any access to data files.
+neverallow app_zygote app_data_file_type:file { rwx_file_perms };
+
+neverallow app_zygote {
+    service_manager_type
+    -activity_service
+    -webviewupdate_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# Isolated apps should not be able to access the driver directly.
+neverallow app_zygote gpu_device:chr_file { rwx_file_perms };
+
+# Do not allow app_zygote access to /cache.
+neverallow app_zygote cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
+neverallow app_zygote cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
+
+# Do not allow most socket access. This is socket_class_set, excluding unix_dgram_socket,
+# unix_stream_socket, and netlink_selinux_socket.
+neverallow app_zygote domain:{
+  socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket
+  appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket netlink_tcpdiag_socket
+  netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
+  netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket netlink_iscsi_socket
+  netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket netlink_netfilter_socket
+  netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket
+  sctp_socket icmp_socket ax25_socket ipx_socket netrom_socket atmpvc_socket
+  x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket atmsvc_socket rds_socket irda_socket
+  pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket bluetooth_socket iucv_socket
+  rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket ieee802154_socket caif_socket
+  alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket
+} *;
+
+# Only allow app_zygote to talk to the logd socket, and
+# su/heapprofd/traced_perf on eng/userdebug. This is because
+# cap_setuid/cap_setgid allow to forge uid/gid in SCM_CREDENTIALS.
+# Think twice before changing.
+neverallow app_zygote {
+  domain
+  -app_zygote
+  -logd
+  -system_server
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
+}:unix_dgram_socket *;
+
+neverallow app_zygote {
+  domain
+  -app_zygote
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
+}:unix_stream_socket *;
+
+# Never allow ptrace
+neverallow app_zygote *:process ptrace;
+
+# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties.
+# neverallow rules for Bluetooth-related data files are listed above.
+neverallow app_zygote {
+  bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop
+  bluetooth_audio_hal_prop
+  bluetooth_prop
+  exported_bluetooth_prop
+}:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/artd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/artd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0aa12dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/artd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# art service daemon
+type artd, domain;
+type artd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Allow artd to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
+binder_use(artd)
+add_service(artd, artd_service)
+allow artd dumpstate:fifo_file  { getattr write };
+
+typeattribute artd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(artd)
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(artd, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(artd, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/asan_extract.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/asan_extract.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..69bcd50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/asan_extract.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
+# public, but conceptually should go with this
+# Technically not a daemon but we do want the transition from init domain to
+# asan_extract to occur.
+with_asan(`
+  typeattribute asan_extract coredomain;
+  init_daemon_domain(asan_extract)
+
+  # We need to signal a reboot when done.
+  set_prop(asan_extract, powerctl_prop)
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/atrace.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/atrace.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4aed40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/atrace.te
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# Domain for atrace process.
+# It is spawned either by traced_probes or by init for the boottrace service.
+
+type atrace_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+# boottrace services uses /data/misc/boottrace/categories
+allow atrace boottrace_data_file:dir search;
+allow atrace boottrace_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow atrace to access tracefs.
+allow atrace debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow atrace debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+allow atrace debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
+
+# Allow atrace to write data when a pipe is used for stdout/stderr
+# This is used by Perfetto to capture the output on error in atrace.
+allow atrace traced_probes:fd use;
+allow atrace traced_probes:fifo_file write;
+
+# atrace sets debug.atrace.* properties
+set_prop(atrace, debug_prop)
+
+# atrace pokes all the binder-enabled processes at startup with a
+# SYSPROPS_TRANSACTION, to tell them to reload the debug.atrace.* properties.
+
+# Allow discovery of binder services.
+allow atrace {
+  service_manager_type
+  -apex_service
+  -incident_service
+  -iorapd_service
+  -netd_service
+  -dnsresolver_service
+  -stats_service
+  -dumpstate_service
+  -installd_service
+  -vold_service
+  -lpdump_service
+  -default_android_service
+}:service_manager { find };
+allow atrace servicemanager:service_manager list;
+
+# Allow notifying the processes hosting specific binder services that
+# trace-related system properties have changed.
+binder_use(atrace)
+allow atrace healthd:binder call;
+allow atrace surfaceflinger:binder call;
+allow atrace system_server:binder call;
+allow atrace cameraserver:binder call;
+
+# Similarly, on debug builds, allow specific HALs to be notified that
+# trace-related system properties have changed.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # List HAL interfaces.
+  allow atrace hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
+  # Notify the camera HAL.
+  hal_client_domain(atrace, hal_camera)
+  hal_client_domain(atrace, hal_vibrator)
+')
+
+# Remove logspam from notification attempts to non-allowlisted services.
+dontaudit atrace hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager find;
+dontaudit atrace service_manager_type:service_manager find;
+dontaudit atrace domain:binder call;
+
+# atrace can call atrace HAL
+hal_client_domain(atrace, hal_atrace)
+
+get_prop(atrace, hwservicemanager_prop)
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # atrace is generally invoked as a standalone binary from shell or perf
+  # daemons like Perfetto traced_probes. However, in userdebug builds, there is
+  # a further option to run atrace as an init daemon for boot tracing.
+  init_daemon_domain(atrace)
+
+  allow atrace debugfs_tracing_debug:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow atrace debugfs_tracing_debug:file rw_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/attributes b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/attributes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..991bac1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/attributes
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+hal_attribute(lazy_test);
+
+# This is applied to apps on vendor images with SDK <=30 only,
+# to exempt them from recent mls changes. It must not be applied
+# to any domain on newer system or vendor image.
+attribute mlsvendorcompat;
+
+# Attributes for property types having both system_property_type
+# and vendor_property_type. Such types are ill-formed because
+# property owner attributes must be exclusive.
+attribute system_and_vendor_property_type;
+expandattribute system_and_vendor_property_type false;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/audioserver.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/audioserver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d0b46d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/audioserver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+# audioserver - audio services daemon
+
+typeattribute audioserver coredomain;
+
+type audioserver_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(audioserver)
+tmpfs_domain(audioserver)
+
+r_dir_file(audioserver, sdcard_type)
+
+binder_use(audioserver)
+binder_call(audioserver, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(audioserver, appdomain)
+binder_service(audioserver)
+
+hal_client_domain(audioserver, hal_allocator)
+# /system/lib64/hw for always-passthrough Allocator HAL ashmem / mapper .so
+r_dir_file(audioserver, system_file)
+
+hal_client_domain(audioserver, hal_audio)
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # used for TEE sink - pcm capture for debug.
+  allow audioserver media_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+  allow audioserver audioserver_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+  allow audioserver audioserver_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+  # ptrace to processes in the same domain for memory leak detection
+  allow audioserver self:process ptrace;
+')
+
+add_service(audioserver, audioserver_service)
+allow audioserver activity_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver appops_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver batterystats_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver external_vibrator_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver package_native_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver permission_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver permission_checker_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver power_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver sensor_privacy_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver soundtrigger_middleware_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow read/write access to bluetooth-specific properties
+set_prop(audioserver, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
+set_prop(audioserver, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
+set_prop(audioserver, bluetooth_prop)
+set_prop(audioserver, exported_bluetooth_prop)
+
+# Grant access to audio files to audioserver
+allow audioserver audio_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
+allow audioserver audio_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# allow access to ALSA MMAP FDs for AAudio API
+allow audioserver audio_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+not_full_treble(`allow audioserver audio_device:dir r_dir_perms;')
+not_full_treble(`allow audioserver audio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;')
+
+# For A2DP bridge which is loaded directly into audioserver
+unix_socket_connect(audioserver, bluetooth, bluetooth)
+
+# Allow shell commands from ADB and shell for CTS testing/dumping
+allow audioserver adbd:fd use;
+allow audioserver adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow audioserver shell:fifo_file { read write };
+
+# Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow audioserver su:fd use;
+  allow audioserver su:fifo_file { read write };
+  allow audioserver su:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+')
+
+# Allow write access to log tag property
+set_prop(audioserver, log_tag_prop);
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# audioserver should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow audioserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
+# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
+# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
+# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
+# hardware/content. Etc.
+#
+# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
+# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
+# Lengthier explanation here:
+# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
+neverallow audioserver domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+
+# Allow using wake locks
+wakelock_use(audioserver)
+
+# Allow reading audio config props, e.g. af.fast_track_multiplier
+get_prop(audioserver, audio_config_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/auditctl.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/auditctl.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f634d3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/auditctl.te
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#
+# /system/bin/auditctl executed for logd
+#
+# Performs maintenance of the kernel auditing system, including
+# setting rate limits on SELinux denials.
+#
+
+type auditctl, domain, coredomain;
+type auditctl_exec, file_type, system_file_type, exec_type;
+
+# Uncomment the line below to put this domain into permissive
+# mode. This helps speed SELinux policy development.
+# userdebug_or_eng(`permissive auditctl;')
+
+init_daemon_domain(auditctl)
+
+allow auditctl self:global_capability_class_set audit_control;
+allow auditctl self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/automotive_display_service.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/automotive_display_service.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa11ca4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/automotive_display_service.te
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Display proxy service for Automotive
+type automotive_display_service, domain, coredomain;
+type automotive_display_service_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+typeattribute automotive_display_service automotive_display_service_server;
+
+# Allow to add a display service to the manager
+add_hwservice(automotive_display_service, fwk_automotive_display_hwservice);
+
+# Allow init to launch automotive display service
+init_daemon_domain(automotive_display_service)
+
+# Allow to use Binder IPC for SurfaceFlinger.
+binder_use(automotive_display_service)
+
+# Allow to use HwBinder IPC for HAL implementations.
+hwbinder_use(automotive_display_service)
+hal_client_domain(automotive_display_service, hal_graphics_composer)
+
+# Allow to read the target property.
+get_prop(automotive_display_service, hwservicemanager_prop)
+
+# Allow to find SurfaceFlinger.
+allow automotive_display_service surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow client domain to do binder IPC to serverdomain.
+binder_call(automotive_display_service, surfaceflinger)
+
+# Allow to use a graphics mapper
+allow automotive_display_service hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# Allow to use hidl token service
+allow automotive_display_service hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/binderservicedomain.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/binderservicedomain.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7275954
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/binderservicedomain.te
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Rules common to all binder service domains
+
+# Allow dumpstate and incidentd to collect information from binder services
+allow binderservicedomain { dumpstate incidentd }:fd use;
+allow binderservicedomain { dumpstate incidentd }:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr };
+allow binderservicedomain { dumpstate incidentd }:fifo_file  { getattr write };
+allow binderservicedomain shell_data_file:file { getattr write };
+
+# Allow dumpsys to work from adb shell or the serial console
+allow binderservicedomain devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow binderservicedomain console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Receive and write to a pipe received over Binder from an app.
+allow binderservicedomain appdomain:fd use;
+allow binderservicedomain appdomain:fifo_file write;
+
+# allow all services to run permission checks
+allow binderservicedomain permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow binderservicedomain keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
+allow binderservicedomain keystore:keystore2 { get_state };
+allow binderservicedomain keystore:keystore2_key { delete get_info rebind use };
+
+use_keystore(binderservicedomain)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/blank_screen.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/blank_screen.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20d50cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/blank_screen.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+type blank_screen, domain, coredomain;
+type blank_screen_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(blank_screen)
+
+# hal_light_client has access to hal_light_server
+hal_client_domain(blank_screen, hal_light)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/blkid.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/blkid.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e972ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/blkid.te
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# blkid called from vold
+
+typeattribute blkid coredomain;
+
+type blkid_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Allowed read-only access to encrypted devices to extract UUID/label
+allow blkid block_device:dir search;
+allow blkid userdata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+allow blkid dm_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow blkid vold:fd use;
+allow blkid vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# For blkid launched through popen()
+allow blkid blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from vold
+neverallow { domain -vold } blkid:process transition;
+neverallow * blkid:process dyntransition;
+neverallow blkid { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/blkid_untrusted.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/blkid_untrusted.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1256771
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/blkid_untrusted.te
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# blkid for untrusted block devices
+
+typeattribute blkid_untrusted coredomain;
+
+# Allowed read-only access to vold block devices to extract UUID/label
+allow blkid_untrusted block_device:dir search;
+allow blkid_untrusted vold_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow blkid_untrusted vold:fd use;
+allow blkid_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# For blkid launched through popen()
+allow blkid_untrusted blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Untrusted blkid should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
+neverallow blkid_untrusted {
+  boot_block_device
+  frp_block_device
+  metadata_block_device
+  recovery_block_device
+  root_block_device
+  swap_block_device
+  system_block_device
+  userdata_block_device
+  cache_block_device
+  dm_device
+}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from vold via blkid binary
+neverallow { domain -vold } blkid_untrusted:process transition;
+neverallow * blkid_untrusted:process dyntransition;
+neverallow blkid_untrusted { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bluetooth.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bluetooth.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8fc6d20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bluetooth.te
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# bluetooth app
+
+typeattribute bluetooth coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+
+app_domain(bluetooth)
+net_domain(bluetooth)
+
+# Socket creation under /data/misc/bluedroid.
+type_transition bluetooth bluetooth_data_file:sock_file bluetooth_socket;
+
+# Allow access to net_admin ioctls
+allowxperm bluetooth self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+
+wakelock_use(bluetooth);
+
+# Data file accesses.
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_logs_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_logs_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Socket creation under /data/misc/bluedroid.
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
+
+allow bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
+allow bluetooth self:global_capability2_class_set wake_alarm;
+
+# tethering
+allow bluetooth self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw net_bind_service };
+allow bluetooth self:tun_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow bluetooth tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm bluetooth tun_device:chr_file ioctl { TUNGETIFF TUNSETIFF };
+allow bluetooth efs_file:dir search;
+
+# allow Bluetooth to access uhid device for HID profile
+allow bluetooth uhid_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# proc access.
+allow bluetooth proc_bluetooth_writable:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow write access to bluetooth specific properties
+set_prop(bluetooth, binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop);
+neverallow { domain -bluetooth -init }
+    binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop:property_service set;
+set_prop(bluetooth, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
+set_prop(bluetooth, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
+set_prop(bluetooth, bluetooth_prop)
+set_prop(bluetooth, exported_bluetooth_prop)
+set_prop(bluetooth, pan_result_prop)
+
+allow bluetooth audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth system_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth network_stack_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth system_suspend_control_service:service_manager find;
+
+# already open bugreport file descriptors may be shared with
+# the bluetooth process, from a file in
+# /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-*.
+allow bluetooth shell_data_file:file read;
+
+# Bluetooth audio needs RT scheduling to meet deadlines, allow sys_nice
+allow bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+
+hal_client_domain(bluetooth, hal_bluetooth)
+hal_client_domain(bluetooth, hal_telephony)
+
+# Bluetooth A2DP offload requires binding with audio HAL
+hal_client_domain(bluetooth, hal_audio)
+
+read_runtime_log_tags(bluetooth)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### These are things that the bluetooth app should NEVER be able to do
+###
+
+# Superuser capabilities.
+# Bluetooth requires net_{admin,raw,bind_service} and wake_alarm and block_suspend and sys_nice.
+neverallow bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set ~{ net_admin net_raw net_bind_service sys_nice};
+neverallow bluetooth self:global_capability2_class_set ~{ wake_alarm block_suspend };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bluetoothdomain.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bluetoothdomain.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe4f0e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bluetoothdomain.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Allow clients to use a socket provided by the bluetooth app.
+allow bluetoothdomain bluetooth:unix_stream_socket { getopt setopt getattr read write ioctl shutdown };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bootanim.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bootanim.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..855bc3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bootanim.te
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+typeattribute bootanim coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(bootanim)
+
+# b/68864350
+dontaudit bootanim unlabeled:dir search;
+
+# Bootanim should not be reading default vendor-defined properties.
+dontaudit bootanim vendor_default_prop:file read;
+
+# Read ro.boot.bootreason b/30654343
+get_prop(bootanim, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
+
+get_prop(bootanim, bootanim_config_prop)
+
+# Allow updating boot animation status.
+set_prop(bootanim, bootanim_system_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bootstat.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bootstat.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..016292e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bootstat.te
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+typeattribute bootstat coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(bootstat)
+
+# Collect metrics on boot time created by init
+get_prop(bootstat, boottime_prop)
+
+# Read/Write [persist.]sys.boot.reason and ro.boot.bootreason (write if empty)
+set_prop(bootstat, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
+set_prop(bootstat, system_boot_reason_prop)
+set_prop(bootstat, last_boot_reason_prop)
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -bootanim
+  -bootstat
+  -dumpstate
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
+  -init
+  -recovery
+  -shell
+  -system_server
+} { bootloader_boot_reason_prop last_boot_reason_prop }:file r_file_perms;
+# ... and refine, as these components should not set the last boot reason
+neverallow { bootanim recovery } last_boot_reason_prop:file r_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -bootstat
+  -init
+  -system_server
+} { bootloader_boot_reason_prop last_boot_reason_prop }:property_service set;
+# ... and refine ... for a ro propertly no less ... keep this _tight_
+neverallow system_server bootloader_boot_reason_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/boringssl_self_test.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/boringssl_self_test.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50fc1fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/boringssl_self_test.te
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# System and vendor domains for BoringSSL self test binaries.
+#
+# For FIPS compliance, all processes linked against libcrypto perform a startup
+# self test which computes a hash of the BoringSSL Crypto Module (BCM) and, at least once
+# per device boot, also run a series of Known Answer Tests (KAT) to verify functionality.
+#
+# The KATs are expensive, and to ensure they are run as few times as possible, they
+# are skipped if a marker file exists in /dev/boringssl/selftest whose name is
+# the hash of the BCM that was computed earlier.  The files are zero length and their contents
+# should never be read or written.  To avoid giving arbitrary processes access to /dev/boringssl
+# to create these marker files, there are dedicated self test binaries which this policy
+# gives access to and which are run during early-init.
+#
+# Due to build skew, the version of libcrypto in /vendor may have a different hash than
+# the system one.  To cater for this there are vendor variants of the self test binaries
+# which also have permission to write to the same files in /dev/boringssl.  In the case where
+# vendor and system libcrypto have the same hash, there will be a race to create the file,
+# but this is harmless.
+#
+# If the self tests fail, then the device should reboot into firmware and for this reason
+# the system boringssl_self_test domain needs to be in coredomain.  As vendor domains
+# are not allowed in coredomain, this means that the vendor self tests cannot trigger a
+# reboot.  However every binary linked against the vendor libcrypto will abort on startup,
+# so in practice the device will crash anyway in this unlikely scenario.
+
+# System boringssl_self_test domain
+type boringssl_self_test, domain, coredomain;
+type boringssl_self_test_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Vendor boringssl_self_test domain
+type vendor_boringssl_self_test, domain;
+type vendor_boringssl_self_test_exec, vendor_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Switch to boringssl_self_test security domain when running boringssl_self_test_exec
+init_daemon_domain(boringssl_self_test)
+
+# Switch to vendor_boringssl_self_test security domain when running vendor_boringssl_self_test_exec
+init_daemon_domain(vendor_boringssl_self_test)
+
+# Marker files, common to both domains, indicating KAT have been performed on a particular libcrypto
+#
+# The files are zero length so there is no issue if both vendor and system code
+# try to create the same file simultaneously. One will succeed and the other will fail
+# silently, i.e. still indicate success.  Similar harmless naming collisions will happen in the
+# system domain e.g. when system and APEX copies of libcrypto are identical.
+type boringssl_self_test_marker, file_type;
+
+# Allow self test binaries to create/check for the existence of boringssl_self_test_marker files
+allow { boringssl_self_test vendor_boringssl_self_test }
+  boringssl_self_test_marker:file create_file_perms;
+allow { boringssl_self_test vendor_boringssl_self_test }
+  boringssl_self_test_marker:dir ra_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow self test binaries to write their stdout/stderr messages to kmsg_debug
+allow { boringssl_self_test vendor_boringssl_self_test }
+  kmsg_debug_device:chr_file { w_file_perms getattr ioctl };
+
+# No other process should be able to create marker files because their existence causes the
+# boringssl KAT to be skipped.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -vendor_boringssl_self_test
+  -boringssl_self_test
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+} boringssl_self_test_marker:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -vendor_boringssl_self_test
+  -boringssl_self_test
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+} boringssl_self_test_marker:dir write;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bpfloader.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bpfloader.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae9b52c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bpfloader.te
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# bpf program loader
+type bpfloader, domain;
+type bpfloader_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+typeattribute bpfloader coredomain;
+
+# These permissions are required to pin ebpf maps & programs.
+allow bpfloader { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir { add_name create search write };
+allow bpfloader { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file { create read setattr };
+allow fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf:filesystem associate;
+
+# Allow bpfloader to create bpf maps and programs.
+allow bpfloader self:bpf { map_create map_read map_write prog_load prog_run };
+
+allow bpfloader self:capability { chown sys_admin net_admin };
+
+set_prop(bpfloader, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init; Note: we don't care about getattr/mounton/search
+neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir { open read setattr };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir { add_name create write };
+neverallow domain { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir ~{ add_name create getattr mounton open read search setattr write };
+
+# TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file { map open setattr };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file create;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -init -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file read;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file write;
+neverallow domain { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file ~{ create map open read setattr write };
+
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } *:bpf prog_run;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -network_stack -system_server } *:bpf { map_read map_write };
+
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init } bpfloader_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+
+neverallow bpfloader *:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+
+# No domain should be allowed to ptrace bpfloader
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') } bpfloader:process ptrace;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bufferhubd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bufferhubd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..012eb20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bufferhubd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute bufferhubd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(bufferhubd)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bug_map b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bug_map
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b042ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/bug_map
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+dnsmasq netd fifo_file b/77868789
+dnsmasq netd unix_stream_socket b/77868789
+gmscore_app system_data_file dir b/146166941
+init app_data_file file b/77873135
+init cache_file blk_file b/77873135
+init logpersist file b/77873135
+init nativetest_data_file dir b/77873135
+init pstorefs dir b/77873135
+init shell_data_file dir b/77873135
+init shell_data_file file b/77873135
+init shell_data_file lnk_file b/77873135
+init shell_data_file sock_file b/77873135
+init system_data_file chr_file b/77873135
+isolated_app privapp_data_file dir b/119596573
+isolated_app app_data_file dir b/120394782
+mediaextractor app_data_file file b/77923736
+mediaextractor radio_data_file file b/77923736
+mediaprovider cache_file blk_file b/77925342
+mediaprovider mnt_media_rw_file dir b/77925342
+mediaprovider shell_data_file dir b/77925342
+mediaswcodec ashmem_device chr_file b/142679232
+netd priv_app unix_stream_socket b/77870037
+netd untrusted_app unix_stream_socket b/77870037
+netd untrusted_app_25 unix_stream_socket b/77870037
+netd untrusted_app_27 unix_stream_socket b/77870037
+netd untrusted_app_29 unix_stream_socket b/77870037
+platform_app nfc_data_file dir b/74331887
+system_server crash_dump process b/73128755
+system_server overlayfs_file file b/142390309
+system_server sdcardfs file b/77856826
+system_server zygote process b/77856826
+untrusted_app untrusted_app netlink_route_socket b/155595000
+vold system_data_file file b/124108085
+zygote untrusted_app_25 process b/77925912
+zygote labeledfs filesystem b/170748799
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/cameraserver.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/cameraserver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2be3c9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/cameraserver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+typeattribute cameraserver coredomain;
+
+typeattribute cameraserver camera_service_server;
+
+init_daemon_domain(cameraserver)
+tmpfs_domain(cameraserver)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/canhalconfigurator.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/canhalconfigurator.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ba60ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/canhalconfigurator.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+type canhalconfigurator, domain, coredomain;
+type canhalconfigurator_exec, exec_type, system_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(canhalconfigurator)
+
+# This allows the configurator to look up the CAN HAL controller via
+# hwservice_manager and communicate with it.
+hal_client_domain(canhalconfigurator, hal_can_controller)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/charger.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/charger.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8be113f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/charger.te
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+typeattribute charger coredomain;
+
+# charger needs to tell init to continue the boot
+# process when running in charger mode.
+set_prop(charger, system_prop)
+set_prop(charger, exported_system_prop)
+set_prop(charger, exported3_system_prop)
+set_prop(charger, charger_status_prop)
+
+get_prop(charger, charger_prop)
+get_prop(charger, charger_config_prop)
+
+# get minui properties
+get_prop(charger, recovery_config_prop)
+
+compatible_property_only(`
+    neverallow {
+        domain
+        -init
+        -dumpstate
+        -charger
+    } charger_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -dumpstate
+    -vendor_init
+    -charger
+} { charger_config_prop charger_status_prop }:file no_rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/clatd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/clatd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0fa774a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/clatd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# 464xlat daemon
+type clatd, domain, coredomain;
+type clatd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+net_domain(clatd)
+
+r_dir_file(clatd, proc_net_type)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  auditallow clatd proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
+')
+
+# Access objects inherited from netd.
+allow clatd netd:fd use;
+allow clatd netd:fifo_file { read write };
+# TODO: Check whether some or all of these sockets should be close-on-exec.
+allow clatd netd:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { read write };
+allow clatd netd:netlink_nflog_socket { read write };
+allow clatd netd:netlink_route_socket { read write };
+allow clatd netd:udp_socket { read write };
+allow clatd netd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow clatd netd:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
+
+allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw setuid setgid };
+
+# clatd calls mmap(MAP_LOCKED) with a 1M buffer. MAP_LOCKED first checks
+# capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK), and then checks to see the requested amount is
+# under RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. If the latter check succeeds clatd won't have
+# needed CAP_IPC_LOCK. But this is not guaranteed to succeed on all devices
+# so we permit any requests we see from clatd asking for this capability.
+# See https://android-review.googlesource.com/127940 and
+# https://b.corp.google.com/issues/21736319
+allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set ipc_lock;
+
+allow clatd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
+allow clatd self:{ packet_socket rawip_socket } create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow clatd tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/coredomain.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/coredomain.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b7f4f5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/coredomain.te
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+get_prop(coredomain, boot_status_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, camera_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, dalvik_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, dalvik_runtime_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, exported_pm_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, ffs_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, graphics_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, hdmi_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, init_service_status_private_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, lmkd_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, localization_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, pm_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, radio_control_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, rollback_test_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, setupwizard_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, sqlite_log_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, storagemanager_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, surfaceflinger_color_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, systemsound_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, telephony_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, usb_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, usb_control_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, userspace_reboot_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, vold_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, vts_status_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, zygote_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, zygote_wrap_prop)
+
+# TODO(b/170590987): remove this after cleaning up default_prop
+get_prop(coredomain, default_prop)
+
+full_treble_only(`
+neverallow {
+    coredomain
+
+    # for chowning
+    -init
+
+    # generic access to sysfs_type
+    -ueventd
+    -vold
+} sysfs_leds:file *;
+')
+
+# On TREBLE devices, a limited set of files in /vendor are accessible to
+# only a few allowlisted coredomains to keep system/vendor separation.
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Limit access to /vendor/app
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -dex2oat
+        -dexoptanalyzer
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -heapprofd
+        -postinstall_dexopt
+        -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+        -system_server
+        -traced_perf
+    } vendor_app_file:dir { open read getattr search };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -dex2oat
+        -dexoptanalyzer
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -heapprofd
+        userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+        -postinstall_dexopt
+        -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+        -system_server
+        -traced_perf
+        -mediaserver
+    } vendor_app_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Limit access to /vendor/overlay
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -iorap_inode2filename
+        -iorap_prefetcherd
+        -postinstall_dexopt
+        -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+        -system_server
+        -traced_perf
+        -app_zygote
+        -webview_zygote
+        -zygote
+        -heapprofd
+    } vendor_overlay_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -iorap_inode2filename
+        -iorap_prefetcherd
+        -postinstall_dexopt
+        -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+        -system_server
+        -traced_perf
+        -app_zygote
+        -webview_zygote
+        -zygote
+        -heapprofd
+        userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+    } vendor_overlay_file:file open;
+')
+
+# Core domains are not permitted to use kernel interfaces which are not
+# explicitly labeled.
+# TODO(b/65643247): Apply these neverallow rules to all coredomain.
+full_treble_only(`
+  # /proc
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -vold
+  } proc:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # /sys
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -ueventd
+    -vold
+  } sysfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # /dev
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -fsck
+    -init
+    -ueventd
+  } device:{ blk_file file } no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # debugfs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    no_debugfs_restriction(`
+      -dumpstate
+      -init
+      -system_server
+    ')
+  } debugfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # tracefs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -atrace
+    -dumpstate
+    -gpuservice
+    -init
+    -traced_perf
+    -traced_probes
+    -shell
+    -system_server
+    -traceur_app
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+  } debugfs_tracing:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # inotifyfs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+  } inotify:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # pstorefs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -bootstat
+    -charger
+    -dumpstate
+    -healthd
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
+    -init
+    -logd
+    -logpersist
+    -recovery_persist
+    -recovery_refresh
+    -shell
+    -system_server
+  } pstorefs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # configfs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -system_server
+  } configfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # functionfs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -adbd
+    -init
+    -mediaprovider
+    -system_server
+  } functionfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # usbfs and binfmt_miscfs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+  }{ usbfs binfmt_miscfs }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # dmabuf heaps
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -ueventd
+  }{
+    dmabuf_heap_device_type
+    -dmabuf_system_heap_device
+    -dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device
+  }:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Following /dev nodes must not be directly accessed by coredomain, but should
+# instead be wrapped by HALs.
+neverallow coredomain {
+  iio_device
+  radio_device
+}:chr_file { open read append write ioctl };
+
+# TODO(b/120243891): HAL permission to tee_device is included into coredomain
+# on non-Treble devices.
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow coredomain tee_device:chr_file { open read append write ioctl };
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/cppreopts.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/cppreopts.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1192ba6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/cppreopts.te
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# cppreopts
+#
+# This command copies preopted files from the system_b partition to the data
+# partition. This domain ensures that we are only copying into specific
+# directories.
+
+type cppreopts, domain, mlstrustedsubject, coredomain;
+type cppreopts_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Technically not a daemon but we do want the transition from init domain to
+# cppreopts to occur.
+init_daemon_domain(cppreopts)
+domain_auto_trans(cppreopts, preopt2cachename_exec, preopt2cachename);
+
+# Allow cppreopts copy files into the dalvik-cache
+allow cppreopts dalvikcache_data_file:dir { add_name remove_name search write };
+allow cppreopts dalvikcache_data_file:file { create getattr open read rename write unlink };
+
+# Allow cppreopts to execute itself using #!/system/bin/sh
+allow cppreopts shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow us to run find on /postinstall
+allow cppreopts system_file:dir { open read };
+
+# Allow running the cp command using cppreopts permissions. Needed so we can
+# write into dalvik-cache
+allow cppreopts toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Silence the denial when /postinstall cannot be mounted, e.g., system_other
+# is wiped, but cppreopts.sh still runs.
+dontaudit cppreopts postinstall_mnt_dir:dir search;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/crash_dump.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/crash_dump.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9233a4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/crash_dump.te
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+typeattribute crash_dump coredomain;
+
+# Crash dump does not need to access devices passed across exec().
+dontaudit crash_dump { devpts dev_type }:chr_file { read write };
+
+allow crash_dump {
+  domain
+  -apexd
+  -bpfloader
+  -crash_dump
+  -init
+  -kernel
+  -keystore
+  -llkd
+  -logd
+  -ueventd
+  -vendor_init
+  -vold
+}:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
+
+# TODO(b/186868271): Remove the keystore exception soon-ish (maybe by May 14, 2021?)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow crash_dump {
+    apexd
+    keystore
+    llkd
+    logd
+    vold
+  }:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
+')
+
+###
+### neverallow assertions
+###
+
+# ptrace neverallow assertions are spread throughout the other policy
+# files, so we avoid adding redundant assertions here
+
+neverallow crash_dump {
+  apexd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-apexd')
+  bpfloader
+  init
+  kernel
+  keystore
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-keystore')
+  llkd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
+  logd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-logd')
+  ueventd
+  vendor_init
+  vold
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-vold')
+}:process { signal sigstop sigkill };
+
+neverallow crash_dump self:process ptrace;
+neverallow crash_dump gpu_device:chr_file *;
+
+# Read ART APEX data directory
+allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/credstore.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/credstore.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d87e2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/credstore.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+typeattribute credstore coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(credstore)
+
+# talk to Identity Credential
+hal_client_domain(credstore, hal_identity)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/crosvm.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/crosvm.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7729fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/crosvm.te
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+type crosvm, domain, coredomain;
+type crosvm_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type crosvm_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+# Let crosvm create temporary files.
+tmpfs_domain(crosvm)
+
+# Let crosvm receive file descriptors from VirtualizationService.
+allow crosvm virtualizationservice:fd use;
+
+# Let crosvm open /dev/kvm.
+allow crosvm kvm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Most other domains shouldn't access /dev/kvm.
+neverallow { domain -crosvm -ueventd -shell } kvm_device:chr_file getattr;
+neverallow { domain -crosvm -ueventd } kvm_device:chr_file ~getattr;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/derive_classpath.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/derive_classpath.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2299ba0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/derive_classpath.te
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+
+# Domain for derive_classpath
+type derive_classpath, domain, coredomain;
+type derive_classpath_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(derive_classpath)
+
+# Read /apex
+allow derive_classpath apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Create /data/system/environ/classpath file
+allow derive_classpath environ_system_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow derive_classpath environ_system_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# b/183079517 fails on gphone targets otherwise
+allow derive_classpath unlabeled:dir search;
+
+# Allow derive_classpath to write the classpath into ota dexopt
+# - Read the ota's apex dir
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+# - Report the BCP to the ota's dexopt
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt:dir search;
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt:fd use;
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt:file read;
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt:lnk_file read;
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt_tmpfs:file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/derive_sdk.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/derive_sdk.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f60e34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/derive_sdk.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+
+# Domain for derive_sdk
+type derive_sdk, domain, coredomain;
+type derive_sdk_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(derive_sdk)
+
+# Read /apex
+allow derive_sdk apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Prop rules: writable by derive_sdk, readable by bootclasspath (apps)
+set_prop(derive_sdk, module_sdkextensions_prop)
+neverallow { domain -init -derive_sdk } module_sdkextensions_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dex2oat.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dex2oat.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28d8b9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dex2oat.te
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# dex2oat
+type dex2oat, domain, coredomain;
+type dex2oat_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+userfaultfd_use(dex2oat)
+
+r_dir_file(dex2oat, apk_data_file)
+# Access to /vendor/app
+r_dir_file(dex2oat, vendor_app_file)
+# Access /vendor/framework
+allow dex2oat vendor_framework_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow dex2oat vendor_framework_file:file { getattr open read map };
+
+allow dex2oat tmpfs:file { read getattr map };
+
+r_dir_file(dex2oat, dalvikcache_data_file)
+allow dex2oat dalvikcache_data_file:file write;
+allow dex2oat installd:fd use;
+
+# Acquire advisory lock on /system/framework/arm/*
+allow dex2oat system_file:file lock;
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:file lock;
+
+# Read already open asec_apk_file file descriptors passed by installd.
+# Also allow reading unlabeled files, to allow for upgrading forward
+# locked APKs.
+allow dex2oat asec_apk_file:file { read map };
+allow dex2oat unlabeled:file { read map };
+allow dex2oat oemfs:file { read map };
+allow dex2oat apk_tmp_file:dir search;
+allow dex2oat apk_tmp_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow dex2oat user_profile_data_file:file { getattr read lock map };
+
+# Allow dex2oat to compile app's secondary dex files which were reported back to
+# the framework.
+allow dex2oat { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file { getattr read write lock map };
+
+# Allow dex2oat to find files and directories under /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.runtime.
+allow dex2oat apex_module_data_file:dir search;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to use file descriptors passed from odrefresh.
+allow dex2oat odrefresh:fd use;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to use devpts and file descriptors passed from odsign
+allow dex2oat odsign_devpts:chr_file { read write };
+allow dex2oat odsign:fd use;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to write to file descriptors from odrefresh for files
+# in the staging area.
+allow dex2oat apex_art_staging_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dex2oat apex_art_staging_data_file:file { getattr map read write unlink };
+
+# Allow dex2oat to read artifacts from odrefresh.
+allow dex2oat apex_art_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dex2oat apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to read runtime native flag properties.
+get_prop(dex2oat, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(dex2oat, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+# Allow dex2oat to read /apex/apex-info-list.xml
+allow dex2oat apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+##################
+# A/B OTA Dexopt #
+##################
+
+# Allow dex2oat to use file descriptors from otapreopt.
+allow dex2oat postinstall_dexopt:fd use;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to read files under /postinstall (e.g. APKs under /system, /system/bin/linker).
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:filesystem getattr;
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:lnk_file { getattr read };
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:file read;
+# Allow dex2oat to use libraries under /postinstall/system (e.g. /system/lib/libc.so).
+# TODO(b/120266448): Remove when Bionic libraries are part of the Runtime APEX.
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:file { execute getattr open };
+
+# Allow dex2oat access to /postinstall/apex.
+allow dex2oat postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir { getattr search };
+
+# Allow dex2oat access to files in /data/ota.
+allow dex2oat ota_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
+allow dex2oat ota_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Create and read symlinks in /data/ota/dalvik-cache. This is required for PIC mode boot images,
+# where the oat file is symlinked to the original file in /system.
+allow dex2oat ota_data_file:lnk_file { create read };
+
+# It would be nice to tie this down, but currently, because of how images are written, we can't
+# pass file descriptors for the preopted boot image to dex2oat. So dex2oat needs to be able to
+# create them itself (and make them world-readable).
+allow dex2oat ota_data_file:file { create w_file_perms setattr };
+
+###############
+# APEX Update #
+###############
+
+# /dev/zero is inherited.
+allow dex2oat apexd:fd use;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to use file descriptors from preinstall.
+
+##############
+# Neverallow #
+##############
+
+neverallow dex2oat { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:notdevfile_class_set open;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dexoptanalyzer.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d194acb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# dexoptanalyzer
+type dexoptanalyzer, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type dexoptanalyzer_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type dexoptanalyzer_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+r_dir_file(dexoptanalyzer, apk_data_file)
+# Access to /vendor/app
+r_dir_file(dexoptanalyzer, vendor_app_file)
+
+# Reading an APK opens a ZipArchive, which unpack to tmpfs.
+# Use tmpfs_domain() which will give tmpfs files created by dexoptanalyzer their
+# own label, which differs from other labels created by other processes.
+# This allows to distinguish in policy files created by dexoptanalyzer vs other
+# processes.
+tmpfs_domain(dexoptanalyzer)
+
+userfaultfd_use(dexoptanalyzer)
+
+# Allow dexoptanalyzer to read files in the dalvik cache.
+allow dexoptanalyzer dalvikcache_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow dexoptanalyzer dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read symlinks in /data/dalvik-cache. This is required for PIC mode boot
+# app_data_file the oat file is symlinked to the original file in /system.
+allow dexoptanalyzer dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file read;
+
+# Allow dexoptanalyzer to read files in the ART APEX data directory.
+allow dexoptanalyzer { apex_art_data_file apex_module_data_file }:dir { getattr search };
+allow dexoptanalyzer apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dexoptanalyzer to use file descriptors from odrefresh.
+allow dexoptanalyzer odrefresh:fd use;
+
+# Use devpts and fd from odsign (which exec()'s odrefresh)
+allow dexoptanalyzer odsign:fd use;
+allow dexoptanalyzer odsign_devpts:chr_file { read write };
+
+allow dexoptanalyzer installd:fd use;
+allow dexoptanalyzer installd:fifo_file { getattr write };
+
+# Acquire advisory lock on /system/framework/arm/*
+allow dexoptanalyzer system_file:file lock;
+
+# Allow reading secondary dex files that were reported by the app to the
+# package manager.
+allow dexoptanalyzer { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file { getattr read map };
+
+# Allow testing /data/user/0 which symlinks to /data/data
+allow dexoptanalyzer system_data_file:lnk_file { getattr };
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(dexoptanalyzer, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(dexoptanalyzer, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dhcp.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dhcp.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ec9111
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dhcp.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+typeattribute dhcp coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(dhcp)
+type_transition dhcp system_data_file:{ dir file } dhcp_data_file;
+
+set_prop(dhcp, dhcp_prop)
+set_prop(dhcp, pan_result_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dnsmasq.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dnsmasq.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96084b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dnsmasq.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+typeattribute dnsmasq coredomain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/domain.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/domain.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c451fcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/domain.te
@@ -0,0 +1,543 @@
+# Transition to crash_dump when /system/bin/crash_dump* is executed.
+# This occurs when the process crashes.
+# We do not apply this to the su domain to avoid interfering with
+# tests (b/114136122)
+domain_auto_trans({ domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }, crash_dump_exec, crash_dump);
+allow domain crash_dump:process sigchld;
+
+# Allow every process to check the heapprofd.enable properties to determine
+# whether to load the heap profiling library. This does not necessarily enable
+# heap profiling, as initialization will fail if it does not have the
+# necessary SELinux permissions.
+get_prop(domain, heapprofd_prop);
+# Allow heap profiling on debug builds.
+userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_heap({
+  domain
+  -bpfloader
+  -init
+  -kernel
+  -keystore
+  -llkd
+  -logd
+  -logpersist
+  -recovery
+  -recovery_persist
+  -recovery_refresh
+  -ueventd
+  -vendor_init
+  -vold
+})')
+
+# As above, allow perf profiling most processes on debug builds.
+# zygote is excluded as system-wide profiling could end up with it
+# (unexpectedly) holding an open fd across a fork.
+userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_perf({
+  domain
+  -bpfloader
+  -init
+  -kernel
+  -keystore
+  -llkd
+  -logd
+  -logpersist
+  -recovery
+  -recovery_persist
+  -recovery_refresh
+  -ueventd
+  -vendor_init
+  -vold
+  -zygote
+})')
+
+# Everyone can access the IncFS list of features.
+r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_fs_incfs_features);
+
+# Path resolution access in cgroups.
+allow domain cgroup:dir search;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:dir w_dir_perms;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:file w_file_perms;
+
+allow domain cgroup_v2:dir search;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:dir w_dir_perms;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
+allow domain cgroup_rc_file:dir search;
+allow domain cgroup_rc_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain task_profiles_api_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain vendor_task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow all domains to read sys.use_memfd to determine
+# if memfd support can be used if device supports it
+get_prop(domain, use_memfd_prop);
+
+# Read access to sdkextensions props
+get_prop(domain, module_sdkextensions_prop)
+
+# Read access to bq configuration values
+get_prop(domain, bq_config_prop);
+
+# For now, everyone can access core property files
+# Device specific properties are not granted by default
+not_compatible_property(`
+    # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
+    get_prop(domain, core_property_type)
+    get_prop(domain, exported3_system_prop)
+    get_prop(domain, vendor_default_prop)
+')
+compatible_property_only(`
+    # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
+    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, core_property_type)
+    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_system_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_camera_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_log_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_test_prop)
+    get_prop({domain -coredomain -appdomain}, vendor_default_prop)
+')
+
+# Allow access to fsverity keyring.
+allow domain kernel:key search;
+# Allow access to keys in the fsverity keyring that were installed at boot.
+allow domain fsverity_init:key search;
+# For testing purposes, allow access to keys installed with su.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow domain su:key search;
+')
+
+# Allow access to linkerconfig file
+allow domain linkerconfig_file:dir search;
+allow domain linkerconfig_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow all processes to check for the existence of the boringssl_self_test_marker files.
+allow domain boringssl_self_test_marker:dir search;
+
+# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
+# with other UIDs to these allowlisted domains.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -vold
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
+  -dumpstate
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+  -storaged
+  -system_server
+} self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
+
+# Limit ability to generate hardware unique device ID attestations to priv_apps
+neverallow { domain -priv_app -gmscore_app } *:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
+neverallow { domain -priv_app -gmscore_app } *:keystore2_key gen_unique_id;
+neverallow { domain -system_server } *:keystore2_key use_dev_id;
+neverallow { domain -system_server } keystore:keystore2 { clear_ns lock reset unlock };
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
+} debugfs_tracing_debug:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# System_server owns dropbox data, and init creates/restorecons the directory
+# Disallow direct access by other processes.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:dir *;
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
+
+###
+# Services should respect app sandboxes
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -installd # creation of sandbox
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
+
+# Only the following processes should be directly accessing private app
+# directories.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -adbd
+  -appdomain
+  -app_zygote
+  -dexoptanalyzer
+  -installd
+  -iorap_inode2filename
+  -iorap_prefetcherd
+  -profman
+  -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+  -runas
+  -system_server
+  -viewcompiler
+  -zygote
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir *;
+
+# Only apps should be modifying app data. installd is exempted for
+# restorecon and package install/uninstall.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -installd
+  -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir ~r_dir_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -app_zygote
+  -installd
+  -iorap_prefetcherd
+  -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file_class_set open;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -installd # creation of sandbox
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -installd
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
+
+# The staging directory contains APEX and APK files. It is important to ensure
+# that these files cannot be accessed by other domains to ensure that the files
+# do not change between system_server staging the files and apexd processing
+# the files.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -apexd -installd -iorap_inode2filename -priv_app } staging_data_file:dir *;
+neverallow { domain -init -system_app -system_server -apexd -adbd -kernel -installd -iorap_inode2filename -priv_app } staging_data_file:file *;
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -installd} staging_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+# apexd needs the link and unlink permissions, so list every `no_w_file_perms`
+# except for `link` and `unlink`.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } staging_data_file:file
+  { append create relabelfrom rename setattr write no_x_file_perms };
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -appdomain # for oemfs
+    -bootanim # for oemfs
+    -recovery # for /tmp/update_binary in tmpfs
+    -microdroid_launcher -microdroid_manager # for executing shared libs on /mnt/apk in Microdroid
+} { fs_type -rootfs }:file execute;
+
+#
+# Assert that, to the extent possible, we're not loading executable content from
+# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few allowlisted domains.
+# Executable files loaded from /data is a persistence vector
+# we want to avoid. See
+# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
+#
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -appdomain
+    with_asan(`-asan_extract')
+    -iorap_prefetcherd
+    -shell
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+    -system_server_startup # for memfd backed executable regions
+    -app_zygote
+    -webview_zygote
+    -zygote
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaextractor')
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaswcodec')
+} {
+    file_type
+    -system_file_type
+    -system_lib_file
+    -system_linker_exec
+    -vendor_file_type
+    -exec_type
+    -postinstall_file
+}:file execute;
+
+# Only init is allowed to write cgroup.rc file
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+} cgroup_rc_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# Only authorized processes should be writing to files in /data/dalvik-cache
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init # TODO: limit init to relabelfrom for files
+  -zygote
+  -installd
+  -postinstall_dexopt
+  -cppreopts
+  -dex2oat
+  -otapreopt_slot
+} dalvikcache_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -installd
+  -postinstall_dexopt
+  -cppreopts
+  -dex2oat
+  -zygote
+  -otapreopt_slot
+} dalvikcache_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+
+# Only authorized processes should be writing to /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art as it
+# contains boot class path and system server AOT artifacts following an ART APEX Mainline update.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  # art processes
+  -odrefresh
+  -odsign
+  # others
+  -apexd
+  -init
+  -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} apex_art_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  # art processes
+  -odrefresh
+  -odsign
+  # others
+  -apexd
+  -init
+  -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} apex_art_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+
+# Protect most domains from executing arbitrary content from /data.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+} {
+  data_file_type
+  -apex_art_data_file
+  -dalvikcache_data_file
+  -system_data_file # shared libs in apks
+  -apk_data_file
+}:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# Minimize dac_override and dac_read_search.
+# Instead of granting them it is usually better to add the domain to
+# a Unix group or change the permissions of a file.
+define(`dac_override_allowed', `{
+  apexd
+  dnsmasq
+  dumpstate
+  init
+  installd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`llkd')
+  lmkd
+  migrate_legacy_obb_data
+  netd
+  postinstall_dexopt
+  recovery
+  rss_hwm_reset
+  sdcardd
+  tee
+  ueventd
+  uncrypt
+  vendor_init
+  vold
+  vold_prepare_subdirs
+  zygote
+}')
+neverallow ~dac_override_allowed self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
+# Since the kernel checks dac_read_search before dac_override, domains that
+# have dac_override should also have dac_read_search to eliminate spurious
+# denials.  Some domains have dac_read_search without having dac_override, so
+# this list should be a superset of the one above.
+neverallow ~{
+  dac_override_allowed
+  iorap_inode2filename
+  iorap_prefetcherd
+  traced_perf
+  traced_probes
+  heapprofd
+} self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
+
+# Limit what domains can mount filesystems or change their mount flags.
+# sdcard_type / vfat is exempt as a larger set of domains need
+# this capability, including device-specific domains.
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -apexd
+    recovery_only(`-fastbootd')
+    -init
+    -kernel
+    -otapreopt_chroot
+    -recovery
+    -update_engine
+    -vold
+    -zygote
+    -zipfuse
+} { fs_type
+    -sdcard_type
+}:filesystem { mount remount relabelfrom relabelto };
+
+enforce_debugfs_restriction(`
+  neverallow {
+    domain userdebug_or_eng(`-init')
+  } { debugfs_type -debugfs_tracing_debug }:filesystem { mount remount relabelfrom relabelto };
+')
+
+# Limit raw I/O to these allowlisted domains. Do not apply to debug builds.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
+  -kernel
+  -gsid
+  -init
+  -recovery
+  -ueventd
+  -healthd
+  -uncrypt
+  -tee
+  -hal_bootctl_server
+  -fastbootd
+} self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
+
+# Limit directory operations that doesn't need to do app data isolation.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -installd
+  -zygote
+} mirror_data_file:dir *;
+
+# This property is being removed. Remove remaining access.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -vendor_init } net_dns_prop:property_service set;
+neverallow { domain -dumpstate -init -system_server -vendor_init } net_dns_prop:file read;
+
+# Only core domains are allowed to access package_manager properties
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } pm_prop:property_service set;
+neverallow { domain -coredomain } pm_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Do not allow reading the last boot timestamp from system properties
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -dumpstate } firstboot_prop:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Kprobes should only be used by adb root
+neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } debugfs_kprobes:file *;
+
+# On TREBLE devices, most coredomains should not access vendor_files.
+# TODO(b/71553434): Remove exceptions here.
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -bootanim
+    -crash_dump
+    -heapprofd
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+    -init
+    -iorap_inode2filename
+    -iorap_prefetcherd
+    -kernel
+    -traced_perf
+    -ueventd
+  } vendor_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms open };
+')
+
+# Vendor domains are not permitted to initiate communications to core domain sockets
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow_establish_socket_comms({
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+  }, {
+    coredomain
+    -logd # Logging by writing to logd Unix domain socket is public API
+    -netd # netdomain needs this
+    -mdnsd # netdomain needs this
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su') # communications with su are permitted only on userdebug or eng builds
+    -init
+    -tombstoned # linker to tombstoned
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
+  });
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+  # Do not allow system components access to /vendor files except for the
+  # ones allowed here.
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    # TODO(b/37168747): clean up fwk access to /vendor
+    -crash_dump
+    -init # starts vendor executables
+    -iorap_inode2filename
+    -iorap_prefetcherd
+    -kernel # loads /vendor/firmware
+    -heapprofd
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+    -shell
+    -system_executes_vendor_violators
+    -traced_perf # library/binary access for symbolization
+    -ueventd # reads /vendor/ueventd.rc
+    -vold # loads incremental fs driver
+  } {
+    vendor_file_type
+    -same_process_hal_file
+    -vendor_app_file
+    -vendor_apex_file
+    -vendor_configs_file
+    -vendor_service_contexts_file
+    -vendor_framework_file
+    -vendor_idc_file
+    -vendor_keychars_file
+    -vendor_keylayout_file
+    -vendor_overlay_file
+    -vendor_public_framework_file
+    -vendor_public_lib_file
+    -vendor_task_profiles_file
+    -vndk_sp_file
+  }:file *;
+')
+
+# mlsvendorcompat is only for compatibility support for older vendor
+# images, and should not be granted to any domain in current policy.
+# (Every domain is allowed self:fork, so this will trigger if the
+# intsersection of domain & mlsvendorcompat is not empty.)
+neverallow domain mlsvendorcompat:process fork;
+
+# Only init and otapreopt_chroot should be mounting filesystems on locations
+# labeled system or vendor (/product and /vendor respectively).
+neverallow { domain -init -otapreopt_chroot } { system_file_type vendor_file_type }:dir_file_class_set mounton;
+
+# Only allow init and vendor_init to read/write mm_events properties
+# NOTE: dumpstate is allowed to read any system property
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+  -dumpstate
+} mm_events_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow the tracing daemon and callstack sampler to use kallsyms to symbolize
+# kernel traces. Addresses are not disclosed, they are repalced with symbol
+# names (if available). Traces don't disclose KASLR.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+  -vendor_init
+  -traced_probes
+  -traced_perf
+} proc_kallsyms:file { open read };
+
+# debugfs_kcov type is not included in this neverallow statement since the KCOV
+# tool uses it for kernel fuzzing.
+# vendor_modprobe is also exempted since the kernel modules it loads may create
+# debugfs files in its context.
+enforce_debugfs_restriction(`
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -vendor_modprobe
+    userdebug_or_eng(`
+      -init
+      -hal_dumpstate
+    ')
+  } { debugfs_type
+      userdebug_or_eng(`-debugfs_kcov')
+      -tracefs_type
+  }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/drmserver.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/drmserver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8449c3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/drmserver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+typeattribute drmserver coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(drmserver)
+
+type_transition drmserver apk_data_file:sock_file drmserver_socket;
+
+typeattribute drmserver_socket coredomain_socket;
+
+get_prop(drmserver, drm_service_config_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dumpstate.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dumpstate.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37a9a0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/dumpstate.te
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+typeattribute dumpstate coredomain;
+type dumpstate_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(dumpstate)
+
+# Execute and transition to the vdc domain
+domain_auto_trans(dumpstate, vdc_exec, vdc)
+
+# Acquire advisory lock on /system/etc/xtables.lock from ip[6]tables
+allow dumpstate system_file:file lock;
+
+allow dumpstate storaged_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# /data/misc/a11ytrace for accessibility traces
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow dumpstate accessibility_trace_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow dumpstate accessibility_trace_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# /data/misc/wmtrace for wm traces
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow dumpstate wm_trace_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow dumpstate wm_trace_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Allow dumpstate to make binder calls to incidentd
+binder_call(dumpstate, incidentd)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to make binder calls to storaged service
+binder_call(dumpstate, storaged)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to make binder calls to statsd
+binder_call(dumpstate, statsd)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to gpuservice over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, gpuservice);
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to idmap over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, idmap);
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to profcollectd over binder
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  binder_call(dumpstate, profcollectd)
+')
+
+# Collect metrics on boot time created by init
+get_prop(dumpstate, boottime_prop)
+
+# Signal native processes to dump their stack.
+allow dumpstate {
+  mediatranscoding
+  statsd
+  netd
+}:process signal;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow dumpstate keystore:process signal;
+')
+
+# For collecting bugreports.
+no_debugfs_restriction(`
+  allow dumpstate debugfs_wakeup_sources:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+allow dumpstate dev_type:blk_file getattr;
+allow dumpstate webview_zygote:process signal;
+allow dumpstate sysfs_dmabuf_stats:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit dumpstate update_engine:binder call;
+
+# Read files in /proc
+allow dumpstate {
+  proc_net_tcp_udp
+  proc_pid_max
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# For comminucating with the system process to do confirmation ui.
+binder_call(dumpstate, incidentcompanion_service)
+
+# Set properties.
+# dumpstate_prop is used to share state with the Shell app.
+set_prop(dumpstate, dumpstate_prop)
+set_prop(dumpstate, exported_dumpstate_prop)
+
+# dumpstate_options_prop is used to pass extra command-line args.
+set_prop(dumpstate, dumpstate_options_prop)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to kill vendor dumpstate service by init
+set_prop(dumpstate, ctl_dumpstate_prop)
+
+# For dumping dynamic partition information.
+set_prop(dumpstate, lpdumpd_prop)
+binder_call(dumpstate, lpdumpd)
+
+# For dumping device-mapper and snapshot information.
+allow dumpstate gsid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+set_prop(dumpstate, ctl_gsid_prop)
+binder_call(dumpstate, gsid)
+
+r_dir_file(dumpstate, ota_metadata_file)
+
+# For starting (and killing) perfetto --save-for-bugreport. If a labelled trace
+# is being recorded, the command above will serialize it into
+# /data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport/*.pftrace .
+domain_auto_trans(dumpstate, perfetto_exec, perfetto)
+allow dumpstate perfetto:process signal;
+allow dumpstate perfetto_traces_data_file:dir { search };
+allow dumpstate perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+
+# When exec-ing /system/bin/perfetto, dumpstates redirects stdio to /dev/null
+# (which is labelled as dumpstate_tmpfs) to avoid leaking a FD to the bugreport
+# zip file. These rules are to allow perfetto.te to inherit dumpstate's
+# /dev/null.
+allow perfetto dumpstate_tmpfs:file rw_file_perms;
+allow perfetto dumpstate:fd use;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/ephemeral_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/ephemeral_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e004891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/ephemeral_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+###
+### Ephemeral apps.
+###
+### This file defines the security policy for apps with the ephemeral
+### feature.
+###
+### The ephemeral_app domain is a reduced permissions sandbox allowing
+### ephemeral applications to be safely installed and run. Non ephemeral
+### applications may also opt-in to ephemeral to take advantage of the
+### additional security features.
+###
+### PackageManager flags an app as ephemeral at install time.
+
+typeattribute ephemeral_app coredomain;
+
+net_domain(ephemeral_app)
+app_domain(ephemeral_app)
+
+# Allow ephemeral apps to read/write files in visible storage if provided fds
+allow ephemeral_app { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file {read write getattr ioctl lock append};
+
+# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
+# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
+allow ephemeral_app privapp_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
+allow ephemeral_app app_data_file:file     { r_file_perms execute };
+
+# Follow priv-app symlinks. This is used for dynamite functionality.
+allow ephemeral_app privapp_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow the renderscript compiler to be run.
+domain_auto_trans(ephemeral_app, rs_exec, rs)
+
+# Allow loading and deleting shared libraries created by trusted system
+# components within an application home directory.
+allow ephemeral_app app_exec_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute unlink };
+
+# services
+allow ephemeral_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app ephemeral_app_api_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
+# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(ephemeral_app)
+
+# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
+can_profile_heap(ephemeral_app)
+can_profile_perf(ephemeral_app)
+
+# allow ephemeral apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow ephemeral_app system_server:udp_socket {
+        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
+
+allow ephemeral_app ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow ephemeral_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Receive or send uevent messages.
+neverallow ephemeral_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+
+# Receive or send generic netlink messages
+neverallow ephemeral_app domain:netlink_socket *;
+
+# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
+# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
+neverallow ephemeral_app debugfs:file read;
+
+# execute gpu_device
+neverallow ephemeral_app gpu_device:chr_file execute;
+
+# access files in /sys with the default sysfs label
+neverallow ephemeral_app sysfs:file *;
+
+# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
+# Create a more specific label if needed
+neverallow ephemeral_app proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Directly access external storage
+neverallow ephemeral_app { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file {open create};
+neverallow ephemeral_app { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:dir search;
+
+# Avoid reads to proc_net, it contains too much device wide information about
+# ongoing connections.
+neverallow ephemeral_app proc_net:file no_rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fastbootd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fastbootd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0174faa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fastbootd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+typeattribute fastbootd coredomain;
+
+# The allow rules are only included in the recovery policy.
+# Otherwise fastbootd is only allowed the domain rules.
+recovery_only(`
+  # Reboot the device
+  set_prop(fastbootd, powerctl_prop)
+
+  # Read serial number of the device from system properties
+  get_prop(fastbootd, serialno_prop)
+
+  # Set sys.usb.ffs.ready.
+  get_prop(fastbootd, ffs_config_prop)
+  set_prop(fastbootd, ffs_control_prop)
+
+  userdebug_or_eng(`
+    get_prop(fastbootd, persistent_properties_ready_prop)
+  ')
+
+  set_prop(fastbootd, gsid_prop)
+
+  # Determine allocation scheme (whether B partitions needs to be
+  # at the second half of super.
+  get_prop(fastbootd, virtual_ab_prop)
+
+  # Needed for TCP protocol
+  allow fastbootd node:tcp_socket node_bind;
+  allow fastbootd port:tcp_socket name_bind;
+  allow fastbootd self:tcp_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl listen accept };
+
+  # Start snapuserd for merging VABC updates
+  set_prop(fastbootd, ctl_snapuserd_prop)
+
+  # Needed to communicate with snapuserd to complete merges.
+  allow fastbootd snapuserd_socket:sock_file write;
+  allow fastbootd snapuserd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+  allow fastbootd dm_user_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # Get fastbootd protocol property
+  get_prop(fastbootd, fastbootd_protocol_prop)
+
+  # Mount /metadata to interact with Virtual A/B snapshots.
+  allow fastbootd labeledfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/file.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/file.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f7e689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/file.te
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# /proc/config.gz
+type config_gz, fs_type, proc_type;
+
+# /data/misc/storaged
+type storaged_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/wmtrace for wm traces
+type wm_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/a11ytrace for accessibility traces
+type accessibility_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/perfetto-traces for perfetto traces
+type perfetto_traces_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport for perfetto traces for bugreports.
+type perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/perfetto-configs for perfetto configs
+type perfetto_configs_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /sys/kernel/debug/kcov for coverage guided kernel fuzzing in userdebug builds.
+type debugfs_kcov, fs_type, debugfs_type;
+
+# App executable files in /data/data directories
+type app_exec_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+typealias app_exec_data_file alias rs_data_file;
+
+# /data/misc_[ce|de]/rollback : Used by installd to store snapshots
+# of application data.
+type rollback_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/gsi/ota
+type ota_image_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/gsi_persistent_data
+type gsi_persistent_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/emergencynumberdb
+type emergency_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/profcollectd
+type profcollectd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art
+type apex_art_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art/staging
+type apex_art_staging_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/font/files
+type font_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/odrefresh
+type odrefresh_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/odsign
+type odsign_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/virtualizationservice
+type virtualizationservice_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/system/environ
+type environ_system_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /dev/kvm
+type kvm_device, dev_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/file_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/file_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c75e81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/file_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,818 @@
+# This is a copy of system/sepolicy/private/file_contexts to build microdroid.img.
+# TODO(inseob): Remove unnecessary entries after experiment
+
+###########################################
+# Root
+/                   u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+
+# Data files
+/adb_keys           u:object_r:adb_keys_file:s0
+/build\.prop        u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/default\.prop      u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/fstab\..*          u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/init\..*           u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/res(/.*)?          u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/selinux_version    u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/ueventd\..*        u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/verity_key         u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+
+# Executables
+/init               u:object_r:init_exec:s0
+/sbin(/.*)?         u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+
+# For kernel modules
+/lib(/.*)?          u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+
+# Empty directories
+/lost\+found        u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/acct               u:object_r:cgroup:s0
+/config             u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/data_mirror        u:object_r:mirror_data_file:s0
+/debug_ramdisk      u:object_r:tmpfs:s0
+/mnt                u:object_r:tmpfs:s0
+/proc               u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/second_stage_resources u:object_r:tmpfs:s0
+/sys                u:object_r:sysfs:s0
+/apex               u:object_r:apex_mnt_dir:s0
+
+# Postinstall directories
+/postinstall         u:object_r:postinstall_mnt_dir:s0
+/postinstall/apex    u:object_r:postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:s0
+
+/apex/(\.(bootstrap|default)-)?apex-info-list.xml u:object_r:apex_info_file:s0
+
+# Symlinks
+/bin                u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/bugreports         u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/charger            u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/d                  u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/etc                u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/sdcard             u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+
+# SELinux policy files
+/vendor_file_contexts   u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/nonplat_file_contexts  u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/plat_file_contexts     u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/product_file_contexts  u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/mapping_sepolicy\.cil   u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/nonplat_sepolicy\.cil   u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/plat_sepolicy\.cil      u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/plat_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/product_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/nonplat_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor_property_contexts   u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/seapp_contexts     u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/nonplat_seapp_contexts     u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor_seapp_contexts      u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/plat_seapp_contexts     u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/sepolicy           u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/plat_service_contexts   u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/plat_hwservice_contexts   u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/plat_keystore2_key_contexts u:object_r:keystore2_key_contexts_file:s0
+/nonplat_service_contexts   u:object_r:nonplat_service_contexts_file:s0
+# Use nonplat_service_contexts_file to allow servicemanager to read it
+# on non full-treble devices.
+/vendor_service_contexts    u:object_r:nonplat_service_contexts_file:s0
+/nonplat_hwservice_contexts   u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor_hwservice_contexts    u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/vndservice_contexts   u:object_r:vndservice_contexts_file:s0
+
+##########################
+# Devices
+#
+/dev(/.*)?		u:object_r:device:s0
+/dev/adf[0-9]*		u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
+/dev/adf-interface[0-9]*\.[0-9]*	u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
+/dev/adf-overlay-engine[0-9]*\.[0-9]*	u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
+/dev/ashmem		u:object_r:ashmem_device:s0
+/dev/ashmem(.*)?	u:object_r:ashmem_libcutils_device:s0
+/dev/audio.*		u:object_r:audio_device:s0
+/dev/binder		u:object_r:binder_device:s0
+/dev/block(/.*)?	u:object_r:block_device:s0
+/dev/block/dm-[0-9]+	u:object_r:dm_device:s0
+/dev/block/loop[0-9]*	u:object_r:loop_device:s0
+/dev/block/vd[a-z][0-9]*  u:object_r:vd_device:s0
+/dev/block/vold/.+	u:object_r:vold_device:s0
+/dev/block/ram[0-9]*	u:object_r:ram_device:s0
+/dev/block/zram[0-9]*	u:object_r:ram_device:s0
+/dev/boringssl/selftest(/.*)?	u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_marker:s0
+/dev/bus/usb(.*)?       u:object_r:usb_device:s0
+/dev/console		u:object_r:console_device:s0
+/dev/cpu_variant:.*     u:object_r:dev_cpu_variant:s0
+/dev/dma_heap(/.*)?     u:object_r:dmabuf_heap_device:s0
+/dev/dma_heap/system    u:object_r:dmabuf_system_heap_device:s0
+/dev/dma_heap/system-uncached    u:object_r:dmabuf_system_heap_device:s0
+/dev/dma_heap/system-secure(.*)	 u:object_r:dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:s0
+/dev/dm-user(/.*)?	u:object_r:dm_user_device:s0
+/dev/device-mapper	u:object_r:dm_device:s0
+/dev/eac		u:object_r:audio_device:s0
+/dev/event-log-tags     u:object_r:runtime_event_log_tags_file:s0
+/dev/cgroup_info(/.*)?  u:object_r:cgroup_rc_file:s0
+/dev/fscklogs(/.*)?	u:object_r:fscklogs:s0
+/dev/fuse		u:object_r:fuse_device:s0
+/dev/gnss[0-9]+		u:object_r:gnss_device:s0
+/dev/graphics(/.*)?	u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
+/dev/hw_random		u:object_r:hw_random_device:s0
+/dev/hwbinder		u:object_r:hwbinder_device:s0
+/dev/input(/.*)?	u:object_r:input_device:s0
+/dev/iio:device[0-9]+   u:object_r:iio_device:s0
+/dev/ion		u:object_r:ion_device:s0
+/dev/keychord   u:object_r:keychord_device:s0
+/dev/loop-control	u:object_r:loop_control_device:s0
+/dev/modem.*		u:object_r:radio_device:s0
+/dev/mtp_usb		u:object_r:mtp_device:s0
+/dev/pmsg0		u:object_r:pmsg_device:s0
+/dev/pn544		u:object_r:nfc_device:s0
+/dev/port		u:object_r:port_device:s0
+/dev/ppp		u:object_r:ppp_device:s0
+/dev/ptmx		u:object_r:ptmx_device:s0
+/dev/pvrsrvkm		u:object_r:gpu_device:s0
+/dev/kmsg		u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0
+/dev/kmsg_debug	u:object_r:kmsg_debug_device:s0
+/dev/kvm		u:object_r:kvm_device:s0
+/dev/null		u:object_r:null_device:s0
+/dev/nvhdcp1		u:object_r:video_device:s0
+/dev/random		u:object_r:random_device:s0
+/dev/rpmsg-omx[0-9]	u:object_r:rpmsg_device:s0
+/dev/rproc_user	u:object_r:rpmsg_device:s0
+/dev/rtc[0-9]      u:object_r:rtc_device:s0
+/dev/snd(/.*)?		u:object_r:audio_device:s0
+/dev/socket(/.*)?	u:object_r:socket_device:s0
+/dev/socket/adbd	u:object_r:adbd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/dnsproxyd	u:object_r:dnsproxyd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/dumpstate	u:object_r:dumpstate_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/fwmarkd	u:object_r:fwmarkd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/lmkd        u:object_r:lmkd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/logd	u:object_r:logd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/logdr	u:object_r:logdr_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/logdw	u:object_r:logdw_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/statsdw	u:object_r:statsdw_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/mdns	u:object_r:mdns_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/mdnsd	u:object_r:mdnsd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/mtpd	u:object_r:mtpd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/buffer_hub	u:object_r:pdx_bufferhub_dir:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/buffer_hub/client	u:object_r:pdx_bufferhub_client_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/performance	u:object_r:pdx_performance_dir:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/performance/client	u:object_r:pdx_performance_client_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display	u:object_r:pdx_display_dir:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/client	u:object_r:pdx_display_client_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/manager	u:object_r:pdx_display_manager_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/screenshot	u:object_r:pdx_display_screenshot_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/vsync	u:object_r:pdx_display_vsync_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/property_service	u:object_r:property_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/racoon	u:object_r:racoon_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/recovery    u:object_r:recovery_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/rild	u:object_r:rild_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/rild-debug	u:object_r:rild_debug_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/snapuserd u:object_r:snapuserd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/tombstoned_crash u:object_r:tombstoned_crash_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/tombstoned_java_trace u:object_r:tombstoned_java_trace_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/tombstoned_intercept u:object_r:tombstoned_intercept_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/traced_consumer	u:object_r:traced_consumer_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/traced_perf	u:object_r:traced_perf_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/traced_producer	u:object_r:traced_producer_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/heapprofd	u:object_r:heapprofd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/uncrypt	u:object_r:uncrypt_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/wpa_eth[0-9] u:object_r:wpa_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/wpa_wlan[0-9] u:object_r:wpa_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/zygote	u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/zygote_secondary	u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/usap_pool_primary	u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/usap_pool_secondary	u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
+/dev/spdif_out.*	u:object_r:audio_device:s0
+/dev/sys/block/by-name/userdata(/.*)?	u:object_r:userdata_sysdev:s0
+/dev/sys/fs/by-name/userdata(/.*)?	u:object_r:userdata_sysdev:s0
+/dev/tty		u:object_r:owntty_device:s0
+/dev/tty[0-9]*		u:object_r:tty_device:s0
+/dev/ttyS[0-9]*		u:object_r:serial_device:s0
+/dev/ttyUSB[0-9]*	u:object_r:usb_serial_device:s0
+/dev/ttyACM[0-9]*	u:object_r:usb_serial_device:s0
+/dev/tun		u:object_r:tun_device:s0
+/dev/uhid		u:object_r:uhid_device:s0
+/dev/uinput		u:object_r:uhid_device:s0
+/dev/uio[0-9]*		u:object_r:uio_device:s0
+/dev/urandom		u:object_r:random_device:s0
+/dev/usb_accessory	u:object_r:usbaccessory_device:s0
+/dev/v4l-touch[0-9]*	u:object_r:input_device:s0
+/dev/vhost-vsock	u:object_r:kvm_device:s0
+/dev/video[0-9]*	u:object_r:video_device:s0
+/dev/vndbinder		u:object_r:vndbinder_device:s0
+/dev/watchdog		u:object_r:watchdog_device:s0
+/dev/xt_qtaguid	u:object_r:qtaguid_device:s0
+/dev/zero		u:object_r:zero_device:s0
+/dev/__properties__ u:object_r:properties_device:s0
+/dev/__properties__/property_info   u:object_r:property_info:s0
+#############################
+# Linker configuration
+#
+/linkerconfig(/.*)?          u:object_r:linkerconfig_file:s0
+#############################
+# System files
+#
+/system(/.*)?		u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/system/apex/com.android.art	u:object_r:art_apex_dir:s0
+/system/lib(64)?(/.*)?		u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/system/lib(64)?/bootstrap(/.*)? u:object_r:system_bootstrap_lib_file:s0
+/system/bin/mm_events		u:object_r:mm_events_exec:s0
+/system/bin/atrace	u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0
+/system/bin/auditctl	u:object_r:auditctl_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bcc                 u:object_r:rs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/blank_screen	u:object_r:blank_screen_exec:s0
+/system/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64) u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
+/system/bin/charger		u:object_r:charger_exec:s0
+/system/bin/canhalconfigurator  u:object_r:canhalconfigurator_exec:s0
+/system/bin/e2fsdroid		u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mke2fs		u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/e2fsck	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/fsck\.exfat	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/fsck\.f2fs	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/init		u:object_r:init_exec:s0
+# TODO(/123600489): merge mini-keyctl into toybox
+/system/bin/mini-keyctl	--	u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0
+/system/bin/fsverity_init	u:object_r:fsverity_init_exec:s0
+/system/bin/sload_f2fs	--	u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/make_f2fs	--	u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/fsck_msdos	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/tcpdump	--	u:object_r:tcpdump_exec:s0
+/system/bin/tune2fs	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/resize2fs	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/toolbox	--	u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0
+/system/bin/toybox	--	u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0
+/system/bin/ld\.mc              u:object_r:rs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/logcat	--	u:object_r:logcat_exec:s0
+/system/bin/logcatd	--	u:object_r:logcat_exec:s0
+/system/bin/sh		--	u:object_r:shell_exec:s0
+/system/bin/run-as	--	u:object_r:runas_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bootanimation u:object_r:bootanim_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bootstat		u:object_r:bootstat_exec:s0
+/system/bin/app_process32	u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
+/system/bin/app_process64	u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
+/system/bin/servicemanager	u:object_r:servicemanager_exec:s0
+/system/bin/hwservicemanager	u:object_r:hwservicemanager_exec:s0
+/system/bin/surfaceflinger	u:object_r:surfaceflinger_exec:s0
+/system/bin/gpuservice	u:object_r:gpuservice_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bufferhubd	u:object_r:bufferhubd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/performanced	u:object_r:performanced_exec:s0
+/system/bin/drmserver	u:object_r:drmserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/dumpstate   u:object_r:dumpstate_exec:s0
+/system/bin/incident   u:object_r:incident_exec:s0
+/system/bin/incidentd   u:object_r:incidentd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/incident_helper  u:object_r:incident_helper_exec:s0
+/system/bin/iw                   u:object_r:iw_exec:s0
+/system/bin/netutils-wrapper-1\.0    u:object_r:netutils_wrapper_exec:s0
+/system/bin/vold	u:object_r:vold_exec:s0
+/system/bin/netd	u:object_r:netd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/wificond	u:object_r:wificond_exec:s0
+/system/bin/audioserver	u:object_r:audioserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediadrmserver	u:object_r:mediadrmserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediaserver	u:object_r:mediaserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediametrics	u:object_r:mediametrics_exec:s0
+/system/bin/cameraserver	u:object_r:cameraserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediaextractor	u:object_r:mediaextractor_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediaswcodec	u:object_r:mediaswcodec_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediatranscoding	u:object_r:mediatranscoding_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediatuner	        u:object_r:mediatuner_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mdnsd	u:object_r:mdnsd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/installd	u:object_r:installd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/otapreopt_chroot   u:object_r:otapreopt_chroot_exec:s0
+/system/bin/otapreopt_slot   u:object_r:otapreopt_slot_exec:s0
+/system/bin/credstore	u:object_r:credstore_exec:s0
+/system/bin/keystore	u:object_r:keystore_exec:s0
+/system/bin/keystore2	u:object_r:keystore_exec:s0
+/system/bin/fingerprintd u:object_r:fingerprintd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/gatekeeperd u:object_r:gatekeeperd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/tombstoned u:object_r:tombstoned_exec:s0
+/system/bin/recovery-persist     u:object_r:recovery_persist_exec:s0
+/system/bin/recovery-refresh     u:object_r:recovery_refresh_exec:s0
+/system/bin/sdcard      u:object_r:sdcardd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/snapshotctl      u:object_r:snapshotctl_exec:s0
+/system/bin/dhcpcd      u:object_r:dhcp_exec:s0
+/system/bin/dhcpcd-6\.8\.2	u:object_r:dhcp_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mtpd	u:object_r:mtp_exec:s0
+/system/bin/pppd	u:object_r:ppp_exec:s0
+/system/bin/racoon	u:object_r:racoon_exec:s0
+/system/xbin/su		u:object_r:su_exec:s0
+/system/bin/dnsmasq     u:object_r:dnsmasq_exec:s0
+/system/bin/healthd     u:object_r:healthd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/clatd	u:object_r:clatd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/linker(64)? u:object_r:system_linker_exec:s0
+/system/bin/linkerconfig u:object_r:linkerconfig_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bootstrap/linker(64)? u:object_r:system_linker_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bootstrap/linkerconfig u:object_r:linkerconfig_exec:s0
+/system/bin/llkd        u:object_r:llkd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/lmkd        u:object_r:lmkd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/usbd   u:object_r:usbd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/inputflinger u:object_r:inputflinger_exec:s0
+/system/bin/logd        u:object_r:logd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/lpdumpd        u:object_r:lpdumpd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/rss_hwm_reset	u:object_r:rss_hwm_reset_exec:s0
+/system/bin/perfetto        u:object_r:perfetto_exec:s0
+/system/bin/traced        u:object_r:traced_exec:s0
+/system/bin/traced_perf        u:object_r:traced_perf_exec:s0
+/system/bin/traced_probes        u:object_r:traced_probes_exec:s0
+/system/bin/heapprofd        u:object_r:heapprofd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/uncrypt     u:object_r:uncrypt_exec:s0
+/system/bin/update_verifier u:object_r:update_verifier_exec:s0
+/system/bin/logwrapper  u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/system/bin/vdc         u:object_r:vdc_exec:s0
+/system/bin/cppreopts\.sh   u:object_r:cppreopts_exec:s0
+/system/bin/preloads_copy\.sh u:object_r:preloads_copy_exec:s0
+/system/bin/preopt2cachename u:object_r:preopt2cachename_exec:s0
+/system/bin/viewcompiler     u:object_r:viewcompiler_exec:s0
+/system/bin/iorapd          u:object_r:iorapd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/iorap\.inode2filename u:object_r:iorap_inode2filename_exec:s0
+/system/bin/iorap\.prefetcherd u:object_r:iorap_prefetcherd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/sgdisk      u:object_r:sgdisk_exec:s0
+/system/bin/blkid       u:object_r:blkid_exec:s0
+/system/bin/tzdatacheck u:object_r:tzdatacheck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/flags_health_check -- u:object_r:flags_health_check_exec:s0
+/system/bin/idmap u:object_r:idmap_exec:s0
+/system/bin/idmap2(d)?           u:object_r:idmap_exec:s0
+/system/bin/update_engine        u:object_r:update_engine_exec:s0
+/system/bin/profcollectd         u:object_r:profcollectd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/profcollectctl       u:object_r:profcollectd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/storaged             u:object_r:storaged_exec:s0
+/system/bin/wpantund             u:object_r:wpantund_exec:s0
+/system/bin/virtual_touchpad     u:object_r:virtual_touchpad_exec:s0
+/system/bin/hw/android\.frameworks\.bufferhub@1\.0-service    u:object_r:fwk_bufferhub_exec:s0
+/system/bin/hw/android\.hidl\.allocator@1\.0-service          u:object_r:hal_allocator_default_exec:s0
+/system/bin/hw/android\.system\.suspend@1\.0-service          u:object_r:system_suspend_exec:s0
+/system/etc/cgroups\.json               u:object_r:cgroup_desc_file:s0
+/system/etc/task_profiles/cgroups_[0-9]+\.json               u:object_r:cgroup_desc_api_file:s0
+/system/etc/event-log-tags              u:object_r:system_event_log_tags_file:s0
+/system/etc/group                       u:object_r:system_group_file:s0
+/system/etc/ld\.config.*                u:object_r:system_linker_config_file:s0
+/system/etc/passwd                      u:object_r:system_passwd_file:s0
+/system/etc/seccomp_policy(/.*)?        u:object_r:system_seccomp_policy_file:s0
+/system/etc/security/cacerts(/.*)?      u:object_r:system_security_cacerts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/mapping/[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.cil       u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_service_contexts  u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_hwservice_contexts  u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_keystore2_key_contexts  u:object_r:keystore2_key_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_file_contexts  u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_seapp_contexts  u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_sepolicy\.cil       u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_and_mapping_sepolicy\.cil\.sha256 u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/system/etc/task_profiles\.json  u:object_r:task_profiles_file:s0
+/system/etc/task_profiles/task_profiles_[0-9]+\.json  u:object_r:task_profiles_api_file:s0
+/system/usr/share/zoneinfo(/.*)? u:object_r:system_zoneinfo_file:s0
+/system/bin/vr_hwc               u:object_r:vr_hwc_exec:s0
+/system/bin/adbd                 u:object_r:adbd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/vold_prepare_subdirs u:object_r:vold_prepare_subdirs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/stats                u:object_r:stats_exec:s0
+/system/bin/statsd               u:object_r:statsd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bpfloader            u:object_r:bpfloader_exec:s0
+/system/bin/wait_for_keymaster   u:object_r:wait_for_keymaster_exec:s0
+/system/bin/watchdogd            u:object_r:watchdogd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/apexd                u:object_r:apexd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/gsid                 u:object_r:gsid_exec:s0
+/system/bin/simpleperf           u:object_r:simpleperf_exec:s0
+/system/bin/simpleperf_app_runner    u:object_r:simpleperf_app_runner_exec:s0
+/system/bin/migrate_legacy_obb_data\.sh u:object_r:migrate_legacy_obb_data_exec:s0
+/system/bin/android\.frameworks\.automotive\.display@1\.0-service u:object_r:automotive_display_service_exec:s0
+/system/bin/snapuserd            u:object_r:snapuserd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/odsign               u:object_r:odsign_exec:s0
+/system/bin/zipfuse              u:object_r:zipfuse_exec:s0
+/system/bin/microdroid_launcher  u:object_r:microdroid_launcher_exec:s0
+/system/bin/microdroid_manager   u:object_r:microdroid_manager_exec:s0
+
+#############################
+# Vendor files
+#
+/(vendor|system/vendor)(/.*)?                  u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/sh                 u:object_r:vendor_shell_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/toybox_vendor      u:object_r:vendor_toolbox_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/toolbox            u:object_r:vendor_toolbox_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/cgroups\.json      u:object_r:vendor_cgroup_desc_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/task_profiles\.json    u:object_r:vendor_task_profiles_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/egl(/.*)?     u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/vndk-sp(/.*)? u:object_r:vndk_sp_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/manifest\.xml           u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/compatibility_matrix\.xml u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/vintf(/.*)?        u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/app(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/priv-app(/.*)?         u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/overlay(/.*)?          u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/framework(/.*)?        u:object_r:vendor_framework_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/apex(/[^/]+){0,2}                      u:object_r:vendor_apex_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/misc_writer                        u:object_r:vendor_misc_writer_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64)         u:object_r:vendor_boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
+
+# HAL location
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/hw            u:object_r:vendor_hal_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/selinux/nonplat_service_contexts u:object_r:nonplat_service_contexts_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/selinux/vendor_service_contexts u:object_r:vendor_service_contexts_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# OEM and ODM files
+#
+/(odm|vendor/odm)(/.*)?                       u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/lib(64)?/egl(/.*)?          u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/lib(64)?/hw                 u:object_r:vendor_hal_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/lib(64)?/vndk-sp(/.*)?      u:object_r:vndk_sp_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/bin/sh                      u:object_r:vendor_shell_exec:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc(/.*)?                   u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/app(/.*)?                   u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/priv-app(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/overlay(/.*)?               u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/framework(/.*)?             u:object_r:vendor_framework_file:s0
+
+# Input configuration
+/(odm|vendor/odm|vendor|system/vendor)/usr/keylayout(/.*)?\.kl        u:object_r:vendor_keylayout_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm|vendor|system/vendor)/usr/keychars(/.*)?\.kcm        u:object_r:vendor_keychars_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm|vendor|system/vendor)/usr/idc(/.*)?\.idc             u:object_r:vendor_idc_file:s0
+
+/oem(/.*)?              u:object_r:oemfs:s0
+/oem/overlay(/.*)?      u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
+
+# The precompiled monolithic sepolicy will be under /odm only when
+# BOARD_USES_ODMIMAGE is true: a separate odm.img is built.
+/odm/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy                           u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/odm/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy\.plat_and_mapping\.sha256 u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_sepolicy\.cil                  u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_file_contexts                 u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_seapp_contexts                u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_property_contexts             u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_hwservice_contexts            u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_keystore2_key_contexts         u:object_r:keystore2_key_contexts_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_mac_permissions\.xml           u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Product files
+#
+/(product|system/product)(/.*)?                                 u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/group                             u:object_r:system_group_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/passwd                            u:object_r:system_passwd_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/overlay(/.*)?                         u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
+
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_file_contexts      u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_hwservice_contexts u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_keystore2_key_contexts u:object_r:keystore2_key_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_seapp_contexts     u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_service_contexts   u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
+
+/(product|system/product)/lib(64)?(/.*)?                         u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# SystemExt files
+#
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)(/.*)?               u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/group           u:object_r:system_group_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/passwd          u:object_r:system_passwd_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/overlay(/.*)?       u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
+
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_file_contexts        u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_hwservice_contexts   u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_keystore2_key_contexts u:object_r:keystore2_key_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_property_contexts    u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_seapp_contexts       u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_service_contexts     u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
+
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/aidl_lazy_test_server   u:object_r:aidl_lazy_test_server_exec:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/hidl_lazy_test_server   u:object_r:hidl_lazy_test_server_exec:s0
+
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/lib(64)?(/.*)?      u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# VendorDlkm files
+# This includes VENDOR Dynamically Loadable Kernel Modules and other misc files.
+#
+/(vendor_dlkm|vendor/vendor_dlkm|system/vendor/vendor_dlkm)(/.*)?         u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# OdmDlkm files
+# This includes ODM Dynamically Loadable Kernel Modules and other misc files.
+#
+/(odm_dlkm|vendor/odm_dlkm|system/vendor/odm_dlkm)(/.*)?                  u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Vendor files from /(product|system/product)/vendor_overlay
+#
+# NOTE: For additional vendor file contexts for vendor overlay files,
+# use device specific file_contexts.
+#
+/(product|system/product)/vendor_overlay/[0-9]+/.*          u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Data files
+#
+# NOTE: When modifying existing label rules, changes may also need to
+# propagate to the "Expanded data files" section.
+#
+/data		u:object_r:system_data_root_file:s0
+/data/(.*)?		u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
+/data/system/environ(/.*)? u:object_r:environ_system_data_file:s0
+/data/system/packages\.list u:object_r:packages_list_file:s0
+/data/unencrypted(/.*)?         u:object_r:unencrypted_data_file:s0
+/data/backup(/.*)?		u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
+/data/secure/backup(/.*)?	u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
+/data/system/ndebugsocket	u:object_r:system_ndebug_socket:s0
+/data/system/unsolzygotesocket  u:object_r:system_unsolzygote_socket:s0
+/data/drm(/.*)?		u:object_r:drm_data_file:s0
+/data/resource-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:resourcecache_data_file:s0
+/data/dalvik-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+/data/ota(/.*)? u:object_r:ota_data_file:s0
+/data/ota_package(/.*)? u:object_r:ota_package_file:s0
+/data/adb(/.*)?		u:object_r:adb_data_file:s0
+/data/anr(/.*)?		u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0
+/data/apex(/.*)?		u:object_r:apex_data_file:s0
+/data/apex/active/(.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+/data/apex/backup/(.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+/data/apex/decompressed/(.*)?    u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+/data/apex/ota_reserved(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_ota_reserved_file:s0
+/data/app(/.*)?                       u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
+# Traditional /data/app/[packageName]-[randomString]/base.apk location
+/data/app/[^/]+/oat(/.*)?                u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+# /data/app/[randomStringA]/[packageName]-[randomStringB]/base.apk layout
+/data/app/[^/]+/[^/]+/oat(/.*)?                u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+/data/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp(/.*)?           u:object_r:apk_tmp_file:s0
+/data/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp/oat(/.*)?           u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+/data/app-private(/.*)?               u:object_r:apk_private_data_file:s0
+/data/app-private/vmdl.*\.tmp(/.*)?   u:object_r:apk_private_tmp_file:s0
+/data/gsi(/.*)?        u:object_r:gsi_data_file:s0
+/data/gsi_persistent_data    u:object_r:gsi_persistent_data_file:s0
+/data/gsi/ota(/.*)?    u:object_r:ota_image_data_file:s0
+/data/tombstones(/.*)?	u:object_r:tombstone_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor/tombstones/wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:tombstone_wifi_data_file:s0
+/data/local/tests(/.*)?	u:object_r:shell_test_data_file:s0
+/data/local/tmp(/.*)?	u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0
+/data/local/tmp/ltp(/.*)?   u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
+/data/local/traces(/.*)?	u:object_r:trace_data_file:s0
+/data/media(/.*)?	u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0
+/data/mediadrm(/.*)?	u:object_r:media_data_file:s0
+/data/nativetest(/.*)?	u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
+/data/nativetest64(/.*)?	u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
+# This directory was removed after Q Beta 2, but we need to preserve labels for upgrading devices.
+/data/pkg_staging(/.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+/data/property(/.*)?	u:object_r:property_data_file:s0
+/data/preloads(/.*)?	u:object_r:preloads_data_file:s0
+/data/preloads/media(/.*)?	u:object_r:preloads_media_file:s0
+/data/preloads/demo(/.*)?	u:object_r:preloads_media_file:s0
+/data/server_configurable_flags(/.*)? u:object_r:server_configurable_flags_data_file:s0
+/data/app-staging(/.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+# Ensure we have the same labels as /data/app or /data/apex/active
+# to avoid restorecon conflicts
+/data/rollback/\d+/[^/]+/.*\.apk  u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
+/data/rollback/\d+/[^/]+/.*\.apex u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+/data/fonts/files(/.*)?     u:object_r:font_data_file:s0
+
+# Misc data
+/data/misc/adb(/.*)?            u:object_r:adb_keys_file:s0
+/data/misc/a11ytrace(/.*)?      u:object_r:accessibility_trace_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.art(/.*)?           u:object_r:apex_art_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.permission(/.*)?    u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.scheduling(/.*)?    u:object_r:apex_scheduling_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)?          u:object_r:apex_wifi_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apns(/.*)?           u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/appcompat(/.*)?      u:object_r:appcompat_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/audio(/.*)?          u:object_r:audio_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/audioserver(/.*)?    u:object_r:audioserver_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/audiohal(/.*)?       u:object_r:audiohal_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/bootstat(/.*)?       u:object_r:bootstat_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/boottrace(/.*)?      u:object_r:boottrace_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/bluetooth(/.*)?      u:object_r:bluetooth_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/bluetooth/logs(/.*)? u:object_r:bluetooth_logs_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/bluedroid(/.*)?      u:object_r:bluetooth_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/bluedroid/\.a2dp_ctrl u:object_r:bluetooth_socket:s0
+/data/misc/bluedroid/\.a2dp_data u:object_r:bluetooth_socket:s0
+/data/misc/camera(/.*)?         u:object_r:camera_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/carrierid(/.*)?      u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/dhcp(/.*)?           u:object_r:dhcp_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/dhcp-6\.8\.2(/.*)?     u:object_r:dhcp_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/emergencynumberdb(/.*)?     u:object_r:emergency_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/gatekeeper(/.*)?     u:object_r:gatekeeper_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/incidents(/.*)?	    u:object_r:incident_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/installd(/.*)?		u:object_r:install_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/keychain(/.*)?       u:object_r:keychain_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/credstore(/.*)?       u:object_r:credstore_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/keystore(/.*)?       u:object_r:keystore_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/logd(/.*)?           u:object_r:misc_logd_file:s0
+/data/misc/media(/.*)?          u:object_r:media_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/net(/.*)?            u:object_r:net_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/network_watchlist(/.*)? u:object_r:network_watchlist_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/nfc/logs(/.*)?       u:object_r:nfc_logs_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/odrefresh(/.*)?      u:object_r:odrefresh_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/odsign(/.*)?         u:object_r:odsign_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport(.*)? u:object_r:perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/perfetto-traces(/.*)?          u:object_r:perfetto_traces_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/perfetto-configs(/.*)?         u:object_r:perfetto_configs_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/prereboot(/.*)?      u:object_r:prereboot_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/profcollectd(/.*)?   u:object_r:profcollectd_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/radio(/.*)?          u:object_r:radio_core_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/recovery(/.*)?       u:object_r:recovery_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/shared_relro(/.*)?   u:object_r:shared_relro_file:s0
+/data/misc/sms(/.*)?            u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/snapshotctl_log(/.*)?      u:object_r:snapshotctl_log_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/stats-active-metric(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/stats-data(/.*)?     u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/stats-service(/.*)?  u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/stats-metadata(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/systemkeys(/.*)?     u:object_r:systemkeys_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/textclassifier(/.*)?       u:object_r:textclassifier_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/train-info(/.*)?     u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/user(/.*)?           u:object_r:misc_user_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/virtualizationservice(/.*)? u:object_r:virtualizationservice_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/vpn(/.*)?            u:object_r:vpn_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/wifi(/.*)?           u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/wifi/sockets(/.*)?   u:object_r:wpa_socket:s0
+/data/misc/wifi/sockets/wpa_ctrl.*   u:object_r:system_wpa_socket:s0
+/data/misc/zoneinfo(/.*)?       u:object_r:zoneinfo_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/vold(/.*)?           u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/iorapd(/.*)?         u:object_r:iorapd_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/update_engine(/.*)?  u:object_r:update_engine_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/update_engine_log(/.*)?  u:object_r:update_engine_log_data_file:s0
+/data/system/dropbox(/.*)?      u:object_r:dropbox_data_file:s0
+/data/system/heapdump(/.*)?     u:object_r:heapdump_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/trace(/.*)?          u:object_r:method_trace_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/wmtrace(/.*)?        u:object_r:wm_trace_data_file:s0
+# TODO(calin) label profile reference differently so that only
+# profman run as a special user can write to them
+/data/misc/profiles/cur(/[0-9]+)?   u:object_r:user_profile_root_file:s0
+/data/misc/profiles/cur/[0-9]+/.*   u:object_r:user_profile_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/profiles/ref(/.*)?       u:object_r:user_profile_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/profman(/.*)?        u:object_r:profman_dump_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor_ce(/.*)?           u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor_de(/.*)?           u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
+
+# storaged proto files
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/storaged(/.*)?       u:object_r:storaged_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/storaged(/.*)?       u:object_r:storaged_data_file:s0
+
+# Fingerprint data
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/fpdata(/.*)? u:object_r:fingerprintd_data_file:s0
+
+# Fingerprint vendor data file
+/data/vendor_de/[0-9]+/fpdata(/.*)? u:object_r:fingerprint_vendor_data_file:s0
+
+# Face vendor data file
+/data/vendor_de/[0-9]+/facedata(/.*)? u:object_r:face_vendor_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor_ce/[0-9]+/facedata(/.*)? u:object_r:face_vendor_data_file:s0
+
+# Iris vendor data file
+/data/vendor_de/[0-9]+/irisdata(/.*)? u:object_r:iris_vendor_data_file:s0
+
+# Bootchart data
+/data/bootchart(/.*)?		u:object_r:bootchart_data_file:s0
+
+# App data snapshots (managed by installd).
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/rollback(/.*)?       u:object_r:rollback_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/rollback(/.*)?       u:object_r:rollback_data_file:s0
+
+# Apex data directories
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.appsearch(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_appsearch_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.permission(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.permission(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_wifi_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_wifi_data_file:s0
+
+# Apex rollback directories
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
+
+# Incremental directories
+/data/incremental(/.*)?                                 u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
+/data/incremental/MT_[^/]+/mount/.pending_reads         u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0
+/data/incremental/MT_[^/]+/mount/.log                   u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0
+/data/incremental/MT_[^/]+/mount/.blocks_written        u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Expanded data files
+#
+/mnt/expand(/.*)?                                   u:object_r:mnt_expand_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+(/.*)?                             u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app(/.*)?                         u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/[^/]+/oat(/.*)?               u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+# /mnt/expand/..../app/[randomStringA]/[packageName]-[randomStringB]/base.apk layout
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/[^/]+/[^/]+/oat(/.*)?        u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp(/.*)?          u:object_r:apk_tmp_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp/oat(/.*)?      u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/local/tmp(/.*)?                   u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/media(/.*)?                       u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/misc/vold(/.*)?                   u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
+
+# coredump directory for userdebug/eng devices
+/cores(/.*)?                    u:object_r:coredump_file:s0
+
+# Wallpaper files
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper_lock_orig	u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper_lock	u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper_orig	u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper		u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
+
+# Ringtone files
+/data/system_de/[0-9]+/ringtones(/.*)?          u:object_r:ringtone_file:s0
+
+# ShortcutManager icons, e.g.
+#   /data/system_ce/0/shortcut_service/bitmaps/com.example.app/1457472879282.png
+/data/system_ce/[0-9]+/shortcut_service/bitmaps(/.*)? u:object_r:shortcut_manager_icons:s0
+
+# User icon files
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/photo\.png             u:object_r:icon_file:s0
+
+# vold per-user data
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/vold(/.*)?           u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/vold(/.*)?           u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
+
+# iorapd per-user data
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/iorapd(/.*)?           u:object_r:iorapd_data_file:s0
+
+# Backup service persistent per-user bookkeeping
+/data/system_ce/[0-9]+/backup(/.*)?		u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
+# Backup service temporary per-user data for inter-change with apps
+/data/system_ce/[0-9]+/backup_stage(/.*)?	u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# efs files
+#
+/efs(/.*)?		u:object_r:efs_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Cache files
+#
+/cache(/.*)?		u:object_r:cache_file:s0
+/cache/recovery(/.*)?	u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0
+# General backup/restore interchange with apps
+/cache/backup_stage(/.*)?	u:object_r:cache_backup_file:s0
+# LocalTransport (backup) uses this subtree
+/cache/backup(/.*)?		u:object_r:cache_private_backup_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Overlayfs support directories
+#
+/cache/overlay(/.*)?            u:object_r:overlayfs_file:s0
+/mnt/scratch(/.*)?              u:object_r:overlayfs_file:s0
+
+/data/cache(/.*)?		u:object_r:cache_file:s0
+/data/cache/recovery(/.*)?	u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0
+# General backup/restore interchange with apps
+/data/cache/backup_stage(/.*)?	u:object_r:cache_backup_file:s0
+# LocalTransport (backup) uses this subtree
+/data/cache/backup(/.*)?	u:object_r:cache_private_backup_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Metadata files
+#
+/metadata(/.*)?           u:object_r:metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/apex(/.*)?      u:object_r:apex_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/vold(/.*)?      u:object_r:vold_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi(/.*)?       u:object_r:gsi_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi/dsu/active  u:object_r:gsi_public_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi/dsu/booted  u:object_r:gsi_public_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi/dsu/lp_names  u:object_r:gsi_public_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi/dsu/[^/]+/metadata_encryption_dir u:object_r:gsi_public_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi/ota(/.*)?   u:object_r:ota_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/password_slots(/.*)?    u:object_r:password_slot_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/ota(/.*)?       u:object_r:ota_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/bootstat(/.*)?  u:object_r:metadata_bootstat_file:s0
+/metadata/staged-install(/.*)?    u:object_r:staged_install_file:s0
+/metadata/userspacereboot(/.*)?    u:object_r:userspace_reboot_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/watchdog(/.*)?    u:object_r:watchdog_metadata_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# asec containers
+/mnt/asec(/.*)?             u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0
+/mnt/asec/[^/]+/[^/]+\.zip  u:object_r:asec_public_file:s0
+/mnt/asec/[^/]+/lib(/.*)?   u:object_r:asec_public_file:s0
+/data/app-asec(/.*)?        u:object_r:asec_image_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# external storage
+/mnt/media_rw(/.*)?         u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0
+/mnt/user(/.*)?             u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0
+/mnt/pass_through(/.*)?     u:object_r:mnt_pass_through_file:s0
+/mnt/sdcard                 u:object_r:mnt_sdcard_file:s0
+/mnt/runtime(/.*)?          u:object_r:storage_file:s0
+/storage(/.*)?              u:object_r:storage_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# mount point for read-write vendor partitions
+/mnt/vendor(/.*)?           u:object_r:mnt_vendor_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# mount point for read-write product partitions
+/mnt/product(/.*)?          u:object_r:mnt_product_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# /postinstall file contexts
+/(system|product)/bin/check_dynamic_partitions  u:object_r:postinstall_exec:s0
+/(system|product)/bin/otapreopt_script          u:object_r:postinstall_exec:s0
+/(system|product)/bin/otapreopt                 u:object_r:postinstall_dexopt_exec:s0
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fingerprintd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fingerprintd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb73ef8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fingerprintd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute fingerprintd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(fingerprintd)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/flags_health_check.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/flags_health_check.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55d1a9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/flags_health_check.te
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+typeattribute flags_health_check coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(flags_health_check)
+
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_boot_count_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_reset_performed_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_input_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_netd_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_activity_manager_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_media_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_profcollect_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_statsd_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_statsd_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_storage_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_swcodec_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_sys_traced_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_configuration_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_connectivity_prop)
+
+# system property device_config_boot_count_prop is used for deciding when to perform server
+# configurable flags related disaster recovery. Mistakenly set up by unrelated components can, at a
+# wrong timing, trigger server configurable flag related disaster recovery, which will override
+# server configured values of all flags with default values.
+neverallow { domain -init -flags_health_check } device_config_boot_count_prop:property_service set;
+
+# system property device_config_reset_performed_prop is used for indicating whether server
+# configurable flags have been reset during booting. Mistakenly modified by unrelated components can
+# cause bad server configurable flags synced back to device.
+neverallow { domain -init -flags_health_check } device_config_reset_performed_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fs_use b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fs_use
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..93d7f1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fs_use
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Label inodes via getxattr.
+fs_use_xattr yaffs2 u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr jffs2 u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr ext2 u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr ext3 u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr ext4 u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr xfs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr btrfs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr f2fs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr squashfs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr overlay u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr erofs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr incremental-fs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr virtiofs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+
+# Label inodes from task label.
+fs_use_task pipefs u:object_r:pipefs:s0;
+fs_use_task sockfs u:object_r:sockfs:s0;
+
+# Label inodes from combination of task label and fs label.
+# Define type_transition rules if you want per-domain types.
+fs_use_trans devpts u:object_r:devpts:s0;
+fs_use_trans tmpfs u:object_r:tmpfs:s0;
+fs_use_trans devtmpfs u:object_r:device:s0;
+fs_use_trans shm u:object_r:shm:s0;
+fs_use_trans mqueue u:object_r:mqueue:s0;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fsck.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fsck.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d68fa5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fsck.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+typeattribute fsck coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(fsck)
+
+allow fsck metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow fsck vd_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fsck_untrusted.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fsck_untrusted.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a57bf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fsck_untrusted.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+typeattribute fsck_untrusted coredomain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fsverity_init.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fsverity_init.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42d142f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fsverity_init.te
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+type fsverity_init, domain, coredomain;
+type fsverity_init_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(fsverity_init)
+
+# Allow to read /proc/keys for searching key id.
+allow fsverity_init proc_keys:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Kernel only prints the keys that can be accessed and only kernel keyring is needed here.
+dontaudit fsverity_init init:key view;
+dontaudit fsverity_init vold:key view;
+allow fsverity_init kernel:key { view search write setattr };
+allow fsverity_init fsverity_init:key { view search write };
+
+# Allow init to write to /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures
+allow fsverity_init proc_fs_verity:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Read the on-device signing certificate, to be able to add it to the keyring
+allow fsverity_init odsign:fd use;
+allow fsverity_init odsign_data_file:file { getattr read };
+
+# When kernel requests an algorithm, the crypto API first looks for an
+# already registered algorithm with that name. If it fails, the kernel creates
+# an implementation of the algorithm from templates.
+dontaudit fsverity_init kernel:system module_request;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fwk_bufferhub.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fwk_bufferhub.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b69cca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/fwk_bufferhub.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+type fwk_bufferhub, domain, coredomain;
+type fwk_bufferhub_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+hal_client_domain(fwk_bufferhub, hal_graphics_allocator)
+allow fwk_bufferhub ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+hal_server_domain(fwk_bufferhub, hal_bufferhub)
+init_daemon_domain(fwk_bufferhub)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gatekeeperd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gatekeeperd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fb88a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gatekeeperd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+typeattribute gatekeeperd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(gatekeeperd)
+
+# For checking whether GSI is running
+get_prop(gatekeeperd, gsid_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/genfs_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/genfs_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3499aa0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/genfs_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+# Label inodes with the fs label.
+genfscon rootfs / u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+# proc labeling can be further refined (longest matching prefix).
+genfscon proc / u:object_r:proc:s0
+genfscon proc /asound u:object_r:proc_asound:s0
+genfscon proc /bootconfig u:object_r:proc_bootconfig:s0
+genfscon proc /buddyinfo u:object_r:proc_buddyinfo:s0
+genfscon proc /cmdline u:object_r:proc_cmdline:s0
+genfscon proc /config.gz u:object_r:config_gz:s0
+genfscon proc /diskstats u:object_r:proc_diskstats:s0
+genfscon proc /filesystems u:object_r:proc_filesystems:s0
+genfscon proc /interrupts u:object_r:proc_interrupts:s0
+genfscon proc /iomem u:object_r:proc_iomem:s0
+genfscon proc /kallsyms u:object_r:proc_kallsyms:s0
+genfscon proc /keys u:object_r:proc_keys:s0
+genfscon proc /kmsg u:object_r:proc_kmsg:s0
+genfscon proc /loadavg u:object_r:proc_loadavg:s0
+genfscon proc /locks u:object_r:proc_locks:s0
+genfscon proc /lowmemorykiller u:object_r:proc_lowmemorykiller:s0
+genfscon proc /meminfo u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0
+genfscon proc /misc u:object_r:proc_misc:s0
+genfscon proc /modules u:object_r:proc_modules:s0
+genfscon proc /mounts u:object_r:proc_mounts:s0
+genfscon proc /net u:object_r:proc_net:s0
+genfscon proc /net/tcp u:object_r:proc_net_tcp_udp:s0
+genfscon proc /net/udp u:object_r:proc_net_tcp_udp:s0
+genfscon proc /net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl u:object_r:proc_qtaguid_ctrl:s0
+genfscon proc /net/xt_qtaguid/ u:object_r:proc_qtaguid_stat:s0
+genfscon proc /cpuinfo u:object_r:proc_cpuinfo:s0
+genfscon proc /pagetypeinfo u:object_r:proc_pagetypeinfo:s0
+genfscon proc /pressure/cpu u:object_r:proc_pressure_cpu:s0
+genfscon proc /pressure/io u:object_r:proc_pressure_io:s0
+genfscon proc /pressure/memory u:object_r:proc_pressure_mem:s0
+genfscon proc /slabinfo u:object_r:proc_slabinfo:s0
+genfscon proc /softirqs u:object_r:proc_timer:s0
+genfscon proc /stat u:object_r:proc_stat:s0
+genfscon proc /swaps u:object_r:proc_swaps:s0
+genfscon proc /sysrq-trigger u:object_r:proc_sysrq:s0
+genfscon proc /kpageflags u:object_r:proc_kpageflags:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/abi/swp u:object_r:proc_abi:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/fs/pipe-max-size u:object_r:proc_pipe_conf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/fs/protected_hardlinks u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/fs/protected_symlinks u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/fs/suid_dumpable u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/fs/verity/require_signatures u:object_r:proc_fs_verity:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/core_pattern u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/core_pipe_limit u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/domainname u:object_r:proc_hostname:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hostname u:object_r:proc_hostname:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hotplug u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hung_task_ u:object_r:proc_hung_task:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/kptr_restrict u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modules_disabled u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/panic_on_oops u:object_r:proc_panic:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_event_max_sample_rate u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_cpu_time_max_percent u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_event_mlock_kb u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/pid_max u:object_r:proc_pid_max:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/random u:object_r:proc_random:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/randomize_va_space u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_child_runs_first u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_latency_ns u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_rt_period_us u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_rt_runtime_us u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_schedstats u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_tunable_scaling u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_util_clamp_max u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_util_clamp_min u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_util_clamp_min_rt_default u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_wakeup_granularity_ns u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sysrq u:object_r:proc_sysrq:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/usermodehelper u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/net u:object_r:proc_net:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/dirty_background_ratio u:object_r:proc_dirty:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/dirty_expire_centisecs u:object_r:proc_dirty:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/extra_free_kbytes u:object_r:proc_extra_free_kbytes:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/max_map_count u:object_r:proc_max_map_count:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/mmap_min_addr u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/page-cluster u:object_r:proc_page_cluster:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/drop_caches u:object_r:proc_drop_caches:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/overcommit_memory u:object_r:proc_overcommit_memory:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/min_free_order_shift u:object_r:proc_min_free_order_shift:s0
+genfscon proc /timer_list u:object_r:proc_timer:s0
+genfscon proc /timer_stats u:object_r:proc_timer:s0
+genfscon proc /tty/drivers u:object_r:proc_tty_drivers:s0
+genfscon proc /uid/ u:object_r:proc_uid_time_in_state:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_cputime/show_uid_stat u:object_r:proc_uid_cputime_showstat:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_cputime/remove_uid_range u:object_r:proc_uid_cputime_removeuid:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_io/stats u:object_r:proc_uid_io_stats:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_procstat/set u:object_r:proc_uid_procstat_set:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_time_in_state u:object_r:proc_uid_time_in_state:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_concurrent_active_time u:object_r:proc_uid_concurrent_active_time:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_concurrent_policy_time u:object_r:proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_cpupower/ u:object_r:proc_uid_cpupower:s0
+genfscon proc /uptime u:object_r:proc_uptime:s0
+genfscon proc /version u:object_r:proc_version:s0
+genfscon proc /vmallocinfo u:object_r:proc_vmallocinfo:s0
+genfscon proc /vmstat u:object_r:proc_vmstat:s0
+genfscon proc /zoneinfo u:object_r:proc_zoneinfo:s0
+
+genfscon fusectl / u:object_r:fusectlfs:s0
+
+# selinuxfs booleans can be individually labeled.
+genfscon selinuxfs / u:object_r:selinuxfs:s0
+genfscon cgroup / u:object_r:cgroup:s0
+genfscon cgroup2 / u:object_r:cgroup_v2:s0
+# sysfs labels can be set by userspace.
+genfscon sysfs / u:object_r:sysfs:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/cs_etm                    u:object_r:sysfs_devices_cs_etm:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/system/cpu u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/android_usb                 u:object_r:sysfs_android_usb:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/extcon                      u:object_r:sysfs_extcon:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/leds                        u:object_r:sysfs_leds:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/net                         u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill0/state        u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill1/state        u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill2/state        u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill3/state        u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/rtc                         u:object_r:sysfs_rtc:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/switch                      u:object_r:sysfs_switch:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/wakeup                      u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/platform/nfc-power/nfc_power u:object_r:sysfs_nfc_power_writable:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/android_usb     u:object_r:sysfs_android_usb:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/            u:object_r:sysfs_devices_block:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/dm-       u:object_r:sysfs_dm:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/loop       u:object_r:sysfs_loop:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram0     u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram1     u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram0/uevent    u:object_r:sysfs_zram_uevent:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram1/uevent    u:object_r:sysfs_zram_uevent:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/misc/hw_random    u:object_r:sysfs_hwrandom:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/net             u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/switch          u:object_r:sysfs_switch:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/wakeup          u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup:s0
+genfscon sysfs /firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android u:object_r:sysfs_dt_firmware_android:s0
+genfscon sysfs /fs/ext4/features                  u:object_r:sysfs_fs_ext4_features:s0
+genfscon sysfs /fs/f2fs                           u:object_r:sysfs_fs_f2fs:s0
+genfscon sysfs /fs/incremental-fs/features        u:object_r:sysfs_fs_incfs_features:s0
+genfscon sysfs /fs/incremental-fs/instances       u:object_r:sysfs_fs_incfs_metrics:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/autosleep u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/state u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/suspend_stats u:object_r:sysfs_suspend_stats:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/wakeup_count u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/wake_lock u:object_r:sysfs_wake_lock:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/wake_unlock u:object_r:sysfs_wake_lock:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/memory_state_time u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/dma_heap u:object_r:sysfs_dma_heap:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/ion u:object_r:sysfs_ion:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/ipv4 u:object_r:sysfs_ipv4:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage u:object_r:sysfs_transparent_hugepage:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/notes u:object_r:sysfs_kernel_notes:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/uevent_helper u:object_r:sysfs_usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/wakeup_reasons u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup_reasons:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/dmabuf/buffers u:object_r:sysfs_dmabuf_stats:s0
+genfscon sysfs /module/dm_verity/parameters/prefetch_cluster u:object_r:sysfs_dm_verity:s0
+genfscon sysfs /module/lowmemorykiller u:object_r:sysfs_lowmemorykiller:s0
+genfscon sysfs /module/tcp_cubic/parameters u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
+genfscon sysfs /module/wlan/parameters/fwpath u:object_r:sysfs_wlan_fwpath:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/timed_output/vibrator/enable u:object_r:sysfs_vibrator:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/misc/uhid u:object_r:sysfs_uhid:s0
+
+genfscon debugfs /kprobes                             u:object_r:debugfs_kprobes:s0
+genfscon debugfs /mmc0                                u:object_r:debugfs_mmc:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_debug:s0
+genfscon tracefs /                                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_debug:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/tracing_on                  u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /tracing_on                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/trace                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /trace                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/per_cpu/cpu                 u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /per_cpu/cpu                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/instances                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0
+genfscon tracefs /instances                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/instances/bootreceiver      u:object_r:debugfs_bootreceiver_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /instances/bootreceiver              u:object_r:debugfs_bootreceiver_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/instances/mm_events         u:object_r:debugfs_mm_events_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /instances/mm_events                 u:object_r:debugfs_mm_events_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/instances/wifi              u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /instances/wifi                      u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/trace_marker                u:object_r:debugfs_trace_marker:s0
+genfscon tracefs /trace_marker                        u:object_r:debugfs_trace_marker:s0
+genfscon debugfs /wakeup_sources                      u:object_r:debugfs_wakeup_sources:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/printk_formats              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_printk_formats:s0
+genfscon tracefs /printk_formats                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_printk_formats:s0
+
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/header_page                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_get_data_block/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_iget/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_enter/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_exit/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_write_begin/              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_write_end/                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_da_write_begin/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_da_write_end/             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_enter/   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_exit/    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_load_inode/               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_enter/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_exit/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/block/block_rq_issue/               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/block/block_rq_complete/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon tracefs /events/header_page                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_get_data_block/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_iget/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_enter/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_exit/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_write_begin/              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_write_end/                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_da_write_begin/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_da_write_end/             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_enter/   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_exit/    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_load_inode/               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_enter/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_exit/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/block/block_rq_issue/               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/block/block_rq_complete/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon tracefs /trace_clock                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /buffer_size_kb                                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /options/overwrite                                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /options/print-tgid                                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /options/record-tgid                                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /saved_cmdlines_size                                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_switch/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_wakeup/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_wakeup_new/                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_waking/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_blocked_reason/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_cpu_hotplug/                        u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_process_exit/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_process_free/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_pi_setprio/                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/cgroup/                                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/cpu_frequency/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/cpu_idle/                                 u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/clock_enable/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/clock_disable/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/clock_set_rate/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/cpu_frequency_limits/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/gpu_frequency/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/suspend_resume/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/cpufreq_interactive/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_begin/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_end/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_wake/                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_sleep/                  u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_transaction/                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_transaction_received/             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_lock/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_locked/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_unlock/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_transaction_alloc_buf/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_set_priority/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/lowmemorykiller/                                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sync/                                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/fence/                                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/dma_fence/                                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/filemap/mm_filemap_add_to_page_cache/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/filemap/mm_filemap_delete_from_page_cache/      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/kmem/rss_stat/                                  u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/kmem/ion_heap_grow/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/kmem/ion_heap_shrink/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ion/ion_stat/                                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/mm_event/mm_event_record/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/oom/oom_score_adj_update/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/oom/mark_victim/                                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/task/task_rename/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/task/task_newtask/                              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ftrace/print/                                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/gpu_mem/gpu_mem_total                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/thermal/thermal_temperature/                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/thermal/cdev_update/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/cpuhp/cpuhp_enter/                              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/cpuhp/cpuhp_exit/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/cpuhp/cpuhp_pause/                              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ipi/                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/irq/                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/clk/clk_enable/                                 u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/clk/clk_disable/                                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/clk/clk_set_rate/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/trace_clock                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/buffer_size_kb                                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/options/overwrite                                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/options/print-tgid                                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/options/record-tgid                                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/saved_cmdlines_size                                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_wakeup/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_wakeup_new/                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_waking/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_blocked_reason/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_cpu_hotplug/                        u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_process_exit/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_process_free/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_pi_setprio/                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cgroup/                                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/cpu_frequency/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/cpu_idle/                                 u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/clock_enable/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/clock_disable/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/clock_set_rate/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/cpu_frequency_limits/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/gpu_frequency/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/suspend_resume/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cpufreq_interactive/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_begin/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_end/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_wake/                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_sleep/                  u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_transaction/                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_transaction_received/             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_lock/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_locked/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_unlock/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_transaction_alloc_buf/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_set_priority/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/lowmemorykiller/                                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sync/                                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/fence/                                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/dma_fence/                                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/filemap/mm_filemap_add_to_page_cache/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/filemap/mm_filemap_delete_from_page_cache/      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/kmem/rss_stat/                                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/kmem/ion_heap_grow/                                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/kmem/ion_heap_shrink/                                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ion/ion_stat/                                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/mm_event/mm_event_record/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/oom/oom_score_adj_update/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/oom/mark_victim/                                        u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/task/task_rename/                                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/task/task_newtask/                                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ftrace/print/                                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/gpu_mem/gpu_mem_total                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/thermal/thermal_temperature/                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/thermal/cdev_update/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cpuhp/cpuhp_enter/                              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cpuhp/cpuhp_exit/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ipi/                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/irq/                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/clk/clk_enable/                                 u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/clk/clk_disable/                                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/clk/clk_set_rate/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon debugfs /kcov								 u:object_r:debugfs_kcov:s0
+
+genfscon securityfs / u:object_r:securityfs:s0
+
+genfscon binder /binder u:object_r:binder_device:s0
+genfscon binder /hwbinder u:object_r:hwbinder_device:s0
+genfscon binder /vndbinder u:object_r:vndbinder_device:s0
+genfscon binder /binder_logs u:object_r:binderfs_logs:s0
+genfscon binder /binder_logs/proc u:object_r:binderfs_logs_proc:s0
+
+genfscon inotifyfs / u:object_r:inotify:s0
+genfscon vfat / u:object_r:vfat:s0
+genfscon binder / u:object_r:binderfs:s0
+genfscon exfat / u:object_r:exfat:s0
+genfscon debugfs / u:object_r:debugfs:s0
+genfscon fuse / u:object_r:fuse:s0
+genfscon configfs / u:object_r:configfs:s0
+genfscon sdcardfs / u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0
+genfscon esdfs / u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0
+genfscon pstore / u:object_r:pstorefs:s0
+genfscon functionfs / u:object_r:functionfs:s0
+genfscon usbfs / u:object_r:usbfs:s0
+genfscon binfmt_misc / u:object_r:binfmt_miscfs:s0
+genfscon bpf / u:object_r:fs_bpf:s0
+genfscon bpf /tethering u:object_r:fs_bpf_tethering:s0
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gki_apex_prepostinstall.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gki_apex_prepostinstall.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1155389
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gki_apex_prepostinstall.te
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# GKI pre- & post-install hooks.
+#
+# Allow to run pre- and post-install hooks for GKI APEXes
+
+type gki_apex_prepostinstall, domain, coredomain;
+type gki_apex_prepostinstall_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Execute /system/bin/sh.
+allow gki_apex_prepostinstall shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Execute various toolsbox utilities.
+allow gki_apex_prepostinstall toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow preinstall.sh to execute update_engine_stable_client binary.
+allow gki_apex_prepostinstall gki_apex_prepostinstall_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Allow preinstall hook to communicate with update_engine to execute update.
+binder_use(gki_apex_prepostinstall)
+allow gki_apex_prepostinstall update_engine_stable_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(gki_apex_prepostinstall, update_engine)
+
+# /dev/zero is inherited although it is not used. See b/126787589.
+allow gki_apex_prepostinstall apexd:fd use;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gmscore_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gmscore_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..571d155
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gmscore_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+###
+### A domain for further sandboxing the PrebuiltGMSCore app.
+###
+typeattribute gmscore_app coredomain;
+
+app_domain(gmscore_app)
+
+allow gmscore_app sysfs_type:dir search;
+# Read access to /sys/class/net/wlan*/address
+r_dir_file(gmscore_app, sysfs_net)
+# Read access to /sys/block/zram*/mm_stat
+r_dir_file(gmscore_app, sysfs_zram)
+
+r_dir_file(gmscore_app, rootfs)
+
+# Allow GMS core to open kernel config for OTA matching through libvintf
+allow gmscore_app config_gz:file { open read getattr };
+
+# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
+binder_call(gmscore_app, update_engine)
+allow gmscore_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow GMS core to communicate with dumpsys storaged.
+binder_call(gmscore_app, storaged)
+allow gmscore_app storaged_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow GMS core to access system_update_service (e.g. to publish pending
+# system update info).
+allow gmscore_app system_update_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow GMS core to communicate with statsd.
+binder_call(gmscore_app, statsd)
+
+# Allow GMS core to generate unique hardware IDs
+allow gmscore_app keystore:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
+allow gmscore_app keystore:keystore2_key gen_unique_id;
+
+# Allow GMS core to access /sys/fs/selinux/policyvers for compatibility check
+allow gmscore_app selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# suppress denials for non-API accesses.
+dontaudit gmscore_app exec_type:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app device:dir r_dir_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app fs_bpf:dir r_dir_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app net_dns_prop:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc_interrupts:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc_modules:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc_net:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc_stat:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc_version:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs_android_usb:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs_dm:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs_loop:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app { wifi_prop wifi_hal_prop }:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app mirror_data_file:dir search;
+dontaudit gmscore_app mnt_vendor_file:dir search;
+
+# Access the network
+net_domain(gmscore_app)
+
+# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7)
+allow gmscore_app self:process ptrace;
+
+# Allow loading executable code from writable priv-app home
+# directories. This is a W^X violation, however, it needs
+# to be supported for now for the following reasons.
+# * /data/user_*/0/*/code_cache/* POSSIBLE uses (b/117841367)
+#   1) com.android.opengl.shaders_cache
+#   2) com.android.skia.shaders_cache
+#   3) com.android.renderscript.cache
+# * /data/user_de/0/com.google.android.gms/app_chimera
+# TODO: Tighten (b/112357170)
+allow gmscore_app privapp_data_file:file execute;
+
+# Chrome Crashpad uses the the dynamic linker to load native executables
+# from an APK (b/112050209, crbug.com/928422)
+allow gmscore_app system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
+allow gmscore_app privapp_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+
+# /proc access
+allow gmscore_app proc_vmstat:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow interaction with gpuservice
+binder_call(gmscore_app, gpuservice)
+allow gmscore_app gpu_service:service_manager find;
+
+# find services that expose both @SystemAPI and normal APIs.
+allow gmscore_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app network_watchlist_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app oem_lock_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app stats_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
+# running "adb install foo.apk".
+allow gmscore_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow gmscore_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Write to /cache.
+allow gmscore_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow gmscore_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
+# /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
+allow gmscore_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
+allow gmscore_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow gmscore_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
+# running "adb install foo.apk".
+allow gmscore_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow gmscore_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
+allow gmscore_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# b/148974132: com.android.vending needs this
+allow gmscore_app priv_app:tcp_socket { read write };
+
+# b/168059475 Allow GMSCore to read Virtual AB properties to determine
+# if device supports VAB.
+get_prop(gmscore_app, virtual_ab_prop)
+
+# b/186488185: Allow GMSCore to read dck properties
+get_prop(gmscore_app, dck_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gpuservice.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gpuservice.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e4254c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gpuservice.te
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# gpuservice - server for gpu stats and other gpu related services
+typeattribute gpuservice coredomain;
+type gpuservice_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(gpuservice)
+
+binder_call(gpuservice, adbd)
+binder_call(gpuservice, shell)
+binder_call(gpuservice, system_server)
+binder_use(gpuservice)
+
+# Access the GPU.
+allow gpuservice gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# GPU service will need to load GPU driver, for example Vulkan driver in order
+# to get the capability of the driver.
+allow gpuservice same_process_hal_file:file { open read getattr execute map };
+allow gpuservice ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+get_prop(gpuservice, hwservicemanager_prop)
+hwbinder_use(gpuservice)
+
+# Access /dev/graphics/fb0.
+allow gpuservice graphics_device:dir search;
+allow gpuservice graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Needed for dumpsys pipes.
+allow gpuservice shell:fifo_file write;
+
+# Needed for perfetto producer.
+perfetto_producer(gpuservice)
+
+# Use socket supplied by adbd, for cmd gpu vkjson etc.
+allow gpuservice adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write getattr };
+
+# Needed for interactive shell
+allow gpuservice devpts:chr_file { read write getattr };
+
+# Needed for dumpstate to dumpsys gpu.
+allow gpuservice dumpstate:fd use;
+allow gpuservice dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+# Needed for stats callback registration to statsd.
+allow gpuservice stats_service:service_manager find;
+allow gpuservice statsmanager_service:service_manager find;
+# TODO(b/146461633): remove this once native pullers talk to StatsManagerService
+binder_call(gpuservice, statsd);
+
+# Needed for reading tracepoint ids in order to attach bpf programs.
+allow gpuservice debugfs_tracing:file r_file_perms;
+allow gpuservice self:perf_event { cpu kernel open write };
+neverallow gpuservice self:perf_event ~{ cpu kernel open write };
+
+# Needed for interact with bpf fs.
+allow gpuservice fs_bpf:dir search;
+allow gpuservice fs_bpf:file read;
+
+# Needed for enable the bpf program and read the map.
+allow gpuservice bpfloader:bpf { map_read prog_run };
+
+# Needed for getting a prop to ensure bpf programs loaded.
+get_prop(gpuservice, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
+
+add_service(gpuservice, gpu_service)
+
+# Only uncomment below line when in development
+# userdebug_or_eng(`permissive gpuservice;')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gsid.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gsid.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a13cb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/gsid.te
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+# gsid - Manager for GSI Installation
+
+type gsid, domain;
+type gsid_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+typeattribute gsid coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(gsid)
+
+binder_use(gsid)
+binder_service(gsid)
+add_service(gsid, gsi_service)
+
+# Manage DSU metadata encryption key through vold.
+allow gsid vold_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(gsid, vold)
+
+set_prop(gsid, gsid_prop)
+
+# Needed to create/delete device-mapper nodes, and read/write to them.
+allow gsid dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow gsid dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow gsid self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+dontaudit gsid self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
+
+# On FBE devices (not using dm-default-key), gsid will use loop devices to map
+# images rather than device-mapper.
+allow gsid loop_control_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow gsid loop_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm gsid loop_device:blk_file ioctl {
+  LOOP_GET_STATUS64
+  LOOP_SET_STATUS64
+  LOOP_SET_FD
+  LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE
+  LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO
+  LOOP_CLR_FD
+  BLKFLSBUF
+};
+
+# libfiemap_writer uses sysfs to derive the bottom of a device-mapper stacking.
+# This requires traversing /sys/block/dm-N/slaves/* and reading the list of
+# file names.
+r_dir_file(gsid, sysfs_dm)
+
+# libfiemap_writer needs to read /sys/fs/f2fs/<dev>/features to determine
+# whether pin_file support is enabled.
+r_dir_file(gsid, sysfs_fs_f2fs)
+
+# Needed to read fstab, which is used to validate that system verity does not
+# use check_once_at_most for sdcard installs. (Note: proc_cmdline is needed
+# to get the A/B slot suffix).
+allow gsid proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+allow gsid sysfs_dt_firmware_android:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow gsid sysfs_dt_firmware_android:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Needed to stat /data/gsi/* and realpath on /dev/block/by-name/*
+allow gsid block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# liblp queries these block alignment properties.
+allowxperm gsid { userdata_block_device sdcard_block_device }:blk_file ioctl {
+  BLKIOMIN
+  BLKALIGNOFF
+};
+
+# When installing images to an sdcard, gsid needs to be able to stat() the
+# block device. gsid also calls realpath() to remove symlinks.
+allow gsid mnt_media_rw_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow gsid mnt_media_rw_stub_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# When installing images to an sdcard, gsid must bypass sdcardfs and install
+# directly to vfat, which supports the FIBMAP ioctl.
+allow gsid vfat:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow gsid vfat:file create_file_perms;
+allow gsid sdcard_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+# This is needed for FIBMAP unfortunately. Oddly FIEMAP does not carry this
+# requirement, but the kernel does not implement FIEMAP support for VFAT.
+allow gsid self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
+
+# Allow rules for gsi_tool.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # gsi_tool passes the system image over the adb connection, via stdin.
+  allow gsid adbd:fd use;
+  # Needed when running gsi_tool through "su root" rather than adb root.
+  allow gsid adbd:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms;
+  # gsi_tool passes a FIFO to gsid if invoked with pipe redirection.
+  allow gsid { shell su }:fifo_file r_file_perms;
+  # Allow installing images from /storage/emulated/...
+  allow gsid sdcard_type:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -gsid
+  -init
+  -update_engine_common
+  -recovery
+  -fastbootd
+} gsid_prop:property_service set;
+
+# gsid needs to store images on /data, but cannot use file I/O. If it did, the
+# underlying blocks would be encrypted, and we couldn't mount the GSI image in
+# first-stage init. So instead of directly writing to /data, we:
+#
+#   1. fallocate a file large enough to hold the signed GSI
+#   2. extract its block layout with FIEMAP
+#   3. create a dm-linear device using the FIEMAP, targeting /dev/block/by-name/userdata
+#   4. write system_gsi into that dm device
+#
+# To make this process work, we need to unwrap the device-mapper stacking for
+# userdata to reach the underlying block device. To verify the result we use
+# stat(), which requires read access.
+allow gsid userdata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# gsid uses /metadata/gsi to communicate GSI boot information to first-stage
+# init. It cannot use userdata since data cannot be decrypted during this
+# stage.
+#
+# gsid uses /metadata/gsi to store three files:
+#   install_status - A short string indicating whether a GSI image is bootable.
+#   lp_metadata    - LpMetadata blob describing the block ranges on userdata
+#                    where system_gsi resides.
+#   booted         - An empty file that, if exists, indicates that a GSI is
+#                    currently running.
+#
+allow gsid metadata_file:dir { search getattr };
+allow gsid {
+    gsi_metadata_file_type
+}:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+allow gsid {
+    ota_metadata_file
+}:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+allow gsid {
+    gsi_metadata_file_type
+    ota_metadata_file
+}:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow restorecon to fix context of gsi_public_metadata_file.
+allow gsid file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow gsid gsi_metadata_file:file relabelfrom;
+allow gsid gsi_public_metadata_file:file relabelto;
+
+allow gsid {
+      gsi_data_file
+      ota_image_data_file
+}:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow gsid {
+      gsi_data_file
+      ota_image_data_file
+}:file create_file_perms;
+allowxperm gsid {
+      gsi_data_file
+      ota_image_data_file
+}:file ioctl {
+      FS_IOC_FIEMAP
+      FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+};
+
+allow gsid system_server:binder call;
+
+# Prevent most processes from writing to gsi_metadata_file_type, but allow
+# adding rules for path resolution of gsi_public_metadata_file and reading
+# gsi_public_metadata_file.
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -gsid
+    -fastbootd
+} gsi_metadata_file_type:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -gsid
+    -fastbootd
+} { gsi_metadata_file_type -gsi_public_metadata_file }:file_class_set *;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -gsid
+    -fastbootd
+} gsi_public_metadata_file:file_class_set ~{ r_file_perms };
+
+# Prevent apps from accessing gsi_metadata_file_type.
+neverallow {
+    appdomain
+    -shell
+} gsi_metadata_file_type:dir_file_class_set *;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -gsid
+} gsi_data_file:dir_file_class_set *;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -gsid
+} gsi_data_file:file_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hal_allocator_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hal_allocator_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7aa28aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hal_allocator_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_allocator_default, domain, coredomain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_allocator_default, hal_allocator)
+
+type hal_allocator_default_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_allocator_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hal_lazy_test.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hal_lazy_test.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..93cf235
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hal_lazy_test.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_lazy_test, hal_lazy_test_hwservice)
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/halclientdomain.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/halclientdomain.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9dcd3ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/halclientdomain.te
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+###
+### Rules for all domains which are clients of a HAL
+###
+
+# Find out whether a HAL in passthrough/in-process mode or
+# binderized/out-of-process mode
+hwbinder_use(halclientdomain)
+
+# Used to wait for hwservicemanager
+get_prop(halclientdomain, hwservicemanager_prop)
+
+# Wait for HAL server to be up (used by getService)
+allow halclientdomain hidl_manager_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/halserverdomain.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/halserverdomain.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f36e0e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/halserverdomain.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+###
+### Rules for all domains which offer a HAL service over HwBinder
+###
+
+# Register the HAL service with hwservicemanager
+hwbinder_use(halserverdomain)
+
+# Find HAL implementations
+allow halserverdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Used to wait for hwservicemanager
+get_prop(halserverdomain, hwservicemanager_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/healthd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/healthd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..93bc3d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/healthd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+typeattribute healthd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(healthd)
+
+# Allow healthd to serve health HAL
+hal_server_domain(healthd, hal_health)
+
+# Healthd needs to tell init to continue the boot
+# process when running in charger mode.
+set_prop(healthd, system_prop)
+set_prop(healthd, exported_system_prop)
+set_prop(healthd, exported3_system_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/heapprofd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/heapprofd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..246f936
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/heapprofd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Android heap profiling daemon. go/heapprofd.
+#
+# On user builds, this daemon is responsible for receiving the initial
+# profiling configuration, finding matching target processes (if profiling by
+# process name), and sending the activation signal to them (+ setting system
+# properties for new processes to start profiling from startup). When profiling
+# is triggered in a process, it spawns a private heapprofd subprocess (in its
+# own SELinux domain), which will exclusively handle profiling of its parent.
+#
+# On debug builds, this central daemon performs profiling for all target
+# processes (which talk directly to this daemon).
+type heapprofd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+type heapprofd_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(heapprofd)
+tmpfs_domain(heapprofd)
+
+# Allow apps in other MLS contexts (for multi-user) to access
+# shared memory buffers created by heapprofd.
+typeattribute heapprofd_tmpfs mlstrustedobject;
+
+set_prop(heapprofd, heapprofd_prop);
+
+# Necessary for /proc/[pid]/cmdline access & sending signals.
+typeattribute heapprofd mlstrustedsubject;
+
+# Allow sending signals to processes. This excludes SIGKILL, SIGSTOP and
+# SIGCHLD, which are controlled by separate permissions.
+allow heapprofd self:capability kill;
+
+# When scanning /proc/[pid]/cmdline to find matching processes for by-name
+# profiling, only allowlisted domains will be allowed by SELinux. Avoid
+# spamming logs with denials for entries that we can not access.
+dontaudit heapprofd domain:dir { search open };
+
+# Write trace data to the Perfetto traced daemon. This requires connecting to
+# its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(heapprofd)
+
+# When handling profiling for all processes, heapprofd needs to read
+# executables/libraries/etc to do stack unwinding.
+r_dir_file(heapprofd, nativetest_data_file)
+r_dir_file(heapprofd, system_file_type)
+r_dir_file(heapprofd, apex_art_data_file)
+r_dir_file(heapprofd, apk_data_file)
+r_dir_file(heapprofd, dalvikcache_data_file)
+r_dir_file(heapprofd, vendor_file_type)
+r_dir_file(heapprofd, shell_test_data_file)
+# Some dex files are not world-readable.
+# We are still constrained by the SELinux rules above.
+allow heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
+
+# For checking profileability.
+allow heapprofd packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# This is going to happen on user but is benign because central heapprofd
+# does not actually need these permission.
+# If the dac_read_search capability check is rejected, the kernel then tries
+# to perform a dac_override capability check, so we need to dontaudit that
+# as well.
+dontaudit heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_read_search dac_override };
+
+never_profile_heap(`{
+  bpfloader
+  init
+  kernel
+  keystore
+  llkd
+  logd
+  ueventd
+  vendor_init
+  vold
+}')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow heapprofd vendor_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hidl_lazy_test_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hidl_lazy_test_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04e8c9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hidl_lazy_test_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+type hidl_lazy_test_server, domain;
+type hidl_lazy_test_server_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  typeattribute hidl_lazy_test_server coredomain;
+  init_daemon_domain(hidl_lazy_test_server)
+  hal_server_domain(hidl_lazy_test_server, hal_lazy_test)
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hwservice.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hwservice.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b7ba4d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hwservice.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type hal_lazy_test_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hwservice_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hwservice_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b6e79d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hwservice_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+android.frameworks.automotive.display::IAutomotiveDisplayProxyService u:object_r:fwk_automotive_display_hwservice:s0
+android.frameworks.bufferhub::IBufferHub                        u:object_r:fwk_bufferhub_hwservice:s0
+android.frameworks.cameraservice.service::ICameraService        u:object_r:fwk_camera_hwservice:s0
+android.frameworks.displayservice::IDisplayService              u:object_r:fwk_display_hwservice:s0
+android.frameworks.schedulerservice::ISchedulingPolicyService   u:object_r:fwk_scheduler_hwservice:s0
+android.frameworks.sensorservice::ISensorManager                u:object_r:fwk_sensor_hwservice:s0
+android.frameworks.stats::IStats                                u:object_r:fwk_stats_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.atrace::IAtraceDevice                          u:object_r:hal_atrace_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.audio.effect::IEffectsFactory                  u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.audio::IDevicesFactory                         u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.authsecret::IAuthSecret                        u:object_r:hal_authsecret_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.automotive.audiocontrol::IAudioControl         u:object_r:hal_audiocontrol_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.automotive.can::ICanController                 u:object_r:hal_can_controller_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.automotive.can::ICanBus                        u:object_r:hal_can_bus_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.automotive.evs::IEvsEnumerator                 u:object_r:hal_evs_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.automotive.vehicle::IVehicle                   u:object_r:hal_vehicle_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.biometrics.face::IBiometricsFace               u:object_r:hal_face_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint::IBiometricsFingerprint u:object_r:hal_fingerprint_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.bluetooth::IBluetoothHci                       u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.bluetooth.a2dp::IBluetoothAudioOffload         u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.bluetooth.audio::IBluetoothAudioProvidersFactory   u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.boot::IBootControl                             u:object_r:hal_bootctl_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.broadcastradio::IBroadcastRadio                u:object_r:hal_broadcastradio_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.broadcastradio::IBroadcastRadioFactory         u:object_r:hal_broadcastradio_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.camera.provider::ICameraProvider               u:object_r:hal_camera_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.configstore::ISurfaceFlingerConfigs            u:object_r:hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:s0
+android.hardware.confirmationui::IConfirmationUI                u:object_r:hal_confirmationui_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.contexthub::IContexthub                        u:object_r:hal_contexthub_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.cas::IMediaCasService                          u:object_r:hal_cas_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.drm::ICryptoFactory                            u:object_r:hal_drm_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.drm::IDrmFactory                               u:object_r:hal_drm_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.dumpstate::IDumpstateDevice                    u:object_r:hal_dumpstate_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.gatekeeper::IGatekeeper                        u:object_r:hal_gatekeeper_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.gnss::IGnss                                    u:object_r:hal_gnss_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.graphics.allocator::IAllocator                 u:object_r:hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.graphics.composer::IComposer                   u:object_r:hal_graphics_composer_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.graphics.mapper::IMapper                       u:object_r:hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.health::IHealth                                u:object_r:hal_health_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.health.storage::IStorage                       u:object_r:hal_health_storage_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.input.classifier::IInputClassifier             u:object_r:hal_input_classifier_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.ir::IConsumerIr                                u:object_r:hal_ir_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.keymaster::IKeymasterDevice                    u:object_r:hal_keymaster_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.tests.lazy::ILazy                              u:object_r:hal_lazy_test_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.light::ILight                                  u:object_r:hal_light_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.lowpan::ILowpanDevice                          u:object_r:hal_lowpan_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.media.omx::IOmx                                u:object_r:hal_omx_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.media.omx::IOmxStore                           u:object_r:hal_omx_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.media.c2::IComponentStore                      u:object_r:hal_codec2_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.memtrack::IMemtrack                            u:object_r:hal_memtrack_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.neuralnetworks::IDevice                        u:object_r:hal_neuralnetworks_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.nfc::INfc                                      u:object_r:hal_nfc_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.oemlock::IOemLock                              u:object_r:hal_oemlock_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.power::IPower                                  u:object_r:hal_power_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.power.stats::IPowerStats                       u:object_r:hal_power_stats_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.radio.config::IRadioConfig                     u:object_r:hal_telephony_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.radio.deprecated::IOemHook                     u:object_r:hal_telephony_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.radio::IRadio                                  u:object_r:hal_telephony_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.radio::ISap                                    u:object_r:hal_telephony_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.renderscript::IDevice                          u:object_r:hal_renderscript_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.secure_element::ISecureElement                 u:object_r:hal_secure_element_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.sensors::ISensors                              u:object_r:hal_sensors_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.soundtrigger::ISoundTriggerHw                  u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.tetheroffload.config::IOffloadConfig           u:object_r:hal_tetheroffload_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.tetheroffload.control::IOffloadControl         u:object_r:hal_tetheroffload_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.thermal::IThermal                              u:object_r:hal_thermal_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.tv.cec::IHdmiCec                               u:object_r:hal_tv_cec_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.tv.input::ITvInput                             u:object_r:hal_tv_input_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.tv.tuner::ITuner                             	u:object_r:hal_tv_tuner_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.usb::IUsb                                      u:object_r:hal_usb_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.usb.gadget::IUsbGadget                         u:object_r:hal_usb_gadget_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.vibrator::IVibrator                            u:object_r:hal_vibrator_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.vr::IVr                                        u:object_r:hal_vr_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.weaver::IWeaver                                u:object_r:hal_weaver_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.wifi::IWifi                                    u:object_r:hal_wifi_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.wifi.hostapd::IHostapd                         u:object_r:hal_wifi_hostapd_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.wifi.supplicant::ISupplicant                   u:object_r:hal_wifi_supplicant_hwservice:s0
+android.hidl.allocator::IAllocator                              u:object_r:hidl_allocator_hwservice:s0
+android.hidl.base::IBase                                        u:object_r:hidl_base_hwservice:s0
+android.hidl.manager::IServiceManager                           u:object_r:hidl_manager_hwservice:s0
+android.hidl.memory::IMapper                                    u:object_r:hidl_memory_hwservice:s0
+android.hidl.token::ITokenManager                               u:object_r:hidl_token_hwservice:s0
+android.system.net.netd::INetd                                  u:object_r:system_net_netd_hwservice:s0
+android.system.suspend::ISystemSuspend                          u:object_r:system_suspend_hwservice:s0
+android.system.wifi.keystore::IKeystore                         u:object_r:system_wifi_keystore_hwservice:s0
+*                                                               u:object_r:default_android_hwservice:s0
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hwservicemanager.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hwservicemanager.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1fde43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/hwservicemanager.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+typeattribute hwservicemanager coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(hwservicemanager)
+
+add_hwservice(hwservicemanager, hidl_manager_hwservice)
+add_hwservice(hwservicemanager, hidl_token_hwservice)
+
+set_prop(hwservicemanager, ctl_interface_start_prop)
+set_prop(hwservicemanager, hwservicemanager_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/idmap.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/idmap.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c982783
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/idmap.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute idmap coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(idmap)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/incident.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/incident.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db9ae86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/incident.te
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+typeattribute incident coredomain;
+
+type incident_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# switch to incident domain for incident command
+domain_auto_trans(shell, incident_exec, incident)
+domain_auto_trans(dumpstate, incident_exec, incident)
+
+# allow incident access to stdout from its parent shell.
+allow incident shell:fd use;
+
+# allow incident to communicate with dumpstate, and write incident report to
+# /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/tmp_incident_report
+allow incident dumpstate:fd use;
+allow incident dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow incident shell_data_file:file write;
+
+# allow incident be able to output data for CTS to fetch.
+allow incident devpts:chr_file { read write };
+
+# allow incident to communicate use, read and write over the adb
+# connection.
+allow incident adbd:fd use;
+allow incident adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+
+# allow adbd to reap incident
+allow incident adbd:process { sigchld };
+
+# Allow the incident command to talk to the incidentd over the binder, and get
+# back the incident report data from a ParcelFileDescriptor.
+binder_use(incident)
+allow incident incident_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(incident, incidentd)
+allow incident incidentd:fifo_file write;
+
+# only allow incident being called by shell or dumpstate
+neverallow { domain -su -shell -incident -dumpstate} incident_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/incident_helper.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/incident_helper.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b453855
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/incident_helper.te
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+typeattribute incident_helper coredomain;
+
+type incident_helper_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# switch to incident_helper domain for incident_helper command
+domain_auto_trans(incidentd, incident_helper_exec, incident_helper)
+
+# use pipe to transmit data from/to incidentd/incident_helper for parsing
+allow incident_helper { shell incident incidentd dumpstate }:fd use;
+allow incident_helper { shell incident incidentd dumpstate }:fifo_file { getattr read write };
+allow incident_helper incidentd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+
+# only allow incidentd and shell to call incident_helper
+neverallow { domain -incidentd -incident_helper -shell } incident_helper_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/incidentd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/incidentd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef191a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/incidentd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+typeattribute incidentd coredomain;
+typeattribute incidentd mlstrustedsubject;
+
+init_daemon_domain(incidentd)
+type incidentd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+binder_use(incidentd)
+wakelock_use(incidentd)
+
+# Allow incidentd to scan through /proc/pid for all processes
+r_dir_file(incidentd, domain)
+
+# Allow incidentd to kill incident_helper when timeout
+allow incidentd incident_helper:process sigkill;
+
+# Allow executing files on system, such as:
+#   /system/bin/toolbox
+#   /system/bin/logcat
+#   /system/bin/dumpsys
+allow incidentd system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+allow incidentd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# section id 1002, allow reading kernel version /proc/version
+allow incidentd proc_version:file r_file_perms;
+
+# section id 1116, allow accessing statsd socket
+unix_socket_send(incidentd, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# section id 2001, allow reading /proc/pagetypeinfo
+allow incidentd proc_pagetypeinfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# section id 2002, allow reading /d/wakeup_sources
+no_debugfs_restriction(`
+  allow incidentd debugfs_wakeup_sources:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# section id 2003, allow executing top
+allow incidentd proc_meminfo:file { open read };
+
+# section id 2004, allow reading /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpufreq/all_time_in_state
+allow incidentd sysfs_devices_system_cpu:file r_file_perms;
+
+# section id 2005, allow reading ps dump in full
+allow incidentd domain:process getattr;
+
+# section id 2006, allow reading /sys/class/power_supply/bms/battery_type
+allow incidentd sysfs_batteryinfo:dir { search };
+allow incidentd sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# section id 2007, allow reading LAST_KMSG /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
+userdebug_or_eng(`allow incidentd pstorefs:dir search');
+userdebug_or_eng(`allow incidentd pstorefs:file r_file_perms');
+
+# section id 3023, allow obtaining stats report
+allow incidentd stats_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(incidentd, statsd)
+
+# section id 3026, allow reading /data/misc/perfetto-traces.
+allow incidentd perfetto_traces_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow incidentd perfetto_traces_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# section id 3052, allow accessing nfc_service
+allow incidentd nfc_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Create and write into /data/misc/incidents
+allow incidentd incident_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow incidentd incident_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Enable incidentd to get stack traces.
+binder_use(incidentd)
+hwbinder_use(incidentd)
+allow incidentd hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager { list };
+get_prop(incidentd, hwservicemanager_prop)
+allow incidentd hidl_manager_hwservice:hwservice_manager { find };
+
+# Read files in /proc
+allow incidentd {
+  proc_cmdline
+  proc_pid_max
+  proc_pipe_conf
+  proc_stat
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Signal java processes to dump their stack and get the results
+allow incidentd { appdomain ephemeral_app system_server }:process signal;
+
+# Signal native processes to dump their stack.
+# This list comes from native_processes_to_dump in incidentd/utils.c
+allow incidentd {
+  # This list comes from native_processes_to_dump in dumputils/dump_utils.cpp
+  audioserver
+  cameraserver
+  drmserver
+  inputflinger
+  mediadrmserver
+  mediaextractor
+  mediametrics
+  mediaserver
+  sdcardd
+  statsd
+  surfaceflinger
+
+  # This list comes from hal_interfaces_to_dump in dumputils/dump_utils.cpp
+  hal_audio_server
+  hal_bluetooth_server
+  hal_camera_server
+  hal_codec2_server
+  hal_face_server
+  hal_graphics_allocator_server
+  hal_graphics_composer_server
+  hal_health_server
+  hal_omx_server
+  hal_sensors_server
+  hal_vr_server
+}:process signal;
+
+# Allow incidentd to make binder calls to any binder service
+binder_call(incidentd, system_server)
+binder_call(incidentd, appdomain)
+
+# Reading /proc/PID/maps of other processes
+userdebug_or_eng(`allow incidentd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace }');
+# incidentd has capability sys_ptrace, but should only use that capability for
+# accessing sensitive /proc/PID files, never for using ptrace attach.
+neverallow incidentd *:process ptrace;
+
+allow incidentd self:global_capability_class_set {
+    # Send signals to processes
+    kill
+};
+
+# Connect to tombstoned to intercept dumps.
+unix_socket_connect(incidentd, tombstoned_intercept, tombstoned)
+
+# Run a shell.
+allow incidentd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# For running am, incident-helper-cmd and similar framework commands.
+# Run /system/bin/app_process.
+allow incidentd zygote_exec:file { rx_file_perms };
+# Access the runtime feature flag properties.
+get_prop(incidentd, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(incidentd, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+# ART locks profile files.
+allow incidentd system_file:file lock;
+# Incidentd should never exec from the memory (e.g. JIT cache). These denials are expected.
+dontaudit incidentd dalvikcache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+dontaudit incidentd apex_module_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+dontaudit incidentd apex_art_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+dontaudit incidentd tmpfs:file rwx_file_perms;
+
+# logd access - work to be done is a PII safe log (possibly an event log?)
+userdebug_or_eng(`read_logd(incidentd)')
+# TODO control_logd(incidentd)
+
+# Access /data/misc/logd
+r_dir_file(incidentd, misc_logd_file)
+
+# Allow incidentd to find these standard groups of services.
+# Others can be allowlisted individually.
+allow incidentd {
+  system_server_service
+  app_api_service
+  system_api_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# Only incidentd can publish the binder service
+add_service(incidentd, incident_service)
+
+# Allow pipes only from dumpstate and incident
+allow incidentd { dumpstate incident }:fd use;
+allow incidentd { dumpstate incident }:fifo_file write;
+
+# Allow incident to call back to incident with status updates.
+binder_call(incidentd, incident)
+
+# Read device serial number from system properties
+# This is used to track reports from lab testing devices
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  get_prop(incidentd, serialno_prop)
+')
+
+# Read ro.boot.bootreason, persist.sys.boot.bootreason
+# This is used to track reports from lab testing devices
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  get_prop(incidentd, bootloader_boot_reason_prop);
+  get_prop(incidentd, system_boot_reason_prop);
+  get_prop(incidentd, last_boot_reason_prop);
+')
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+# only incidentd and the other root services in limited circumstances
+# can get to the files in /data/misc/incidents
+#
+# write, execute, append are forbidden almost everywhere
+neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold } incident_data_file:file {
+  w_file_perms
+  x_file_perms
+  create
+  rename
+  setattr
+  unlink
+  append
+};
+# read is also allowed by system_server, for when the file is handed to dropbox
+neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold -system_server } incident_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+# limited access to the directory itself
+neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold } incident_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/init.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/init.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99afd84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/init.te
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+typeattribute init coredomain;
+
+tmpfs_domain(init)
+
+# Transitions to seclabel processes in init.rc
+domain_trans(init, rootfs, healthd)
+domain_trans(init, rootfs, slideshow)
+domain_auto_trans(init, charger_exec, charger)
+domain_auto_trans(init, e2fs_exec, e2fs)
+domain_auto_trans(init, bpfloader_exec, bpfloader)
+
+recovery_only(`
+  # Files in recovery image are labeled as rootfs.
+  domain_trans(init, rootfs, adbd)
+  domain_trans(init, rootfs, charger)
+  domain_trans(init, rootfs, fastbootd)
+  domain_trans(init, rootfs, recovery)
+  domain_trans(init, rootfs, linkerconfig)
+  domain_trans(init, rootfs, snapuserd)
+')
+domain_trans(init, shell_exec, shell)
+domain_trans(init, init_exec, ueventd)
+domain_trans(init, init_exec, vendor_init)
+domain_trans(init, { rootfs toolbox_exec }, modprobe)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # case where logpersistd is actually logcat -f in logd context (nee: logcatd)
+  domain_auto_trans(init, logcat_exec, logpersist)
+
+  # allow init to execute services marked with seclabel u:r:su:s0 in userdebug/eng
+  allow init su:process transition;
+  dontaudit init su:process noatsecure;
+  allow init su:process { siginh rlimitinh };
+')
+
+# Allow init to figure out name of dm-device from it's /dev/block/dm-XX path.
+# This is useful in case of remounting ext4 userdata into checkpointing mode,
+# since it potentially requires tearing down dm-devices (e.g. dm-bow, dm-crypto)
+# that userdata is mounted onto.
+allow init sysfs_dm:file read;
+
+# Allow init to write to the drop_caches file.
+allow init proc_drop_caches:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow the BoringSSL self test to request a reboot upon failure
+set_prop(init, powerctl_prop)
+
+# Only init is allowed to set userspace reboot related properties.
+set_prop(init, userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
+neverallow { domain -init } userspace_reboot_exported_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Second-stage init performs a test for whether the kernel has SELinux hooks
+# for the perf_event_open() syscall. This is done by testing for the syscall
+# outcomes corresponding to this policy.
+# TODO(b/137092007): this can be removed once the platform stops supporting
+# kernels that precede the perf_event_open hooks (Android common kernels 4.4
+# and 4.9).
+allow init self:perf_event { open cpu };
+allow init self:global_capability2_class_set perfmon;
+neverallow init self:perf_event { kernel tracepoint read write };
+dontaudit init self:perf_event { kernel tracepoint read write };
+
+# Allow init to communicate with snapuserd to transition Virtual A/B devices
+# from the first-stage daemon to the second-stage.
+allow init snapuserd_socket:sock_file write;
+allow init snapuserd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+# Allow for libsnapshot's use of flock() on /metadata/ota.
+allow init ota_metadata_file:dir lock;
+
+# Allow init to restore contexts of vd_device(/dev/block/vd[..]) when labeling
+# /dev/block.
+allow init vd_device:blk_file relabelto;
+
+# Only init is allowed to set the sysprop indicating whether perf_event_open()
+# SELinux hooks were detected.
+set_prop(init, init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop)
+neverallow { domain -init } init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Only init can write vts.native_server.on
+set_prop(init, vts_status_prop)
+neverallow { domain -init } vts_status_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Only init can write normal ro.boot. properties
+neverallow { domain -init } bootloader_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Only init can write hal.instrumentation.enable
+neverallow { domain -init } hal_instrumentation_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Only init can write ro.property_service.version
+neverallow { domain -init } property_service_version_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Only init can set keystore.boot_level
+neverallow { domain -init } keystore_listen_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Allow accessing /sys/kernel/tracing/instances/bootreceiver to set up tracing.
+allow init debugfs_bootreceiver_tracing:file w_file_perms;
+
+# chown/chmod on devices.
+allow init {
+  dev_type
+  -hw_random_device
+  -keychord_device
+  -kvm_device
+  -port_device
+}:chr_file setattr;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/initial_sid_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/initial_sid_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9819051
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/initial_sid_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+sid kernel u:r:kernel:s0
+sid security u:object_r:kernel:s0
+sid unlabeled u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid fs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0
+sid file u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid file_labels u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid init u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid any_socket u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid port u:object_r:port:s0
+sid netif u:object_r:netif:s0
+sid netmsg u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid node u:object_r:node:s0
+sid igmp_packet u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid icmp_socket u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid tcp_socket u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid sysctl_modprobe u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid sysctl u:object_r:proc:s0
+sid sysctl_fs u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid sysctl_kernel u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid sysctl_net u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid sysctl_net_unix u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid sysctl_vm u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid sysctl_dev u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid kmod u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid policy u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid scmp_packet u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
+sid devnull u:object_r:null_device:s0
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/initial_sids b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/initial_sids
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91ac816
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/initial_sids
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# FLASK
+
+#
+# Define initial security identifiers
+#
+
+sid kernel
+sid security
+sid unlabeled
+sid fs
+sid file
+sid file_labels
+sid init
+sid any_socket
+sid port
+sid netif
+sid netmsg
+sid node
+sid igmp_packet
+sid icmp_socket
+sid tcp_socket
+sid sysctl_modprobe
+sid sysctl
+sid sysctl_fs
+sid sysctl_kernel
+sid sysctl_net
+sid sysctl_net_unix
+sid sysctl_vm
+sid sysctl_dev
+sid kmod
+sid policy
+sid scmp_packet
+sid devnull
+
+# FLASK
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/inputflinger.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/inputflinger.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9696b49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/inputflinger.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute inputflinger coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(inputflinger)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/installd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/installd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c89ba8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/installd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+typeattribute installd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(installd)
+
+# Run migrate_legacy_obb_data.sh in its own sandbox.
+domain_auto_trans(installd, migrate_legacy_obb_data_exec, migrate_legacy_obb_data)
+allow installd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Run dex2oat in its own sandbox.
+domain_auto_trans(installd, dex2oat_exec, dex2oat)
+
+# Run dexoptanalyzer in its own sandbox.
+domain_auto_trans(installd, dexoptanalyzer_exec, dexoptanalyzer)
+
+# Run viewcompiler in its own sandbox.
+domain_auto_trans(installd, viewcompiler_exec, viewcompiler)
+
+# Run profman in its own sandbox.
+domain_auto_trans(installd, profman_exec, profman)
+
+# Run idmap in its own sandbox.
+domain_auto_trans(installd, idmap_exec, idmap)
+
+# For collecting bugreports.
+allow installd dumpstate:fd use;
+allow installd dumpstate:fifo_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Delete /system/bin/bcc generated artifacts
+allow installd app_exec_data_file:file unlink;
+
+# Capture userdata snapshots to /data/misc_[ce|de]/rollback and
+# subsequently restore them.
+allow installd rollback_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow installd rollback_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow installd to access the runtime feature flag properties.
+get_prop(installd, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(installd, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+# Allow installd to access apk verity feature flag (for legacy case).
+get_prop(installd, apk_verity_prop)
+
+# Allow installd to delete files in /data/staging
+allow installd staging_data_file:file unlink;
+allow installd staging_data_file:dir { open read remove_name rmdir search write };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iorap_inode2filename.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iorap_inode2filename.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5acb262
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iorap_inode2filename.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+typeattribute iorap_inode2filename coredomain;
+
+# Grant access to open most of the files under /
+allow iorap_inode2filename { apex_module_data_file apex_art_data_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow iorap_inode2filename apex_data_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename dalvikcache_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename dalvikcache_data_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename dex2oat_exec:lnk_file { getattr open read };
+allow iorap_inode2filename dexoptanalyzer_exec:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename storaged_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename storaged_data_file:file { getattr };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iorap_prefecherd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iorap_prefecherd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ddb512
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iorap_prefecherd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+typeattribute iorap_prefetcherd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(iorap_prefetcherd)
+tmpfs_domain(iorap_prefetcherd)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iorapd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iorapd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73acec9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iorapd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+typeattribute iorapd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(iorapd)
+tmpfs_domain(iorapd)
+
+domain_auto_trans(iorapd, iorap_prefetcherd_exec, iorap_prefetcherd)
+domain_auto_trans(iorapd, iorap_inode2filename_exec, iorap_inode2filename)
+
+# Allow iorapd to access the runtime native boot feature flag properties.
+get_prop(iorapd, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/isolated_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/isolated_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71749c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+###
+### Services with isolatedProcess=true in their manifest.
+###
+### This file defines the rules for isolated apps. An "isolated
+### app" is an APP with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000)
+### and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
+###
+
+typeattribute isolated_app coredomain;
+
+app_domain(isolated_app)
+
+# Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
+allow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { append read write getattr lock map };
+
+# Allow access to network sockets received over IPC. New socket creation is not
+# permitted.
+allow isolated_app { ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl };
+
+allow isolated_app activity_service:service_manager find;
+allow isolated_app display_service:service_manager find;
+allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Google Breakpad (crash reporter for Chrome) relies on ptrace
+# functionality. Without the ability to ptrace, the crash reporter
+# tool is broken.
+# b/20150694
+# https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=475270
+allow isolated_app self:process ptrace;
+
+# b/32896414: Allow accessing sdcard file descriptors passed to isolated_apps
+# by other processes. Open should never be allowed, and is blocked by
+# neverallow rules below.
+# media_rw_data_file is included for sdcardfs, and can be removed if sdcardfs
+# is modified to change the secontext when accessing the lower filesystem.
+allow isolated_app { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file { read write append getattr lock map };
+
+# For webviews, isolated_app processes can be forked from the webview_zygote
+# in addition to the zygote. Allow access to resources inherited from the
+# webview_zygote process. These rules are specialized copies of the ones in app.te.
+# Inherit FDs from the webview_zygote.
+allow isolated_app webview_zygote:fd use;
+# Notify webview_zygote of child death.
+allow isolated_app webview_zygote:process sigchld;
+# Inherit logd write socket.
+allow isolated_app webview_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
+# Read system properties managed by webview_zygote.
+allow isolated_app webview_zygote_tmpfs:file read;
+
+# Inherit FDs from the app_zygote.
+allow isolated_app app_zygote:fd use;
+# Notify app_zygote of child death.
+allow isolated_app app_zygote:process sigchld;
+# Inherit logd write socket.
+allow isolated_app app_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
+
+# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
+# suppress denials to /data/local/tmp
+dontaudit isolated_app shell_data_file:dir search;
+
+# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
+# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(isolated_app)
+
+# Allow profiling if the main app has been marked as profileable or
+# debuggable.
+can_profile_heap(isolated_app)
+can_profile_perf(isolated_app)
+
+#####
+##### Neverallow
+#####
+
+# Isolated apps should not directly open app data files themselves.
+neverallow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file open;
+
+# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
+# TODO: are there situations where isolated_apps write to this file?
+# TODO: should we tighten these restrictions further?
+neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
+neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:dir ~search;
+
+# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use HwBinder
+neverallow isolated_app hwbinder_device:chr_file *;
+neverallow isolated_app *:hwservice_manager *;
+
+# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use VndBinder
+neverallow isolated_app vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
+
+# Isolated apps must not be permitted to perform actions on Binder and VndBinder service_manager
+# except the find actions for services allowlisted below.
+neverallow isolated_app *:service_manager ~find;
+
+# b/17487348
+# Isolated apps can only access three services,
+# activity_service, display_service, webviewupdate_service.
+neverallow isolated_app {
+    service_manager_type
+    -activity_service
+    -display_service
+    -webviewupdate_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
+neverallow isolated_app gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
+
+# Do not allow isolated_app access to /cache
+neverallow isolated_app cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
+neverallow isolated_app cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
+
+# Do not allow isolated_app to access external storage, except for files passed
+# via file descriptors (b/32896414).
+neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file sdcard_type }:dir ~getattr;
+neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file }:file_class_set *;
+neverallow isolated_app sdcard_type:{ devfile_class_set lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } *;
+neverallow isolated_app sdcard_type:file ~{ read write append getattr lock map };
+
+# Do not allow USB access
+neverallow isolated_app { usb_device usbaccessory_device }:chr_file *;
+
+# Restrict the webview_zygote control socket.
+neverallow isolated_app webview_zygote:sock_file write;
+
+# Limit the /sys files which isolated_app can access. This is important
+# for controlling isolated_app attack surface.
+neverallow isolated_app {
+  sysfs_type
+  -sysfs_devices_system_cpu
+  -sysfs_transparent_hugepage
+  -sysfs_usb # TODO: check with audio team if needed for isolated_app (b/28417852)
+  -sysfs_fs_incfs_features
+}:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# No creation of sockets families other than AF_UNIX sockets.
+# List taken from system/sepolicy/public/global_macros - socket_class_set
+# excluding unix_stream_socket and unix_dgram_socket.
+# Many of these are socket families which have never and will never
+# be compiled into the Android kernel.
+neverallow isolated_app { self ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{
+  socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket
+  key_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket
+  netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket
+  netlink_selinux_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_dnrt_socket
+  netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket netlink_iscsi_socket
+  netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket netlink_netfilter_socket
+  netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket netlink_rdma_socket
+  netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket icmp_socket ax25_socket ipx_socket
+  netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket atmsvc_socket
+  rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket
+  bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket
+  ieee802154_socket caif_socket alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket
+  qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
+} create;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iw.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iw.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adc8c96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/iw.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+type iw, domain, coredomain;
+type iw_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(iw)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/kernel.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/kernel.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5341163
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/kernel.te
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+typeattribute kernel coredomain;
+
+domain_auto_trans(kernel, init_exec, init)
+domain_auto_trans(kernel, snapuserd_exec, snapuserd)
+
+# Allow the kernel to read otapreopt_chroot's file descriptors and files under
+# /postinstall, as it uses apexd logic to mount APEX packages in /postinstall/apex.
+allow kernel otapreopt_chroot:fd use;
+allow kernel postinstall_file:file read;
+
+# The following sections are for the transition period during a Virtual A/B
+# OTA. Once sepolicy is loaded, snapuserd must be re-launched in the correct
+# context, and with properly labelled devices. This must be done before
+# enabling enforcement, eg, in permissive mode while still in the kernel
+# context.
+allow kernel tmpfs:blk_file { getattr relabelfrom };
+allow kernel tmpfs:chr_file { getattr relabelfrom };
+allow kernel tmpfs:lnk_file { getattr relabelfrom };
+allow kernel tmpfs:dir { open read relabelfrom };
+
+allow kernel block_device:blk_file relabelto;
+allow kernel block_device:lnk_file relabelto;
+allow kernel dm_device:chr_file relabelto;
+allow kernel dm_device:blk_file relabelto;
+allow kernel dm_user_device:dir { read open search relabelto };
+allow kernel dm_user_device:chr_file relabelto;
+allow kernel kmsg_device:chr_file relabelto;
+allow kernel null_device:chr_file relabelto;
+allow kernel random_device:chr_file relabelto;
+allow kernel snapuserd_exec:file relabelto;
+
+allow kernel kmsg_device:chr_file write;
+allow kernel gsid:fd use;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keys.conf b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keys.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..362e73d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keys.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#
+# Maps an arbitrary tag [TAGNAME] with the string contents found in
+# TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT. Common convention is to start TAGNAME with an @ and
+# name it after the base file name of the pem file.
+#
+# Each tag (section) then allows one to specify any string found in
+# TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT. Typcially this is user, eng, and userdebug. Another
+# option is to use ALL which will match ANY TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT string.
+#
+
+[@PLATFORM]
+ALL : $DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE/platform.x509.pem
+
+[@MEDIA]
+ALL : $DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE/media.x509.pem
+
+[@NETWORK_STACK]
+ALL : $MAINLINE_SEPOLICY_DEV_CERTIFICATES/networkstack.x509.pem
+
+[@SHARED]
+ALL : $DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE/shared.x509.pem
+
+# Example of ALL TARGET_BUILD_VARIANTS
+[@RELEASE]
+ENG       : $DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE/testkey.x509.pem
+USER      : $DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE/testkey.x509.pem
+USERDEBUG : $DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE/testkey.x509.pem
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keystore.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keystore.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3fccf59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keystore.te
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+typeattribute keystore coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(keystore)
+
+# talk to keymaster
+hal_client_domain(keystore, hal_keymaster)
+
+# talk to confirmationui
+hal_client_domain(keystore, hal_confirmationui)
+
+# talk to keymint
+hal_client_domain(keystore, hal_keymint)
+
+# This is used for the ConfirmationUI async callback.
+allow keystore platform_app:binder call;
+
+# Allow to check whether security logging is enabled.
+get_prop(keystore, device_logging_prop)
+
+# Allow keystore to write to statsd.
+unix_socket_send(keystore, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# Allow keystore to register callbacks with statsd.
+allow keystore stats_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(keystore, statsd);
+
+# Keystore need access to the keystore_key context files to load the keystore key backend.
+allow keystore keystore2_key_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+get_prop(keystore, keystore_listen_prop)
+
+# Keystore needs to transfer binder references to vold and wait_for_keymaster so that they
+# can call keystore methods on those references.
+allow keystore vold:binder transfer;
+allow keystore wait_for_keymaster:binder transfer;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keystore2_key_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keystore2_key_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3833971
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keystore2_key_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# Keystore 2.0 key contexts.
+# This file defines Keystore 2.0 namespaces and maps them to labels.
+# Format:
+# <namespace> <label>
+#
+# <namespace> must be an integer in the interval [0 ...  2^31)
+# su_key is a keystore_key namespace for the su domain intended for native tests.
+0              u:object_r:su_key:s0
+
+# shell_key is a keystore_key namespace for the shell domain intended for native tests.
+1              u:object_r:shell_key:s0
+
+# vold_key is a keystore2_key namespace for vold. It allows using raw Keymint blobs.
+100            u:object_r:vold_key:s0
+
+# odsign_key is a keystore2_key namespace for the on-device signing daemon.
+101            u:object_r:odsign_key:s0
+
+# wifi_key is a keystore2_key namespace for the WI-FI subsystem. It replaces the WIFI_UID
+# namespace in keystore.
+102            u:object_r:wifi_key:s0
+
+# locksettings_key is a keystore2_key namespace for the LockSettingsService.
+103            u:object_r:locksettings_key:s0
+
+# resume_on_reboot_key is a keystore2_key namespace intended for resume on reboot.
+120            u:object_r:resume_on_reboot_key:s0
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keystore_keys.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keystore_keys.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f97608
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/keystore_keys.te
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Specify keystore2_key namespaces in this file.
+# Please keep the names in alphabetical order and comment each new entry.
+
+# A keystore2_key namespace for the shell domain. Mainly used for native tests.
+type shell_key, keystore2_key_type;
+
+# A keystore2 namespace for the su domain. Mainly used for native tests.
+type su_key, keystore2_key_type;
+
+# A keystore2 namespace for vold. Vold need special permission to handle
+# its own Keymint blobs.
+type vold_key, keystore2_key_type;
+
+# A keystore2 namespace for the on-device signing daemon.
+type odsign_key, keystore2_key_type;
+
+# A keystore2 namespace for LockSettingsService.
+type locksettings_key, keystore2_key_type;
+
+# A keystore2 namespace for resume on reboot.
+type resume_on_reboot_key, keystore2_key_type;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/linkerconfig.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/linkerconfig.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2688102
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/linkerconfig.te
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+type linkerconfig, domain, coredomain;
+type linkerconfig_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(linkerconfig)
+
+## Read and write linkerconfig subdirectory.
+allow linkerconfig linkerconfig_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow linkerconfig linkerconfig_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow linkerconfig to log to the kernel.
+allow linkerconfig kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
+
+# Allow linkerconfig to be invoked with logwrapper from init.
+allow linkerconfig devpts:chr_file { read write };
+
+# Allow linkerconfig to scan for apex modules
+allow linkerconfig apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow linkerconfig to read apex-info-list.xml
+allow linkerconfig apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow linkerconfig to be called in the otapreopt_chroot
+allow linkerconfig otapreopt_chroot:fd use;
+allow linkerconfig postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow linkerconfig postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:file r_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { domain -init -linkerconfig -otapreopt_chroot } linkerconfig_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/llkd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/llkd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f218dec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/llkd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# llkd Live LocK Daemon
+typeattribute llkd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(llkd)
+
+get_prop(llkd, llkd_prop)
+
+allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set kill;
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace sys_admin };
+  allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
+')
+
+# llkd optionally locks itself in memory, to prevent it from being
+# swapped out and unable to discover a kernel in live-lock state.
+allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set ipc_lock;
+
+# Send kill signals to _anyone_ suffering from Live Lock
+allow llkd domain:process sigkill;
+
+# read stack to check for Live Lock
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow llkd {
+    domain
+    -apexd
+    -kernel
+    -keystore
+    -init
+    -llkd
+    -ueventd
+    -vendor_init
+  }:process ptrace;
+')
+
+# live lock watchdog process allowed to look through /proc/
+allow llkd domain:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow llkd domain:file r_file_perms;
+allow llkd domain:lnk_file read;
+# Set /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_*
+allow llkd proc_hung_task:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# live lock watchdog process allowed to dump process trace and
+# reboot because orderly shutdown may not be possible.
+allow llkd proc_sysrq:file w_file_perms;
+allow llkd kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
+
+### neverallow rules
+
+neverallow { domain -init } llkd:process { dyntransition transition };
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-crash_dump') } llkd:process ptrace;
+
+# never honor LD_PRELOAD
+neverallow * llkd:process noatsecure;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/lmkd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/lmkd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fef3a89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/lmkd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+typeattribute lmkd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(lmkd)
+
+# Set sys.lmk.* properties.
+set_prop(lmkd, system_lmk_prop)
+
+# Set lmkd.* properties.
+set_prop(lmkd, lmkd_prop)
+
+neverallow { domain -init -lmkd -vendor_init } lmkd_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/logd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/logd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7112c4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/logd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+typeattribute logd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(logd)
+
+# Access device logging gating property
+get_prop(logd, device_logging_prop)
+
+# logd is not allowed to write anywhere other than /data/misc/logd, and then
+# only on userdebug or eng builds
+neverallow logd {
+  file_type
+  -runtime_event_log_tags_file
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-coredump_file -misc_logd_file')
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:file { create write append };
+
+# protect the event-log-tags file
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain # covered below
+  -bootstat
+  -dumpstate
+  -init
+  -logd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-logpersist')
+  -servicemanager
+  -system_server
+  -surfaceflinger
+  -zygote
+} runtime_event_log_tags_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  appdomain
+  -bluetooth
+  -platform_app
+  -priv_app
+  -radio
+  -shell
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+  -system_app
+} runtime_event_log_tags_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/logpersist.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/logpersist.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab2c9c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/logpersist.te
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+typeattribute logpersist coredomain;
+
+# android debug log storage in logpersist domains (eng and userdebug only)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+
+  r_dir_file(logpersist, cgroup)
+  r_dir_file(logpersist, cgroup_v2)
+
+  allow logpersist misc_logd_file:file create_file_perms;
+  allow logpersist misc_logd_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+  allow logpersist self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+  allow logpersist pstorefs:dir search;
+  allow logpersist pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+
+  control_logd(logpersist)
+  unix_socket_connect(logpersist, logdr, logd)
+  read_runtime_log_tags(logpersist)
+
+')
+
+# logpersist is allowed to write to /data/misc/log for userdebug and eng builds
+neverallow logpersist {
+  file_type
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-misc_logd_file -coredump_file')
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:file { create write append };
+neverallow { domain -init -dumpstate -incidentd userdebug_or_eng(`-logpersist -logd') } misc_logd_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -init userdebug_or_eng(`-logpersist -logd') } misc_logd_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -init userdebug_or_eng(`-logpersist -logd') } misc_logd_file:dir { add_name link relabelfrom remove_name rename reparent rmdir write };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/lpdumpd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/lpdumpd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f5f87e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/lpdumpd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+type lpdumpd, domain, coredomain;
+type lpdumpd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(lpdumpd)
+
+# Allow lpdumpd to register itself as a service.
+binder_use(lpdumpd)
+add_service(lpdumpd, lpdump_service)
+
+# Allow lpdumpd to find the super partition block device.
+allow lpdumpd block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow lpdumpd to read super partition metadata.
+allow lpdumpd super_block_device_type:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow lpdumpd to read fstab.
+allow lpdumpd sysfs_dt_firmware_android:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow lpdumpd sysfs_dt_firmware_android:file r_file_perms;
+read_fstab(lpdumpd)
+
+### Neverallow rules
+
+# Disallow other domains to get lpdump_service and call lpdumpd.
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -dumpstate
+    -lpdumpd
+    -shell
+} lpdump_service:service_manager find;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -dumpstate
+    -lpdumpd
+    -shell
+    -servicemanager
+} lpdumpd:binder call;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mac_permissions.xml b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mac_permissions.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fc37c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mac_permissions.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<policy>
+
+<!--
+
+    * A signature is a hex encoded X.509 certificate or a tag defined in
+      keys.conf and is required for each signer tag. The signature can
+      either appear as a set of attached cert child tags or as an attribute.
+    * A signer tag must contain a seinfo tag XOR multiple package stanzas.
+    * Each signer/package tag is allowed to contain one seinfo tag. This tag
+      represents additional info that each app can use in setting a SELinux security
+      context on the eventual process as well as the apps data directory.
+    * seinfo assignments are made according to the following rules:
+      - Stanzas with package name refinements will be checked first.
+      - Stanzas w/o package name refinements will be checked second.
+      - The "default" seinfo label is automatically applied.
+
+    * valid stanzas can take one of the following forms:
+
+     // single cert protecting seinfo
+     <signer signature="@PLATFORM" >
+       <seinfo value="platform" />
+     </signer>
+
+     // multiple certs protecting seinfo (all contained certs must match)
+     <signer>
+       <cert signature="@PLATFORM1"/>
+       <cert signature="@PLATFORM2"/>
+       <seinfo value="platform" />
+     </signer>
+
+     // single cert protecting explicitly named app
+     <signer signature="@PLATFORM" >
+       <package name="com.android.foo">
+         <seinfo value="bar" />
+       </package>
+     </signer>
+
+     // multiple certs protecting explicitly named app (all certs must match)
+     <signer>
+       <cert signature="@PLATFORM1"/>
+       <cert signature="@PLATFORM2"/>
+       <package name="com.android.foo">
+         <seinfo value="bar" />
+       </package>
+     </signer>
+-->
+
+    <!-- Platform dev key in AOSP -->
+    <signer signature="@PLATFORM" >
+      <seinfo value="platform" />
+    </signer>
+
+    <!-- Media key in AOSP -->
+    <signer signature="@MEDIA" >
+      <seinfo value="media" />
+    </signer>
+
+    <signer signature="@NETWORK_STACK" >
+      <seinfo value="network_stack" />
+    </signer>
+</policy>
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mdnsd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mdnsd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98e95da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mdnsd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# mdns daemon
+
+typeattribute mdnsd coredomain;
+typeattribute mdnsd mlstrustedsubject;
+
+type mdnsd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(mdnsd)
+
+net_domain(mdnsd)
+
+# Read from /proc/net
+r_dir_file(mdnsd, proc_net_type)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediadrmserver.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediadrmserver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e511a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediadrmserver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+typeattribute mediadrmserver coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(mediadrmserver)
+
+# allocate and use graphic buffers
+hal_client_domain(mediadrmserver, hal_graphics_allocator)
+auditallow mediadrmserver hal_graphics_allocator_server:binder call;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaextractor.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaextractor.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7bcf5c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaextractor.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+typeattribute mediaextractor coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(mediaextractor)
+tmpfs_domain(mediaextractor)
+allow mediaextractor appdomain_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+allow mediaextractor mediaserver_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+allow mediaextractor system_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+
+get_prop(mediaextractor, device_config_media_native_prop)
+get_prop(mediaextractor, device_config_swcodec_native_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediametrics.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediametrics.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a6f2e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediametrics.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+typeattribute mediametrics coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(mediametrics)
+
+# Needed for stats callback registration to statsd.
+allow mediametrics stats_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediametrics statsmanager_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(mediametrics, statsd)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaprovider.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaprovider.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78bbdb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaprovider.te
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+###
+### A domain for android.process.media, which contains both
+### MediaProvider and DownloadProvider and associated services.
+###
+
+typeattribute mediaprovider coredomain;
+app_domain(mediaprovider)
+
+# DownloadProvider accesses the network.
+net_domain(mediaprovider)
+
+# DownloadProvider uses /cache.
+allow mediaprovider cache_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow mediaprovider cache_file:file create_file_perms;
+# /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
+allow mediaprovider cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+# mediaprovider searches through /cache looking for orphans
+# Ignore denials to /cache/recovery and /cache/backup.
+dontaudit mediaprovider cache_private_backup_file:dir getattr;
+dontaudit mediaprovider cache_recovery_file:dir getattr;
+
+# Access external sdcards through /mnt/media_rw
+allow mediaprovider { mnt_media_rw_file }:dir search;
+
+allow mediaprovider app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaprovider audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaprovider cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaprovider drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaprovider mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaprovider mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow MediaProvider to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
+allow mediaprovider ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
+
+# MtpServer uses /dev/mtp_usb
+allow mediaprovider mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# MtpServer uses /dev/usb-ffs/mtp
+allow mediaprovider functionfs:dir search;
+allow mediaprovider functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm mediaprovider functionfs:file ioctl FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_DESC;
+
+# MtpServer sets sys.usb.ffs.mtp.ready
+get_prop(mediaprovider, ffs_config_prop)
+set_prop(mediaprovider, ffs_control_prop)
+
+# DownloadManager may retrieve DRM status
+get_prop(mediaprovider, drm_service_config_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaprovider_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaprovider_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e4a50e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaprovider_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+###
+### A domain for further sandboxing the MediaProvider mainline module.
+###
+type mediaprovider_app, domain, coredomain;
+
+app_domain(mediaprovider_app)
+
+# Access to /mnt/pass_through.
+r_dir_file(mediaprovider_app, mnt_pass_through_file)
+
+# Allow MediaProvider to host a FUSE daemon for external storage
+allow mediaprovider_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
+
+# Allow MediaProvider to read/write media_rw_data_file files and dirs
+allow mediaprovider_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow mediaprovider_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+# Talk to the DRM service
+allow mediaprovider_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Talk to the MediaServer service
+allow mediaprovider_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Talk to regular app services
+allow mediaprovider_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Talk to the GPU service
+binder_call(mediaprovider_app, gpuservice)
+
+# Talk to statsd
+allow mediaprovider_app statsmanager_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(mediaprovider_app, statsd)
+
+# read pipe-max-size configuration
+allow mediaprovider_app proc_pipe_conf:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow MediaProvider to set extended attributes (such as quota project ID)
+# on media files.
+allowxperm mediaprovider_app media_rw_data_file:{ dir file } ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+  FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+};
+
+# Access external sdcards through /mnt/media_rw
+allow mediaprovider_app { mnt_media_rw_file }:dir search;
+
+allow mediaprovider_app proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
+
+#Allow MediaProvider to see if sdcardfs is in use
+get_prop(mediaprovider_app, storage_config_prop)
+
+get_prop(mediaprovider_app, drm_service_config_prop)
+
+allow mediaprovider_app gpu_device:dir search;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaserver.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaserver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fe460c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaserver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+typeattribute mediaserver coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(mediaserver)
+tmpfs_domain(mediaserver)
+allow mediaserver appdomain_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+
+# allocate and use graphic buffers
+hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_graphics_allocator)
+hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_configstore)
+hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_drm)
+hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_omx)
+hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_codec2)
+
+set_prop(mediaserver, audio_prop)
+
+get_prop(mediaserver, drm_service_config_prop)
+get_prop(mediaserver, media_config_prop)
+
+# Allow mediaserver to start media.transcoding service via ctl.start.
+set_prop(mediaserver, ctl_mediatranscoding_prop);
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaswcodec.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaswcodec.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02079c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediaswcodec.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+typeattribute mediaswcodec coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(mediaswcodec)
+
+get_prop(mediaswcodec, device_config_media_native_prop)
+get_prop(mediaswcodec, device_config_swcodec_native_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediatranscoding.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediatranscoding.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a43cf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediatranscoding.te
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# mediatranscoding - daemon for transcoding video and image.
+type mediatranscoding, domain;
+type mediatranscoding_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type mediatranscoding_tmpfs, file_type;
+typeattribute mediatranscoding coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(mediatranscoding)
+tmpfs_domain(mediatranscoding)
+allow mediatranscoding appdomain_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+
+binder_use(mediatranscoding)
+binder_call(mediatranscoding, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(mediatranscoding, appdomain)
+binder_service(mediatranscoding)
+
+add_service(mediatranscoding, mediatranscoding_service)
+
+hal_client_domain(mediatranscoding, hal_graphics_allocator)
+hal_client_domain(mediatranscoding, hal_configstore)
+hal_client_domain(mediatranscoding, hal_omx)
+hal_client_domain(mediatranscoding, hal_codec2)
+
+allow mediatranscoding mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediatranscoding mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediatranscoding mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediatranscoding package_native_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediatranscoding thermal_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow mediatranscoding system_server:fd use;
+allow mediatranscoding activity_service:service_manager find;
+
+# allow mediatranscoding service read/write permissions for file sources
+allow mediatranscoding sdcardfs:file { getattr read write };
+allow mediatranscoding media_rw_data_file:file { getattr read write };
+allow mediatranscoding apk_data_file:file { getattr read };
+allow mediatranscoding app_data_file:file { getattr read write };
+allow mediatranscoding shell_data_file:file { getattr read write };
+
+# allow mediatranscoding service write permission to statsd socket
+unix_socket_send(mediatranscoding, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# Allow mediatranscoding to access the DMA-BUF system heap
+allow mediatranscoding dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+allow mediatranscoding gpu_device:dir search;
+
+# Allow mediatranscoding service to access media-related system properties
+get_prop(mediatranscoding, media_config_prop)
+
+# mediatranscoding should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow mediatranscoding { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
+# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
+# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
+# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
+# hardware/content. Etc.
+#
+# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
+# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
+# Lengthier explanation here:
+# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
+neverallow mediatranscoding domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediatuner.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediatuner.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..413d2e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mediatuner.te
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# mediatuner - mediatuner daemon
+type mediatuner, domain;
+type mediatuner_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+typeattribute mediatuner coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(mediatuner)
+hal_client_domain(mediatuner, hal_tv_tuner)
+
+binder_use(mediatuner)
+binder_call(mediatuner, appdomain)
+binder_service(mediatuner)
+
+add_service(mediatuner, mediatuner_service)
+allow mediatuner system_server:fd use;
+allow mediatuner tv_tuner_resource_mgr_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediatuner package_native_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(mediatuner, system_server)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# mediatuner should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow mediatuner { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands
+neverallowxperm mediatuner domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/microdroid_launcher.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/microdroid_launcher.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5983cb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/microdroid_launcher.te
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# microdroid_launcher is a binary that loads a shared library from an apk and
+# executes it by calling an entry point in the library. This can be considered
+# as the native counterpart of app_process for Java.
+
+type microdroid_launcher, domain, coredomain;
+type microdroid_launcher_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+# allow executing files on the zipfuse fs
+# TODO(b/188400186) uncomment the below when the zipfuse is mounted with
+# fscontext=u:object_r:zipfusefs:s0
+# allow microdroid_launcher zipfusefs:dir r_dir_perms;
+# allow microdroid_launcher zipfusefs:file rx_file_perms;
+# TODO(b/188400186) remove the below two rules
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow microdroid_launcher fuse:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow microdroid_launcher fuse:file rx_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Allow to communicate use, read and write over the adb connection.
+allow microdroid_launcher adbd:fd use;
+allow microdroid_launcher adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+
+# Allow to use FDs inherited from the shell. This includes the FD opened for
+# the microdroid_launcher executable itself and the FD for adb connection.
+# TODO(b/186396070) remove this when this is executed from microdroid_manager
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow microdroid_launcher shell:fd use;
+')
+
+# Allow to use terminal
+allow microdroid_launcher devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/microdroid_manager.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/microdroid_manager.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce55ba8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/microdroid_manager.te
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# microdroid_manager is a daemon running in the microdroid.
+
+type microdroid_manager, domain, coredomain;
+type microdroid_manager_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+# allow domain transition from init
+init_daemon_domain(microdroid_manager)
+
+# microdroid_manager accesses /dev/block/by-name/signature which points to
+# a /dev/vd* block device file.
+allow microdroid_manager block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow microdroid_manager block_device:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow microdroid_manager vd_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# microdroid_manager start payload task via microdroid_launcher
+domain_auto_trans(microdroid_manager, microdroid_launcher_exec, microdroid_launcher);
+
+# Let microdroid_manager exec other files (e.g. payload command) in the same domain.
+# TODO(b/189706019) we need to a domain for the app process.
+allow microdroid_manager system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+# Until then, allow microdroid_manager to execute the shell or other system executables.
+allow microdroid_manager {shell_exec toolbox_exec}:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Let microdroid_manager read a config file from /mnt/apk (fusefs)
+# TODO(b/188400186) remove the below two rules
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow microdroid_manager fuse:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow microdroid_manager fuse:file rx_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/migrate_legacy_obb_data.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/migrate_legacy_obb_data.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2a1fb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/migrate_legacy_obb_data.te
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+type migrate_legacy_obb_data, domain, coredomain;
+type migrate_legacy_obb_data_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid };
+
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data mnt_user_file:dir search;
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data mnt_user_file:lnk_file read;
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data storage_file:dir search;
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data storage_file:lnk_file read;
+
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data sdcard_type:file create_file_perms;
+
+# TODO: This should not be necessary. We don't deliberately hand over
+# any open file descriptors to this domain, so anything that triggers this
+# should be a candidate for O_CLOEXEC.
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data installd:fd use;
+
+# This rule is required to let this process read /proc/{parent_pid}/mount.
+# TODO: Why is this required ?
+allow migrate_legacy_obb_data installd:file read;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mls b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mls
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..955c27b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mls
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+#################################################
+# MLS policy constraints
+#
+
+#
+# Process constraints
+#
+
+# Process transition:  Require equivalence unless the subject is trusted.
+mlsconstrain process { transition dyntransition }
+	     ((h1 eq h2 and l1 eq l2) or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+
+# Process read operations: No read up unless trusted.
+mlsconstrain process { getsched getsession getpgid getcap getattr ptrace share }
+	     (l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+
+# Process write operations:  Require equivalence unless trusted.
+mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop signal setsched setpgid setcap setrlimit ptrace share }
+	     (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+
+#
+# Socket constraints
+#
+
+# Create/relabel operations:  Subject must be equivalent to object unless
+# the subject is trusted.  Sockets inherit the range of their creator.
+mlsconstrain socket_class_set { create relabelfrom relabelto }
+	     ((h1 eq h2 and l1 eq l2) or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+
+# Datagram send: Sender must be equivalent to the receiver unless one of them
+# is trusted.
+mlsconstrain unix_dgram_socket { sendto }
+	     (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedsubject);
+
+# Stream connect:  Client must be equivalent to server unless one of them
+# is trusted.
+mlsconstrain unix_stream_socket { connectto }
+	     (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedsubject);
+
+#
+# Directory/file constraints
+#
+
+# Create/relabel operations:  Subject must be equivalent to object unless
+# the subject is trusted. Also, files should always be single-level.
+# Do NOT exempt mlstrustedobject types from this constraint.
+mlsconstrain dir_file_class_set { create relabelfrom relabelto }
+	     (l2 eq h2 and (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject));
+
+#
+# Userfaultfd constraints
+#
+# To enforce that anonymous inodes are self contained in the application's process.
+mlsconstrain anon_inode { ioctl read write create getattr setattr lock relabelfrom relabelto append map unlink link rename execute open execmod }
+	     (l1 eq l2);
+
+#
+# Constraints for app data files only.
+#
+
+# Only constrain open, not read/write, so already open fds can be used.
+# Also constrain other forms of manipulation, e.g. chmod/chown, unlink, rename, etc.
+# Subject must dominate object unless the subject is trusted.
+mlsconstrain dir { open search getattr setattr rename add_name remove_name reparent rmdir }
+	     (t2 != app_data_file_type or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+mlsconstrain { file sock_file } { open setattr unlink link rename }
+	     ( (t2 != app_data_file_type and t2 != appdomain_tmpfs) or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+
+# For symlinks in app data files, require equivalence in order to manipulate or follow (read).
+mlsconstrain { lnk_file } { open setattr unlink link rename read }
+	     ( (t2 != app_data_file_type or t2 == privapp_data_file) or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+# But for priv_app_data_file, continue to use dominance for symlinks because dynamite relies on this.
+# TODO: Migrate to equivalence when it's no longer needed.
+mlsconstrain { lnk_file } { open setattr unlink link rename read }
+	     ( (t2 != privapp_data_file and t2 != appdomain_tmpfs) or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject);
+
+#
+# Constraints for file types other than app data files.
+#
+
+# Read operations: Subject must dominate object unless the subject
+# or the object is trusted.
+mlsconstrain dir { read getattr search }
+	     (t2 == app_data_file_type or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject
+	     or (t1 == mlsvendorcompat and (t2 == system_data_file or t2 == user_profile_root_file) ) );
+
+mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file chr_file blk_file } { read getattr execute }
+	     (t2 == app_data_file_type or t2 == appdomain_tmpfs or l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
+
+# Write operations: Subject must be equivalent to the object unless the
+# subject or the object is trusted.
+mlsconstrain dir { write setattr rename add_name remove_name reparent rmdir }
+	     (t2 == app_data_file_type or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
+
+mlsconstrain { file lnk_file sock_file chr_file blk_file } { write setattr append unlink link rename }
+	     (t2 == app_data_file_type or t2 == appdomain_tmpfs or l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject);
+
+# Special case for FIFOs.
+# These can be unnamed pipes, in which case they will be labeled with the
+# creating process' label. Thus we also have an exemption when the "object"
+# is a domain type, so that processes can communicate via unnamed pipes
+# passed by binder or local socket IPC.
+mlsconstrain fifo_file { read getattr }
+	     (l1 dom l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject or t2 == domain);
+
+mlsconstrain fifo_file { write setattr append unlink link rename }
+	     (l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedobject or t2 == domain);
+
+#
+# Binder IPC constraints
+#
+# Presently commented out, as apps are expected to call one another.
+# This would only make sense if apps were assigned categories
+# based on allowable communications rather than per-app categories.
+#mlsconstrain binder call
+#	(l1 eq l2 or t1 == mlstrustedsubject or t2 == mlstrustedsubject);
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mls_decl b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mls_decl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd53bea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mls_decl
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#########################################
+# MLS declarations
+#
+
+# Generate the desired number of sensitivities and categories.
+gen_sens(mls_num_sens)
+gen_cats(mls_num_cats)
+
+# Generate level definitions for each sensitivity and category.
+gen_levels(mls_num_sens,mls_num_cats)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mls_macros b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mls_macros
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83e0542
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mls_macros
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+########################################
+#
+# gen_cats(N)
+#
+# declares categores c0 to c(N-1)
+#
+define(`decl_cats',`dnl
+category c$1;
+ifelse(`$1',`$2',,`decl_cats(incr($1),$2)')dnl
+')
+
+define(`gen_cats',`decl_cats(0,decr($1))')
+
+########################################
+#
+# gen_sens(N)
+#
+# declares sensitivites s0 to s(N-1) with dominance
+# in increasing numeric order with s0 lowest, s(N-1) highest
+#
+define(`decl_sens',`dnl
+sensitivity s$1;
+ifelse(`$1',`$2',,`decl_sens(incr($1),$2)')dnl
+')
+
+define(`gen_dominance',`s$1 ifelse(`$1',`$2',,`gen_dominance(incr($1),$2)')')
+
+define(`gen_sens',`
+# Each sensitivity has a name and zero or more aliases.
+decl_sens(0,decr($1))
+
+# Define the ordering of the sensitivity levels (least to greatest)
+dominance { gen_dominance(0,decr($1)) }
+')
+
+########################################
+#
+# gen_levels(N,M)
+#
+# levels from s0 to (N-1) with categories c0 to (M-1)
+#
+define(`decl_levels',`dnl
+level s$1:c0.c$3;
+ifelse(`$1',`$2',,`decl_levels(incr($1),$2,$3)')dnl
+')
+
+define(`gen_levels',`decl_levels(0,decr($1),decr($2))')
+
+########################################
+#
+# Basic level names for system low and high
+#
+define(`mls_systemlow',`s0')
+define(`mls_systemhigh',`s`'decr(mls_num_sens):c0.c`'decr(mls_num_cats)')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mlstrustedsubject.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mlstrustedsubject.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22482d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mlstrustedsubject.te
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# MLS override can't be used to access private app data.
+
+# Apps should not normally be mlstrustedsubject, but if they must be
+# they cannot use this to access app private data files; their own app
+# data files must use a different label.
+
+neverallow {
+  mlstrustedsubject
+  -installd
+  -iorap_prefetcherd
+  -iorap_inode2filename
+} { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file ~{ read write map getattr ioctl lock append };
+
+neverallow {
+  mlstrustedsubject
+  -installd
+  -iorap_prefetcherd
+  -iorap_inode2filename
+} { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir ~{ read getattr search };
+
+neverallow {
+  mlstrustedsubject
+  -installd
+  -iorap_prefetcherd
+  -iorap_inode2filename
+  -system_server
+  -adbd
+  -runas
+  -zygote
+} { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir { read getattr search };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mm_events.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mm_events.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4875d40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mm_events.te
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+type mm_events, domain, coredomain;
+type mm_events_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(mm_events)
+
+allow mm_events shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow running the sleep command to rate limit attempts
+# to arm mm_events on failure.
+allow mm_events toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+allow mm_events perfetto_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+domain_auto_trans(mm_events, perfetto_exec, perfetto)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/modprobe.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/modprobe.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9858675
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/modprobe.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+typeattribute modprobe coredomain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mtp.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mtp.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..732e111
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/mtp.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute mtp coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(mtp)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/netd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/netd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..670a4bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/netd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+typeattribute netd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(netd)
+
+# Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain
+domain_auto_trans(netd, dnsmasq_exec, dnsmasq)
+
+# Allow netd to start clatd in its own domain and kill it
+domain_auto_trans(netd, clatd_exec, clatd)
+allow netd clatd:process signal;
+
+# give netd permission to setup iptables rule with xt_bpf, attach program to cgroup, and read/write
+# the map created by bpfloader
+allow netd bpfloader:bpf { prog_run map_read map_write };
+
+# in order to invoke side effect of close() on such a socket calling synchronize_rcu()
+# TODO: Remove this permission when 4.9 kernel is deprecated.
+allow netd self:key_socket create;
+
+set_prop(netd, ctl_mdnsd_prop)
+set_prop(netd, netd_stable_secret_prop)
+
+get_prop(netd, adbd_config_prop)
+get_prop(netd, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
+get_prop(netd, hwservicemanager_prop)
+get_prop(netd, device_config_netd_native_prop)
+
+# Allow netd to write to statsd.
+unix_socket_send(netd, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# Allow netd to send callbacks to network_stack
+binder_call(netd, network_stack)
+
+# Allow netd to send dump info to dumpstate
+allow netd dumpstate:fd use;
+allow netd dumpstate:fifo_file { getattr write };
+
+# persist.netd.stable_secret contains RFC 7217 secret key which should never be
+# leaked to other processes. Make sure it never leaks.
+neverallow { domain -netd -init -dumpstate } netd_stable_secret_prop:file r_file_perms;
+
+# We want to ensure that no other process ever tries tampering with persist.netd.stable_secret,
+# the RFC 7217 secret key managed by netd. Doing so could compromise user privacy.
+neverallow { domain -netd -init } netd_stable_secret_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/netutils_wrapper.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/netutils_wrapper.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca3b515
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/netutils_wrapper.te
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+typeattribute netutils_wrapper coredomain;
+
+r_dir_file(netutils_wrapper, system_file);
+
+# For netutils (ip, iptables, tc)
+allow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set net_raw;
+
+allow netutils_wrapper system_file:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+allow netutils_wrapper proc_net_type:file { open read getattr };
+allow netutils_wrapper self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow netutils_wrapper self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
+# ip utils need everything but ioctl
+allow netutils_wrapper self:netlink_route_socket ~ioctl;
+allow netutils_wrapper self:netlink_xfrm_socket ~ioctl;
+
+# For netutils (ndc) to be able to talk to netd
+allow netutils_wrapper netd_service:service_manager find;
+allow netutils_wrapper dnsresolver_service:service_manager find;
+binder_use(netutils_wrapper);
+binder_call(netutils_wrapper, netd);
+
+# For vendor code that update the iptables rules at runtime. They need to reload
+# the whole chain including the xt_bpf rules. They need to access to the pinned
+# program when reloading the rule.
+allow netutils_wrapper fs_bpf:dir search;
+allow netutils_wrapper fs_bpf:file { read write };
+allow netutils_wrapper bpfloader:bpf prog_run;
+
+# For /data/misc/net access to ndc and ip
+r_dir_file(netutils_wrapper, net_data_file)
+
+domain_auto_trans({
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+}, netutils_wrapper_exec, netutils_wrapper)
+
+# suppress spurious denials
+dontaudit netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
+dontaudit netutils_wrapper sysfs_type:file read;
+
+# netutils wrapper may only use the following capabilities.
+neverallow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set ~{ net_admin net_raw };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/network_stack.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/network_stack.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09a98b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/network_stack.te
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Networking service app
+typeattribute network_stack coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+
+app_domain(network_stack);
+net_domain(network_stack);
+
+allow network_stack self:global_capability_class_set {
+    net_admin
+    net_bind_service
+    net_broadcast
+    net_raw
+};
+
+# Allow access to net_admin ioctl, DHCP server uses SIOCSARP
+allowxperm network_stack self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+
+# The DhcpClient uses packet_sockets
+allow network_stack self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Monitor neighbors via netlink.
+allow network_stack self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
+
+allow network_stack app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow network_stack dnsresolver_service:service_manager find;
+allow network_stack netd_service:service_manager find;
+allow network_stack network_watchlist_service:service_manager find;
+allow network_stack radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow network_stack system_config_service:service_manager find;
+allow network_stack radio_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow network_stack radio_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+binder_call(network_stack, netd);
+
+# in order to invoke side effect of close() on such a socket calling synchronize_rcu()
+# TODO: Remove this permission when 4.9 kernel is deprecated.
+allow network_stack self:key_socket create;
+# Java's Os.close() in libcore/luni/src/main/java/libcore/io/BlockGuardOs.java;l=100
+# calls if (fd.isSocket$()) if (isLingerSocket(fd)) ...
+dontaudit network_stack self:key_socket getopt;
+
+# Grant read permission of connectivity namespace system property prefix.
+get_prop(network_stack, device_config_connectivity_prop)
+
+# Create/use netlink_tcpdiag_socket to get tcp info
+allow network_stack self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read nlmsg_write };
+############### Tethering Service app - Tethering.apk ##############
+hal_client_domain(network_stack, hal_tetheroffload)
+# Create and share netlink_netfilter_sockets for tetheroffload.
+allow network_stack self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow network_stack network_stack_service:service_manager find;
+# allow Tethering(network_stack process) to run/update/read the eBPF maps to offload tethering traffic by eBPF.
+allow network_stack { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir search;
+allow network_stack { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file { read write };
+allow network_stack bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
+
+# Only the bpfloader and the network_stack should ever touch 'fs_bpf_tethering' programs/maps.
+# Unfortunately init/vendor_init have all sorts of extra privs
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:dir ~getattr;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:file *;
+
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack } fs_bpf_tethering:dir ~{ getattr open read search setattr };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack } fs_bpf_tethering:file ~{ map open read setattr };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/nfc.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/nfc.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1a08f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/nfc.te
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# nfc subsystem
+typeattribute nfc coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+app_domain(nfc)
+net_domain(nfc)
+
+binder_service(nfc)
+add_service(nfc, nfc_service)
+
+hal_client_domain(nfc, hal_nfc)
+
+# Data file accesses.
+allow nfc nfc_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow nfc nfc_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
+allow nfc nfc_logs_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow nfc nfc_logs_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# SoundPool loading and playback
+allow nfc audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow nfc drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow nfc mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow nfc mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow nfc mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow nfc radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow nfc app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow nfc system_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow nfc vr_manager_service:service_manager find;
+allow nfc secure_element_service:service_manager find;
+
+set_prop(nfc, nfc_prop);
+
+# already open bugreport file descriptors may be shared with
+# the nfc process, from a file in
+# /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-*.
+allow nfc shell_data_file:file read;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/odrefresh.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/odrefresh.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a64247
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/odrefresh.te
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# odrefresh
+type odrefresh, domain, coredomain;
+type odrefresh_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Allow odrefresh to create files and directories for on device signing.
+allow odrefresh apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow odrefresh apex_art_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
+allow odrefresh apex_art_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow odrefresh to create data files (typically for metrics before statsd starts).
+allow odrefresh odrefresh_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow odrefresh odrefresh_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+userfaultfd_use(odrefresh)
+
+# Staging area labels (/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art/staging). odrefresh
+# sets up files here and passes file descriptors for dex2oat to write to.
+allow odrefresh apex_art_staging_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow odrefresh apex_art_staging_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Run dex2oat in its own sandbox.
+domain_auto_trans(odrefresh, dex2oat_exec, dex2oat)
+
+# Run dexoptanalyzer in its own sandbox.
+domain_auto_trans(odrefresh, dexoptanalyzer_exec, dexoptanalyzer)
+
+# Use devpts and fd from odsign (which exec()'s odrefresh)
+allow odrefresh odsign_devpts:chr_file { read write };
+allow odrefresh odsign:fd use;
+
+# Do not audit unused resources from parent processes (adb, shell, su).
+# These appear to be unnecessary for odrefresh.
+dontaudit odrefresh { adbd shell }:fd use;
+dontaudit odrefresh devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+dontaudit odrefresh adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
+
+# Allow odrefresh to read /apex/apex-info-list.xml to determine
+# whether current apex is in /system or /data.
+allow odrefresh apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# No other processes should be creating files in the staging area.
+neverallow { domain -init -odrefresh } apex_art_staging_data_file:file open;
+
+# No processes other than init, odrefresh and system_server access
+# odrefresh_data_files.
+neverallow { domain -init -odrefresh -system_server } odrefresh_data_file:dir *;
+neverallow { domain -init -odrefresh -system_server } odrefresh_data_file:file *;
+
+# Allow updating boot animation status.
+set_prop(odrefresh, bootanim_system_prop)
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(odrefresh, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(odrefresh, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/odsign.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/odsign.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ff3b7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/odsign.te
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# odsign - on-device signing.
+type odsign, domain;
+
+# odsign - Binary for signing ART artifacts.
+typeattribute odsign coredomain;
+
+type odsign_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+# Allow init to start odsign
+init_daemon_domain(odsign)
+
+# Allow using persistent storage in /data/odsign
+allow odsign odsign_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow odsign odsign_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Create and use pty created by android_fork_execvp().
+create_pty(odsign)
+
+# FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY and FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY on ART data files
+allowxperm odsign apex_art_data_file:file ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+};
+
+# talk to binder services (for keystore)
+binder_use(odsign);
+
+# talk to keystore specifically
+use_keystore(odsign);
+
+# Use our dedicated keystore key
+allow odsign odsign_key:keystore2_key {
+    delete
+    get_info
+    rebind
+    use
+};
+
+# talk to keymaster
+hal_client_domain(odsign, hal_keymaster)
+
+# For ART apex data dir access
+allow odsign apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+allow odsign apex_art_data_file:dir { rw_dir_perms rmdir };
+allow odsign apex_art_data_file:file { rw_file_perms unlink };
+
+# Run odrefresh to refresh ART artifacts
+domain_auto_trans(odsign, odrefresh_exec, odrefresh)
+
+# Run fsverity_init to add key to fsverity keyring
+domain_auto_trans(odsign, fsverity_init_exec, fsverity_init)
+
+# only odsign can set odsign sysprop
+set_prop(odsign, odsign_prop)
+neverallow { domain -odsign -init } odsign_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Neverallows
+neverallow { domain -odsign -init -fsverity_init } odsign_data_file:dir *;
+neverallow { domain -odsign -init -fsverity_init } odsign_data_file:file *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/otapreopt_chroot.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/otapreopt_chroot.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea9d4ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/otapreopt_chroot.te
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# otapreopt_chroot executable
+typeattribute otapreopt_chroot coredomain;
+type otapreopt_chroot_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+# Chroot preparation and execution.
+# We need to create an unshared mount namespace, and then mount /data.
+allow otapreopt_chroot postinstall_file:dir { search mounton };
+allow otapreopt_chroot apex_mnt_dir:dir mounton;
+allow otapreopt_chroot device:dir mounton;
+allow otapreopt_chroot linkerconfig_file:dir mounton;
+allow otapreopt_chroot rootfs:dir mounton;
+allow otapreopt_chroot sysfs:dir mounton;
+allow otapreopt_chroot system_data_root_file:dir mounton;
+allow otapreopt_chroot system_file:dir mounton;
+allow otapreopt_chroot vendor_file:dir mounton;
+allow otapreopt_chroot self:global_capability_class_set { sys_admin sys_chroot };
+
+# This is required to mount /vendor and mount/unmount ext4 images from
+# APEX packages in /postinstall/apex.
+allow otapreopt_chroot block_device:dir search;
+allow otapreopt_chroot labeledfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
+# This is required for dynamic partitions.
+allow otapreopt_chroot dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# This is required to unmount flattened APEX packages under
+# /postinstall/system/apex (which are bind-mounted in /postinstall/apex).
+allow otapreopt_chroot postinstall_file:filesystem unmount;
+# Mounting /vendor can have this side-effect. Ignore denial.
+dontaudit otapreopt_chroot kernel:process setsched;
+
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to read SELinux policy files.
+allow otapreopt_chroot file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to open and read the contents of /postinstall/system/apex.
+allow otapreopt_chroot postinstall_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to read the persist.apexd.verity_on_system system property.
+get_prop(otapreopt_chroot, apexd_prop)
+
+# Allow otapreopt to use file descriptors from update-engine. It will
+# close them immediately.
+allow otapreopt_chroot postinstall:fd use;
+allow otapreopt_chroot update_engine:fd use;
+allow otapreopt_chroot update_engine:fifo_file write;
+
+# Allow to transition to postinstall_dexopt, to run otapreopt in its own sandbox.
+domain_auto_trans(otapreopt_chroot, postinstall_dexopt_exec, postinstall_dexopt)
+domain_auto_trans(otapreopt_chroot, linkerconfig_exec, linkerconfig)
+domain_auto_trans(otapreopt_chroot, apexd_exec, apexd)
+
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to control linkerconfig
+allow otapreopt_chroot linkerconfig_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow otapreopt_chroot linkerconfig_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to create loop devices with /dev/loop-control.
+allow otapreopt_chroot loop_control_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to access loop devices.
+allow otapreopt_chroot loop_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm otapreopt_chroot loop_device:blk_file ioctl {
+  LOOP_CONFIGURE
+  LOOP_GET_STATUS64
+  LOOP_SET_STATUS64
+  LOOP_SET_FD
+  LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE
+  LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO
+  LOOP_CLR_FD
+  BLKFLSBUF
+};
+
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to configure read-ahead of loop devices.
+allow otapreopt_chroot sysfs_loop:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow otapreopt_chroot sysfs_loop:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to mount a tmpfs filesystem in /postinstall/apex.
+allow otapreopt_chroot tmpfs:filesystem mount;
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to restore the security context of /postinstall/apex.
+allow otapreopt_chroot tmpfs:dir relabelfrom;
+allow otapreopt_chroot postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir relabelto;
+
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to manipulate directory /postinstall/apex.
+allow otapreopt_chroot postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow otapreopt_chroot postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:file create_file_perms;
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to mount APEX packages in /postinstall/apex.
+allow otapreopt_chroot postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir mounton;
+
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to access /dev/block (needed to detach loop
+# devices used by ext4 images from APEX packages).
+allow otapreopt_chroot block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow to access the linker through the symlink.
+allow otapreopt_chroot postinstall_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow otapreopt_chroot to read ro.cold_boot_done prop.
+# This is a temporary solution to make sure that otapreopt_chroot doesn't block indefinetelly.
+# TODO(b/165948777): remove this once otapreopt_chroot is migrated to libapexmount.
+get_prop(otapreopt_chroot, cold_boot_done_prop)
+
+# allow otapreopt_chroot to run the linkerconfig from the new image.
+allow otapreopt_chroot linkerconfig_exec:file rx_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/otapreopt_slot.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/otapreopt_slot.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27a3b0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/otapreopt_slot.te
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# This command set moves the artifact corresponding to the current slot
+# from /data/ota to /data/dalvik-cache.
+
+type otapreopt_slot, domain, mlstrustedsubject, coredomain;
+type otapreopt_slot_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Technically not a daemon but we do want the transition from init domain to
+# cppreopts to occur.
+init_daemon_domain(otapreopt_slot)
+
+# The otapreopt_slot renames the OTA dalvik-cache to the regular dalvik-cache, and cleans up
+# the directory afterwards. For logging of aggregate size, we need getattr.
+allow otapreopt_slot ota_data_file:dir { rw_dir_perms rename reparent rmdir };
+allow otapreopt_slot ota_data_file:{ file lnk_file } getattr;
+# (du follows symlinks)
+allow otapreopt_slot ota_data_file:lnk_file read;
+
+# Delete old content of the dalvik-cache.
+allow otapreopt_slot dalvikcache_data_file:dir { add_name getattr open read remove_name rmdir search write };
+allow otapreopt_slot dalvikcache_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
+allow otapreopt_slot dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file { getattr read unlink };
+
+# Allow cppreopts to execute itself using #!/system/bin/sh
+allow otapreopt_slot shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow running the mv and rm/rmdir commands using otapreopt_slot  permissions.
+# Needed so we can move artifacts into /data/dalvik-cache/dalvik-cache.
+allow otapreopt_slot toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/perfetto.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/perfetto.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9693da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/perfetto.te
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+# Perfetto command-line client. Can be used only from the domains that are
+# explicitly allowlisted with a domain_auto_trans(X, perfetto_exec, perfetto).
+# This command line client accesses the privileged socket of the traced
+# daemon.
+
+type perfetto_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type perfetto_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+tmpfs_domain(perfetto);
+
+# Allow to access traced's privileged consumer socket.
+unix_socket_connect(perfetto, traced_consumer, traced)
+
+# Connect to the Perfetto traced daemon as a producer. This requires
+# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(perfetto)
+
+# Allow to write and unlink traces into /data/misc/perfetto-traces.
+allow perfetto perfetto_traces_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow perfetto perfetto_traces_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow to access binder to pass the traces to Dropbox.
+binder_use(perfetto)
+binder_call(perfetto, system_server)
+allow perfetto dropbox_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow perfetto to read the trace config from /data/misc/perfetto-configs.
+# shell and adb can write files into that directory.
+allow perfetto perfetto_configs_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow perfetto perfetto_configs_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow perfetto to read the trace config from statsd, mm_events and shell
+# (both root and non-root) on stdin and also to write the resulting trace to
+# stdout.
+allow perfetto { statsd mm_events shell su }:fd use;
+allow perfetto { statsd mm_events shell su }:fifo_file { getattr read write };
+
+# Allow to communicate use, read and write over the adb connection.
+allow perfetto adbd:fd use;
+allow perfetto adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+
+# Allow adbd to reap perfetto.
+allow perfetto adbd:process { sigchld };
+
+# Allow perfetto to write to statsd.
+unix_socket_send(perfetto, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# Allow to access /dev/pts when launched in an adb shell.
+allow perfetto devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow perfetto to ask incidentd to start a report.
+allow perfetto incident_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(perfetto, incidentd)
+
+# perfetto log formatter calls isatty() on its stderr. Denial when running
+# under adbd is harmless. Avoid generating denial logs.
+dontaudit perfetto adbd:unix_stream_socket getattr;
+dontauditxperm perfetto adbd:unix_stream_socket ioctl unpriv_tty_ioctls;
+# As above, when adbd is running in "su" domain (only the ioctl is denied in
+# practice).
+dontauditxperm perfetto su:unix_stream_socket ioctl unpriv_tty_ioctls;
+# Similarly, CTS tests end up hitting a denial on shell pipes.
+dontauditxperm perfetto shell:fifo_file ioctl unpriv_tty_ioctls;
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### perfetto should NEVER do any of this
+
+# Disallow mapping executable memory (execstack and exec are already disallowed
+# globally in domain.te).
+neverallow perfetto self:process execmem;
+
+# Block device access.
+neverallow perfetto dev_type:blk_file { read write };
+
+# ptrace any other process
+neverallow perfetto domain:process ptrace;
+
+# Disallows access to other /data files.
+neverallow perfetto {
+  data_file_type
+  -system_data_file
+  -system_data_root_file
+  # TODO(b/72998741) Remove exemption. Further restricted in a subsequent
+  # neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
+  -vendor_data_file
+  -zoneinfo_data_file
+  -perfetto_traces_data_file
+  -perfetto_configs_data_file
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:dir *;
+neverallow perfetto { system_data_file -perfetto_traces_data_file }:dir ~{ getattr search };
+neverallow perfetto zoneinfo_data_file:dir ~r_dir_perms;
+neverallow perfetto { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file -perfetto_traces_data_file }:lnk_file *;
+neverallow perfetto {
+  data_file_type
+  -zoneinfo_data_file
+  -perfetto_traces_data_file
+  -perfetto_configs_data_file
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:file ~write;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/performanced.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/performanced.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..792826e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/performanced.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute performanced coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(performanced)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/permissioncontroller_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/permissioncontroller_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f81875
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/permissioncontroller_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+###
+### A domain for further sandboxing the GooglePermissionController app.
+###
+type permissioncontroller_app, domain, coredomain;
+
+app_domain(permissioncontroller_app)
+
+allow permissioncontroller_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow permissioncontroller_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow interaction with gpuservice
+binder_call(permissioncontroller_app, gpuservice)
+
+allow permissioncontroller_app radio_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow the app to request and collect incident reports.
+# (Also requires DUMP and PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS permissions)
+allow permissioncontroller_app incident_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(permissioncontroller_app, incidentd)
+allow permissioncontroller_app incidentd:fifo_file { read write };
+
+allow permissioncontroller_app gpu_device:dir search;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/platform_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/platform_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a112081
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/platform_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+###
+### Apps signed with the platform key.
+###
+
+typeattribute platform_app coredomain;
+
+app_domain(platform_app)
+
+# Access the network.
+net_domain(platform_app)
+# Access bluetooth.
+bluetooth_domain(platform_app)
+# Read from /data/local/tmp or /data/data/com.android.shell.
+allow platform_app shell_data_file:dir search;
+allow platform_app shell_data_file:file { open getattr read };
+allow platform_app icon_file:file { open getattr read };
+# Populate /data/app/vmdl*.tmp, /data/app-private/vmdl*.tmp files
+# created by system server.
+allow platform_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow platform_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file rw_file_perms;
+allow platform_app apk_private_data_file:dir search;
+# ASEC
+allow platform_app asec_apk_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow platform_app asec_apk_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+allow platform_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow platform_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /cache.
+allow platform_app cache_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow platform_app cache_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Direct access to vold-mounted storage under /mnt/media_rw
+# This is a performance optimization that allows platform apps to bypass the FUSE layer
+allow platform_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow platform_app sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow platform_app sdcard_type:file create_file_perms;
+
+# com.android.systemui
+allow platform_app rootfs:dir getattr;
+
+# com.android.captiveportallogin reads /proc/vmstat
+allow platform_app {
+  proc_vmstat
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# /proc/net access.
+# TODO(b/9496886) Audit access for removal.
+r_dir_file(platform_app, proc_net_type)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  auditallow platform_app proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
+')
+
+allow platform_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app thermal_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app timezone_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app vr_manager_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app stats_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow platform apps to log via statsd.
+binder_call(platform_app, statsd)
+
+# Access to /data/preloads
+allow platform_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow platform_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow platform_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow platform_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+read_runtime_log_tags(platform_app)
+
+# allow platform apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow platform_app system_server:udp_socket {
+        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
+
+# allow platform apps to connect to the property service
+set_prop(platform_app, test_boot_reason_prop)
+
+# allow platform apps to read keyguard.no_require_sim
+get_prop(platform_app, keyguard_config_prop)
+
+# allow platform apps to read qemu.hw.mainkeys
+get_prop(platform_app, qemu_hw_prop)
+
+# allow platform apps to create symbolic link
+allow platform_app app_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+
+# suppress denials caused by debugfs_tracing
+dontaudit platform_app debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# app domains which access /dev/fuse should not run as platform_app
+neverallow platform_app fuse_device:chr_file *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/policy_capabilities b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/policy_capabilities
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9290e3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/policy_capabilities
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Enable new networking controls.
+policycap network_peer_controls;
+
+# Enable open permission check.
+policycap open_perms;
+
+# Enable separate security classes for
+# all network address families previously
+# mapped to the socket class and for
+# ICMP and SCTP sockets previously mapped
+# to the rawip_socket class.
+policycap extended_socket_class;
+
+# Enable NoNewPrivileges support.  Requires libsepol 2.7+
+# and kernel 4.14 (estimated).
+#
+# Checks enabled;
+# process2: nnp_transition, nosuid_transition
+#
+policycap nnp_nosuid_transition;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/port_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/port_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b473c0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/port_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# portcon statements go here, e.g.
+# portcon tcp 80 u:object_r:http_port:s0
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/postinstall.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/postinstall.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7060c59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/postinstall.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+typeattribute postinstall coredomain;
+type postinstall_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+domain_auto_trans(postinstall, otapreopt_chroot_exec, otapreopt_chroot)
+
+allow postinstall rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/postinstall_dexopt.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/postinstall_dexopt.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94af043
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/postinstall_dexopt.te
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# Domain for the otapreopt executable, running under postinstall_dexopt
+#
+# Note: otapreopt is a driver for dex2oat, and reuses parts of installd. As such,
+# this is derived and adapted from installd.te.
+
+type postinstall_dexopt, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type postinstall_dexopt_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type postinstall_dexopt_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+# Run dex2oat/patchoat in its own sandbox.
+# We have to manually transition, as we don't have an entrypoint.
+# - Case where dex2oat is in a non-flattened APEX, which has retained
+#   the correct type (`dex2oat_exec`).
+domain_auto_trans(postinstall_dexopt, dex2oat_exec, dex2oat)
+# - Case where dex2oat is in a flattened APEX, which has been tagged
+#   with the `postinstall_file` type by update_engine.
+domain_auto_trans(postinstall_dexopt, postinstall_file, dex2oat)
+
+# Run derive_classpath to get the current BCP.
+domain_auto_trans(postinstall_dexopt, derive_classpath_exec, derive_classpath)
+# Allow postinstall_dexopt to make a tempfile for derive_classpath to write into
+tmpfs_domain(postinstall_dexopt);
+allow postinstall_dexopt postinstall_dexopt_tmpfs:file open;
+
+allow postinstall_dexopt self:global_capability_class_set { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid setgid setuid };
+
+allow postinstall_dexopt postinstall_file:filesystem getattr;
+allow postinstall_dexopt postinstall_file:dir { getattr read search };
+allow postinstall_dexopt postinstall_file:lnk_file { getattr read };
+allow postinstall_dexopt proc_filesystems:file { getattr open read };
+allow postinstall_dexopt rootfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow postinstall_dexopt tmpfs:file read;
+
+# Allow access to /postinstall/apex.
+allow postinstall_dexopt postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir { getattr search };
+
+# Note: /data/ota is created by init (see system/core/rootdir/init.rc) to avoid giving access
+# here and having to relabel the directory.
+
+# Read app data (APKs) as input to dex2oat.
+r_dir_file(postinstall_dexopt, apk_data_file)
+# Read vendor app data (APKs) as input to dex2oat.
+r_dir_file(postinstall_dexopt, vendor_app_file)
+# Read vendor overlay files (APKs) as input to dex2oat.
+r_dir_file(postinstall_dexopt, vendor_overlay_file)
+# Access to app oat directory.
+r_dir_file(postinstall_dexopt, dalvikcache_data_file)
+
+# Read profile data.
+allow postinstall_dexopt { user_profile_root_file user_profile_data_file }:dir { getattr search };
+allow postinstall_dexopt user_profile_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+# Suppress deletion denial (we do not want to update the profile).
+dontaudit postinstall_dexopt user_profile_data_file:file { write };
+
+# Write to /data/ota(/*). Create symlinks in /data/ota(/*)
+allow postinstall_dexopt ota_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow postinstall_dexopt ota_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow postinstall_dexopt ota_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+
+# Need to write .b files, which are dalvikcache_data_file, not ota_data_file.
+# TODO: See whether we can apply ota_data_file?
+allow postinstall_dexopt dalvikcache_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow postinstall_dexopt dalvikcache_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow labeling of files under /data/app/com.example/oat/
+# TODO: Restrict to .b suffix?
+allow postinstall_dexopt dalvikcache_data_file:dir relabelto;
+allow postinstall_dexopt dalvikcache_data_file:file { relabelto link };
+
+# Check validity of SELinux context before use.
+selinux_check_context(postinstall_dexopt)
+selinux_check_access(postinstall_dexopt)
+
+
+# Postinstall wants to know about our child.
+allow postinstall_dexopt postinstall:process sigchld;
+
+# Allow otapreopt to use file descriptors from otapreopt_chroot.
+# TODO: Probably we can actually close file descriptors...
+allow postinstall_dexopt otapreopt_chroot:fd use;
+
+# Allow postinstall_dexopt to access the runtime feature flag properties.
+get_prop(postinstall_dexopt, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(postinstall_dexopt, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/ppp.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/ppp.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..968b221
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/ppp.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute ppp coredomain;
+
+domain_auto_trans(mtp, ppp_exec, ppp)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/preloads_copy.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/preloads_copy.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba54b70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/preloads_copy.te
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+type preloads_copy, domain, coredomain;
+type preloads_copy_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(preloads_copy)
+
+allow preloads_copy shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow preloads_copy toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow preloads_copy preloads_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow preloads_copy preloads_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow preloads_copy preloads_media_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow preloads_copy preloads_media_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow to copy from /postinstall
+allow preloads_copy system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Silence the denial when /postinstall cannot be mounted, e.g., system_other
+# is wiped, but preloads_copy.sh still runs.
+dontaudit preloads_copy postinstall_mnt_dir:dir search;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/preopt2cachename.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/preopt2cachename.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dcfba14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/preopt2cachename.te
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# preopt2cachename executable
+#
+# This executable translates names from the preopted versions the build system
+# creates to the names the runtime expects in the data directory.
+
+type preopt2cachename, domain, coredomain;
+type preopt2cachename_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Allow write to stdout.
+allow preopt2cachename cppreopts:fd use;
+allow preopt2cachename cppreopts:fifo_file { getattr read write };
+
+# Allow write to logcat.
+allow preopt2cachename proc_net_type:file r_file_perms;
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  auditallow preopt2cachename proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/priv_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/priv_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63a9cbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/priv_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+###
+### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
+###
+
+typeattribute priv_app coredomain;
+app_domain(priv_app)
+
+# Access the network.
+net_domain(priv_app)
+# Access bluetooth.
+bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
+
+# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
+# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
+create_pty(priv_app)
+
+# Allow loading executable code from writable priv-app home
+# directories. This is a W^X violation, however, it needs
+# to be supported for now for the following reasons.
+# * /data/user_*/0/*/code_cache/* POSSIBLE uses (b/117841367)
+#   1) com.android.opengl.shaders_cache
+#   2) com.android.skia.shaders_cache
+#   3) com.android.renderscript.cache
+# * /data/user_de/0/com.google.android.gms/app_chimera
+# TODO: Tighten (b/112357170)
+allow priv_app privapp_data_file:file execute;
+
+# Chrome Crashpad uses the the dynamic linker to load native executables
+# from an APK (b/112050209, crbug.com/928422)
+allow priv_app system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
+allow priv_app privapp_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+
+# Priv apps can find services that expose both @SystemAPI and normal APIs.
+allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app music_recognition_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app network_watchlist_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app oem_lock_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app stats_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Write to /cache.
+allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
+# /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
+allow priv_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
+# running "adb install foo.apk".
+allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to betterbug
+allow priv_app trace_data_file:file { getattr read };
+
+# Allow betterbug to read profile reports generated by profcollect.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow priv_app profcollectd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Allow the bug reporting frontend to read the presence and timestamp of the
+# trace attached to the bugreport (but not its contents, which will go in the
+# usual bugreport .zip file). This is used by the bug reporting UI to tell if
+# the bugreport will contain a system trace or not while the bugreport is still
+# in progress.
+allow priv_app perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow priv_app perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:file { getattr };
+# Required to traverse the parent dir (/data/misc/perfetto-traces).
+allow priv_app perfetto_traces_data_file:dir { search };
+
+# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
+allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
+
+# For AppFuse.
+allow priv_app vold:fd use;
+allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+# /proc access
+allow priv_app {
+  proc_vmstat
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow priv_app sysfs_type:dir search;
+# Read access to /sys/class/net/wlan*/address
+r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_net)
+# Read access to /sys/block/zram*/mm_stat
+r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_zram)
+
+r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs)
+
+# access the mac address
+allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
+
+# Allow com.android.vending to communicate with statsd.
+binder_call(priv_app, statsd)
+
+# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
+allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
+
+# Access to /data/preloads
+allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow priv_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow priv_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app)
+
+# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
+# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(priv_app)
+
+# Allow priv_apps to request and collect incident reports.
+# (Also requires DUMP and PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS permissions)
+allow priv_app incident_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(priv_app, incidentd)
+allow priv_app incidentd:fifo_file { read write };
+
+# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
+can_profile_heap(priv_app)
+can_profile_perf(priv_app)
+
+# Allow priv_apps to check whether Dynamic System Update is enabled
+get_prop(priv_app, dynamic_system_prop)
+
+# suppress denials for non-API accesses.
+dontaudit priv_app exec_type:file getattr;
+dontaudit priv_app device:dir read;
+dontaudit priv_app fs_bpf:dir search;
+dontaudit priv_app net_dns_prop:file read;
+dontaudit priv_app proc:file read;
+dontaudit priv_app proc_interrupts:file read;
+dontaudit priv_app proc_modules:file read;
+dontaudit priv_app proc_net:file read;
+dontaudit priv_app proc_stat:file read;
+dontaudit priv_app proc_version:file read;
+dontaudit priv_app sysfs:dir read;
+dontaudit priv_app sysfs:file read;
+dontaudit priv_app sysfs_android_usb:file read;
+dontaudit priv_app sysfs_dm:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit priv_app { wifi_prop wifi_hal_prop }:file read;
+
+# allow privileged apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow priv_app system_server:udp_socket {
+        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
+
+# allow apps like Phonesky to check the file signature of an apk installed on
+# the Incremental File System, fill missing blocks and get the app status and loading progress
+allowxperm priv_app apk_data_file:file ioctl {
+  INCFS_IOCTL_READ_SIGNATURE
+  INCFS_IOCTL_FILL_BLOCKS
+  INCFS_IOCTL_GET_BLOCK_COUNT
+  INCFS_IOCTL_GET_FILLED_BLOCKS
+};
+
+# allow privileged data loader apps (e.g. com.android.vending) to read logs from Incremental File System
+allow priv_app incremental_control_file:file { read getattr ioctl };
+
+# allow apps like Phonesky to request permission to fill blocks of an apk file
+# on the Incremental File System.
+allowxperm priv_app incremental_control_file:file ioctl INCFS_IOCTL_PERMIT_FILL;
+
+# allow privileged apps to read the vendor property that indicates if Incremental File System is enabled
+get_prop(priv_app, incremental_prop)
+
+# Required for Phonesky to be able to read APEX files under /data/apex/active/.
+allow priv_app apex_data_file:dir search;
+allow priv_app staging_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+# Required for Phonesky to be able to read staged files under /data/app-staging.
+allow priv_app staging_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# allow priv app to access the system app data files for ContentProvider case.
+allow priv_app system_app_data_file:file { read getattr };
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Receive or send uevent messages.
+neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+
+# Receive or send generic netlink messages
+neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
+
+# Read or write kernel printk buffer
+neverallow priv_app kmsg_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
+# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
+neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
+
+# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
+# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
+# services.
+neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
+
+# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
+# or set properties. b/10243159
+neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
+
+# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
+# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
+# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
+# constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
+# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
+# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
+# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
+# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
+neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
+
+# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
+# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
+# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
+# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
+# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
+# capability.
+neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;
+
+# priv apps should not be able to open trace data files, they should depend
+# upon traceur to pass a file descriptor which they can then read
+neverallow priv_app trace_data_file:dir *;
+neverallow priv_app trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open };
+
+# Do not allow priv_app access to cgroups.
+neverallow priv_app cgroup:file *;
+neverallow priv_app cgroup_v2:file *;
+
+# Do not allow loading executable code from non-privileged
+# application home directories. Code loading across a security boundary
+# is dangerous and allows a full compromise of a privileged process
+# by an unprivileged process. b/112357170
+neverallow priv_app app_data_file:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# Do not follow untrusted app provided symlinks
+neverallow priv_app app_data_file:lnk_file { open read getattr };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/profcollectd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/profcollectd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..efde321
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/profcollectd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# profcollectd - hardware profile collection daemon
+type profcollectd, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type profcollectd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  init_daemon_domain(profcollectd)
+
+  # profcollectd opens a file for writing in /data/misc/profcollectd.
+  allow profcollectd profcollectd_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+  allow profcollectd profcollectd_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+  # Allow profcollectd full use of perf_event_open(2), to enable system wide profiling.
+  allow profcollectd self:perf_event { cpu kernel open read write };
+
+  # Allow profcollectd to scan through /proc/pid for all processes.
+  r_dir_file(profcollectd, domain)
+
+  # Allow profcollectd to read executable binaries.
+  allow profcollectd system_file_type:file r_file_perms;
+  allow profcollectd vendor_file_type:file r_file_perms;
+
+  # Allow profcollectd to search for and read kernel modules.
+  allow profcollectd vendor_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow profcollectd vendor_kernel_modules:file r_file_perms;
+
+  # Allow profcollectd to read system bootstrap libs.
+  allow profcollectd system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir search;
+  allow profcollectd system_bootstrap_lib_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+  # Allow profcollectd to access tracefs.
+  allow profcollectd debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow profcollectd debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+  allow profcollectd debugfs_tracing_debug:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow profcollectd debugfs_tracing_debug:file rw_file_perms;
+
+  # Allow profcollectd to write to perf_event_paranoid under /proc.
+  allow profcollectd proc_perf:file write;
+
+  # Allow profcollectd to access cs_etm sysfs.
+  r_dir_file(profcollectd, sysfs_devices_cs_etm)
+
+  # Allow profcollectd to ptrace.
+  allow profcollectd self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
+
+  # Allow profcollectd to read its system properties.
+  get_prop(profcollectd, device_config_profcollect_native_boot_prop)
+  set_prop(profcollectd, profcollectd_node_id_prop)
+
+  # Allow profcollectd to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
+  binder_use(profcollectd)
+  add_service(profcollectd, profcollectd_service)
+
+  # Allow to temporarily lift the kptr_restrict setting and get kernel start address
+  # by reading /proc/kallsyms, get module start address by reading /proc/modules.
+  set_prop(profcollectd, lower_kptr_restrict_prop)
+  allow profcollectd proc_kallsyms:file r_file_perms;
+  allow profcollectd proc_modules:file r_file_perms;
+
+  # Allow profcollectd to read kernel build id.
+  allow profcollectd sysfs_kernel_notes:file r_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/profman.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/profman.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f61d05e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/profman.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+typeattribute profman coredomain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/property.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/property.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01d4fd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/property.te
@@ -0,0 +1,604 @@
+# Properties used only in /system
+system_internal_prop(adbd_prop)
+system_internal_prop(ctl_snapuserd_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_profcollect_native_boot_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_statsd_native_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_statsd_native_boot_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_storage_native_boot_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_sys_traced_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_configuration_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_connectivity_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_swcodec_native_prop)
+system_internal_prop(fastbootd_protocol_prop)
+system_internal_prop(gsid_prop)
+system_internal_prop(init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop)
+system_internal_prop(init_service_status_private_prop)
+system_internal_prop(init_svc_debug_prop)
+system_internal_prop(keystore_listen_prop)
+system_internal_prop(last_boot_reason_prop)
+system_internal_prop(localization_prop)
+system_internal_prop(lower_kptr_restrict_prop)
+system_internal_prop(net_464xlat_fromvendor_prop)
+system_internal_prop(net_connectivity_prop)
+system_internal_prop(netd_stable_secret_prop)
+system_internal_prop(odsign_prop)
+system_internal_prop(perf_drop_caches_prop)
+system_internal_prop(pm_prop)
+system_internal_prop(profcollectd_node_id_prop)
+system_internal_prop(rollback_test_prop)
+system_internal_prop(setupwizard_prop)
+system_internal_prop(system_adbd_prop)
+system_internal_prop(traced_perf_enabled_prop)
+system_internal_prop(userspace_reboot_log_prop)
+system_internal_prop(userspace_reboot_test_prop)
+system_internal_prop(verity_status_prop)
+system_internal_prop(zygote_wrap_prop)
+system_internal_prop(ctl_mediatranscoding_prop)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+treble_sysprop_neverallow(`
+
+enforce_sysprop_owner(`
+  neverallow domain {
+    property_type
+    -system_property_type
+    -product_property_type
+    -vendor_property_type
+  }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+neverallow { domain -coredomain } {
+  system_property_type
+  system_internal_property_type
+  -system_restricted_property_type
+  -system_public_property_type
+}:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { domain -coredomain } {
+  system_property_type
+  -system_public_property_type
+}:property_service set;
+
+# init is in coredomain, but should be able to read/write all props.
+# dumpstate is also in coredomain, but should be able to read all props.
+neverallow { coredomain -init -dumpstate } {
+  vendor_property_type
+  vendor_internal_property_type
+  -vendor_restricted_property_type
+  -vendor_public_property_type
+}:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { coredomain -init } {
+  vendor_property_type
+  -vendor_public_property_type
+}:property_service set;
+
+')
+
+# There is no need to perform ioctl or advisory locking operations on
+# property files. If this neverallow is being triggered, it is
+# likely that the policy is using r_file_perms directly instead of
+# the get_prop() macro.
+neverallow domain property_type:file { ioctl lock };
+
+neverallow * {
+  core_property_type
+  -audio_prop
+  -config_prop
+  -cppreopt_prop
+  -dalvik_prop
+  -debuggerd_prop
+  -debug_prop
+  -dhcp_prop
+  -dumpstate_prop
+  -fingerprint_prop
+  -logd_prop
+  -net_radio_prop
+  -nfc_prop
+  -ota_prop
+  -pan_result_prop
+  -persist_debug_prop
+  -powerctl_prop
+  -radio_prop
+  -restorecon_prop
+  -shell_prop
+  -system_prop
+  -usb_prop
+  -vold_prop
+}:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# sigstop property is only used for debugging; should only be set by su which is permissive
+# for userdebug/eng
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+} ctl_sigstop_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Don't audit legacy ctl. property handling.  We only want the newer permission check to appear
+# in the audit log
+dontaudit domain {
+  ctl_bootanim_prop
+  ctl_bugreport_prop
+  ctl_console_prop
+  ctl_default_prop
+  ctl_dumpstate_prop
+  ctl_fuse_prop
+  ctl_mdnsd_prop
+  ctl_rildaemon_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+} init_svc_debug_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -dumpstate
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+} init_svc_debug_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+compatible_property_only(`
+# Prevent properties from being set
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    core_property_type
+    extended_core_property_type
+    exported_config_prop
+    exported_default_prop
+    exported_dumpstate_prop
+    exported_system_prop
+    exported3_system_prop
+    usb_control_prop
+    -nfc_prop
+    -powerctl_prop
+    -radio_prop
+  }:property_service set;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -hal_nfc_server
+  } {
+    nfc_prop
+  }:property_service set;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -hal_telephony_server
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    radio_control_prop
+  }:property_service set;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -hal_telephony_server
+  } {
+    radio_prop
+  }:property_service set;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -bluetooth
+    -hal_bluetooth_server
+  } {
+    bluetooth_prop
+  }:property_service set;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -bluetooth
+    -hal_bluetooth_server
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    exported_bluetooth_prop
+  }:property_service set;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -hal_camera_server
+    -cameraserver
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    exported_camera_prop
+  }:property_service set;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -hal_wifi_server
+    -wificond
+  } {
+    wifi_prop
+  }:property_service set;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -dumpstate
+    -hal_wifi_server
+    -wificond
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    wifi_hal_prop
+  }:property_service set;
+
+# Prevent properties from being read
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    core_property_type
+    dalvik_config_prop
+    extended_core_property_type
+    exported3_system_prop
+    systemsound_config_prop
+    -debug_prop
+    -logd_prop
+    -nfc_prop
+    -powerctl_prop
+    -radio_prop
+  }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -hal_nfc_server
+  } {
+    nfc_prop
+  }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -hal_telephony_server
+  } {
+    radio_prop
+  }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -bluetooth
+    -hal_bluetooth_server
+  } {
+    bluetooth_prop
+  }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -hal_wifi_server
+    -wificond
+  } {
+    wifi_prop
+  }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    suspend_prop
+  }:property_service set;
+')
+
+compatible_property_only(`
+  # Neverallow coredomain to set vendor properties
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -system_writes_vendor_properties_violators
+  } {
+    property_type
+    -system_property_type
+    -extended_core_property_type
+  }:property_service set;
+')
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -coredomain
+  -vendor_init
+} {
+  ffs_config_prop
+  ffs_control_prop
+}:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+} {
+  userspace_reboot_log_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  # Only allow init and system_server to set system_adbd_prop
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+} {
+  system_adbd_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+# Let (vendor_)init, adbd, and system_server set service.adb.tcp.port
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+  -adbd
+  -system_server
+} {
+  adbd_config_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  # Only allow init and adbd to set adbd_prop
+  domain
+  -init
+  -adbd
+} {
+  adbd_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  # Only allow init and shell to set userspace_reboot_test_prop
+  domain
+  -init
+  -shell
+} {
+  userspace_reboot_test_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+  -vendor_init
+} {
+  surfaceflinger_color_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+} {
+  libc_debug_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+# Allow the shell to set MTE props, so that non-root users with adb shell
+# access can control the settings on their device.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -shell
+} {
+  arm64_memtag_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+  -vendor_init
+} zram_control_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+  -vendor_init
+} dalvik_runtime_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -coredomain
+  -vendor_init
+} {
+  usb_config_prop
+  usb_control_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+} {
+  provisioned_prop
+  retaildemo_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -coredomain
+  -vendor_init
+} {
+  provisioned_prop
+  retaildemo_prop
+}:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+} {
+  init_service_status_private_prop
+  init_service_status_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -radio
+  -appdomain
+  -hal_telephony_server
+  not_compatible_property(`-vendor_init')
+} telephony_status_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+} {
+  graphics_config_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -surfaceflinger
+} {
+  surfaceflinger_display_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -coredomain
+  -appdomain
+  -vendor_init
+} packagemanager_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -coredomain
+  -vendor_init
+} keyguard_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+} {
+  localization_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+  -dumpstate
+  -system_app
+} oem_unlock_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -coredomain
+  -vendor_init
+} storagemanager_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+  -dumpstate
+  -appdomain
+} sendbug_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+  -dumpstate
+  -appdomain
+} camera_calibration_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -dumpstate
+  -hal_dumpstate_server
+  not_compatible_property(`-vendor_init')
+} hal_dumpstate_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_probes')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
+} {
+  lower_kptr_restrict_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+} zygote_wrap_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+} verity_status_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+} setupwizard_prop:property_service set;
+
+# ro.product.property_source_order is useless after initialization of ro.product.* props.
+# So making it accessible only from init and vendor_init.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -dumpstate
+  -vendor_init
+} build_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -shell
+} sqlite_log_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -coredomain
+  -appdomain
+} sqlite_log_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+} default_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Only one of system_property_type and vendor_property_type can be assigned.
+# Property types having both attributes won't be accessible from anywhere.
+neverallow domain system_and_vendor_property_type:{file property_service} *;
+
+neverallow {
+  # Only allow init and shell to set rollback_test_prop
+  domain
+  -init
+  -shell
+} rollback_test_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  # Only allow init and profcollectd to access profcollectd_node_id_prop
+  domain
+  -init
+  -dumpstate
+  -profcollectd
+} profcollectd_node_id_prop:file r_file_perms;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/property_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/property_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..605e912
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/property_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,1199 @@
+##########################
+# property service keys
+#
+#
+net.rmnet               u:object_r:net_radio_prop:s0
+net.gprs                u:object_r:net_radio_prop:s0
+net.ppp                 u:object_r:net_radio_prop:s0
+net.qmi                 u:object_r:net_radio_prop:s0
+net.lte                 u:object_r:net_radio_prop:s0
+net.cdma                u:object_r:net_radio_prop:s0
+net.dns                 u:object_r:net_dns_prop:s0
+ril.                    u:object_r:radio_prop:s0
+ro.ril.                 u:object_r:radio_prop:s0
+gsm.                    u:object_r:radio_prop:s0
+persist.radio           u:object_r:radio_prop:s0
+
+net.                    u:object_r:system_prop:s0
+dev.                    u:object_r:system_prop:s0
+ro.runtime.             u:object_r:system_prop:s0
+ro.runtime.firstboot    u:object_r:firstboot_prop:s0
+hw.                     u:object_r:system_prop:s0
+ro.hw.                  u:object_r:system_prop:s0
+sys.                    u:object_r:system_prop:s0
+sys.audio.              u:object_r:audio_prop:s0
+sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks u:object_r:init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop:s0
+sys.cppreopt            u:object_r:cppreopt_prop:s0
+sys.lpdumpd             u:object_r:lpdumpd_prop:s0
+sys.powerctl            u:object_r:powerctl_prop:s0
+service.                u:object_r:system_prop:s0
+dhcp.                   u:object_r:dhcp_prop:s0
+dhcp.bt-pan.result      u:object_r:pan_result_prop:s0
+bluetooth.              u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0
+
+debug.                  u:object_r:debug_prop:s0
+debug.db.               u:object_r:debuggerd_prop:s0
+dumpstate.              u:object_r:dumpstate_prop:s0
+dumpstate.options       u:object_r:dumpstate_options_prop:s0
+init.svc_debug_pid.     u:object_r:init_svc_debug_prop:s0
+llk.                    u:object_r:llkd_prop:s0
+khungtask.              u:object_r:llkd_prop:s0
+ro.llk.                 u:object_r:llkd_prop:s0
+ro.khungtask.           u:object_r:llkd_prop:s0
+log.                    u:object_r:log_prop:s0
+log.tag                 u:object_r:log_tag_prop:s0
+log.tag.WifiHAL         u:object_r:wifi_log_prop:s0
+security.perf_harden    u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
+security.lower_kptr_restrict u:object_r:lower_kptr_restrict_prop:s0
+service.adb.root        u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
+service.adb.tls.port    u:object_r:adbd_prop:s0
+persist.adb.wifi.       u:object_r:adbd_prop:s0
+persist.adb.tls_server.enable  u:object_r:system_adbd_prop:s0
+
+persist.audio.          u:object_r:audio_prop:s0
+persist.bluetooth.      u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0
+persist.nfc_cfg.        u:object_r:nfc_prop:s0
+persist.debug.          u:object_r:persist_debug_prop:s0
+logd.                   u:object_r:logd_prop:s0
+persist.logd.           u:object_r:logd_prop:s0
+ro.logd.                u:object_r:logd_prop:s0
+persist.logd.security   u:object_r:device_logging_prop:s0
+persist.logd.logpersistd        u:object_r:logpersistd_logging_prop:s0
+logd.logpersistd        u:object_r:logpersistd_logging_prop:s0
+persist.log.tag         u:object_r:log_tag_prop:s0
+persist.mmc.            u:object_r:mmc_prop:s0
+persist.netd.stable_secret      u:object_r:netd_stable_secret_prop:s0
+persist.pm.mock-upgrade u:object_r:mock_ota_prop:s0
+persist.profcollectd.node_id    u:object_r:profcollectd_node_id_prop:s0     exact   string
+persist.sys.            u:object_r:system_prop:s0
+persist.sys.safemode    u:object_r:safemode_prop:s0
+persist.sys.theme       u:object_r:theme_prop:s0
+persist.sys.fflag.override.settings_dynamic_system    u:object_r:dynamic_system_prop:s0
+ro.sys.safemode         u:object_r:safemode_prop:s0
+persist.sys.audit_safemode      u:object_r:safemode_prop:s0
+persist.sys.dalvik.jvmtiagent   u:object_r:system_jvmti_agent_prop:s0
+persist.service.        u:object_r:system_prop:s0
+persist.service.bdroid. u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0
+persist.security.       u:object_r:system_prop:s0
+persist.traced.enable   u:object_r:traced_enabled_prop:s0
+traced.lazy.            u:object_r:traced_lazy_prop:s0
+persist.heapprofd.enable u:object_r:heapprofd_enabled_prop:s0
+persist.traced_perf.enable u:object_r:traced_perf_enabled_prop:s0
+persist.vendor.debug.wifi. u:object_r:persist_vendor_debug_wifi_prop:s0
+persist.vendor.overlay.  u:object_r:overlay_prop:s0
+ro.boot.vendor.overlay.  u:object_r:overlay_prop:s0
+ro.boottime.             u:object_r:boottime_prop:s0
+ro.serialno             u:object_r:serialno_prop:s0
+ro.boot.btmacaddr       u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0
+ro.boot.serialno        u:object_r:serialno_prop:s0
+ro.bt.                  u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0
+ro.boot.bootreason      u:object_r:bootloader_boot_reason_prop:s0
+persist.sys.boot.reason u:object_r:last_boot_reason_prop:s0
+sys.boot.reason         u:object_r:system_boot_reason_prop:s0
+sys.boot.reason.last    u:object_r:last_boot_reason_prop:s0
+pm.                     u:object_r:pm_prop:s0
+test.sys.boot.reason    u:object_r:test_boot_reason_prop:s0
+test.userspace_reboot.requested u:object_r:userspace_reboot_test_prop:s0
+sys.lmk.                u:object_r:system_lmk_prop:s0
+sys.trace.              u:object_r:system_trace_prop:s0
+wrap.                   u:object_r:zygote_wrap_prop:s0 prefix string
+
+# Suspend service properties
+suspend.max_sleep_time_millis u:object_r:suspend_prop:s0 exact uint
+suspend.base_sleep_time_millis u:object_r:suspend_prop:s0 exact uint
+suspend.backoff_threshold_count u:object_r:suspend_prop:s0 exact uint
+suspend.short_suspend_threshold_millis u:object_r:suspend_prop:s0 exact uint
+suspend.sleep_time_scale_factor u:object_r:suspend_prop:s0 exact double
+suspend.failed_suspend_backoff_enabled u:object_r:suspend_prop:s0 exact bool
+suspend.short_suspend_backoff_enabled u:object_r:suspend_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# Fastbootd protocol control property
+fastbootd.protocol    u:object_r:fastbootd_protocol_prop:s0 exact enum usb tcp
+
+# adbd protoctl configuration property
+service.adb.tcp.port    u:object_r:adbd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+service.adb.transport   u:object_r:adbd_config_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# Boolean property set by system server upon boot indicating
+# if device is fully owned by organization instead of being
+# a personal device.
+ro.organization_owned   u:object_r:device_logging_prop:s0
+
+# selinux non-persistent properties
+selinux.restorecon_recursive   u:object_r:restorecon_prop:s0
+
+# default property context
+*                       u:object_r:default_prop:s0
+
+# data partition encryption properties
+vold.                   u:object_r:vold_prop:s0
+ro.crypto.              u:object_r:vold_prop:s0
+
+# ro.build.fingerprint is either set in /system/build.prop, or is
+# set at runtime by system_server.
+ro.build.fingerprint    u:object_r:fingerprint_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.persistent_properties.ready  u:object_r:persistent_properties_ready_prop:s0
+
+# ctl properties
+ctl.bootanim            u:object_r:ctl_bootanim_prop:s0
+ctl.dumpstate           u:object_r:ctl_dumpstate_prop:s0
+ctl.fuse_               u:object_r:ctl_fuse_prop:s0
+ctl.mdnsd               u:object_r:ctl_mdnsd_prop:s0
+ctl.ril-daemon          u:object_r:ctl_rildaemon_prop:s0
+ctl.bugreport           u:object_r:ctl_bugreport_prop:s0
+ctl.console             u:object_r:ctl_console_prop:s0
+ctl.                    u:object_r:ctl_default_prop:s0
+
+# Don't allow uncontrolled access to all services
+ctl.sigstop_on$         u:object_r:ctl_sigstop_prop:s0
+ctl.sigstop_off$        u:object_r:ctl_sigstop_prop:s0
+ctl.start$              u:object_r:ctl_start_prop:s0
+ctl.stop$               u:object_r:ctl_stop_prop:s0
+ctl.restart$            u:object_r:ctl_restart_prop:s0
+ctl.interface_start$    u:object_r:ctl_interface_start_prop:s0
+ctl.interface_stop$     u:object_r:ctl_interface_stop_prop:s0
+ctl.interface_restart$  u:object_r:ctl_interface_restart_prop:s0
+
+ # Restrict access to starting/stopping adbd
+ctl.start$adbd             u:object_r:ctl_adbd_prop:s0
+ctl.stop$adbd              u:object_r:ctl_adbd_prop:s0
+ctl.restart$adbd           u:object_r:ctl_adbd_prop:s0
+
+# Restrict access to starting/stopping gsid.
+ctl.start$gsid          u:object_r:ctl_gsid_prop:s0
+ctl.stop$gsid           u:object_r:ctl_gsid_prop:s0
+ctl.restart$gsid        u:object_r:ctl_gsid_prop:s0
+
+# Restrict access to stopping apexd.
+ctl.stop$apexd          u:object_r:ctl_apexd_prop:s0
+
+# Restrict access to starting media.transcoding.
+ctl.start$media.transcoding  u:object_r:ctl_mediatranscoding_prop:s0
+
+# Restrict access to restart dumpstate
+ctl.interface_restart$android.hardware.dumpstate u:object_r:ctl_dumpstate_prop:s0
+
+# Restrict access to control snapuserd
+ctl.start$snapuserd     u:object_r:ctl_snapuserd_prop:s0
+ctl.stop$snapuserd      u:object_r:ctl_snapuserd_prop:s0
+ctl.restart$snapuserd   u:object_r:ctl_snapuserd_prop:s0
+
+# NFC properties
+nfc.                    u:object_r:nfc_prop:s0
+
+# These properties are not normally set by processes other than init.
+# They are only distinguished here for setting by qemu-props on the
+# emulator/goldfish.
+config.                 u:object_r:config_prop:s0
+ro.config.              u:object_r:config_prop:s0
+dalvik.                 u:object_r:dalvik_prop:s0
+ro.dalvik.              u:object_r:dalvik_prop:s0
+
+# qemu_hw_prop is read/written by both system and vendor.
+qemu.hw.mainkeys        u:object_r:qemu_hw_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# qemu_sf_lcd_density_prop is read/written by both system and vendor.
+qemu.sf.lcd_density     u:object_r:qemu_sf_lcd_density_prop:s0 exact int
+
+# Shared between system server and wificond
+wifi.                   u:object_r:wifi_prop:s0
+wlan.                   u:object_r:wifi_prop:s0
+
+# Lowpan properties
+lowpan.                 u:object_r:lowpan_prop:s0
+ro.lowpan.              u:object_r:lowpan_prop:s0
+
+# heapprofd properties
+heapprofd.              u:object_r:heapprofd_prop:s0
+
+# hwservicemanager properties
+hwservicemanager.       u:object_r:hwservicemanager_prop:s0
+
+# Common default properties for vendor, odm, vendor_dlkm, and odm_dlkm.
+init.svc.odm.           u:object_r:vendor_default_prop:s0
+init.svc.vendor.        u:object_r:vendor_default_prop:s0
+ro.hardware.            u:object_r:vendor_default_prop:s0
+ro.odm.                 u:object_r:vendor_default_prop:s0
+ro.vendor.              u:object_r:vendor_default_prop:s0
+ro.vendor_dlkm.         u:object_r:vendor_default_prop:s0
+ro.odm_dlkm.            u:object_r:vendor_default_prop:s0
+odm.                    u:object_r:vendor_default_prop:s0
+persist.odm.            u:object_r:vendor_default_prop:s0
+persist.vendor.         u:object_r:vendor_default_prop:s0
+vendor.                 u:object_r:vendor_default_prop:s0
+
+# Properties that relate to time / time zone detection behavior.
+persist.time.           u:object_r:time_prop:s0
+
+# Properties that relate to server configurable flags
+device_config.reset_performed                       u:object_r:device_config_reset_performed_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.activity_manager_native_boot. u:object_r:device_config_activity_manager_native_boot_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.attempted_boot_count          u:object_r:device_config_boot_count_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.configuration.                u:object_r:device_config_configuration_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.connectivity.                 u:object_r:device_config_connectivity_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.input_native_boot.            u:object_r:device_config_input_native_boot_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.media_native.                 u:object_r:device_config_media_native_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.netd_native.                  u:object_r:device_config_netd_native_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.profcollect_native_boot.      u:object_r:device_config_profcollect_native_boot_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.runtime_native.               u:object_r:device_config_runtime_native_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.runtime_native_boot.          u:object_r:device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.statsd_native.                u:object_r:device_config_statsd_native_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.statsd_native_boot.           u:object_r:device_config_statsd_native_boot_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.storage_native_boot.          u:object_r:device_config_storage_native_boot_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.swcodec_native.               u:object_r:device_config_swcodec_native_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.window_manager_native_boot.   u:object_r:device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop:s0
+
+# MM Events config props
+persist.mm_events.enabled                           u:object_r:mm_events_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# Properties that relate to legacy server configurable flags
+persist.device_config.global_settings.sys_traced u:object_r:device_config_sys_traced_prop:s0
+
+apexd.                  u:object_r:apexd_prop:s0
+apexd.config.dm_delete.timeout           u:object_r:apexd_config_prop:s0 exact uint
+apexd.config.dm_create.timeout           u:object_r:apexd_config_prop:s0 exact uint
+persist.apexd.          u:object_r:apexd_prop:s0
+
+bpf.progs_loaded        u:object_r:bpf_progs_loaded_prop:s0
+
+gsid.                   u:object_r:gsid_prop:s0
+ro.gsid.                u:object_r:gsid_prop:s0
+
+# Property for disabling NNAPI vendor extensions on product image (used on GSI /product image,
+# which can't use NNAPI vendor extensions).
+ro.nnapi.extensions.deny_on_product                u:object_r:nnapi_ext_deny_product_prop:s0
+
+# Property that is set once ueventd finishes cold boot.
+ro.cold_boot_done       u:object_r:cold_boot_done_prop:s0
+
+# Properties that control performance operations.
+# Leave space to later set drop_caches to 1, 2, and 4.
+perf.drop_caches        u:object_r:perf_drop_caches_prop:s0 exact enum 0 3
+
+# Charger properties
+ro.charger.                 u:object_r:charger_prop:s0
+sys.boot_from_charger_mode  u:object_r:charger_status_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.enable_boot_charger_mode u:object_r:charger_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# Virtual A/B properties
+ro.virtual_ab.enabled   u:object_r:virtual_ab_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.virtual_ab.retrofit  u:object_r:virtual_ab_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.virtual_ab.compression.enabled  u:object_r:virtual_ab_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.product.ab_ota_partitions u:object_r:ota_prop:s0 exact string
+# Property to set/clear the warm reset flag after an OTA update.
+ota.warm_reset  u:object_r:ota_prop:s0
+# The vbmeta digest for the inactive slot. It can be set after installing
+# ota updates to the b partition of a/b devices.
+ota.other.vbmeta_digest  u:object_r:ota_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# Module properties
+com.android.sdkext.                  u:object_r:module_sdkextensions_prop:s0
+persist.com.android.sdkext.          u:object_r:module_sdkextensions_prop:s0
+
+# Connectivity module
+net.464xlat.cellular.enabled         u:object_r:net_464xlat_fromvendor_prop:s0 exact bool
+net.tcp_def_init_rwnd                u:object_r:net_connectivity_prop:s0 exact int
+
+# Userspace reboot properties
+sys.userspace_reboot.log.         u:object_r:userspace_reboot_log_prop:s0
+persist.sys.userspace_reboot.log. u:object_r:userspace_reboot_log_prop:s0
+
+# Integer property which is used in libgui to configure the number of frames
+# tracked by buffer queue's frame event timing history. The property is set
+# by devices with video decoding pipelines long enough to overflow the default
+# history size.
+ro.lib_gui.frame_event_history_size u:object_r:bq_config_prop:s0
+
+af.fast_track_multiplier         u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.af.client_heap_size_kbyte     u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.audio.flinger_standbytime_ms  u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+audio.camerasound.force         u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+audio.deep_buffer.media         u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+audio.offload.video             u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+audio.offload.min.duration.secs u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.audio.ignore_effects   u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.audio.monitorRotation  u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.audio.offload_wakelock u:object_r:audio_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+persist.config.calibration_fac u:object_r:camera_calibration_prop:s0 exact string
+
+config.disable_cameraservice u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+camera.disable_zsl_mode u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+camera.fifo.disable     u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.camera.notify_nfc    u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.camera.enableLazyHal u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.camerax.extensions.enabled u:object_r:camerax_extensions_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# ART properties
+dalvik.vm.                 u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0
+ro.dalvik.vm.              u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0
+ro.zygote                  u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# A set of ART properties listed explicitly for compatibility purposes.
+ro.dalvik.vm.native.bridge u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.always_debuggable                   u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.appimageformat                      u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.backgroundgctype                    u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.boot-dex2oat-cpu-set                u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.boot-dex2oat-threads                u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.boot-image                          u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.bgdexopt.new-classes-percent        u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.bgdexopt.new-methods-percent        u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.checkjni                            u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-Xms                         u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-Xmx                         u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-cpu-set                     u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-filter                      u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-flags                       u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-max-image-block-size        u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-minidebuginfo               u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-resolve-startup-strings     u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-threads                     u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-updatable-bcp-packages-file u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-very-large                  u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat-swap                        u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.dex2oat64.enabled                   u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.dexopt.secondary                    u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.dexopt.thermal-cutoff               u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.execution-mode                      u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.extra-opts                          u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.foreground-heap-growth-multiplier   u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.gctype                              u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.heapgrowthlimit                     u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.heapmaxfree                         u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.heapminfree                         u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.heapsize                            u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.heapstartsize                       u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.heaptargetutilization               u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.hot-startup-method-samples          u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.image-dex2oat-Xms                   u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.image-dex2oat-Xmx                   u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.image-dex2oat-cpu-set               u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.image-dex2oat-filter                u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.image-dex2oat-flags                 u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.image-dex2oat-threads               u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.isa.arm.features                    u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.arm.variant                     u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.arm64.features                  u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.arm64.variant                   u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.mips.features                   u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.mips.variant                    u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.mips64.features                 u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.mips64.variant                  u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.unknown.features                u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.unknown.variant                 u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.x86.features                    u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.x86.variant                     u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.x86_64.features                 u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.isa.x86_64.variant                  u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.jitinitialsize                      u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.jitmaxsize                          u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.jitprithreadweight                  u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.jitthreshold                        u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.jittransitionweight                 u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.jniopts                             u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.lockprof.threshold                  u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.method-trace                        u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.method-trace-file                   u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.method-trace-file-siz               u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.method-trace-stream                 u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.profilesystemserver                 u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.profilebootclasspath                u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.ps-min-save-period-ms               u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.ps-resolved-classes-delay-ms        u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.restore-dex2oat-cpu-set             u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact string
+dalvik.vm.restore-dex2oat-threads             u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+dalvik.vm.usejit                              u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.usejitprofiles                      u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+dalvik.vm.zygote.max-boot-retry               u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+persist.sys.dalvik.vm.lib.2 u:object_r:dalvik_runtime_prop:s0 exact string
+
+keyguard.no_require_sim u:object_r:keyguard_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+media.c2.dmabuf.padding                      u:object_r:codec2_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+media.recorder.show_manufacturer_and_model   u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+media.stagefright.cache-params               u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact string
+media.stagefright.enable-aac                 u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+media.stagefright.enable-fma2dp              u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+media.stagefright.enable-http                u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+media.stagefright.enable-player              u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+media.stagefright.enable-qcp                 u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+media.stagefright.enable-scan                u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+media.stagefright.thumbnail.prefer_hw_codecs u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.sys.media.avsync                     u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap             u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact string
+persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.disabled        u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.bluetooth_audio_hal.disabled u:object_r:bluetooth_audio_hal_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.btsnoopenable                u:object_r:exported_bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+persist.radio.multisim.config u:object_r:radio_control_prop:s0 exact string
+
+persist.sys.hdmi.keep_awake                                        u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.hdmi.cec_device_types                                           u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hdmi.device_type                                                u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hdmi.set_menu_language                                          u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.hdmi.cec.source.set_menu_language.enabled                       u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.hdmi.property_sytem_audio_device_arc_port                       u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hdmi.cec_audio_device_forward_volume_keys_system_audio_mode_off u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.hdmi.property_is_device_hdmi_cec_switch                         u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.hdmi.wake_on_hotplug                                            u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.hdmi.cec.source.send_standby_on_sleep                           u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact enum to_tv broadcast none
+ro.hdmi.cec.source.playback_device_action_on_routing_control       u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact enum none wake_up_only wake_up_and_send_active_source
+
+pm.dexopt.ab-ota                            u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.bg-dexopt                         u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.boot                              u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.cmdline                           u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.disable_bg_dexopt                 u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact bool
+pm.dexopt.downgrade_after_inactive_days     u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
+pm.dexopt.first-boot                        u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.inactive                          u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install                           u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install-fast                      u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install-bulk                      u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install-bulk-secondary            u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install-bulk-downgraded           u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install-bulk-secondary-downgraded u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.shared                            u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.apk_verity.mode u:object_r:apk_verity_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.supported u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.boot.vendor.overlay.theme u:object_r:exported_overlay_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.bt.bdaddr_path u:object_r:exported_bluetooth_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.config.alarm_alert         u:object_r:systemsound_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.config.alarm_vol_default   u:object_r:systemsound_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.config.alarm_vol_steps     u:object_r:systemsound_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.config.media_vol_default   u:object_r:systemsound_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.config.media_vol_steps     u:object_r:systemsound_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.config.notification_sound  u:object_r:systemsound_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.config.ringtone            u:object_r:systemsound_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.config.system_vol_default  u:object_r:systemsound_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.config.system_vol_steps    u:object_r:systemsound_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.config.vc_call_vol_default u:object_r:systemsound_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.control_privapp_permissions u:object_r:packagemanager_config_prop:s0 exact enum disable enforce log
+ro.cp_system_other_odex        u:object_r:packagemanager_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.crypto.allow_encrypt_override                u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.crypto.dm_default_key.options_format.version u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.crypto.fde_algorithm                         u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.crypto.fde_sector_size                       u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.crypto.scrypt_params                         u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.crypto.set_dun                               u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.crypto.volume.contents_mode                  u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.crypto.volume.filenames_mode                 u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.crypto.volume.metadata.encryption            u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.crypto.volume.metadata.method                u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.crypto.volume.options                        u:object_r:vold_config_prop:s0 exact string
+
+external_storage.projid.enabled   u:object_r:storage_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+external_storage.casefold.enabled u:object_r:storage_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+external_storage.sdcardfs.enabled u:object_r:storage_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+external_storage.cross_user.enabled u:object_r:storage_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.config.per_app_memcg         u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.lmk.critical                 u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.critical_upgrade         u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.lmk.debug                    u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.lmk.downgrade_pressure       u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.kill_heaviest_task       u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.lmk.kill_timeout_ms          u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.log_stats                u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.lmk.low                      u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.medium                   u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.psi_partial_stall_ms     u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.psi_complete_stall_ms    u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.swap_free_low_percentage u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.swap_util_max            u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.thrashing_limit          u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.thrashing_limit_critical u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.thrashing_limit_decay    u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.lmk.use_minfree_levels       u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.lmk.upgrade_pressure         u:object_r:lmkd_config_prop:s0 exact int
+lmkd.reinit                     u:object_r:lmkd_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.media.xml_variant.codecs             u:object_r:media_variant_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.media.xml_variant.codecs_performance u:object_r:media_variant_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.media.xml_variant.profiles           u:object_r:media_variant_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.minui.default_rotation u:object_r:recovery_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.minui.overscan_percent u:object_r:recovery_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.minui.pixel_format     u:object_r:recovery_config_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.oem_unlock_supported u:object_r:oem_unlock_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.rebootescrow.device u:object_r:rebootescrow_hal_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.storage_manager.enabled     u:object_r:storagemanager_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.storage_manager.show_opt_in u:object_r:storagemanager_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.vehicle.hal u:object_r:vehicle_hal_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.vendor.build.security_patch u:object_r:vendor_security_patch_level_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.zram.mark_idle_delay_mins    u:object_r:zram_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.zram.first_wb_delay_mins     u:object_r:zram_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.zram.periodic_wb_delay_hours u:object_r:zram_config_prop:s0 exact int
+zram.force_writeback            u:object_r:zram_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.sys.zram_enabled        u:object_r:zram_control_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+sendbug.preferred.domain u:object_r:sendbug_config_prop:s0 exact string
+
+persist.sys.usb.usbradio.config u:object_r:usb_control_prop:s0 exact string
+
+sys.usb.config     u:object_r:usb_control_prop:s0 exact string
+sys.usb.configfs   u:object_r:usb_control_prop:s0 exact int
+sys.usb.controller u:object_r:usb_control_prop:s0 exact string
+sys.usb.state      u:object_r:usb_control_prop:s0 exact string
+
+sys.usb.mtp.device_type u:object_r:usb_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+sys.usb.config. u:object_r:usb_prop:s0
+
+sys.usb.ffs.aio_compat u:object_r:ffs_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+sys.usb.ffs.max_read   u:object_r:ffs_config_prop:s0 exact int
+sys.usb.ffs.max_write  u:object_r:ffs_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+sys.usb.ffs.ready     u:object_r:ffs_control_prop:s0 exact bool
+sys.usb.ffs.mtp.ready u:object_r:ffs_control_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+tombstoned.max_tombstone_count u:object_r:tombstone_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+vold.post_fs_data_done u:object_r:vold_post_fs_data_prop:s0 exact int
+
+apexd.status u:object_r:apexd_prop:s0 exact enum starting activated ready
+
+odsign.key.done u:object_r:odsign_prop:s0 exact bool
+odsign.verification.done u:object_r:odsign_prop:s0 exact bool
+odsign.verification.success u:object_r:odsign_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+dev.bootcomplete   u:object_r:boot_status_prop:s0 exact bool
+sys.boot_completed u:object_r:boot_status_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+persist.sys.device_provisioned u:object_r:provisioned_prop:s0 exact string
+
+persist.sys.theme               u:object_r:theme_prop:s0 exact string
+
+sys.retaildemo.enabled u:object_r:retaildemo_prop:s0 exact int
+
+sys.user.0.ce_available u:object_r:exported3_system_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+aac_drc_boost            u:object_r:aac_drc_prop:s0 exact int
+aac_drc_cut              u:object_r:aac_drc_prop:s0 exact int
+aac_drc_enc_target_level u:object_r:aac_drc_prop:s0 exact int
+aac_drc_heavy            u:object_r:aac_drc_prop:s0 exact int
+aac_drc_reference_level  u:object_r:aac_drc_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.aac_drc_effect_type   u:object_r:aac_drc_prop:s0 exact int
+
+build.version.extensions. u:object_r:module_sdkextensions_prop:s0 prefix int
+
+drm.64bit.enabled            u:object_r:mediadrm_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+media.mediadrmservice.enable u:object_r:mediadrm_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+drm.service.enabled u:object_r:drm_service_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+dumpstate.dry_run u:object_r:exported_dumpstate_prop:s0 exact bool
+dumpstate.unroot  u:object_r:exported_dumpstate_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.dumpstate.verbose_logging.enabled u:object_r:hal_dumpstate_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+hal.instrumentation.enable u:object_r:hal_instrumentation_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# default contexts only accessible by coredomain
+init.svc. u:object_r:init_service_status_private_prop:s0 prefix string
+
+# Globally-readable init service props
+init.svc.adbd           u:object_r:init_service_status_prop:s0 exact string
+init.svc.bugreport      u:object_r:init_service_status_prop:s0 exact string
+init.svc.bugreportd     u:object_r:init_service_status_prop:s0 exact string
+init.svc.console        u:object_r:init_service_status_prop:s0 exact string
+init.svc.dumpstatez     u:object_r:init_service_status_prop:s0 exact string
+init.svc.mediadrm       u:object_r:init_service_status_prop:s0 exact string
+init.svc.statsd         u:object_r:init_service_status_prop:s0 exact string
+init.svc.surfaceflinger u:object_r:init_service_status_prop:s0 exact string
+init.svc.tombstoned     u:object_r:init_service_status_prop:s0 exact string
+init.svc.zygote         u:object_r:init_service_status_prop:s0 exact string
+
+libc.debug.malloc.options u:object_r:libc_debug_prop:s0 exact string
+libc.debug.malloc.program u:object_r:libc_debug_prop:s0 exact string
+libc.debug.hooks.enable   u:object_r:libc_debug_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# shell-only props for ARM memory tagging (MTE).
+arm64.memtag. u:object_r:arm64_memtag_prop:s0 prefix string
+
+net.redirect_socket_calls.hooked u:object_r:socket_hook_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+persist.sys.locale       u:object_r:exported_system_prop:s0 exact string
+persist.sys.timezone     u:object_r:exported_system_prop:s0 exact string
+persist.sys.test_harness u:object_r:test_harness_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.arch u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# ro.boot. properties are set based on kernel commandline arguments, which are vendor owned.
+ro.boot.                   u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0
+ro.boot.avb_version        u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.baseband           u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.bootdevice         u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.bootloader         u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.boottime           u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.console            u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.hardware           u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.hardware.color     u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.hardware.sku       u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.keymaster          u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.mode               u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+# Populated on Android Studio Emulator (for emulator specific workarounds)
+ro.boot.qemu               u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.boot.revision           u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.vbmeta.avb_version u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.verifiedbootstate  u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.veritymode         u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# These ro.X properties are set to values of ro.boot.X by property_service.
+ro.baseband   u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bootloader u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bootmode   u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware   u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.revision   u:object_r:bootloader_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.boot.dynamic_partitions          u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.dynamic_partitions_retrofit u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.boottime.init.mount.data u:object_r:boottime_public_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boottime.init.fsck.data  u:object_r:boottime_public_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.build.characteristics                  u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.date                             u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.date.utc                         u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.build.description                      u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.display.id                       u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.flavor                           u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.host                             u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.id                               u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.product                          u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.system_root_image                u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.build.tags                             u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.type                             u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.user                             u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.version.all_codenames            u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.version.base_os                  u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.version.codename                 u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.version.incremental              u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.version.min_supported_target_sdk u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.build.version.preview_sdk              u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.build.version.preview_sdk_fingerprint  u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.version.release                  u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.version.release_or_codename      u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.version.sdk                      u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.build.version.security_patch           u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.actionable_compatible_property.enabled u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.debuggable u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.treble.enabled u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.product.cpu.abi       u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.cpu.abilist   u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.cpu.abilist32 u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.cpu.abilist64 u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.product.system.brand        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.system.device       u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.system.manufacturer u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.system.model        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.system.name         u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.system.build.date                        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system.build.date.utc                    u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.system.build.fingerprint                 u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system.build.id                          u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system.build.tags                        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system.build.type                        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system.build.version.incremental         u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system.build.version.release             u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system.build.version.release_or_codename u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system.build.version.sdk                 u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.adb.secure u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.secure     u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.product.system_ext.brand        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.system_ext.device       u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.system_ext.manufacturer u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.system_ext.model        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.system_ext.name         u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.system_ext.build.date                        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system_ext.build.date.utc                    u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.system_ext.build.fingerprint                 u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system_ext.build.id                          u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system_ext.build.tags                        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system_ext.build.type                        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system_ext.build.version.incremental         u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system_ext.build.version.release             u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system_ext.build.version.release_or_codename u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.system_ext.build.version.sdk                 u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact int
+
+# These ro.product.product.* and ro.product.build.* are set by /product/etc/build.prop
+ro.product.product.brand        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.product.device       u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.product.manufacturer u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.product.model        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.product.name         u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.product.build.date                        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.build.date.utc                    u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.product.build.fingerprint                 u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.build.id                          u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.build.tags                        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.build.type                        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.build.version.incremental         u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.build.version.release             u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.build.version.release_or_codename u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.build.version.sdk                 u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact int
+
+# These 5 properties are set by property_service
+ro.product.brand         u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.device        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.manufacturer  u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.model         u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.name          u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# Sanitizer properties
+ro.sanitize.address          u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.sanitize.cfi              u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.sanitize.default-ub       u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.sanitize.fuzzer           u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.sanitize.hwaddress        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.sanitize.integer_overflow u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.sanitize.safe-stack       u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.sanitize.scudo            u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.sanitize.thread           u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.sanitize.undefined        u:object_r:build_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# All odm build props are set by /odm/build.prop
+ro.odm.build.date                u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.odm.build.date.utc            u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.odm.build.fingerprint         u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.odm.build.version.incremental u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.odm.build.media_performance_class   u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.product.odm.brand        u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.odm.device       u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.odm.manufacturer u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.odm.model        u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.odm.name         u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# All vendor_dlkm build props are set by /vendor_dlkm/etc/build.prop
+ro.vendor_dlkm.build.date                        u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor_dlkm.build.date.utc                    u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.vendor_dlkm.build.fingerprint                 u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor_dlkm.build.id                          u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor_dlkm.build.tags                        u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor_dlkm.build.type                        u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor_dlkm.build.version.incremental         u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor_dlkm.build.version.release             u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor_dlkm.build.version.release_or_codename u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor_dlkm.build.version.sdk                 u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
+
+# All odm_dlkm build props are set by /odm_dlkm/etc/build.prop
+ro.product.odm_dlkm.brand        u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.odm_dlkm.device       u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.odm_dlkm.manufacturer u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.odm_dlkm.model        u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.odm_dlkm.name         u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.odm_dlkm.build.date                        u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.odm_dlkm.build.date.utc                    u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.odm_dlkm.build.fingerprint                 u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.odm_dlkm.build.id                          u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.odm_dlkm.build.tags                        u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.odm_dlkm.build.type                        u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.odm_dlkm.build.version.incremental         u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.odm_dlkm.build.version.release             u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.odm_dlkm.build.version.release_or_codename u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.odm_dlkm.build.version.sdk                 u:object_r:build_odm_prop:s0 exact int
+
+# enforces debugfs restrictions in non-user builds, set by /vendor/build.prop
+ro.product.debugfs_restrictions.enabled u:object_r:debugfs_restriction_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# All vendor build props are set by /vendor/build.prop
+ro.vendor.build.date                        u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor.build.date.utc                    u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.vendor.build.fingerprint                 u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor.build.fingerprint_has_digest      u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.vendor.build.id                          u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor.build.tags                        u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor.build.type                        u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor.build.version.incremental         u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor.build.version.release             u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor.build.version.release_or_codename u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor.build.version.sdk                 u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
+
+# All vendor CPU abilist props are set by /vendor/build.prop
+ro.vendor.product.cpu.abilist   u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor.product.cpu.abilist32 u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vendor.product.cpu.abilist64 u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.product.board                    u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.first_api_level          u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.product.vendor.brand             u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.vendor.device            u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.vendor.manufacturer      u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.vendor.model             u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.vendor.name              u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.vendor_dlkm.brand        u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.vendor_dlkm.device       u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.vendor_dlkm.manufacturer u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.vendor_dlkm.model        u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.vendor_dlkm.name         u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# GRF property for the first api level of the vendor partition
+ro.board.first_api_level u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.board.api_level       u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
+
+# Boot image build props set by /{second_stage_resources/,}boot/etc/build.prop
+ro.bootimage.build.date                        u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bootimage.build.date.utc                    u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.bootimage.build.fingerprint                 u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bootimage.build.id                          u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bootimage.build.tags                        u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bootimage.build.type                        u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bootimage.build.version.incremental         u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bootimage.build.version.release             u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bootimage.build.version.release_or_codename u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bootimage.build.version.sdk                 u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.product.bootimage.brand        u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.bootimage.device       u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.bootimage.manufacturer u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.bootimage.model        u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.product.bootimage.name         u:object_r:build_bootimage_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# ro.product.property_source_order is settable from any build.prop
+ro.product.property_source_order u:object_r:build_config_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.crypto.state u:object_r:vold_status_prop:s0 exact enum encrypted unencrypted unsupported
+ro.crypto.type  u:object_r:vold_status_prop:s0 exact enum block file none
+
+ro.property_service.version u:object_r:property_service_version_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.vendor.redirect_socket_calls u:object_r:vendor_socket_hook_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+service.bootanim.exit u:object_r:bootanim_system_prop:s0 exact int
+service.bootanim.progress u:object_r:bootanim_system_prop:s0 exact int
+
+sys.init.userspace_reboot.in_progress u:object_r:userspace_reboot_exported_prop:s0 exact bool
+sys.use_memfd                         u:object_r:use_memfd_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+vold.decrypt u:object_r:vold_status_prop:s0 exact string
+
+aaudio.hw_burst_min_usec     u:object_r:aaudio_config_prop:s0 exact int
+aaudio.minimum_sleep_usec    u:object_r:aaudio_config_prop:s0 exact int
+aaudio.mixer_bursts          u:object_r:aaudio_config_prop:s0 exact int
+aaudio.mmap_exclusive_policy u:object_r:aaudio_config_prop:s0 exact int
+aaudio.mmap_policy           u:object_r:aaudio_config_prop:s0 exact int
+aaudio.wakeup_delay_usec     u:object_r:aaudio_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+persist.rcs.supported u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.bionic.2nd_arch        u:object_r:cpu_variant_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bionic.2nd_cpu_variant u:object_r:cpu_variant_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bionic.arch            u:object_r:cpu_variant_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.bionic.cpu_variant     u:object_r:cpu_variant_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.board.platform u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.boot.fake_battery         u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.boot.fstab_suffix         u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.hardware.revision    u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.product.hardware.sku u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.product.vendor.sku   u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.boot.slot_suffix          u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.boringcrypto.hwrand u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# Update related props
+ro.build.ab_update                                u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.ab_update.gki.prevent_downgrade_version  u:object_r:ab_update_gki_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.build.ab_update.gki.prevent_downgrade_spl      u:object_r:ab_update_gki_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.build.expect.baseband   u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.build.expect.bootloader u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.carrier u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.config.low_ram           u:object_r:exported_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.config.vc_call_vol_steps u:object_r:exported_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.frp.pst u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.hardware.activity_recognition u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.audio                u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.audio.a2dp           u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.audio.hearing_aid    u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.audio.primary        u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.audio.usb            u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.audio_policy         u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.bootctrl             u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.camera               u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.consumerir           u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.context_hub          u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.egl                  u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.fingerprint          u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.flp                  u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.gatekeeper           u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.gps                  u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.gralloc              u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.hdmi_cec             u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.hwcomposer           u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.input                u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.keystore             u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.keystore_desede      u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.lights               u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.local_time           u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.memtrack             u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.nfc                  u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.nfc_nci              u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.nfc_tag              u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.nvram                u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.power                u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.radio                u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.sensors              u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.sound_trigger        u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.thermal              u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.tv_input             u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.type                 u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.vehicle              u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.vibrator             u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.virtual_device       u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.hardware.vulkan               u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.hw_timeout_multiplier u:object_r:hw_timeout_multiplier_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.hwui.use_vulkan u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# ro.kernel.* properties are emulator specific and deprecated. Do not use.
+# Should be retired once presubmit allows.
+ro.kernel.qemu             u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.kernel.qemu.            u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0
+ro.kernel.android.bootanim u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.oem.key1 u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.product.vndk.version u:object_r:vndk_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.vndk.lite    u:object_r:vndk_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.vndk.version u:object_r:vndk_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.vts.coverage u:object_r:vts_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+vts.native_server.on u:object_r:vts_status_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+wifi.active.interface     u:object_r:wifi_hal_prop:s0 exact string
+wifi.aware.interface      u:object_r:wifi_hal_prop:s0 exact string
+wifi.concurrent.interface u:object_r:wifi_hal_prop:s0 exact string
+wifi.direct.interface     u:object_r:wifi_hal_prop:s0 exact string
+wifi.interface            u:object_r:wifi_hal_prop:s0 exact string
+wlan.driver.status        u:object_r:wifi_hal_prop:s0 exact enum ok unloaded
+
+ro.boot.wificountrycode u:object_r:wifi_config_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.apex.updatable u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# Property to enable incremental feature
+ro.incremental.enable      u:object_r:incremental_prop:s0
+
+# Properties to configure userspace reboot.
+init.userspace_reboot.is_supported u:object_r:userspace_reboot_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+init.userspace_reboot.sigkill.timeoutmillis u:object_r:userspace_reboot_config_prop:s0 exact int
+init.userspace_reboot.sigterm.timeoutmillis u:object_r:userspace_reboot_config_prop:s0 exact int
+init.userspace_reboot.started.timeoutmillis u:object_r:userspace_reboot_config_prop:s0 exact int
+init.userspace_reboot.userdata_remount.timeoutmillis u:object_r:userspace_reboot_config_prop:s0 exact int
+init.userspace_reboot.watchdog.timeoutmillis u:object_r:userspace_reboot_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+sys.shutdown.requested u:object_r:exported_system_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# surfaceflinger properties
+ro.surface_flinger.default_composition_dataspace          u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.default_composition_pixel_format       u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.force_hwc_copy_for_virtual_displays    u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.has_HDR_display                        u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.has_wide_color_display                 u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.max_frame_buffer_acquired_buffers      u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.max_graphics_height                    u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.max_graphics_width                     u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.max_virtual_display_dimension          u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.primary_display_orientation            u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact enum ORIENTATION_0 ORIENTATION_180 ORIENTATION_270 ORIENTATION_90
+ro.surface_flinger.present_time_offset_from_vsync_ns      u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.running_without_sync_framework         u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.start_graphics_allocator_service       u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.use_color_management                   u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.use_context_priority                   u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.use_vr_flinger                         u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.vsync_event_phase_offset_ns            u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.vsync_sf_event_phase_offset_ns         u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.wcg_composition_dataspace              u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.wcg_composition_pixel_format           u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.display_primary_red                    u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.surface_flinger.display_primary_green                  u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.surface_flinger.display_primary_blue                   u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.surface_flinger.display_primary_white                  u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.surface_flinger.protected_contents                     u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.set_idle_timer_ms                      u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.set_touch_timer_ms                     u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.set_display_power_timer_ms             u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.support_kernel_idle_timer              u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.supports_background_blur               u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.use_smart_90_for_video                 u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.use_content_detection_for_refresh_rate u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.color_space_agnostic_dataspace         u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.surface_flinger.refresh_rate_switching                 u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.update_device_product_info_on_hotplug_reconnect u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.enable_frame_rate_override             u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.enable_layer_caching                   u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.display_update_imminent_timeout_ms     u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.sf.disable_triple_buffer u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.sf.lcd_density           u:object_r:surfaceflinger_prop:s0 exact int
+
+persist.sys.sf.color_mode       u:object_r:surfaceflinger_color_prop:s0 exact int
+persist.sys.sf.color_saturation u:object_r:surfaceflinger_color_prop:s0 exact string
+persist.sys.sf.native_mode      u:object_r:surfaceflinger_color_prop:s0 exact int
+
+# Binder cache properties.  These are world-readable
+cache_key.app_inactive                   u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.is_compat_change_enabled       u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.get_packages_for_uid           u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.has_system_feature             u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.is_interactive                 u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.is_power_save_mode             u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.is_user_unlocked               u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.volume_list                    u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.display_info                   u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.location_enabled               u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.package_info                   u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+
+cache_key.bluetooth.                     u:object_r:binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop:s0 prefix string
+cache_key.system_server.                 u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0 prefix string
+cache_key.telephony.                     u:object_r:binder_cache_telephony_server_prop:s0 prefix string
+
+# Framework watchdog configuration properties.
+framework_watchdog.fatal_count                u:object_r:framework_watchdog_config_prop:s0 exact int
+framework_watchdog.fatal_window.second        u:object_r:framework_watchdog_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+gsm.sim.operator.numeric       u:object_r:telephony_status_prop:s0 exact string
+persist.radio.airplane_mode_on u:object_r:telephony_status_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+ro.cdma.home.operator.alpha       u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.cdma.home.operator.numeric     u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.com.android.dataroaming        u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.com.android.prov_mobiledata    u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.radio.noril                    u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.telephony.call_ring.multiple   u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.telephony.default_cdma_sub     u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.telephony.default_network      u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.telephony.iwlan_operation_mode u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact enum default legacy AP-assisted
+telephony.active_modems.max_count u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact int
+telephony.lteOnCdmaDevice         u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact int
+persist.dbg.volte_avail_ovr       u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact int
+persist.dbg.vt_avail_ovr          u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact int
+persist.dbg.wfc_avail_ovr         u:object_r:telephony_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+# System locale list filter configuration
+ro.localization.locale_filter u:object_r:localization_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# Graphics related properties
+ro.opengles.version u:object_r:graphics_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.gfx.driver.0          u:object_r:graphics_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.gfx.driver.1          u:object_r:graphics_config_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.gfx.angle.supported   u:object_r:graphics_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.gfx.driver_build_time u:object_r:graphics_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+graphics.gpu.profiler.support          u:object_r:graphics_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+graphics.gpu.profiler.vulkan_layer_apk u:object_r:graphics_config_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.cpuvulkan.version u:object_r:graphics_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+# surfaceflinger-settable
+graphics.display.kernel_idle_timer.enabled u:object_r:surfaceflinger_display_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# Disable/enable charger input
+power.battery_input.suspended u:object_r:power_debug_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# zygote config property
+zygote.critical_window.minute u:object_r:zygote_config_prop:s0 exact int
+
+ro.zygote.disable_gl_preload u:object_r:zygote_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# Broadcast boot stages, which keystore listens to
+keystore.boot_level u:object_r:keystore_listen_prop:s0 exact int
+
+partition.system.verified     u:object_r:verity_status_prop:s0 exact string
+partition.system_ext.verified u:object_r:verity_status_prop:s0 exact string
+partition.product.verified    u:object_r:verity_status_prop:s0 exact string
+partition.vendor.verified     u:object_r:verity_status_prop:s0 exact string
+
+partition.system.verified.hash_alg     u:object_r:verity_status_prop:s0 exact string
+partition.system_ext.verified.hash_alg u:object_r:verity_status_prop:s0 exact string
+partition.product.verified.hash_alg    u:object_r:verity_status_prop:s0 exact string
+partition.vendor.verified.hash_alg     u:object_r:verity_status_prop:s0 exact string
+
+ro.setupwizard.enterprise_mode u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.setupwizard.esim_cid_ignore u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.setupwizard.rotation_locked u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.setupwizard.wifi_on_exit    u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+setupwizard.enable_assist_gesture_training                         u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.avoid_duplicate_tos                            u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.baseline_setupwizard_enabled                   u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.day_night_mode_enabled                         u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.deferred_setup_low_ram_filter                  u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.deferred_setup_notification                    u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.deferred_setup_suggestion                      u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.device_default_dark_mode                       u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.esim_enabled                                   u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.google_services_deferred_setup_pretend_not_suw u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.lock_mobile_data                               u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.lock_mobile_data.carrier-1                     u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.portal_notification                            u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.predeferred_enabled                            u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.return_partner_customization_bundle            u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.show_pixel_tos                                 u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.use_biometric_lock                             u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.feature.wallpaper_suggestion_after_restore             u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.logging                                                u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.metrics_debug_mode                                     u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+setupwizard.theme                                                  u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact string
+
+db.log.detailed              u:object_r:sqlite_log_prop:s0 exact bool
+db.log.slow_query_threshold  u:object_r:sqlite_log_prop:s0 exact int
+db.log.slow_query_threshold. u:object_r:sqlite_log_prop:s0 prefix int
+
+# SOC related props
+ro.soc.manufacturer u:object_r:soc_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.soc.model        u:object_r:soc_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# set to true when running rollback tests to disable fallback-to-copy when enabling rollbacks
+# to detect failures where hard linking should work otherwise
+persist.rollback.is_test u:object_r:rollback_test_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# bootanimation properties
+ro.bootanim.quiescent.enabled u:object_r:bootanim_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# dck properties
+ro.gms.dck.eligible_wcc u:object_r:dck_prop:s0 exact int
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/racoon.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/racoon.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42ea7c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/racoon.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute racoon coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(racoon)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/radio.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/radio.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2758289
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/radio.te
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+typeattribute radio coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+
+app_domain(radio)
+
+read_runtime_log_tags(radio)
+
+# Property service
+set_prop(radio, radio_control_prop)
+set_prop(radio, radio_prop)
+set_prop(radio, net_radio_prop)
+set_prop(radio, telephony_status_prop)
+
+# ctl interface
+set_prop(radio, ctl_rildaemon_prop)
+
+# Telephony code contains time / time zone detection logic so it reads the associated properties.
+get_prop(radio, time_prop)
+
+# allow telephony to access platform compat to log permission denials
+allow radio platform_compat_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow radio uce_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/emergencynumberdb
+allow radio emergency_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow radio emergency_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow telephony to access related cache properties
+set_prop(radio, binder_cache_telephony_server_prop);
+neverallow { domain -radio -init }
+    binder_cache_telephony_server_prop:property_service set;
+
+# allow sending pulled atoms to statsd
+binder_call(radio, statsd)
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/recovery.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/recovery.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00d7132
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/recovery.te
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+typeattribute recovery coredomain;
+
+# The allow rules are only included in the recovery policy.
+# Otherwise recovery is only allowed the domain rules.
+recovery_only(`
+  # Reboot the device
+  set_prop(recovery, powerctl_prop)
+
+  # Read serial number of the device from system properties
+  get_prop(recovery, serialno_prop)
+
+  # Set sys.usb.ffs.ready when starting minadbd for sideload.
+  get_prop(recovery, ffs_config_prop)
+  set_prop(recovery, ffs_control_prop)
+
+  # Set sys.usb.config when switching into fastboot.
+  set_prop(recovery, usb_control_prop)
+  set_prop(recovery, usb_prop)
+
+  # Read ro.boot.bootreason
+  get_prop(recovery, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
+
+  # Read storage properties (for correctly formatting filesystems)
+  get_prop(recovery, storage_config_prop)
+
+  set_prop(recovery, gsid_prop)
+
+  # These are needed to allow recovery to manage network
+  allow recovery self:netlink_route_socket { create write read nlmsg_readpriv nlmsg_read };
+  allow recovery self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
+  allow recovery self:tcp_socket { create ioctl };
+  allowxperm recovery self:tcp_socket ioctl { SIOCGIFFLAGS SIOCSIFFLAGS };
+
+  # Start snapuserd for merging VABC updates
+  set_prop(recovery, ctl_snapuserd_prop)
+
+  # Needed to communicate with snapuserd to complete merges.
+  allow recovery snapuserd_socket:sock_file write;
+  allow recovery snapuserd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+  allow recovery dm_user_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # Set fastbootd protocol property
+  set_prop(recovery, fastbootd_protocol_prop)
+
+  get_prop(recovery, recovery_config_prop)
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/recovery_persist.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/recovery_persist.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cb2e67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/recovery_persist.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+typeattribute recovery_persist coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(recovery_persist)
+
+# recovery_persist is not allowed to write anywhere other than recovery_data_file
+neverallow recovery_persist {
+  file_type
+  -recovery_data_file
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-coredump_file')
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:file write;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/recovery_refresh.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/recovery_refresh.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c095cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/recovery_refresh.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+typeattribute recovery_refresh coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(recovery_refresh)
+
+# recovery_refresh is not allowed to write anywhere
+neverallow recovery_refresh {
+  file_type
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-coredump_file')
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:file write;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/remote_prov_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/remote_prov_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..010c9bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/remote_prov_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+type remote_prov_app, domain;
+typeattribute remote_prov_app coredomain;
+
+app_domain(remote_prov_app)
+net_domain(remote_prov_app)
+
+# The app needs access to properly build a DeviceInfo package for the verifying server
+get_prop(remote_prov_app, vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
+
+allow remote_prov_app {
+    app_api_service
+    remoteprovisioning_service
+}:service_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/roles_decl b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/roles_decl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c84fcba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/roles_decl
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+role r;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/rs.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/rs.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf10841
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/rs.te
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# Any files which would have been created as app_data_file
+# will be created as app_exec_data_file instead.
+allow rs app_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
+allow rs app_exec_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+type_transition rs app_data_file:file app_exec_data_file;
+
+# Follow /data/user/0 symlink
+allow rs system_data_file:lnk_file read;
+
+# Read files from the app home directory.
+allow rs app_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow rs app_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Cleanup app_exec_data_file files in the app home directory.
+allow rs app_data_file:dir remove_name;
+
+# Use vendor resources
+allow rs vendor_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+r_dir_file(rs, vendor_overlay_file)
+r_dir_file(rs, vendor_app_file)
+
+# Read contents of app apks
+r_dir_file(rs, apk_data_file)
+
+allow rs gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow rs ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow rs same_process_hal_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
+
+# File descriptors passed from app to renderscript
+allow rs { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app }:fd use;
+
+# rs can access app data, so ensure it can only be entered via an app domain and cannot have
+# CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.
+neverallow rs rs:capability_class_set *;
+neverallow { domain -appdomain } rs:process { dyntransition transition };
+neverallow rs { domain -crash_dump }:process { dyntransition transition };
+neverallow rs app_data_file:file_class_set ~r_file_perms;
+# rs should never use network sockets
+neverallow rs *:network_socket_class_set *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/rss_hwm_reset.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/rss_hwm_reset.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30818c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/rss_hwm_reset.te
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+type rss_hwm_reset_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Start rss_hwm_reset from init.
+init_daemon_domain(rss_hwm_reset)
+
+# Search /proc/pid directories.
+allow rss_hwm_reset domain:dir search;
+
+# Write to /proc/pid/clear_refs of other processes.
+# /proc/pid/clear_refs is S_IWUSER, see: fs/proc/base.c
+allow rss_hwm_reset self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override };
+
+# Write to /prc/pid/clear_refs.
+allow rss_hwm_reset domain:file w_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/runas.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/runas.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef31aac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/runas.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+typeattribute runas coredomain;
+
+# ndk-gdb invokes adb shell run-as.
+domain_auto_trans(shell, runas_exec, runas)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/runas_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/runas_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1b354a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/runas_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+typeattribute runas_app coredomain;
+
+app_domain(runas_app)
+untrusted_app_domain(runas_app)
+net_domain(runas_app)
+bluetooth_domain(runas_app)
+
+# The ability to call exec() on files in the apps home directories
+# when using run-as on a debuggable app. Used to run lldb/ndk-gdb/simpleperf,
+# which are copied to the apps home directories.
+allow runas_app app_data_file:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Allow lldb/ndk-gdb/simpleperf to read maps of debuggable app processes.
+r_dir_file(runas_app, untrusted_app_all)
+
+# Allow lldb/ndk-gdb/simpleperf to ptrace attach to debuggable app processes.
+allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:process { ptrace signal sigstop };
+allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+# Allow executing system image simpleperf without a domain transition.
+allow runas_app simpleperf_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Suppress denial logspam when simpleperf is trying to find a matching process
+# by scanning /proc/<pid>/cmdline files. The /proc/<pid> directories are within
+# the same domain as their respective process, most of which this domain is not
+# allowed to see.
+dontaudit runas_app domain:dir search;
+
+# Allow runas_app to call perf_event_open for profiling debuggable app
+# processes, but not the whole system.
+allow runas_app self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+neverallow runas_app self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/sdcardd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/sdcardd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..126d643
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/sdcardd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute sdcardd coredomain;
+
+type_transition sdcardd system_data_file:{ dir file } media_rw_data_file;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/seapp_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/seapp_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8e42ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+# The entries in this file define how security contexts for apps are determined.
+# Each entry lists input selectors, used to match the app, and outputs which are
+# used to determine the security contexts for matching apps.
+#
+# Input selectors:
+#       isSystemServer (boolean)
+#       isEphemeralApp (boolean)
+#       isOwner (boolean)
+#       user (string)
+#       seinfo (string)
+#       name (string)
+#       path (string)
+#       isPrivApp (boolean)
+#       minTargetSdkVersion (unsigned integer)
+#       fromRunAs (boolean)
+#
+# All specified input selectors in an entry must match (i.e. logical AND).
+# An unspecified string or boolean selector with no default will match any
+# value.
+# A user, name, or path string selector that ends in * will perform a prefix
+# match.
+# String matching is case-insensitive.
+# See external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android_platform.c,
+# seapp_context_lookup().
+#
+# isSystemServer=true only matches the system server.
+# An unspecified isSystemServer defaults to false.
+# isEphemeralApp=true will match apps marked by PackageManager as Ephemeral
+# isOwner=true will only match for the owner/primary user.
+# user=_app will match any regular app process.
+# user=_isolated will match any isolated service process.
+# Other values of user are matched against the name associated with the process
+# UID.
+# seinfo= matches aginst the seinfo tag for the app, determined from
+# mac_permissions.xml files.
+# The ':' character is reserved and may not be used in seinfo.
+# name= matches against the package name of the app.
+# path= matches against the directory path when labeling app directories.
+# isPrivApp=true will only match for applications preinstalled in
+#       /system/priv-app.
+# minTargetSdkVersion will match applications with a targetSdkVersion
+#       greater than or equal to the specified value. If unspecified,
+#       it has a default value of 0.
+# fromRunAs=true means the process being labeled is started by run-as. Default
+# is false.
+#
+# Precedence: entries are compared using the following rules, in the order shown
+# (see external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android_platform.c,
+# seapp_context_cmp()).
+#       (1) isSystemServer=true before isSystemServer=false.
+#       (2) Specified isEphemeralApp= before unspecified isEphemeralApp=
+#             boolean.
+#       (3) Specified isOwner= before unspecified isOwner= boolean.
+#       (4) Specified user= string before unspecified user= string;
+#             more specific user= string before less specific user= string.
+#       (5) Specified seinfo= string before unspecified seinfo= string.
+#       (6) Specified name= string before unspecified name= string;
+#             more specific name= string before less specific name= string.
+#       (7) Specified path= string before unspecified path= string.
+#             more specific name= string before less specific name= string.
+#       (8) Specified isPrivApp= before unspecified isPrivApp= boolean.
+#       (9) Higher value of minTargetSdkVersion= before lower value of
+#              minTargetSdkVersion= integer. Note that minTargetSdkVersion=
+#              defaults to 0 if unspecified.
+#       (10) fromRunAs=true before fromRunAs=false.
+# (A fixed selector is more specific than a prefix, i.e. ending in *, and a
+# longer prefix is more specific than a shorter prefix.)
+# Apps are checked against entries in precedence order until the first match,
+# regardless of their order in this file.
+#
+# Duplicate entries, i.e. with identical input selectors, are not allowed.
+#
+# Outputs:
+#       domain (string)
+#       type (string)
+#       levelFrom (string; one of none, all, app, or user)
+#       level (string)
+#
+# domain= determines the label to be used for the app process; entries
+# without domain= are ignored for this purpose.
+# type= specifies the label to be used for the app data directory; entries
+# without type= are ignored for this purpose. The label specified must
+# have the app_data_file_type attribute.
+# levelFrom and level are used to determine the level (sensitivity + categories)
+# for MLS/MCS.
+# levelFrom=none omits the level.
+# levelFrom=app determines the level from the process UID.
+# levelFrom=user determines the level from the user ID.
+# levelFrom=all determines the level from both UID and user ID.
+#
+# levelFrom=user is only supported for _app or _isolated UIDs.
+# levelFrom=app or levelFrom=all is only supported for _app UIDs.
+# level may be used to specify a fixed level for any UID.
+#
+# For backwards compatibility levelFromUid=true is equivalent to levelFrom=app
+# and levelFromUid=false is equivalent to levelFrom=none.
+#
+#
+# Neverallow Assertions
+# Additional compile time assertion checks for the rules in this file can be
+# added as well. The assertion
+# rules are lines beginning with the keyword neverallow. Full support for PCRE
+# regular expressions exists on all input and output selectors. Neverallow
+# rules are never output to the built seapp_contexts file. Like all keywords,
+# neverallows are case-insensitive. A neverallow is asserted when all key value
+# inputs are matched on a key value rule line.
+#
+
+# only the system server can be in system_server domain
+neverallow isSystemServer=false domain=system_server
+neverallow isSystemServer="" domain=system_server
+
+# system domains should never be assigned outside of system uid
+neverallow user=((?!system).)* domain=system_app
+neverallow user=((?!system).)* type=system_app_data_file
+
+# any non priv-app with a non-known uid with a specified name should have a specified
+# seinfo
+neverallow user=_app isPrivApp=false name=.* seinfo=""
+neverallow user=_app isPrivApp=false name=.* seinfo=default
+
+# neverallow shared relro to any other domain
+# and neverallow any other uid into shared_relro
+neverallow user=shared_relro domain=((?!shared_relro).)*
+neverallow user=((?!shared_relro).)* domain=shared_relro
+
+# neverallow non-isolated uids into isolated_app domain
+# and vice versa
+neverallow user=_isolated domain=((?!isolated_app).)*
+neverallow user=((?!_isolated).)* domain=isolated_app
+
+# uid shell should always be in shell domain, however non-shell
+# uid's can be in shell domain
+neverallow user=shell domain=((?!shell).)*
+
+# only the package named com.android.shell can run in the shell domain
+neverallow domain=shell name=((?!com\.android\.shell).)*
+neverallow user=shell name=((?!com\.android\.shell).)*
+
+# Ephemeral Apps must run in the ephemeral_app domain
+neverallow isEphemeralApp=true domain=((?!ephemeral_app).)*
+
+isSystemServer=true domain=system_server_startup
+
+user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.android.traceur domain=traceur_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.android.remoteprovisioner domain=remote_prov_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=system seinfo=platform domain=system_app type=system_app_data_file
+user=bluetooth seinfo=platform domain=bluetooth type=bluetooth_data_file
+user=network_stack seinfo=network_stack domain=network_stack type=radio_data_file
+user=nfc seinfo=platform domain=nfc type=nfc_data_file
+user=secure_element seinfo=platform domain=secure_element levelFrom=all
+user=radio seinfo=platform domain=radio type=radio_data_file
+user=shared_relro domain=shared_relro levelFrom=all
+user=shell seinfo=platform domain=shell name=com.android.shell type=shell_data_file
+user=webview_zygote seinfo=webview_zygote domain=webview_zygote
+user=_isolated domain=isolated_app levelFrom=user
+user=_app seinfo=app_zygote domain=app_zygote levelFrom=user
+user=_app seinfo=media domain=mediaprovider type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isEphemeralApp=true domain=ephemeral_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=31 isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.permissioncontroller domain=permissioncontroller_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app seinfo=media isPrivApp=true name=com.android.providers.media.module domain=mediaprovider_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.providers.media.module domain=mediaprovider_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app seinfo=platform isPrivApp=true name=com.android.permissioncontroller domain=permissioncontroller_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.android.vzwomatrigger domain=vzwomatrigger_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gms domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gms.* domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gms:* domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gsf domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=30 domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=29 domain=untrusted_app_29 type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=28 domain=untrusted_app_27 type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=26 domain=untrusted_app_27 type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app domain=untrusted_app_25 type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=28 fromRunAs=true domain=runas_app levelFrom=all
+user=_app fromRunAs=true domain=runas_app levelFrom=user
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/secure_element.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/secure_element.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57f512b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/secure_element.te
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# secure element subsystem
+typeattribute secure_element coredomain;
+app_domain(secure_element)
+
+binder_service(secure_element)
+add_service(secure_element, secure_element_service)
+
+allow secure_element app_api_service:service_manager find;
+hal_client_domain(secure_element, hal_secure_element)
+
+# already open bugreport file descriptors may be shared with
+# the secure element process, from a file in
+# /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-*.
+allow secure_element shell_data_file:file read;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/security_classes b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/security_classes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..200b030
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/security_classes
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+# FLASK
+
+#
+# Define the security object classes
+#
+
+# Classes marked as userspace are classes
+# for userspace object managers
+
+class security
+class process
+class system
+class capability
+
+# file-related classes
+class filesystem
+class file
+class anon_inode
+class dir
+class fd
+class lnk_file
+class chr_file
+class blk_file
+class sock_file
+class fifo_file
+
+# network-related classes
+class socket
+class tcp_socket
+class udp_socket
+class rawip_socket
+class node
+class netif
+class netlink_socket
+class packet_socket
+class key_socket
+class unix_stream_socket
+class unix_dgram_socket
+
+# sysv-ipc-related classes
+class sem
+class msg
+class msgq
+class shm
+class ipc
+
+# extended netlink sockets
+class netlink_route_socket
+class netlink_tcpdiag_socket
+class netlink_nflog_socket
+class netlink_xfrm_socket
+class netlink_selinux_socket
+class netlink_audit_socket
+class netlink_dnrt_socket
+
+# IPSec association
+class association
+
+# Updated Netlink class for KOBJECT_UEVENT family.
+class netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
+
+class appletalk_socket
+
+class packet
+
+# Kernel access key retention
+class key
+
+class dccp_socket
+
+class memprotect
+
+# network peer labels
+class peer
+
+# Capabilities >= 32
+class capability2
+
+# kernel services that need to override task security, e.g. cachefiles
+class kernel_service
+
+class tun_socket
+
+class binder
+
+# Updated netlink classes for more recent netlink protocols.
+class netlink_iscsi_socket
+class netlink_fib_lookup_socket
+class netlink_connector_socket
+class netlink_netfilter_socket
+class netlink_generic_socket
+class netlink_scsitransport_socket
+class netlink_rdma_socket
+class netlink_crypto_socket
+
+# Infiniband
+class infiniband_pkey
+class infiniband_endport
+
+# Capability checks when on a non-init user namespace
+class cap_userns
+class cap2_userns
+
+# New socket classes introduced by extended_socket_class policy capability.
+# These two were previously mapped to rawip_socket.
+class sctp_socket
+class icmp_socket
+# These were previously mapped to socket.
+class ax25_socket
+class ipx_socket
+class netrom_socket
+class atmpvc_socket
+class x25_socket
+class rose_socket
+class decnet_socket
+class atmsvc_socket
+class rds_socket
+class irda_socket
+class pppox_socket
+class llc_socket
+class can_socket
+class tipc_socket
+class bluetooth_socket
+class iucv_socket
+class rxrpc_socket
+class isdn_socket
+class phonet_socket
+class ieee802154_socket
+class caif_socket
+class alg_socket
+class nfc_socket
+class vsock_socket
+class kcm_socket
+class qipcrtr_socket
+class smc_socket
+
+class process2
+
+class bpf
+
+class xdp_socket
+
+class perf_event
+
+# Introduced in https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/59438b46471ae6cdfb761afc8c9beaf1e428a331
+class lockdown
+
+# Property service
+class property_service          # userspace
+
+# Service manager
+class service_manager           # userspace
+
+# hardware service manager      # userspace
+class hwservice_manager
+
+# Legacy Keystore key permissions
+class keystore_key              # userspace
+
+# Keystore 2.0 permissions
+class keystore2                 # userspace
+
+# Keystore 2.0 key permissions
+class keystore2_key             # userspace
+
+class drmservice                # userspace
+# FLASK
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/service.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/service.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f692f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/service.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+type attention_service,             system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type dynamic_system_service,        system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type gsi_service,                   service_manager_type;
+type incidentcompanion_service,     system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type mediatuner_service,            app_api_service, service_manager_type;
+type profcollectd_service,          service_manager_type;
+type resolver_service,              system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type stats_service,                 service_manager_type;
+type statscompanion_service,        system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type statsmanager_service,          system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type tracingproxy_service,          system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type uce_service,                   service_manager_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/service_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/service_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b410b18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/service_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+android.hardware.authsecret.IAuthSecret/default                      u:object_r:hal_authsecret_service:s0
+android.hardware.automotive.audiocontrol.IAudioControl/default       u:object_r:hal_audiocontrol_service:s0
+android.hardware.biometrics.face.IFace/default                       u:object_r:hal_face_service:s0
+android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint.IFingerprint/default         u:object_r:hal_fingerprint_service:s0
+android.hardware.gnss.IGnss/default                                  u:object_r:hal_gnss_service:s0
+android.hardware.health.storage.IStorage/default                     u:object_r:hal_health_storage_service:s0
+android.hardware.identity.IIdentityCredentialStore/default           u:object_r:hal_identity_service:s0
+android.hardware.light.ILights/default                               u:object_r:hal_light_service:s0
+android.hardware.memtrack.IMemtrack/default                          u:object_r:hal_memtrack_service:s0
+android.hardware.oemlock.IOemLock/default                            u:object_r:hal_oemlock_service:s0
+android.hardware.power.IPower/default                                u:object_r:hal_power_service:s0
+android.hardware.power.stats.IPowerStats/default                     u:object_r:hal_power_stats_service:s0
+android.hardware.rebootescrow.IRebootEscrow/default                  u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_service:s0
+android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintDevice/default             u:object_r:hal_keymint_service:s0
+android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/default u:object_r:hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_service:s0
+android.hardware.security.secureclock.ISecureClock/default             u:object_r:hal_secureclock_service:s0
+android.hardware.security.sharedsecret.ISharedSecret/default             u:object_r:hal_sharedsecret_service:s0
+android.hardware.soundtrigger3.ISoundTriggerHw/default               u:object_r:hal_audio_service:s0
+android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator/default                          u:object_r:hal_vibrator_service:s0
+android.hardware.vibrator.IVibratorManager/default                   u:object_r:hal_vibrator_service:s0
+android.hardware.weaver.IWeaver/default                              u:object_r:hal_weaver_service:s0
+android.frameworks.stats.IStats/default                              u:object_r:fwk_stats_service:s0
+android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default                    u:object_r:keystore_service:s0
+
+accessibility                             u:object_r:accessibility_service:s0
+account                                   u:object_r:account_service:s0
+activity                                  u:object_r:activity_service:s0
+activity_task                             u:object_r:activity_task_service:s0
+adb                                       u:object_r:adb_service:s0
+aidl_lazy_test_1                          u:object_r:aidl_lazy_test_service:s0
+aidl_lazy_test_2                          u:object_r:aidl_lazy_test_service:s0
+alarm                                     u:object_r:alarm_service:s0
+android.os.UpdateEngineService            u:object_r:update_engine_service:s0
+android.os.UpdateEngineStableService      u:object_r:update_engine_stable_service:s0
+android.security.apc                      u:object_r:apc_service:s0
+android.security.authorization            u:object_r:authorization_service:s0
+android.security.compat                   u:object_r:keystore_compat_hal_service:s0
+android.security.identity                 u:object_r:credstore_service:s0
+android.security.keystore                 u:object_r:keystore_service:s0
+android.security.maintenance              u:object_r:keystore_maintenance_service:s0
+android.security.remoteprovisioning       u:object_r:remoteprovisioning_service:s0
+android.security.vpnprofilestore          u:object_r:vpnprofilestore_service:s0
+android.service.gatekeeper.IGateKeeperService    u:object_r:gatekeeper_service:s0
+app_binding                               u:object_r:app_binding_service:s0
+app_hibernation                           u:object_r:app_hibernation_service:s0
+app_integrity                             u:object_r:app_integrity_service:s0
+app_prediction                            u:object_r:app_prediction_service:s0
+app_search                                u:object_r:app_search_service:s0
+apexservice                               u:object_r:apex_service:s0
+blob_store                                u:object_r:blob_store_service:s0
+gsiservice                                u:object_r:gsi_service:s0
+appops                                    u:object_r:appops_service:s0
+appwidget                                 u:object_r:appwidget_service:s0
+artd                                      u:object_r:artd_service:s0
+assetatlas                                u:object_r:assetatlas_service:s0
+attention                                 u:object_r:attention_service:s0
+audio                                     u:object_r:audio_service:s0
+auth                                      u:object_r:auth_service:s0
+autofill                                  u:object_r:autofill_service:s0
+backup                                    u:object_r:backup_service:s0
+batteryproperties                         u:object_r:batteryproperties_service:s0
+batterystats                              u:object_r:batterystats_service:s0
+battery                                   u:object_r:battery_service:s0
+binder_calls_stats                        u:object_r:binder_calls_stats_service:s0
+biometric                                 u:object_r:biometric_service:s0
+bluetooth_manager                         u:object_r:bluetooth_manager_service:s0
+bluetooth                                 u:object_r:bluetooth_service:s0
+broadcastradio                            u:object_r:broadcastradio_service:s0
+bugreport                                 u:object_r:bugreport_service:s0
+cacheinfo                                 u:object_r:cacheinfo_service:s0
+carrier_config                            u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+clipboard                                 u:object_r:clipboard_service:s0
+com.android.net.IProxyService             u:object_r:IProxyService_service:s0
+android.system.virtualizationservice      u:object_r:virtualization_service:s0
+companiondevice                           u:object_r:companion_device_service:s0
+platform_compat                           u:object_r:platform_compat_service:s0
+platform_compat_native                    u:object_r:platform_compat_service:s0
+connectivity                              u:object_r:connectivity_service:s0
+connmetrics                               u:object_r:connmetrics_service:s0
+consumer_ir                               u:object_r:consumer_ir_service:s0
+content                                   u:object_r:content_service:s0
+content_capture                           u:object_r:content_capture_service:s0
+content_suggestions                       u:object_r:content_suggestions_service:s0
+contexthub                                u:object_r:contexthub_service:s0
+country_detector                          u:object_r:country_detector_service:s0
+coverage                                  u:object_r:coverage_service:s0
+cpuinfo                                   u:object_r:cpuinfo_service:s0
+crossprofileapps                          u:object_r:crossprofileapps_service:s0
+dataloader_manager                        u:object_r:dataloader_manager_service:s0
+dbinfo                                    u:object_r:dbinfo_service:s0
+device_config                             u:object_r:device_config_service:s0
+device_policy                             u:object_r:device_policy_service:s0
+device_identifiers                        u:object_r:device_identifiers_service:s0
+deviceidle                                u:object_r:deviceidle_service:s0
+device_state                              u:object_r:device_state_service:s0
+devicestoragemonitor                      u:object_r:devicestoragemonitor_service:s0
+diskstats                                 u:object_r:diskstats_service:s0
+display                                   u:object_r:display_service:s0
+dnsresolver                               u:object_r:dnsresolver_service:s0
+domain_verification                       u:object_r:domain_verification_service:s0
+color_display                             u:object_r:color_display_service:s0
+netd_listener                             u:object_r:netd_listener_service:s0
+network_watchlist                         u:object_r:network_watchlist_service:s0
+DockObserver                              u:object_r:DockObserver_service:s0
+dreams                                    u:object_r:dreams_service:s0
+drm.drmManager                            u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0
+dropbox                                   u:object_r:dropbox_service:s0
+dumpstate                                 u:object_r:dumpstate_service:s0
+dynamic_system                            u:object_r:dynamic_system_service:s0
+econtroller                               u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+emergency_affordance                      u:object_r:emergency_affordance_service:s0
+euicc_card_controller                     u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+external_vibrator_service                 u:object_r:external_vibrator_service:s0
+lowpan                                    u:object_r:lowpan_service:s0
+ethernet                                  u:object_r:ethernet_service:s0
+face                                      u:object_r:face_service:s0
+file_integrity                            u:object_r:file_integrity_service:s0
+fingerprint                               u:object_r:fingerprint_service:s0
+font                                      u:object_r:font_service:s0
+android.hardware.fingerprint.IFingerprintDaemon u:object_r:fingerprintd_service:s0
+game                                      u:object_r:game_service:s0
+gfxinfo                                   u:object_r:gfxinfo_service:s0
+graphicsstats                             u:object_r:graphicsstats_service:s0
+gpu                                       u:object_r:gpu_service:s0
+hardware                                  u:object_r:hardware_service:s0
+hardware_properties                       u:object_r:hardware_properties_service:s0
+hdmi_control                              u:object_r:hdmi_control_service:s0
+ions                                      u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+idmap                                     u:object_r:idmap_service:s0
+incident                                  u:object_r:incident_service:s0
+incidentcompanion                         u:object_r:incidentcompanion_service:s0
+inputflinger                              u:object_r:inputflinger_service:s0
+input_method                              u:object_r:input_method_service:s0
+input                                     u:object_r:input_service:s0
+installd                                  u:object_r:installd_service:s0
+iorapd                                    u:object_r:iorapd_service:s0
+iphonesubinfo_msim                        u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+iphonesubinfo2                            u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+iphonesubinfo                             u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+ims                                       u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+imms                                      u:object_r:imms_service:s0
+incremental                               u:object_r:incremental_service:s0
+ipsec                                     u:object_r:ipsec_service:s0
+ircsmessage                               u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+iris                                      u:object_r:iris_service:s0
+isms_msim                                 u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+isms2                                     u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+isms                                      u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+isub                                      u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+jobscheduler                              u:object_r:jobscheduler_service:s0
+launcherapps                              u:object_r:launcherapps_service:s0
+legacy_permission                         u:object_r:legacy_permission_service:s0
+lights                                    u:object_r:light_service:s0
+location                                  u:object_r:location_service:s0
+location_time_zone_manager                u:object_r:location_time_zone_manager_service:s0
+lock_settings                             u:object_r:lock_settings_service:s0
+looper_stats                              u:object_r:looper_stats_service:s0
+lpdump_service                            u:object_r:lpdump_service:s0
+media.aaudio                              u:object_r:audioserver_service:s0
+media.audio_flinger                       u:object_r:audioserver_service:s0
+media.audio_policy                        u:object_r:audioserver_service:s0
+media.camera                              u:object_r:cameraserver_service:s0
+media.camera.proxy                        u:object_r:cameraproxy_service:s0
+media.log                                 u:object_r:audioserver_service:s0
+media.player                              u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0
+media.metrics                             u:object_r:mediametrics_service:s0
+media.extractor                           u:object_r:mediaextractor_service:s0
+media.transcoding                         u:object_r:mediatranscoding_service:s0
+media.resource_manager                    u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0
+media.resource_observer                   u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0
+media.sound_trigger_hw                    u:object_r:audioserver_service:s0
+media.drm                                 u:object_r:mediadrmserver_service:s0
+media.tuner                               u:object_r:mediatuner_service:s0
+media_communication                       u:object_r:media_communication_service:s0
+media_metrics                             u:object_r:media_metrics_service:s0
+media_projection                          u:object_r:media_projection_service:s0
+media_resource_monitor                    u:object_r:media_session_service:s0
+media_router                              u:object_r:media_router_service:s0
+media_session                             u:object_r:media_session_service:s0
+meminfo                                   u:object_r:meminfo_service:s0
+memtrack.proxy                            u:object_r:memtrackproxy_service:s0
+midi                                      u:object_r:midi_service:s0
+mount                                     u:object_r:mount_service:s0
+music_recognition                         u:object_r:music_recognition_service:s0
+netd                                      u:object_r:netd_service:s0
+netpolicy                                 u:object_r:netpolicy_service:s0
+netstats                                  u:object_r:netstats_service:s0
+network_stack                             u:object_r:network_stack_service:s0
+network_management                        u:object_r:network_management_service:s0
+network_score                             u:object_r:network_score_service:s0
+network_time_update_service               u:object_r:network_time_update_service:s0
+nfc                                       u:object_r:nfc_service:s0
+notification                              u:object_r:notification_service:s0
+oem_lock                                  u:object_r:oem_lock_service:s0
+otadexopt                                 u:object_r:otadexopt_service:s0
+overlay                                   u:object_r:overlay_service:s0
+pac_proxy                                 u:object_r:pac_proxy_service:s0
+package                                   u:object_r:package_service:s0
+package_native                            u:object_r:package_native_service:s0
+people                                    u:object_r:people_service:s0
+performance_hint                          u:object_r:hint_service:s0
+permission                                u:object_r:permission_service:s0
+permissionmgr                             u:object_r:permissionmgr_service:s0
+permission_checker                        u:object_r:permission_checker_service:s0
+persistent_data_block                     u:object_r:persistent_data_block_service:s0
+phone_msim                                u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+phone1                                    u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+phone2                                    u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+phone                                     u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+pinner                                    u:object_r:pinner_service:s0
+power_stats                               u:object_r:power_stats_service:s0
+power                                     u:object_r:power_service:s0
+print                                     u:object_r:print_service:s0
+processinfo                               u:object_r:processinfo_service:s0
+procstats                                 u:object_r:procstats_service:s0
+profcollectd                              u:object_r:profcollectd_service:s0
+radio.phonesubinfo                        u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+radio.phone                               u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+radio.sms                                 u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+rcs                                       u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+reboot_readiness                          u:object_r:reboot_readiness_service:s0
+recovery                                  u:object_r:recovery_service:s0
+resolver                                  u:object_r:resolver_service:s0
+restrictions                              u:object_r:restrictions_service:s0
+role                                      u:object_r:role_service:s0
+rollback                                  u:object_r:rollback_service:s0
+rttmanager                                u:object_r:rttmanager_service:s0
+runtime                                   u:object_r:runtime_service:s0
+samplingprofiler                          u:object_r:samplingprofiler_service:s0
+scheduling_policy                         u:object_r:scheduling_policy_service:s0
+search                                    u:object_r:search_service:s0
+search_ui                                 u:object_r:search_ui_service:s0
+secure_element                            u:object_r:secure_element_service:s0
+sec_key_att_app_id_provider               u:object_r:sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service:s0
+sensorservice                             u:object_r:sensorservice_service:s0
+sensor_privacy                            u:object_r:sensor_privacy_service:s0
+serial                                    u:object_r:serial_service:s0
+servicediscovery                          u:object_r:servicediscovery_service:s0
+manager                                   u:object_r:service_manager_service:s0
+settings                                  u:object_r:settings_service:s0
+shortcut                                  u:object_r:shortcut_service:s0
+simphonebook_msim                         u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+simphonebook2                             u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+simphonebook                              u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+sip                                       u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+slice                                     u:object_r:slice_service:s0
+smartspace                                u:object_r:smartspace_service:s0
+speech_recognition                        u:object_r:speech_recognition_service:s0
+stats                                     u:object_r:stats_service:s0
+statscompanion                            u:object_r:statscompanion_service:s0
+statsmanager                              u:object_r:statsmanager_service:s0
+soundtrigger                              u:object_r:voiceinteraction_service:s0
+soundtrigger_middleware                   u:object_r:soundtrigger_middleware_service:s0
+statusbar                                 u:object_r:statusbar_service:s0
+storaged                                  u:object_r:storaged_service:s0
+storaged_pri                              u:object_r:storaged_service:s0
+storagestats                              u:object_r:storagestats_service:s0
+SurfaceFlinger                            u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0
+suspend_control                           u:object_r:system_suspend_control_service:s0
+suspend_control_internal                  u:object_r:system_suspend_control_internal_service:s0
+system_config                             u:object_r:system_config_service:s0
+system_server_dumper                      u:object_r:system_server_dumper_service:s0
+system_update                             u:object_r:system_update_service:s0
+task                                      u:object_r:task_service:s0
+telecom                                   u:object_r:telecom_service:s0
+telephony.registry                        u:object_r:registry_service:s0
+telephony_ims                             u:object_r:radio_service:s0
+testharness                               u:object_r:testharness_service:s0
+tethering                                 u:object_r:tethering_service:s0
+textclassification                        u:object_r:textclassification_service:s0
+textservices                              u:object_r:textservices_service:s0
+texttospeech                              u:object_r:texttospeech_service:s0
+time_detector                             u:object_r:timedetector_service:s0
+time_zone_detector                        u:object_r:timezonedetector_service:s0
+timezone                                  u:object_r:timezone_service:s0
+thermalservice                            u:object_r:thermal_service:s0
+tracing.proxy                             u:object_r:tracingproxy_service:s0
+transformer                               u:object_r:transformer_service:s0
+trust                                     u:object_r:trust_service:s0
+tv_input                                  u:object_r:tv_input_service:s0
+tv_tuner_resource_mgr                     u:object_r:tv_tuner_resource_mgr_service:s0
+uce                                       u:object_r:uce_service:s0
+uimode                                    u:object_r:uimode_service:s0
+updatelock                                u:object_r:updatelock_service:s0
+uri_grants                                u:object_r:uri_grants_service:s0
+usagestats                                u:object_r:usagestats_service:s0
+usb                                       u:object_r:usb_service:s0
+user                                      u:object_r:user_service:s0
+uwb                                       u:object_r:uwb_service:s0
+vcn_management                            u:object_r:vcn_management_service:s0
+vibrator                                  u:object_r:vibrator_service:s0
+vibrator_manager                          u:object_r:vibrator_manager_service:s0
+virtual_touchpad                          u:object_r:virtual_touchpad_service:s0
+voiceinteraction                          u:object_r:voiceinteraction_service:s0
+vold                                      u:object_r:vold_service:s0
+vpn_management                            u:object_r:vpn_management_service:s0
+vr_hwc                                    u:object_r:vr_hwc_service:s0
+vrflinger_vsync                           u:object_r:vrflinger_vsync_service:s0
+vrmanager                                 u:object_r:vr_manager_service:s0
+wallpaper                                 u:object_r:wallpaper_service:s0
+webviewupdate                             u:object_r:webviewupdate_service:s0
+wifip2p                                   u:object_r:wifip2p_service:s0
+wifiscanner                               u:object_r:wifiscanner_service:s0
+wifi                                      u:object_r:wifi_service:s0
+wifinl80211                               u:object_r:wifinl80211_service:s0
+wifiaware                                 u:object_r:wifiaware_service:s0
+wifirtt                                   u:object_r:rttmanager_service:s0
+window                                    u:object_r:window_service:s0
+*                                         u:object_r:default_android_service:s0
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/servicemanager.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/servicemanager.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6294452
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/servicemanager.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+typeattribute servicemanager coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(servicemanager)
+
+read_runtime_log_tags(servicemanager)
+
+set_prop(servicemanager, ctl_interface_start_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/sgdisk.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/sgdisk.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a17342e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/sgdisk.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+typeattribute sgdisk coredomain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/shared_relro.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/shared_relro.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31fdb8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/shared_relro.te
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+typeattribute shared_relro coredomain;
+
+# The shared relro process is a Java program forked from the zygote, so it
+# inherits from app to get basic permissions it needs to run.
+app_domain(shared_relro)
+
+allow shared_relro shared_relro_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow shared_relro shared_relro_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow shared_relro activity_service:service_manager find;
+allow shared_relro webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
+allow shared_relro package_service:service_manager find;
+
+# StrictMode may attempt to find this service, failure is harmless.
+dontaudit shared_relro network_management_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/shell.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/shell.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c786c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/shell.te
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+typeattribute shell coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+
+# allow shell input injection
+allow shell uhid_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# systrace support - allow atrace to run
+allow shell debugfs_tracing_debug:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow shell debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow shell debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+allow shell debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
+allow shell atrace_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow shell debugfs_tracing_debug:file rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+# read config.gz for CTS purposes
+allow shell config_gz:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Run app_process.
+# XXX Transition into its own domain?
+app_domain(shell)
+
+# allow shell to call dumpsys storaged
+binder_call(shell, storaged)
+
+# Perform SELinux access checks, needed for CTS
+selinux_check_access(shell)
+selinux_check_context(shell)
+
+# Control Perfetto traced and obtain traces from it.
+# Needed for Studio and debugging.
+unix_socket_connect(shell, traced_consumer, traced)
+
+# Allow shell binaries to write trace data to Perfetto. Used for testing and
+# cmdline utils.
+perfetto_producer(shell)
+
+domain_auto_trans(shell, vendor_shell_exec, vendor_shell)
+
+# Allow shell binaries to exec the perfetto cmdline util and have that
+# transition into its own domain, so that it behaves consistently to
+# when exec()-d by statsd.
+domain_auto_trans(shell, perfetto_exec, perfetto)
+# Allow to send SIGINT to perfetto when daemonized.
+allow shell perfetto:process signal;
+
+# Allow shell to run adb shell cmd stats commands. Needed for CTS.
+binder_call(shell, statsd);
+
+# Allow shell to read and unlink traces stored in /data/misc/a11ytraces.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow shell accessibility_trace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow shell accessibility_trace_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+')
+
+# Allow shell to read and unlink traces stored in /data/misc/perfetto-traces.
+allow shell perfetto_traces_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow shell perfetto_traces_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+# ... and /data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport/ .
+allow shell perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow shell perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+
+# Allow shell to create/remove configs stored in /data/misc/perfetto-configs.
+allow shell perfetto_configs_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow shell perfetto_configs_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow shell to run adb shell cmd gpu commands.
+binder_call(shell, gpuservice);
+
+# Allow shell to use atrace HAL
+hal_client_domain(shell, hal_atrace)
+
+# For hostside tests such as CTS listening ports test.
+allow shell proc_net_tcp_udp:file r_file_perms;
+
+# The dl.exec_linker* tests need to execute /system/bin/linker
+# b/124789393
+allow shell system_linker_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Renderscript host side tests depend on being able to execute
+# /system/bin/bcc (b/126388046)
+allow shell rs_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow (host-driven) ART run-tests to execute dex2oat, in order to
+# check ART's compiler.
+allow shell dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow shell to start and comminicate with lpdumpd.
+set_prop(shell, lpdumpd_prop);
+binder_call(shell, lpdumpd)
+
+# Allow shell to set and read value of properties used for CTS tests of
+# userspace reboot
+set_prop(shell, userspace_reboot_test_prop)
+
+# Allow shell to set this property used for rollback tests
+set_prop(shell, rollback_test_prop)
+
+# Allow shell to get encryption policy of /data/local/tmp/, for CTS
+allowxperm shell shell_data_file:dir ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
+  FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX
+};
+
+# Allow shell to execute simpleperf without a domain transition.
+allow shell simpleperf_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow shell to execute profcollectctl without a domain transition.
+allow shell profcollectd_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow shell to call perf_event_open for profiling other shell processes, but
+# not the whole system.
+allow shell self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+neverallow shell self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
+
+# Set properties.
+set_prop(shell, shell_prop)
+set_prop(shell, ctl_bugreport_prop)
+set_prop(shell, ctl_dumpstate_prop)
+set_prop(shell, dumpstate_prop)
+set_prop(shell, exported_dumpstate_prop)
+set_prop(shell, debug_prop)
+set_prop(shell, perf_drop_caches_prop)
+set_prop(shell, powerctl_prop)
+set_prop(shell, log_tag_prop)
+set_prop(shell, wifi_log_prop)
+# Allow shell to start/stop traced via the persist.traced.enable
+# property (which also takes care of /data/misc initialization).
+set_prop(shell, traced_enabled_prop)
+# adjust is_loggable properties
+userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, log_prop)')
+# logpersist script
+userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, logpersistd_logging_prop)')
+# Allow shell to start/stop heapprofd via the persist.heapprofd.enable
+# property.
+set_prop(shell, heapprofd_enabled_prop)
+# Allow shell to start/stop traced_perf via the persist.traced_perf.enable
+# property.
+set_prop(shell, traced_perf_enabled_prop)
+# Allow shell to start/stop gsid via ctl.start|stop|restart gsid.
+set_prop(shell, ctl_gsid_prop)
+set_prop(shell, ctl_snapuserd_prop)
+# Allow shell to enable Dynamic System Update
+set_prop(shell, dynamic_system_prop)
+# Allow shell to mock an OTA using persist.pm.mock-upgrade
+set_prop(shell, mock_ota_prop)
+
+# Read device's serial number from system properties
+get_prop(shell, serialno_prop)
+
+# Allow shell to read the vendor security patch level for CTS
+get_prop(shell, vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
+
+# Read state of logging-related properties
+get_prop(shell, device_logging_prop)
+
+# Read state of boot reason properties
+get_prop(shell, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
+get_prop(shell, last_boot_reason_prop)
+get_prop(shell, system_boot_reason_prop)
+
+# Allow reading the outcome of perf_event_open LSM support test for CTS.
+get_prop(shell, init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop)
+
+# Allow shell to read boot image timestamps and fingerprints.
+get_prop(shell, build_bootimage_prop)
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, persist_debug_prop)')
+
+# Allow to issue control commands to profcollectd binder service.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow shell profcollectd:binder call;
+')
+
+# Allow shell to read the keystore key contexts files. Used by native tests to test label lookup.
+allow shell keystore2_key_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow shell to access the keystore2_key namespace shell_key. Mainly used for native tests.
+allow shell shell_key:keystore2_key { delete rebind use get_info update };
+
+# Allow shell to write db.log.detailed, db.log.slow_query_threshold*
+set_prop(shell, sqlite_log_prop)
+
+# Allow shell to write MTE properties even on user builds.
+set_prop(shell, arm64_memtag_prop)
+
+# Allow shell to read the dm-verity props on user builds.
+get_prop(shell, verity_status_prop)
+
+# Allow shell to read Virtual A/B related properties
+get_prop(shell, virtual_ab_prop)
+
+# Allow shell to launch microdroid_launcher in its own domain
+# TODO(b/186396070) remove this when microdroid_manager can do this
+domain_auto_trans(shell, microdroid_launcher_exec, microdroid_launcher)
+domain_auto_trans(shell, microdroid_manager_exec, microdroid_manager)
+
+# Never allow others to set or get the perf.drop_caches property.
+neverallow { domain -shell -init } perf_drop_caches_prop:property_service set;
+neverallow { domain -shell -init -dumpstate } perf_drop_caches_prop:file read;
+
+# Allow ReadDefaultFstab() for CTS.
+read_fstab(shell)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/simpleperf.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/simpleperf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0639c11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/simpleperf.te
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Domain used when running /system/bin/simpleperf to profile a specific app.
+# Entered either by the app itself exec-ing the binary, or through
+# simpleperf_app_runner (with shell as its origin). Certain other domains
+# (runas_app, shell) can also exec this binary without a domain transition.
+typeattribute simpleperf coredomain;
+type simpleperf_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+domain_auto_trans({ untrusted_app_all -runas_app }, simpleperf_exec, simpleperf)
+
+# When running in this domain, simpleperf is scoped to profiling an individual
+# app. The necessary MAC permissions for profiling are more maintainable and
+# consistent if simpleperf is marked as an app domain as well (as, for example,
+# it will then see the same set of system libraries as the app).
+app_domain(simpleperf)
+untrusted_app_domain(simpleperf)
+
+# Allow ptrace attach to the target app, for reading JIT debug info (using
+# process_vm_readv) during unwinding and symbolization.
+allow simpleperf untrusted_app_all:process ptrace;
+
+# Allow using perf_event_open syscall for profiling the target app.
+allow simpleperf self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+
+# Allow /proc/<pid> access for the target app (for example, when trying to
+# discover it by cmdline).
+r_dir_file(simpleperf, untrusted_app_all)
+
+# Suppress denial logspam when simpleperf is trying to find a matching process
+# by scanning /proc/<pid>/cmdline files. The /proc/<pid> directories are within
+# the same domain as their respective processes, most of which this domain is
+# not allowed to see.
+dontaudit simpleperf domain:dir search;
+
+# Neverallows:
+
+# Profiling must be confined to the scope of an individual app.
+neverallow simpleperf self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/simpleperf_app_runner.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/simpleperf_app_runner.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8501826
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/simpleperf_app_runner.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute simpleperf_app_runner coredomain;
+
+domain_auto_trans(shell, simpleperf_app_runner_exec, simpleperf_app_runner)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/slideshow.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/slideshow.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7dfa994
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/slideshow.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+typeattribute slideshow coredomain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/snapshotctl.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/snapshotctl.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb2bbca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/snapshotctl.te
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+type snapshotctl, domain, coredomain;
+type snapshotctl_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Allow init to run snapshotctl and do auto domain transfer.
+init_daemon_domain(snapshotctl);
+
+# Allow to start gsid service.
+set_prop(snapshotctl, ctl_gsid_prop)
+
+# Allow to talk to gsid.
+binder_use(snapshotctl)
+allow snapshotctl gsi_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(snapshotctl, gsid)
+
+# Allow to create/read/write/delete OTA metadata files for snapshot status and COW file status.
+allow snapshotctl metadata_file:dir search;
+allow snapshotctl ota_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow snapshotctl ota_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow to get A/B slot suffix from device tree or kernel cmdline.
+r_dir_file(snapshotctl, sysfs_dt_firmware_android);
+allow snapshotctl proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Needed to (re-)map logical partitions.
+allow snapshotctl block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow snapshotctl super_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Interact with device-mapper to collapse snapshots.
+allow snapshotctl dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Needed to mutate device-mapper nodes.
+allow snapshotctl self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+
+# Snapshotctl talk to boot control HAL to set merge status.
+hwbinder_use(snapshotctl)
+hal_client_domain(snapshotctl, hal_bootctl)
+
+# Allow snapshotctl to write to statsd socket.
+unix_socket_send(snapshotctl, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# Logging
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow snapshotctl snapshotctl_log_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow snapshotctl snapshotctl_log_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/snapuserd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/snapuserd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d96b31e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/snapuserd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# snapuserd - Daemon for servicing dm-user requests for Virtual A/B snapshots.
+type snapuserd, domain;
+type snapuserd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+typeattribute snapuserd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(snapuserd)
+
+allow snapuserd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Reading and writing to /dev/block/dm-* (device-mapper) nodes.
+allow snapuserd block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow snapuserd dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow snapuserd dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Reading and writing to dm-user control nodes.
+allow snapuserd dm_user_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow snapuserd dm_user_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Reading and writing to /dev/socket/snapuserd.
+allow snapuserd snapuserd_socket:unix_stream_socket { accept listen getattr read write };
+
+# This arises due to first-stage init opening /dev/null without F_CLOEXEC
+# (see SetStdioToDevNull in init). When we fork() and execveat() snapuserd
+# again, the descriptor leaks into the new process.
+allow snapuserd kernel:fd use;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/stats.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/stats.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db29072
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/stats.te
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+type stats, domain;
+typeattribute stats coredomain;
+type stats_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# switch to stats domain for stats command
+domain_auto_trans(shell, stats_exec, stats)
+
+# allow stats access to stdout from its parent shell.
+allow stats shell:fd use;
+
+# allow stats to communicate use, read and write over the adb
+# connection.
+allow stats adbd:fd use;
+allow stats adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+
+# allow adbd to reap stats
+allow stats adbd:process { sigchld };
+
+# Allow the stats command to talk to the statsd over the binder, and get
+# back the stats report data from a ParcelFileDescriptor.
+binder_use(stats)
+allow stats stats_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(stats, statsd)
+allow stats statsd:fifo_file write;
+
+# Only statsd can publish the binder service.
+add_service(statsd, stats_service)
+
+# Allow pipes from (and only from) stats.
+allow statsd stats:fd use;
+allow statsd stats:fifo_file write;
+
+# Allow statsd to call back to stats with status updates.
+binder_call(statsd, stats)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -dumpstate
+  -gmscore_app
+  -gpuservice
+  -incidentd
+  -keystore
+  -mediametrics
+  -platform_app
+  -priv_app
+  -shell
+  -stats
+  -statsd
+  -surfaceflinger
+  -system_app
+  -system_server
+  -traceur_app
+} stats_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/statsd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/statsd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..444d82e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/statsd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+typeattribute statsd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(statsd)
+
+# Allow to exec the perfetto cmdline client and pass it the trace config on
+# stdint through a pipe. It allows statsd to  capture traces and hand them
+# to Android dropbox.
+allow statsd perfetto_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+domain_auto_trans(statsd, perfetto_exec, perfetto)
+
+# Grant statsd with permissions to register the services.
+allow statsd {
+  statscompanion_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow incidentd to obtain the statsd incident section.
+allow statsd incidentd:fifo_file write;
+
+# Allow StatsCompanionService to pipe data to statsd.
+allow statsd system_server:fifo_file { read getattr };
+
+# Allow statsd to retrieve SF statistics over binder
+binder_call(statsd, surfaceflinger);
+
+# Allow statsd to read its system properties
+get_prop(statsd, device_config_statsd_native_prop)
+get_prop(statsd, device_config_statsd_native_boot_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/storaged.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/storaged.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb39e5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/storaged.te
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+# storaged daemon
+type storaged, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type storaged_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(storaged)
+
+# Read access to pseudo filesystems
+r_dir_file(storaged, domain)
+
+# Read /proc/uid_io/stats
+allow storaged proc_uid_io_stats:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read /data/system/packages.list
+allow storaged system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow storaged packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Store storaged proto file
+allow storaged storaged_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow storaged storaged_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+no_debugfs_restriction(`
+  userdebug_or_eng(`
+    # Read access to debugfs
+    allow storaged debugfs_mmc:dir search;
+    allow storaged debugfs_mmc:file r_file_perms;
+  ')
+')
+
+# Needed to provide debug dump output via dumpsys pipes.
+allow storaged shell:fd use;
+allow storaged shell:fifo_file write;
+
+# Needed for GMScore to call dumpsys storaged
+allow storaged priv_app:fd use;
+# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
+# Remove after no logs are seen for this rule.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  auditallow storaged priv_app:fd use;
+')
+allow storaged gmscore_app:fd use;
+allow storaged { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file write;
+allow storaged permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Binder permissions
+add_service(storaged, storaged_service)
+
+binder_use(storaged)
+binder_call(storaged, system_server)
+
+hal_client_domain(storaged, hal_health)
+
+# Implements a dumpsys interface.
+allow storaged dumpstate:fd use;
+
+# use a subset of the package manager service
+allow storaged package_native_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Kernel does extra check on CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE for libbinder when storaged is
+# running as root. See b/35323867 #3.
+dontaudit storaged self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
+
+# For collecting bugreports.
+allow storaged dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+###
+### neverallow
+###
+neverallow storaged domain:process ptrace;
+neverallow storaged self:capability_class_set *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/su.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/su.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..587f449
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/su.te
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  typeattribute su coredomain;
+
+  domain_auto_trans(shell, su_exec, su)
+  # Allow dumpstate to call su on userdebug / eng builds to collect
+  # additional information.
+  domain_auto_trans(dumpstate, su_exec, su)
+
+  # Make sure that dumpstate runs the same from the "su" domain as
+  # from the "init" domain.
+  domain_auto_trans(su, dumpstate_exec, dumpstate)
+
+  # Put the incident command into its domain so it is the same on user, userdebug and eng.
+  domain_auto_trans(su, incident_exec, incident)
+
+  # Put the odrefresh command into its domain.
+  domain_auto_trans(su, odrefresh_exec, odrefresh)
+
+  # Put the perfetto command into its domain so it is the same on user, userdebug and eng.
+  domain_auto_trans(su, perfetto_exec, perfetto)
+
+  # su is also permissive to permit setenforce.
+  permissive su;
+
+  app_domain(su)
+
+  # Do not audit accesses to keystore2 namespace for the su domain.
+  dontaudit su keystore2_key_type:{ keystore2 keystore2_key } *;
+
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/surfaceflinger.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/surfaceflinger.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a92bd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/surfaceflinger.te
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+# surfaceflinger - display compositor service
+
+typeattribute surfaceflinger coredomain;
+
+type surfaceflinger_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(surfaceflinger)
+tmpfs_domain(surfaceflinger)
+
+typeattribute surfaceflinger mlstrustedsubject;
+typeattribute surfaceflinger display_service_server;
+
+read_runtime_log_tags(surfaceflinger)
+
+# Perform HwBinder IPC.
+hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_graphics_allocator)
+hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_graphics_composer)
+typeattribute surfaceflinger_tmpfs hal_graphics_composer_client_tmpfs;
+hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_codec2)
+hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_omx)
+hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_configstore)
+hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_power)
+hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_bufferhub)
+allow surfaceflinger hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# Perform Binder IPC.
+binder_use(surfaceflinger)
+binder_call(surfaceflinger, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(surfaceflinger, appdomain)
+binder_call(surfaceflinger, bootanim)
+binder_call(surfaceflinger, system_server);
+binder_service(surfaceflinger)
+
+# Binder IPC to bu, presently runs in adbd domain.
+binder_call(surfaceflinger, adbd)
+
+# Read /proc/pid files for Binder clients.
+r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, binderservicedomain)
+r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, appdomain)
+
+# Access the GPU.
+allow surfaceflinger gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Access /dev/graphics/fb0.
+allow surfaceflinger graphics_device:dir search;
+allow surfaceflinger graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Access /dev/video1.
+allow surfaceflinger video_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow surfaceflinger video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Create and use netlink kobject uevent sockets.
+allow surfaceflinger self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Set properties.
+set_prop(surfaceflinger, system_prop)
+set_prop(surfaceflinger, bootanim_system_prop)
+set_prop(surfaceflinger, exported_system_prop)
+set_prop(surfaceflinger, exported3_system_prop)
+set_prop(surfaceflinger, ctl_bootanim_prop)
+set_prop(surfaceflinger, surfaceflinger_display_prop)
+
+# Get properties.
+get_prop(surfaceflinger, qemu_sf_lcd_density_prop)
+
+# Use open files supplied by an app.
+allow surfaceflinger appdomain:fd use;
+allow surfaceflinger { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { read write };
+
+# Allow writing surface traces to /data/misc/wmtrace.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow surfaceflinger wm_trace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow surfaceflinger wm_trace_data_file:file { getattr setattr create w_file_perms };
+')
+
+# Needed to register as a Perfetto producer.
+perfetto_producer(surfaceflinger)
+
+# Use socket supplied by adbd, for cmd gpu vkjson etc.
+allow surfaceflinger adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write getattr };
+
+# Allow a dumpstate triggered screenshot
+binder_call(surfaceflinger, dumpstate)
+binder_call(surfaceflinger, shell)
+r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, dumpstate)
+
+# media.player service
+
+# do not use add_service() as hal_graphics_composer_default may be the
+# provider as well
+#add_service(surfaceflinger, surfaceflinger_service)
+allow surfaceflinger surfaceflinger_service:service_manager { add find };
+
+add_service(surfaceflinger, vrflinger_vsync_service)
+
+allow surfaceflinger mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow surfaceflinger permission_service:service_manager find;
+allow surfaceflinger power_service:service_manager find;
+allow surfaceflinger vr_manager_service:service_manager find;
+allow surfaceflinger window_service:service_manager find;
+allow surfaceflinger inputflinger_service:service_manager find;
+
+
+# allow self to set SCHED_FIFO
+allow surfaceflinger self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+allow surfaceflinger proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, cgroup_v2)
+r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, system_file)
+allow surfaceflinger tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow surfaceflinger system_server:fd use;
+allow surfaceflinger system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow surfaceflinger ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow surfaceflinger dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# pdx IPC
+pdx_server(surfaceflinger, display_client)
+pdx_server(surfaceflinger, display_manager)
+pdx_server(surfaceflinger, display_screenshot)
+pdx_server(surfaceflinger, display_vsync)
+
+pdx_client(surfaceflinger, bufferhub_client)
+pdx_client(surfaceflinger, performance_client)
+
+# Allow supplying timestats statistics to statsd
+allow surfaceflinger stats_service:service_manager find;
+allow surfaceflinger statsmanager_service:service_manager find;
+# TODO(146461633): remove this once native pullers talk to StatsManagerService
+binder_call(surfaceflinger, statsd);
+
+# Allow pushing jank event atoms to statsd
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+    unix_socket_send(surfaceflinger, statsdw, statsd)
+')
+
+# Surfaceflinger should not be reading default vendor-defined properties.
+dontaudit surfaceflinger vendor_default_prop:file read;
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### surfaceflinger should NEVER do any of this
+
+# Do not allow accessing SDcard files as unsafe ejection could
+# cause the kernel to kill the process.
+neverallow surfaceflinger sdcard_type:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# b/68864350
+dontaudit surfaceflinger unlabeled:dir search;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48d5f9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+###
+### Apps that run with the system UID, e.g. com.android.system.ui,
+### com.android.settings.  These are not as privileged as the system
+### server.
+###
+
+typeattribute system_app coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+
+app_domain(system_app)
+net_domain(system_app)
+binder_service(system_app)
+
+# android.ui and system.ui
+allow system_app rootfs:dir getattr;
+
+# Read and write /data/data subdirectory.
+allow system_app system_app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_app system_app_data_file:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms;
+
+# Read and write to /data/misc/user.
+allow system_app misc_user_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_app misc_user_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Access to apex files stored on /data (b/136063500)
+# Needed so that Settings can access NOTICE files inside apex
+# files located in the assets/ directory.
+allow system_app apex_data_file:dir search;
+allow system_app staging_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read wallpaper file.
+allow system_app wallpaper_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read icon file.
+allow system_app icon_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Write to properties
+set_prop(system_app, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, bluetooth_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, debug_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, system_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, exported_bluetooth_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, exported_system_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, exported3_system_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, logd_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, net_radio_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, usb_control_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, usb_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, log_tag_prop)
+userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(system_app, logpersistd_logging_prop)')
+auditallow system_app net_radio_prop:property_service set;
+auditallow system_app usb_control_prop:property_service set;
+auditallow system_app usb_prop:property_service set;
+# Allow Settings to enable Dynamic System Update
+set_prop(system_app, dynamic_system_prop)
+
+# ctl interface
+set_prop(system_app, ctl_default_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, ctl_bugreport_prop)
+
+# Allow developer settings to query gsid status
+get_prop(system_app, gsid_prop)
+
+# Create /data/anr/traces.txt.
+allow system_app anr_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
+allow system_app anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Settings need to access app name and icon from asec
+allow system_app asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow system apps (like Settings) to interact with statsd
+binder_call(system_app, statsd)
+
+# Allow system apps to interact with incidentd
+binder_call(system_app, incidentd)
+
+# Allow system app to interact with Dumpstate HAL
+hal_client_domain(system_app, hal_dumpstate)
+
+allow system_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
+# TODO: scope this down? Too broad?
+allow system_app {
+  service_manager_type
+  -apex_service
+  -dnsresolver_service
+  -dumpstate_service
+  -installd_service
+  -iorapd_service
+  -lpdump_service
+  -netd_service
+  -system_suspend_control_internal_service
+  -system_suspend_control_service
+  -virtual_touchpad_service
+  -vold_service
+  -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
+}:service_manager find;
+# suppress denials for services system_app should not be accessing.
+dontaudit system_app {
+  dnsresolver_service
+  dumpstate_service
+  installd_service
+  iorapd_service
+  netd_service
+  virtual_touchpad_service
+  vold_service
+  vr_hwc_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# suppress denials caused by debugfs_tracing
+dontaudit system_app debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow system_app keystore:keystore_key {
+    get_state
+    get
+    insert
+    delete
+    exist
+    list
+    reset
+    password
+    lock
+    unlock
+    is_empty
+    sign
+    verify
+    grant
+    duplicate
+    clear_uid
+    user_changed
+};
+
+allow system_app keystore:keystore2_key {
+    delete
+    get_info
+    grant
+    rebind
+    update
+    use
+};
+
+# Allow Settings to manage WI-FI keys.
+allow system_app wifi_key:keystore2_key {
+    delete
+    get_info
+    rebind
+    update
+    use
+};
+
+# settings app reads /proc/version
+allow system_app {
+  proc_version
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks.
+allow system_app cgroup:file w_file_perms;
+allow system_app cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
+control_logd(system_app)
+read_runtime_log_tags(system_app)
+get_prop(system_app, device_logging_prop)
+
+# allow system apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow system_app system_server:udp_socket {
+        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
+
+# Settings app reads ro.oem_unlock_supported
+get_prop(system_app, oem_unlock_prop)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# app domains which access /dev/fuse should not run as system_app
+neverallow system_app fuse_device:chr_file *;
+
+# Apps which run as UID=system should not rely on any attacker controlled
+# filesystem locations, such as /data/local/tmp. For /data/local/tmp, we
+# allow writes to files passed by file descriptor to support dumpstate and
+# bug reports, but not reads.
+neverallow system_app shell_data_file:dir { no_w_dir_perms open search read };
+neverallow system_app shell_data_file:file { open read ioctl lock };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e57739
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1,1403 @@
+#
+# System Server aka system_server spawned by zygote.
+# Most of the framework services run in this process.
+#
+
+typeattribute system_server coredomain;
+typeattribute system_server mlstrustedsubject;
+typeattribute system_server scheduler_service_server;
+typeattribute system_server sensor_service_server;
+typeattribute system_server stats_service_server;
+
+# Define a type for tmpfs-backed ashmem regions.
+tmpfs_domain(system_server)
+
+userfaultfd_use(system_server)
+
+# Create a socket for connections from crash_dump.
+type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_ndebug_socket "ndebugsocket";
+
+# Create a socket for connections from zygotes.
+type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_unsolzygote_socket "unsolzygotesocket";
+
+allow system_server zygote_tmpfs:file read;
+allow system_server appdomain_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+
+# For Incremental Service to check if incfs is available
+allow system_server proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
+
+# To create files, get permission to fill blocks, and configure Incremental File System
+allow system_server incremental_control_file:file { ioctl r_file_perms };
+allowxperm system_server incremental_control_file:file ioctl {
+  INCFS_IOCTL_CREATE_FILE
+  INCFS_IOCTL_CREATE_MAPPED_FILE
+  INCFS_IOCTL_PERMIT_FILL
+  INCFS_IOCTL_GET_READ_TIMEOUTS
+  INCFS_IOCTL_SET_READ_TIMEOUTS
+  INCFS_IOCTL_GET_LAST_READ_ERROR
+};
+
+# To get signature of an APK installed on Incremental File System, and fill in data
+# blocks and get the filesystem state
+allowxperm system_server apk_data_file:file ioctl {
+  INCFS_IOCTL_READ_SIGNATURE
+  INCFS_IOCTL_FILL_BLOCKS
+  INCFS_IOCTL_GET_FILLED_BLOCKS
+  INCFS_IOCTL_GET_BLOCK_COUNT
+  F2FS_IOC_GET_FEATURES
+  F2FS_IOC_GET_COMPRESS_BLOCKS
+  F2FS_IOC_COMPRESS_FILE
+  F2FS_IOC_DECOMPRESS_FILE
+  F2FS_IOC_RELEASE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS
+  F2FS_IOC_RESERVE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS
+  FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+};
+
+allowxperm system_server apk_tmp_file:file ioctl {
+  F2FS_IOC_RELEASE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS
+  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+};
+
+# For Incremental Service to check incfs metrics
+allow system_server sysfs_fs_incfs_metrics:file r_file_perms;
+
+# For f2fs-compression support
+allow system_server sysfs_fs_f2fs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server sysfs_fs_f2fs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# For art.
+allow system_server { apex_art_data_file dalvikcache_data_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server { apex_art_data_file dalvikcache_data_file }:file r_file_perms;
+
+# When running system server under --invoke-with, we'll try to load the boot image under the
+# system server domain, following links to the system partition.
+with_asan(`allow system_server dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;')
+
+# /data/resource-cache
+allow system_server resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow system_server resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# ptrace to processes in the same domain for debugging crashes.
+allow system_server self:process ptrace;
+
+# Child of the zygote.
+allow system_server zygote:fd use;
+allow system_server zygote:process sigchld;
+
+# May kill zygote on crashes.
+allow system_server {
+  app_zygote
+  crash_dump
+  webview_zygote
+  zygote
+}:process { sigkill signull };
+
+# Read /system/bin/app_process.
+allow system_server zygote_exec:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Needed to close the zygote socket, which involves getopt / getattr
+allow system_server zygote:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr };
+
+# system server gets network and bluetooth permissions.
+net_domain(system_server)
+# in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, also allow system_server
+# to use privileged ioctls commands. Needed to set up VPNs.
+allowxperm system_server self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+bluetooth_domain(system_server)
+
+# Allow setup of tcp keepalive offload. This gives system_server the permission to
+# call ioctl on app domains' tcp sockets. Additional ioctl commands still need to
+# be granted individually, except for a small set of safe values allowlisted in
+# public/domain.te.
+allow system_server appdomain:tcp_socket ioctl;
+
+# These are the capabilities assigned by the zygote to the
+# system server.
+allow system_server self:global_capability_class_set {
+    ipc_lock
+    kill
+    net_admin
+    net_bind_service
+    net_broadcast
+    net_raw
+    sys_boot
+    sys_nice
+    sys_ptrace
+    sys_time
+    sys_tty_config
+};
+
+# Trigger module auto-load.
+allow system_server kernel:system module_request;
+
+# Allow alarmtimers to be set
+allow system_server self:global_capability2_class_set wake_alarm;
+
+# Create and share netlink_netfilter_sockets for tetheroffload.
+allow system_server self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Create/use netlink_tcpdiag_socket for looking up connection UIDs for VPN apps.
+allow system_server self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read };
+
+# Use netlink uevent sockets.
+allow system_server self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Use generic netlink sockets.
+allow system_server self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow system_server self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# libvintf reads the kernel config to verify vendor interface compatibility.
+allow system_server config_gz:file { read open };
+
+# Use generic "sockets" where the address family is not known
+# to the kernel. The ioctl permission is specifically omitted here, but may
+# be added to device specific policy along with the ioctl commands to be
+# allowlisted.
+allow system_server self:socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Set and get routes directly via netlink.
+allow system_server self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
+
+# Kill apps.
+allow system_server appdomain:process { getpgid sigkill signal };
+# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
+allow system_server appdomain:process { signull };
+
+# Set scheduling info for apps.
+allow system_server appdomain:process { getsched setsched };
+allow system_server audioserver:process { getsched setsched };
+allow system_server hal_audio:process { getsched setsched };
+allow system_server hal_bluetooth:process { getsched setsched };
+allow system_server hal_codec2_server:process { getsched setsched };
+allow system_server hal_omx_server:process { getsched setsched };
+allow system_server mediaswcodec:process { getsched setsched };
+allow system_server cameraserver:process { getsched setsched };
+allow system_server hal_camera:process { getsched setsched };
+allow system_server mediaserver:process { getsched setsched };
+allow system_server bootanim:process { getsched setsched };
+
+# Set scheduling info for psi monitor thread.
+# TODO: delete this line b/131761776
+allow system_server kernel:process { getsched setsched };
+
+# Allow system_server to write to /proc/<pid>/*
+allow system_server domain:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Read /proc/pid data for all domains. This is used by ProcessCpuTracker
+# within system_server to keep track of memory and CPU usage for
+# all processes on the device. In addition, /proc/pid files access is needed
+# for dumping stack traces of native processes.
+r_dir_file(system_server, domain)
+
+# Write /proc/uid_cputime/remove_uid_range.
+allow system_server proc_uid_cputime_removeuid:file { w_file_perms getattr };
+
+# Write /proc/uid_procstat/set.
+allow system_server proc_uid_procstat_set:file { w_file_perms getattr };
+
+# Write to /proc/sysrq-trigger.
+allow system_server proc_sysrq:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Delete /data/misc/stats-data/ and /data/misc/stats-service/ directories.
+allow system_server stats_data_file:dir { open read remove_name search write };
+allow system_server stats_data_file:file unlink;
+
+# Read /sys/kernel/debug/wakeup_sources.
+no_debugfs_restriction(`
+  allow system_server debugfs_wakeup_sources:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Read /sys/kernel/ion/*.
+allow system_server sysfs_ion:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read /sys/kernel/dma_heap/*.
+allow system_server sysfs_dma_heap:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow reading DMA-BUF sysfs stats from /sys/kernel/dmabuf.
+allow system_server sysfs_dmabuf_stats:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server sysfs_dmabuf_stats:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow ActivityManager to look at the list of DMA-BUF heaps from /dev/dma_heap
+# for dumpsys meminfo
+allow system_server dmabuf_heap_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# The DhcpClient and WifiWatchdog use packet_sockets
+allow system_server self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# 3rd party VPN clients require a tun_socket to be created
+allow system_server self:tun_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Talk to init and various daemons via sockets.
+unix_socket_connect(system_server, lmkd, lmkd)
+unix_socket_connect(system_server, mtpd, mtp)
+unix_socket_connect(system_server, zygote, zygote)
+unix_socket_connect(system_server, racoon, racoon)
+unix_socket_connect(system_server, uncrypt, uncrypt)
+
+# Allow system_server to write to statsd.
+unix_socket_send(system_server, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# Communicate over a socket created by surfaceflinger.
+allow system_server surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt };
+
+allow system_server gpuservice:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt };
+
+# Communicate over a socket created by webview_zygote.
+allow system_server webview_zygote:unix_stream_socket { read write connectto setopt };
+
+# Communicate over a socket created by app_zygote.
+allow system_server app_zygote:unix_stream_socket { read write connectto setopt };
+
+# Perform Binder IPC.
+binder_use(system_server)
+binder_call(system_server, appdomain)
+binder_call(system_server, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(system_server, dumpstate)
+binder_call(system_server, fingerprintd)
+binder_call(system_server, gatekeeperd)
+binder_call(system_server, gpuservice)
+binder_call(system_server, idmap)
+binder_call(system_server, installd)
+binder_call(system_server, incidentd)
+binder_call(system_server, iorapd)
+binder_call(system_server, netd)
+userdebug_or_eng(`binder_call(system_server, profcollectd)')
+binder_call(system_server, statsd)
+binder_call(system_server, storaged)
+binder_call(system_server, update_engine)
+binder_call(system_server, vold)
+binder_call(system_server, wificond)
+binder_call(system_server, wpantund)
+binder_service(system_server)
+
+# Use HALs
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_allocator)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_audio)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_authsecret)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_broadcastradio)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_codec2)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_configstore)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_contexthub)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_face)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_fingerprint)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_gnss)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_graphics_allocator)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_health)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_input_classifier)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_ir)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_light)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_memtrack)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_neuralnetworks)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_oemlock)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_omx)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_power)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_power_stats)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_rebootescrow)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_sensors)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tetheroffload)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_thermal)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tv_cec)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tv_input)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_usb)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_usb_gadget)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_vibrator)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_vr)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_weaver)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_wifi)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_wifi_hostapd)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_wifi_supplicant)
+# The bootctl is a pass through HAL mode under recovery mode. So we skip the
+# permission for recovery in order not to give system server the access to
+# the low level block devices.
+not_recovery(`hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_bootctl)')
+
+# Talk with graphics composer fences
+allow system_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
+# Use RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
+allow system_server hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow system_server same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# Talk to tombstoned to get ANR traces.
+unix_socket_connect(system_server, tombstoned_intercept, tombstoned)
+
+# List HAL interfaces to get ANR traces.
+allow system_server hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
+allow system_server servicemanager:service_manager list;
+
+# Send signals to trigger ANR traces.
+allow system_server {
+  # This is derived from the list that system server defines as interesting native processes
+  # to dump during ANRs or watchdog aborts, defined in NATIVE_STACKS_OF_INTEREST in
+  # frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/Watchdog.java.
+  audioserver
+  cameraserver
+  drmserver
+  gpuservice
+  inputflinger
+  keystore
+  mediadrmserver
+  mediaextractor
+  mediametrics
+  mediaserver
+  mediaswcodec
+  mediatranscoding
+  mediatuner
+  netd
+  sdcardd
+  statsd
+  surfaceflinger
+  vold
+
+  # This list comes from HAL_INTERFACES_OF_INTEREST in
+  # frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/Watchdog.java.
+  hal_audio_server
+  hal_bluetooth_server
+  hal_camera_server
+  hal_codec2_server
+  hal_face_server
+  hal_fingerprint_server
+  hal_gnss_server
+  hal_graphics_allocator_server
+  hal_graphics_composer_server
+  hal_health_server
+  hal_light_server
+  hal_neuralnetworks_server
+  hal_omx_server
+  hal_power_stats_server
+  hal_sensors_server
+  hal_vr_server
+  system_suspend_server
+}:process { signal };
+
+# Use sockets received over binder from various services.
+allow system_server audioserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
+allow system_server audioserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
+allow system_server mediaserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
+allow system_server mediaserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
+
+# Use sockets received over binder from various services.
+allow system_server mediadrmserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
+allow system_server mediadrmserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`perfetto_producer({ system_server })')
+
+# Get file context
+allow system_server file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+# access for mac_permissions
+allow system_server mac_perms_file: file r_file_perms;
+# Check SELinux permissions.
+selinux_check_access(system_server)
+
+allow system_server sysfs_type:dir search;
+
+r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_android_usb)
+allow system_server sysfs_android_usb:file w_file_perms;
+
+allow system_server sysfs_extcon:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_ipv4)
+allow system_server sysfs_ipv4:file w_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_rtc)
+r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_switch)
+
+allow system_server sysfs_nfc_power_writable:file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server sysfs_power:dir search;
+allow system_server sysfs_power:file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server sysfs_thermal:dir search;
+allow system_server sysfs_thermal:file r_file_perms;
+allow system_server sysfs_uhid:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server sysfs_uhid:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# TODO: Remove when HALs are forced into separate processes
+allow system_server sysfs_vibrator:file { write append };
+
+# TODO: added to match above sysfs rule. Remove me?
+allow system_server sysfs_usb:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Access devices.
+allow system_server device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server mdns_socket:sock_file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server usbaccessory_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server video_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server adbd_socket:sock_file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server rtc_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server audio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# write access to ALSA interfaces (/dev/snd/*) needed for MIDI
+allow system_server audio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# tun device used for 3rd party vpn apps
+allow system_server tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm system_server tun_device:chr_file ioctl { TUNGETIFF TUNSETIFF };
+
+# Manage data/ota_package
+allow system_server ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow system_server ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage system data files.
+allow system_server system_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server system_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
+allow system_server packages_list_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow system_server keychain_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server keychain_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow system_server keychain_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/app.
+allow system_server apk_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server apk_data_file:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms link };
+allow system_server apk_tmp_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server apk_tmp_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Access input configuration files in the /vendor directory
+r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_keylayout_file)
+r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_keychars_file)
+r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_idc_file)
+
+# Access /vendor/{app,framework,overlay}
+r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_app_file)
+r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_framework_file)
+r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_overlay_file)
+
+# Manage /data/app-private.
+allow system_server apk_private_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server apk_private_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow system_server apk_private_tmp_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server apk_private_tmp_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage files within asec containers.
+allow system_server asec_apk_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server asec_apk_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow system_server asec_public_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/anr.
+#
+# TODO: Some of these permissions can be withdrawn once we've switched to the
+# new stack dumping mechanism, see b/32064548 and the rules below. In particular,
+# the system_server should never need to create a new anr_data_file:file or write
+# to one, but it will still need to read and append to existing files.
+allow system_server anr_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# New stack dumping scheme : request an output FD from tombstoned via a unix
+# domain socket.
+#
+# Allow system_server to connect and write to the tombstoned java trace socket in
+# order to dump its traces. Also allow the system server to write its traces to
+# dumpstate during bugreport capture and incidentd during incident collection.
+unix_socket_connect(system_server, tombstoned_java_trace, tombstoned)
+allow system_server tombstoned:fd use;
+allow system_server dumpstate:fifo_file append;
+allow system_server incidentd:fifo_file append;
+# Write to a pipe created from `adb shell` (for debuggerd -j `pidof system_server`)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow system_server su:fifo_file append;
+')
+
+# Allow system_server to read pipes from incidentd (used to deliver incident reports
+# to dropbox)
+allow system_server incidentd:fifo_file read;
+
+# Read /data/misc/incidents - only read. The fd will be sent over binder,
+# with no DAC access to it, for dropbox to read.
+allow system_server incident_data_file:file read;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/prereboot.
+allow system_server prereboot_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow system_server prereboot_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dropbox to read /data/misc/perfetto-traces. Only the fd is sent over
+# binder.
+allow system_server perfetto_traces_data_file:file read;
+allow system_server perfetto:fd use;
+
+# Manage /data/backup.
+allow system_server backup_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server backup_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /data/system/dropbox
+allow system_server dropbox_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server dropbox_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /data/system/heapdump
+allow system_server heapdump_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow system_server heapdump_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/adb.
+allow system_server adb_keys_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server adb_keys_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/appcompat.
+allow system_server appcompat_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow system_server appcompat_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/emergencynumberdb
+allow system_server emergency_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server emergency_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/network_watchlist
+allow system_server network_watchlist_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server network_watchlist_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/sms.
+# TODO:  Split into a separate type?
+allow system_server radio_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server radio_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/systemkeys.
+allow system_server systemkeys_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server systemkeys_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/textclassifier.
+allow system_server textclassifier_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server textclassifier_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Access /data/tombstones.
+allow system_server tombstone_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server tombstone_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow write access to be able to truncate tombstones.
+allow system_server tombstone_data_file:file write;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/vpn.
+allow system_server vpn_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server vpn_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/wifi.
+allow system_server wifi_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server wifi_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/misc/zoneinfo.
+allow system_server zoneinfo_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server zoneinfo_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/app-staging.
+allow system_server staging_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server staging_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage /data/rollback.
+allow system_server staging_data_file:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms link };
+
+# Walk /data/data subdirectories.
+allow system_server app_data_file_type:dir { getattr read search };
+
+# Also permit for unlabeled /data/data subdirectories and
+# for unlabeled asec containers on upgrades from 4.2.
+allow system_server unlabeled:dir r_dir_perms;
+# Read pkg.apk file before it has been relabeled by vold.
+allow system_server unlabeled:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
+allow system_server system_app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server system_app_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Receive and use open app data files passed over binder IPC.
+allow system_server app_data_file_type:file { getattr read write append map };
+
+# Access to /data/media for measuring disk usage.
+allow system_server media_rw_data_file:dir { search getattr open read };
+
+# Receive and use open /data/media files passed over binder IPC.
+# Also used for measuring disk usage.
+allow system_server media_rw_data_file:file { getattr read write append };
+
+# System server needs to setfscreate to packages_list_file when writing
+# /data/system/packages.list
+allow system_server system_server:process setfscreate;
+
+# Relabel apk files.
+allow system_server { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:{ dir file } { relabelfrom relabelto };
+allow system_server { apk_data_file apk_private_data_file }:{ dir file } { relabelfrom relabelto };
+# Allow PackageManager to:
+# 1. rename file from /data/app-staging folder to /data/app
+# 2. relabel files (linked to /data/rollback) under /data/app-staging
+# during staged apk/apex install.
+allow system_server { staging_data_file }:{ dir file } { relabelfrom relabelto };
+
+# Relabel wallpaper.
+allow system_server system_data_file:file relabelfrom;
+allow system_server wallpaper_file:file relabelto;
+allow system_server wallpaper_file:file { rw_file_perms rename unlink };
+
+# Backup of wallpaper imagery uses temporary hard links to avoid data churn
+allow system_server { system_data_file wallpaper_file }:file link;
+
+# ShortcutManager icons
+allow system_server system_data_file:dir relabelfrom;
+allow system_server shortcut_manager_icons:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow system_server shortcut_manager_icons:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage ringtones.
+allow system_server ringtone_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow system_server ringtone_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Relabel icon file.
+allow system_server icon_file:file relabelto;
+allow system_server icon_file:file { rw_file_perms unlink };
+
+# FingerprintService.java does a restorecon of the directory /data/system/users/[0-9]+/fpdata(/.*)?
+allow system_server system_data_file:dir relabelfrom;
+
+# server_configurable_flags_data_file is used for storing server configurable flags which
+# have been reset during current booting. system_server needs to read the data to perform related
+# disaster recovery actions.
+allow system_server server_configurable_flags_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server server_configurable_flags_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Property Service write
+set_prop(system_server, system_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, bootanim_system_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, exported_system_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, exported3_system_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, safemode_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, theme_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, dhcp_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, net_connectivity_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, net_radio_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, net_dns_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, usb_control_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, usb_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, debug_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, powerctl_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, fingerprint_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_logging_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, dumpstate_options_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, overlay_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, exported_overlay_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, pm_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, exported_pm_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, socket_hook_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, audio_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, boot_status_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, surfaceflinger_color_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, provisioned_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, retaildemo_prop)
+userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(system_server, wifi_log_prop)')
+
+# ctl interface
+set_prop(system_server, ctl_default_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, ctl_bugreport_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, ctl_gsid_prop)
+
+# cppreopt property
+set_prop(system_server, cppreopt_prop)
+
+# server configurable flags properties
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_input_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_netd_native_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_activity_manager_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_media_native_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_profcollect_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_statsd_native_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_statsd_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_storage_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_swcodec_native_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_sys_traced_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_configuration_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_connectivity_prop)
+
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(system_server, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+get_prop(system_server, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+
+# BootReceiver to read ro.boot.bootreason
+get_prop(system_server, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
+# PowerManager to read sys.boot.reason
+get_prop(system_server, system_boot_reason_prop)
+
+# Collect metrics on boot time created by init
+get_prop(system_server, boottime_prop)
+
+# Read device's serial number from system properties
+get_prop(system_server, serialno_prop)
+
+# Read/write the property which keeps track of whether this is the first start of system_server
+set_prop(system_server, firstboot_prop)
+
+# Audio service in system server can read audio config properties,
+# such as camera shutter enforcement
+get_prop(system_server, audio_config_prop)
+
+# system server reads this property to keep track of whether server configurable flags have been
+# reset during current boot.
+get_prop(system_server, device_config_reset_performed_prop)
+
+# Read/write the property that enables Test Harness Mode
+set_prop(system_server, test_harness_prop)
+
+# Read gsid.image_running.
+get_prop(system_server, gsid_prop)
+
+# Read the property that mocks an OTA
+get_prop(system_server, mock_ota_prop)
+
+# Read the property as feature flag for protecting apks with fs-verity.
+get_prop(system_server, apk_verity_prop)
+
+# Read wifi.interface
+get_prop(system_server, wifi_prop)
+
+# Read the vendor property that indicates if Incremental features is enabled
+get_prop(system_server, incremental_prop)
+
+# Read ro.zram. properties
+get_prop(system_server, zram_config_prop)
+
+# Read/write persist.sys.zram_enabled
+set_prop(system_server, zram_control_prop)
+
+# Read/write persist.sys.dalvik.vm.lib.2
+set_prop(system_server, dalvik_runtime_prop)
+
+# Read ro.control_privapp_permissions and ro.cp_system_other_odex
+get_prop(system_server, packagemanager_config_prop)
+
+# Read the net.464xlat.cellular.enabled property (written by init).
+get_prop(system_server, net_464xlat_fromvendor_prop)
+
+# Create a socket for connections from debuggerd.
+allow system_server system_ndebug_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
+
+# Create a socket for connections from zygotes.
+allow system_server system_unsolzygote_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage cache files.
+allow system_server cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir { relabelfrom create_dir_perms };
+allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file { relabelfrom create_file_perms };
+allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:fifo_file create_file_perms;
+
+allow system_server system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server system_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# ART locks profile files.
+allow system_server system_file:file lock;
+
+# LocationManager(e.g, GPS) needs to read and write
+# to uart driver and ctrl proc entry
+allow system_server gps_control:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow system_server to use app-created sockets and pipes.
+allow system_server appdomain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { getattr getopt setopt read write shutdown };
+allow system_server appdomain:{ fifo_file unix_stream_socket } { getattr read write };
+
+# BackupManagerService needs to manipulate backup data files
+allow system_server cache_backup_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow system_server cache_backup_file:file create_file_perms;
+# LocalTransport works inside /cache/backup
+allow system_server cache_private_backup_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server cache_private_backup_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow system to talk to usb device
+allow system_server usb_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server usb_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Read and delete files under /dev/fscklogs.
+r_dir_file(system_server, fscklogs)
+allow system_server fscklogs:dir { write remove_name };
+allow system_server fscklogs:file unlink;
+
+# logd access, system_server inherit logd write socket
+# (urge is to deprecate this long term)
+allow system_server zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
+
+# Read from log daemon.
+read_logd(system_server)
+read_runtime_log_tags(system_server)
+
+# Be consistent with DAC permissions. Allow system_server to write to
+# /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/parameters/adj
+# /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/parameters/minfree
+allow system_server sysfs_lowmemorykiller:file { getattr w_file_perms };
+
+# Read /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
+# Don't worry about overly broad permissions for now, as there's
+# only one file in /sys/fs/pstore
+allow system_server pstorefs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# /sys access
+allow system_server sysfs_zram:dir search;
+allow system_server sysfs_zram:file rw_file_perms;
+
+add_service(system_server, system_server_service);
+allow system_server audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server authorization_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server batteryproperties_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server dataloader_manager_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server dnsresolver_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server dumpstate_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server fingerprintd_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server gatekeeper_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server gpu_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server gsi_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server idmap_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server incident_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server incremental_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server installd_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server iorapd_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server keystore_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server mediatuner_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server netd_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server nfc_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server stats_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server storaged_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server update_engine_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server vold_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server wifinl80211_service:service_manager find;
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow system_server profcollectd_service:service_manager find;
+')
+
+add_service(system_server, batteryproperties_service)
+
+allow system_server keystore:keystore_key {
+	get_state
+	get
+	insert
+	delete
+	exist
+	list
+	reset
+	password
+	lock
+	unlock
+	is_empty
+	sign
+	verify
+	grant
+	duplicate
+	clear_uid
+	add_auth
+	user_changed
+};
+
+allow system_server keystore:keystore2 {
+	add_auth
+	change_password
+	change_user
+	clear_ns
+	clear_uid
+	get_state
+	lock
+	reset
+	unlock
+};
+
+allow system_server keystore:keystore2_key {
+	delete
+	use_dev_id
+	grant
+	get_info
+	rebind
+	update
+	use
+};
+
+# Allow Wifi module to manage Wi-Fi keys.
+allow system_server wifi_key:keystore2_key {
+	delete
+	get_info
+	rebind
+	update
+	use
+};
+
+# Allow lock_settings service to manage RoR keys.
+allow system_server resume_on_reboot_key:keystore2_key {
+	delete
+	get_info
+	rebind
+	update
+	use
+};
+
+# Allow lock_settings service to manage locksettings keys (e.g. the synthetic password key).
+allow system_server locksettings_key:keystore2_key {
+	delete
+	get_info
+	rebind
+	update
+	use
+};
+
+
+# Allow system server to search and write to the persistent factory reset
+# protection partition. This block device does not get wiped in a factory reset.
+allow system_server block_device:dir search;
+allow system_server frp_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm system_server frp_block_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKSECDISCARD BLKDISCARD };
+
+# Create new process groups and clean up old cgroups
+allow system_server cgroup:dir { remove_name rmdir };
+allow system_server cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server cgroup_v2:file { r_file_perms setattr };
+
+# /oem access
+r_dir_file(system_server, oemfs)
+
+# Allow resolving per-user storage symlinks
+allow system_server { mnt_user_file storage_file }:dir { getattr search };
+allow system_server { mnt_user_file storage_file }:lnk_file { getattr read };
+
+# Allow statfs() on storage devices, which happens fast enough that
+# we shouldn't be killed during unsafe removal
+allow system_server sdcard_type:dir { getattr search };
+
+# Traverse into expanded storage
+allow system_server mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow system process to relabel the fingerprint directory after mkdir
+# and delete the directory and files when no longer needed
+allow system_server fingerprintd_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms remove_name rmdir relabelto write };
+allow system_server fingerprintd_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # Allow system server to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
+  allow system_server method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
+  allow system_server method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
+
+  # Allow system server to read dmesg
+  allow system_server kernel:system syslog_read;
+
+  # Allow writing and removing window traces in /data/misc/wmtrace.
+  allow system_server wm_trace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow system_server wm_trace_data_file:file { getattr setattr create unlink w_file_perms };
+
+  # Allow writing and removing accessibility traces in /data/misc/a11ytrace.
+  allow system_server accessibility_trace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow system_server accessibility_trace_data_file:file { getattr setattr create unlink w_file_perms };
+')
+
+# For AppFuse.
+allow system_server vold:fd use;
+allow system_server fuse_device:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
+allow system_server app_fuse_file:file { read write getattr };
+
+# For configuring sdcardfs
+allow system_server configfs:dir { create_dir_perms };
+allow system_server configfs:file { getattr open create unlink write };
+
+# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
+# Used for e.g. jdwp.
+allow system_server adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+allow system_server adbd:fd use;
+allow system_server adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
+
+# Read service.adb.tls.port, persist.adb.wifi. properties
+get_prop(system_server, adbd_prop)
+
+# Set persist.adb.tls_server.enable property
+set_prop(system_server, system_adbd_prop)
+
+# Allow invoking tools like "timeout"
+allow system_server toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow system process to setup and measure fs-verity
+allowxperm system_server apk_data_file:file ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY
+};
+
+# Postinstall
+#
+# For OTA dexopt, allow calls coming from postinstall.
+binder_call(system_server, postinstall)
+
+allow system_server postinstall:fifo_file write;
+allow system_server update_engine:fd use;
+allow system_server update_engine:fifo_file write;
+
+# Access to /data/preloads
+allow system_server preloads_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+allow system_server preloads_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name rmdir };
+allow system_server preloads_media_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+allow system_server preloads_media_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name rmdir };
+
+r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup_v2)
+allow system_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /dev/dma_heap/system
+allow system_server dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+# Access to /dev/dma_heap/system-secure
+allow system_server dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(system_server, proc_asound)
+r_dir_file(system_server, proc_net_type)
+r_dir_file(system_server, proc_qtaguid_stat)
+allow system_server {
+  proc_cmdline
+  proc_loadavg
+  proc_locks
+  proc_meminfo
+  proc_pagetypeinfo
+  proc_pipe_conf
+  proc_stat
+  proc_uid_cputime_showstat
+  proc_uid_io_stats
+  proc_uid_time_in_state
+  proc_uid_concurrent_active_time
+  proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time
+  proc_version
+  proc_vmallocinfo
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow system_server proc_uid_time_in_state:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server proc_uid_cpupower:file r_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(system_server, rootfs)
+
+# Allow WifiService to start, stop, and read wifi-specific trace events.
+allow system_server debugfs_tracing_instances:dir search;
+allow system_server debugfs_wifi_tracing:dir search;
+allow system_server debugfs_wifi_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow BootReceiver to watch trace error_report events.
+allow system_server debugfs_bootreceiver_tracing:dir search;
+allow system_server debugfs_bootreceiver_tracing:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow system_server to read tracepoint ids in order to attach BPF programs to them.
+allow system_server debugfs_tracing:file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow system_server to exec shell, asanwrapper & zygote(app_process) on ASAN builds. Needed to run
+# asanwrapper.
+with_asan(`
+  allow system_server shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+  allow system_server asanwrapper_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+  allow system_server zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+')
+
+# allow system_server to read the eBPF maps that stores the traffic stats information and update
+# the map after snapshot is recorded, and to read, update and run the maps and programs used for
+# time in state accounting
+allow system_server fs_bpf:dir search;
+allow system_server fs_bpf:file { read write };
+allow system_server bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
+
+# ART Profiles.
+# Allow system_server to open profile snapshots for read.
+# System server never reads the actual content. It passes the descriptor to
+# to privileged apps which acquire the permissions to inspect the profiles.
+allow system_server { user_profile_root_file user_profile_data_file}:dir { getattr search };
+allow system_server user_profile_data_file:file { getattr open read };
+
+# System server may dump profile data for debuggable apps in the /data/misc/profman.
+# As such it needs to be able create files but it should never read from them.
+allow system_server profman_dump_data_file:file { create getattr setattr w_file_perms};
+allow system_server profman_dump_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
+
+# On userdebug build we may profile system server. Allow it to write and create its own profile.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow system_server user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+')
+# Allow system server to load JVMTI agents under control of a property.
+get_prop(system_server,system_jvmti_agent_prop)
+
+# UsbDeviceManager uses /dev/usb-ffs
+allow system_server functionfs:dir search;
+allow system_server functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# system_server contains time / time zone detection logic so reads the associated properties.
+get_prop(system_server, time_prop)
+
+# system_server reads this property to know it should expect the lmkd sends notification to it
+# on low memory kills.
+get_prop(system_server, system_lmk_prop)
+
+get_prop(system_server, wifi_config_prop)
+
+# Only system server can access BINDER_FREEZE and BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO
+allowxperm system_server binder_device:chr_file ioctl { BINDER_FREEZE BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO };
+
+# Watchdog prints debugging log to /dev/kmsg_debug.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow system_server kmsg_debug_device:chr_file { open append getattr };
+')
+# Watchdog reads sysprops framework_watchdog.fatal_* to handle watchdog timeout loop.
+get_prop(system_server, framework_watchdog_config_prop)
+
+
+# Font files are written by system server
+allow system_server font_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow system_server font_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+# Allow system process to setup fs-verity for font files
+allowxperm system_server font_data_file:file ioctl FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY;
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### system_server should NEVER do any of this
+
+# Do not allow opening files from external storage as unsafe ejection
+# could cause the kernel to kill the system_server.
+neverallow system_server sdcard_type:dir { open read write };
+neverallow system_server sdcard_type:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# system server should never be operating on zygote spawned app data
+# files directly. Rather, they should always be passed via a
+# file descriptor.
+# Exclude those types that system_server needs to open directly.
+neverallow system_server {
+  app_data_file_type
+  -system_app_data_file
+  -radio_data_file
+}:file { open create unlink link };
+
+# Forking and execing is inherently dangerous and racy. See, for
+# example, https://www.linuxprogrammingblog.com/threads-and-fork-think-twice-before-using-them
+# Prevent the addition of new file execs to stop the problem from
+# getting worse. b/28035297
+neverallow system_server {
+  file_type
+  -toolbox_exec
+  -logcat_exec
+  with_asan(`-shell_exec -asanwrapper_exec -zygote_exec')
+}:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Ensure that system_server doesn't perform any domain transitions other than
+# transitioning to the crash_dump domain when a crash occurs.
+neverallow system_server { domain -crash_dump }:process transition;
+neverallow system_server *:process dyntransition;
+
+# Only allow crash_dump to connect to system_ndebug_socket.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -crash_dump } system_ndebug_socket:sock_file { open write };
+
+# Only allow zygotes to connect to system_unsolzygote_socket.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+  -zygote
+  -app_zygote
+  -webview_zygote
+} system_unsolzygote_socket:sock_file { open write };
+
+# Only allow init, system_server, flags_health_check to set properties for server configurable flags
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+  -flags_health_check
+} {
+  device_config_activity_manager_native_boot_prop
+  device_config_connectivity_prop
+  device_config_input_native_boot_prop
+  device_config_netd_native_prop
+  device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop
+  device_config_runtime_native_prop
+  device_config_media_native_prop
+  device_config_storage_native_boot_prop
+  device_config_sys_traced_prop
+  device_config_swcodec_native_prop
+  device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop
+}:property_service set;
+
+# system_server should never be executing dex2oat. This is either
+# a bug (for example, bug 16317188), or represents an attempt by
+# system server to dynamically load a dex file, something we do not
+# want to allow.
+neverallow system_server dex2oat_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# system_server should never execute or load executable shared libraries
+# in /data. Executable files in /data are a persistence vector.
+# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
+neverallow system_server data_file_type:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# The only block device system_server should be accessing is
+# the frp_block_device. This helps avoid a system_server to root
+# escalation by writing to raw block devices.
+neverallow system_server { dev_type -frp_block_device }:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# system_server should never use JIT functionality
+# See https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/12/bitunmap-attacking-android-ashmem.html
+# in the section titled "A Short ROP Chain" for why.
+# However, in emulator builds without OpenGL passthrough, we use software
+# rendering via SwiftShader, which requires JIT support. These builds are
+# never shipped to users.
+ifelse(target_requires_insecure_execmem_for_swiftshader, `true',
+  `allow system_server self:process execmem;',
+  `neverallow system_server self:process execmem;')
+neverallow system_server { ashmem_device ashmem_libcutils_device }:chr_file execute;
+
+# TODO: deal with tmpfs_domain pub/priv split properly
+neverallow system_server system_server_tmpfs:file execute;
+
+# Resources handed off by system_server_startup
+allow system_server system_server_startup:fd use;
+allow system_server system_server_startup_tmpfs:file { read write map };
+allow system_server system_server_startup:unix_dgram_socket write;
+
+# Allow system server to communicate to apexd
+allow system_server apex_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server apexd:binder call;
+
+# Allow system server to scan /apex for flattened APEXes
+allow system_server apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow system server to read /apex/apex-info-list.xml
+allow system_server apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow system server to communicate to system-suspend's control interface
+allow system_server system_suspend_control_internal_service:service_manager find;
+allow system_server system_suspend_control_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(system_server, system_suspend)
+binder_call(system_suspend, system_server)
+
+# Allow system server to communicate to system-suspend's wakelock interface
+wakelock_use(system_server)
+
+# Allow the system server to read files under /data/apex. The system_server
+# needs these privileges to compare file signatures while processing installs.
+#
+# Only apexd is allowed to create new entries or write to any file under /data/apex.
+allow system_server apex_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow system_server apex_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow the system server to read files under /vendor/apex. This is where
+# vendor APEX packages might be installed and system_server needs to parse
+# these packages to inspect the signatures and other metadata.
+allow system_server vendor_apex_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow system_server vendor_apex_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow the system server to manage relevant apex module data files.
+allow system_server apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow system_server apex_appsearch_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server apex_appsearch_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow system_server apex_permission_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server apex_permission_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow system_server apex_scheduling_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server apex_scheduling_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow system_server apex_wifi_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server apex_wifi_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow PasswordSlotManager rw access to /metadata/password_slots, so GSIs and the host image can
+# communicate which slots are available for use.
+allow system_server metadata_file:dir search;
+allow system_server password_slot_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow system_server password_slot_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow system_server userspace_reboot_metadata_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server userspace_reboot_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow system server rw access to files in /metadata/staged-install folder
+allow system_server staged_install_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow system_server staged_install_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow system_server watchdog_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow system_server watchdog_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow system_server gsi_persistent_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow system_server gsi_persistent_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow system server read and remove files under /data/misc/odrefresh
+allow system_server odrefresh_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow system_server odrefresh_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+
+# Allow system server r access to /system/bin/surfaceflinger for PinnerService.
+allow system_server surfaceflinger_exec:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow init to set sysprop used to compute stats about userspace reboot.
+set_prop(system_server, userspace_reboot_log_prop)
+
+# JVMTI agent settings are only readable from the system server.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -system_server
+  -dumpstate
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+} {
+  system_jvmti_agent_prop
+}:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Read/Write /proc/pressure/memory
+allow system_server proc_pressure_mem:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# dexoptanalyzer is currently used only for secondary dex files which
+# system_server should never access.
+neverallow system_server dexoptanalyzer_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# No ptracing others
+neverallow system_server { domain -system_server }:process ptrace;
+
+# CAP_SYS_RESOURCE was traditionally needed for sensitive /proc/PID
+# file read access. However, that is now unnecessary (b/34951864)
+neverallow system_server system_server:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
+
+# Only system_server/init should access /metadata/password_slots.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } password_slot_metadata_file:dir *;
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+} password_slot_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } password_slot_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set *;
+
+# Only system_server/init should access /metadata/userspacereboot.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } userspace_reboot_metadata_file:dir *;
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } userspace_reboot_metadata_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow systemserver to read/write the invalidation property
+set_prop(system_server, binder_cache_system_server_prop)
+neverallow { domain -system_server -init }
+    binder_cache_system_server_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Allow system server to attach BPF programs to tracepoints. Deny read permission so that
+# system_server cannot use this access to read perf event data like process stacks.
+allow system_server self:perf_event { open write cpu kernel };
+neverallow system_server self:perf_event ~{ open write cpu kernel };
+
+# Do not allow any domain other than init or system server to set the property
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } socket_hook_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } boot_status_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+  -dumpstate
+  -system_server
+} wifi_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow system server to write uhid sysfs files
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -system_server
+    -ueventd
+    -vendor_init
+} sysfs_uhid:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# BINDER_FREEZE is used to block ipc transactions to frozen processes, so it
+# can be accessed by system_server only (b/143717177)
+# BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO is used by system_server to determine the state of a frozen binder
+# interface
+neverallowxperm { domain -system_server } binder_device:chr_file ioctl { BINDER_FREEZE BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO };
+
+# Only system server can write the font files.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } font_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } font_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+
+# Read qemu.hw.mainkeys property
+get_prop(system_server, qemu_hw_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_server_startup.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_server_startup.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3301304
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_server_startup.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+type system_server_startup, domain, coredomain;
+type system_server_startup_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+tmpfs_domain(system_server_startup)
+
+# Create JIT memory
+allow system_server_startup self:process execmem;
+allow system_server_startup system_server_startup_tmpfs:file { execute read write open map };
+
+# Allow system_server_startup to run setcon() and enter the
+# system_server domain
+allow system_server_startup self:process setcurrent;
+allow system_server_startup system_server:process dyntransition;
+
+# Child of the zygote.
+allow system_server_startup zygote:process sigchld;
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(system_server_startup, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+get_prop(system_server_startup, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_suspend.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_suspend.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..caf8955
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/system_suspend.te
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+type system_suspend, domain, coredomain, system_suspend_server, system_suspend_internal_server;
+
+type system_suspend_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(system_suspend)
+
+# To serve ISuspendControlService.
+binder_use(system_suspend)
+add_service(system_suspend, system_suspend_control_service)
+
+# Access to /sys/power/{ wakeup_count, state } suspend interface.
+allow system_suspend sysfs_power:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Access to wakeup, suspend stats, and wakeup reasons.
+r_dir_file(system_suspend, sysfs_suspend_stats)
+r_dir_file(system_suspend, sysfs_wakeup)
+r_dir_file(system_suspend, sysfs_wakeup_reasons)
+# To resolve arbitrary sysfs paths from /sys/class/wakeup/* symlinks.
+allow system_suspend sysfs_type:dir search;
+
+# Access to suspend_hal system properties
+get_prop(system_suspend, suspend_prop)
+
+# To call BTAA registered callbacks
+allow system_suspend bluetooth:binder call;
+
+# For adding `dumpsys syspend_control` output to bugreport
+allow system_suspend dumpstate:fd use;
+allow system_suspend dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -atrace # tracing
+    -bluetooth # support Bluetooth activity attribution (BTAA)
+    -dumpstate # bug reports
+    -system_suspend # implements system_suspend_control_service
+    -system_server # configures system_suspend via ISuspendControlService
+    -traceur_app # tracing
+} system_suspend_control_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/technical_debt.cil b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/technical_debt.cil
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b3e3c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/technical_debt.cil
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+; THIS IS A WORKAROUND for the current limitations of the module policy language
+; This should be used sparingly until we figure out a saner way to achieve the
+; stuff below, for example, by improving typeattribute statement of module
+; language.
+;
+; NOTE: This file has no effect on recovery policy.
+
+; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Allocator HAL
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_allocator_client;
+;     typeattribute hal_allocator_client halclientdomain;
+(typeattributeset hal_allocator_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+(typeattributeset halclientdomain (hal_allocator_client))
+
+; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of OMX-related services
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+(typeattributeset hal_omx_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+
+; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Codec2-related services
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+(typeattributeset hal_codec2_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+
+; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Drm-related services
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+(typeattributeset hal_drm_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+
+; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Configstore HAL
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_configstore_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_configstore_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+
+; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Graphics Allocator HAL
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_graphics_allocator_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_graphics_allocator_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+
+; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Cas HAL
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_cas_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_cas_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+
+; Domains hosting Camera HAL implementations are clients of Allocator HAL
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute hal_camera hal_allocator_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_allocator_client (hal_camera))
+
+; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Neuralnetworks HAL
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_neuralnetworks_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_neuralnetworks_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+
+; TODO(b/112056006): move these to mapping files when/if we implement 'versioned' attributes.
+; Rename untrusted_app_visible_* to untrusted_app_visible_*_violators.
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute untrusted_app_visible_hwservice untrusted_app_visible_hwservice_violators;
+;     typeattribute untrusted_app_visible_halserver untrusted_app_visible_halserver_violators;
+(typeattribute untrusted_app_visible_hwservice)
+(typeattributeset untrusted_app_visible_hwservice_violators (untrusted_app_visible_hwservice))
+(typeattribute untrusted_app_visible_halserver)
+(typeattributeset untrusted_app_visible_halserver_violators (untrusted_app_visible_halserver))
+
+; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of BufferHub HAL
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_cas_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_bufferhub_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+
+; Properties having both system_property_type and vendor_property_type are illegal
+; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
+;     typeattribute { system_property_type && vendor_property_type } system_and_vendor_property_type;
+(typeattribute system_and_vendor_property_type)
+(typeattributeset system_and_vendor_property_type ((and (system_property_type) (vendor_property_type))))
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/tombstoned.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/tombstoned.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6dfd1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/tombstoned.te
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+typeattribute tombstoned coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(tombstoned)
+
+get_prop(tombstoned, tombstone_config_prop)
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -vendor_init
+    -dumpstate
+    -tombstoned
+} tombstone_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/toolbox.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/toolbox.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2b958d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/toolbox.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute toolbox coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(toolbox)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traced.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traced.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e3ad46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traced.te
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+# Perfetto user-space tracing daemon (unprivileged)
+
+# type traced is defined under /public (because iorapd rules
+# under public/ need to refer to it).
+type traced_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Allow init to exec the daemon.
+init_daemon_domain(traced)
+tmpfs_domain(traced)
+
+# Allow apps in other MLS contexts (for multi-user) to access
+# share memory buffers created by traced.
+typeattribute traced_tmpfs mlstrustedobject;
+
+# Allow traced to start with a lower scheduling class and change
+# class accordingly to what defined in the config provided by
+# the privileged process that controls it.
+allow traced self:global_capability_class_set { sys_nice };
+
+# Allow to pass a file descriptor for the output trace from "perfetto" (the
+# cmdline client) and other shell binaries to traced and let traced write
+# directly into that (rather than returning the trace contents over the socket).
+allow traced perfetto:fd use;
+allow traced shell:fd use;
+allow traced shell:fifo_file { read write };
+
+# Allow the service to create new files within /data/misc/perfetto-traces.
+allow traced perfetto_traces_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow traced perfetto_traces_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+# ... and /data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport*
+allow traced perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow traced perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow traceur to pass open file descriptors to traced, so traced can directly
+# write into the output file without doing roundtrips over IPC.
+allow traced traceur_app:fd use;
+allow traced trace_data_file:file { read write };
+
+# Allow perfetto to access the proxy service for notifying Traceur.
+allow traced tracingproxy_service:service_manager find;
+binder_use(traced);
+binder_call(traced, system_server);
+
+# Allow iorapd to pass memfd descriptors to traced, so traced can directly
+# write into the shmem buffer file without doing roundtrips over IPC.
+allow traced iorapd:fd use;
+allow traced iorapd_tmpfs:file { read write };
+
+# Allow traced to use shared memory supplied by producers. Typically, traced
+# (i.e. the tracing service) creates the shared memory used for data transfer
+# from the producer. This rule allows an alternative scheme, where the producer
+# creates the shared memory, that is then adopted by traced (after validating
+# that it is appropriately sealed).
+# This list has to replicate the tmpfs domains of all applicable domains that
+# have perfetto_producer() macro applied to them.
+# perfetto_tmpfs excluded as it should never need to use the producer-supplied
+# shared memory scheme.
+allow traced  {
+  appdomain_tmpfs
+  heapprofd_tmpfs
+  surfaceflinger_tmpfs
+  traced_probes_tmpfs
+  userdebug_or_eng(`system_server_tmpfs')
+}:file { getattr map read write };
+
+# Allow traced to notify Traceur when a trace ends by setting the
+# sys.trace.trace_end_signal property.
+set_prop(traced, system_trace_prop)
+# Allow to lazily start producers.
+set_prop(traced, traced_lazy_prop)
+
+# Allow traced to talk to statsd for logging metrics.
+unix_socket_send(traced, statsdw, statsd)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### traced should NEVER do any of this
+
+# Disallow mapping executable memory (execstack and exec are already disallowed
+# globally in domain.te).
+neverallow traced self:process execmem;
+
+# Block device access.
+neverallow traced dev_type:blk_file { read write };
+
+# ptrace any other process
+neverallow traced domain:process ptrace;
+
+# Disallows access to /data files, still allowing to write to file descriptors
+# passed through the socket.
+neverallow traced {
+  data_file_type
+  -perfetto_traces_data_file
+  -perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file
+  -system_data_file
+  -system_data_root_file
+  # TODO(b/72998741) Remove vendor_data_file exemption. Further restricted in a
+  # subsequent neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
+  -vendor_data_file
+  -zoneinfo_data_file
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:dir *;
+neverallow traced { system_data_file }:dir ~{ getattr search };
+neverallow traced zoneinfo_data_file:dir ~r_dir_perms;
+neverallow traced { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file }:lnk_file *;
+neverallow traced {
+  data_file_type
+  -zoneinfo_data_file
+  -perfetto_traces_data_file
+  -perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file
+  -trace_data_file
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:file ~write;
+
+# Only init is allowed to enter the traced domain via exec()
+neverallow { domain -init } traced:process transition;
+neverallow * traced:process dyntransition;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traced_perf.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traced_perf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96a7263
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traced_perf.te
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# Performance profiler, backed by perf_event_open(2).
+# See go/perfetto-perf-android.
+typeattribute traced_perf coredomain;
+typeattribute traced_perf mlstrustedsubject;
+
+type traced_perf_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(traced_perf)
+perfetto_producer(traced_perf)
+
+# Allow traced_perf full use of perf_event_open(2). It will perform cpu-wide
+# profiling, but retain samples only for profileable processes.
+# Thread-specific profiling is still disallowed due to a PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
+# check (which would require a process:attach SELinux allow-rule).
+allow traced_perf self:perf_event { open cpu kernel read write tracepoint };
+
+# Allow CAP_KILL for delivery of dedicated signal to obtain proc-fds from a
+# process. Allow CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH for stack unwinding and symbolization of
+# sampled stacks, which requires opening the backing libraries/executables (as
+# symbols are usually not mapped into the process space). Not all such files
+# are world-readable, e.g. odex files that included user profiles during
+# profile-guided optimization.
+allow traced_perf self:capability { kill dac_read_search };
+
+# Allow reading /system/data/packages.list.
+allow traced_perf packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow reading files for stack unwinding and symbolization.
+r_dir_file(traced_perf, nativetest_data_file)
+r_dir_file(traced_perf, system_file_type)
+r_dir_file(traced_perf, apex_art_data_file)
+r_dir_file(traced_perf, apk_data_file)
+r_dir_file(traced_perf, dalvikcache_data_file)
+r_dir_file(traced_perf, vendor_file_type)
+
+# Allow to temporarily lift the kptr_restrict setting and build a symbolization
+# map reading /proc/kallsyms.
+userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(traced_perf, lower_kptr_restrict_prop)')
+allow traced_perf proc_kallsyms:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow reading tracefs files to get the format and numeric ids of tracepoints.
+allow traced_perf debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow traced_perf debugfs_tracing:file r_file_perms;
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow traced_perf debugfs_tracing_debug:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow traced_perf debugfs_tracing_debug:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Do not audit the cases where traced_perf attempts to access /proc/[pid] for
+# domains that it cannot read.
+dontaudit traced_perf domain:dir { search getattr open };
+
+# Do not audit failures to signal a process, as there are cases when this is
+# expected (native processes on debug builds use the policy for enforcing which
+# processes are profileable).
+dontaudit traced_perf domain:process signal;
+
+# Never allow access to app data files
+neverallow traced_perf { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file *;
+
+# Never allow profiling highly privileged processes.
+never_profile_perf(`{
+  bpfloader
+  init
+  kernel
+  keystore
+  llkd
+  logd
+  ueventd
+  vendor_init
+  vold
+}')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traced_probes.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traced_probes.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..730a45c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traced_probes.te
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# Perfetto tracing probes, has tracefs access.
+type traced_probes_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type traced_probes_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+# Allow init to exec the daemon.
+init_daemon_domain(traced_probes)
+tmpfs_domain(traced_probes)
+
+# Write trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires connecting to its
+# producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(traced_probes)
+
+# Allow traced_probes to access tracefs.
+allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+allow traced_probes debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
+allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing_printk_formats:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow traced_probes to access mm_events trace instance
+allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing_instances:dir search;
+allow traced_probes debugfs_mm_events_tracing:dir search;
+allow traced_probes debugfs_mm_events_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# TODO(primiano): temporarily I/O tracing categories are still
+# userdebug only until we nail down the denylist/allowlist.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing_debug:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing_debug:file rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Allow traced_probes to start with a higher scheduling class and then downgrade
+# itself.
+allow traced_probes self:global_capability_class_set { sys_nice };
+
+# Allow procfs access
+r_dir_file(traced_probes, domain)
+
+# Allow to temporarily lift the kptr_restrict setting and build a symbolization
+# map reading /proc/kallsyms.
+userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(traced_probes, lower_kptr_restrict_prop)')
+allow traced_probes proc_kallsyms:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow to read packages.list file.
+allow traced_probes packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow to log to kernel dmesg when starting / stopping ftrace.
+allow traced_probes kmsg_device:chr_file write;
+
+# Allow traced_probes to list the system partition.
+allow traced_probes system_file:dir { open read };
+
+# Allow traced_probes to list some of the data partition.
+allow traced_probes self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
+
+allow traced_probes apk_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow traced_probes { apex_art_data_file apex_module_data_file }:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow traced_probes dalvikcache_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+# search and getattr are granted via domain and coredomain, respectively.
+allow traced_probes system_data_file:dir { open read };
+')
+allow traced_probes system_app_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow traced_probes backup_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow traced_probes bootstat_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow traced_probes update_engine_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow traced_probes update_engine_log_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow traced_probes { user_profile_root_file user_profile_data_file}:dir { getattr open read search };
+
+# Allow traced_probes to run atrace. atrace pokes at system services to enable
+# their userspace TRACE macros.
+domain_auto_trans(traced_probes, atrace_exec, atrace);
+
+# Allow traced_probes to kill atrace on timeout.
+allow traced_probes atrace:process sigkill;
+
+# Allow traced_probes to access /proc files for system stats.
+# Note: trace data is NOT exposed to anything other than shell and privileged
+# system apps that have access to the traced consumer socket.
+allow traced_probes {
+  proc_meminfo
+  proc_vmstat
+  proc_stat
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow access to read /sys/class/devfreq/ and /$DEVICE/cur_freq files
+allow traced_probes sysfs_devfreq_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow traced_probes sysfs_devfreq_cur:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow access to the IHealth and IPowerStats HAL service for tracing battery counters.
+hal_client_domain(traced_probes, hal_health)
+hal_client_domain(traced_probes, hal_power_stats)
+
+# Allow access to Atrace HAL for enabling vendor/device specific tracing categories.
+hal_client_domain(traced_probes, hal_atrace)
+
+# On debug builds allow to ingest system logs into the trace.
+userdebug_or_eng(`read_logd(traced_probes)')
+
+# Allow traced_probes to talk to statsd for logging metrics.
+unix_socket_send(traced_probes, statsdw, statsd)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### traced_probes should NEVER do any of this
+
+# Disallow mapping executable memory (execstack and exec are already disallowed
+# globally in domain.te).
+neverallow traced_probes self:process execmem;
+
+# Block device access.
+neverallow traced_probes dev_type:blk_file { read write };
+
+# ptrace any other app
+neverallow traced_probes domain:process ptrace;
+
+# Disallows access to /data files.
+neverallow traced_probes {
+  data_file_type
+  -apex_module_data_file
+  -apex_art_data_file
+  -apk_data_file
+  -dalvikcache_data_file
+  -system_data_file
+  -system_data_root_file
+  -system_app_data_file
+  -backup_data_file
+  -bootstat_data_file
+  -update_engine_data_file
+  -update_engine_log_data_file
+  -user_profile_root_file
+  -user_profile_data_file
+  # TODO(b/72998741) Remove vendor_data_file exemption. Further restricted in a
+  # subsequent neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
+  -vendor_data_file
+  -zoneinfo_data_file
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:dir *;
+neverallow traced_probes system_data_file:dir ~{ getattr userdebug_or_eng(`open read') search };
+neverallow traced_probes zoneinfo_data_file:dir ~r_dir_perms;
+neverallow traced_probes { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file }:lnk_file *;
+neverallow traced_probes {
+  data_file_type
+  -zoneinfo_data_file
+  -packages_list_file
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:file *;
+
+# Only init is allowed to enter the traced_probes domain via exec()
+neverallow { domain -init } traced_probes:process transition;
+neverallow * traced_probes:process dyntransition;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traceur_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traceur_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2937e26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/traceur_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+typeattribute traceur_app coredomain;
+
+app_domain(traceur_app);
+allow traceur_app debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+allow traceur_app debugfs_tracing_debug:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow traceur_app debugfs_tracing_debug:file rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+allow traceur_app trace_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow traceur_app trace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow traceur_app atrace_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# To exec the perfetto cmdline client and pass it the trace config on
+# stdint through a pipe.
+allow traceur_app perfetto_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow to access traced's privileged consumer socket.
+unix_socket_connect(traceur_app, traced_consumer, traced)
+
+dontaudit traceur_app debugfs_tracing_debug:file audit_access;
+
+set_prop(traceur_app, debug_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/tzdatacheck.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/tzdatacheck.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..502735c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/tzdatacheck.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute tzdatacheck coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(tzdatacheck)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/ueventd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/ueventd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bcdbf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/ueventd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+typeattribute ueventd coredomain;
+
+tmpfs_domain(ueventd)
+
+# ueventd can set properties, particularly it sets ro.cold_boot_done to signal
+# to init that cold boot has completed.
+set_prop(ueventd, cold_boot_done_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/uncrypt.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/uncrypt.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a94cd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/uncrypt.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+typeattribute uncrypt coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(uncrypt)
+
+# Set a property to reboot the device.
+set_prop(uncrypt, powerctl_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e7a99c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+###
+### Untrusted apps.
+###
+### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+### targetSdkVersion >= 30.
+###
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
+###
+
+typeattribute untrusted_app coredomain;
+
+app_domain(untrusted_app)
+untrusted_app_domain(untrusted_app)
+net_domain(untrusted_app)
+bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_25.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_25.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82c07ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_25.te
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+###
+### Untrusted_app_25
+###
+### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+### targetSdkVersion <= 25.
+###
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
+###
+
+typeattribute untrusted_app_25 coredomain;
+
+app_domain(untrusted_app_25)
+untrusted_app_domain(untrusted_app_25)
+net_domain(untrusted_app_25)
+bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app_25)
+
+# b/35917228 - /proc/misc access
+# This will go away in a future Android release
+allow untrusted_app_25 proc_misc:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /proc/tty/drivers, to allow apps to determine if they
+# are running in an emulated environment.
+# b/33214085 b/33814662 b/33791054 b/33211769
+# https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator/blob/master/AntiEmulator/src/diff/strazzere/anti/emulator/FindEmulator.java
+# This will go away in a future Android release
+allow untrusted_app_25 proc_tty_drivers:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Text relocation support for API < 23. This is now disallowed for targetSdkVersion>=Q.
+# https://android.googlesource.com/platform/bionic/+/master/android-changes-for-ndk-developers.md#text-relocations-enforced-for-api-level-23
+allow untrusted_app_25 { apk_data_file app_data_file asec_public_file }:file execmod;
+
+# The ability to call exec() on files in the apps home directories
+# for targetApi<=25. This is also allowed for targetAPIs 26, 27,
+# and 28 in untrusted_app_27.te.
+allow untrusted_app_25 app_data_file:file execute_no_trans;
+auditallow untrusted_app_25 app_data_file:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+
+# The ability to invoke dex2oat. Historically required by ART, now only
+# allowed for targetApi<=28 for compat reasons.
+allow untrusted_app_25 dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+userdebug_or_eng(`auditallow untrusted_app_25 dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;')
+
+# The ability to talk to /dev/ashmem directly. targetApi>=29 must use
+# ASharedMemory instead.
+allow untrusted_app_25 ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+auditallow untrusted_app_25 ashmem_device:chr_file open;
+
+# Read /mnt/sdcard symlink.
+allow untrusted_app_25 mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_27.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_27.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a326a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_27.te
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+###
+### Untrusted_27.
+###
+### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+### 25 < targetSdkVersion <= 28.
+###
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
+###
+
+typeattribute untrusted_app_27 coredomain;
+
+app_domain(untrusted_app_27)
+untrusted_app_domain(untrusted_app_27)
+net_domain(untrusted_app_27)
+bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app_27)
+
+# Text relocation support for API < 23. This is now disallowed for targetSdkVersion>=Q.
+# https://android.googlesource.com/platform/bionic/+/master/android-changes-for-ndk-developers.md#text-relocations-enforced-for-api-level-23
+allow untrusted_app_27 { apk_data_file app_data_file asec_public_file }:file execmod;
+
+# The ability to call exec() on files in the apps home directories
+# for targetApi 26, 27, and 28.
+allow untrusted_app_27 app_data_file:file execute_no_trans;
+auditallow untrusted_app_27 app_data_file:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+
+# The ability to invoke dex2oat. Historically required by ART, now only
+# allowed for targetApi<=28 for compat reasons.
+allow untrusted_app_27 dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+userdebug_or_eng(`auditallow untrusted_app_27 dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;')
+
+# The ability to talk to /dev/ashmem directly. targetApi>=29 must use
+# ASharedMemory instead.
+allow untrusted_app_27 ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+auditallow untrusted_app_27 ashmem_device:chr_file open;
+
+# Read /mnt/sdcard symlink.
+allow untrusted_app_27 mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_29.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_29.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d03f399
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_29.te
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+###
+### Untrusted_29.
+###
+### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+### targetSdkVersion = 29.
+###
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
+###
+
+typeattribute untrusted_app_29 coredomain;
+
+app_domain(untrusted_app_29)
+untrusted_app_domain(untrusted_app_29)
+net_domain(untrusted_app_29)
+bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app_29)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_all.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_all.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6064c14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/untrusted_app_all.te
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+###
+### Untrusted_app_all.
+###
+### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains except
+### ephemeral_app for instant apps and isolated_app (which has a reduced
+### permission set).
+### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
+### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
+### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
+### directory).  The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default
+### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
+### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
+### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
+### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
+### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
+### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
+### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
+### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
+### seapp_contexts.
+###
+### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also
+### added to ephemeral_app.te.
+
+# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
+# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
+allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
+allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file     { r_file_perms execute };
+auditallow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file execute;
+
+# Chrome Crashpad uses the the dynamic linker to load native executables
+# from an APK (b/112050209, crbug.com/928422)
+allow untrusted_app_all system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Follow priv-app symlinks. This is used for dynamite functionality.
+allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow handling of less common filesystem objects
+allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:{ lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow loading and deleting executable shared libraries
+# within an application home directory. Such shared libraries would be
+# created by things like renderscript or via other mechanisms.
+allow untrusted_app_all app_exec_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute unlink };
+
+# ASEC
+allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+# Execute libs in asec containers.
+allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute };
+
+# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
+# running "adb install foo.apk".
+# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.
+# Figure out a way to remove these rules.
+allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to untrusted apps
+# for the purpose of sharing files through e.g. gmail
+allow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { getattr read };
+
+# untrusted apps should not be able to open trace data files, they should depend
+# upon traceur to pass a file descriptor
+neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:dir *;
+neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open };
+
+# neverallow untrusted apps accessing debugfs_tracing
+neverallow untrusted_app_all debugfs_tracing:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow to read staged apks.
+allow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file {read getattr};
+
+# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
+# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
+# cropping or taking user photos.
+allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };
+
+#
+# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app.
+# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app.
+#
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# allow cts to query all services
+allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list;
+
+allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find;
+
+# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
+allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace;
+
+# Android Studio Instant Run has the application connect to a
+# runas_app socket listening in the abstract namespace.
+# https://developer.android.com/studio/run/
+# b/123297648
+allow untrusted_app_all runas_app:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+# Untrusted apps need to be able to send a SIGCHLD to runas_app
+# when running under a debugger (b/123612207)
+allow untrusted_app_all runas_app:process sigchld;
+
+# Cts: HwRngTest
+allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search;
+allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apps to view preloaded media content
+allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir search;
+
+# Allow untrusted apps read / execute access to /vendor/app for there can
+# be pre-installed vendor apps that package a library within themselves.
+# TODO (b/37784178) Consider creating  a special type for /vendor/app installed
+# apps.
+allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:dir { open getattr read search };
+allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
+allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read };
+
+# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
+# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(untrusted_app_all)
+
+# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
+can_profile_heap(untrusted_app_all)
+can_profile_perf(untrusted_app_all)
+
+# allow untrusted apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow untrusted_app_all system_server:udp_socket {
+        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
+
+# Allow the renderscript compiler to be run.
+domain_auto_trans(untrusted_app_all, rs_exec, rs)
+
+# suppress denials caused by debugfs_tracing
+dontaudit untrusted_app_all debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# This is allowed for targetSdkVersion <= 25 but disallowed on newer versions.
+dontaudit untrusted_app_all net_dns_prop:file read;
+
+# These have been disallowed since Android O.
+# For P, we assume that apps are safely handling the denial.
+dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_stat:file read;
+dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_vmstat:file read;
+dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_uptime:file read;
+
+# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
+# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
+create_pty(untrusted_app_all)
+
+# Allow access to kcov via its ioctl interface for coverage
+# guided kernel fuzzing.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file rw_file_perms;
+  allowxperm untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file ioctl { KCOV_INIT_TRACE KCOV_ENABLE KCOV_DISABLE };
+  # The use of debugfs kcov is considered a breach of the kernel integrity
+  # according to the heuristic of lockdown.
+  allow untrusted_app_all self:lockdown integrity;
+')
+
+# Allow signalling simpleperf domain, which is the domain that the simpleperf
+# profiler runs as when executed by the app. The signals are used to control
+# the profiler (which would be profiling the app that is sending the signal).
+allow untrusted_app_all simpleperf:process signal;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/update_engine.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/update_engine.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d828e1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/update_engine.te
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+typeattribute update_engine coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(update_engine);
+
+# Allow to talk to gsid.
+allow update_engine gsi_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(update_engine, gsid)
+
+# Allow to start gsid service.
+set_prop(update_engine, ctl_gsid_prop)
+
+# Allow to start snapuserd for dm-user communication.
+set_prop(update_engine, ctl_snapuserd_prop)
+
+# Allow to set the OTA related properties, e.g. ota.warm_reset.
+set_prop(update_engine, ota_prop)
+
+# Allow to get the DSU status
+get_prop(update_engine, gsid_prop)
+
+# Allow update_engine to call the callback function provided by GKI update hook.
+binder_call(update_engine, gki_apex_prepostinstall)
+
+# Allow to communicate with the snapuserd service, for dm-user snapshots.
+allow update_engine snapuserd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+allow update_engine snapuserd_socket:sock_file write;
+
+# Allow to communicate with apexd for calculating and reserving space for
+# capex decompression
+allow update_engine apex_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(update_engine, apexd)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/update_engine_common.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/update_engine_common.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8571ff6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/update_engine_common.te
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
+# public, but conceptually should go with this
+# The postinstall program is run by update_engine_common and must be tagged
+# with postinstall_exec in the new filesystem.
+# TODO Have build system attempt to verify this
+domain_auto_trans(update_engine_common, postinstall_exec, postinstall)
+
+# Vendor directories can have the transition as well during OTA. This is caused
+# by update_engine execing scripts in vendor to perform any update tasks needed
+# there.
+domain_auto_trans(update_engine_common, postinstall_file, postinstall)
+
+allow update_engine_common labeledfs:filesystem { mount unmount relabelfrom };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/update_verifier.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/update_verifier.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e1b27b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/update_verifier.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+typeattribute update_verifier coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(update_verifier)
+
+# Allow update_verifier to reboot the device.
+set_prop(update_verifier, powerctl_prop)
+
+# Allow to set the OTA related properties e.g. ota.warm_reset.
+set_prop(update_verifier, ota_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/usbd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/usbd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42f2324
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/usbd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+typeattribute usbd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(usbd)
+
+# Access usb gadget hal
+hal_client_domain(usbd, hal_usb_gadget)
+
+# Access persist.sys.usb.config
+get_prop(usbd, system_prop)
+
+# start adbd during boot if adb is enabled
+set_prop(usbd, ctl_default_prop)
+
+# Start/stop adbd via ctl.start adbd
+set_prop(usbd, ctl_adbd_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/users b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/users
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51b7b57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/users
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+user u roles { r } level s0 range s0 - mls_systemhigh;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vdc.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vdc.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc7409e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vdc.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute vdc coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(vdc)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vendor_init.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vendor_init.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e616f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vendor_init.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Creating files on sysfs is impossible so this isn't a threat
+# Sometimes we have to write to non-existent files to avoid conditional
+# init behavior. See b/35303861 for an example.
+dontaudit vendor_init sysfs:dir write;
+
+# TODO(b/140259336) We want to remove vendor_init in the long term but allow for now
+allow vendor_init system_data_root_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+# Let vendor_init set service.adb.tcp.port.
+set_prop(vendor_init, adbd_config_prop)
+
+# chown/chmod on devices, e.g. /dev/ttyHS0
+allow vendor_init {
+  dev_type
+  -keychord_device
+  -kvm_device
+  -port_device
+  -lowpan_device
+  -hw_random_device
+}:chr_file setattr;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/viewcompiler.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/viewcompiler.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1f0964
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/viewcompiler.te
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# viewcompiler
+type viewcompiler, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type viewcompiler_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type viewcompiler_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+# Reading an APK opens a ZipArchive, which unpack to tmpfs.
+# Use tmpfs_domain() which will give tmpfs files created by viewcompiler their
+# own label, which differs from other labels created by other processes.
+# This allows to distinguish in policy files created by viewcompiler vs other
+# processes.
+tmpfs_domain(viewcompiler)
+
+allow viewcompiler installd:fd use;
+
+# Include write permission for app data files so viewcompiler can generate
+# compiled layout dex files
+allow viewcompiler app_data_file:file { getattr write };
+
+# Allow the view compiler to read resources from the apps APK.
+allow viewcompiler apk_data_file:file { read map };
+
+# priv-apps are moving to a world where they can only execute
+# signed code. Make sure viewcompiler never can write to privapp
+# directories to avoid introducing unsigned executable code
+neverallow viewcompiler privapp_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/virtual_touchpad.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/virtual_touchpad.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e735172
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/virtual_touchpad.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute virtual_touchpad coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(virtual_touchpad)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/virtualizationservice.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/virtualizationservice.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c6f1f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/virtualizationservice.te
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+type virtualizationservice, domain, coredomain;
+type virtualizationservice_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# When init runs a file labelled with virtualizationservice_exec, run it in the
+# virtualizationservice domain.
+init_daemon_domain(virtualizationservice)
+
+# Let the virtualizationservice domain use Binder.
+binder_use(virtualizationservice)
+
+# Let the virtualizationservice domain register the virtualization_service with ServiceManager.
+add_service(virtualizationservice, virtualization_service)
+
+# When virtualizationservice execs a file with the crosvm_exec label, run it in the crosvm domain.
+domain_auto_trans(virtualizationservice, crosvm_exec, crosvm)
+
+# Let virtualizationservice exec other files (e.g. mk_cdisk) in the same domain.
+allow virtualizationservice system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Let virtualizationservice kill crosvm.
+allow virtualizationservice crosvm:process sigkill;
+
+# Let virtualizationservice access its data directory.
+allow virtualizationservice virtualizationservice_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow virtualizationservice virtualizationservice_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vold.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vold.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a802bdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vold.te
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+typeattribute vold coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(vold)
+
+# Switch to more restrictive domains when executing common tools
+domain_auto_trans(vold, sgdisk_exec, sgdisk);
+domain_auto_trans(vold, sdcardd_exec, sdcardd);
+
+# For a handful of probing tools, we choose an even more restrictive
+# domain when working with untrusted block devices
+domain_trans(vold, blkid_exec, blkid);
+domain_trans(vold, blkid_exec, blkid_untrusted);
+domain_trans(vold, fsck_exec, fsck);
+domain_trans(vold, fsck_exec, fsck_untrusted);
+
+# Newly created storage dirs are always treated as mount stubs to prevent us
+# from accidentally writing when the mount point isn't present.
+type_transition vold storage_file:dir storage_stub_file;
+type_transition vold mnt_media_rw_file:dir mnt_media_rw_stub_file;
+
+# Property Service
+get_prop(vold, vold_config_prop)
+get_prop(vold, storage_config_prop);
+get_prop(vold, incremental_prop);
+
+set_prop(vold, vold_post_fs_data_prop)
+set_prop(vold, vold_prop)
+set_prop(vold, vold_status_prop)
+set_prop(vold, powerctl_prop)
+set_prop(vold, ctl_fuse_prop)
+set_prop(vold, restorecon_prop)
+set_prop(vold, ota_prop)
+set_prop(vold, boottime_prop)
+set_prop(vold, boottime_public_prop)
+
+# Vold will use Keystore instead of using Keymint directly. But it still needs
+# to manage its Keymint blobs. This is why it needs the `manage_blob` permission.
+allow vold vold_key:keystore2_key {
+    convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral
+    delete
+    get_info
+    manage_blob
+    rebind
+    req_forced_op
+    update
+    use
+};
+
+# vold needs to call keystore methods
+allow vold keystore:binder call;
+
+# vold needs to find keystore2 services
+allow vold keystore_service:service_manager find;
+allow vold keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
+
+# vold needs to be able to call earlyBootEnded()
+allow vold keystore:keystore2 early_boot_ended;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -system_server
+    -vdc
+    -vold
+    -update_verifier
+    -apexd
+    -gsid
+} vold_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..956e94e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+domain_auto_trans(vold, vold_prepare_subdirs_exec, vold_prepare_subdirs)
+
+typeattribute vold_prepare_subdirs mlstrustedsubject;
+
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs vold:fd use;
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs vold:fifo_file { read write };
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs self:global_capability_class_set { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner };
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs self:process setfscreate;
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
+  system_data_file
+  vendor_data_file
+}:dir { open read write add_name remove_name rmdir relabelfrom };
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
+    apex_appsearch_data_file
+    apex_art_data_file
+    apex_module_data_file
+    apex_permission_data_file
+    apex_rollback_data_file
+    apex_scheduling_data_file
+    apex_wifi_data_file
+    backup_data_file
+    face_vendor_data_file
+    fingerprint_vendor_data_file
+    iris_vendor_data_file
+    rollback_data_file
+    storaged_data_file
+    system_data_file
+    vold_data_file
+}:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
+    apex_appsearch_data_file
+    apex_art_data_file
+    apex_art_staging_data_file
+    apex_module_data_file
+    apex_permission_data_file
+    apex_rollback_data_file
+    apex_scheduling_data_file
+    apex_wifi_data_file
+    backup_data_file
+    face_vendor_data_file
+    fingerprint_vendor_data_file
+    iris_vendor_data_file
+    rollback_data_file
+    storaged_data_file
+    system_data_file
+    vold_data_file
+}:file { getattr unlink };
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs apex_mnt_dir:dir { open read };
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs mnt_expand_file:dir search;
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs user_profile_data_file:dir { search getattr relabelfrom };
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs user_profile_root_file:dir { search getattr relabelfrom relabelto };
+# /data/misc is unlabeled during early boot.
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs unlabeled:dir search;
+
+dontaudit vold_prepare_subdirs { proc unlabeled }:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vr_hwc.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vr_hwc.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..053c03d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vr_hwc.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+typeattribute vr_hwc coredomain;
+
+# Daemon started by init.
+init_daemon_domain(vr_hwc)
+
+hal_server_domain(vr_hwc, hal_graphics_composer)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vzwomatrigger_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vzwomatrigger_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8deb22b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/vzwomatrigger_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+###
+### A domain for further sandboxing the VzwOmaTrigger app.
+###
+type vzwomatrigger_app, domain;
+
+app_domain(vzwomatrigger_app)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/wait_for_keymaster.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/wait_for_keymaster.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da98e2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/wait_for_keymaster.te
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# wait_for_keymaster service
+type wait_for_keymaster, domain, coredomain;
+type wait_for_keymaster_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(wait_for_keymaster)
+
+hal_client_domain(wait_for_keymaster, hal_keymaster)
+
+allow wait_for_keymaster kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
+
+# wait_for_keymaster needs to find keystore and call methods with the returned
+# binder reference.
+binder_use(wait_for_keymaster)
+allow wait_for_keymaster keystore_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(wait_for_keymaster, keystore)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/watchdogd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/watchdogd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91ece70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/watchdogd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute watchdogd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(watchdogd)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/webview_zygote.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/webview_zygote.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10bcf1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/webview_zygote.te
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# webview_zygote is an auxiliary zygote process that is used to spawn
+# isolated_app processes for rendering untrusted web content.
+
+typeattribute webview_zygote coredomain;
+
+# The webview_zygote needs to be able to transition domains.
+typeattribute webview_zygote mlstrustedsubject;
+
+# Allow access to temporary files, which is normally permitted through
+# a domain macro.
+tmpfs_domain(webview_zygote);
+
+userfaultfd_use(webview_zygote)
+
+# Allow reading/executing installed binaries to enable preloading the
+# installed WebView implementation.
+allow webview_zygote apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow webview_zygote apk_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
+
+# Access to the WebView relro file.
+allow webview_zygote shared_relro_file:dir search;
+allow webview_zygote shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Set the UID/GID of the process.
+allow webview_zygote self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid };
+# Drop capabilities from bounding set.
+allow webview_zygote self:global_capability_class_set setpcap;
+# Switch SELinux context to app domains.
+allow webview_zygote self:process setcurrent;
+allow webview_zygote isolated_app:process dyntransition;
+
+# For art.
+allow webview_zygote { apex_art_data_file dalvikcache_data_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow webview_zygote dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow webview_zygote { apex_art_data_file dalvikcache_data_file }:file { r_file_perms execute };
+allow webview_zygote apex_module_data_file:dir search;
+
+# Allow webview_zygote to create JIT memory.
+allow webview_zygote self:process execmem;
+
+# Allow webview_zygote to stat the files that it opens. It must
+# be able to inspect them so that it can reopen them on fork
+# if necessary: b/30963384.
+allow webview_zygote debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
+
+# Allow webview_zygote to manage the pgroup of its children.
+allow webview_zygote system_server:process getpgid;
+
+# Interaction between the webview_zygote and its children.
+allow webview_zygote isolated_app:process setpgid;
+
+# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
+# Suppress denials to storage. Webview zygote should not be accessing.
+dontaudit webview_zygote mnt_expand_file:dir getattr;
+
+# TODO (b/72957399) remove this when webview_zygote is reparented to
+# app_process zygote
+dontaudit webview_zygote dex2oat_exec:file execute;
+
+# Get seapp_contexts
+allow webview_zygote seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+# Check validity of SELinux context before use.
+selinux_check_context(webview_zygote)
+# Check SELinux permissions.
+selinux_check_access(webview_zygote)
+
+# Directory listing in /system.
+allow webview_zygote system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Read and inspect temporary files (like system properties) managed by zygote.
+allow webview_zygote zygote_tmpfs:file { read getattr };
+# Child of zygote.
+allow webview_zygote zygote:fd use;
+allow webview_zygote zygote:process sigchld;
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(webview_zygote, vendor_overlay_file)
+
+allow webview_zygote same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+allow webview_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(webview_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
+# Allow the webview_zygote to access the runtime feature flag properties.
+get_prop(webview_zygote, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(webview_zygote, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+#####
+##### Neverallow
+#####
+
+# Only permit transition to isolated_app.
+neverallow webview_zygote { domain -isolated_app }:process dyntransition;
+
+# Only setcon() transitions, no exec() based transitions, except for crash_dump.
+neverallow webview_zygote { domain -crash_dump }:process transition;
+
+# Must not exec() a program without changing domains.
+# Having said that, exec() above is not allowed.
+neverallow webview_zygote *:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The only way to enter this domain is for the zygote to fork a new
+# webview_zygote child.
+neverallow { domain -zygote } webview_zygote:process dyntransition;
+
+# Disallow write access to properties.
+neverallow webview_zygote property_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow webview_zygote property_type:property_service set;
+
+# Should not have any access to app data files.
+neverallow webview_zygote app_data_file_type:file { rwx_file_perms };
+
+neverallow webview_zygote {
+    service_manager_type
+    -activity_service
+    -webviewupdate_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
+neverallow webview_zygote gpu_device:chr_file { rwx_file_perms };
+
+# Do not allow webview_zygote access to /cache.
+neverallow webview_zygote cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
+neverallow webview_zygote cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
+
+# Do not allow most socket access. This is socket_class_set, excluding unix_dgram_socket,
+# unix_stream_socket, and netlink_selinux_socket.
+neverallow webview_zygote domain:{
+  socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket
+  appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket netlink_tcpdiag_socket
+  netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
+  netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket netlink_iscsi_socket
+  netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket netlink_netfilter_socket
+  netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket
+  sctp_socket icmp_socket ax25_socket ipx_socket netrom_socket atmpvc_socket
+  x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket atmsvc_socket rds_socket irda_socket
+  pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket bluetooth_socket iucv_socket
+  rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket ieee802154_socket caif_socket
+  alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket
+  xdp_socket
+} *;
+
+# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties.
+# neverallow rules for Bluetooth-related data files are listed above.
+neverallow webview_zygote {
+  bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop
+  bluetooth_audio_hal_prop
+  bluetooth_prop
+  exported_bluetooth_prop
+}:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/wificond.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/wificond.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bf37ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/wificond.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+typeattribute wificond coredomain;
+
+set_prop(wificond, wifi_hal_prop)
+set_prop(wificond, wifi_prop)
+set_prop(wificond, ctl_default_prop)
+
+get_prop(wificond, hwservicemanager_prop)
+
+init_daemon_domain(wificond)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/wpantund.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/wpantund.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e91662c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/wpantund.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute wpantund coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(wpantund)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/zipfuse.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/zipfuse.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d5faad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/zipfuse.te
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# zipfuse is a FUSE daemon running in the microdroid. It mounts
+# /dev/block/by-name/microdroid-apk whose content is from an apk file on
+# /mnt/apk so that the entries in the apk file are seen as regular files. See
+# packages/modules/Virtualization/zipfuse.
+
+type zipfuse, domain, coredomain;
+type zipfuse_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+# allow domain transition from init
+init_daemon_domain(zipfuse)
+
+# allow basic rules to implement FUSE
+allow zipfuse fuse_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow zipfuse self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+
+# allow access to /dev/vd* block device files and also access to the symlinks
+# /dev/block/by-name/*
+allow zipfuse block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow zipfuse block_device:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow zipfuse vd_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow mounting on /mnt/apk
+allow zipfuse tmpfs:dir mounton;
+
+# TODO(b/188400186) uncomment the following when this filesystem is mounted with
+# fscontext=u:object_r:zipfusefs:s0
+# type zipfusefs, fs_type, contextmount_type;
+# allow zipfuse fuse:filesystem relabelfrom;
+# allow zipfuse zipfusefs:filesystem { mount relabelfrom relabelto };
+
+# TODO(b/188400186) remove this when this filesystem is mounted with correct fcontext
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow zipfuse fuse:filesystem mount;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/zygote.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/zygote.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9038c4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/private/zygote.te
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+# zygote
+typeattribute zygote coredomain;
+typeattribute zygote mlstrustedsubject;
+
+init_daemon_domain(zygote)
+tmpfs_domain(zygote)
+
+read_runtime_log_tags(zygote)
+
+# Override DAC on files and switch uid/gid.
+allow zygote self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search setgid setuid fowner chown };
+
+# Drop capabilities from bounding set.
+allow zygote self:global_capability_class_set setpcap;
+
+# Switch SELinux context to app domains.
+allow zygote self:process setcurrent;
+allow zygote system_server_startup:process dyntransition;
+allow zygote appdomain:process dyntransition;
+allow zygote webview_zygote:process dyntransition;
+allow zygote app_zygote:process dyntransition;
+
+# Allow zygote to read app /proc/pid dirs (b/10455872).
+allow zygote appdomain:dir { getattr search };
+allow zygote appdomain:file { r_file_perms };
+
+userfaultfd_use(zygote)
+
+# Move children into the peer process group.
+allow zygote system_server:process { getpgid setpgid };
+allow zygote appdomain:process { getpgid setpgid };
+allow zygote webview_zygote:process { getpgid setpgid };
+allow zygote app_zygote:process { getpgid setpgid };
+
+# Read system data.
+allow zygote system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow zygote system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /data/dalvik-cache.
+allow zygote dalvikcache_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow zygote dalvikcache_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Create symlinks in /data/dalvik-cache.
+allow zygote dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /data/resource-cache.
+allow zygote resourcecache_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow zygote resourcecache_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# For updateability, the zygote may fetch the current boot
+# classpath from the dalvik cache. Integrity of the files
+# is ensured by fsverity protection (checked in art_apex_boot_integrity).
+allow zygote dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
+
+# Allow zygote to find files in APEX data directories.
+allow zygote apex_module_data_file:dir search;
+
+# Allow zygote to find and map files created by on device signing.
+allow zygote apex_art_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow zygote apex_art_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
+
+# Bind mount on /data/data and mounted volumes
+allow zygote { system_data_file mnt_expand_file }:dir mounton;
+
+# Relabel /data/user /data/user_de and /data/data
+allow zygote tmpfs:{ dir lnk_file } relabelfrom;
+allow zygote system_data_file:{ dir lnk_file } relabelto;
+
+# Zygote opens /mnt/expand to mount CE DE storage on each vol
+allow zygote mnt_expand_file:dir { open read search relabelto };
+
+# Bind mount subdirectories on /data/misc/profiles/cur
+allow zygote user_profile_root_file:dir { mounton search };
+
+# Create and bind dirs on /data/data
+allow zygote tmpfs:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+
+# Goes into media directory and bind mount obb directory
+allow zygote media_rw_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+# Bind mount on top of existing mounted obb and data directory
+allow zygote media_rw_data_file:dir { mounton };
+
+# Read if sdcardfs is supported
+allow zygote proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Create symlink for /data/user/0
+allow zygote tmpfs:lnk_file create;
+
+allow zygote mirror_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Get inode of directories for app data isolation
+allow zygote {
+  app_data_file_type
+  system_data_file
+  mnt_expand_file
+}:dir getattr;
+
+# Allow zygote to create JIT memory.
+allow zygote self:process execmem;
+allow zygote zygote_tmpfs:file execute;
+allow zygote ashmem_libcutils_device:chr_file execute;
+
+# Execute idmap and dex2oat within zygote's own domain.
+# TODO:  Should either of these be transitioned to the same domain
+# used by installd or stay in-domain for zygote?
+allow zygote idmap_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow zygote dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(zygote, vendor_overlay_file)
+
+# Control cgroups.
+allow zygote cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow zygote cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+allow zygote cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow zygote cgroup_v2:{ file lnk_file } { r_file_perms setattr };
+allow zygote self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+
+# Allow zygote to stat the files that it opens. The zygote must
+# be able to inspect them so that it can reopen them on fork
+# if necessary: b/30963384.
+allow zygote pmsg_device:chr_file getattr;
+allow zygote debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
+
+# Get seapp_contexts
+allow zygote seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+# Check validity of SELinux context before use.
+selinux_check_context(zygote)
+# Check SELinux permissions.
+selinux_check_access(zygote)
+
+# Native bridge functionality requires that zygote replaces
+# /proc/cpuinfo with /system/lib/<ISA>/cpuinfo using a bind mount
+allow zygote proc_cpuinfo:file mounton;
+
+# Allow remounting rootfs as MS_SLAVE.
+allow zygote rootfs:dir mounton;
+allow zygote tmpfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
+allow zygote fuse:filesystem { unmount };
+allow zygote sdcardfs:filesystem { unmount };
+
+# Allow creating user-specific storage source if started before vold.
+allow zygote mnt_user_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+allow zygote mnt_user_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+allow zygote mnt_user_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow mounting user-specific storage source if started before vold.
+allow zygote mnt_pass_through_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+
+# Allowed to mount user-specific storage into place
+allow zygote storage_file:dir { search mounton };
+
+# Allow mounting and creating files, dirs on sdcardfs.
+allow zygote { sdcard_type }:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+allow zygote { sdcard_type }:file { create_file_perms };
+
+# Handle --invoke-with command when launching Zygote with a wrapper command.
+allow zygote zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow zygote to write to statsd.
+unix_socket_send(zygote, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# Root fs.
+r_dir_file(zygote, rootfs)
+
+# System file accesses.
+r_dir_file(zygote, system_file)
+
+# /oem accesses.
+allow zygote oemfs:dir search;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # Allow zygote to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
+  allow zygote method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
+  allow zygote method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
+')
+
+allow zygote ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow zygote tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+allow zygote same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# Allow the zygote to access storage properties to check if sdcardfs is enabled.
+get_prop(zygote, storage_config_prop);
+
+# Let the zygote access overlays so it can initialize the AssetManager.
+get_prop(zygote, overlay_prop)
+get_prop(zygote, exported_overlay_prop)
+
+# Allow the zygote to access the runtime feature flag properties.
+get_prop(zygote, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(zygote, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+# Allow the zygote to access window manager native boot feature flags
+# to initialize WindowManager static properties.
+get_prop(zygote, device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
+
+# ingore spurious denials
+# fsetid can be checked as a consequence of chmod when using cgroup v2 uid/pid hierarchy. This is
+# done to determine if the file should inherit setgid. In this case, setgid on the file is
+# undesirable, so suppress the denial.
+dontaudit zygote self:global_capability_class_set { sys_resource fsetid };
+
+# Ignore spurious denials calling access() on fuse.
+# Also ignore read and open as sdcardfs may read and open dir when app tries to access a dir that
+# doesn't exist.
+# TODO(b/151316657): avoid the denials
+dontaudit zygote media_rw_data_file:dir  { read open setattr };
+
+# Allow zygote to use ashmem fds from system_server.
+allow zygote system_server:fd use;
+
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
+# Allow zygote to access media_variant_prop for static initialization
+get_prop(zygote, media_variant_prop)
+
+# Allow zygote to read ro.control_privapp_permissions and ro.cp_system_other_odex
+get_prop(zygote, packagemanager_config_prop)
+
+# Allow zygote to read qemu.sf.lcd_density
+get_prop(zygote, qemu_sf_lcd_density_prop)
+
+# Allow zygote to read /apex/apex-info-list.xml
+allow zygote apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Ensure that all types assigned to app processes are included
+# in the appdomain attribute, so that all allow and neverallow rules
+# written on appdomain are applied to all app processes.
+# This is achieved by ensuring that it is impossible for zygote to
+# setcon (dyntransition) to any types other than those associated
+# with appdomain plus system_server_startup, webview_zygote and
+# app_zygote.
+neverallow zygote ~{
+  appdomain
+  system_server_startup
+  webview_zygote
+  app_zygote
+}:process dyntransition;
+
+# Zygote should never execute anything from /data except for
+# /data/dalvik-cache files or files generated during on-device
+# signing under /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art/.
+neverallow zygote {
+  data_file_type
+  -apex_art_data_file # map PROT_EXEC
+  -dalvikcache_data_file # map PROT_EXEC
+}:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties and files
+neverallow zygote {
+  bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop
+  bluetooth_audio_hal_prop
+  bluetooth_prop
+  exported_bluetooth_prop
+}:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Zygote should not be able to access app private data.
+neverallow zygote app_data_file_type:dir ~getattr;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/adbd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/adbd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5056b35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/adbd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# adbd seclabel is specified in init.rc since
+# it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
+type adbd, domain;
+type adbd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+# Only init is allowed to enter the adbd domain via exec()
+neverallow { domain -init } adbd:process transition;
+neverallow * adbd:process dyntransition;
+
+# Access /data/local/tests.
+allow adbd shell_test_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow adbd shell_test_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow adbd shell_test_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/aidl_lazy_test_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/aidl_lazy_test_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..626d008
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/aidl_lazy_test_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+type aidl_lazy_test_server, domain;
+type aidl_lazy_test_server_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  binder_use(aidl_lazy_test_server)
+  binder_call(aidl_lazy_test_server, binderservicedomain)
+
+  add_service(aidl_lazy_test_server, aidl_lazy_test_service)
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/apexd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/apexd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..53bc569
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/apexd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# apexd -- manager for APEX packages
+type apexd, domain;
+type apexd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+binder_use(apexd)
+add_service(apexd, apex_service)
+
+neverallow { domain -init -apexd -system_server -update_engine } apex_service:service_manager find;
+neverallow { domain -init -apexd -system_server -servicemanager -update_engine } apexd:binder call;
+
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-crash_dump') } apexd:process ptrace;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae8d7fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,597 @@
+###
+### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
+###
+### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
+### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
+### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
+### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
+###
+type appdomain_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+# WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
+allow appdomain self:process execmem;
+
+allow appdomain { ashmem_device ashmem_libcutils_device }:chr_file execute;
+
+# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
+allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
+
+# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
+# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
+allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Notify zygote of death;
+allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;
+
+# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
+allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
+allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
+allow appdomain tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
+allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # Allow apps to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
+  allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
+  allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
+')
+
+# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
+allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
+allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
+
+# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
+allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
+
+# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
+allow appdomain system_server:fd use;
+allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
+allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };
+
+# For AppFuse.
+allow appdomain vold:fd use;
+
+# Communication with other apps via fifos
+allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
+allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
+
+# App sandbox file accesses.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
+
+# Traverse into expanded storage
+allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Keychain and user-trusted credentials
+r_dir_file(appdomain, keychain_data_file)
+allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# TextClassifier
+r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app }, textclassifier_data_file)
+
+# Access to OEM provided data and apps
+allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Execute the shell or other system executables.
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow appdomain system_file:file x_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
+
+# Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
+allow appdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain system_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };
+# Renderscript specific permissions to open /system/vendor/lib64.
+not_full_treble(`
+    allow appdomain vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+    allow appdomain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr open read };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    # For looking up Renderscript vendor drivers
+    allow { appdomain -isolated_app } vendor_file:dir { open read };
+')
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
+# apps which cannot be in /vendor.
+r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app }, vendor_app_file)
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_app_file:file execute;
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_overlay_file)
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/framework
+# for vendor provided libraries.
+r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_framework_file)
+
+# Allow apps read / execute access to vendor public libraries.
+allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
+allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write map };
+
+# Read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
+allow appdomain ringtone_file:file { getattr read write map };
+
+# Read ShortcutManager icon files (opened by system).
+allow appdomain shortcut_manager_icons:file { getattr read map };
+
+# Read icon file (opened by system).
+allow appdomain icon_file:file { getattr read map };
+
+# Old stack dumping scheme : append to a global trace file (/data/anr/traces.txt).
+#
+# TODO: All of these permissions except for anr_data_file:file append can be
+# withdrawn once we've switched to the new stack dumping mechanism, see b/32064548
+# and the rules below.
+allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
+allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };
+
+# New stack dumping scheme : request an output FD from tombstoned via a unix
+# domain socket.
+#
+# Allow apps to connect and write to the tombstoned java trace socket in
+# order to dump their traces. Also allow them to append traces to pipes
+# created by dumptrace. (Also see the rules below where they are given
+# additional permissions to dumpstate pipes for other aspects of bug report
+# creation).
+unix_socket_connect(appdomain, tombstoned_java_trace, tombstoned)
+allow appdomain tombstoned:fd use;
+allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file append;
+allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file append;
+
+# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
+allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
+allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
+allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file { write getattr };
+allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };
+
+# Allow apps to send dump information to incidentd
+allow appdomain incidentd:fd use;
+allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file { write getattr };
+
+# Allow apps to send information to statsd socket.
+unix_socket_send(appdomain, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# Write profiles /data/misc/profiles
+allow appdomain user_profile_root_file:dir search;
+allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:dir { search write add_name };
+allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Send heap dumps to system_server via an already open file descriptor
+# % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576
+# % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing
+# debuggable builds only.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow appdomain heapdump_data_file:file append;
+')
+
+# /proc/net access.
+# TODO(b/9496886) Audit access for removal.
+# proc_net access for the negated domains below is granted (or not) in their
+# individual .te files.
+r_dir_file({
+  appdomain
+  -ephemeral_app
+  -isolated_app
+  -platform_app
+  -priv_app
+  -shell
+  -system_app
+  -untrusted_app_all
+}, proc_net_type)
+# audit access for all these non-core app domains.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  auditallow {
+    appdomain
+    -ephemeral_app
+    -isolated_app
+    -platform_app
+    -priv_app
+    -shell
+    -su
+    -system_app
+    -untrusted_app_all
+  } proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
+')
+
+# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
+# They need that to render the standard UI.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Use the Binder.
+binder_use(appdomain)
+# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
+binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
+# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
+binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
+# Perform binder IPC to ephemeral apps.
+binder_call(appdomain, ephemeral_app)
+# Perform binder IPC to gpuservice.
+binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app }, gpuservice)
+
+# Talk with graphics composer fences
+allow appdomain hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
+# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
+# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
+# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
+# are examined.
+allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };
+
+# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
+# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
+allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr map };
+allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr map };
+allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
+# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
+allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
+
+# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
+
+# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
+
+# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
+# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read/write visible storage
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcard_type:file create_file_perms;
+# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
+# accesses to the underlying FS.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
+# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
+#
+# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
+# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
+
+# For art.
+allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
+allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
+allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
+allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
+allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain apk_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# /data/resource-cache
+allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# logd access
+read_logd(appdomain)
+control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app })
+# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
+allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
+
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
+
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
+
+use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
+
+use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
+
+allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+# only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
+allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
+  ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
+
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow AAudio apps to use shared memory file descriptors from the HAL
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_audio:fd use;
+
+# Allow app to access shared memory created by camera HAL1
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_camera:fd use;
+
+# Allow apps to access shared memory file descriptor from the tuner HAL
+allow {appdomain -isolated_app} hal_tv_tuner_server:fd use;
+
+# RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow appdomain same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# TODO: switch to meminfo service
+allow appdomain proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# For app fuse.
+allow appdomain app_fuse_file:file { getattr read append write map };
+
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_client)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_manager)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_vsync)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, performance_client)
+# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
+pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, bufferhub_client)
+
+###
+### CTS-specific rules
+###
+
+# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
+# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
+allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
+# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.
+
+# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
+# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
+allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
+
+# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
+# This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
+allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+allow appdomain adbd:fd use;
+allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
+
+allow appdomain cache_file:dir getattr;
+
+# Allow apps to run with asanwrapper.
+with_asan(`allow appdomain asanwrapper_exec:file rx_file_perms;')
+
+# Read access to FDs from the DropboxManagerService.
+allow appdomain dropbox_data_file:file { getattr read };
+
+# Read tmpfs types from these processes.
+allow appdomain audioserver_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+allow appdomain system_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file { map read };
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
+###
+
+# Superuser capabilities.
+# bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm. network stack app requires net_admin.
+neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -network_stack } self:capability_class_set *;
+
+# Block device access.
+neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };
+
+# Access to any of the following character devices.
+neverallow appdomain {
+    audio_device
+    camera_device
+    dm_device
+    radio_device
+    rpmsg_device
+    video_device
+}:chr_file { read write };
+
+# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
+neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
+    { read write };
+neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
+    { read write };
+neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
+neverallow { appdomain -network_stack }
+    domain:{
+        netlink_tcpdiag_socket
+        netlink_nflog_socket
+        netlink_xfrm_socket
+        netlink_audit_socket
+        netlink_dnrt_socket
+    } *;
+
+# These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
+# Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
+# of rooting vulns in the past.
+neverallow appdomain domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };
+
+# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
+neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;
+
+# Unix domain sockets.
+neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;
+
+# ptrace access to non-app domains.
+neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
+
+# The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
+# of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
+# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
+# to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
+# produce stack traces.  llkd is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
+# inspect stack traces for live lock conditions.
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -crash_dump
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
+} appdomain:process ptrace;
+
+# Read or write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
+# A different form of hidepid=2 like protections
+neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { appdomain -shell } { domain -appdomain }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# signal access to non-app domains.
+# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
+# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
+# All others prohibited.
+# -perfetto is to allow shell (which is an appdomain) to kill perfetto
+# (see private/shell.te).
+neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain -perfetto }:process
+    { sigkill sigstop signal };
+
+# Write to rootfs.
+neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+# Write to /system.
+neverallow appdomain system_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+# Write to entrypoint executables.
+neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
+# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
+# specified in file_contexts.  Define a different type for portions
+# that should be writable by apps.
+neverallow appdomain system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+# Write to various other parts of /data.
+neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
+    apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
+    apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
+    apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
+    apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { appdomain -shell }
+    shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
+    bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { domain -credstore -init } credstore_data_file:dir_file_class_set *;
+neverallow appdomain
+    keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow appdomain
+    systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow appdomain
+    wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow appdomain
+    dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+# access tmp apk files
+neverallow { appdomain -untrusted_app_all -platform_app -priv_app }
+    { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir_file_class_set *;
+
+neverallow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:{ devfile_class_set dir fifo_file lnk_file sock_file } *;
+neverallow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file ~{ getattr read };
+
+# Access to factory files.
+neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
+neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;
+
+# Write to various pseudo file systems.
+neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
+    sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
+neverallow appdomain
+    proc:dir_file_class_set write;
+
+# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
+neverallow appdomain kernel:system { syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };
+
+# SELinux is not an API for apps to use
+neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:security { compute_av check_context };
+neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:netlink_selinux_socket *;
+
+# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
+# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
+neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;
+
+# prevent creation/manipulation of globally readable symlinks
+neverallow appdomain {
+  apk_data_file
+  cache_file
+  cache_recovery_file
+  dev_type
+  rootfs
+  system_file
+  tmpfs
+}:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# Applications should use the activity model for receiving events
+neverallow {
+  appdomain
+  -shell # bugreport
+} input_device:chr_file ~getattr;
+
+# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties except for a few allowed domains.
+# neverallow rules for access to Bluetooth-related data files are above.
+neverallow {
+  appdomain
+  -bluetooth
+  -system_app
+} { bluetooth_audio_hal_prop bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop bluetooth_prop exported_bluetooth_prop }:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Apps cannot access proc_uid_time_in_state
+neverallow appdomain proc_uid_time_in_state:file *;
+
+# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_active_time
+neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_active_time:file *;
+
+# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time
+neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time:file *;
+
+# Apps cannot access proc_uid_cpupower
+neverallow appdomain proc_uid_cpupower:file *;
+
+# Apps may not read /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6}. These files leak information across the
+# application boundary. VPN apps may use the ConnectivityManager.getConnectionOwnerUid() API to
+# perform UID lookups.
+neverallow { appdomain -shell } proc_net_tcp_udp:file *;
+
+# Apps cannot access bootstrap files. The bootstrap files are only for
+# extremely early processes (like init, etc.) which are started before
+# the runtime APEX is activated and Bionic libs are provided from there.
+# If app process accesses (or even load/execute) the bootstrap files,
+# it might cause problems such as ODR violation, etc.
+neverallow appdomain system_bootstrap_lib_file:file
+    { open read write append execute execute_no_trans map };
+neverallow appdomain system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir
+    { open read getattr search };
+
+# Allow to ro.camerax.extensions.enabled
+get_prop(appdomain, camerax_extensions_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/app_zygote.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/app_zygote.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c1ec96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/app_zygote.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# app_zygote is an auxiliary zygote process that is used to spawn
+# isolated service processes for individual applications. It is
+# spawned from the regular zygote process as a "child zygote".
+
+type app_zygote, domain;
+type app_zygote_tmpfs, file_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/asan_extract.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/asan_extract.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8a1b73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/asan_extract.te
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# asan_extract
+#
+# This command set moves the artifact corresponding to the current slot
+# from /data/ota to /data/dalvik-cache.
+
+with_asan(`
+  type asan_extract, domain, coredomain;
+  type asan_extract_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+  # Allow asan_extract to execute itself using #!/system/bin/sh
+  allow asan_extract shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+  # We execute log, rm, gzip and tar.
+  allow asan_extract toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+  allow asan_extract system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+
+  # asan_extract deletes old /data/lib.
+  allow asan_extract system_file:dir { open read remove_name rmdir write };
+  allow asan_extract system_file:file unlink;
+
+  # asan_extract untars ASAN libraries into /data.
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:dir create_dir_perms ;
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms ;
+
+  # Relabel the libraries with restorecon.
+  allow asan_extract file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:{ dir file } relabelfrom;
+  allow asan_extract system_file:dir { relabelto setattr };
+  allow asan_extract system_file:file relabelto;
+
+  # Restorecon will actually already try to run with sanitized libraries (libpackagelistparser).
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:file execute;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/atrace.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/atrace.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7327f84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/atrace.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type atrace, domain, coredomain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/attributes b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/attributes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..daef4bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/attributes
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+######################################
+# Attribute declarations
+#
+
+# All types used for devices.
+# On change, update CHECK_FC_ASSERT_ATTRS
+# in tools/checkfc.c
+attribute dev_type;
+
+# All types used for processes.
+attribute domain;
+
+# All types used for filesystems.
+# On change, update CHECK_FC_ASSERT_ATTRS
+# definition in tools/checkfc.c.
+attribute fs_type;
+
+# All types used for context= mounts.
+attribute contextmount_type;
+
+# All types used for files that can exist on a labeled fs.
+# Do not use for pseudo file types.
+# On change, update CHECK_FC_ASSERT_ATTRS
+# definition in tools/checkfc.c.
+attribute file_type;
+
+# All types used for domain entry points.
+attribute exec_type;
+
+# All types used for /data files.
+attribute data_file_type;
+expandattribute data_file_type false;
+# All types in /data, not in /data/vendor
+attribute core_data_file_type;
+expandattribute core_data_file_type false;
+
+# All types used for app private data files in seapp_contexts.
+# Such types should not be applied to any other files.
+attribute app_data_file_type;
+expandattribute app_data_file_type false;
+
+# All types in /system
+attribute system_file_type;
+
+# All types in /vendor
+attribute vendor_file_type;
+
+# All types used for procfs files.
+attribute proc_type;
+expandattribute proc_type false;
+
+# Types in /proc/net, excluding qtaguid types.
+# TODO(b/9496886) Lock down access to /proc/net.
+# This attribute is used to audit access to proc_net. it is temporary and will
+# be removed.
+attribute proc_net_type;
+expandattribute proc_net_type true;
+
+# All types used for sysfs files.
+attribute sysfs_type;
+
+# All types use for debugfs files.
+attribute debugfs_type;
+
+# All types used for tracefs files.
+attribute tracefs_type;
+
+# Attribute used for all sdcards
+attribute sdcard_type;
+
+# All types used for nodes/hosts.
+attribute node_type;
+
+# All types used for network interfaces.
+attribute netif_type;
+
+# All types used for network ports.
+attribute port_type;
+
+# All types used for property service
+# On change, update CHECK_PC_ASSERT_ATTRS
+# definition in tools/checkfc.c.
+attribute property_type;
+
+# All properties defined in core SELinux policy. Should not be
+# used by device specific properties
+attribute core_property_type;
+
+# All properties used to configure log filtering.
+attribute log_property_type;
+
+# All properties that are not specific to device but are added from
+# outside of AOSP. (e.g. OEM-specific properties)
+# These properties are not accessible from device-specific domains
+attribute extended_core_property_type;
+
+# Properties used for representing ownership. All properties should have one
+# of: system_property_type, product_property_type, or vendor_property_type.
+
+# All properties defined by /system.
+attribute system_property_type;
+expandattribute system_property_type false;
+
+# All /system-defined properties used only in /system.
+attribute system_internal_property_type;
+expandattribute system_internal_property_type false;
+
+# All /system-defined properties which can't be written outside /system.
+attribute system_restricted_property_type;
+expandattribute system_restricted_property_type false;
+
+# All /system-defined properties with no restrictions.
+attribute system_public_property_type;
+expandattribute system_public_property_type false;
+
+# All keystore2_key labels.
+attribute keystore2_key_type;
+
+# All properties defined by /product.
+# Currently there are no enforcements between /system and /product, so for now
+# /product attributes are just replaced to /system attributes.
+define(`product_property_type',   `system_property_type')
+define(`product_internal_property_type',   `system_internal_property_type')
+define(`product_restricted_property_type', `system_restricted_property_type')
+define(`product_public_property_type',     `system_public_property_type')
+
+# All properties defined by /vendor.
+attribute vendor_property_type;
+expandattribute vendor_property_type false;
+
+# All /vendor-defined properties used only in /vendor.
+attribute vendor_internal_property_type;
+expandattribute vendor_internal_property_type false;
+
+# All /vendor-defined properties which can't be written outside /vendor.
+attribute vendor_restricted_property_type;
+expandattribute vendor_restricted_property_type false;
+
+# All /vendor-defined properties with no restrictions.
+attribute vendor_public_property_type;
+expandattribute vendor_public_property_type false;
+
+# All service_manager types created by system_server
+attribute system_server_service;
+
+# services which should be available to all but isolated apps
+attribute app_api_service;
+
+# services which should be available to all ephemeral apps
+attribute ephemeral_app_api_service;
+
+# services which export only system_api
+attribute system_api_service;
+
+# services which are explicitly disallowed for untrusted apps to access
+attribute protected_service;
+
+# services which served by vendor and also using the copy of libbinder on
+# system (for instance via libbinder_ndk). services using a different copy
+# of libbinder currently need their own context manager (e.g.
+# vndservicemanager)
+attribute vendor_service;
+
+# All types used for services managed by servicemanager.
+# On change, update CHECK_SC_ASSERT_ATTRS
+# definition in tools/checkfc.c.
+attribute service_manager_type;
+
+# All types used for services managed by hwservicemanager
+attribute hwservice_manager_type;
+
+# All HwBinder services guaranteed to be passthrough. These services always run
+# in the process of their clients, and thus operate with the same access as
+# their clients.
+attribute same_process_hwservice;
+
+# All HwBinder services guaranteed to be offered only by core domain components
+attribute coredomain_hwservice;
+
+# All HwBinder services that untrusted apps can't directly access
+attribute protected_hwservice;
+
+# All types used for services managed by vndservicemanager
+attribute vndservice_manager_type;
+
+
+# All domains that can override MLS restrictions.
+# i.e. processes that can read up and write down.
+attribute mlstrustedsubject;
+
+# All types that can override MLS restrictions.
+# i.e. files that can be read by lower and written by higher
+attribute mlstrustedobject;
+
+# All domains used for apps.
+attribute appdomain;
+
+# All third party apps (except isolated_app and ephemeral_app)
+attribute untrusted_app_all;
+
+# All domains used for apps with network access.
+attribute netdomain;
+
+# All domains used for apps with bluetooth access.
+attribute bluetoothdomain;
+
+# All domains used for binder service domains.
+attribute binderservicedomain;
+
+# update_engine related domains that need to apply an update and run
+# postinstall. This includes the background daemon and the sideload tool from
+# recovery for A/B devices.
+attribute update_engine_common;
+
+# All core domains (as opposed to vendor/device-specific domains)
+attribute coredomain;
+
+# All vendor hwservice.
+attribute vendor_hwservice_type;
+
+# All socket devices owned by core domain components
+attribute coredomain_socket;
+expandattribute coredomain_socket false;
+
+# All vendor domains which violate the requirement of not using sockets for
+# communicating with core components
+# TODO(b/36577153): Remove this once there are no violations
+attribute socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
+expandattribute socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators false;
+
+# All vendor domains which violate the requirement of not executing
+# system processes
+# TODO(b/36463595)
+attribute vendor_executes_system_violators;
+expandattribute vendor_executes_system_violators false;
+
+# All domains which violate the requirement of not sharing files by path
+# between between vendor and core domains.
+# TODO(b/34980020)
+attribute data_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
+expandattribute data_between_core_and_vendor_violators false;
+
+# All system domains which violate the requirement of not executing vendor
+# binaries/libraries.
+# TODO(b/62041836)
+attribute system_executes_vendor_violators;
+expandattribute system_executes_vendor_violators false;
+
+# All system domains which violate the requirement of not writing vendor
+# properties.
+# TODO(b/78598545): Remove this once there are no violations
+attribute system_writes_vendor_properties_violators;
+expandattribute system_writes_vendor_properties_violators false;
+
+# All system domains which violate the requirement of not writing to
+# /mnt/vendor/*. Must not be used on devices launched with P or later.
+attribute system_writes_mnt_vendor_violators;
+expandattribute system_writes_mnt_vendor_violators false;
+
+# hwservices that are accessible from untrusted applications
+# WARNING: Use of this attribute should be avoided unless
+# absolutely necessary.  It is a temporary allowance to aid the
+# transition to treble and will be removed in a future platform
+# version, requiring all hwservices that are labeled with this
+# attribute to be submitted to AOSP in order to maintain their
+# app-visibility.
+attribute untrusted_app_visible_hwservice_violators;
+expandattribute untrusted_app_visible_hwservice_violators false;
+
+# halserver domains that are accessible to untrusted applications.  These
+# domains are typically those hosting  hwservices attributed by the
+# untrusted_app_visible_hwservice_violators.
+# WARNING: Use of this attribute should be avoided unless absolutely necessary.
+# It is a temporary allowance to aid the transition to treble and will be
+# removed in the future platform version, requiring all halserver domains that
+# are labeled with this attribute to be submitted to AOSP in order to maintain
+# their app-visibility.
+attribute untrusted_app_visible_halserver_violators;
+expandattribute untrusted_app_visible_halserver_violators false;
+
+# PDX services
+attribute pdx_endpoint_dir_type;
+attribute pdx_endpoint_socket_type;
+expandattribute pdx_endpoint_socket_type false;
+attribute pdx_channel_socket_type;
+expandattribute pdx_channel_socket_type false;
+
+pdx_service_attributes(display_client)
+pdx_service_attributes(display_manager)
+pdx_service_attributes(display_screenshot)
+pdx_service_attributes(display_vsync)
+pdx_service_attributes(performance_client)
+pdx_service_attributes(bufferhub_client)
+
+# All HAL servers
+attribute halserverdomain;
+# All HAL clients
+attribute halclientdomain;
+expandattribute halclientdomain true;
+
+# Exempt for halserverdomain to access sockets. Only builds for automotive
+# device types are allowed to use this attribute (enforced by CTS).
+# Unlike phone, in a car many modules are external from Android perspective and
+# HALs should be able to communicate with those devices through sockets.
+attribute hal_automotive_socket_exemption;
+
+# HALs
+hal_attribute(allocator);
+hal_attribute(atrace);
+hal_attribute(audio);
+hal_attribute(audiocontrol);
+hal_attribute(authsecret);
+hal_attribute(bluetooth);
+hal_attribute(bootctl);
+hal_attribute(bufferhub);
+hal_attribute(broadcastradio);
+hal_attribute(camera);
+hal_attribute(can_bus);
+hal_attribute(can_controller);
+hal_attribute(cas);
+hal_attribute(codec2);
+hal_attribute(configstore);
+hal_attribute(confirmationui);
+hal_attribute(contexthub);
+hal_attribute(drm);
+hal_attribute(dumpstate);
+hal_attribute(evs);
+hal_attribute(face);
+hal_attribute(fingerprint);
+hal_attribute(gatekeeper);
+hal_attribute(gnss);
+hal_attribute(graphics_allocator);
+hal_attribute(graphics_composer);
+hal_attribute(health);
+hal_attribute(health_storage);
+hal_attribute(identity);
+hal_attribute(input_classifier);
+hal_attribute(ir);
+hal_attribute(keymaster);
+hal_attribute(keymint);
+hal_attribute(light);
+hal_attribute(lowpan);
+hal_attribute(memtrack);
+hal_attribute(neuralnetworks);
+hal_attribute(nfc);
+hal_attribute(oemlock);
+hal_attribute(omx);
+hal_attribute(power);
+hal_attribute(power_stats);
+hal_attribute(rebootescrow);
+hal_attribute(secure_element);
+hal_attribute(sensors);
+hal_attribute(telephony);
+hal_attribute(tetheroffload);
+hal_attribute(thermal);
+hal_attribute(tv_cec);
+hal_attribute(tv_input);
+hal_attribute(tv_tuner);
+hal_attribute(usb);
+hal_attribute(usb_gadget);
+hal_attribute(vehicle);
+hal_attribute(vibrator);
+hal_attribute(vr);
+hal_attribute(weaver);
+hal_attribute(wifi);
+hal_attribute(wifi_hostapd);
+hal_attribute(wifi_supplicant);
+
+# HwBinder services offered across the core-vendor boundary
+#
+# We annotate server domains with x_server  to loosen the coupling between
+# system and vendor images. For example, it should be possible to move a service
+# from one core domain to another, without having to update the vendor image
+# which contains clients of this service.
+
+attribute automotive_display_service_server;
+attribute camera_service_server;
+attribute display_service_server;
+attribute scheduler_service_server;
+attribute sensor_service_server;
+attribute stats_service_server;
+attribute system_suspend_internal_server;
+attribute system_suspend_server;
+attribute wifi_keystore_service_server;
+
+# All types used for super partition block devices.
+attribute super_block_device_type;
+
+# All types used for DMA-BUF heaps
+attribute dmabuf_heap_device_type;
+expandattribute dmabuf_heap_device_type false;
+
+# All types used for DSU metadata files.
+attribute gsi_metadata_file_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/audioserver.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/audioserver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8a33cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/audioserver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# audioserver - audio services daemon
+type audioserver, domain;
+type audioserver_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+# Allow audioserver to signal audio HAL processes and dump their stacks.
+allow audioserver hal_audio_server:process signal;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/blkid.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/blkid.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dabe014
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/blkid.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# blkid called from vold
+type blkid, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/blkid_untrusted.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/blkid_untrusted.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4be4c0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/blkid_untrusted.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# blkid for untrusted block devices
+type blkid_untrusted, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bluetooth.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bluetooth.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b3442a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bluetooth.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# bluetooth subsystem
+type bluetooth, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bootanim.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bootanim.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88fe173
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bootanim.te
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# bootanimation oneshot service
+type bootanim, domain;
+type bootanim_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+hal_client_domain(bootanim, hal_configstore)
+hal_client_domain(bootanim, hal_graphics_allocator)
+hal_client_domain(bootanim, hal_graphics_composer)
+
+binder_use(bootanim)
+binder_call(bootanim, surfaceflinger)
+binder_call(bootanim, audioserver)
+
+hwbinder_use(bootanim)
+
+allow bootanim gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# /oem access
+allow bootanim oemfs:dir search;
+allow bootanim oemfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow bootanim audio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow bootanim audio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow bootanim audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow bootanim surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+allow bootanim surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+
+# Allow access to ion memory allocation device
+allow bootanim ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow access to DMA-BUF system heap
+allow bootanim dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+allow bootanim hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
+
+# Fences
+allow bootanim hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
+# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
+allow bootanim proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# System file accesses.
+allow bootanim system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bootstat.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bootstat.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5079c28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bootstat.te
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# bootstat command
+type bootstat, domain;
+type bootstat_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+read_runtime_log_tags(bootstat)
+
+# Allow persistent storage in /data/misc/bootstat.
+allow bootstat bootstat_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow bootstat bootstat_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow bootstat metadata_file:dir search;
+allow bootstat metadata_bootstat_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow bootstat metadata_bootstat_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# ToDo: TBI move access for the following to a system health HAL
+
+# Allow access to /sys/fs/pstore/ and syslog
+allow bootstat pstorefs:dir search;
+allow bootstat pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+allow bootstat kernel:system syslog_read;
+
+# Allow access to reading the logs to read aspects of system health
+read_logd(bootstat)
+
+# Allow bootstat write to statsd.
+unix_socket_send(bootstat, statsdw, statsd)
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -bootstat
+  -init
+} system_boot_reason_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bufferhubd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bufferhubd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37edb5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/bufferhubd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# bufferhubd
+type bufferhubd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type bufferhubd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+hal_client_domain(bufferhubd, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+# TODO(b/112338294): remove these after migrate to Binder
+pdx_server(bufferhubd, bufferhub_client)
+pdx_client(bufferhubd, performance_client)
+
+# Access the GPU.
+allow bufferhubd gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Access /dev/ion
+allow bufferhubd ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Receive sync fence FDs from hal_omx_server. Note that hal_omx_server never directly
+# connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge between
+# those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd via PDX.
+# Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
+allow bufferhubd hal_omx_server:fd use;
+
+# Codec2 is similar to OMX
+allow bufferhubd hal_codec2_server:fd use;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/camera_service_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/camera_service_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..352e1b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/camera_service_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+add_hwservice(camera_service_server, fwk_camera_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/cameraserver.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/cameraserver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a29240
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/cameraserver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+# cameraserver - camera daemon
+type cameraserver, domain;
+type cameraserver_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type cameraserver_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+binder_use(cameraserver)
+binder_call(cameraserver, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(cameraserver, appdomain)
+binder_service(cameraserver)
+
+hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_camera)
+
+hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+allow cameraserver ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow cameraserver dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Talk with graphics composer fences
+allow cameraserver hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
+add_service(cameraserver, cameraserver_service)
+add_hwservice(cameraserver, fwk_camera_hwservice)
+
+allow cameraserver activity_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver appops_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver batterystats_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver cameraproxy_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver package_native_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver processinfo_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver sensor_privacy_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow cameraserver hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# cameraserver should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow cameraserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
+# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
+# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
+# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
+# hardware/content. Etc.
+#
+# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
+# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
+# Lengthier explanation here:
+# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
+neverallow cameraserver domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+
+# Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
+allow cameraserver adbd:fd use;
+allow cameraserver adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow cameraserver shell:fd use;
+allow cameraserver shell:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow cameraserver shell:fifo_file { read write };
+
+# Allow to talk with media codec
+allow cameraserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_codec2)
+hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_omx)
+hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_allocator)
+
+# Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow cameraserver su:fd use;
+  allow cameraserver su:fifo_file { read write };
+  allow cameraserver su:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/charger.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/charger.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37359e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/charger.te
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+type charger, domain;
+type charger_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Write to /dev/kmsg
+allow charger kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
+r_dir_file(charger, rootfs)
+r_dir_file(charger, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(charger, cgroup_v2)
+
+# Allow to read /sys/class/power_supply directory
+allow charger sysfs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+allow charger self:global_capability_class_set { sys_tty_config };
+allow charger self:global_capability_class_set sys_boot;
+
+wakelock_use(charger)
+
+allow charger self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Read/write to /sys/power/state
+allow charger sysfs_power:file rw_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(charger, sysfs_batteryinfo)
+
+# Read /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
+# Don't worry about overly broad permissions for now, as there's
+# only one file in /sys/fs/pstore
+allow charger pstorefs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow charger pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow charger graphics_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow charger graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow charger input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow charger input_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow charger tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow charger proc_sysrq:file rw_file_perms;
+
+hal_client_domain(charger, hal_health)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/crash_dump.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/crash_dump.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6f0a94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/crash_dump.te
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+type crash_dump, domain;
+type crash_dump_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# crash_dump might inherit CAP_SYS_PTRACE from a privileged process,
+# which will result in an audit log even when it's allowed to trace.
+dontaudit crash_dump self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace };
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow crash_dump logd:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
+
+  # Let crash_dump write to /dev/kmsg_debug crashes that happen before logd comes up.
+  allow crash_dump kmsg_debug_device:chr_file { open append };
+')
+
+# Use inherited file descriptors
+allow crash_dump domain:fd use;
+
+# Read/write IPC pipes inherited from crashing processes.
+allow crash_dump domain:fifo_file { read write };
+
+# Append to pipes given to us by processes requesting dumps (e.g. dumpstate)
+allow crash_dump domain:fifo_file { append };
+
+# Read information from /proc/$PID.
+allow crash_dump domain:process getattr;
+
+r_dir_file(crash_dump, domain)
+allow crash_dump exec_type:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
+allow crash_dump dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
+allow crash_dump dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read APEX data directories.
+allow crash_dump apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+# Read APK files.
+r_dir_file(crash_dump, apk_data_file);
+
+# Read all /vendor
+r_dir_file(crash_dump, { vendor_file same_process_hal_file })
+
+# Talk to tombstoned
+unix_socket_connect(crash_dump, tombstoned_crash, tombstoned)
+
+# Talk to ActivityManager.
+unix_socket_connect(crash_dump, system_ndebug, system_server)
+
+# Append to ANR files.
+allow crash_dump anr_data_file:file { append getattr };
+
+# Append to tombstone files.
+allow crash_dump tombstone_data_file:file { append getattr };
+
+# crash_dump writes out logcat logs at the bottom of tombstones,
+# which is super useful in some cases.
+unix_socket_connect(crash_dump, logdr, logd)
+
+# Crash dump is not intended to access the following files. Since these
+# are WAI, suppress the denials to clean up the logs.
+dontaudit crash_dump {
+  core_data_file_type
+  vendor_file_type
+}:dir search;
+dontaudit crash_dump system_data_file:{ lnk_file file } read;
+dontaudit crash_dump property_type:file read;
+
+# Suppress denials for files in /proc that are passed
+# across exec().
+dontaudit crash_dump proc_type:file rw_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow assertions
+###
+
+# A domain transition must occur for crash_dump to get the privileges needed to trace the process.
+# Do not allow the execution of crash_dump without a domain transition.
+neverallow domain crash_dump_exec:file execute_no_trans;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/credstore.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/credstore.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97d942d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/credstore.te
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+type credstore, domain;
+type credstore_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# credstore daemon
+binder_use(credstore)
+binder_service(credstore)
+binder_call(credstore, system_server)
+
+allow credstore credstore_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow credstore credstore_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+add_service(credstore, credstore_service)
+allow credstore sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service:service_manager find;
+allow credstore dropbox_service:service_manager find;
+allow credstore authorization_service:service_manager find;
+allow credstore keystore:keystore2 get_auth_token;
+
+r_dir_file(credstore, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(credstore, cgroup_v2)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/device.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/device.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..686f955
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/device.te
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+# Device types
+type device, dev_type, fs_type;
+type ashmem_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type ashmem_libcutils_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type audio_device, dev_type;
+type binder_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type hwbinder_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type vndbinder_device, dev_type;
+type block_device, dev_type;
+type camera_device, dev_type;
+type dm_device, dev_type;
+type dm_user_device, dev_type;
+type keychord_device, dev_type;
+type loop_control_device, dev_type;
+type loop_device, dev_type;
+type pmsg_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type radio_device, dev_type;
+type ram_device, dev_type;
+type rtc_device, dev_type;
+type vd_device, dev_type;
+type vold_device, dev_type;
+type console_device, dev_type;
+type fscklogs, dev_type;
+# GPU (used by most UI apps)
+type gpu_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type graphics_device, dev_type;
+type hw_random_device, dev_type;
+type input_device, dev_type;
+type port_device, dev_type;
+type lowpan_device, dev_type;
+type mtp_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type nfc_device, dev_type;
+type ptmx_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type kmsg_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type kmsg_debug_device, dev_type;
+type null_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type random_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type secure_element_device, dev_type;
+type sensors_device, dev_type;
+type serial_device, dev_type;
+type socket_device, dev_type;
+type owntty_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type tty_device, dev_type;
+type video_device, dev_type;
+type zero_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type fuse_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type iio_device, dev_type;
+type ion_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type dmabuf_heap_device, dmabuf_heap_device_type, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type dmabuf_system_heap_device, dmabuf_heap_device_type, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device, dmabuf_heap_device_type, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type qtaguid_device, dev_type;
+type watchdog_device, dev_type;
+type uhid_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type uio_device, dev_type;
+type tun_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type usbaccessory_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type usb_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type usb_serial_device, dev_type;
+type gnss_device, dev_type;
+type properties_device, dev_type;
+type properties_serial, dev_type;
+type property_info, dev_type;
+
+# All devices have a uart for the hci
+# attach service. The uart dev node
+# varies per device. This type
+# is used in per device policy
+type hci_attach_dev, dev_type;
+
+# All devices have a rpmsg device for
+# achieving remoteproc and rpmsg modules
+type rpmsg_device, dev_type;
+
+# Partition layout block device
+type root_block_device, dev_type;
+
+# factory reset protection block device
+type frp_block_device, dev_type;
+
+# System block device mounted on /system.
+# Documented at https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/partitions-images
+type system_block_device, dev_type;
+
+# Recovery block device.
+# Documented at https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/partitions-images
+type recovery_block_device, dev_type;
+
+# boot block device.
+# Documented at https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/partitions-images
+type boot_block_device, dev_type;
+
+# Userdata block device mounted on /data.
+# Documented at https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/partitions-images
+type userdata_block_device, dev_type;
+
+# Cache block device mounted on /cache.
+# Documented at https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/partitions-images
+type cache_block_device, dev_type;
+
+# Block device for any swap partition.
+type swap_block_device, dev_type;
+
+# Metadata block device used for encryption metadata.
+# Assign this type to the partition specified by the encryptable=
+# mount option in your fstab file in the entry for userdata.
+# Documented at https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/partitions-images
+type metadata_block_device, dev_type;
+
+# The 'misc' partition used by recovery and A/B.
+# Documented at https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/partitions-images
+type misc_block_device, dev_type;
+
+# 'super' partition to be used for logical partitioning.
+type super_block_device, super_block_device_type, dev_type;
+
+# sdcard devices; normally vold uses the vold_block_device label and creates a
+# separate device node. gsid, however, accesses the original devide node
+# created through uevents, so we use a separate label.
+type sdcard_block_device, dev_type;
+
+# Userdata device file for filesystem tunables
+type userdata_sysdev, dev_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/dhcp.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/dhcp.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d875ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/dhcp.te
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+type dhcp, domain;
+type dhcp_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+net_domain(dhcp)
+
+allow dhcp cgroup:dir { create write add_name };
+allow dhcp cgroup_v2:dir { create write add_name };
+allow dhcp self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid net_admin net_raw net_bind_service };
+allow dhcp self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow dhcp self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
+allow dhcp shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow dhcp system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow dhcp vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;')
+
+# dhcpcd runs dhcpcd-hooks/*, which runs getprop / setprop (toolbox_exec)
+allow dhcp toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# For /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/promote_secondaries
+allow dhcp proc_net_type:file write;
+
+allow dhcp dhcp_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow dhcp dhcp_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# PAN connections
+allow dhcp netd:fd use;
+allow dhcp netd:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+allow dhcp netd:{ dgram_socket_class_set unix_stream_socket } { read write };
+allow dhcp netd:{ netlink_kobject_uevent_socket netlink_route_socket netlink_nflog_socket } { read write };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/display_service_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/display_service_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5839fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/display_service_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+add_hwservice(display_service_server, fwk_display_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/dnsmasq.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/dnsmasq.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86f1eb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/dnsmasq.te
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# DNS, DHCP services
+type dnsmasq, domain;
+type dnsmasq_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+net_domain(dnsmasq)
+allowxperm dnsmasq self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+
+# TODO:  Run with dhcp group to avoid need for dac_override.
+allow dnsmasq self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
+
+allow dnsmasq self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw net_bind_service setgid setuid };
+
+allow dnsmasq dhcp_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
+allow dnsmasq dhcp_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Inherit and use open files from netd.
+allow dnsmasq netd:fd use;
+allow dnsmasq netd:fifo_file { getattr read write };
+# TODO: Investigate whether these inherited sockets should be closed on exec.
+allow dnsmasq netd:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { read write };
+allow dnsmasq netd:netlink_nflog_socket { read write };
+allow dnsmasq netd:netlink_route_socket { read write };
+allow dnsmasq netd:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
+allow dnsmasq netd:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
+allow dnsmasq netd:udp_socket { read write };
+
+# sometimes a network device vanishes and we try to load module netdev-{devicename}
+dontaudit dnsmasq kernel:system module_request;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/domain.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/domain.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d84abf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/domain.te
@@ -0,0 +1,1400 @@
+# Rules for all domains.
+
+# Allow reaping by init.
+allow domain init:process sigchld;
+
+# Intra-domain accesses.
+allow domain self:process {
+    fork
+    sigchld
+    sigkill
+    sigstop
+    signull
+    signal
+    getsched
+    setsched
+    getsession
+    getpgid
+    setpgid
+    getcap
+    setcap
+    getattr
+    setrlimit
+};
+allow domain self:fd use;
+allow domain proc:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow domain proc_net_type:dir search;
+r_dir_file(domain, self)
+allow domain self:{ fifo_file file } rw_file_perms;
+allow domain self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
+allow domain self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
+
+# Inherit or receive open files from others.
+allow domain init:fd use;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow domain su:fd use;
+  allow domain su:unix_stream_socket { connectto getattr getopt read write shutdown };
+  allow domain su:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
+
+  allow { domain -init } su:binder { call transfer };
+
+  # Running something like "pm dump com.android.bluetooth" requires
+  # fifo writes
+  allow domain su:fifo_file { write getattr };
+
+  # allow "gdbserver --attach" to work for su.
+  allow domain su:process sigchld;
+
+  # Allow writing coredumps to /cores/*
+  allow domain coredump_file:file create_file_perms;
+  allow domain coredump_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
+')
+
+with_native_coverage(`
+  # Allow writing coverage information to /data/misc/trace
+  allow domain method_trace_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+  allow domain method_trace_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Root fs.
+allow domain tmpfs:dir { getattr search };
+allow domain rootfs:dir search;
+allow domain rootfs:lnk_file { read getattr };
+
+# Device accesses.
+allow domain device:dir search;
+allow domain dev_type:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow domain devpts:dir search;
+allow domain dmabuf_heap_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow domain socket_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow domain owntty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow domain null_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow domain zero_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# /dev/ashmem is being deprecated by means of constraining and eventually
+# removing all "open" permissions. We preserve the other permissions.
+allow domain ashmem_device:chr_file { getattr read ioctl lock map append write };
+# This device is used by libcutils, which is accessible to everyone.
+allow domain ashmem_libcutils_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# /dev/binder can be accessed by ... everyone! :)
+allow { domain -hwservicemanager -vndservicemanager } binder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Restrict binder ioctls to an allowlist. Additional ioctl commands may be
+# added to individual domains, but this sets safe defaults for all processes.
+allowxperm domain binder_device:chr_file ioctl { unpriv_binder_ioctls };
+
+# /dev/binderfs needs to be accessed by everyone too!
+allow domain binderfs:dir { getattr search };
+allow domain binderfs_logs_proc:dir search;
+
+allow { domain -servicemanager -vndservicemanager -isolated_app } hwbinder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow domain ptmx_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow domain random_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow domain proc_random:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow domain proc_random:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain properties_device:dir { search getattr };
+allow domain properties_serial:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain property_info:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Public readable properties
+get_prop(domain, aaudio_config_prop)
+get_prop(domain, arm64_memtag_prop)
+get_prop(domain, bootloader_prop)
+get_prop(domain, build_odm_prop)
+get_prop(domain, build_prop)
+get_prop(domain, build_vendor_prop)
+get_prop(domain, debug_prop)
+get_prop(domain, exported_config_prop)
+get_prop(domain, exported_default_prop)
+get_prop(domain, exported_dumpstate_prop)
+get_prop(domain, exported_secure_prop)
+get_prop(domain, exported_system_prop)
+get_prop(domain, fingerprint_prop)
+get_prop(domain, hal_instrumentation_prop)
+get_prop(domain, hw_timeout_multiplier_prop)
+get_prop(domain, init_service_status_prop)
+get_prop(domain, libc_debug_prop)
+get_prop(domain, logd_prop)
+get_prop(domain, mediadrm_config_prop)
+get_prop(domain, property_service_version_prop)
+get_prop(domain, soc_prop)
+get_prop(domain, socket_hook_prop)
+get_prop(domain, surfaceflinger_prop)
+get_prop(domain, telephony_status_prop)
+get_prop(domain, vendor_socket_hook_prop)
+get_prop(domain, vndk_prop)
+get_prop(domain, vold_status_prop)
+get_prop(domain, vts_config_prop)
+
+# Binder cache properties are world-readable
+get_prop(domain, binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop)
+get_prop(domain, binder_cache_system_server_prop)
+get_prop(domain, binder_cache_telephony_server_prop)
+
+# Let everyone read log properties, so that liblog can avoid sending unloggable
+# messages to logd.
+get_prop(domain, log_property_type)
+dontaudit domain property_type:file audit_access;
+allow domain property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow domain init:key search;
+allow domain vold:key search;
+
+# logd access
+write_logd(domain)
+
+# Directory/link file access for path resolution.
+allow domain {
+    system_file
+    system_lib_file
+    system_seccomp_policy_file
+    system_security_cacerts_file
+}:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow domain system_file:lnk_file { getattr read };
+
+# Global access to /system/etc/security/cacerts/*, /system/etc/seccomp_policy/*, /system/lib[64]/*,
+# /(system|product|system_ext)/etc/(group|passwd), linker and its config.
+allow domain system_seccomp_policy_file:file r_file_perms;
+# cacerts are accessible from public Java API.
+allow domain system_security_cacerts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain system_group_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain system_passwd_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain system_linker_exec:file { execute read open getattr map };
+allow domain system_linker_config_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain system_lib_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+# To allow following symlinks at /system/bin/linker, /system/lib/libc.so, etc.
+allow domain system_linker_exec:lnk_file { read open getattr };
+allow domain system_lib_file:lnk_file { read open getattr };
+
+allow domain system_event_log_tags_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow { appdomain coredomain } system_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# Make sure system/vendor split doesn not affect non-treble
+# devices
+not_full_treble(`
+    allow domain system_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+    allow domain vendor_file_type:dir { search getattr };
+    allow domain vendor_file_type:file { execute read open getattr map };
+    allow domain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr read };
+')
+
+# All domains are allowed to open and read directories
+# that contain HAL implementations (e.g. passthrough
+# HALs require clients to have these permissions)
+allow domain vendor_hal_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Everyone can read and execute all same process HALs
+allow domain same_process_hal_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain # access is explicitly granted to individual coredomains
+} same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# Any process can load vndk-sp libraries, which are system libraries
+# used by same process HALs
+allow domain vndk_sp_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow domain vndk_sp_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# All domains get access to /vendor/etc
+allow domain vendor_configs_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow domain vendor_configs_file:file { read open getattr map };
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Allow all domains to be able to follow /system/vendor and/or
+    # /vendor/odm symlinks.
+    allow domain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr open read };
+
+    # This is required to be able to search & read /vendor/lib64
+    # in order to lookup vendor libraries. The execute permission
+    # for coredomains is granted *only* for same process HALs
+    allow domain vendor_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+    # Allow reading and executing out of /vendor to all vendor domains
+    allow { domain -coredomain } vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+    allow { domain -coredomain } vendor_file_type:file { read open getattr execute map };
+    allow { domain -coredomain } vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr read };
+')
+
+# read and stat any sysfs symlinks
+allow domain sysfs:lnk_file { getattr read };
+
+# libc references /data/misc/zoneinfo and /system/usr/share/zoneinfo for
+# timezone related information.
+# This directory is considered to be a VNDK-stable
+allow domain { system_zoneinfo_file zoneinfo_data_file }:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain { system_zoneinfo_file zoneinfo_data_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Lots of processes access current CPU information
+r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_devices_system_cpu)
+
+r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_usb);
+
+# If kernel CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE is enabled, libjemalloc5 (statically
+# included by libc) reads /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled.
+allow domain sysfs_transparent_hugepage:dir search;
+allow domain sysfs_transparent_hugepage:file r_file_perms;
+
+# files under /data.
+not_full_treble(`
+  allow domain system_data_file:dir getattr;
+')
+allow { coredomain appdomain } system_data_file:dir getattr;
+# /data has the label system_data_root_file. Vendor components need the search
+# permission on system_data_root_file for path traversal to /data/vendor.
+allow domain system_data_root_file:dir { search getattr } ;
+allow domain system_data_file:dir search;
+# TODO restrict this to non-coredomain
+allow domain vendor_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+# required by the dynamic linker
+allow domain proc:lnk_file { getattr read };
+
+# /proc/cpuinfo
+allow domain proc_cpuinfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# /dev/cpu_variant:.*
+allow domain dev_cpu_variant:file r_file_perms;
+
+# profiling needs to read /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_sample_rate
+allow domain proc_perf:file r_file_perms;
+
+# toybox loads libselinux which stats /sys/fs/selinux/
+allow domain selinuxfs:dir search;
+allow domain selinuxfs:file getattr;
+allow domain sysfs:dir search;
+allow domain selinuxfs:filesystem getattr;
+
+# Almost all processes log tracing information to
+# /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker
+# The reason behind this is documented in b/6513400
+allow domain debugfs:dir search;
+allow domain debugfs_tracing:dir search;
+allow domain debugfs_tracing_debug:dir search;
+allow domain debugfs_trace_marker:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Linux lockdown mode offers coarse-grained definitions for access controls.
+# The "confidentiality" level detects access to tracefs or the perf subsystem.
+# This overlaps with more precise declarations in Android's policy. The
+# debugfs_trace_marker above is an example in which all processes should have
+# some access to tracefs. Therefore, allow all domains to access this level.
+# The "integrity" level is however enforced.
+allow domain self:lockdown confidentiality;
+
+# Filesystem access.
+allow domain fs_type:filesystem getattr;
+allow domain fs_type:dir getattr;
+
+# Restrict all domains to an allowlist for common socket types. Additional
+# ioctl commands may be added to individual domains, but this sets safe
+# defaults for all processes. Note that granting this allowlist to domain does
+# not grant the ioctl permission on these socket types. That must be granted
+# separately.
+allowxperm domain domain:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
+  ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
+# default allowlist for unix sockets.
+allowxperm domain { domain pdx_channel_socket_type }:{ unix_dgram_socket unix_stream_socket }
+  ioctl unpriv_unix_sock_ioctls;
+
+# Restrict PTYs to only allowed ioctls.
+# Note that granting this allowlist to domain does
+# not grant the wider ioctl permission. That must be granted
+# separately.
+allowxperm domain devpts:chr_file ioctl unpriv_tty_ioctls;
+
+# All domains must clearly enumerate what ioctls they use
+# on filesystem objects (plain files, directories, symbolic links,
+# named pipes, and named sockets). We start off with a safe set.
+allowxperm domain { file_type fs_type domain dev_type }:{ dir notdevfile_class_set blk_file } ioctl { FIOCLEX FIONCLEX };
+
+# If a domain has ioctl access to tun_device, it must clearly enumerate the
+# ioctls used. Safe defaults are listed below.
+allowxperm domain tun_device:chr_file ioctl { FIOCLEX FIONCLEX };
+
+# Allow a process to make a determination whether a file descriptor
+# for a plain file or pipe (fifo_file) is a tty. Note that granting
+# this allowlist to domain does not grant the ioctl permission to
+# these files. That must be granted separately.
+allowxperm domain { file_type fs_type }:file ioctl { TCGETS };
+allowxperm domain domain:fifo_file ioctl { TCGETS };
+
+# If a domain has access to perform an ioctl on a block device, allow these
+# very common, benign ioctls
+allowxperm domain dev_type:blk_file ioctl { BLKGETSIZE64 BLKSSZGET };
+
+# Support sqlite F2FS specific optimizations
+# ioctl permission on the specific file type is still required
+# TODO: consider only compiling these rules if we know the
+# /data partition is F2FS
+allowxperm domain { file_type sdcard_type }:file ioctl {
+  F2FS_IOC_ABORT_VOLATILE_WRITE
+  F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE
+  F2FS_IOC_GET_FEATURES
+  F2FS_IOC_GET_PIN_FILE
+  F2FS_IOC_SET_PIN_FILE
+  F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE
+};
+
+# Workaround for policy compiler being too aggressive and removing hwservice_manager_type
+# when it's not explicitly used in allow rules
+allow { domain -domain } hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager { add find };
+# Workaround for policy compiler being too aggressive and removing vndservice_manager_type
+# when it's not explicitly used in allow rules
+allow { domain -domain } vndservice_manager_type:service_manager { add find };
+
+# Under ASAN, processes will try to read /data, as the sanitized libraries are there.
+with_asan(`allow domain system_data_file:dir getattr;')
+# Under ASAN, /system/asan.options needs to be globally accessible.
+with_asan(`allow domain system_asan_options_file:file r_file_perms;')
+
+# read APEX dir and stat any symlink pointing to APEXs.
+allow domain apex_mnt_dir:dir { getattr search };
+allow domain apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# All ioctls on file-like objects (except chr_file and blk_file) and
+# sockets must be restricted to an allowlist.
+neverallowxperm * *:{ dir notdevfile_class_set socket_class_set blk_file } ioctl { 0 };
+
+# b/68014825 and https://android-review.googlesource.com/516535
+# rfc6093 says that processes should not use the TCP urgent mechanism
+neverallowxperm domain domain:socket_class_set ioctl { SIOCATMARK };
+
+# TIOCSTI is only ever used for exploits. Block it.
+# b/33073072, b/7530569
+# http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/26/14
+neverallowxperm * devpts:chr_file ioctl TIOCSTI;
+
+# Do not allow any domain other than init to create unlabeled files.
+neverallow { domain -init -recovery } unlabeled:dir_file_class_set create;
+
+# Limit device node creation to these allowed domains.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -kernel
+  -init
+  -ueventd
+  -vold
+} self:global_capability_class_set mknod;
+
+# No process can map low memory (< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR).
+neverallow * self:memprotect mmap_zero;
+
+# No domain needs mac_override as it is unused by SELinux.
+neverallow * self:global_capability2_class_set mac_override;
+
+# Disallow attempts to set contexts not defined in current policy
+# This helps guarantee that unknown or dangerous contents will not ever
+# be set.
+neverallow * self:global_capability2_class_set mac_admin;
+
+# Once the policy has been loaded there shall be none to modify the policy.
+# It is sealed.
+neverallow * kernel:security load_policy;
+
+# Only init prior to switching context should be able to set enforcing mode.
+# init starts in kernel domain and switches to init domain via setcon in
+# the init.rc, so the setenforce occurs while still in kernel. After
+# switching domains, there is never any need to setenforce again by init.
+neverallow * kernel:security setenforce;
+neverallow { domain -kernel } kernel:security setcheckreqprot;
+
+# No booleans in AOSP policy, so no need to ever set them.
+neverallow * kernel:security setbool;
+
+# Adjusting the AVC cache threshold.
+# Not presently allowed to anything in policy, but possibly something
+# that could be set from init.rc.
+neverallow { domain -init } kernel:security setsecparam;
+
+# Only the kernel hwrng thread should be able to read from the HW RNG.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -shell # For CTS, restricted to just getattr in shell.te
+  -ueventd # To create the /dev/hw_random file
+} hw_random_device:chr_file *;
+# b/78174219 b/64114943
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -shell # stat of /dev, getattr only
+  -ueventd
+} keychord_device:chr_file *;
+
+# Ensure that all entrypoint executables are in exec_type or postinstall_file.
+neverallow * { file_type -exec_type -postinstall_file }:file entrypoint;
+
+# The dynamic linker always calls access(2) on the path. Don't generate SElinux
+# denials since the linker does not actually access the path in case the path
+# does not exist or isn't accessible for the process.
+dontaudit domain postinstall_mnt_dir:dir audit_access;
+
+#Ensure that nothing in userspace can access /dev/port
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -shell # Shell user should not have any abilities outside of getattr
+  -ueventd
+} port_device:chr_file *;
+neverallow * port_device:chr_file ~{ create relabelto unlink setattr getattr };
+# Only init should be able to configure kernel usermodehelpers or
+# security-sensitive proc settings.
+neverallow { domain -init } usermodehelper:file { append write };
+neverallow { domain -init -ueventd } sysfs_usermodehelper:file { append write };
+neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } proc_security:file { append open read write };
+
+# Init can't do anything with binder calls. If this neverallow rule is being
+# triggered, it's probably due to a service with no SELinux domain.
+neverallow * init:binder *;
+neverallow * vendor_init:binder *;
+
+# Don't allow raw read/write/open access to block_device
+# Rather force a relabel to a more specific type
+neverallow { domain -kernel -init -recovery } block_device:blk_file { open read write };
+
+# Do not allow renaming of block files or character files
+# Ability to do so can lead to possible use in an exploit chain
+# e.g. https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/12/chrome-os-exploit-one-byte-overflow-and.html
+neverallow * *:{ blk_file chr_file } rename;
+
+# Don't allow raw read/write/open access to generic devices.
+# Rather force a relabel to a more specific type.
+neverallow domain device:chr_file { open read write };
+
+# Files from cache should never be executed
+neverallow domain { cache_file cache_backup_file cache_private_backup_file cache_recovery_file }:file execute;
+
+# The test files and executables MUST not be accessible to any domain
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-kernel') } nativetest_data_file:file_class_set no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow domain nativetest_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-shell') } nativetest_data_file:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { domain -shell -init -adbd } shell_test_data_file:file_class_set no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -shell -init -adbd } shell_test_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -shell -init -adbd -heapprofd } shell_test_data_file:file *;
+neverallow heapprofd shell_test_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+neverallow { domain -shell -init -adbd } shell_test_data_file:sock_file *;
+
+# Only the init property service should write to /data/property and /dev/__properties__
+neverallow { domain -init } property_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -init } property_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+neverallow { domain -init } property_type:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+neverallow { domain -init } properties_device:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+neverallow { domain -init } properties_serial:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Nobody should be doing writes to /system & /vendor
+# These partitions are intended to be read-only and must never be
+# modified. Doing so would violate important Android security guarantees
+# and invalidate dm-verity signatures.
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    with_asan(`-asan_extract')
+    recovery_only(`userdebug_or_eng(`-fastbootd')')
+} {
+    system_file_type
+    vendor_file_type
+    exec_type
+}:dir_file_class_set { create write setattr relabelfrom append unlink link rename };
+
+neverallow { domain -kernel with_asan(`-asan_extract') } { system_file_type vendor_file_type exec_type }:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
+
+# Don't allow mounting on top of /system files or directories
+neverallow * exec_type:dir_file_class_set mounton;
+
+# Nothing should be writing to files in the rootfs.
+neverallow * rootfs:file { create write setattr relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+# Restrict context mounts to specific types marked with
+# the contextmount_type attribute.
+neverallow * {fs_type -contextmount_type}:filesystem relabelto;
+
+# Ensure that context mount types are not writable, to ensure that
+# the write to /system restriction above is not bypassed via context=
+# mount to another type.
+neverallow * contextmount_type:dir_file_class_set
+    { create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append link rename };
+neverallow { domain recovery_only(`userdebug_or_eng(`-fastbootd')') } contextmount_type:dir_file_class_set { write unlink };
+
+# Do not allow service_manager add for default service labels.
+# Instead domains should use a more specific type such as
+# system_app_service rather than the generic type.
+# New service_types are defined in {,hw,vnd}service.te and new mappings
+# from service name to service_type are defined in {,hw,vnd}service_contexts.
+neverallow * default_android_service:service_manager *;
+neverallow * default_android_vndservice:service_manager *;
+neverallow * default_android_hwservice:hwservice_manager *;
+
+# Looking up the base class/interface of all HwBinder services is a bad idea.
+# hwservicemanager currently offer such lookups only to make it so that security
+# decisions are expressed in SELinux policy. However, it's unclear whether this
+# lookup has security implications. If it doesn't, hwservicemanager should be
+# modified to not offer this lookup.
+# This rule can be removed if hwservicemanager is modified to not permit these
+# lookups.
+neverallow * hidl_base_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# Require that domains explicitly label unknown properties, and do not allow
+# anyone but init to modify unknown properties.
+neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } mmc_prop:property_service set;
+neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } vndk_prop:property_service set;
+
+compatible_property_only(`
+    neverallow { domain -init } mmc_prop:property_service set;
+    neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } exported_default_prop:property_service set;
+    neverallow { domain -init } exported_secure_prop:property_service set;
+    neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } vendor_default_prop:property_service set;
+    neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } storage_config_prop:property_service set;
+    neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } hw_timeout_multiplier_prop:property_service set;
+')
+
+compatible_property_only(`
+    neverallow { domain -init -system_server -vendor_init } exported_pm_prop:property_service set;
+    neverallow { domain -coredomain -vendor_init } exported_pm_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+neverallow { domain -init } aac_drc_prop:property_service set;
+neverallow { domain -init } build_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Do not allow reading device's serial number from system properties except form
+# a few allowed domains.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -adbd
+  -dumpstate
+  -fastbootd
+  -hal_camera_server
+  -hal_cas_server
+  -hal_drm_server
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
+  -init
+  -mediadrmserver
+  -mediaserver
+  -recovery
+  -shell
+  -system_server
+  -vendor_init
+} serialno_prop:file r_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -recovery
+  -system_server
+  -shell # Shell is further restricted in shell.te
+  -ueventd # Further restricted in ueventd.te
+} frp_block_device:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# The metadata block device is set aside for device encryption and
+# verified boot metadata. It may be reset at will and should not
+# be used by other domains.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -recovery
+  -vold
+  -e2fs
+  -fsck
+  -fastbootd
+} metadata_block_device:blk_file { append link rename write open read ioctl lock };
+
+# No domain other than recovery, update_engine and fastbootd can write to system partition(s).
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -fastbootd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-fsck')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-init')
+  -recovery
+  -update_engine
+} system_block_device:blk_file { write append };
+
+# No domains other than a select few can access the misc_block_device. This
+# block device is reserved for OTA use.
+# Do not assert this rule on userdebug/eng builds, due to some devices using
+# this partition for testing purposes.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-domain') # exclude debuggable builds
+  -fastbootd
+  -hal_bootctl_server
+  -init
+  -uncrypt
+  -update_engine
+  -vendor_init
+  -vendor_misc_writer
+  -vold
+  -recovery
+  -ueventd
+} misc_block_device:blk_file { append link relabelfrom rename write open read ioctl lock };
+
+# Only (hw|vnd|)servicemanager should be able to register with binder as the context manager
+neverallow { domain -servicemanager -hwservicemanager -vndservicemanager } *:binder set_context_mgr;
+# The service managers are only allowed to access their own device node
+neverallow servicemanager hwbinder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow servicemanager vndbinder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow hwservicemanager binder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow hwservicemanager vndbinder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow vndservicemanager binder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow vndservicemanager hwbinder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# system services cant add vendor services
+neverallow {
+  coredomain
+} vendor_service:service_manager add;
+
+full_treble_only(`
+  # vendor services cant add system services
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+  } {
+    service_manager_type
+    -vendor_service
+  }:service_manager add;
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+  # Vendor apps are permited to use only stable public services. If they were to use arbitrary
+  # services which can change any time framework/core is updated, breakage is likely.
+  #
+  # Note, this same logic applies to untrusted apps, but neverallows for these are separate.
+  neverallow {
+    appdomain
+    -coredomain
+  } {
+    service_manager_type
+
+    -app_api_service
+    -vendor_service # must be @VintfStability to be used by an app
+    -ephemeral_app_api_service
+
+    -apc_service
+    -audioserver_service # TODO(b/36783122) remove exemptions below once app_api_service is fixed
+    -cameraserver_service
+    -drmserver_service
+    -credstore_service
+    -keystore_maintenance_service
+    -keystore_service
+    -mediadrmserver_service
+    -mediaextractor_service
+    -mediametrics_service
+    -mediaserver_service
+    -nfc_service
+    -radio_service
+    -virtual_touchpad_service
+    -vpnprofilestore_service
+    -vr_hwc_service
+    -vr_manager_service
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-hal_face_service')
+  }:service_manager find;
+')
+
+# On full TREBLE devices, only vendor components, shell, and su can use VendorBinder.
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -shell
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+    -ueventd # uevent is granted create for this device, but we still neverallow I/O below
+  } vndbinder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+')
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow ueventd vndbinder_device:chr_file { read write append ioctl };
+')
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -shell
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+  } vndservice_manager_type:service_manager *;
+')
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -shell
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+  } vndservicemanager:binder *;
+')
+
+# On full TREBLE devices, socket communications between core components and vendor components are
+# not permitted.
+  # Most general rules first, more specific rules below.
+
+  # Core domains are not permitted to initiate communications to vendor domain sockets.
+  # We are not restricting the use of already established sockets because it is fine for a process
+  # to obtain an already established socket via some public/official/stable API and then exchange
+  # data with its peer over that socket. The wire format in this scenario is dicatated by the API
+  # and thus does not break the core-vendor separation.
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow_establish_socket_comms({
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -adbd
+  }, {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+  });
+')
+
+  # Vendor domains are not permitted to initiate create/open sockets owned by core domains
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain # appdomain restrictions below
+    -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators # b/70393317
+    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    coredomain_socket
+    core_data_file_type
+    unlabeled # used only by core domains
+  }:sock_file ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };
+')
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    appdomain
+    -coredomain
+  } {
+    coredomain_socket
+    unlabeled # used only by core domains
+    core_data_file_type
+    -app_data_file
+    -privapp_data_file
+    -pdx_endpoint_socket_type # used by VR layer
+    -pdx_channel_socket_type # used by VR layer
+  }:sock_file ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };
+')
+
+  # Core domains are not permitted to create/open sockets owned by vendor domains
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -ueventd
+    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+  } {
+    file_type
+    dev_type
+    -coredomain_socket
+    -core_data_file_type
+    -app_data_file_type
+    -unlabeled
+  }:sock_file ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };
+')
+
+# On TREBLE devices, vendor and system components are only allowed to share
+# files by passing open FDs over hwbinder. Ban all directory access and all file
+# accesses other than what can be applied to an open FD such as
+# ioctl/stat/read/write/append. This is enforced by segregating /data.
+# Vendor domains may directly access file in /data/vendor by path, but may only
+# access files outside of /data/vendor via an open FD passed over hwbinder.
+# Likewise, core domains may only directly access files outside /data/vendor by
+# path and files in /data/vendor by open FD.
+full_treble_only(`
+  # only coredomains may only access core_data_file_type, particularly not
+  # /data/vendor
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -appdomain # TODO(b/34980020) remove exemption for appdomain
+    -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+    -init
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+  } {
+    data_file_type
+    -core_data_file_type
+    -app_data_file_type
+  }:file_class_set ~{ append getattr ioctl read write map };
+')
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -appdomain # TODO(b/34980020) remove exemption for appdomain
+    -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+    -init
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+    } {
+      data_file_type
+      -core_data_file_type
+      -app_data_file_type
+      # TODO(b/72998741) Remove exemption. Further restricted in a subsequent
+      # neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
+      -vendor_data_file
+    }:dir *;
+
+')
+full_treble_only(`
+  # vendor domains may only access files in /data/vendor, never core_data_file_types
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -appdomain # TODO(b/34980020) remove exemption for appdomain
+    -coredomain
+    -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators # TODO(b/34980020) Remove once all violators have been cleaned up
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    core_data_file_type
+    # libc includes functions like mktime and localtime which attempt to access
+    # files in /data/misc/zoneinfo/tzdata and /system/usr/share/zoneinfo/tzdata.
+    # These functions are considered vndk-stable and thus must be allowed for
+    # all processes.
+    -zoneinfo_data_file
+    with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+  }:file_class_set ~{ append getattr ioctl read write map };
+  neverallow {
+    vendor_init
+    -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+  } {
+    core_data_file_type
+    -unencrypted_data_file
+    -zoneinfo_data_file
+    with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+  }:file_class_set ~{ append getattr ioctl read write map };
+  # vendor init needs to be able to read unencrypted_data_file to create directories with FBE.
+  # The vendor init binary lives on the system partition so there is not a concern with stability.
+  neverallow vendor_init unencrypted_data_file:file ~r_file_perms;
+')
+full_treble_only(`
+  # vendor domains may only access dirs in /data/vendor, never core_data_file_types
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -appdomain # TODO(b/34980020) remove exemption for appdomain
+    -coredomain
+    -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    core_data_file_type
+    -system_data_file # default label for files on /data. Covered below...
+    -system_data_root_file
+    -vendor_data_file
+    -zoneinfo_data_file
+    with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+  }:dir *;
+  neverallow {
+    vendor_init
+    -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+  } {
+    core_data_file_type
+    -unencrypted_data_file
+    -system_data_file
+    -system_data_root_file
+    -vendor_data_file
+    -zoneinfo_data_file
+    with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+  }:dir *;
+  # vendor init needs to be able to read unencrypted_data_file to create directories with FBE.
+  # The vendor init binary lives on the system partition so there is not a concern with stability.
+  neverallow vendor_init unencrypted_data_file:dir ~search;
+')
+full_treble_only(`
+  # vendor domains may only access dirs in /data/vendor, never core_data_file_types
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -appdomain # TODO(b/34980020) remove exemption for appdomain
+    -coredomain
+    -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators # TODO(b/34980020) Remove once all violators have been cleaned up
+    } {
+      system_data_file # default label for files on /data. Covered below
+    }:dir ~{ getattr search };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+  #  coredomains may not access dirs in /data/vendor.
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators # TODO(b/34980020) Remove once all violators have been cleaned up
+    -init
+    -vold # vold creates per-user storage for both system and vendor
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+    } {
+      vendor_data_file # default label for files on /data. Covered below
+    }:dir ~{ getattr search };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+  #  coredomains may not access dirs in /data/vendor.
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators # TODO(b/34980020) Remove once all violators have been cleaned up
+    -init
+    } {
+      vendor_data_file # default label for files on /data/vendor{,_ce,_de}.
+    }:file_class_set ~{ append getattr ioctl read write map };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Non-vendor domains are not allowed to file execute shell
+    # from vendor
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -init
+        -shell
+        -ueventd
+    } vendor_shell_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Do not allow vendor components to execute files from system
+    # except for the ones allowed here.
+    neverallow {
+        domain
+        -coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -vendor_executes_system_violators
+        -vendor_init
+    } {
+        system_file_type
+        -system_lib_file
+        -system_linker_exec
+        -crash_dump_exec
+        -iorap_prefetcherd_exec
+        -iorap_inode2filename_exec
+        -netutils_wrapper_exec
+        userdebug_or_eng(`-tcpdump_exec')
+    }:file { entrypoint execute execute_no_trans };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Do not allow coredomain to access entrypoint for files other
+    # than system_file_type and postinstall_file
+    neverallow coredomain {
+        file_type
+        -system_file_type
+        -postinstall_file
+    }:file entrypoint;
+    # Do not allow domains other than coredomain to access entrypoint
+    # for anything but vendor_file_type and init_exec for vendor_init.
+    neverallow { domain -coredomain } {
+        file_type
+        -vendor_file_type
+        -init_exec
+    }:file entrypoint;
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Do not allow system components to execute files from vendor
+    # except for the ones allowed here.
+    neverallow {
+      coredomain
+      -init
+      -shell
+      -system_executes_vendor_violators
+      -ueventd
+    } {
+      vendor_file_type
+      -same_process_hal_file
+      -vndk_sp_file
+      -vendor_app_file
+      -vendor_public_framework_file
+      -vendor_public_lib_file
+    }:file execute;
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    neverallow {
+      coredomain
+      -shell
+      -system_executes_vendor_violators
+    } {
+      vendor_file_type
+      -same_process_hal_file
+    }:file execute_no_trans;
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+  # Do not allow vendor components access to /system files except for the
+  # ones allowed here.
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -appdomain
+    -coredomain
+    -vendor_executes_system_violators
+    # vendor_init needs access to init_exec for domain transition. vendor_init
+    # neverallows are covered in public/vendor_init.te
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    system_file_type
+    -crash_dump_exec
+    -file_contexts_file
+    -iorap_inode2filename_exec
+    -netutils_wrapper_exec
+    -property_contexts_file
+    -system_event_log_tags_file
+    -system_group_file
+    -system_lib_file
+    with_asan(`-system_asan_options_file')
+    -system_linker_exec
+    -system_linker_config_file
+    -system_passwd_file
+    -system_seccomp_policy_file
+    -system_security_cacerts_file
+    -system_zoneinfo_file
+    -task_profiles_api_file
+    -task_profiles_file
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-tcpdump_exec')
+  }:file *;
+')
+
+# Only system_server should be able to send commands via the zygote socket
+neverallow { domain -zygote -system_server } zygote:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+neverallow { domain -system_server } zygote_socket:sock_file write;
+
+neverallow { domain -system_server -webview_zygote -app_zygote } webview_zygote:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+neverallow { domain -system_server } webview_zygote:sock_file write;
+neverallow { domain -system_server } app_zygote:sock_file write;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -tombstoned
+  -crash_dump
+  -dumpstate
+  -incidentd
+  -system_server
+
+  # Processes that can't exec crash_dump
+  -hal_codec2_server
+  -hal_omx_server
+  -mediaextractor
+} tombstoned_crash_socket:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+# Never allow anyone except dumpstate, incidentd, or the system server to connect or write to
+# the tombstoned intercept socket.
+neverallow { domain -dumpstate -incidentd -system_server } tombstoned_intercept_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow { domain -dumpstate -incidentd -system_server } tombstoned_intercept_socket:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+# Never allow anyone but system_server to read heapdumps in /data/system/heapdump.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } heapdump_data_file:file read;
+
+# Android does not support System V IPCs.
+#
+# The reason for this is due to the fact that, by design, they lead to global
+# kernel resource leakage.
+#
+# For example, there is no way to automatically release a SysV semaphore
+# allocated in the kernel when:
+#
+# - a buggy or malicious process exits
+# - a non-buggy and non-malicious process crashes or is explicitly killed.
+#
+# Killing processes automatically to make room for new ones is an
+# important part of Android's application lifecycle implementation. This means
+# that, even assuming only non-buggy and non-malicious code, it is very likely
+# that over time, the kernel global tables used to implement SysV IPCs will fill
+# up.
+neverallow * *:{ shm sem msg msgq } *;
+
+# Do not mount on top of symlinks, fifos, or sockets.
+# Feature parity with Chromium LSM.
+neverallow * { file_type fs_type dev_type }:{ lnk_file fifo_file sock_file } mounton;
+
+# Nobody should be able to execute su on user builds.
+# On userdebug/eng builds, only dumpstate, shell, and
+# su itself execute su.
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-dumpstate -shell -su') } su_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# Do not allow the introduction of new execmod rules. Text relocations
+# and modification of executable pages are unsafe.
+# The only exceptions are for NDK text relocations associated with
+# https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=23203
+# which, long term, need to go away.
+neverallow * {
+  file_type
+  -apk_data_file
+  -app_data_file
+  -asec_public_file
+}:file execmod;
+
+# Do not allow making the stack or heap executable.
+# We would also like to minimize execmem but it seems to be
+# required by some device-specific service domains.
+neverallow * self:process { execstack execheap };
+
+# Do not allow the introduction of new execmod rules. Text relocations
+# and modification of executable pages are unsafe.
+neverallow { domain -untrusted_app_25 -untrusted_app_27 } file_type:file execmod;
+
+neverallow { domain -init } proc:{ file dir } mounton;
+
+# Ensure that all types assigned to processes are included
+# in the domain attribute, so that all allow and neverallow rules
+# written on domain are applied to all processes.
+# This is achieved by ensuring that it is impossible to transition
+# from a domain to a non-domain type and vice versa.
+# TODO - rework this: neverallow domain ~domain:process { transition dyntransition };
+neverallow ~domain domain:process { transition dyntransition };
+
+#
+# Only system_app and system_server should be creating or writing
+# their files. The proper way to share files is to setup
+# type transitions to a more specific type or assigning a type
+# to its parent directory via a file_contexts entry.
+# Example type transition:
+#  mydomain.te:file_type_auto_trans(mydomain, system_data_file, new_file_type)
+#
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -system_server
+  -system_app
+  -init
+  -toolbox # TODO(b/141108496) We want to remove toolbox
+  -installd # for relabelfrom and unlink, check for this in explicit neverallow
+  -vold_prepare_subdirs # For unlink
+  with_asan(`-asan_extract')
+} system_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+# do not grant anything greater than r_file_perms and relabelfrom unlink
+# to installd
+neverallow installd system_data_file:file ~{ r_file_perms relabelfrom unlink };
+
+# respect system_app sandboxes
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
+  -system_server #populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
+  -installd # creation of app sandbox
+  -iorap_inode2filename
+  -traced_probes # resolve inodes for i/o tracing.
+                 # only needs open and read, the rest is neverallow in
+                 # traced_probes.te.
+} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
+neverallow {
+  isolated_app
+  untrusted_app_all # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
+  ephemeral_app
+  priv_app
+} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
+
+#
+# Only these domains should transition to shell domain. This domain is
+# permissible for the "shell user". If you need a process to exec a shell
+# script with differing privilege, define a domain and set up a transition.
+#
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -adbd
+  -init
+  -runas
+  -zygote
+} shell:process { transition dyntransition };
+
+# Only domains spawned from zygote, runas and simpleperf_app_runner may have
+# the appdomain attribute. simpleperf is excluded as a domain transitioned to
+# when running an app-scoped profiling session.
+neverallow { domain -simpleperf_app_runner -runas -app_zygote -webview_zygote -zygote } {
+  appdomain -shell -simpleperf userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+}:process { transition dyntransition };
+
+# Minimize read access to shell- or app-writable symlinks.
+# This is to prevent malicious symlink attacks.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -installd
+} { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:lnk_file read;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -shell
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
+  -installd
+} shell_data_file:lnk_file read;
+
+# In addition to the symlink reading restrictions above, restrict
+# write access to shell owned directories. The /data/local/tmp
+# directory is untrustworthy, and non-allowed domains should
+# not be trusting any content in those directories.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -adbd
+  -dumpstate
+  -installd
+  -init
+  -shell
+  -vold
+} shell_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -adbd
+  -appdomain
+  -dumpstate
+  -init
+  -installd
+  -iorap_inode2filename
+  -simpleperf_app_runner
+  -system_server # why?
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
+} shell_data_file:dir { open search };
+
+# Same as above for /data/local/tmp files. We allow shell files
+# to be passed around by file descriptor, but not directly opened.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -adbd
+  -appdomain
+  -dumpstate
+  -installd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
+} shell_data_file:file open;
+
+# servicemanager and vndservicemanager are the only processes which handle the
+# service_manager list request
+neverallow * ~{
+    servicemanager
+    vndservicemanager
+    }:service_manager list;
+
+# hwservicemanager is the only process which handles hw list requests
+neverallow * ~{
+    hwservicemanager
+    }:hwservice_manager list;
+
+# only service_manager_types can be added to service_manager
+# TODO - rework this: neverallow * ~service_manager_type:service_manager { add find };
+
+# Prevent assigning non property types to properties
+# TODO - rework this: neverallow * ~property_type:property_service set;
+
+# Domain types should never be assigned to any files other
+# than the /proc/pid files associated with a process. The
+# executable file used to enter a domain should be labeled
+# with its own _exec type, not with the domain type.
+# Conventionally, this looks something like:
+# $ cat mydaemon.te
+# type mydaemon, domain;
+# type mydaemon_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+# init_daemon_domain(mydaemon)
+# $ grep mydaemon file_contexts
+# /system/bin/mydaemon -- u:object_r:mydaemon_exec:s0
+neverallow * domain:file { execute execute_no_trans entrypoint };
+
+# Do not allow access to the generic debugfs label. This is too broad.
+# Instead, if access to part of debugfs is desired, it should have a
+# more specific label.
+# TODO: fix dumpstate
+neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init -dumpstate } debugfs:{ file lnk_file } no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Do not allow executable files in debugfs.
+neverallow domain debugfs_type:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+
+# Don't allow access to the FUSE control filesystem, except to vold and init's
+neverallow { domain -vold -init -vendor_init } fusectlfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Profiles contain untrusted data and profman parses that. We should only run
+# in from installd forked processes.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -installd
+  -profman
+} profman_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# Enforce restrictions on kernel module origin.
+# Do not allow kernel module loading except from system,
+# vendor, and boot partitions.
+neverallow * ~{ system_file_type vendor_file_type rootfs }:system module_load;
+
+# Only allow filesystem caps to be set at build time. Runtime changes
+# to filesystem capabilities are not permitted.
+neverallow * self:global_capability_class_set setfcap;
+
+# Enforce AT_SECURE for executing crash_dump.
+neverallow domain crash_dump:process noatsecure;
+
+# Do not permit non-core domains to register HwBinder services which are
+# guaranteed to be provided by core domains only.
+neverallow ~coredomain coredomain_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;
+
+# Do not permit the registeration of HwBinder services which are guaranteed to
+# be passthrough only (i.e., run in the process of their clients instead of a
+# separate server process).
+neverallow * same_process_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;
+
+# If an already existing file is opened with O_CREAT, the kernel might generate
+# a false report of a create denial. Silence these denials and make sure that
+# inappropriate permissions are not granted.
+
+# These filesystems don't allow files or directories to be created, so the permission
+# to do so should never be granted.
+neverallow domain {
+  proc_type
+  sysfs_type
+}:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir write };
+
+# cgroupfs directories can be created, but not files within them.
+neverallow domain cgroup:file create;
+neverallow domain cgroup_v2:file create;
+
+dontaudit domain proc_type:dir write;
+dontaudit domain sysfs_type:dir write;
+dontaudit domain cgroup:file create;
+dontaudit domain cgroup_v2:file create;
+
+# These are only needed in permissive mode - in enforcing mode the
+# directory write check fails and so these are never attempted.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  dontaudit domain proc_type:dir add_name;
+  dontaudit domain sysfs_type:dir add_name;
+  dontaudit domain proc_type:file create;
+  dontaudit domain sysfs_type:file create;
+')
+
+# Platform must not have access to /mnt/vendor.
+neverallow {
+  coredomain
+  -init
+  -ueventd
+  -vold
+  -system_writes_mnt_vendor_violators
+} mnt_vendor_file:dir *;
+
+# Only apps are allowed access to vendor public libraries.
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -appdomain
+  } {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+')
+
+# Vendor domian must not have access to /mnt/product.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -coredomain
+} mnt_product_file:dir *;
+
+# Platform must not have access to sysfs_batteryinfo, but should do it via health HAL and healthd
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -healthd
+    -shell
+    # Generate uevents for health info
+    -ueventd
+    # Recovery uses health HAL passthrough implementation.
+    -recovery
+    # Charger uses health HAL passthrough implementation.
+    -charger
+    # TODO(b/110891300): remove this exception
+    -incidentd
+  } sysfs_batteryinfo:file { open read };
+')
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -hal_codec2_server
+  -hal_omx_server
+} hal_codec2_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;
+
+# Only apps targetting < Q are allowed to open /dev/ashmem directly.
+# Apps must use ASharedMemory NDK API. Native code must use libcutils API.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -ephemeral_app # We don't distinguish ephemeral apps based on target API.
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+} ashmem_device:chr_file open;
+
+neverallow { domain -traced_probes -init -vendor_init } debugfs_tracing_printk_formats:file *;
+
+# Linux lockdown "integrity" level is enforced for user builds.
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-domain') } self:lockdown integrity;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/drmserver.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/drmserver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eede0fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/drmserver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# drmserver - DRM service
+type drmserver, domain;
+type drmserver_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+typeattribute drmserver mlstrustedsubject;
+
+net_domain(drmserver)
+
+# Perform Binder IPC to system server.
+binder_use(drmserver)
+binder_call(drmserver, system_server)
+binder_call(drmserver, appdomain)
+binder_call(drmserver, mediametrics)
+binder_service(drmserver)
+# Inherit or receive open files from system_server.
+allow drmserver system_server:fd use;
+
+# Perform Binder IPC to mediaserver
+binder_call(drmserver, mediaserver)
+
+allow drmserver sdcard_type:dir search;
+allow drmserver drm_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow drmserver drm_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow drmserver { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { read write getattr map };
+allow drmserver sdcard_type:file { read write getattr map };
+r_dir_file(drmserver, efs_file)
+
+type drmserver_socket, file_type;
+
+# /data/app/tlcd_sock socket file.
+# Clearly, /data/app is the most logical place to create a socket.  Not.
+allow drmserver apk_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+auditallow drmserver apk_data_file:dir { add_name write };
+allow drmserver drmserver_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
+auditallow drmserver drmserver_socket:sock_file create;
+# Delete old socket file if present.
+allow drmserver apk_data_file:sock_file unlink;
+
+# After taking a video, drmserver looks at the video file.
+r_dir_file(drmserver, media_rw_data_file)
+
+# Read resources from open apk files passed over Binder.
+allow drmserver apk_data_file:file { read getattr map };
+allow drmserver asec_apk_file:file { read getattr map };
+allow drmserver ringtone_file:file { read getattr map };
+
+# Read /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
+allow drmserver radio_data_file:file { read getattr map };
+
+# /oem access
+allow drmserver oemfs:dir search;
+allow drmserver oemfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# overlay package access
+allow drmserver vendor_overlay_file:file { read map };
+
+add_service(drmserver, drmserver_service)
+allow drmserver permission_service:service_manager find;
+allow drmserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+
+selinux_check_access(drmserver)
+
+r_dir_file(drmserver, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(drmserver, cgroup_v2)
+r_dir_file(drmserver, system_file)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/dumpstate.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/dumpstate.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85a5796
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/dumpstate.te
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+# dumpstate
+type dumpstate, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type dumpstate_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+net_domain(dumpstate)
+binder_use(dumpstate)
+wakelock_use(dumpstate)
+
+# Allow setting process priority, protect from OOM killer, and dropping
+# privileges by switching UID / GID
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid sys_resource };
+
+# Allow dumpstate to scan through /proc/pid for all processes
+r_dir_file(dumpstate, domain)
+
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set {
+    # Send signals to processes
+    kill
+    # Run iptables
+    net_raw
+    net_admin
+};
+
+# Allow executing files on system, such as:
+#   /system/bin/toolbox
+#   /system/bin/logcat
+#   /system/bin/dumpsys
+allow dumpstate system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+not_full_treble(`allow dumpstate vendor_file:file execute_no_trans;')
+allow dumpstate toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# hidl searches for files in /system/lib(64)/hw/
+allow dumpstate system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Create and write into /data/anr/
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search chown fowner fsetid };
+allow dumpstate anr_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow reading /data/system/uiderrors.txt
+# TODO: scope this down.
+allow dumpstate system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to append into apps' private files.
+allow dumpstate { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file append;
+
+# Read dmesg
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability2_class_set syslog;
+allow dumpstate kernel:system syslog_read;
+
+# Read /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
+allow dumpstate pstorefs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Get process attributes
+allow dumpstate domain:process getattr;
+
+# Signal java processes to dump their stack
+allow dumpstate { appdomain system_server zygote }:process signal;
+
+# Signal native processes to dump their stack.
+allow dumpstate {
+  # This list comes from native_processes_to_dump in dumputils/dump_utils.c
+  audioserver
+  cameraserver
+  drmserver
+  inputflinger
+  mediadrmserver
+  mediaextractor
+  mediametrics
+  mediaserver
+  mediaswcodec
+  sdcardd
+  surfaceflinger
+  vold
+
+  # This list comes from hal_interfaces_to_dump in dumputils/dump_utils.c
+  hal_audio_server
+  hal_audiocontrol_server
+  hal_bluetooth_server
+  hal_camera_server
+  hal_codec2_server
+  hal_drm_server
+  hal_evs_server
+  hal_face_server
+  hal_fingerprint_server
+  hal_graphics_allocator_server
+  hal_graphics_composer_server
+  hal_health_server
+  hal_neuralnetworks_server
+  hal_omx_server
+  hal_power_server
+  hal_power_stats_server
+  hal_sensors_server
+  hal_thermal_server
+  hal_vehicle_server
+  hal_vr_server
+  system_suspend_server
+}:process signal;
+
+# Connect to tombstoned to intercept dumps.
+unix_socket_connect(dumpstate, tombstoned_intercept, tombstoned)
+
+# Access to /sys
+allow dumpstate sysfs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+allow dumpstate {
+  sysfs_devices_block
+  sysfs_dm
+  sysfs_loop
+  sysfs_usb
+  sysfs_zram
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Other random bits of data we want to collect
+no_debugfs_restriction(`
+  allow dumpstate debugfs:file r_file_perms;
+  auditallow dumpstate debugfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+  allow dumpstate debugfs_mmc:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# df for
+allow dumpstate {
+  block_device
+  cache_file
+  metadata_file
+  rootfs
+  selinuxfs
+  storage_file
+  tmpfs
+}:dir { search getattr };
+allow dumpstate fuse_device:chr_file getattr;
+allow dumpstate { dm_device cache_block_device }:blk_file getattr;
+allow dumpstate { cache_file rootfs }:lnk_file { getattr read };
+
+# Read /dev/cpuctl and /dev/cpuset
+r_dir_file(dumpstate, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(dumpstate, cgroup_v2)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to make binder calls to any binder service
+binder_call(dumpstate, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(dumpstate, { appdomain netd wificond })
+
+dump_hal(hal_dumpstate)
+dump_hal(hal_wifi)
+dump_hal(hal_graphics_allocator)
+dump_hal(hal_light)
+dump_hal(hal_neuralnetworks)
+dump_hal(hal_thermal)
+dump_hal(hal_power)
+dump_hal(hal_power_stats)
+dump_hal(hal_identity)
+dump_hal(hal_face)
+dump_hal(hal_fingerprint)
+dump_hal(hal_gnss)
+
+# Vibrate the device after we are done collecting the bugreport
+hal_client_domain(dumpstate, hal_vibrator)
+
+# Reading /proc/PID/maps of other processes
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
+
+# Allow the bugreport service to create a file in
+# /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport
+allow dumpstate shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate shell_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Run a shell.
+allow dumpstate shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# For running am and similar framework commands.
+# Run /system/bin/app_process.
+allow dumpstate zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# For Bluetooth
+allow dumpstate bluetooth_data_file:dir search;
+allow dumpstate bluetooth_logs_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate bluetooth_logs_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# For Nfc
+allow dumpstate nfc_logs_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate nfc_logs_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Dumpstate calls screencap, which grabs a screenshot. Needs gpu access
+allow dumpstate gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# logd access
+read_logd(dumpstate)
+control_logd(dumpstate)
+read_runtime_log_tags(dumpstate)
+
+# Read files in /proc
+allow dumpstate {
+  proc_buddyinfo
+  proc_cmdline
+  proc_meminfo
+  proc_modules
+  proc_net_type
+  proc_pipe_conf
+  proc_pagetypeinfo
+  proc_qtaguid_ctrl
+  proc_qtaguid_stat
+  proc_slabinfo
+  proc_version
+  proc_vmallocinfo
+  proc_vmstat
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read network state info files.
+allow dumpstate net_data_file:dir search;
+allow dumpstate net_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# List sockets via ss.
+allow dumpstate self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read };
+
+# Access /data/tombstones.
+allow dumpstate tombstone_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate tombstone_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access /cache/recovery
+allow dumpstate cache_recovery_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate cache_recovery_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access /data/misc/recovery
+allow dumpstate recovery_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate recovery_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+#Access /data/misc/update_engine_log
+allow dumpstate update_engine_log_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate update_engine_log_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access /data/misc/profiles/{cur,ref}/
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow dumpstate { user_profile_root_file user_profile_data_file}:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow dumpstate user_profile_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Access /data/misc/logd
+allow dumpstate misc_logd_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate misc_logd_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access /data/misc/prereboot
+allow dumpstate prereboot_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate prereboot_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow dumpstate app_fuse_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate overlayfs_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+allow dumpstate {
+  service_manager_type
+  -apex_service
+  -dumpstate_service
+  -gatekeeper_service
+  -virtual_touchpad_service
+  -vold_service
+  -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
+}:service_manager find;
+# suppress denials for services dumpstate should not be accessing.
+dontaudit dumpstate {
+  apex_service
+  dumpstate_service
+  gatekeeper_service
+  virtual_touchpad_service
+  vold_service
+  vr_hwc_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# Most of these are neverallowed.
+dontaudit dumpstate hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager find;
+
+allow dumpstate servicemanager:service_manager list;
+allow dumpstate hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
+
+allow dumpstate devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Read any system properties
+get_prop(dumpstate, property_type)
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
+# accesses to the underlying FS.
+allow dumpstate media_rw_data_file:dir getattr;
+allow dumpstate proc_interrupts:file r_file_perms;
+allow dumpstate proc_zoneinfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Create a service for talking back to system_server
+add_service(dumpstate, dumpstate_service)
+
+# use /dev/ion for screen capture
+allow dumpstate ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to run top
+allow dumpstate proc_stat:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow dumpstate proc_pressure_cpu:file r_file_perms;
+allow dumpstate proc_pressure_mem:file r_file_perms;
+allow dumpstate proc_pressure_io:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to run ps
+allow dumpstate proc_pid_max:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to installd over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, installd);
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to iorapd over binder.
+binder_call(dumpstate, iorapd)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to run ip xfrm policy
+allow dumpstate self:netlink_xfrm_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read };
+
+# Allow dumpstate to run iotop
+allow dumpstate self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+# newer kernels (e.g. 4.4) have a new class for sockets
+allow dumpstate self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to run ss
+allow dumpstate { domain pdx_channel_socket_type pdx_endpoint_socket_type }:socket_class_set getattr;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to read linkerconfig directory
+allow dumpstate linkerconfig_file:dir { read open };
+
+# For when dumpstate runs df
+dontaudit dumpstate {
+  mnt_vendor_file
+  mirror_data_file
+  mnt_user_file
+}:dir search;
+dontaudit dumpstate {
+  apex_mnt_dir
+  linkerconfig_file
+  mirror_data_file
+  mnt_user_file
+}:dir getattr;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to bufferhubd over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, bufferhubd);
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to mediaswcodec over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, mediaswcodec);
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to these stable AIDL services over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, hal_rebootescrow_server)
+allow hal_rebootescrow_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+allow hal_rebootescrow_server dumpstate:fd use;
+
+binder_call(dumpstate, hal_authsecret_server)
+allow hal_authsecret_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+allow hal_authsecret_server dumpstate:fd use;
+
+binder_call(dumpstate, hal_keymint_server)
+allow hal_keymint_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+allow hal_keymint_server dumpstate:fd use;
+
+binder_call(dumpstate, hal_memtrack_server)
+allow hal_memtrack_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+allow hal_memtrack_server dumpstate:fd use;
+
+binder_call(dumpstate, hal_oemlock_server)
+allow hal_oemlock_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+allow hal_oemlock_server dumpstate:fd use;
+
+binder_call(dumpstate, hal_weaver_server)
+allow hal_weaver_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+allow hal_weaver_server dumpstate:fd use;
+
+#Access /data/misc/snapshotctl_log
+allow dumpstate snapshotctl_log_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate snapshotctl_log_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+#Allow access to /dev/binderfs/binder_logs
+allow dumpstate binderfs_logs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate binderfs_logs:file r_file_perms;
+allow dumpstate binderfs_logs_proc:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow dumpstate apex_info_file:file getattr;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# dumpstate has capability sys_ptrace, but should only use that capability for
+# accessing sensitive /proc/PID files, never for using ptrace attach.
+neverallow dumpstate *:process ptrace;
+
+# only system_server, dumpstate, traceur_app and shell can find the dumpstate service
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -system_server
+  -shell
+  -traceur_app
+  -dumpstate
+} dumpstate_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/e2fs.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/e2fs.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe8b2ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/e2fs.te
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+type e2fs, domain, coredomain;
+type e2fs_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow e2fs devpts:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
+
+allow e2fs dev_type:blk_file getattr;
+allow e2fs block_device:dir search;
+allow e2fs userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow e2fs metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow e2fs dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm e2fs { userdata_block_device metadata_block_device dm_device }:blk_file ioctl {
+  BLKSECDISCARD BLKDISCARD BLKPBSZGET BLKDISCARDZEROES BLKROGET
+};
+
+# Allow e2fs to format /dev/block/vd*
+allow e2fs vd_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm e2fs vd_device:blk_file ioctl {
+  BLKSECDISCARD BLKDISCARD BLKPBSZGET BLKDISCARDZEROES BLKROGET
+};
+
+allow e2fs {
+  proc_filesystems
+  proc_mounts
+  proc_swaps
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# access /sys/fs/ext4/features
+allow e2fs sysfs_fs_ext4_features:dir search;
+allow e2fs sysfs_fs_ext4_features:file r_file_perms;
+
+# access SELinux context files
+allow e2fs file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ephemeral_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ephemeral_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc39a22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ephemeral_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+###
+### Ephemeral apps.
+###
+### This file defines the security policy for apps with the ephemeral
+### feature.
+###
+### The ephemeral_app domain is a reduced permissions sandbox allowing
+### ephemeral applications to be safely installed and run. Non ephemeral
+### applications may also opt-in to ephemeral to take advantage of the
+### additional security features.
+###
+### PackageManager flags an app as ephemeral at install time.
+
+type ephemeral_app, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fastbootd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fastbootd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e167a5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fastbootd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+# fastbootd (used in recovery init.rc for /sbin/fastbootd)
+
+# Declare the domain unconditionally so we can always reference it
+# in neverallow rules.
+type fastbootd, domain;
+
+# But the allow rules are only included in the recovery policy.
+# Otherwise fastbootd is only allowed the domain rules.
+recovery_only(`
+  # fastbootd can only use HALs in passthrough mode
+  passthrough_hal_client_domain(fastbootd, hal_bootctl)
+
+  # Access /dev/usb-ffs/fastbootd/ep0
+  allow fastbootd functionfs:dir search;
+  allow fastbootd functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
+
+  allowxperm fastbootd functionfs:file ioctl { FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_DESC };
+  # Log to serial
+  allow fastbootd kmsg_device:chr_file { open getattr write };
+
+  # battery info
+  allow fastbootd sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+  allow fastbootd device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # For dev/block/by-name dir
+  allow fastbootd block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # Needed for DM_DEV_CREATE ioctl call
+  allow fastbootd self:capability sys_admin;
+
+  unix_socket_connect(fastbootd, recovery, recovery)
+
+  # Required for flashing
+  allow fastbootd dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+  allow fastbootd cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd super_block_device_type:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd {
+    boot_block_device
+    metadata_block_device
+    system_block_device
+    userdata_block_device
+  }:blk_file { w_file_perms getattr ioctl };
+
+  # For disabling/wiping GSI, and for modifying/deleting files created via
+  # libfiemap.
+  allow fastbootd metadata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd {rootfs tmpfs}:dir mounton;
+  allow fastbootd metadata_file:dir { search getattr mounton };
+  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file_type:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file_type:file create_file_perms;
+
+  allowxperm fastbootd super_block_device_type:blk_file ioctl { BLKIOMIN BLKALIGNOFF };
+
+  allowxperm fastbootd {
+    metadata_block_device
+    userdata_block_device
+    dm_device
+    cache_block_device
+  }:blk_file ioctl { BLKSECDISCARD BLKDISCARD };
+
+  allow fastbootd misc_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+  allow fastbootd proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # Needed to read fstab node from device tree.
+  allow fastbootd sysfs_dt_firmware_android:file r_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd sysfs_dt_firmware_android:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # Needed because libdm reads sysfs to validate when a dm path is ready.
+  r_dir_file(fastbootd, sysfs_dm)
+
+  # Needed for realpath() call to resolve symlinks.
+  allow fastbootd block_device:dir getattr;
+  userdebug_or_eng(`
+    # Refined manipulation of /mnt/scratch, without these perms resorts
+    # to deleting scratch partition when partition(s) are flashed.
+    allow fastbootd self:process setfscreate;
+    allow fastbootd cache_file:dir search;
+    allow fastbootd proc_filesystems:file { getattr open read };
+    allow fastbootd self:capability sys_rawio;
+    dontaudit fastbootd kernel:system module_request;
+    allowxperm fastbootd dev_type:blk_file ioctl BLKROSET;
+    allow fastbootd overlayfs_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+    allow fastbootd {
+      system_file_type
+      unlabeled
+      vendor_file_type
+    }:dir { remove_name rmdir search write };
+    allow fastbootd {
+      overlayfs_file
+      system_file_type
+      unlabeled
+      vendor_file_type
+    }:{ file lnk_file } unlink;
+    allow fastbootd tmpfs:dir rw_dir_perms;
+    # Fetch vendor_boot partition
+    allow fastbootd boot_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+  ')
+
+  # Allow using libfiemap/gsid directly (no binder in recovery).
+  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file_type:dir search;
+  allow fastbootd ota_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow fastbootd ota_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+')
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Write permission is required to wipe userdata
+# until recovery supports vold.
+neverallow fastbootd {
+   data_file_type
+}:file { no_x_file_perms };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/file.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/file.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20348b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/file.te
@@ -0,0 +1,600 @@
+# Filesystem types
+type labeledfs, fs_type;
+type pipefs, fs_type;
+type sockfs, fs_type;
+type rootfs, fs_type;
+type proc, fs_type, proc_type;
+type binderfs, fs_type;
+type binderfs_logs, fs_type;
+type binderfs_logs_proc, fs_type;
+# Security-sensitive proc nodes that should not be writable to most.
+type proc_security, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_drop_caches, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_overcommit_memory, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_min_free_order_shift, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_kpageflags, fs_type, proc_type;
+# proc, sysfs, or other nodes that permit configuration of kernel usermodehelpers.
+type usermodehelper, fs_type, proc_type;
+type sysfs_usermodehelper, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type proc_qtaguid_ctrl, fs_type, mlstrustedobject, proc_type;
+type proc_qtaguid_stat, fs_type, mlstrustedobject, proc_type;
+type proc_bluetooth_writable, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_abi, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_asound, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_bootconfig, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_buddyinfo, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_cmdline, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_cpuinfo, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_dirty, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_diskstats, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_extra_free_kbytes, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_filesystems, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_fs_verity, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_hostname, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_hung_task, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_interrupts, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_iomem, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_kallsyms, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_keys, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_kmsg, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_loadavg, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_locks, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_lowmemorykiller, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_max_map_count, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_meminfo, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_misc, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_modules, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_mounts, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_net, fs_type, proc_type, proc_net_type;
+type proc_net_tcp_udp, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_page_cluster, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_pagetypeinfo, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_panic, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_perf, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_pid_max, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_pipe_conf, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_pressure_cpu, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_pressure_io, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_pressure_mem, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_random, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_sched, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_slabinfo, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_stat, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_swaps, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_sysrq, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_timer, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_tty_drivers, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_uid_cputime_showstat, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_uid_cputime_removeuid, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_uid_io_stats, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_uid_procstat_set, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_uid_time_in_state, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_uid_concurrent_active_time, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_uid_cpupower, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_uptime, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_version, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_vmallocinfo, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_vmstat, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_zoneinfo, fs_type, proc_type;
+type selinuxfs, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type fusectlfs, fs_type;
+type cgroup, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type cgroup_v2, fs_type;
+type sysfs, fs_type, sysfs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type sysfs_android_usb, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_uio, sysfs_type, fs_type;
+type sysfs_batteryinfo, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_bluetooth_writable, fs_type, sysfs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type sysfs_devfreq_cur, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_devfreq_dir, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_devices_block, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_dm, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_dm_verity, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_dma_heap, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_dmabuf_stats, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_dt_firmware_android, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_extcon, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_ion, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_ipv4, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_kernel_notes, fs_type, sysfs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type sysfs_leds, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_loop, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_hwrandom, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_nfc_power_writable, fs_type, sysfs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type sysfs_wake_lock, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_net, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_power, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_rtc, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_suspend_stats, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_switch, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_transparent_hugepage, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_usb, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_wakeup, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_wakeup_reasons, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_fs_ext4_features, sysfs_type, fs_type;
+type sysfs_fs_f2fs, sysfs_type, fs_type;
+type sysfs_fs_incfs_features, sysfs_type, fs_type;
+type sysfs_fs_incfs_metrics, sysfs_type, fs_type;
+type fs_bpf, fs_type;
+type fs_bpf_tethering, fs_type;
+type configfs, fs_type;
+# /sys/devices/cs_etm
+type sysfs_devices_cs_etm, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+# /sys/devices/system/cpu
+type sysfs_devices_system_cpu, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+# /sys/module/lowmemorykiller
+type sysfs_lowmemorykiller, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+# /sys/module/wlan/parameters/fwpath
+type sysfs_wlan_fwpath, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_vibrator, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_uhid, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_thermal, sysfs_type, fs_type;
+
+type sysfs_zram, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_zram_uevent, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type inotify, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type devpts, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type tmpfs, fs_type;
+type shm, fs_type;
+type mqueue, fs_type;
+type fuse, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type sdcardfs, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type vfat, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type exfat, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type debugfs, fs_type, debugfs_type;
+type debugfs_kprobes, fs_type, debugfs_type;
+type debugfs_mmc, fs_type, debugfs_type;
+type debugfs_mm_events_tracing, fs_type, debugfs_type, tracefs_type;
+type debugfs_trace_marker, fs_type, debugfs_type, mlstrustedobject, tracefs_type;
+type debugfs_tracing, fs_type, debugfs_type, mlstrustedobject, tracefs_type;
+type debugfs_tracing_debug, fs_type, debugfs_type, mlstrustedobject, tracefs_type;
+type debugfs_tracing_instances, fs_type, debugfs_type, tracefs_type;
+type debugfs_tracing_printk_formats, fs_type, debugfs_type, tracefs_type;
+type debugfs_wakeup_sources, fs_type, debugfs_type;
+type debugfs_wifi_tracing, fs_type, debugfs_type, tracefs_type;
+type securityfs, fs_type;
+
+type pstorefs, fs_type;
+type functionfs, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type oemfs, fs_type, contextmount_type;
+type usbfs, fs_type;
+type binfmt_miscfs, fs_type;
+type app_fusefs, fs_type, contextmount_type;
+
+# File types
+type unlabeled, file_type;
+
+# Default type for anything under /system.
+type system_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for /system/asan.options
+type system_asan_options_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Type for /system/etc/event-log-tags (liblog implementation detail)
+type system_event_log_tags_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for anything under /system/lib[64].
+type system_lib_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# system libraries that are available only to bootstrap processes
+type system_bootstrap_lib_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for the group file /system/etc/group.
+type system_group_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for linker executable /system/bin/linker[64].
+type system_linker_exec, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for linker config /system/etc/ld.config.*.
+type system_linker_config_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for the passwd file /system/etc/passwd.
+type system_passwd_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for linker config /system/etc/seccomp_policy/*.
+type system_seccomp_policy_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for cacerts in /system/etc/security/cacerts/*.
+type system_security_cacerts_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for /system/bin/tcpdump.
+type tcpdump_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+# Default type for zoneinfo files in /system/usr/share/zoneinfo/*.
+type system_zoneinfo_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Cgroups description file under /system/etc/cgroups.json
+type cgroup_desc_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Cgroups description file under /system/etc/task_profiles/cgroups_*.json
+type cgroup_desc_api_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Vendor cgroups description file under /vendor/etc/cgroups.json
+type vendor_cgroup_desc_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Task profiles file under /system/etc/task_profiles.json
+type task_profiles_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Task profiles file under /system/etc/task_profiles/task_profiles_*.json
+type task_profiles_api_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+# Vendor task profiles file under /vendor/etc/task_profiles.json
+type vendor_task_profiles_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Type for /system/apex/com.android.art
+type art_apex_dir, system_file_type, file_type;
+# /linkerconfig(/.*)?
+type linkerconfig_file, file_type;
+# Control files under /data/incremental
+type incremental_control_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# Default type for directories search for
+# HAL implementations
+type vendor_hal_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for under /vendor or /system/vendor
+type vendor_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for everything in /vendor/app
+type vendor_app_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for everything under /vendor/etc/
+type vendor_configs_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for all *same process* HALs and their lib/bin dependencies.
+# e.g. libEGL_xxx.so, android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.0-impl.so
+type same_process_hal_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for vndk-sp libs. /vendor/lib/vndk-sp
+type vndk_sp_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for everything in /vendor/framework
+type vendor_framework_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for everything in /vendor/overlay
+type vendor_overlay_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Type for all vendor public libraries. These libs should only be exposed to
+# apps. ABI stability of these libs is vendor's responsibility.
+type vendor_public_lib_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Type for all vendor public libraries for system. These libs should only be exposed to
+# system. ABI stability of these libs is vendor's responsibility.
+type vendor_public_framework_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+# Input configuration
+type vendor_keylayout_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+type vendor_keychars_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+type vendor_idc_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+# /metadata partition itself
+type metadata_file, file_type;
+# Vold files within /metadata
+type vold_metadata_file, file_type;
+# GSI files within /metadata
+type gsi_metadata_file, gsi_metadata_file_type, file_type;
+# DSU (GSI) files within /metadata that are globally readable.
+type gsi_public_metadata_file, gsi_metadata_file_type, file_type;
+# system_server shares Weaver slot information in /metadata
+type password_slot_metadata_file, file_type;
+# APEX files within /metadata
+type apex_metadata_file, file_type;
+# libsnapshot files within /metadata
+type ota_metadata_file, file_type;
+# property files within /metadata/bootstat
+type metadata_bootstat_file, file_type;
+# userspace reboot files within /metadata/userspacereboot
+type userspace_reboot_metadata_file, file_type;
+# Staged install files within /metadata/staged-install
+type staged_install_file, file_type;
+# Metadata information within /metadata/watchdog
+type watchdog_metadata_file, file_type;
+
+# Type for /dev/cpu_variant:.*.
+type dev_cpu_variant, file_type;
+# Speedup access for trusted applications to the runtime event tags
+type runtime_event_log_tags_file, file_type;
+# Type for /system/bin/logcat.
+type logcat_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+# Speedup access to cgroup map file
+type cgroup_rc_file, file_type;
+# /cores for coredumps on userdebug / eng builds
+type coredump_file, file_type;
+# Type of /data itself
+type system_data_root_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# Default type for anything under /data.
+type system_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# Type for /data/system/packages.list.
+# TODO(b/129332765): Narrow down permissions to this.
+# Find out users of system_data_file that should be granted only this.
+type packages_list_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# Default type for anything under /data/vendor{_ce,_de}.
+type vendor_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+# Unencrypted data
+type unencrypted_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# installd-create files in /data/misc/installd such as layout_version
+type install_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/drm - DRM plugin data
+type drm_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/adb - adb debugging files
+type adb_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/anr - ANR traces
+type anr_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# /data/tombstones - core dumps
+type tombstone_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# /data/vendor/tombstones/wifi - vendor wifi dumps
+type tombstone_wifi_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+# /data/apex - APEX data files
+type apex_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/app - user-installed apps
+type apk_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apk_tmp_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# /data/app-private - forward-locked apps
+type apk_private_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apk_private_tmp_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# /data/dalvik-cache
+type dalvikcache_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/ota
+type ota_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/ota_package
+type ota_package_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# /data/misc/profiles
+type user_profile_root_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type user_profile_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# /data/misc/profman
+type profman_dump_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/misc/prereboot
+type prereboot_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/resource-cache
+type resourcecache_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/local - writable by shell
+type shell_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, app_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# /data/property
+type property_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/bootchart
+type bootchart_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/system/dropbox
+type dropbox_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/system/heapdump
+type heapdump_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# /data/nativetest
+type nativetest_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/local/tests
+type shell_test_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/system_de/0/ringtones
+type ringtone_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# /data/preloads
+type preloads_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/preloads/media
+type preloads_media_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/misc/dhcp and /data/misc/dhcp-6.8.2
+type dhcp_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/server_configurable_flags
+type server_configurable_flags_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/app-staging
+type staging_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /vendor/apex
+type vendor_apex_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+# Mount locations managed by vold
+type mnt_media_rw_file, file_type;
+type mnt_user_file, file_type;
+type mnt_pass_through_file, file_type;
+type mnt_expand_file, file_type;
+type mnt_sdcard_file, file_type;
+type storage_file, file_type;
+
+# Label for storage dirs which are just mount stubs
+type mnt_media_rw_stub_file, file_type;
+type storage_stub_file, file_type;
+
+# Mount location for read-write vendor partitions.
+type mnt_vendor_file, file_type;
+
+# Mount location for read-write product partitions.
+type mnt_product_file, file_type;
+
+# Mount point used for APEX images
+type apex_mnt_dir, file_type;
+
+# /apex/apex-info-list.xml created by apexd
+type apex_info_file, file_type;
+
+# /postinstall: Mount point used by update_engine to run postinstall.
+type postinstall_mnt_dir, file_type;
+# Files inside the /postinstall mountpoint are all labeled as postinstall_file.
+type postinstall_file, file_type;
+# /postinstall/apex: Mount point used for APEX images within /postinstall.
+type postinstall_apex_mnt_dir, file_type;
+
+# /data_mirror: Contains mirror directory for storing all apps data.
+type mirror_data_file, file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc subdirectories
+type adb_keys_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apex_appsearch_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apex_module_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apex_ota_reserved_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apex_permission_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apex_rollback_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apex_scheduling_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apex_wifi_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type appcompat_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type audio_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type audioserver_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type bluetooth_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, app_data_file_type;
+type bluetooth_logs_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type bootstat_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type boottrace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type camera_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type credstore_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type gatekeeper_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type incident_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type keychain_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type keystore_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type media_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type media_rw_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type misc_user_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type net_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type network_watchlist_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type nfc_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, app_data_file_type;
+type nfc_logs_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type radio_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, app_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type recovery_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type shared_relro_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type snapshotctl_log_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type stats_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type systemkeys_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type textclassifier_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type vpn_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type wifi_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type zoneinfo_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type vold_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type iorapd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type tee_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type update_engine_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type update_engine_log_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/misc/trace for method traces on userdebug / eng builds
+type method_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type gsi_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type radio_core_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/data subdirectories - app sandboxes
+type app_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, app_data_file_type;
+# /data/data subdirectories - priv-app sandboxes
+type privapp_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, app_data_file_type;
+# /data/data subdirectory for system UID apps.
+type system_app_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, app_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# Compatibility with type name used in Android 4.3 and 4.4.
+# Default type for anything under /cache
+type cache_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# Type for /cache/overlay /mnt/scratch/overlay
+type overlayfs_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# Type for /cache/backup_stage/* (fd interchange with apps)
+type cache_backup_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# type for anything under /cache/backup (local transport storage)
+type cache_private_backup_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# Type for anything under /cache/recovery
+type cache_recovery_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# Default type for anything under /efs
+type efs_file, file_type;
+# Type for wallpaper file.
+type wallpaper_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# Type for shortcut manager icon file.
+type shortcut_manager_icons, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# Type for user icon file.
+type icon_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /mnt/asec
+type asec_apk_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# Elements of asec files (/mnt/asec) that are world readable
+type asec_public_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/app-asec
+type asec_image_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/backup and /data/secure/backup
+type backup_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# All devices have bluetooth efs files. But they
+# vary per device, so this type is used in per
+# device policy
+type bluetooth_efs_file, file_type;
+# Type for fingerprint template file
+type fingerprintd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# Type for _new_ fingerprint template file
+type fingerprint_vendor_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+# Type for appfuse file.
+type app_fuse_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+# Type for face template file
+type face_vendor_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+# Type for iris template file
+type iris_vendor_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+
+# Socket types
+type adbd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type bluetooth_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type dnsproxyd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type dumpstate_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type fwmarkd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type lmkd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type logd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type logdr_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type logdw_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type mdns_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type mdnsd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type misc_logd_file, coredomain_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type mtpd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type property_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type racoon_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type recovery_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type rild_socket, file_type;
+type rild_debug_socket, file_type;
+type snapuserd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type statsdw_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type system_wpa_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type system_ndebug_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type system_unsolzygote_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type tombstoned_crash_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type tombstoned_java_trace_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type tombstoned_intercept_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type traced_consumer_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type traced_perf_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type traced_producer_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type uncrypt_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type wpa_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type zygote_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
+type heapprofd_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+# UART (for GPS) control proc file
+type gps_control, file_type;
+
+# PDX endpoint types
+type pdx_display_dir, pdx_endpoint_dir_type, file_type;
+type pdx_performance_dir, pdx_endpoint_dir_type, file_type;
+type pdx_bufferhub_dir, pdx_endpoint_dir_type, file_type;
+
+pdx_service_socket_types(display_client, pdx_display_dir)
+pdx_service_socket_types(display_manager, pdx_display_dir)
+pdx_service_socket_types(display_screenshot, pdx_display_dir)
+pdx_service_socket_types(display_vsync, pdx_display_dir)
+pdx_service_socket_types(performance_client, pdx_performance_dir)
+pdx_service_socket_types(bufferhub_client, pdx_bufferhub_dir)
+
+# file_contexts files
+type file_contexts_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+
+# mac_permissions file
+type mac_perms_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+
+# property_contexts file
+type property_contexts_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+
+# seapp_contexts file
+type seapp_contexts_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+
+# sepolicy files binary and others
+type sepolicy_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+
+# service_contexts file
+type service_contexts_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+
+# keystore2_key_contexts_file
+type keystore2_key_contexts_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+
+# vendor service_contexts file
+type vendor_service_contexts_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+# nonplat service_contexts file (only accessible on non full-treble devices)
+type nonplat_service_contexts_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+# hwservice_contexts file
+type hwservice_contexts_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+
+# vndservice_contexts file
+type vndservice_contexts_file, file_type;
+
+# /sys/kernel/tracing/instances/bootreceiver for monitoring kernel memory corruptions.
+type debugfs_bootreceiver_tracing, fs_type, debugfs_type, tracefs_type;
+
+# kernel modules
+type vendor_kernel_modules, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+# Allow files to be created in their appropriate filesystems.
+allow fs_type self:filesystem associate;
+allow cgroup tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+allow cgroup_v2 tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+allow cgroup_rc_file tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+allow sysfs_type sysfs:filesystem associate;
+allow debugfs_type { debugfs debugfs_tracing debugfs_tracing_debug }:filesystem associate;
+allow file_type labeledfs:filesystem associate;
+allow file_type tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+allow file_type rootfs:filesystem associate;
+allow dev_type tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+allow app_fuse_file app_fusefs:filesystem associate;
+allow postinstall_file self:filesystem associate;
+allow proc_net proc:filesystem associate;
+
+# asanwrapper (run a sanitized app_process, to be used with wrap properties)
+with_asan(`type asanwrapper_exec, exec_type, file_type;')
+
+# Deprecated in SDK version 28
+type audiohal_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# It's a bug to assign the file_type attribute and fs_type attribute
+# to any type. Do not allow it.
+#
+# For example, the following is a bug:
+#   type apk_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, fs_type;
+# Should be:
+#   type apk_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+neverallow fs_type file_type:filesystem associate;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fingerprintd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fingerprintd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8cf2411
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fingerprintd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+type fingerprintd, domain;
+type fingerprintd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+binder_use(fingerprintd)
+
+# Scan through /system/lib64/hw looking for installed HALs
+allow fingerprintd system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# need to find KeyStore and add self
+add_service(fingerprintd, fingerprintd_service)
+
+# allow HAL module to read dir contents
+allow fingerprintd fingerprintd_data_file:file { create_file_perms };
+
+# allow HAL module to read/write/unlink contents of this dir
+allow fingerprintd fingerprintd_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+# Need to add auth tokens to KeyStore
+use_keystore(fingerprintd)
+allow fingerprintd keystore:keystore_key { add_auth };
+allow fingerprintd keystore:keystore2 { add_auth };
+
+# For permissions checking
+binder_call(fingerprintd, system_server);
+allow fingerprintd permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow fingerprintd ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/flags_health_check.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/flags_health_check.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25a7768
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/flags_health_check.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# The flags_health_check command run by init.
+type flags_health_check, domain, coredomain;
+type flags_health_check_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow flags_health_check server_configurable_flags_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow flags_health_check server_configurable_flags_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# server_configurable_flags_data_file is used for storing whether server configurable flags which
+# have been reset during current booting. Mistakenly modified by unrelated components can
+# cause bad server configurable flags synced back to device.
+neverallow { domain -init -flags_health_check } server_configurable_flags_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fsck.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fsck.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a9fbee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fsck.te
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Any fsck program run by init
+type fsck, domain;
+type fsck_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
+# open fd inherited by fsck.
+allow fsck tmpfs:chr_file { read write ioctl };
+
+# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
+allow fsck devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow fsck vold:fd use;
+allow fsck vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# Run fsck on certain block devices
+allow fsck block_device:dir search;
+allow fsck userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow fsck cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow fsck dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+allow fsck system_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+# For the block devices where we have ioctl access,
+# allow at a minimum the following common fsck ioctls.
+allowxperm fsck dev_type:blk_file ioctl {
+  BLKDISCARDZEROES
+  BLKROGET
+};
+
+# To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
+# must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
+# e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
+# block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
+# device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
+# passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
+# is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
+# Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
+# major/minor values.
+allow fsck dev_type:blk_file getattr;
+
+allow fsck {
+  proc_mounts
+  proc_swaps
+}:file r_file_perms;
+allow fsck rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# fsck should never be run on these block devices
+neverallow fsck {
+  boot_block_device
+  frp_block_device
+  recovery_block_device
+  root_block_device
+  swap_block_device
+  system_block_device
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-system_block_device')
+  vold_device
+}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from init or vold via fsck binaries
+neverallow { domain -init -vold } fsck:process transition;
+neverallow * fsck:process dyntransition;
+neverallow fsck { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fsck_untrusted.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fsck_untrusted.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8510c94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fsck_untrusted.te
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# Any fsck program run on untrusted block devices
+type fsck_untrusted, domain;
+
+# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
+allow fsck_untrusted devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow fsck_untrusted vold:fd use;
+allow fsck_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# Run fsck on vold block devices
+allow fsck_untrusted block_device:dir search;
+allow fsck_untrusted vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow fsck_untrusted proc_mounts:file r_file_perms;
+
+# To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
+# must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
+# e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
+# block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
+# device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
+# passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
+# is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
+# Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
+# major/minor values.
+allow fsck_untrusted dev_type:blk_file getattr;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Untrusted fsck should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
+neverallow fsck_untrusted {
+  boot_block_device
+  frp_block_device
+  metadata_block_device
+  recovery_block_device
+  root_block_device
+  swap_block_device
+  system_block_device
+  userdata_block_device
+  cache_block_device
+  dm_device
+}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from vold via fsck binaries
+neverallow { domain -vold } fsck_untrusted:process transition;
+neverallow * fsck_untrusted:process dyntransition;
+neverallow fsck_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fwk_bufferhub.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fwk_bufferhub.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..03486bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/fwk_bufferhub.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+binder_call(hal_bufferhub_client, hal_bufferhub_server)
+binder_call(hal_bufferhub_server, hal_bufferhub_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_bufferhub, fwk_bufferhub_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/gatekeeperd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/gatekeeperd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d48c5f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/gatekeeperd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+type gatekeeperd, domain;
+type gatekeeperd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# gatekeeperd
+binder_service(gatekeeperd)
+binder_use(gatekeeperd)
+
+### Rules needed when Gatekeeper HAL runs inside gatekeeperd process.
+### These rules should eventually be granted only when needed.
+allow gatekeeperd ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+# Load HAL implementation
+allow gatekeeperd system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+###
+
+### Rules needed when Gatekeeper HAL runs outside of gatekeeperd process.
+### These rules should eventually be granted only when needed.
+hal_client_domain(gatekeeperd, hal_gatekeeper)
+###
+
+# need to find KeyStore and add self
+add_service(gatekeeperd, gatekeeper_service)
+
+# Need to add auth tokens to KeyStore
+use_keystore(gatekeeperd)
+allow gatekeeperd keystore:keystore_key { add_auth };
+allow gatekeeperd keystore:keystore2 { add_auth };
+allow gatekeeperd authorization_service:service_manager find;
+
+
+# For permissions checking
+allow gatekeeperd system_server:binder call;
+allow gatekeeperd permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+# for SID file access
+allow gatekeeperd gatekeeper_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow gatekeeperd gatekeeper_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# For hardware properties retrieval
+allow gatekeeperd hardware_properties_service:service_manager find;
+
+r_dir_file(gatekeeperd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(gatekeeperd, cgroup_v2)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/global_macros b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/global_macros
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c87fde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/global_macros
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#####################################
+# Common groupings of object classes.
+#
+define(`capability_class_set', `{ capability capability2 cap_userns cap2_userns }')
+define(`global_capability_class_set', `{ capability cap_userns }')
+define(`global_capability2_class_set', `{ capability2 cap2_userns }')
+
+define(`devfile_class_set', `{ chr_file blk_file }')
+define(`notdevfile_class_set', `{ file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }')
+define(`file_class_set', `{ devfile_class_set notdevfile_class_set }')
+define(`dir_file_class_set', `{ dir file_class_set }')
+
+define(`socket_class_set', `{ socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket unix_stream_socket unix_dgram_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_selinux_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket netlink_iscsi_socket netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket netlink_netfilter_socket netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket icmp_socket ax25_socket ipx_socket netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket atmsvc_socket rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket ieee802154_socket caif_socket alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket }')
+define(`dgram_socket_class_set', `{ udp_socket unix_dgram_socket }')
+define(`stream_socket_class_set', `{ tcp_socket unix_stream_socket sctp_socket }')
+define(`unpriv_socket_class_set', `{ tcp_socket udp_socket unix_stream_socket unix_dgram_socket sctp_socket }')
+define(`network_socket_class_set', `{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }')
+
+define(`ipc_class_set', `{ sem msgq shm ipc }')
+
+#####################################
+# Common groupings of permissions.
+#
+define(`x_file_perms', `{ getattr execute execute_no_trans map }')
+define(`r_file_perms', `{ getattr open read ioctl lock map watch watch_reads }')
+define(`w_file_perms', `{ open append write lock map }')
+define(`rx_file_perms', `{ r_file_perms x_file_perms }')
+define(`ra_file_perms', `{ r_file_perms append }')
+define(`rw_file_perms', `{ r_file_perms w_file_perms }')
+define(`rwx_file_perms', `{ rw_file_perms x_file_perms }')
+define(`create_file_perms', `{ create rename setattr unlink rw_file_perms }')
+
+define(`r_dir_perms', `{ open getattr read search ioctl lock watch watch_reads }')
+define(`w_dir_perms', `{ open search write add_name remove_name lock }')
+define(`ra_dir_perms', `{ r_dir_perms add_name write }')
+define(`rw_dir_perms', `{ r_dir_perms w_dir_perms }')
+define(`create_dir_perms', `{ create reparent rename rmdir setattr rw_dir_perms }')
+
+define(`r_ipc_perms', `{ getattr read associate unix_read }')
+define(`w_ipc_perms', `{ write unix_write }')
+define(`rw_ipc_perms', `{ r_ipc_perms w_ipc_perms }')
+define(`create_ipc_perms', `{ create setattr destroy rw_ipc_perms }')
+
+#####################################
+# Common socket permission sets.
+define(`rw_socket_perms', `{ ioctl read getattr write setattr lock append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown map }')
+define(`rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl', `{ read getattr write setattr lock append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown map }')
+define(`create_socket_perms', `{ create rw_socket_perms }')
+define(`create_socket_perms_no_ioctl', `{ create rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl }')
+define(`rw_stream_socket_perms', `{ rw_socket_perms listen accept }')
+define(`create_stream_socket_perms', `{ create rw_stream_socket_perms }')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/gmscore_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/gmscore_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b574bf3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/gmscore_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+###
+### A domain for further sandboxing the PrebuiltGMSCore app.
+###
+
+type gmscore_app, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/gpuservice.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/gpuservice.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c862d0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/gpuservice.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# gpuservice - server for gpu stats and other gpu related services
+type gpuservice, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_allocator.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_allocator.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6417b62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_allocator.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_allocator_client, hal_allocator_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_allocator, hidl_allocator_hwservice)
+allow hal_allocator_client hidl_memory_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow hal_allocator_client same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_atrace.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_atrace.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51d9237
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_atrace.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_atrace_client, hal_atrace_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_atrace, hal_atrace_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_audio.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_audio.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1970b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_audio.te
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_audio_client, hal_audio_server)
+binder_call(hal_audio_server, hal_audio_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_audio, hal_audio_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_audio, hal_audio_service)
+
+allow hal_audio ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(hal_audio, proc)
+r_dir_file(hal_audio, proc_asound)
+allow hal_audio_server audio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow hal_audio_server audio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Needed to provide debug dump output via dumpsys' pipes.
+allow hal_audio shell:fd use;
+allow hal_audio shell:fifo_file write;
+allow hal_audio dumpstate:fd use;
+allow hal_audio dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+# Needed to allow sound trigger hal to access shared memory from apps.
+allow hal_audio_server appdomain:fd use;
+
+# allow hal audio to use vnbinder
+vndbinder_use(hal_audio)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Should never execute any executable without a domain transition
+neverallow hal_audio_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Only audio HAL may directly access the audio hardware
+neverallow { halserverdomain -hal_audio_server -hal_omx_server } audio_device:chr_file *;
+
+get_prop(hal_audio, audio_config_prop)
+get_prop(hal_audio, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
+get_prop(hal_audio, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_audiocontrol.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_audiocontrol.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f45b0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_audiocontrol.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_audiocontrol_client, hal_audiocontrol_server)
+binder_call(hal_audiocontrol_server, hal_audiocontrol_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_audiocontrol, hal_audiocontrol_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_audiocontrol, hal_audiocontrol_service)
+
+binder_call(hal_audiocontrol_server, servicemanager)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_authsecret.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_authsecret.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbcdb9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_authsecret.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_authsecret_client, hal_authsecret_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_authsecret, hal_authsecret_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_authsecret, hal_authsecret_service)
+
+binder_call(hal_authsecret_server, servicemanager)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_bluetooth.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_bluetooth.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97177ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_bluetooth.te
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from clients into server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_bluetooth_client, hal_bluetooth_server)
+binder_call(hal_bluetooth_server, hal_bluetooth_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_bluetooth, hal_bluetooth_hwservice)
+
+wakelock_use(hal_bluetooth);
+
+# The HAL toggles rfkill to power the chip off/on.
+allow hal_bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
+
+# bluetooth factory file accesses.
+r_dir_file(hal_bluetooth, bluetooth_efs_file)
+
+allow hal_bluetooth { uhid_device hci_attach_dev }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# sysfs access.
+r_dir_file(hal_bluetooth, sysfs_type)
+allow hal_bluetooth sysfs_bluetooth_writable:file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_bluetooth self:global_capability2_class_set wake_alarm;
+
+# Allow write access to bluetooth-specific properties
+set_prop(hal_bluetooth, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
+set_prop(hal_bluetooth, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
+set_prop(hal_bluetooth, bluetooth_prop)
+set_prop(hal_bluetooth, exported_bluetooth_prop)
+
+# /proc access (bluesleep etc.).
+allow hal_bluetooth proc_bluetooth_writable:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# allow to run with real-time scheduling policy
+allow hal_bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_bootctl.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_bootctl.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1f3d7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_bootctl.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_bootctl_client, hal_bootctl_server)
+binder_call(hal_bootctl_server, hal_bootctl_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_bootctl, hal_bootctl_hwservice)
+allow hal_bootctl_server proc_bootconfig:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_broadcastradio.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_broadcastradio.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84a2597
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_broadcastradio.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+binder_call(hal_broadcastradio_client, hal_broadcastradio_server)
+binder_call(hal_broadcastradio_server, hal_broadcastradio_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_broadcastradio, hal_broadcastradio_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_camera.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_camera.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45fad56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_camera.te
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from clients to server and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_camera_client, hal_camera_server)
+binder_call(hal_camera_server, hal_camera_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_camera, hal_camera_hwservice)
+
+allow hal_camera device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow hal_camera video_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow hal_camera video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_camera camera_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_camera ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_camera dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Both the client and the server need to use the graphics allocator
+allow { hal_camera_client hal_camera_server } hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
+
+# Allow hal_camera to use fd from app,gralloc,and ashmem HAL
+allow hal_camera { appdomain -isolated_app }:fd use;
+allow hal_camera surfaceflinger:fd use;
+allow hal_camera hal_allocator_server:fd use;
+
+# Needed to provide debug dump output via dumpsys' pipes.
+allow hal_camera shell:fd use;
+allow hal_camera shell:fifo_file write;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# hal_camera should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow hal_camera_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# hal_camera should never need network access. Disallow network sockets.
+neverallow hal_camera_server domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+
+# Only camera HAL may directly access the camera hardware
+neverallow { halserverdomain -hal_camera_server } camera_device:chr_file *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_can.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_can.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..959d1d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_can.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# CAN controller
+binder_call(hal_can_controller_client, hal_can_controller_server)
+binder_call(hal_can_controller_server, hal_can_controller_client)
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_can_controller, hal_can_controller_hwservice)
+
+# CAN bus
+binder_call(hal_can_bus_client, hal_can_bus_server)
+binder_call(hal_can_bus_server, hal_can_bus_client)
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_can_bus, hal_can_bus_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_cas.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_cas.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e699a6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_cas.te
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_cas_client, hal_cas_server)
+binder_call(hal_cas_server, hal_cas_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_cas, hal_cas_hwservice)
+allow hal_cas_server hidl_memory_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# Permit reading device's serial number from system properties
+get_prop(hal_cas_server, serialno_prop)
+
+# Read files already opened under /data
+allow hal_cas system_data_file:file { getattr read };
+
+# Read access to pseudo filesystems
+r_dir_file(hal_cas, cgroup)
+allow hal_cas cgroup:dir { search write };
+allow hal_cas cgroup:file w_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(hal_cas, cgroup_v2)
+allow hal_cas cgroup_v2:dir { search write };
+allow hal_cas cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Allow access to ion memory allocation device
+allow hal_cas ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_cas hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
+
+allow hal_cas tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# hal_cas should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow hal_cas_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands
+neverallowxperm hal_cas_server domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_codec2.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_codec2.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a379bb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_codec2.te
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+get_prop(hal_codec2_client, media_variant_prop)
+get_prop(hal_codec2_server, media_variant_prop)
+get_prop(hal_codec2_client, codec2_config_prop)
+get_prop(hal_codec2_server, codec2_config_prop)
+
+binder_call(hal_codec2_client, hal_codec2_server)
+binder_call(hal_codec2_server, hal_codec2_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_codec2, hal_codec2_hwservice)
+
+# The following permissions are added to hal_codec2_server because vendor and
+# vndk libraries provided for Codec2 implementation need them.
+
+# Allow server access to composer sync fences
+allow hal_codec2_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
+# Allow both server and client access to ion
+allow hal_codec2_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow server access to camera HAL's fences
+allow hal_codec2_server hal_camera:fd use;
+
+# Receive gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd.
+allow hal_codec2_server bufferhubd:fd use;
+
+allow hal_codec2_client ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_configstore.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_configstore.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..069da47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_configstore.te
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_configstore_client, hal_configstore_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_configstore, hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs)
+
+# hal_configstore runs with a strict seccomp filter. Use crash_dump's
+# fallback path to collect crash data.
+crash_dump_fallback(hal_configstore_server)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Should never execute an executable without a domain transition
+neverallow hal_configstore_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Should never need network access. Disallow sockets except for
+# for unix stream/dgram sockets used for logging/debugging.
+neverallow hal_configstore_server domain:{
+  rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket
+  netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket
+  socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket appletalk_socket
+  netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket
+  netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
+  netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket
+  netlink_iscsi_socket netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket
+  netlink_netfilter_socket netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket
+  netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket
+} *;
+neverallow hal_configstore_server {
+  domain
+  -hal_configstore_server
+  -logd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+  -tombstoned
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
+}:{ unix_dgram_socket unix_stream_socket } *;
+
+# Should never need access to anything on /data
+neverallow hal_configstore_server {
+  data_file_type
+  -anr_data_file # for crash dump collection
+  -tombstone_data_file # for crash dump collection
+  -zoneinfo_data_file # granted to domain
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:{ file fifo_file sock_file } *;
+
+# Should never need sdcard access
+neverallow hal_configstore_server {
+    sdcard_type
+    fuse sdcardfs vfat exfat        # manual expansion for completeness
+}:dir ~getattr;
+neverallow hal_configstore_server {
+    sdcard_type
+    fuse sdcardfs vfat exfat        # manual expansion for completeness
+}:file *;
+
+# Do not permit access to service_manager and vndservice_manager
+neverallow hal_configstore_server *:service_manager *;
+
+# No privileged capabilities
+neverallow hal_configstore_server self:capability_class_set *;
+
+# No ptracing other processes
+neverallow hal_configstore_server *:process ptrace;
+
+# no relabeling
+neverallow hal_configstore_server *:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_confirmationui.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_confirmationui.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d2e4b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_confirmationui.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_confirmationui_client, hal_confirmationui_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_confirmationui, hal_confirmationui_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_contexthub.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_contexthub.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..34acb38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_contexthub.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_contexthub_client, hal_contexthub_server)
+binder_call(hal_contexthub_server, hal_contexthub_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_contexthub, hal_contexthub_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_drm.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_drm.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb1bd91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_drm.te
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_drm_client, hal_drm_server)
+binder_call(hal_drm_server, hal_drm_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_drm, hal_drm_hwservice)
+
+allow hal_drm hidl_memory_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# Required by Widevine DRM (b/22990512)
+allow hal_drm self:process execmem;
+
+# Permit reading device's serial number from system properties
+get_prop(hal_drm, serialno_prop)
+
+# Read files already opened under /data
+allow hal_drm system_data_file:file { getattr read };
+
+# Read access to pseudo filesystems
+r_dir_file(hal_drm, cgroup)
+allow hal_drm cgroup:dir { search write };
+allow hal_drm cgroup:file w_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(hal_drm, cgroup_v2)
+allow hal_drm cgroup_v2:dir { search write };
+allow hal_drm cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Allow access to ion memory allocation device
+allow hal_drm ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_drm hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
+
+# Allow access to hidl_memory allocation service
+allow hal_drm hal_allocator_server:fd use;
+
+# Allow access to fds allocated by mediaserver
+allow hal_drm mediaserver:fd use;
+
+allow hal_drm sysfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow hal_drm tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow hal_drm_server { appdomain -isolated_app }:fd use;
+
+# only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
+allowxperm hal_drm self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
+  ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# hal_drm should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow hal_drm_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands
+neverallowxperm hal_drm_server domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_dumpstate.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_dumpstate.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f854e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_dumpstate.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_dumpstate_client, hal_dumpstate_server)
+binder_call(hal_dumpstate_server, hal_dumpstate_client)
+
+set_prop(hal_dumpstate_server, hal_dumpstate_config_prop)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_dumpstate, hal_dumpstate_hwservice)
+
+# write bug reports in /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport
+allow hal_dumpstate shell_data_file:file write;
+# allow reading /proc/interrupts for all hal impls
+allow hal_dumpstate proc_interrupts:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_evs.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_evs.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..789333a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_evs.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+hwbinder_use(hal_evs_client)
+hwbinder_use(hal_evs_server)
+binder_call(hal_evs_client, hal_evs_server)
+binder_call(hal_evs_server, hal_evs_client)
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_evs, hal_evs_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_face.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_face.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0134576
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_face.te
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Allow HwBinder IPC from client to server, and vice versa for callbacks.
+binder_call(hal_face_client, hal_face_server)
+binder_call(hal_face_server, hal_face_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_face, hal_face_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_face, hal_face_service)
+
+binder_call(hal_face_server, servicemanager)
+
+# Allow access to the ion memory allocation device.
+allow hal_face ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow read/write access to the face template directory.
+allow hal_face face_vendor_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow hal_face face_vendor_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_fingerprint.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_fingerprint.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..444cfda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_fingerprint.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_fingerprint_client, hal_fingerprint_server)
+binder_call(hal_fingerprint_server, hal_fingerprint_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_fingerprint, hal_fingerprint_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_fingerprint, hal_fingerprint_service)
+
+binder_call(hal_fingerprint_server, servicemanager)
+
+# For memory allocation
+allow hal_fingerprint ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+allow hal_fingerprint fingerprint_vendor_data_file:file { create_file_perms };
+allow hal_fingerprint fingerprint_vendor_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(hal_fingerprint, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(hal_fingerprint, cgroup_v2)
+r_dir_file(hal_fingerprint, sysfs)
+
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_gatekeeper.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_gatekeeper.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b918f88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_gatekeeper.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+binder_call(hal_gatekeeper_client, hal_gatekeeper_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_gatekeeper, hal_gatekeeper_hwservice)
+
+# TEE access.
+allow hal_gatekeeper tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_gatekeeper ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_gnss.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_gnss.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..832bc8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_gnss.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_gnss_client, hal_gnss_server)
+binder_call(hal_gnss_server, hal_gnss_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_gnss, hal_gnss_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_gnss, hal_gnss_service)
+binder_call(hal_gnss_server, servicemanager)
+binder_call(hal_gnss_client, servicemanager)
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ec6b96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_graphics_allocator_client, hal_graphics_allocator_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_graphics_allocator, hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice)
+allow hal_graphics_allocator_client hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow hal_graphics_allocator_client same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# GPU device access
+allow hal_graphics_allocator gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_graphics_allocator ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow hal_graphics_allocator dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow to run with real-time scheduling policy
+allow hal_graphics_allocator self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_graphics_composer.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_graphics_composer.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c69c99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_graphics_composer.te
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+type hal_graphics_composer_server_tmpfs, file_type;
+attribute hal_graphics_composer_client_tmpfs;
+expandattribute hal_graphics_composer_client_tmpfs true;
+
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_graphics_composer_client, hal_graphics_composer_server)
+binder_call(hal_graphics_composer_server, hal_graphics_composer_client)
+allow hal_graphics_composer_client hal_graphics_composer_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+allow hal_graphics_composer_server hal_graphics_composer_client_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_graphics_composer, hal_graphics_composer_hwservice)
+
+# Coordinate with hal_graphics_mapper
+allow hal_graphics_composer_server hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# GPU device access
+allow hal_graphics_composer gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_graphics_composer ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow hal_graphics_composer dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow hal_graphics_composer hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
+
+# Access /dev/graphics/fb0.
+allow hal_graphics_composer graphics_device:dir search;
+allow hal_graphics_composer graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Fences
+allow hal_graphics_composer system_server:fd use;
+allow hal_graphics_composer bootanim:fd use;
+allow hal_graphics_composer appdomain:fd use;
+
+# allow self to set SCHED_FIFO
+allow hal_graphics_composer self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_health.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_health.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc7d083
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_health.te
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_health_client, hal_health_server)
+binder_call(hal_health_server, hal_health_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_health, hal_health_hwservice)
+
+# Common rules for a health service.
+
+# Allow to listen to uevents for updates
+allow hal_health_server self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Allow to read /sys/class/power_supply directory
+allow hal_health_server sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow to read files under /sys/class/power_supply. Implementations typically have symlinks
+# to vendor specific files. Vendors should mark sysfs_batteryinfo on all files read by health
+# HAL service.
+r_dir_file(hal_health_server, sysfs_batteryinfo)
+
+# Allow to wake up to send periodic events
+wakelock_use(hal_health_server)
+
+# Write to /dev/kmsg
+allow hal_health_server kmsg_device:chr_file { getattr w_file_perms };
+
+# Allow to use timerfd to wake itself up periodically to send health info.
+allow hal_health_server self:capability2 wake_alarm;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_health_storage.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_health_storage.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4938a16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_health_storage.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_health_storage_client, hal_health_storage_server)
+binder_call(hal_health_storage_server, hal_health_storage_client)
+
+binder_use(hal_health_storage_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_health_storage, hal_health_storage_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_health_storage, hal_health_storage_service)
+
+# Allow ReadDefaultFstab().
+read_fstab(hal_health_storage_server)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_identity.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_identity.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d558ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_identity.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_identity_client, hal_identity_server)
+
+hal_attribute_service(hal_identity, hal_identity_service)
+
+binder_call(hal_identity_server, servicemanager)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_input_classifier.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_input_classifier.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70a4b7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_input_classifier.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_input_classifier_client, hal_input_classifier_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_input_classifier, hal_input_classifier_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_ir.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_ir.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29555f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_ir.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_ir_client, hal_ir_server)
+binder_call(hal_ir_server, hal_ir_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_ir, hal_ir_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_keymaster.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_keymaster.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e164ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_keymaster.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_keymaster_client, hal_keymaster_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_keymaster, hal_keymaster_hwservice)
+
+allow hal_keymaster tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_keymaster ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_keymint.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_keymint.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e56ab99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_keymint.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+binder_call(hal_keymint_client, hal_keymint_server)
+
+hal_attribute_service(hal_keymint, hal_keymint_service)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_keymint, hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_service)
+binder_call(hal_keymint_server, servicemanager)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_light.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_light.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40829b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_light.te
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_light_client, hal_light_server)
+binder_call(hal_light_server, hal_light_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_light, hal_light_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_light, hal_light_service)
+
+binder_call(hal_light_server, servicemanager)
+binder_use(hal_light_client)
+
+allow hal_light_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+allow hal_light sysfs_leds:lnk_file read;
+allow hal_light sysfs_leds:file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_light sysfs_leds:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_lowpan.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_lowpan.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fb95e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_lowpan.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_lowpan_client, hal_lowpan_server)
+binder_call(hal_lowpan_server, hal_lowpan_client)
+
+
+# Allow hal_lowpan_client to be able to find the hal_lowpan_server
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_lowpan, hal_lowpan_hwservice)
+
+# hal_lowpan domain can write/read to/from lowpan_prop
+set_prop(hal_lowpan_server, lowpan_prop)
+
+# Allow hal_lowpan_server to open lowpan_devices
+allow hal_lowpan_server lowpan_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Only LoWPAN HAL may directly access LoWPAN hardware
+neverallow { domain -hal_lowpan_server -init -ueventd } lowpan_device:chr_file ~getattr;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_memtrack.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_memtrack.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30a4480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_memtrack.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_memtrack_client, hal_memtrack_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_memtrack, hal_memtrack_hwservice)
+
+hal_attribute_service(hal_memtrack, hal_memtrack_service)
+binder_call(hal_memtrack_server, servicemanager)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_neuralnetworks.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_neuralnetworks.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7497dec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_neuralnetworks.te
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_neuralnetworks_client, hal_neuralnetworks_server)
+binder_call(hal_neuralnetworks_server, hal_neuralnetworks_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_neuralnetworks, hal_neuralnetworks_hwservice)
+allow hal_neuralnetworks hidl_memory_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow hal_neuralnetworks hal_allocator:fd use;
+allow hal_neuralnetworks hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow hal_neuralnetworks hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
+
+# Allow NN HAL service to use a client-provided fd residing in /data/data/.
+allow hal_neuralnetworks_server app_data_file:file { read write getattr map };
+allow hal_neuralnetworks_server privapp_data_file:file { read write getattr map };
+
+# Allow NN HAL service to use a client-provided fd residing in /data/local/tmp/.
+allow hal_neuralnetworks_server shell_data_file:file { read write getattr map };
+
+# Allow NN HAL service to read a client-provided ION memory fd.
+allow hal_neuralnetworks_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow NN HAL service to use a client-provided fd residing in /storage
+allow hal_neuralnetworks_server storage_file:file { getattr map read };
+
+# Allow NN HAL service to read a client-provided fd residing in /data/app/.
+allow hal_neuralnetworks_server apk_data_file:file { getattr map read };
+
+# Allow NN HAL client to check the ro.nnapi.extensions.deny_on_product
+# property to determine whether to deny NNAPI extensions use for apps
+# on product partition (apps in GSI are not allowed to use NNAPI extensions).
+get_prop(hal_neuralnetworks_client, nnapi_ext_deny_product_prop);
+# This property is only expected to be found in /product/build.prop,
+# allow to be set only by init.
+neverallow { domain -init } nnapi_ext_deny_product_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Define sepolicy for NN AIDL HAL service
+hal_attribute_service(hal_neuralnetworks, hal_neuralnetworks_service)
+binder_call(hal_neuralnetworks_server, servicemanager)
+
+binder_use(hal_neuralnetworks_server)
+
+allow hal_neuralnetworks_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_neverallows.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_neverallows.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4117878
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_neverallows.te
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# only HALs responsible for network hardware should have privileged
+# network capabilities
+neverallow {
+  halserverdomain
+  -hal_bluetooth_server
+  -hal_can_controller_server
+  -hal_wifi_server
+  -hal_wifi_hostapd_server
+  -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
+  -hal_telephony_server
+} self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
+
+# Unless a HAL's job is to communicate over the network, or control network
+# hardware, it should not be using network sockets.
+# NOTE: HALs for automotive devices have an exemption from this rule because in
+# a car it is common to have external modules and HALs need to communicate to
+# those modules using network.  Using this exemption for non-automotive builds
+# will result in CTS failure.
+neverallow {
+  halserverdomain
+  -hal_automotive_socket_exemption
+  -hal_can_controller_server
+  -hal_tetheroffload_server
+  -hal_wifi_server
+  -hal_wifi_hostapd_server
+  -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
+  -hal_telephony_server
+} domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+
+###
+# HALs are defined as an attribute and so a given domain could hypothetically
+# have multiple HALs in it (or even all of them) with the subsequent policy of
+# the domain comprised of the union of all the HALs.
+#
+# This is a problem because
+# 1) Security sensitive components should only be accessed by specific HALs.
+# 2) hwbinder_call and the restrictions it provides cannot be reasoned about in
+#    the platform.
+# 3) The platform cannot reason about defense in depth if there are
+#    monolithic domains etc.
+#
+# As an example, hal_keymaster and hal_gatekeeper can access the TEE and while
+# its OK for them to share a process its not OK with them to share processes
+# with other hals.
+#
+# The following neverallow rules, in conjuntion with CTS tests, assert that
+# these security principles are adhered to.
+#
+# Do not allow a hal to exec another process without a domain transition.
+# TODO remove exemptions.
+neverallow {
+  halserverdomain
+  -hal_dumpstate_server
+  -hal_telephony_server
+} { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+# Do not allow a process other than init to transition into a HAL domain.
+neverallow { domain -init } halserverdomain:process transition;
+# Only allow transitioning to a domain by running its executable. Do not
+# allow transitioning into a HAL domain by use of seclabel in an
+# init.*.rc script.
+neverallow * halserverdomain:process dyntransition;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_nfc.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_nfc.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cef4a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_nfc.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_nfc_client, hal_nfc_server)
+binder_call(hal_nfc_server, hal_nfc_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_nfc, hal_nfc_hwservice)
+
+# Set NFC properties (used by bcm2079x HAL).
+set_prop(hal_nfc, nfc_prop)
+
+# NFC device access.
+allow hal_nfc nfc_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_oemlock.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_oemlock.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f38fa5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_oemlock.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_oemlock_client, hal_oemlock_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_oemlock, hal_oemlock_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_oemlock, hal_oemlock_service)
+
+binder_call(hal_oemlock_server, servicemanager)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_omx.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_omx.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e74383
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_omx.te
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# applies all permissions to hal_omx NOT hal_omx_server
+# since OMX must always be in its own process.
+
+binder_call(hal_omx_server, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(hal_omx_server, { appdomain -isolated_app })
+
+# Allow hal_omx_server access to composer sync fences
+allow hal_omx_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
+allow hal_omx_server ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_omx_server hal_camera:fd use;
+
+crash_dump_fallback(hal_omx_server)
+
+# Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that hal_omx_server never
+# directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge
+# between those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd
+# via PDX. Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
+allow hal_omx_server bufferhubd:fd use;
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_omx, hal_omx_hwservice)
+
+allow hal_omx_client hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+get_prop(hal_omx_client, media_variant_prop)
+get_prop(hal_omx_server, media_variant_prop)
+
+binder_call(hal_omx_client, hal_omx_server)
+binder_call(hal_omx_server, hal_omx_client)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# hal_omx_server should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow hal_omx_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
+# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
+# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
+# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
+# hardware/content. Etc.
+#
+# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
+# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
+# Lengthier explanation here:
+# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
+neverallow hal_omx_server domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_power.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_power.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aae32a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_power.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_power_client, hal_power_server)
+binder_call(hal_power_server, hal_power_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_power, hal_power_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_power, hal_power_service)
+
+binder_call(hal_power_server, servicemanager)
+binder_call(hal_power_client, servicemanager)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_power_stats.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_power_stats.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4076eff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_power_stats.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_power_stats_client, hal_power_stats_server)
+binder_call(hal_power_stats_server, hal_power_stats_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_power_stats, hal_power_stats_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_power_stats, hal_power_stats_service)
+
+binder_call(hal_power_stats_server, servicemanager)
+binder_call(hal_power_stats_client, servicemanager)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_rebootescrow.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_rebootescrow.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d16333b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_rebootescrow.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_rebootescrow_client, hal_rebootescrow_server)
+
+hal_attribute_service(hal_rebootescrow, hal_rebootescrow_service)
+
+binder_use(hal_rebootescrow_server)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_secure_element.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_secure_element.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3724d35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_secure_element.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_secure_element_client, hal_secure_element_server)
+binder_call(hal_secure_element_server, hal_secure_element_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_secure_element, hal_secure_element_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_sensors.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_sensors.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06e76f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_sensors.te
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_sensors_client, hal_sensors_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_sensors, hal_sensors_hwservice)
+
+# Allow sensor hals to access ashmem memory allocated by apps
+allow hal_sensors { appdomain -isolated_app }:fd use;
+
+# Allow sensor hals to access ashmem memory allocated by android.hidl.allocator
+# fd is passed in from framework sensorservice HAL.
+allow hal_sensors hal_allocator:fd use;
+
+# allow to run with real-time scheduling policy
+allow hal_sensors self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_telephony.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_telephony.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0cf075
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_telephony.te
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_telephony_client, hal_telephony_server)
+binder_call(hal_telephony_server, hal_telephony_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_telephony, hal_telephony_hwservice)
+
+allowxperm hal_telephony_server self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+
+allow hal_telephony_server self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
+allow hal_telephony_server kernel:system module_request;
+allow hal_telephony_server self:global_capability_class_set { setpcap setgid setuid net_admin net_raw };
+allow hal_telephony_server cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server cgroup_v2:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server radio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server radio_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server efs_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server efs_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server vendor_shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server bluetooth_efs_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server bluetooth_efs_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# property service
+get_prop(hal_telephony_server, telephony_config_prop)
+set_prop(hal_telephony_server, radio_control_prop)
+set_prop(hal_telephony_server, radio_prop)
+set_prop(hal_telephony_server, telephony_status_prop)
+
+allow hal_telephony_server tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow hal_telephony_server to create and use netlink sockets.
+allow hal_telephony_server self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow hal_telephony_server self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow hal_telephony_server self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Access to wake locks
+wakelock_use(hal_telephony_server)
+
+r_dir_file(hal_telephony_server, proc_net_type)
+r_dir_file(hal_telephony_server, sysfs_type)
+
+# granting the ioctl permission for hal_telephony_server should be device specific
+allow hal_telephony_server self:socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tetheroffload.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tetheroffload.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf51723
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tetheroffload.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+## HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_tetheroffload_client, hal_tetheroffload_server)
+binder_call(hal_tetheroffload_server, hal_tetheroffload_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_tetheroffload, hal_tetheroffload_hwservice)
+
+# allow the client to pass the server already open netlink sockets
+allow hal_tetheroffload_server hal_tetheroffload_client:netlink_netfilter_socket { getattr read setopt write };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_thermal.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_thermal.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2115da1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_thermal.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_thermal_client, hal_thermal_server)
+binder_call(hal_thermal_server, hal_thermal_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_thermal, hal_thermal_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tv_cec.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tv_cec.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6584904
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tv_cec.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from clients into server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_tv_cec_client, hal_tv_cec_server)
+binder_call(hal_tv_cec_server, hal_tv_cec_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_tv_cec, hal_tv_cec_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tv_input.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tv_input.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a5bdda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tv_input.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from clients into server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_tv_input_client, hal_tv_input_server)
+binder_call(hal_tv_input_server, hal_tv_input_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_tv_input, hal_tv_input_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tv_tuner.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tv_tuner.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0da4ec7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_tv_tuner.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+binder_call(hal_tv_tuner_client, hal_tv_tuner_server)
+binder_call(hal_tv_tuner_server, hal_tv_tuner_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_tv_tuner, hal_tv_tuner_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_usb.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_usb.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38bc49a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_usb.te
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_usb_client, hal_usb_server)
+binder_call(hal_usb_server, hal_usb_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_usb, hal_usb_hwservice)
+
+allow hal_usb self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create;
+allow hal_usb self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket setopt;
+allow hal_usb self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket getopt;
+allow hal_usb self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket bind;
+allow hal_usb self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket read;
+allow hal_usb sysfs:dir open;
+allow hal_usb sysfs:dir read;
+allow hal_usb sysfs:file read;
+allow hal_usb sysfs:file open;
+allow hal_usb sysfs:file write;
+allow hal_usb sysfs:file getattr;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_usb_gadget.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_usb_gadget.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a474652
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_usb_gadget.te
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_usb_gadget_client, hal_usb_gadget_server)
+binder_call(hal_usb_gadget_server, hal_usb_gadget_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_usb_gadget, hal_usb_gadget_hwservice)
+
+# Configuring usb gadget functions
+allow hal_usb_gadget_server configfs:lnk_file { read create unlink};
+allow hal_usb_gadget_server configfs:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow hal_usb_gadget_server configfs:file create_file_perms;
+allow hal_usb_gadget_server functionfs:dir { read search };
+allow hal_usb_gadget_server functionfs:file read;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_vehicle.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_vehicle.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6855d14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_vehicle.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_vehicle_client, hal_vehicle_server)
+binder_call(hal_vehicle_server, hal_vehicle_client)
+
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_vehicle, hal_vehicle_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_vibrator.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_vibrator.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c902495
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_vibrator.te
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# HwBinder IPC client/server
+binder_call(hal_vibrator_client, hal_vibrator_server)
+binder_call(hal_vibrator_server, hal_vibrator_client);
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_vibrator, hal_vibrator_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_vibrator, hal_vibrator_service)
+
+binder_call(hal_vibrator_server, servicemanager)
+
+allow hal_vibrator_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+# vibrator sysfs rw access
+allow hal_vibrator sysfs_vibrator:file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_vibrator sysfs_vibrator:dir search;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_vr.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_vr.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e52c77f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_vr.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_vr_client, hal_vr_server)
+binder_call(hal_vr_server, hal_vr_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_vr, hal_vr_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_weaver.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_weaver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b34989
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_weaver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_weaver_client, hal_weaver_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_weaver, hal_weaver_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_weaver, hal_weaver_service)
+
+binder_call(hal_weaver_server, servicemanager)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_wifi.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_wifi.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e4fa78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_wifi.te
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_wifi_client, hal_wifi_server)
+binder_call(hal_wifi_server, hal_wifi_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_wifi, hal_wifi_hwservice)
+
+r_dir_file(hal_wifi, proc_net_type)
+r_dir_file(hal_wifi, sysfs_type)
+
+set_prop(hal_wifi_server, wifi_hal_prop)
+set_prop(hal_wifi, wifi_prop)
+userdebug_or_eng(`get_prop(hal_wifi, persist_vendor_debug_wifi_prop)')
+
+# allow hal wifi set interfaces up and down and get the factory MAC
+allow hal_wifi self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+allowxperm hal_wifi self:udp_socket ioctl { SIOCSIFFLAGS SIOCSIFHWADDR SIOCETHTOOL };
+
+allow hal_wifi self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
+# allow hal_wifi to speak to nl80211 in the kernel
+allow hal_wifi self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+# newer kernels (e.g. 4.4 but not 4.1) have a new class for sockets
+allow hal_wifi self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+# hal_wifi writes firmware paths to this file.
+allow hal_wifi sysfs_wlan_fwpath:file { w_file_perms };
+# allow hal_wifi to access /proc/modules to check if Wi-Fi driver is loaded
+allow hal_wifi proc_modules:file { getattr open read };
+# Allow hal_wifi to send dump info to dumpstate
+allow hal_wifi dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+# allow hal_wifi to write into /data/vendor/tombstones/wifi
+allow hal_wifi_server tombstone_wifi_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow hal_wifi_server tombstone_wifi_data_file:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_wifi_hostapd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_wifi_hostapd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12d72b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_wifi_hostapd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_wifi_hostapd_client, hal_wifi_hostapd_server)
+binder_call(hal_wifi_hostapd_server, hal_wifi_hostapd_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_wifi_hostapd, hal_wifi_hostapd_hwservice)
+
+allow hal_wifi_hostapd_server self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
+
+allow hal_wifi_hostapd_server sysfs_net:dir search;
+
+# Allow hal_wifi_hostapd to access /proc/net/psched
+allow hal_wifi_hostapd_server proc_net_type:file { getattr open read };
+
+# Various socket permissions.
+allowxperm hal_wifi_hostapd_server self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+allow hal_wifi_hostapd_server self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow hal_wifi_hostapd_server self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow hal_wifi_hostapd_server self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow hal_wifi_hostapd_server self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# hal_wifi_hostapd should not trust any data from sdcards
+neverallow hal_wifi_hostapd_server sdcard_type:dir ~getattr;
+neverallow hal_wifi_hostapd_server sdcard_type:file *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7361af1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_wifi_supplicant_client, hal_wifi_supplicant_server)
+binder_call(hal_wifi_supplicant_server, hal_wifi_supplicant_client)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_wifi_supplicant, hal_wifi_supplicant_hwservice)
+
+# in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, grant hal_wifi_supplicant priv_sock_ioctls.
+allowxperm hal_wifi_supplicant self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+
+r_dir_file(hal_wifi_supplicant, sysfs_type)
+r_dir_file(hal_wifi_supplicant, proc_net_type)
+
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant kernel:system module_request;
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:global_capability_class_set { setuid net_admin setgid net_raw };
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
+allowxperm hal_wifi_supplicant self:packet_socket ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls priv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
+
+use_keystore(hal_wifi_supplicant)
+binder_use(hal_wifi_supplicant_server)
+
+# Allow the WI-FI HAL to use keys in the keystore namespace wifi_key.
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant wifi_key:keystore2_key {
+    get_info
+    use
+};
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# wpa_supplicant should not trust any data from sdcards
+neverallow hal_wifi_supplicant_server sdcard_type:dir ~getattr;
+neverallow hal_wifi_supplicant_server sdcard_type:file *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/healthd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/healthd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05acb84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/healthd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# healthd - battery/charger monitoring service daemon
+type healthd, domain;
+type healthd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Write to /dev/kmsg
+allow healthd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
+allow healthd sysfs_type:dir search;
+# Allow to read /sys/class/power_supply directory.
+allow healthd sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+r_dir_file(healthd, rootfs)
+r_dir_file(healthd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(healthd, cgroup_v2)
+
+allow healthd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_tty_config };
+allow healthd self:global_capability_class_set sys_boot;
+dontaudit healthd self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
+
+allow healthd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+wakelock_use(healthd)
+
+hal_client_domain(healthd, hal_health)
+
+# Read/write to /sys/power/state
+allow healthd sysfs_power:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# TODO: added to match above sysfs rule. Remove me?
+allow healthd sysfs_usb:file write;
+
+r_dir_file(healthd, sysfs_batteryinfo)
+
+###
+### healthd: charger mode
+###
+
+# Read /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
+# Don't worry about overly broad permissions for now, as there's
+# only one file in /sys/fs/pstore
+allow healthd pstorefs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow healthd pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow healthd graphics_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow healthd graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow healthd input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow healthd input_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow healthd tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow healthd ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
+allow healthd proc_sysrq:file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/heapprofd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/heapprofd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ceb23f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/heapprofd.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type heapprofd, domain, coredomain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hwservice.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hwservice.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..11b77f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hwservice.te
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# hwservice types. By default most of the HALs are protected_hwservice, which means
+# access from untrusted apps is prohibited.
+type default_android_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type fwk_camera_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
+type fwk_display_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
+type fwk_scheduler_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
+type fwk_sensor_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
+type fwk_stats_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
+type fwk_automotive_display_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_atrace_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_audio_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_audiocontrol_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_authsecret_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_bluetooth_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_bootctl_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_broadcastradio_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_camera_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_can_bus_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_can_controller_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_confirmationui_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_contexthub_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_dumpstate_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_evs_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_face_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_fingerprint_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_gatekeeper_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_gnss_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_graphics_composer_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_health_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_health_storage_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_input_classifier_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_ir_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_keymaster_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_light_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_lowpan_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_memtrack_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_nfc_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_oemlock_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_power_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_power_stats_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_secure_element_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_sensors_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_telephony_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_tetheroffload_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_thermal_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_tv_cec_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_tv_input_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_tv_tuner_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_usb_gadget_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_usb_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_vehicle_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_vibrator_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_vr_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_weaver_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_wifi_hostapd_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_wifi_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_wifi_supplicant_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type system_net_netd_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
+type system_suspend_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
+type system_wifi_keystore_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
+
+# Following is the hwservices that are explicitly not marked with protected_hwservice.
+# These are directly accessible from untrusted apps.
+# - same process services: because they by definition run in the process
+#   of the client and thus have the same access as the client domain in which
+#   the process runs
+# - coredomain_hwservice: are considered safer than ordinary hwservices which
+#   are from vendor partition
+# - hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:  becuase it has specifically been
+#   designed for use by any domain.
+# - hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice: because these operations are also offered
+#   by surfaceflinger Binder service, which apps are permitted to access
+# - hal_omx_hwservice: because this is a HwBinder version of the mediacodec
+#   Binder service which apps were permitted to access.
+# - hal_codec2_hwservice: because this is a newer version of hal_omx_hwservice.
+# - hal_drm_hwservice: versions > API 29 are designed specifically with
+#   untrusted app access in mind.
+type fwk_bufferhub_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+type hal_cas_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_codec2_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_drm_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, same_process_hwservice;
+type hal_neuralnetworks_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_omx_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_renderscript_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, same_process_hwservice;
+type hidl_allocator_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+type hidl_base_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hidl_manager_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+type hidl_memory_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+type hidl_token_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice;
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# hwservicemanager handles registering or looking up named services.
+# It does not make sense to register or lookup something which is not a
+# hwservice. Trigger a compile error if this occurs.
+neverallow domain ~hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager { add find };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hwservicemanager.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hwservicemanager.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ec1872
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/hwservicemanager.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# hwservicemanager - the Binder context manager for HAL services
+type hwservicemanager, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type hwservicemanager_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Note that we do not use the binder_* macros here.
+# hwservicemanager provides name service (aka context manager)
+# for hwbinder.
+# Additionally, it initiates binder IPC calls to
+# clients who request service notifications. The permission
+# to do this is granted in the hwbinder_use macro.
+allow hwservicemanager self:binder set_context_mgr;
+
+# Scan through /system/lib64/hw looking for installed HALs
+allow hwservicemanager system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Read hwservice_contexts
+allow hwservicemanager hwservice_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Check SELinux permissions.
+selinux_check_access(hwservicemanager)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/idmap.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/idmap.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f41f573
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/idmap.te
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# idmap, when executed by installd
+type idmap, domain;
+type idmap_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# TODO remove /system/bin/idmap and the link between idmap and installd (b/118711077)
+# Use open file to /data/resource-cache file inherited from installd.
+allow idmap installd:fd use;
+allow idmap resourcecache_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow idmap resourcecache_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+# Ignore reading /proc/<pid>/maps after a fork.
+dontaudit idmap installd:file read;
+
+# Open and read from target and overlay apk files passed by argument.
+allow idmap apk_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow idmap apk_data_file:dir search;
+
+# Allow /data/app/vmdl*.tmp, /data/app-private/vmdl*.tmp files
+allow idmap { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
+allow idmap { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir search;
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/app
+r_dir_file(idmap, vendor_app_file)
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(idmap, vendor_overlay_file)
+
+# Allow the idmap2d binary to register as a service and communicate via AIDL
+binder_use(idmap)
+binder_service(idmap)
+add_service(idmap, idmap_service)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/incident.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/incident.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce57bf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/incident.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The incident command is used to call into the incidentd service to
+# take an incident report (binary, shared bugreport), download incident
+# reports that have already been taken, and monitor for new ones.
+# It doesn't do anything else.
+
+# incident
+type incident, domain;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/incident_helper.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/incident_helper.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bca1018
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/incident_helper.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# The incident_helper is called by incidentd and
+# can only read/write data from/to incidentd
+
+# incident_helper
+type incident_helper, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/incidentd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/incidentd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b03249c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/incidentd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# incidentd
+type incidentd, domain;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/init.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/init.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea5a979
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/init.te
@@ -0,0 +1,659 @@
+# init is its own domain.
+type init, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type init_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type init_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+# /dev/__null__ node created by init.
+allow init tmpfs:chr_file { create setattr unlink rw_file_perms };
+
+#
+# init direct restorecon calls.
+#
+# /dev/kmsg
+allow init tmpfs:chr_file relabelfrom;
+allow init kmsg_device:chr_file { getattr write relabelto };
+# /dev/kmsg_debug
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow init kmsg_debug_device:chr_file { open write relabelto };
+')
+
+# allow init to mount and unmount debugfs in debug builds
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow init debugfs:dir mounton;
+')
+
+# /dev/__properties__
+allow init properties_device:dir relabelto;
+allow init properties_serial:file { write relabelto };
+allow init property_type:file { append create getattr map open read relabelto rename setattr unlink write };
+# /dev/__properties__/property_info
+allow init properties_device:file create_file_perms;
+allow init property_info:file relabelto;
+# /dev/event-log-tags
+allow init device:file relabelfrom;
+allow init runtime_event_log_tags_file:file { open write setattr relabelto create };
+# /dev/socket
+allow init { device socket_device dm_user_device }:dir relabelto;
+# allow init to establish connection and communicate with lmkd
+unix_socket_connect(init, lmkd, lmkd)
+# Relabel /dev nodes created in first stage init, /dev/null, /dev/ptmx, /dev/random, /dev/urandom
+allow init { null_device ptmx_device random_device } : chr_file relabelto;
+# /dev/device-mapper, /dev/block(/.*)?
+allow init tmpfs:{ chr_file blk_file } relabelfrom;
+allow init tmpfs:blk_file getattr;
+allow init block_device:{ dir blk_file lnk_file } relabelto;
+allow init dm_device:{ chr_file blk_file } relabelto;
+allow init dm_user_device:chr_file relabelto;
+allow init kernel:fd use;
+# restorecon for early mount device symlinks
+allow init tmpfs:lnk_file { getattr read relabelfrom };
+allow init {
+  metadata_block_device
+  misc_block_device
+  recovery_block_device
+  system_block_device
+  userdata_block_device
+}:{ blk_file lnk_file } relabelto;
+
+allow init super_block_device:lnk_file relabelto;
+
+# Create /mnt/sdcard -> /storage/self/primary symlink.
+allow init mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file create;
+
+# setrlimit
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
+
+# Remove /dev/.booting and load /debug_ramdisk/* files
+allow init tmpfs:file { getattr unlink };
+
+# Access pty created for fsck.
+allow init devpts:chr_file { read write open };
+
+# Create /dev/fscklogs files.
+allow init fscklogs:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Access /dev/__null__ node created prior to initial policy load.
+allow init tmpfs:chr_file write;
+
+# Access /dev/console.
+allow init console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Access /dev/tty0.
+allow init tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Call mount(2).
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+
+# Call setns(2).
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set sys_chroot;
+
+# Create and mount on directories in /.
+allow init rootfs:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow init {
+    rootfs
+    cache_file
+    cgroup
+    linkerconfig_file
+    storage_file
+    mnt_user_file
+    system_data_file
+    system_data_root_file
+    system_file
+    vendor_file
+    postinstall_mnt_dir
+    mirror_data_file
+}:dir mounton;
+
+# Mount bpf fs on sys/fs/bpf
+allow init fs_bpf:dir mounton;
+
+# Mount on /dev/usb-ffs/adb.
+allow init device:dir mounton;
+
+# Mount tmpfs on /apex
+allow init apex_mnt_dir:dir mounton;
+
+# Bind-mount on /system/apex/com.android.art
+allow init art_apex_dir:dir mounton;
+
+# Create and remove symlinks in /.
+allow init rootfs:lnk_file { create unlink };
+
+# Mount debugfs on /sys/kernel/debug.
+allow init sysfs:dir mounton;
+
+# Create cgroups mount points in tmpfs and mount cgroups on them.
+allow init tmpfs:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow init tmpfs:dir mounton;
+allow init cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow init cgroup:file rw_file_perms;
+allow init cgroup_rc_file:file rw_file_perms;
+allow init cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow init cgroup_desc_api_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow init vendor_cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow init cgroup_v2:dir { mounton create_dir_perms};
+allow init cgroup_v2:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# /config
+allow init configfs:dir mounton;
+allow init configfs:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow init configfs:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms;
+
+# /metadata
+allow init metadata_file:dir mounton;
+
+# Use tmpfs as /data, used for booting when /data is encrypted
+allow init tmpfs:dir relabelfrom;
+
+# Create directories under /dev/cpuctl after chowning it to system.
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
+
+# Set system clock.
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set sys_time;
+
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set { sys_rawio mknod };
+
+# Mounting filesystems from block devices.
+allow init dev_type:blk_file r_file_perms;
+allowxperm init dev_type:blk_file ioctl BLKROSET;
+
+# Mounting filesystems.
+# Only allow relabelto for types used in context= mount options,
+# which should all be assigned the contextmount_type attribute.
+# This can be done in device-specific policy via type or typeattribute
+# declarations.
+allow init {
+  fs_type
+  enforce_debugfs_restriction(`-debugfs_type')
+}:filesystem ~relabelto;
+
+# Allow init to mount/unmount debugfs in non-user builds.
+enforce_debugfs_restriction(`
+  userdebug_or_eng(`allow init debugfs_type:filesystem { mount unmount };')
+')
+
+# Allow init to mount tracefs in /sys/kernel/tracing
+allow init debugfs_tracing_debug:filesystem mount;
+
+allow init unlabeled:filesystem ~relabelto;
+allow init contextmount_type:filesystem relabelto;
+
+# Allow read-only access to context= mounted filesystems.
+allow init contextmount_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow init contextmount_type:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
+
+# restorecon /adb_keys or any other rootfs files and directories to a more
+# specific type.
+allow init rootfs:{ dir file } relabelfrom;
+
+# mkdir, symlink, write, rm/rmdir, chown/chmod, restorecon/restorecon_recursive from init.rc files.
+# chown/chmod require open+read+setattr required for open()+fchown/fchmod().
+# system/core/init.rc requires at least cache_file and data_file_type.
+# init.<board>.rc files often include device-specific types, so
+# we just allow all file types except /system files here.
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set { chown fowner fsetid };
+
+allow init {
+  file_type
+  -app_data_file
+  -exec_type
+  -misc_logd_file
+  -nativetest_data_file
+  -privapp_data_file
+  -system_app_data_file
+  -system_file_type
+  -vendor_file_type
+}:dir { create search getattr open read setattr ioctl };
+
+allow init {
+  file_type
+  -app_data_file
+  -exec_type
+  -iorapd_data_file
+  -credstore_data_file
+  -keystore_data_file
+  -misc_logd_file
+  -nativetest_data_file
+  -privapp_data_file
+  -shell_data_file
+  -system_app_data_file
+  -system_file_type
+  -vendor_file_type
+  -vold_data_file
+}:dir { write add_name remove_name rmdir relabelfrom };
+
+allow init {
+  file_type
+  -apex_info_file
+  -app_data_file
+  -exec_type
+  -gsi_data_file
+  -iorapd_data_file
+  -credstore_data_file
+  -keystore_data_file
+  -misc_logd_file
+  -nativetest_data_file
+  -privapp_data_file
+  -runtime_event_log_tags_file
+  -shell_data_file
+  -system_app_data_file
+  -system_file_type
+  -vendor_file_type
+  -vold_data_file
+  enforce_debugfs_restriction(`-debugfs_type')
+}:file { create getattr open read write setattr relabelfrom unlink map };
+
+allow init tracefs_type:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
+
+allow init {
+  file_type
+  -app_data_file
+  -exec_type
+  -gsi_data_file
+  -iorapd_data_file
+  -credstore_data_file
+  -keystore_data_file
+  -misc_logd_file
+  -nativetest_data_file
+  -privapp_data_file
+  -shell_data_file
+  -system_app_data_file
+  -system_file_type
+  -vendor_file_type
+  -vold_data_file
+}:{ sock_file fifo_file } { create getattr open read setattr relabelfrom unlink };
+
+allow init {
+  file_type
+  -apex_mnt_dir
+  -app_data_file
+  -exec_type
+  -gsi_data_file
+  -iorapd_data_file
+  -credstore_data_file
+  -keystore_data_file
+  -misc_logd_file
+  -nativetest_data_file
+  -privapp_data_file
+  -shell_data_file
+  -system_app_data_file
+  -system_file_type
+  -vendor_file_type
+  -vold_data_file
+}:lnk_file { create getattr setattr relabelfrom unlink };
+
+allow init cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+allow init {
+  file_type
+  -system_file_type
+  -vendor_file_type
+  -exec_type
+  -app_data_file
+  -privapp_data_file
+}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
+
+allow init { sysfs no_debugfs_restriction(`debugfs') debugfs_tracing debugfs_tracing_debug }:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr relabelfrom };
+allow init { sysfs_type no_debugfs_restriction(`debugfs_type') tracefs_type }:{ dir file lnk_file } { relabelto getattr };
+allow init dev_type:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow init dev_type:lnk_file create;
+
+# Disable tracing by writing to /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on
+allow init debugfs_tracing:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Setup and control wifi event tracing (see wifi-events.rc)
+allow init debugfs_tracing_instances:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow init debugfs_tracing_instances:file w_file_perms;
+allow init debugfs_wifi_tracing:file w_file_perms;
+
+# chown/chmod on pseudo files.
+allow init {
+  fs_type
+  -contextmount_type
+  -keychord_device
+  -proc_type
+  -sdcard_type
+  -sysfs_type
+  -rootfs
+  enforce_debugfs_restriction(`-debugfs_type')
+}:file { open read setattr };
+allow init { fs_type -contextmount_type -sdcard_type -rootfs }:dir  { open read setattr search };
+
+allow init {
+  binder_device
+  console_device
+  devpts
+  dm_device
+  hwbinder_device
+  input_device
+  kmsg_device
+  null_device
+  owntty_device
+  pmsg_device
+  ptmx_device
+  random_device
+  tty_device
+  zero_device
+}:chr_file { read open };
+
+# Unlabeled file access for upgrades from 4.2.
+allow init unlabeled:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
+allow init unlabeled:notdevfile_class_set { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
+
+# Any operation that can modify the kernel ring buffer, e.g. clear
+# or a read that consumes the messages that were read.
+allow init kernel:system syslog_mod;
+allow init self:global_capability2_class_set syslog;
+
+# init access to /proc.
+r_dir_file(init, proc_net_type)
+allow init proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # Overlayfs workdir write access check during mount to permit remount,rw
+  allow init overlayfs_file:dir { relabelfrom mounton write };
+  allow init overlayfs_file:file { append };
+  allow init system_block_device:blk_file { write };
+')
+
+allow init {
+  proc # b/67049235 processes /proc/<pid>/* files are mislabeled.
+  proc_bootconfig
+  proc_cmdline
+  proc_diskstats
+  proc_kmsg # Open /proc/kmsg for logd service.
+  proc_meminfo
+  proc_stat # Read /proc/stat for bootchart.
+  proc_uptime
+  proc_version
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow init {
+  proc_abi
+  proc_dirty
+  proc_hostname
+  proc_hung_task
+  proc_extra_free_kbytes
+  proc_net_type
+  proc_max_map_count
+  proc_min_free_order_shift
+  proc_overcommit_memory      # /proc/sys/vm/overcommit_memory
+  proc_panic
+  proc_page_cluster
+  proc_perf
+  proc_sched
+  proc_sysrq
+}:file w_file_perms;
+
+allow init {
+  proc_security
+}:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# init chmod/chown access to /proc files.
+allow init {
+  proc_cmdline
+  proc_bootconfig
+  proc_kmsg
+  proc_net
+  proc_pagetypeinfo
+  proc_qtaguid_stat
+  proc_slabinfo
+  proc_sysrq
+  proc_qtaguid_ctrl
+  proc_vmallocinfo
+}:file setattr;
+
+# init access to /sys files.
+allow init {
+  sysfs_android_usb
+  sysfs_dm_verity
+  sysfs_leds
+  sysfs_power
+  sysfs_fs_f2fs
+  sysfs_dm
+}:file w_file_perms;
+
+allow init {
+  sysfs_dt_firmware_android
+  sysfs_fs_ext4_features
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow init {
+  sysfs_zram
+}:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# allow init to create loop devices with /dev/loop-control
+allow init loop_control_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow init loop_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm init loop_device:blk_file ioctl {
+  LOOP_SET_FD
+  LOOP_CLR_FD
+  LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE
+  LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE
+  LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO
+  LOOP_GET_STATUS
+};
+
+# Allow init to write to vibrator/trigger
+allow init sysfs_vibrator:file w_file_perms;
+
+# init chmod/chown access to /sys files.
+allow init {
+  sysfs_android_usb
+  sysfs_devices_system_cpu
+  sysfs_ipv4
+  sysfs_leds
+  sysfs_lowmemorykiller
+  sysfs_power
+  sysfs_vibrator
+  sysfs_wake_lock
+  sysfs_zram
+}:file setattr;
+
+# Set usermodehelpers.
+allow init { usermodehelper sysfs_usermodehelper }:file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
+
+# Reboot.
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set sys_boot;
+
+# Init will create /data/misc/logd when the property persist.logd.logpersistd is "logcatd".
+# Init will also walk through the directory as part of a recursive restorecon.
+allow init misc_logd_file:dir { add_name open create read getattr setattr search write };
+allow init misc_logd_file:file { open create getattr setattr write };
+
+# Support "adb shell stop"
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set kill;
+allow init domain:process { getpgid sigkill signal };
+
+# Init creates credstore's directory on boot, and walks through
+# the directory as part of a recursive restorecon.
+allow init credstore_data_file:dir { open create read getattr setattr search };
+allow init credstore_data_file:file { getattr };
+
+# Init creates keystore's directory on boot, and walks through
+# the directory as part of a recursive restorecon.
+allow init keystore_data_file:dir { open create read getattr setattr search };
+allow init keystore_data_file:file { getattr };
+
+# Init creates vold's directory on boot, and walks through
+# the directory as part of a recursive restorecon.
+allow init vold_data_file:dir { open create read getattr setattr search };
+allow init vold_data_file:file { getattr };
+
+# Init creates /data/local/tmp at boot
+allow init shell_data_file:dir { open create read getattr setattr search };
+allow init shell_data_file:file { getattr };
+
+# Set UID, GID, and adjust capability bounding set for services.
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid setpcap };
+
+# For bootchart to read the /proc/$pid/cmdline file of each process,
+# we need to have following line to allow init to have access
+# to different domains.
+r_dir_file(init, domain)
+
+# Use setexeccon(), setfscreatecon(), and setsockcreatecon().
+# setexec is for services with seclabel options.
+# setfscreate is for labeling directories and socket files.
+# setsockcreate is for labeling local/unix domain sockets.
+allow init self:process { setexec setfscreate setsockcreate };
+
+# Get file context
+allow init file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# sepolicy access
+allow init sepolicy_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Perform SELinux access checks on setting properties.
+selinux_check_access(init)
+
+# Ask the kernel for the new context on services to label their sockets.
+allow init kernel:security compute_create;
+
+# Create sockets for the services.
+allow init domain:unix_stream_socket { create bind setopt };
+allow init domain:unix_dgram_socket { create bind setopt };
+
+# Create /data/property and files within it.
+allow init property_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow init property_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Set any property.
+allow init property_type:property_service set;
+
+# Send an SELinux userspace denial to the kernel audit subsystem,
+# so it can be picked up and processed by logd. These denials are
+# generated when an attempt to set a property is denied by policy.
+allow init self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_relay };
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set audit_write;
+
+# Run "ifup lo" to bring up the localhost interface
+allow init self:udp_socket { create ioctl };
+# in addition to unpriv ioctls granted to all domains, init also needs:
+allowxperm init self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCSIFFLAGS;
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set net_raw;
+
+# Set scheduling info for psi monitor thread.
+# TODO: delete or revise this line b/131761776
+allow init kernel:process { getsched setsched };
+
+# swapon() needs write access to swap device
+# system/core/fs_mgr/fs_mgr.c - fs_mgr_swapon_all
+allow init swap_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Create and access /dev files without a specific type,
+# e.g. /dev/.coldboot_done, /dev/.booting
+# TODO:  Move these files into their own type unless they are
+# only ever accessed by init.
+allow init device:file create_file_perms;
+
+# keychord retrieval from /dev/input/ devices
+allow init input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow init input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Access device mapper for setting up dm-verity
+allow init dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow init dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Access dm-user for OTA boot
+allow init dm_user_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Access metadata block device for storing dm-verity state
+allow init metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Read /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops to detect restarts caused
+# by dm-verity detecting corrupted blocks
+allow init pstorefs:dir search;
+allow init pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+allow init kernel:system syslog_read;
+
+# linux keyring configuration
+allow init init:key { write search setattr };
+
+# Allow init to create /data/unencrypted
+allow init unencrypted_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+# Set encryption policy on dirs in /data
+allowxperm init { data_file_type unlabeled }:dir ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
+  FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
+};
+
+# Raw writes to misc block device
+allow init misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(init, system_file)
+r_dir_file(init, vendor_file_type)
+
+allow init system_data_file:file { getattr read };
+allow init system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# For init to be able to run shell scripts from vendor
+allow init vendor_shell_exec:file execute;
+
+# Metadata setup
+allow init vold_metadata_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow init vold_metadata_file:file getattr;
+allow init metadata_bootstat_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow init metadata_bootstat_file:file w_file_perms;
+allow init userspace_reboot_metadata_file:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Allow init to touch PSI monitors
+allow init proc_pressure_mem:file { rw_file_perms setattr };
+
+# init is using bootstrap bionic
+allow init system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow init system_bootstrap_lib_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# stat the root dir of fuse filesystems (for the mount handler)
+allow init fuse:dir { search getattr };
+
+# allow filesystem tuning
+allow init userdata_sysdev:file create_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# The init domain is only entered via an exec based transition from the
+# kernel domain, never via setcon().
+neverallow domain init:process dyntransition;
+neverallow { domain -kernel } init:process transition;
+neverallow init { file_type fs_type -init_exec }:file entrypoint;
+
+# Never read/follow symlinks created by shell or untrusted apps.
+neverallow init shell_data_file:lnk_file read;
+neverallow init { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:lnk_file read;
+
+# init should never execute a program without changing to another domain.
+neverallow init { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The use of sensitive environment variables, such as LD_PRELOAD, is disallowed
+# when init is executing other binaries. The use of LD_PRELOAD for init spawned
+# services is generally considered a no-no, as it injects libraries which the
+# binary was not expecting. This is especially problematic for APEXes. The use
+# of LD_PRELOAD via APEXes is a layering violation, and inappropriately loads
+# code into a process which wasn't expecting that code, with potentially
+# unexpected side effects. (b/140789528)
+neverallow init *:process noatsecure;
+
+# init can never add binder services
+neverallow init service_manager_type:service_manager { add find };
+# init can never list binder services
+neverallow init servicemanager:service_manager list;
+
+# Init should not be creating subdirectories in /data/local/tmp
+neverallow init shell_data_file:dir { write add_name remove_name };
+
+# Init should not access sysfs node that are not explicitly labeled.
+neverallow init sysfs:file { open read write };
+
+# No domain should be allowed to ptrace init.
+neverallow * init:process ptrace;
+
+# init owns the root of /data
+# TODO(b/140259336) We want to remove vendor_init
+# TODO(b/141108496) We want to remove toolbox
+neverallow { domain -init -toolbox -vendor_init -vold } system_data_root_file:dir { write add_name remove_name };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/inputflinger.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/inputflinger.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b62c06d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/inputflinger.te
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# inputflinger
+type inputflinger, domain;
+type inputflinger_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+binder_use(inputflinger)
+binder_service(inputflinger)
+
+binder_call(inputflinger, system_server)
+
+wakelock_use(inputflinger)
+
+allow inputflinger input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow inputflinger input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(inputflinger, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(inputflinger, cgroup_v2)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/installd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/installd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb13cfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/installd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+# installer daemon
+type installd, domain;
+type installd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+typeattribute installd mlstrustedsubject;
+allow installd self:global_capability_class_set { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid setgid setuid sys_admin };
+
+# Allow labeling of files under /data/app/com.example/oat/
+allow installd dalvikcache_data_file:dir relabelto;
+allow installd dalvikcache_data_file:file { relabelto link };
+
+# Allow movement of APK files between volumes
+allow installd apk_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
+allow installd apk_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom link };
+allow installd apk_data_file:lnk_file { create r_file_perms unlink };
+
+# FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY and FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY (or in old implementation used in installd,
+# FS_IOC_SET_VERITY_MEASUREMENT) ioctls on APKs in /data/app, to support fsverity.
+# TODO(b/120629632): this path is deprecated, remove when possible.
+allowxperm installd apk_data_file:file ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY
+};
+
+allow installd asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow installd apk_tmp_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+allow installd apk_tmp_file:dir { relabelfrom create_dir_perms };
+allow installd oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow installd oemfs:file r_file_perms;
+allow installd cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow installd cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow installd mnt_expand_file:dir { search getattr };
+# Check validity of SELinux context before use.
+selinux_check_context(installd)
+
+r_dir_file(installd, rootfs)
+# Scan through APKs in /system/app and /system/priv-app
+r_dir_file(installd, system_file)
+# Scan through APKs in /vendor/app
+r_dir_file(installd, vendor_app_file)
+# Scan through JARs in /vendor/framework
+r_dir_file(installd, vendor_framework_file)
+# Scan through Runtime Resource Overlay APKs in /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(installd, vendor_overlay_file)
+# Get file context
+allow installd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+# Get seapp_context
+allow installd seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Search /data/app-asec and stat files in it.
+allow installd asec_image_file:dir search;
+allow installd asec_image_file:file getattr;
+
+# Create /data/user and /data/user/0 if necessary.
+# Also required to initially create /data/data subdirectories
+# and lib symlinks before the setfilecon call.  May want to
+# move symlink creation after setfilecon in installd.
+allow installd system_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+# Also, allow read for lnk_file so that we can process /data/user/0 links when
+# optimizing application code.
+allow installd system_data_file:lnk_file { create getattr read setattr unlink };
+
+# Manage lower filesystem via pass_through mounts
+allow installd mnt_pass_through_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Upgrade /data/media for multi-user if necessary.
+allow installd media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow installd media_rw_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
+# restorecon new /data/media directory.
+allow installd system_data_file:dir relabelfrom;
+allow installd media_rw_data_file:dir relabelto;
+
+# Delete /data/media files through sdcardfs, instead of going behind its back
+allow installd tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow installd storage_file:dir search;
+allow installd sdcard_type:dir { search open read write remove_name getattr rmdir };
+allow installd sdcard_type:file { getattr unlink };
+
+# Create app's mirror data directory in /data_mirror, and bind mount the real directory to it
+allow installd mirror_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+
+# Upgrade /data/misc/keychain for multi-user if necessary.
+allow installd misc_user_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow installd misc_user_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow installd keychain_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow installd keychain_data_file:file {r_file_perms unlink};
+
+# Create /data/misc/installd/layout_version.* file
+allow installd install_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow installd install_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+# Create files under /data/dalvik-cache.
+allow installd dalvikcache_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow installd dalvikcache_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow installd dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file getattr;
+
+# Create files under /data/resource-cache.
+allow installd resourcecache_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow installd resourcecache_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Upgrade from unlabeled userdata.
+# Just need enough to remove and/or relabel it.
+allow installd unlabeled:dir { getattr search relabelfrom rw_dir_perms rmdir };
+allow installd unlabeled:notdevfile_class_set { getattr relabelfrom rename unlink setattr };
+# Read pkg.apk file for input during dexopt.
+allow installd unlabeled:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Upgrade from before system_app_data_file was used for system UID apps.
+# Just need enough to relabel it and to unlink removed package files.
+# Directory access covered by earlier rule above.
+allow installd system_data_file:notdevfile_class_set { getattr relabelfrom unlink };
+
+# Manage /data/data subdirectories, including initially labeling them
+# upon creation via setfilecon or running restorecon_recursive,
+# setting owner/mode, creating symlinks within them, and deleting them
+# upon package uninstall.
+allow installd app_data_file_type:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
+allow installd app_data_file_type:notdevfile_class_set { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
+
+# Similar for the files under /data/misc/profiles/
+allow installd user_profile_root_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
+allow installd user_profile_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow installd user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow installd user_profile_data_file:file unlink;
+
+# Allow zygote to unmount mirror directories
+allow installd labeledfs:filesystem unmount;
+
+# Files created/updated by profman dumps.
+allow installd profman_dump_data_file:dir { search add_name write };
+allow installd profman_dump_data_file:file { create setattr open write };
+
+# Create and use pty created by android_fork_execvp().
+allow installd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# execute toybox for app relocation
+allow installd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow installd to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
+binder_use(installd)
+add_service(installd, installd_service)
+allow installd dumpstate:fifo_file  { getattr write };
+
+# Allow installd to call into the system server so it can check permissions.
+binder_call(installd, system_server)
+allow installd permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow installd to read and write quotas
+allow installd block_device:dir { search };
+allow installd labeledfs:filesystem { quotaget quotamod };
+
+# Allow installd to delete from /data/preloads when trimming data caches
+# TODO b/34690396 Remove when time-based purge policy for preloads is implemented in system_server
+allow installd preloads_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+allow installd preloads_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name rmdir };
+allow installd preloads_media_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+allow installd preloads_media_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name rmdir };
+
+# Allow installd to read /proc/filesystems
+allow installd proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
+
+#add for move app to sd card
+get_prop(installd, storage_config_prop)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# only system_server, installd, dumpstate, and servicemanager may interact with installd over binder
+neverallow { domain -system_server -dumpstate -installd } installd_service:service_manager find;
+neverallow { domain -system_server -dumpstate -servicemanager } installd:binder call;
+neverallow installd {
+    domain
+    -system_server
+    -servicemanager
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+}:binder call;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ioctl_defines b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ioctl_defines
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ac4d94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ioctl_defines
@@ -0,0 +1,2751 @@
+define(`ADD_NEW_DISK', `0x40140921')
+define(`ADV7842_CMD_RAM_TEST', `0x000056c0')
+define(`AGPIOC_ACQUIRE', `0x00004101')
+define(`AGPIOC_ALLOCATE', `0xc0084106')
+define(`AGPIOC_BIND', `0x40084108')
+define(`AGPIOC_CHIPSET_FLUSH', `0x0000410a')
+define(`AGPIOC_DEALLOCATE', `0x40044107')
+define(`AGPIOC_INFO', `0x80084100')
+define(`AGPIOC_PROTECT', `0x40084105')
+define(`AGPIOC_RELEASE', `0x00004102')
+define(`AGPIOC_RESERVE', `0x40084104')
+define(`AGPIOC_SETUP', `0x40084103')
+define(`AGPIOC_UNBIND', `0x40084109')
+define(`AMDKFD_IOC_CREATE_QUEUE', `0xc0584b02')
+define(`AMDKFD_IOC_DESTROY_QUEUE', `0xc0084b03')
+define(`AMDKFD_IOC_GET_CLOCK_COUNTERS', `0xc0284b05')
+define(`AMDKFD_IOC_GET_PROCESS_APERTURES', `0x81904b06')
+define(`AMDKFD_IOC_GET_VERSION', `0x80084b01')
+define(`AMDKFD_IOC_SET_MEMORY_POLICY', `0x40204b04')
+define(`AMDKFD_IOC_UPDATE_QUEUE', `0x40184b07')
+define(`ANDROID_ALARM_SET_RTC', `0x40106105')
+define(`ANDROID_ALARM_WAIT', `0x00006101')
+define(`APEI_ERST_CLEAR_RECORD', `0x40084501')
+define(`APEI_ERST_GET_RECORD_COUNT', `0x80044502')
+define(`APM_IOC_STANDBY', `0x00004101')
+define(`APM_IOC_SUSPEND', `0x00004102')
+define(`ASHMEM_GET_NAME', `0x81007702')
+define(`ASHMEM_GET_PIN_STATUS', `0x00007709')
+define(`ASHMEM_GET_PROT_MASK', `0x00007706')
+define(`ASHMEM_GET_SIZE', `0x00007704')
+define(`ASHMEM_PIN', `0x40087707')
+define(`ASHMEM_PURGE_ALL_CACHES', `0x0000770a')
+define(`ASHMEM_SET_NAME', `0x41007701')
+define(`ASHMEM_SET_PROT_MASK', `0x40087705')
+define(`ASHMEM_SET_SIZE', `0x40087703')
+define(`ASHMEM_UNPIN', `0x40087708')
+define(`ATM_ADDADDR', `0x40106188')
+define(`ATM_ADDLECSADDR', `0x4010618e')
+define(`ATM_ADDPARTY', `0x401061f4')
+define(`ATMARPD_CTRL', `0x000061e1')
+define(`ATMARP_ENCAP', `0x000061e5')
+define(`ATMARP_MKIP', `0x000061e2')
+define(`ATMARP_SETENTRY', `0x000061e3')
+define(`ATM_DELADDR', `0x40106189')
+define(`ATM_DELLECSADDR', `0x4010618f')
+define(`ATM_DROPPARTY', `0x400461f5')
+define(`ATM_GETADDR', `0x40106186')
+define(`ATM_GETCIRANGE', `0x4010618a')
+define(`ATM_GETESI', `0x40106185')
+define(`ATM_GETLECSADDR', `0x40106190')
+define(`ATM_GETLINKRATE', `0x40106181')
+define(`ATM_GETLOOP', `0x40106152')
+define(`ATM_GETNAMES', `0x40106183')
+define(`ATM_GETSTAT', `0x40106150')
+define(`ATM_GETSTATZ', `0x40106151')
+define(`ATM_GETTYPE', `0x40106184')
+define(`ATMLEC_CTRL', `0x000061d0')
+define(`ATMLEC_DATA', `0x000061d1')
+define(`ATMLEC_MCAST', `0x000061d2')
+define(`ATMMPC_CTRL', `0x000061d8')
+define(`ATMMPC_DATA', `0x000061d9')
+define(`ATM_NEWBACKENDIF', `0x400261f3')
+define(`ATM_QUERYLOOP', `0x40106154')
+define(`ATM_RSTADDR', `0x40106187')
+define(`ATM_SETBACKEND', `0x400261f2')
+define(`ATM_SETCIRANGE', `0x4010618b')
+define(`ATM_SETESI', `0x4010618c')
+define(`ATM_SETESIF', `0x4010618d')
+define(`ATM_SETLOOP', `0x40106153')
+define(`ATM_SETSC', `0x400461f1')
+define(`ATMSIGD_CTRL', `0x000061f0')
+define(`ATMTCP_CREATE', `0x0000618e')
+define(`ATMTCP_REMOVE', `0x0000618f')
+define(`AUDIO_BILINGUAL_CHANNEL_SELECT', `0x00006f14')
+define(`AUDIO_CHANNEL_SELECT', `0x00006f09')
+define(`AUDIO_CLEAR_BUFFER', `0x00006f0c')
+define(`AUDIO_CONTINUE', `0x00006f04')
+define(`AUDIO_GET_CAPABILITIES', `0x80046f0b')
+define(`AUDIO_GET_PTS', `0x80086f13')
+define(`AUDIO_GET_STATUS', `0x80206f0a')
+define(`AUDIO_PAUSE', `0x00006f03')
+define(`AUDIO_PLAY', `0x00006f02')
+define(`AUDIO_SELECT_SOURCE', `0x00006f05')
+define(`AUDIO_SET_ATTRIBUTES', `0x40026f11')
+define(`AUDIO_SET_AV_SYNC', `0x00006f07')
+define(`AUDIO_SET_BYPASS_MODE', `0x00006f08')
+define(`AUDIO_SET_EXT_ID', `0x00006f10')
+define(`AUDIO_SET_ID', `0x00006f0d')
+define(`AUDIO_SET_KARAOKE', `0x400c6f12')
+define(`AUDIO_SET_MIXER', `0x40086f0e')
+define(`AUDIO_SET_MUTE', `0x00006f06')
+define(`AUDIO_SET_STREAMTYPE', `0x00006f0f')
+define(`AUDIO_STOP', `0x00006f01')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_ASKUMOUNT', `0xc018937d')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_CATATONIC', `0xc0189379')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_CLOSEMOUNT', `0xc0189375')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_EXPIRE', `0xc018937c')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_FAIL', `0xc0189377')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_ISMOUNTPOINT', `0xc018937e')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_OPENMOUNT', `0xc0189374')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_PROTOSUBVER', `0xc0189373')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_PROTOVER', `0xc0189372')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_READY', `0xc0189376')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_REQUESTER', `0xc018937b')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_SETPIPEFD', `0xc0189378')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_TIMEOUT', `0xc018937a')
+define(`AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_VERSION', `0xc0189371')
+define(`AUTOFS_IOC_ASKUMOUNT', `0x80049370')
+define(`AUTOFS_IOC_CATATONIC', `0x00009362')
+define(`AUTOFS_IOC_EXPIRE', `0x810c9365')
+define(`AUTOFS_IOC_EXPIRE_MULTI', `0x40049366')
+define(`AUTOFS_IOC_FAIL', `0x00009361')
+define(`AUTOFS_IOC_PROTOSUBVER', `0x80049367')
+define(`AUTOFS_IOC_PROTOVER', `0x80049363')
+define(`AUTOFS_IOC_READY', `0x00009360')
+define(`AUTOFS_IOC_SETTIMEOUT', `0xc0089364')
+define(`AUTOFS_IOC_SETTIMEOUT32', `0xc0049364')
+define(`BC_ACQUIRE', `0x40046305')
+define(`BC_ACQUIRE_DONE', `0x40106309')
+define(`BC_ACQUIRE_RESULT', `0x40046302')
+define(`BC_ATTEMPT_ACQUIRE', `0x4008630a')
+define(`BC_CLEAR_DEATH_NOTIFICATION', `0x400c630f')
+define(`BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE', `0x40086310')
+define(`BC_DECREFS', `0x40046307')
+define(`BC_ENTER_LOOPER', `0x0000630c')
+define(`BC_EXIT_LOOPER', `0x0000630d')
+define(`BC_FREE_BUFFER', `0x40086303')
+define(`BC_INCREFS', `0x40046304')
+define(`BC_INCREFS_DONE', `0x40106308')
+define(`BC_REGISTER_LOOPER', `0x0000630b')
+define(`BC_RELEASE', `0x40046306')
+define(`BC_REPLY', `0x40406301')
+define(`BC_REQUEST_DEATH_NOTIFICATION', `0x400c630e')
+define(`BC_TRANSACTION', `0x40406300')
+define(`BINDER_ENABLE_ONEWAY_SPAM_DETECTION', `0x40046210')
+define(`BINDER_FREEZE', `0x400c620e')
+define(`BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO', `0xc00c620f')
+define(`BINDER_GET_NODE_DEBUG_INFO', `0xc018620b')
+define(`BINDER_GET_NODE_INFO_FOR_REF', `0xc018620c')
+define(`BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR', `0x40046207')
+define(`BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR_EXT', `0x4018620d')
+define(`BINDER_SET_IDLE_PRIORITY', `0x40046206')
+define(`BINDER_SET_IDLE_TIMEOUT', `0x40086203')
+define(`BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS', `0x40046205')
+define(`BINDER_THREAD_EXIT', `0x40046208')
+define(`BINDER_VERSION', `0xc0046209')
+define(`BINDER_WRITE_READ', `0xc0306201')
+define(`BLKALIGNOFF', `0x0000127a')
+define(`BLKBSZGET', `0x80081270')
+define(`BLKBSZSET', `0x40081271')
+define(`BLKDISCARD', `0x00001277')
+define(`BLKDISCARDZEROES', `0x0000127c')
+define(`BLKFLSBUF', `0x00001261')
+define(`BLKFRAGET', `0x00001265')
+define(`BLKFRASET', `0x00001264')
+define(`BLKGETSIZE', `0x00001260')
+define(`BLKGETSIZE64', `0x80081272')
+define(`BLKI2OGRSTRAT', `0x80043201')
+define(`BLKI2OGWSTRAT', `0x80043202')
+define(`BLKI2OSRSTRAT', `0x40043203')
+define(`BLKI2OSWSTRAT', `0x40043204')
+define(`BLKIOMIN', `0x00001278')
+define(`BLKIOOPT', `0x00001279')
+define(`BLKPBSZGET', `0x0000127b')
+define(`BLKPG', `0x00001269')
+define(`BLKRAGET', `0x00001263')
+define(`BLKRASET', `0x00001262')
+define(`BLKROGET', `0x0000125e')
+define(`BLKROSET', `0x0000125d')
+define(`BLKROTATIONAL', `0x0000127e')
+define(`BLKRRPART', `0x0000125f')
+define(`BLKSECDISCARD', `0x0000127d')
+define(`BLKSECTGET', `0x00001267')
+define(`BLKSECTSET', `0x00001266')
+define(`BLKSSZGET', `0x00001268')
+define(`BLKTRACESETUP', `0xc0481273')
+define(`BLKTRACESTART', `0x00001274')
+define(`BLKTRACESTOP', `0x00001275')
+define(`BLKTRACETEARDOWN', `0x00001276')
+define(`BLKZEROOUT', `0x0000127f')
+define(`BR2684_SETFILT', `0x401c6190')
+define(`BR_ACQUIRE', `0x80107208')
+define(`BR_ACQUIRE_RESULT', `0x80047204')
+define(`BR_ATTEMPT_ACQUIRE', `0x8018720b')
+define(`BR_CLEAR_DEATH_NOTIFICATION_DONE', `0x80087210')
+define(`BR_DEAD_BINDER', `0x8008720f')
+define(`BR_DEAD_REPLY', `0x00007205')
+define(`BR_DECREFS', `0x8010720a')
+define(`BR_ERROR', `0x80047200')
+define(`BR_FAILED_REPLY', `0x00007211')
+define(`BR_FINISHED', `0x0000720e')
+define(`BR_INCREFS', `0x80107207')
+define(`BR_NOOP', `0x0000720c')
+define(`BR_OK', `0x00007201')
+define(`BR_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT', `0x00007213')
+define(`BR_RELEASE', `0x80107209')
+define(`BR_REPLY', `0x80407203')
+define(`BR_SPAWN_LOOPER', `0x0000720d')
+define(`BR_TRANSACTION', `0x80407202')
+define(`BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE', `0x00007206')
+define(`BT819_FIFO_RESET_HIGH', `0x00006201')
+define(`BT819_FIFO_RESET_LOW', `0x00006200')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_ADD_DEV', `0x5000940a')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_BALANCE', `0x5000940c')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_BALANCE_CTL', `0x40049421')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_BALANCE_PROGRESS', `0x84009422')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_BALANCE_V2', `0xc4009420')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_CLONE', `0x40049409')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_CLONE_RANGE', `0x4020940d')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_DEFAULT_SUBVOL', `0x40089413')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_DEFRAG', `0x50009402')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_DEFRAG_RANGE', `0x40309410')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_DEVICES_READY', `0x90009427')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_DEV_INFO', `0xd000941e')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_DEV_REPLACE', `0xca289435')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_FILE_EXTENT_SAME', `0xc0189436')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_FS_INFO', `0x8400941f')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_GET_DEV_STATS', `0xc4089434')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_GET_FEATURES', `0x80189439')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_GET_FSLABEL', `0x81009431')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUPPORTED_FEATURES', `0x80489439')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_INO_LOOKUP', `0xd0009412')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_INO_PATHS', `0xc0389423')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_LOGICAL_INO', `0xc0389424')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_QGROUP_ASSIGN', `0x40189429')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_QGROUP_CREATE', `0x4010942a')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_QGROUP_LIMIT', `0x8030942b')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_QUOTA_CTL', `0xc0109428')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_QUOTA_RESCAN', `0x4040942c')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_QUOTA_RESCAN_STATUS', `0x8040942d')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_QUOTA_RESCAN_WAIT', `0x0000942e')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_RESIZE', `0x50009403')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_RM_DEV', `0x5000940b')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SCAN_DEV', `0x50009404')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SCRUB', `0xc400941b')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SCRUB_CANCEL', `0x0000941c')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SCRUB_PROGRESS', `0xc400941d')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SEND', `0x40489426')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SET_FEATURES', `0x40309439')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SET_FSLABEL', `0x41009432')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SET_RECEIVED_SUBVOL', `0xc0c89425')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SNAP_CREATE', `0x50009401')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SNAP_CREATE_V2', `0x50009417')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SNAP_DESTROY', `0x5000940f')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SPACE_INFO', `0xc0109414')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_START_SYNC', `0x80089418')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SUBVOL_CREATE', `0x5000940e')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SUBVOL_CREATE_V2', `0x50009418')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SUBVOL_GETFLAGS', `0x80089419')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SUBVOL_SETFLAGS', `0x4008941a')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_SYNC', `0x00009408')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_TRANS_END', `0x00009407')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_TRANS_START', `0x00009406')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_TREE_SEARCH', `0xd0009411')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_TREE_SEARCH_V2', `0xc0709411')
+define(`BTRFS_IOC_WAIT_SYNC', `0x40089416')
+define(`CA_GET_CAP', `0x80106f81')
+define(`CA_GET_DESCR_INFO', `0x80086f83')
+define(`CA_GET_MSG', `0x810c6f84')
+define(`CA_GET_SLOT_INFO', `0x800c6f82')
+define(`CAPI_CLR_FLAGS', `0x80044325')
+define(`CAPI_GET_ERRCODE', `0x80024321')
+define(`CAPI_GET_FLAGS', `0x80044323')
+define(`CAPI_GET_MANUFACTURER', `0xc0044306')
+define(`CAPI_GET_PROFILE', `0xc0404309')
+define(`CAPI_GET_SERIAL', `0xc0044308')
+define(`CAPI_GET_VERSION', `0xc0104307')
+define(`CAPI_INSTALLED', `0x80024322')
+define(`CAPI_MANUFACTURER_CMD', `0xc0104320')
+define(`CAPI_NCCI_GETUNIT', `0x80044327')
+define(`CAPI_NCCI_OPENCOUNT', `0x80044326')
+define(`CAPI_REGISTER', `0x400c4301')
+define(`CAPI_SET_FLAGS', `0x80044324')
+define(`CA_RESET', `0x00006f80')
+define(`CA_SEND_MSG', `0x410c6f85')
+define(`CA_SET_DESCR', `0x40106f86')
+define(`CA_SET_PID', `0x40086f87')
+define(`CCISS_BIG_PASSTHRU', `0xc0604212')
+define(`CCISS_DEREGDISK', `0x0000420c')
+define(`CCISS_GETBUSTYPES', `0x80044207')
+define(`CCISS_GETDRIVVER', `0x80044209')
+define(`CCISS_GETFIRMVER', `0x80044208')
+define(`CCISS_GETHEARTBEAT', `0x80044206')
+define(`CCISS_GETINTINFO', `0x80084202')
+define(`CCISS_GETLUNINFO', `0x800c4211')
+define(`CCISS_GETNODENAME', `0x80104204')
+define(`CCISS_GETPCIINFO', `0x80084201')
+define(`CCISS_PASSTHRU', `0xc058420b')
+define(`CCISS_REGNEWD', `0x0000420e')
+define(`CCISS_REGNEWDISK', `0x4004420d')
+define(`CCISS_RESCANDISK', `0x00004210')
+define(`CCISS_REVALIDVOLS', `0x0000420a')
+define(`CCISS_SETINTINFO', `0x40084203')
+define(`CCISS_SETNODENAME', `0x40104205')
+define(`CDROMAUDIOBUFSIZ', `0x00005382')
+define(`CDROM_CHANGER_NSLOTS', `0x00005328')
+define(`CDROM_CLEAR_OPTIONS', `0x00005321')
+define(`CDROMCLOSETRAY', `0x00005319')
+define(`CDROM_DEBUG', `0x00005330')
+define(`CDROM_DISC_STATUS', `0x00005327')
+define(`CDROM_DRIVE_STATUS', `0x00005326')
+define(`CDROMEJECT', `0x00005309')
+define(`CDROMEJECT_SW', `0x0000530f')
+define(`CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY', `0x00005331')
+define(`CDROM_GET_MCN', `0x00005311')
+define(`CDROMGETSPINDOWN', `0x0000531d')
+define(`CDROM_LAST_WRITTEN', `0x00005395')
+define(`CDROM_LOCKDOOR', `0x00005329')
+define(`CDROM_MEDIA_CHANGED', `0x00005325')
+define(`CDROMMULTISESSION', `0x00005310')
+define(`CDROM_NEXT_WRITABLE', `0x00005394')
+define(`CDROMPAUSE', `0x00005301')
+define(`CDROMPLAYBLK', `0x00005317')
+define(`CDROMPLAYMSF', `0x00005303')
+define(`CDROMPLAYTRKIND', `0x00005304')
+define(`CDROMREADALL', `0x00005318')
+define(`CDROMREADAUDIO', `0x0000530e')
+define(`CDROMREADCOOKED', `0x00005315')
+define(`CDROMREADMODE1', `0x0000530d')
+define(`CDROMREADMODE2', `0x0000530c')
+define(`CDROMREADRAW', `0x00005314')
+define(`CDROMREADTOCENTRY', `0x00005306')
+define(`CDROMREADTOCHDR', `0x00005305')
+define(`CDROMRESET', `0x00005312')
+define(`CDROMRESUME', `0x00005302')
+define(`CDROMSEEK', `0x00005316')
+define(`CDROM_SELECT_DISC', `0x00005323')
+define(`CDROM_SELECT_SPEED', `0x00005322')
+define(`CDROM_SEND_PACKET', `0x00005393')
+define(`CDROM_SET_OPTIONS', `0x00005320')
+define(`CDROMSETSPINDOWN', `0x0000531e')
+define(`CDROMSTART', `0x00005308')
+define(`CDROMSTOP', `0x00005307')
+define(`CDROMSUBCHNL', `0x0000530b')
+define(`CDROMVOLCTRL', `0x0000530a')
+define(`CDROMVOLREAD', `0x00005313')
+define(`CHIOEXCHANGE', `0x401c6302')
+define(`CHIOGELEM', `0x406c6310')
+define(`CHIOGPARAMS', `0x80146306')
+define(`CHIOGPICKER', `0x80046304')
+define(`CHIOGSTATUS', `0x40106308')
+define(`CHIOGVPARAMS', `0x80706313')
+define(`CHIOINITELEM', `0x00006311')
+define(`CHIOMOVE', `0x40146301')
+define(`CHIOPOSITION', `0x400c6303')
+define(`CHIOSPICKER', `0x40046305')
+define(`CHIOSVOLTAG', `0x40306312')
+define(`CIOC_KERNEL_VERSION', `0xc008630a')
+define(`CLEAR_ARRAY', `0x00000920')
+define(`CM_IOCARDOFF', `0x00006304')
+define(`CM_IOCGATR', `0xc0086301')
+define(`CM_IOCGSTATUS', `0x80086300')
+define(`CM_IOCSPTS', `0x40086302')
+define(`CM_IOCSRDR', `0x00006303')
+define(`CM_IOSDBGLVL', `0x400863fa')
+define(`CXL_IOCTL_GET_PROCESS_ELEMENT', `0x8004ca01')
+define(`CXL_IOCTL_START_WORK', `0x4040ca00')
+define(`DM_DEV_CREATE', `0xc138fd03')
+define(`DM_DEV_REMOVE', `0xc138fd04')
+define(`DM_DEV_RENAME', `0xc138fd05')
+define(`DM_DEV_SET_GEOMETRY', `0xc138fd0f')
+define(`DM_DEV_STATUS', `0xc138fd07')
+define(`DM_DEV_SUSPEND', `0xc138fd06')
+define(`DM_DEV_WAIT', `0xc138fd08')
+define(`DM_LIST_DEVICES', `0xc138fd02')
+define(`DM_LIST_VERSIONS', `0xc138fd0d')
+define(`DM_REMOVE_ALL', `0xc138fd01')
+define(`DM_TABLE_CLEAR', `0xc138fd0a')
+define(`DM_TABLE_DEPS', `0xc138fd0b')
+define(`DM_TABLE_LOAD', `0xc138fd09')
+define(`DM_TABLE_STATUS', `0xc138fd0c')
+define(`DM_TARGET_MSG', `0xc138fd0e')
+define(`DM_VERSION', `0xc138fd00')
+define(`DMX_ADD_PID', `0x40026f33')
+define(`DMX_GET_CAPS', `0x80086f30')
+define(`DMX_GET_PES_PIDS', `0x800a6f2f')
+define(`DMX_GET_STC', `0xc0106f32')
+define(`DMX_REMOVE_PID', `0x40026f34')
+define(`DMX_SET_BUFFER_SIZE', `0x00006f2d')
+define(`DMX_SET_FILTER', `0x403c6f2b')
+define(`DMX_SET_PES_FILTER', `0x40146f2c')
+define(`DMX_SET_SOURCE', `0x40046f31')
+define(`DMX_START', `0x00006f29')
+define(`DMX_STOP', `0x00006f2a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_ADD_BUFS', `0xc0206416')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_ADD_CTX', `0xc0086420')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_ADD_DRAW', `0xc0046427')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_ADD_MAP', `0xc0286415')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_AGP_ACQUIRE', `0x00006430')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_AGP_ALLOC', `0xc0206434')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_AGP_BIND', `0x40106436')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_AGP_ENABLE', `0x40086432')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_AGP_FREE', `0x40206435')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_AGP_INFO', `0x80386433')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_AGP_RELEASE', `0x00006431')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_AGP_UNBIND', `0x40106437')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_AUTH_MAGIC', `0x40046411')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_BLOCK', `0xc0046412')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_CONTROL', `0x40086414')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_DMA', `0xc0406429')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_DROP_MASTER', `0x0000641f')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_EXYNOS_G2D_EXEC', `0xc0086462')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_EXYNOS_G2D_GET_VER', `0xc0086460')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_EXYNOS_G2D_SET_CMDLIST', `0xc0286461')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_EXYNOS_GEM_CREATE', `0xc0106440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_EXYNOS_GEM_GET', `0xc0106444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_EXYNOS_IPP_CMD_CTRL', `0xc0086473')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_EXYNOS_IPP_GET_PROPERTY', `0xc0506470')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_EXYNOS_IPP_QUEUE_BUF', `0xc0286472')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_EXYNOS_IPP_SET_PROPERTY', `0xc0606471')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_EXYNOS_VIDI_CONNECTION', `0xc0106447')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_FINISH', `0x4008642c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_FREE_BUFS', `0x4010641a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_GEM_CLOSE', `0x40086409')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_GEM_FLINK', `0xc008640a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_GEM_OPEN', `0xc010640b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_GET_CAP', `0xc010640c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_GET_CLIENT', `0xc0286405')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_GET_CTX', `0xc0086423')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_GET_MAGIC', `0x80046402')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_GET_MAP', `0xc0286404')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_GET_SAREA_CTX', `0xc010641d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_GET_STATS', `0x80f86406')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_GET_UNIQUE', `0xc0106401')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_CLEAR', `0x400c6442')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_COPY', `0x40106447')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_DOCOPY', `0x00006448')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_FLIP', `0x0000644e')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_FLUSH', `0x00006443')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_FSTATUS', `0x0000644a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_GETAGE', `0x00006444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_GETBUF', `0xc0186445')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_INIT', `0x40406440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_MC', `0x4020644c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_OV0FLIP', `0x0000644b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_OV0INFO', `0x80086449')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_RSTATUS', `0x0000644d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_SWAP', `0x00006446')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I810_VERTEX', `0x400c6441')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_ALLOC', `0xc0186448')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_BATCHBUFFER', `0x40206443')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_CMDBUFFER', `0x4020644b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_DESTROY_HEAP', `0x4004644c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_FLIP', `0x00006442')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_FLUSH', `0x00006441')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_FREE', `0x40086449')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_BUSY', `0xc0086457')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_CONTEXT_CREATE', `0xc008646d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_CONTEXT_DESTROY', `0x4008646e')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_CREATE', `0xc010645b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_ENTERVT', `0x00006459')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_EXECBUFFER', `0x40286454')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_EXECBUFFER2', `0x40406469')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_GET_APERTURE', `0x80106463')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_GET_CACHING', `0xc0086470')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_GET_TILING', `0xc0106462')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_INIT', `0x40106453')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_LEAVEVT', `0x0000645a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_MADVISE', `0xc00c6466')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_MMAP', `0xc020645e')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_MMAP_GTT', `0xc0106464')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_PIN', `0xc0186455')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_PREAD', `0x4020645c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_PWRITE', `0x4020645d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_SET_CACHING', `0x4008646f')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_SET_DOMAIN', `0x400c645f')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_SET_TILING', `0xc0106461')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_SW_FINISH', `0x40046460')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_THROTTLE', `0x00006458')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_UNPIN', `0x40086456')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_USERPTR', `0xc0186473')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GEM_WAIT', `0xc010646c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GETPARAM', `0xc0106446')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GET_PIPE_FROM_CRTC_ID', `0xc0086465')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GET_RESET_STATS', `0xc0186472')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GET_SPRITE_COLORKEY', `0xc014646b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_GET_VBLANK_PIPE', `0x8004644e')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_HWS_ADDR', `0x40106451')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_INIT', `0x40446440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_INIT_HEAP', `0x400c644a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_IRQ_EMIT', `0xc0086444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_IRQ_WAIT', `0x40046445')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_OVERLAY_ATTRS', `0xc02c6468')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_OVERLAY_PUT_IMAGE', `0x402c6467')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_REG_READ', `0xc0106471')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_SETPARAM', `0x40086447')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_SET_SPRITE_COLORKEY', `0xc014646b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_SET_VBLANK_PIPE', `0x4004644d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_I915_VBLANK_SWAP', `0xc00c644f')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_INFO_BUFS', `0xc0106418')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_IRQ_BUSID', `0xc0106403')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_LOCK', `0x4008642a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MAP_BUFS', `0xc0186419')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MARK_BUFS', `0x40206417')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_BLIT', `0x40346448')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_CLEAR', `0x40146444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_DMA_BOOTSTRAP', `0xc020644c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_FLUSH', `0x40086441')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_GETPARAM', `0xc0106449')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_ILOAD', `0x400c6447')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_INDICES', `0x40106446')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_INIT', `0x40806440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_RESET', `0x00006442')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_SET_FENCE', `0x4004644a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_SWAP', `0x00006443')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_VERTEX', `0x400c6445')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MGA_WAIT_FENCE', `0xc004644b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MOD_CTX', `0x40086422')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_ADDFB', `0xc01c64ae')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_ADDFB2', `0xc04464b8')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_ATTACHMODE', `0xc04864a8')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB', `0xc02064b2')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CURSOR', `0xc01c64a3')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CURSOR2', `0xc02464bb')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_DESTROY_DUMB', `0xc00464b4')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_DETACHMODE', `0xc04864a9')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_DIRTYFB', `0xc01864b1')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_GETCONNECTOR', `0xc05064a7')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_GETCRTC', `0xc06864a1')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_GETENCODER', `0xc01464a6')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_GETFB', `0xc01c64ad')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_GETGAMMA', `0xc02064a4')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_GETPLANE', `0xc02064b6')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_GETPLANERESOURCES', `0xc01064b5')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_GETPROPBLOB', `0xc01064ac')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_GETPROPERTY', `0xc04064aa')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_GETRESOURCES', `0xc04064a0')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_MAP_DUMB', `0xc01064b3')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_OBJ_GETPROPERTIES', `0xc02064b9')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_OBJ_SETPROPERTY', `0xc01864ba')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_PAGE_FLIP', `0xc01864b0')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_RMFB', `0xc00464af')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_SETCRTC', `0xc06864a2')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODESET_CTL', `0x40086408')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_SETGAMMA', `0xc02064a5')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_SETPLANE', `0xc03064b7')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MODE_SETPROPERTY', `0xc01064ab')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MSM_GEM_CPU_FINI', `0x40046445')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MSM_GEM_CPU_PREP', `0x40186444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MSM_GEM_INFO', `0xc0106443')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MSM_GEM_NEW', `0xc0106442')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MSM_GEM_SUBMIT', `0xc0206446')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MSM_GET_PARAM', `0xc0106440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_MSM_WAIT_FENCE', `0x40186447')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_NEW_CTX', `0x40086425')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_NOUVEAU_GEM_CPU_FINI', `0x40046483')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_NOUVEAU_GEM_CPU_PREP', `0x40086482')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_NOUVEAU_GEM_INFO', `0xc0286484')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_NOUVEAU_GEM_NEW', `0xc0306480')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_NOUVEAU_GEM_PUSHBUF', `0xc0406481')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_OMAP_GEM_CPU_FINI', `0x40106445')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_OMAP_GEM_CPU_PREP', `0x40086444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_OMAP_GEM_INFO', `0xc0186446')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_OMAP_GEM_NEW', `0xc0106443')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_OMAP_GET_PARAM', `0xc0106440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_OMAP_SET_PARAM', `0x40106441')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_FD_TO_HANDLE', `0xc00c642e')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_HANDLE_TO_FD', `0xc00c642d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_QXL_ALLOC', `0xc0086440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_QXL_ALLOC_SURF', `0xc0186446')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_QXL_CLIENTCAP', `0x40086445')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_QXL_EXECBUFFER', `0x40106442')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_QXL_GETPARAM', `0xc0106444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_QXL_MAP', `0xc0106441')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_QXL_UPDATE_AREA', `0x40186443')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_BLIT', `0x4018644b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_CCE_IDLE', `0x00006444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_CCE_RESET', `0x00006443')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_CCE_START', `0x00006441')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_CCE_STOP', `0x40086442')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_CLEAR', `0x40146448')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_DEPTH', `0x4028644c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_FLIP', `0x00006453')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_FULLSCREEN', `0x40046450')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_GETPARAM', `0xc0106452')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_INDICES', `0x4014644a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_INDIRECT', `0xc010644f')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_INIT', `0x40786440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_RESET', `0x00006446')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_STIPPLE', `0x4008644d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_SWAP', `0x00006447')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_R128_VERTEX', `0x40106449')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_ALLOC', `0xc0186453')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_CLEAR', `0x40206448')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_CMDBUF', `0x40206450')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_CP_IDLE', `0x00006444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_CP_INIT', `0x40786440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_CP_RESET', `0x00006443')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_CP_RESUME', `0x00006458')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_CP_START', `0x00006441')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_CP_STOP', `0x40086442')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_CS', `0xc0206466')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_FLIP', `0x00006452')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_FREE', `0x40086454')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_FULLSCREEN', `0x40046446')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_BUSY', `0xc008646a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_CREATE', `0xc020645d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_GET_TILING', `0xc00c6469')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_INFO', `0xc018645c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_MMAP', `0xc020645e')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_OP', `0xc010646c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_PREAD', `0xc0206461')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_PWRITE', `0xc0206462')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_SET_DOMAIN', `0xc00c6463')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_SET_TILING', `0xc00c6468')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_USERPTR', `0xc018646d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_VA', `0xc018646b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_WAIT_IDLE', `0x40086464')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GETPARAM', `0xc0106451')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_INDICES', `0x4014644a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_INDIRECT', `0xc010644d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_INFO', `0xc0106467')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_INIT_HEAP', `0x400c6455')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_IRQ_EMIT', `0xc0086456')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_IRQ_WAIT', `0x40046457')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_RESET', `0x00006445')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_SETPARAM', `0x40106459')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_STIPPLE', `0x4008644c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_SURF_ALLOC', `0x400c645a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_SURF_FREE', `0x4004645b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_SWAP', `0x00006447')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_TEXTURE', `0xc020644e')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_VERTEX', `0x40106449')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_VERTEX2', `0x4028644f')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RES_CTX', `0xc0106426')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RM_CTX', `0xc0086421')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RM_DRAW', `0xc0046428')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_RM_MAP', `0x4028641b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SAVAGE_BCI_CMDBUF', `0x40386441')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SAVAGE_BCI_EVENT_EMIT', `0xc0086442')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SAVAGE_BCI_EVENT_WAIT', `0x40086443')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SAVAGE_BCI_INIT', `0x40606440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SET_CLIENT_CAP', `0x4010640d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SET_MASTER', `0x0000641e')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SET_SAREA_CTX', `0x4010641c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SET_UNIQUE', `0x40106410')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SET_VERSION', `0xc0106407')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SG_ALLOC', `0xc0106438')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SG_FREE', `0x40106439')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SIS_AGP_ALLOC', `0xc0206454')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SIS_AGP_FREE', `0x40206455')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SIS_AGP_INIT', `0xc0106453')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SIS_FB_ALLOC', `0xc0206444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SIS_FB_FREE', `0x40206445')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SIS_FB_INIT', `0x40106456')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_SWITCH_CTX', `0x40086424')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_CLOSE_CHANNEL', `0xc0106446')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_GEM_CREATE', `0xc0106440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_GEM_GET_FLAGS', `0xc008644d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_GEM_GET_TILING', `0xc010644b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_GEM_MMAP', `0xc0086441')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_GEM_SET_FLAGS', `0xc008644c')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_GEM_SET_TILING', `0xc010644a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_GET_SYNCPT', `0xc0106447')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_GET_SYNCPT_BASE', `0xc0106449')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_OPEN_CHANNEL', `0xc0106445')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_SUBMIT', `0xc0586448')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_SYNCPT_INCR', `0xc0086443')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_SYNCPT_READ', `0xc0086442')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_TEGRA_SYNCPT_WAIT', `0xc0106444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_UNBLOCK', `0xc0046413')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_UNLOCK', `0x4008642b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_UPDATE_DRAW', `0x4018643f')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VERSION', `0xc0406400')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_AGP_INIT', `0xc0086442')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_ALLOCMEM', `0xc0206440')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_BLIT_SYNC', `0x4008644f')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_CMDBUFFER', `0x40106448')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_CMDBUF_SIZE', `0xc00c644b')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_DEC_FUTEX', `0x40106445')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_DMA_BLIT', `0x4030644e')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_DMA_INIT', `0xc0206447')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_FB_INIT', `0xc0086443')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_FLUSH', `0x00006449')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_FREEMEM', `0x40206441')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_MAP_INIT', `0xc0286444')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_PCICMD', `0x4010644a')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_VIA_WAIT_IRQ', `0xc018644d')
+define(`DRM_IOCTL_WAIT_VBLANK', `0xc018643a')
+define(`DVD_AUTH', `0x00005392')
+define(`DVD_READ_STRUCT', `0x00005390')
+define(`DVD_WRITE_STRUCT', `0x00005391')
+define(`ECCGETLAYOUT', `0x81484d11')
+define(`ECCGETSTATS', `0x80104d12')
+define(`ENI_MEMDUMP', `0x40106160')
+define(`ENI_SETMULT', `0x40106167')
+define(`EVIOCGEFFECTS', `0x80044584')
+define(`EVIOCGID', `0x80084502')
+define(`EVIOCGKEYCODE', `0x80084504')
+define(`EVIOCGKEYCODE_V2', `0x80284504')
+define(`EVIOCGRAB', `0x40044590')
+define(`EVIOCGREP', `0x80084503')
+define(`EVIOCGVERSION', `0x80044501')
+define(`EVIOCREVOKE', `0x40044591')
+define(`EVIOCRMFF', `0x40044581')
+define(`EVIOCSCLOCKID', `0x400445a0')
+define(`EVIOCSFF', `0x40304580')
+define(`EVIOCSKEYCODE', `0x40084504')
+define(`EVIOCSKEYCODE_V2', `0x40284504')
+define(`EVIOCSREP', `0x40084503')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE', `0xf501')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE', `0xf502')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_START_VOLATILE_WRITE', `0xf503')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_RELEASE_VOLATILE_WRITE', `0xf504')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_ABORT_VOLATILE_WRITE', `0xf505')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_GARBAGE_COLLECT', `0xf506')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_WRITE_CHECKPOINT', `0xf507')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_DEFRAGMENT', `0xf508')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE', `0xf509')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_FLUSH_DEVICE', `0xf50a')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_GARBAGE_COLLECT_RANGE', `0xf50b')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_GET_FEATURES', `0xf50c')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_SET_PIN_FILE', `0xf50d')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_GET_PIN_FILE', `0xf50e')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_PRECACHE_EXTENTS', `0xf50f')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_RESIZE_FS', `0xf510')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_GET_COMPRESS_BLOCKS', `0xf511')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_RELEASE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS', `0xf512')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_RESERVE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS', `0xf513')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE', `0xf514')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_GET_COMPRESS_OPTION', `0xf515')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_SET_COMPRESS_OPTION', `0xf516')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_DECOMPRESS_FILE', `0xf517')
+define(`F2FS_IOC_COMPRESS_FILE', `0xf518')
+define(`FAT_IOCTL_GET_ATTRIBUTES', `0x80047210')
+define(`FAT_IOCTL_GET_VOLUME_ID', `0x80047213')
+define(`FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES', `0x40047211')
+define(`FBIGET_BRIGHTNESS', `0x80044603')
+define(`FBIGET_COLOR', `0x80044605')
+define(`FBIO_ALLOC', `0x00004613')
+define(`FBIOBLANK', `0x00004611')
+define(`FBIO_CURSOR', `0xc0684608')
+define(`FBIO_FREE', `0x00004614')
+define(`FBIOGETCMAP', `0x00004604')
+define(`FBIOGET_CON2FBMAP', `0x0000460f')
+define(`FBIOGET_CONTRAST', `0x80044601')
+define(`FBIO_GETCONTROL2', `0x80084689')
+define(`FBIOGET_DISPINFO', `0x00004618')
+define(`FBIOGET_FSCREENINFO', `0x00004602')
+define(`FBIOGET_GLYPH', `0x00004615')
+define(`FBIOGET_HWCINFO', `0x00004616')
+define(`FBIOGET_VBLANK', `0x80204612')
+define(`FBIOGET_VSCREENINFO', `0x00004600')
+define(`FBIOPAN_DISPLAY', `0x00004606')
+define(`FBIOPUTCMAP', `0x00004605')
+define(`FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP', `0x00004610')
+define(`FBIOPUT_CONTRAST', `0x40044602')
+define(`FBIOPUT_MODEINFO', `0x00004617')
+define(`FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO', `0x00004601')
+define(`FBIO_RADEON_GET_MIRROR', `0x80084003')
+define(`FBIO_RADEON_SET_MIRROR', `0x40084004')
+define(`FBIO_WAITEVENT', `0x00004688')
+define(`FBIO_WAITFORVSYNC', `0x40044620')
+define(`FBIPUT_BRIGHTNESS', `0x40044603')
+define(`FBIPUT_COLOR', `0x40044606')
+define(`FBIPUT_HSYNC', `0x40044609')
+define(`FBIPUT_VSYNC', `0x4004460a')
+define(`FDCLRPRM', `0x00000241')
+define(`FDDEFPRM', `0x40200243')
+define(`FDEJECT', `0x0000025a')
+define(`FDFLUSH', `0x0000024b')
+define(`FDFMTBEG', `0x00000247')
+define(`FDFMTEND', `0x00000249')
+define(`FDFMTTRK', `0x400c0248')
+define(`FDGETDRVPRM', `0x80800211')
+define(`FDGETDRVSTAT', `0x80500212')
+define(`FDGETDRVTYP', `0x8010020f')
+define(`FDGETFDCSTAT', `0x80280215')
+define(`FDGETMAXERRS', `0x8014020e')
+define(`FDGETPRM', `0x80200204')
+define(`FDMSGOFF', `0x00000246')
+define(`FDMSGON', `0x00000245')
+define(`FDPOLLDRVSTAT', `0x80500213')
+define(`FDRAWCMD', `0x00000258')
+define(`FDRESET', `0x00000254')
+define(`FDSETDRVPRM', `0x40800290')
+define(`FDSETEMSGTRESH', `0x0000024a')
+define(`FDSETMAXERRS', `0x4014024c')
+define(`FDSETPRM', `0x40200242')
+define(`FDTWADDLE', `0x00000259')
+define(`FDWERRORCLR', `0x00000256')
+define(`FDWERRORGET', `0x80280217')
+define(`FE_DISEQC_RECV_SLAVE_REPLY', `0x800c6f40')
+define(`FE_DISEQC_RESET_OVERLOAD', `0x00006f3e')
+define(`FE_DISEQC_SEND_BURST', `0x00006f41')
+define(`FE_DISEQC_SEND_MASTER_CMD', `0x40076f3f')
+define(`FE_DISHNETWORK_SEND_LEGACY_CMD', `0x00006f50')
+define(`FE_ENABLE_HIGH_LNB_VOLTAGE', `0x00006f44')
+define(`FE_GET_EVENT', `0x80286f4e')
+define(`FE_GET_FRONTEND', `0x80246f4d')
+define(`FE_GET_INFO', `0x80a86f3d')
+define(`FE_GET_PROPERTY', `0x80106f53')
+define(`FE_READ_BER', `0x80046f46')
+define(`FE_READ_SIGNAL_STRENGTH', `0x80026f47')
+define(`FE_READ_SNR', `0x80026f48')
+define(`FE_READ_STATUS', `0x80046f45')
+define(`FE_READ_UNCORRECTED_BLOCKS', `0x80046f49')
+define(`FE_SET_FRONTEND', `0x40246f4c')
+define(`FE_SET_FRONTEND_TUNE_MODE', `0x00006f51')
+define(`FE_SET_PROPERTY', `0x40106f52')
+define(`FE_SET_TONE', `0x00006f42')
+define(`FE_SET_VOLTAGE', `0x00006f43')
+define(`FIBMAP', `0x00000001')
+define(`FIFREEZE', `0xc0045877')
+define(`FIGETBSZ', `0x00000002')
+define(`FIOASYNC', `0x00005452')
+define(`FIOCLEX', ifelse(target_arch, mips, 0x00006601, 0x00005451))
+define(`FIOGETOWN', `0x00008903')
+define(`FIONBIO', `0x00005421')
+define(`FIONCLEX', ifelse(target_arch, mips, 0x00006602, 0x00005450))
+define(`FIONREAD', ifelse(target_arch, mips, 0x0000467f, 0x0000541b))
+define(`FIOQSIZE', `0x00005460')
+define(`FIOSETOWN', `0x00008901')
+define(`FITHAW', `0xc0045878')
+define(`FITRIM', `0xc0185879')
+define(`FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS', `0x80046601')
+define(`FS_IOC32_GETVERSION', `0x80047601')
+define(`FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS', `0x40046602')
+define(`FS_IOC32_SETVERSION', `0x40047602')
+define(`FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY', `0xc0506617')
+define(`FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY', `0x6685')
+define(`FS_IOC_FIEMAP', `0xc020660b')
+define(`FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR', `0x801c581f')
+define(`FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR', `0x401c5820')
+define(`FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY', `0x400c6615')
+define(`FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX', `0xc0096616')
+define(`FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT', `0x40106614')
+define(`FS_IOC_GETFLAGS', `0x80086601')
+define(`FS_IOC_GETVERSION', `0x80087601')
+define(`FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY', `0x6686')
+define(`FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY', `0xc0406618')
+define(`FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY', `0x800c6613')
+define(`FS_IOC_SETFLAGS', `0x40086602')
+define(`FS_IOC_SETVERSION', `0x40087602')
+define(`FSL_HV_IOCTL_DOORBELL', `0xc008af06')
+define(`FSL_HV_IOCTL_GETPROP', `0xc028af07')
+define(`FSL_HV_IOCTL_MEMCPY', `0xc028af05')
+define(`FSL_HV_IOCTL_PARTITION_GET_STATUS', `0xc00caf02')
+define(`FSL_HV_IOCTL_PARTITION_RESTART', `0xc008af01')
+define(`FSL_HV_IOCTL_PARTITION_START', `0xc010af03')
+define(`FSL_HV_IOCTL_PARTITION_STOP', `0xc008af04')
+define(`FSL_HV_IOCTL_SETPROP', `0xc028af08')
+define(`FUNCTIONFS_CLEAR_HALT', `0x00006703')
+define(`FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_DESC', `0x80096782')
+define(`FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_REVMAP', `0x00006781')
+define(`FUNCTIONFS_FIFO_FLUSH', `0x00006702')
+define(`FUNCTIONFS_FIFO_STATUS', `0x00006701')
+define(`FUNCTIONFS_INTERFACE_REVMAP', `0x00006780')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_ADD_DESCRIPTOR', `0xc0182306')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_ALLOCATE', `0xc0202302')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_ALLOCATE_ISO_RESOURCE', `0xc018230d')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_ALLOCATE_ISO_RESOURCE_ONCE', `0x4018230f')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_CREATE_ISO_CONTEXT', `0xc0202308')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_DEALLOCATE', `0x40042303')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_DEALLOCATE_ISO_RESOURCE', `0x4004230e')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_DEALLOCATE_ISO_RESOURCE_ONCE', `0x40182310')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_FLUSH_ISO', `0x40042318')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_GET_CYCLE_TIMER', `0x8010230c')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_GET_CYCLE_TIMER2', `0xc0182314')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_GET_INFO', `0xc0282300')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_GET_SPEED', `0x00002311')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_INITIATE_BUS_RESET', `0x40042305')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_QUEUE_ISO', `0xc0182309')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_RECEIVE_PHY_PACKETS', `0x40082316')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_REMOVE_DESCRIPTOR', `0x40042307')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_SEND_BROADCAST_REQUEST', `0x40282312')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_SEND_PHY_PACKET', `0xc0182315')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_SEND_REQUEST', `0x40282301')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_SEND_RESPONSE', `0x40182304')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_SEND_STREAM_PACKET', `0x40282313')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_SET_ISO_CHANNELS', `0x40102317')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_START_ISO', `0x4010230a')
+define(`FW_CDEV_IOC_STOP_ISO', `0x4004230b')
+define(`GADGETFS_CLEAR_HALT', `0x00006703')
+define(`GADGETFS_FIFO_FLUSH', `0x00006702')
+define(`GADGETFS_FIFO_STATUS', `0x00006701')
+define(`GADGET_GET_PRINTER_STATUS', `0x80016721')
+define(`GADGET_SET_PRINTER_STATUS', `0xc0016722')
+define(`GENWQE_EXECUTE_DDCB', `0xc0e8a532')
+define(`GENWQE_EXECUTE_RAW_DDCB', `0xc0e8a533')
+define(`GENWQE_GET_CARD_STATE', `0x8004a524')
+define(`GENWQE_PIN_MEM', `0xc020a528')
+define(`GENWQE_READ_REG16', `0x8010a522')
+define(`GENWQE_READ_REG32', `0x8010a520')
+define(`GENWQE_READ_REG64', `0x8010a51e')
+define(`GENWQE_SLU_READ', `0xc038a551')
+define(`GENWQE_SLU_UPDATE', `0xc038a550')
+define(`GENWQE_UNPIN_MEM', `0xc020a529')
+define(`GENWQE_WRITE_REG16', `0x4010a523')
+define(`GENWQE_WRITE_REG32', `0x4010a521')
+define(`GENWQE_WRITE_REG64', `0x4010a51f')
+define(`GET_ARRAY_INFO', `0x80480911')
+define(`GET_BITMAP_FILE', `0x90000915')
+define(`GET_DISK_INFO', `0x80140912')
+define(`GIGASET_BRKCHARS', `0x40064702')
+define(`GIGASET_CONFIG', `0xc0044701')
+define(`GIGASET_REDIR', `0xc0044700')
+define(`GIGASET_VERSION', `0xc0104703')
+define(`GIO_CMAP', `0x00004b70')
+define(`GIO_FONT', `0x00004b60')
+define(`GIO_FONTX', `0x00004b6b')
+define(`GIO_SCRNMAP', `0x00004b40')
+define(`GIO_UNIMAP', `0x00004b66')
+define(`GIO_UNISCRNMAP', `0x00004b69')
+define(`GSMIOC_DISABLE_NET', `0x00004703')
+define(`GSMIOC_ENABLE_NET', `0x40344702')
+define(`GSMIOC_GETCONF', `0x804c4700')
+define(`GSMIOC_SETCONF', `0x404c4701')
+define(`HCIBLOCKADDR', `0x400448e6')
+define(`HCIDEVDOWN', `0x400448ca')
+define(`HCIDEVRESET', `0x400448cb')
+define(`HCIDEVRESTAT', `0x400448cc')
+define(`HCIDEVUP', `0x400448c9')
+define(`HCIGETAUTHINFO', `0x800448d7')
+define(`HCIGETCONNINFO', `0x800448d5')
+define(`HCIGETCONNLIST', `0x800448d4')
+define(`HCIGETDEVINFO', `0x800448d3')
+define(`HCIGETDEVLIST', `0x800448d2')
+define(`HCIINQUIRY', `0x800448f0')
+define(`HCISETACLMTU', `0x400448e3')
+define(`HCISETAUTH', `0x400448de')
+define(`HCISETENCRYPT', `0x400448df')
+define(`HCISETLINKMODE', `0x400448e2')
+define(`HCISETLINKPOL', `0x400448e1')
+define(`HCISETPTYPE', `0x400448e0')
+define(`HCISETRAW', `0x400448dc')
+define(`HCISETSCAN', `0x400448dd')
+define(`HCISETSCOMTU', `0x400448e4')
+define(`HCIUNBLOCKADDR', `0x400448e7')
+define(`HDA_IOCTL_GET_WCAP', `0xc0084812')
+define(`HDA_IOCTL_PVERSION', `0x80044810')
+define(`HDA_IOCTL_VERB_WRITE', `0xc0084811')
+define(`HDIO_DRIVE_CMD', `0x0000031f')
+define(`HDIO_DRIVE_RESET', `0x0000031c')
+define(`HDIO_DRIVE_TASK', `0x0000031e')
+define(`HDIO_DRIVE_TASKFILE', `0x0000031d')
+define(`HDIO_GET_32BIT', `0x00000309')
+define(`HDIO_GET_ACOUSTIC', `0x0000030f')
+define(`HDIO_GET_ADDRESS', `0x00000310')
+define(`HDIO_GET_BUSSTATE', `0x0000031a')
+define(`HDIO_GET_DMA', `0x0000030b')
+define(`HDIO_GETGEO', `0x00000301')
+define(`HDIO_GET_IDENTITY', `0x0000030d')
+define(`HDIO_GET_KEEPSETTINGS', `0x00000308')
+define(`HDIO_GET_MULTCOUNT', `0x00000304')
+define(`HDIO_GET_NICE', `0x0000030c')
+define(`HDIO_GET_NOWERR', `0x0000030a')
+define(`HDIO_GET_QDMA', `0x00000305')
+define(`HDIO_GET_UNMASKINTR', `0x00000302')
+define(`HDIO_GET_WCACHE', `0x0000030e')
+define(`HDIO_OBSOLETE_IDENTITY', `0x00000307')
+define(`HDIO_SCAN_HWIF', `0x00000328')
+define(`HDIO_SET_32BIT', `0x00000324')
+define(`HDIO_SET_ACOUSTIC', `0x0000032c')
+define(`HDIO_SET_ADDRESS', `0x0000032f')
+define(`HDIO_SET_BUSSTATE', `0x0000032d')
+define(`HDIO_SET_DMA', `0x00000326')
+define(`HDIO_SET_KEEPSETTINGS', `0x00000323')
+define(`HDIO_SET_MULTCOUNT', `0x00000321')
+define(`HDIO_SET_NICE', `0x00000329')
+define(`HDIO_SET_NOWERR', `0x00000325')
+define(`HDIO_SET_PIO_MODE', `0x00000327')
+define(`HDIO_SET_QDMA', `0x0000032e')
+define(`HDIO_SET_UNMASKINTR', `0x00000322')
+define(`HDIO_SET_WCACHE', `0x0000032b')
+define(`HDIO_SET_XFER', `0x00000306')
+define(`HDIO_TRISTATE_HWIF', `0x0000031b')
+define(`HDIO_UNREGISTER_HWIF', `0x0000032a')
+define(`HE_GET_REG', `0x40106160')
+define(`HIDIOCAPPLICATION', `0x00004802')
+define(`HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX', `0x40184810')
+define(`HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINFO', `0xc0104811')
+define(`HIDIOCGDEVINFO', `0x801c4803')
+define(`HIDIOCGFIELDINFO', `0xc038480a')
+define(`HIDIOCGFLAG', `0x8004480e')
+define(`HIDIOCGRAWINFO', `0x80084803')
+define(`HIDIOCGRDESC', `0x90044802')
+define(`HIDIOCGRDESCSIZE', `0x80044801')
+define(`HIDIOCGREPORT', `0x400c4807')
+define(`HIDIOCGREPORTINFO', `0xc00c4809')
+define(`HIDIOCGSTRING', `0x81044804')
+define(`HIDIOCGUCODE', `0xc018480d')
+define(`HIDIOCGUSAGE', `0xc018480b')
+define(`HIDIOCGUSAGES', `0xd01c4813')
+define(`HIDIOCGVERSION', `0x80044801')
+define(`HIDIOCINITREPORT', `0x00004805')
+define(`HIDIOCSFLAG', `0x4004480f')
+define(`HIDIOCSREPORT', `0x400c4808')
+define(`HIDIOCSUSAGE', `0x4018480c')
+define(`HIDIOCSUSAGES', `0x501c4814')
+define(`HOT_ADD_DISK', `0x00000928')
+define(`HOT_GENERATE_ERROR', `0x0000092a')
+define(`HOT_REMOVE_DISK', `0x00000922')
+define(`HPET_DPI', `0x00006805')
+define(`HPET_EPI', `0x00006804')
+define(`HPET_IE_OFF', `0x00006802')
+define(`HPET_IE_ON', `0x00006801')
+define(`HPET_INFO', `0x80186803')
+define(`HPET_IRQFREQ', `0x40086806')
+define(`HSC_GET_RX', `0x400c6b14')
+define(`HSC_GET_TX', `0x40106b16')
+define(`HSC_RESET', `0x00006b10')
+define(`HSC_SEND_BREAK', `0x00006b12')
+define(`HSC_SET_PM', `0x00006b11')
+define(`HSC_SET_RX', `0x400c6b13')
+define(`HSC_SET_TX', `0x40106b15')
+define(`I2OEVTGET', `0x8068690b')
+define(`I2OEVTREG', `0x400c690a')
+define(`I2OGETIOPS', `0x80206900')
+define(`I2OHRTGET', `0xc0186901')
+define(`I2OHTML', `0xc0306909')
+define(`I2OLCTGET', `0xc0186902')
+define(`I2OPARMGET', `0xc0286904')
+define(`I2OPARMSET', `0xc0286903')
+define(`I2OPASSTHRU', `0x8010690c')
+define(`I2OPASSTHRU32', `0x8008690c')
+define(`I2OSWDEL', `0xc0306907')
+define(`I2OSWDL', `0xc0306905')
+define(`I2OSWUL', `0xc0306906')
+define(`I2OVALIDATE', `0x80046908')
+define(`I8K_BIOS_VERSION', `0x80046980')
+define(`I8K_FN_STATUS', `0x80086983')
+define(`I8K_GET_FAN', `0xc0086986')
+define(`I8K_GET_SPEED', `0xc0086985')
+define(`I8K_GET_TEMP', `0x80086984')
+define(`I8K_MACHINE_ID', `0x80046981')
+define(`I8K_POWER_STATUS', `0x80086982')
+define(`I8K_SET_FAN', `0xc0086987')
+define(`IB_USER_MAD_ENABLE_PKEY', `0x00001b03')
+define(`IB_USER_MAD_REGISTER_AGENT', `0xc01c1b01')
+define(`IB_USER_MAD_REGISTER_AGENT2', `0xc0281b04')
+define(`IB_USER_MAD_UNREGISTER_AGENT', `0x40041b02')
+define(`IDT77105_GETSTAT', `0x40106132')
+define(`IDT77105_GETSTATZ', `0x40106133')
+define(`IIOCDBGVAR', `0x0000497f')
+define(`IIOCDRVCTL', `0x00004980')
+define(`IIOCGETCPS', `0x00004915')
+define(`IIOCGETDVR', `0x00004916')
+define(`IIOCGETMAP', `0x00004911')
+define(`IIOCGETPRF', `0x0000490f')
+define(`IIOCGETSET', `0x00004908')
+define(`IIOCNETAIF', `0x00004901')
+define(`IIOCNETALN', `0x00004920')
+define(`IIOCNETANM', `0x00004905')
+define(`IIOCNETASL', `0x00004913')
+define(`IIOCNETDIF', `0x00004902')
+define(`IIOCNETDIL', `0x00004914')
+define(`IIOCNETDLN', `0x00004921')
+define(`IIOCNETDNM', `0x00004906')
+define(`IIOCNETDWRSET', `0x00004918')
+define(`IIOCNETGCF', `0x00004904')
+define(`IIOCNETGNM', `0x00004907')
+define(`IIOCNETGPN', `0x00004922')
+define(`IIOCNETHUP', `0x0000490b')
+define(`IIOCNETLCR', `0x00004917')
+define(`IIOCNETSCF', `0x00004903')
+define(`IIOCSETBRJ', `0x0000490d')
+define(`IIOCSETGST', `0x0000490c')
+define(`IIOCSETMAP', `0x00004912')
+define(`IIOCSETPRF', `0x00004910')
+define(`IIOCSETSET', `0x00004909')
+define(`IIOCSETVER', `0x0000490a')
+define(`IIOCSIGPRF', `0x0000490e')
+define(`IIO_GET_EVENT_FD_IOCTL', `0x80046990')
+define(`IMADDTIMER', `0x80044940')
+define(`IMCLEAR_L2', `0x80044946')
+define(`IMCTRLREQ', `0x80044945')
+define(`IMDELTIMER', `0x80044941')
+define(`IMGETCOUNT', `0x80044943')
+define(`IMGETDEVINFO', `0x80044944')
+define(`IMGETVERSION', `0x80044942')
+define(`IMHOLD_L1', `0x80044948')
+define(`IMSETDEVNAME', `0x80184947')
+define(`INCFS_IOCTL_CREATE_FILE', `0x0000671e')
+define(`INCFS_IOCTL_READ_SIGNATURE', `0x0000671f')
+define(`INCFS_IOCTL_FILL_BLOCKS', `0x00006720')
+define(`INCFS_IOCTL_PERMIT_FILL', `0x00006721')
+define(`INCFS_IOCTL_GET_FILLED_BLOCKS', `0x00006722')
+define(`INCFS_IOCTL_CREATE_MAPPED_FILE', `0x00006723')
+define(`INCFS_IOCTL_GET_BLOCK_COUNT', `0x00006724')
+define(`INCFS_IOCTL_GET_READ_TIMEOUTS', `0x00006725')
+define(`INCFS_IOCTL_SET_READ_TIMEOUTS', `0x00006726')
+define(`INCFS_IOCTL_GET_LAST_READ_ERROR', `0x00006727')
+define(`IOCTL_EVTCHN_BIND_INTERDOMAIN', `0x00084501')
+define(`IOCTL_EVTCHN_BIND_UNBOUND_PORT', `0x00044502')
+define(`IOCTL_EVTCHN_BIND_VIRQ', `0x00044500')
+define(`IOCTL_EVTCHN_NOTIFY', `0x00044504')
+define(`IOCTL_EVTCHN_RESET', `0x00004505')
+define(`IOCTL_EVTCHN_UNBIND', `0x00044503')
+define(`IOCTL_MEI_CONNECT_CLIENT', `0xc0104801')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_CTX_ADD_NOTIFICATION', `0x000007af')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_CTX_GET_CPT_STATE', `0x000007b1')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_CTX_REMOVE_NOTIFICATION', `0x000007b0')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_CTX_SET_CPT_STATE', `0x000007b2')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_DATAGRAM_RECEIVE', `0x000007ac')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_DATAGRAM_SEND', `0x000007ab')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_GET_CONTEXT_ID', `0x000007b3')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_INIT_CONTEXT', `0x000007a0')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_NOTIFICATIONS_RECEIVE', `0x000007a6')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_NOTIFY_RESOURCE', `0x000007a5')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_QUEUEPAIR_ALLOC', `0x000007a8')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_QUEUEPAIR_DETACH', `0x000007aa')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_QUEUEPAIR_SETPAGEFILE', `0x000007a9')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_QUEUEPAIR_SETVA', `0x000007a4')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_SET_NOTIFY', `0x000007cb')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_SOCKETS_GET_AF_VALUE', `0x000007b8')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_SOCKETS_GET_LOCAL_CID', `0x000007b9')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_SOCKETS_VERSION', `0x000007b4')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_VERSION', `0x0000079f')
+define(`IOCTL_VMCI_VERSION2', `0x000007a7')
+define(`IOCTL_VM_SOCKETS_GET_LOCAL_CID', `0x000007b9')
+define(`IOCTL_WDM_MAX_COMMAND', `0x800248a0')
+define(`IOCTL_XENBUS_BACKEND_EVTCHN', `0x00004200')
+define(`IOCTL_XENBUS_BACKEND_SETUP', `0x00004201')
+define(`ION_IOC_ALLOC', `0xc0204900')
+define(`ION_IOC_CUSTOM', `0xc0104906')
+define(`ION_IOC_FREE', `0xc0044901')
+define(`ION_IOC_IMPORT', `0xc0084905')
+define(`ION_IOC_MAP', `0xc0084902')
+define(`ION_IOC_SHARE', `0xc0084904')
+define(`ION_IOC_SYNC', `0xc0084907')
+define(`ION_IOC_TEST_DMA_MAPPING', `0x402049f1')
+define(`ION_IOC_TEST_KERNEL_MAPPING', `0x402049f2')
+define(`ION_IOC_TEST_SET_FD', `0x000049f0')
+define(`IOW_GETINFO', `0x8028c003')
+define(`IOW_READ', `0x4008c002')
+define(`IOW_WRITE', `0x4008c001')
+define(`IPMICTL_GET_MAINTENANCE_MODE_CMD', `0x8004691e')
+define(`IPMICTL_GET_MY_ADDRESS_CMD', `0x80046912')
+define(`IPMICTL_GET_MY_CHANNEL_ADDRESS_CMD', `0x80046919')
+define(`IPMICTL_GET_MY_CHANNEL_LUN_CMD', `0x8004691b')
+define(`IPMICTL_GET_MY_LUN_CMD', `0x80046914')
+define(`IPMICTL_GET_TIMING_PARMS_CMD', `0x80086917')
+define(`IPMICTL_RECEIVE_MSG', `0xc030690c')
+define(`IPMICTL_RECEIVE_MSG_TRUNC', `0xc030690b')
+define(`IPMICTL_REGISTER_FOR_CMD', `0x8002690e')
+define(`IPMICTL_REGISTER_FOR_CMD_CHANS', `0x800c691c')
+define(`IPMICTL_SEND_COMMAND', `0x8028690d')
+define(`IPMICTL_SEND_COMMAND_SETTIME', `0x80306915')
+define(`IPMICTL_SET_GETS_EVENTS_CMD', `0x80046910')
+define(`IPMICTL_SET_MAINTENANCE_MODE_CMD', `0x4004691f')
+define(`IPMICTL_SET_MY_ADDRESS_CMD', `0x80046911')
+define(`IPMICTL_SET_MY_CHANNEL_ADDRESS_CMD', `0x80046918')
+define(`IPMICTL_SET_MY_CHANNEL_LUN_CMD', `0x8004691a')
+define(`IPMICTL_SET_MY_LUN_CMD', `0x80046913')
+define(`IPMICTL_SET_TIMING_PARMS_CMD', `0x80086916')
+define(`IPMICTL_UNREGISTER_FOR_CMD', `0x8002690f')
+define(`IPMICTL_UNREGISTER_FOR_CMD_CHANS', `0x800c691d')
+define(`IVTVFB_IOC_DMA_FRAME', `0x401856c0')
+define(`IVTV_IOC_DMA_FRAME', `0x404056c0')
+define(`IVTV_IOC_PASSTHROUGH_MODE', `0x400456c1')
+define(`IXJCTL_AEC_GET_LEVEL', `0x000071cd')
+define(`IXJCTL_AEC_START', `0x400471cb')
+define(`IXJCTL_AEC_STOP', `0x000071cc')
+define(`IXJCTL_CARDTYPE', `0x800471c1')
+define(`IXJCTL_CID', `0x800871d4')
+define(`IXJCTL_CIDCW', `0x400871d9')
+define(`IXJCTL_DAA_AGAIN', `0x400471d2')
+define(`IXJCTL_DAA_COEFF_SET', `0x400471d0')
+define(`IXJCTL_DRYBUFFER_CLEAR', `0x000071e7')
+define(`IXJCTL_DRYBUFFER_READ', `0x800871e6')
+define(`IXJCTL_DSP_IDLE', `0x000071c5')
+define(`IXJCTL_DSP_RESET', `0x000071c0')
+define(`IXJCTL_DSP_TYPE', `0x800471c3')
+define(`IXJCTL_DSP_VERSION', `0x800471c4')
+define(`IXJCTL_DTMF_PRESCALE', `0x400471e8')
+define(`IXJCTL_FILTER_CADENCE', `0x400871d6')
+define(`IXJCTL_FRAMES_READ', `0x800871e2')
+define(`IXJCTL_FRAMES_WRITTEN', `0x800871e3')
+define(`IXJCTL_GET_FILTER_HIST', `0x400471c8')
+define(`IXJCTL_HZ', `0x400471e0')
+define(`IXJCTL_INIT_TONE', `0x400871c9')
+define(`IXJCTL_INTERCOM_START', `0x400471fd')
+define(`IXJCTL_INTERCOM_STOP', `0x400471fe')
+define(`IXJCTL_MIXER', `0x400471cf')
+define(`IXJCTL_PLAY_CID', `0x000071d7')
+define(`IXJCTL_PORT', `0x400471d1')
+define(`IXJCTL_POTS_PSTN', `0x400471d5')
+define(`IXJCTL_PSTN_LINETEST', `0x000071d3')
+define(`IXJCTL_RATE', `0x400471e1')
+define(`IXJCTL_READ_WAIT', `0x800871e4')
+define(`IXJCTL_SC_RXG', `0x400471ea')
+define(`IXJCTL_SC_TXG', `0x400471eb')
+define(`IXJCTL_SERIAL', `0x800471c2')
+define(`IXJCTL_SET_FILTER', `0x400871c7')
+define(`IXJCTL_SET_FILTER_RAW', `0x400871dd')
+define(`IXJCTL_SET_LED', `0x400471ce')
+define(`IXJCTL_SIGCTL', `0x400871e9')
+define(`IXJCTL_TESTRAM', `0x000071c6')
+define(`IXJCTL_TONE_CADENCE', `0x400871ca')
+define(`IXJCTL_VERSION', `0x800871da')
+define(`IXJCTL_VMWI', `0x800471d8')
+define(`IXJCTL_WRITE_WAIT', `0x800871e5')
+define(`JSIOCGAXES', `0x80016a11')
+define(`JSIOCGAXMAP', `0x80406a32')
+define(`JSIOCGBTNMAP', `0x84006a34')
+define(`JSIOCGBUTTONS', `0x80016a12')
+define(`JSIOCGCORR', `0x80246a22')
+define(`JSIOCGVERSION', `0x80046a01')
+define(`JSIOCSAXMAP', `0x40406a31')
+define(`JSIOCSBTNMAP', `0x44006a33')
+define(`JSIOCSCORR', `0x40246a21')
+define(`KCOV_DISABLE', `0x00006365')
+define(`KCOV_ENABLE', `0x00006364')
+define(`KCOV_INIT_TRACE', `0x80086301')
+define(`KDADDIO', `0x00004b34')
+define(`KDDELIO', `0x00004b35')
+define(`KDDISABIO', `0x00004b37')
+define(`KDENABIO', `0x00004b36')
+define(`KDFONTOP', `0x00004b72')
+define(`KDGETKEYCODE', `0x00004b4c')
+define(`KDGETLED', `0x00004b31')
+define(`KDGETMODE', `0x00004b3b')
+define(`KDGKBDIACR', `0x00004b4a')
+define(`KDGKBDIACRUC', `0x00004bfa')
+define(`KDGKBENT', `0x00004b46')
+define(`KDGKBLED', `0x00004b64')
+define(`KDGKBMETA', `0x00004b62')
+define(`KDGKBMODE', `0x00004b44')
+define(`KDGKBSENT', `0x00004b48')
+define(`KDGKBTYPE', `0x00004b33')
+define(`KDKBDREP', `0x00004b52')
+define(`KDMAPDISP', `0x00004b3c')
+define(`KDMKTONE', `0x00004b30')
+define(`KDSETKEYCODE', `0x00004b4d')
+define(`KDSETLED', `0x00004b32')
+define(`KDSETMODE', `0x00004b3a')
+define(`KDSIGACCEPT', `0x00004b4e')
+define(`KDSKBDIACR', `0x00004b4b')
+define(`KDSKBDIACRUC', `0x00004bfb')
+define(`KDSKBENT', `0x00004b47')
+define(`KDSKBLED', `0x00004b65')
+define(`KDSKBMETA', `0x00004b63')
+define(`KDSKBMODE', `0x00004b45')
+define(`KDSKBSENT', `0x00004b49')
+define(`KDUNMAPDISP', `0x00004b3d')
+define(`KIOCSOUND', `0x00004b2f')
+define(`KVM_ALLOCATE_RMA', `0x8008aea9')
+define(`KVM_ARM_PREFERRED_TARGET', `0x8020aeaf')
+define(`KVM_ARM_SET_DEVICE_ADDR', `0x4010aeab')
+define(`KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT', `0x4020aeae')
+define(`KVM_ASSIGN_DEV_IRQ', `0x4040ae70')
+define(`KVM_ASSIGN_PCI_DEVICE', `0x8040ae69')
+define(`KVM_ASSIGN_SET_INTX_MASK', `0x4040aea4')
+define(`KVM_ASSIGN_SET_MSIX_ENTRY', `0x4010ae74')
+define(`KVM_ASSIGN_SET_MSIX_NR', `0x4008ae73')
+define(`KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION', `0x0000ae03')
+define(`KVM_CREATE_DEVICE', `0xc00caee0')
+define(`KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP', `0x0000ae60')
+define(`KVM_CREATE_PIT', `0x0000ae64')
+define(`KVM_CREATE_PIT2', `0x4040ae77')
+define(`KVM_CREATE_SPAPR_TCE', `0x400caea8')
+define(`KVM_CREATE_VCPU', `0x0000ae41')
+define(`KVM_CREATE_VM', `0x0000ae01')
+define(`KVM_DEASSIGN_DEV_IRQ', `0x4040ae75')
+define(`KVM_DEASSIGN_PCI_DEVICE', `0x4040ae72')
+define(`KVM_DIRTY_TLB', `0x4010aeaa')
+define(`KVM_ENABLE_CAP', `0x4068aea3')
+define(`KVM_GET_API_VERSION', `0x0000ae00')
+define(`KVM_GET_CLOCK', `0x8030ae7c')
+define(`KVM_GET_CPUID2', `0xc008ae91')
+define(`KVM_GET_DEBUGREGS', `0x8080aea1')
+define(`KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR', `0x4018aee2')
+define(`KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG', `0x4010ae42')
+define(`KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID', `0xc008ae09')
+define(`KVM_GET_FPU', `0x81a0ae8c')
+define(`KVM_GET_IRQCHIP', `0xc208ae62')
+define(`KVM_GET_LAPIC', `0x8400ae8e')
+define(`KVM_GET_MP_STATE', `0x8004ae98')
+define(`KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST', `0xc004ae02')
+define(`KVM_GET_MSRS', `0xc008ae88')
+define(`KVM_GET_NR_MMU_PAGES', `0x0000ae45')
+define(`KVM_GET_ONE_REG', `0x4010aeab')
+define(`KVM_GET_PIT', `0xc048ae65')
+define(`KVM_GET_PIT2', `0x8070ae9f')
+define(`KVM_GET_REG_LIST', `0xc008aeb0')
+define(`KVM_GET_REGS', `0x8090ae81')
+define(`KVM_GET_SREGS', `0x8138ae83')
+define(`KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID', `0xc008ae05')
+define(`KVM_GET_TSC_KHZ', `0x0000aea3')
+define(`KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS', `0x8040ae9f')
+define(`KVM_GET_VCPU_MMAP_SIZE', `0x0000ae04')
+define(`KVM_GET_XCRS', `0x8188aea6')
+define(`KVM_GET_XSAVE', `0x9000aea4')
+define(`KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR', `0x4018aee3')
+define(`KVM_INTERRUPT', `0x4004ae86')
+define(`KVM_IOEVENTFD', `0x4040ae79')
+define(`KVM_IRQFD', `0x4020ae76')
+define(`KVM_IRQ_LINE', `0x4008ae61')
+define(`KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS', `0xc008ae67')
+define(`KVM_KVMCLOCK_CTRL', `0x0000aead')
+define(`KVM_NMI', `0x0000ae9a')
+define(`KVM_PPC_ALLOCATE_HTAB', `0xc004aea7')
+define(`KVM_PPC_GET_HTAB_FD', `0x4020aeaa')
+define(`KVM_PPC_GET_PVINFO', `0x4080aea1')
+define(`KVM_PPC_GET_SMMU_INFO', `0x8250aea6')
+define(`KVM_PPC_RTAS_DEFINE_TOKEN', `0x4080aeac')
+define(`KVM_REGISTER_COALESCED_MMIO', `0x4010ae67')
+define(`KVM_REINJECT_CONTROL', `0x0000ae71')
+define(`KVM_RUN', `0x0000ae80')
+define(`KVM_S390_ENABLE_SIE', `0x0000ae06')
+define(`KVM_S390_INITIAL_RESET', `0x0000ae97')
+define(`KVM_S390_INTERRUPT', `0x4010ae94')
+define(`KVM_S390_SET_INITIAL_PSW', `0x4010ae96')
+define(`KVM_S390_STORE_STATUS', `0x4008ae95')
+define(`KVM_S390_UCAS_MAP', `0x4018ae50')
+define(`KVM_S390_UCAS_UNMAP', `0x4018ae51')
+define(`KVM_S390_VCPU_FAULT', `0x4008ae52')
+define(`KVM_SET_BOOT_CPU_ID', `0x0000ae78')
+define(`KVM_SET_CLOCK', `0x4030ae7b')
+define(`KVM_SET_CPUID', `0x4008ae8a')
+define(`KVM_SET_CPUID2', `0x4008ae90')
+define(`KVM_SET_DEBUGREGS', `0x4080aea2')
+define(`KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR', `0x4018aee1')
+define(`KVM_SET_FPU', `0x41a0ae8d')
+define(`KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING', `0x4008ae6a')
+define(`KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG', `0x4048ae9b')
+define(`KVM_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR', `0x4008ae48')
+define(`KVM_SET_IRQCHIP', `0x8208ae63')
+define(`KVM_SET_LAPIC', `0x4400ae8f')
+define(`KVM_SET_MEMORY_ALIAS', `0x4020ae43')
+define(`KVM_SET_MEMORY_REGION', `0x4018ae40')
+define(`KVM_SET_MP_STATE', `0x4004ae99')
+define(`KVM_SET_MSRS', `0x4008ae89')
+define(`KVM_SET_NR_MMU_PAGES', `0x0000ae44')
+define(`KVM_SET_ONE_REG', `0x4010aeac')
+define(`KVM_SET_PIT', `0x8048ae66')
+define(`KVM_SET_PIT2', `0x4070aea0')
+define(`KVM_SET_REGS', `0x4090ae82')
+define(`KVM_SET_SIGNAL_MASK', `0x4004ae8b')
+define(`KVM_SET_SREGS', `0x4138ae84')
+define(`KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ', `0x0000aea2')
+define(`KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR', `0x0000ae47')
+define(`KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION', `0x4020ae46')
+define(`KVM_SET_VAPIC_ADDR', `0x4008ae93')
+define(`KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS', `0x4040aea0')
+define(`KVM_SET_XCRS', `0x4188aea7')
+define(`KVM_SET_XSAVE', `0x5000aea5')
+define(`KVM_SIGNAL_MSI', `0x4020aea5')
+define(`KVM_TPR_ACCESS_REPORTING', `0xc028ae92')
+define(`KVM_TRANSLATE', `0xc018ae85')
+define(`KVM_UNREGISTER_COALESCED_MMIO', `0x4010ae68')
+define(`KVM_X86_GET_MCE_CAP_SUPPORTED', `0x8008ae9d')
+define(`KVM_X86_SET_MCE', `0x4040ae9e')
+define(`KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE', `0x4008ae9c')
+define(`KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG', `0x4038ae7a')
+define(`KYRO_IOCTL_OVERLAY_CREATE', `0x00006b00')
+define(`KYRO_IOCTL_OVERLAY_OFFSET', `0x00006b04')
+define(`KYRO_IOCTL_OVERLAY_VIEWPORT_SET', `0x00006b01')
+define(`KYRO_IOCTL_SET_VIDEO_MODE', `0x00006b02')
+define(`KYRO_IOCTL_STRIDE', `0x00006b05')
+define(`KYRO_IOCTL_UVSTRIDE', `0x00006b03')
+define(`LIRC_GET_FEATURES', `0x80046900')
+define(`LIRC_GET_LENGTH', `0x8004690f')
+define(`LIRC_GET_MAX_FILTER_PULSE', `0x8004690b')
+define(`LIRC_GET_MAX_FILTER_SPACE', `0x8004690d')
+define(`LIRC_GET_MAX_TIMEOUT', `0x80046909')
+define(`LIRC_GET_MIN_FILTER_PULSE', `0x8004690a')
+define(`LIRC_GET_MIN_FILTER_SPACE', `0x8004690c')
+define(`LIRC_GET_MIN_TIMEOUT', `0x80046908')
+define(`LIRC_GET_REC_CARRIER', `0x80046904')
+define(`LIRC_GET_REC_DUTY_CYCLE', `0x80046906')
+define(`LIRC_GET_REC_MODE', `0x80046902')
+define(`LIRC_GET_REC_RESOLUTION', `0x80046907')
+define(`LIRC_GET_SEND_CARRIER', `0x80046903')
+define(`LIRC_GET_SEND_DUTY_CYCLE', `0x80046905')
+define(`LIRC_GET_SEND_MODE', `0x80046901')
+define(`LIRC_NOTIFY_DECODE', `0x00006920')
+define(`LIRC_SET_MEASURE_CARRIER_MODE', `0x4004691d')
+define(`LIRC_SET_REC_CARRIER', `0x40046914')
+define(`LIRC_SET_REC_CARRIER_RANGE', `0x4004691f')
+define(`LIRC_SET_REC_DUTY_CYCLE', `0x40046916')
+define(`LIRC_SET_REC_DUTY_CYCLE_RANGE', `0x4004691e')
+define(`LIRC_SET_REC_FILTER', `0x4004691c')
+define(`LIRC_SET_REC_FILTER_PULSE', `0x4004691a')
+define(`LIRC_SET_REC_FILTER_SPACE', `0x4004691b')
+define(`LIRC_SET_REC_MODE', `0x40046912')
+define(`LIRC_SET_REC_TIMEOUT', `0x40046918')
+define(`LIRC_SET_REC_TIMEOUT_REPORTS', `0x40046919')
+define(`LIRC_SET_SEND_CARRIER', `0x40046913')
+define(`LIRC_SET_SEND_DUTY_CYCLE', `0x40046915')
+define(`LIRC_SET_SEND_MODE', `0x40046911')
+define(`LIRC_SET_TRANSMITTER_MASK', `0x40046917')
+define(`LIRC_SETUP_END', `0x00006922')
+define(`LIRC_SETUP_START', `0x00006921')
+define(`LIRC_SET_WIDEBAND_RECEIVER', `0x40046923')
+define(`LOGGER_FLUSH_LOG', `0x0000ae04')
+define(`LOGGER_GET_LOG_BUF_SIZE', `0x0000ae01')
+define(`LOGGER_GET_LOG_LEN', `0x0000ae02')
+define(`LOGGER_GET_NEXT_ENTRY_LEN', `0x0000ae03')
+define(`LOGGER_GET_VERSION', `0x0000ae05')
+define(`LOGGER_SET_VERSION', `0x0000ae06')
+define(`LOOP_CHANGE_FD', `0x00004c06')
+define(`LOOP_CLR_FD', `0x00004c01')
+define(`LOOP_CONFIGURE', `0x00004c0a')
+define(`LOOP_CTL_ADD', `0x00004c80')
+define(`LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE', `0x00004c82')
+define(`LOOP_CTL_REMOVE', `0x00004c81')
+define(`LOOP_GET_STATUS', `0x00004c03')
+define(`LOOP_GET_STATUS64', `0x00004c05')
+define(`LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE', `0x00004c09')
+define(`LOOP_SET_CAPACITY', `0x00004c07')
+define(`LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO', `0x00004c08')
+define(`LOOP_SET_FD', `0x00004c00')
+define(`LOOP_SET_STATUS', `0x00004c02')
+define(`LOOP_SET_STATUS64', `0x00004c04')
+define(`MATROXFB_GET_ALL_OUTPUTS', `0x80086efb')
+define(`MATROXFB_GET_AVAILABLE_OUTPUTS', `0x80086ef9')
+define(`MATROXFB_GET_OUTPUT_CONNECTION', `0x80086ef8')
+define(`MATROXFB_GET_OUTPUT_MODE', `0xc0086efa')
+define(`MATROXFB_SET_OUTPUT_CONNECTION', `0x40086ef8')
+define(`MATROXFB_SET_OUTPUT_MODE', `0x40086efa')
+define(`MBXFB_IOCG_ALPHA', `0x8018f401')
+define(`MBXFB_IOCS_ALPHA', `0x4018f402')
+define(`MBXFB_IOCS_PLANEORDER', `0x8002f403')
+define(`MBXFB_IOCS_REG', `0x400cf404')
+define(`MBXFB_IOCX_OVERLAY', `0xc030f400')
+define(`MBXFB_IOCX_REG', `0xc00cf405')
+define(`MCE_GETCLEAR_FLAGS', `0x80044d03')
+define(`MCE_GET_LOG_LEN', `0x80044d02')
+define(`MCE_GET_RECORD_LEN', `0x80044d01')
+define(`MEDIA_IOC_DEVICE_INFO', `0xc1007c00')
+define(`MEDIA_IOC_ENUM_ENTITIES', `0xc1007c01')
+define(`MEDIA_IOC_ENUM_LINKS', `0xc0287c02')
+define(`MEDIA_IOC_SETUP_LINK', `0xc0347c03')
+define(`MEMERASE', `0x40084d02')
+define(`MEMERASE64', `0x40104d14')
+define(`MEMGETBADBLOCK', `0x40084d0b')
+define(`MEMGETINFO', `0x80204d01')
+define(`MEMGETOOBSEL', `0x80c84d0a')
+define(`MEMGETREGIONCOUNT', `0x80044d07')
+define(`MEMGETREGIONINFO', `0xc0104d08')
+define(`MEMISLOCKED', `0x80084d17')
+define(`MEMLOCK', `0x40084d05')
+define(`MEMREADOOB', `0xc0104d04')
+define(`MEMREADOOB64', `0xc0184d16')
+define(`MEMSETBADBLOCK', `0x40084d0c')
+define(`MEMUNLOCK', `0x40084d06')
+define(`MEMWRITE', `0xc0304d18')
+define(`MEMWRITEOOB', `0xc0104d03')
+define(`MEMWRITEOOB64', `0xc0184d15')
+define(`MEYEIOC_G_PARAMS', `0x800676c0')
+define(`MEYEIOC_QBUF_CAPT', `0x400476c2')
+define(`MEYEIOC_S_PARAMS', `0x400676c1')
+define(`MEYEIOC_STILLCAPT', `0x000076c4')
+define(`MEYEIOC_STILLJCAPT', `0x800476c5')
+define(`MEYEIOC_SYNC', `0xc00476c3')
+define(`MFB_GET_ALPHA', `0x80014d00')
+define(`MFB_GET_AOID', `0x80084d04')
+define(`MFB_GET_GAMMA', `0x80014d01')
+define(`MFB_GET_PIXFMT', `0x80044d08')
+define(`MFB_SET_ALPHA', `0x40014d00')
+define(`MFB_SET_AOID', `0x40084d04')
+define(`MFB_SET_BRIGHTNESS', `0x40014d03')
+define(`MFB_SET_CHROMA_KEY', `0x400c4d01')
+define(`MFB_SET_GAMMA', `0x40014d01')
+define(`MFB_SET_PIXFMT', `0x40044d08')
+define(`MGSL_IOCCLRMODCOUNT', `0x00006d0f')
+define(`MGSL_IOCGGPIO', `0x80106d11')
+define(`MGSL_IOCGIF', `0x00006d0b')
+define(`MGSL_IOCGPARAMS', `0x80306d01')
+define(`MGSL_IOCGSTATS', `0x00006d07')
+define(`MGSL_IOCGTXIDLE', `0x00006d03')
+define(`MGSL_IOCGXCTRL', `0x00006d16')
+define(`MGSL_IOCGXSYNC', `0x00006d14')
+define(`MGSL_IOCLOOPTXDONE', `0x00006d09')
+define(`MGSL_IOCRXENABLE', `0x00006d05')
+define(`MGSL_IOCSGPIO', `0x40106d10')
+define(`MGSL_IOCSIF', `0x00006d0a')
+define(`MGSL_IOCSPARAMS', `0x40306d00')
+define(`MGSL_IOCSTXIDLE', `0x00006d02')
+define(`MGSL_IOCSXCTRL', `0x00006d15')
+define(`MGSL_IOCSXSYNC', `0x00006d13')
+define(`MGSL_IOCTXABORT', `0x00006d06')
+define(`MGSL_IOCTXENABLE', `0x00006d04')
+define(`MGSL_IOCWAITEVENT', `0xc0046d08')
+define(`MGSL_IOCWAITGPIO', `0xc0106d12')
+define(`MIC_VIRTIO_ADD_DEVICE', `0xc0087301')
+define(`MIC_VIRTIO_CONFIG_CHANGE', `0xc0087305')
+define(`MIC_VIRTIO_COPY_DESC', `0xc0087302')
+define(`MMC_IOC_CMD', `0xc048b300')
+define(`MMTIMER_GETBITS', `0x00006d04')
+define(`MMTIMER_GETCOUNTER', `0x80086d09')
+define(`MMTIMER_GETFREQ', `0x80086d02')
+define(`MMTIMER_GETOFFSET', `0x00006d00')
+define(`MMTIMER_GETRES', `0x80086d01')
+define(`MMTIMER_MMAPAVAIL', `0x00006d06')
+define(`MSMFB_BLIT', `0x40046d02')
+define(`MSMFB_GRP_DISP', `0x40046d01')
+define(`MTDFILEMODE', `0x00004d13')
+define(`MTIOCGET', `0x80306d02')
+define(`MTIOCPOS', `0x80086d03')
+define(`MTIOCTOP', `0x40086d01')
+define(`MTRRIOC_ADD_ENTRY', `0x40104d00')
+define(`MTRRIOC_ADD_PAGE_ENTRY', `0x40104d05')
+define(`MTRRIOC_DEL_ENTRY', `0x40104d02')
+define(`MTRRIOC_DEL_PAGE_ENTRY', `0x40104d07')
+define(`MTRRIOC_GET_ENTRY', `0xc0184d03')
+define(`MTRRIOC_GET_PAGE_ENTRY', `0xc0184d08')
+define(`MTRRIOC_KILL_ENTRY', `0x40104d04')
+define(`MTRRIOC_KILL_PAGE_ENTRY', `0x40104d09')
+define(`MTRRIOC_SET_ENTRY', `0x40104d01')
+define(`MTRRIOC_SET_PAGE_ENTRY', `0x40104d06')
+define(`NBD_CLEAR_QUE', `0x0000ab05')
+define(`NBD_CLEAR_SOCK', `0x0000ab04')
+define(`NBD_DISCONNECT', `0x0000ab08')
+define(`NBD_DO_IT', `0x0000ab03')
+define(`NBD_PRINT_DEBUG', `0x0000ab06')
+define(`NBD_SET_BLKSIZE', `0x0000ab01')
+define(`NBD_SET_FLAGS', `0x0000ab0a')
+define(`NBD_SET_SIZE', `0x0000ab02')
+define(`NBD_SET_SIZE_BLOCKS', `0x0000ab07')
+define(`NBD_SET_SOCK', `0x0000ab00')
+define(`NBD_SET_TIMEOUT', `0x0000ab09')
+define(`NCP_IOC_CONN_LOGGED_IN', `0x00006e03')
+define(`NCP_IOC_GETCHARSETS', `0xc02a6e0b')
+define(`NCP_IOC_GETDENTRYTTL', `0x40046e0c')
+define(`NCP_IOC_GET_FS_INFO', `0xc0286e04')
+define(`NCP_IOC_GET_FS_INFO_V2', `0xc0306e04')
+define(`NCP_IOC_GETMOUNTUID', `0x40026e02')
+define(`NCP_IOC_GETMOUNTUID2', `0x40086e02')
+define(`NCP_IOC_GETOBJECTNAME', `0xc0186e09')
+define(`NCP_IOC_GETPRIVATEDATA', `0xc0106e0a')
+define(`NCP_IOC_GETROOT', `0x400c6e08')
+define(`NCP_IOC_LOCKUNLOCK', `0x80146e07')
+define(`NCP_IOC_NCPREQUEST', `0x80106e01')
+define(`NCP_IOC_SETCHARSETS', `0x802a6e0b')
+define(`NCP_IOC_SETDENTRYTTL', `0x80046e0c')
+define(`NCP_IOC_SETOBJECTNAME', `0x80186e09')
+define(`NCP_IOC_SETPRIVATEDATA', `0x80106e0a')
+define(`NCP_IOC_SETROOT', `0x800c6e08')
+define(`NCP_IOC_SET_SIGN_WANTED', `0x40046e06')
+define(`NCP_IOC_SIGN_INIT', `0x80186e05')
+define(`NCP_IOC_SIGN_WANTED', `0x80046e06')
+define(`NET_ADD_IF', `0xc0066f34')
+define(`NET_GET_IF', `0xc0066f36')
+define(`NET_REMOVE_IF', `0x00006f35')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_CHANGE_CPMODE', `0x40106e80')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS', `0x40786e88')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_DELETE_CHECKPOINT', `0x40086e81')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_GET_BDESCS', `0xc0186e87')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_GET_CPINFO', `0x80186e82')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_GET_CPSTAT', `0x80186e83')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_GET_SUINFO', `0x80186e84')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_GET_SUSTAT', `0x80306e85')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_GET_VINFO', `0xc0186e86')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_RESIZE', `0x40086e8b')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_SET_ALLOC_RANGE', `0x40106e8c')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_SET_SUINFO', `0x40186e8d')
+define(`NILFS_IOCTL_SYNC', `0x80086e8a')
+define(`NS_ADJBUFLEV', `0x00006163')
+define(`NS_GETPSTAT', `0xc0106161')
+define(`NS_SETBUFLEV', `0x40106162')
+define(`NVME_IOCTL_ADMIN_CMD', `0xc0484e41')
+define(`NVME_IOCTL_ID', `0x00004e40')
+define(`NVME_IOCTL_IO_CMD', `0xc0484e43')
+define(`NVME_IOCTL_SUBMIT_IO', `0x40304e42')
+define(`NVRAM_INIT', `0x00007040')
+define(`NVRAM_SETCKS', `0x00007041')
+define(`OLD_PHONE_RING_START', `0x00007187')
+define(`OMAPFB_CTRL_TEST', `0x40044f2e')
+define(`OMAPFB_GET_CAPS', `0x800c4f2a')
+define(`OMAPFB_GET_COLOR_KEY', `0x40104f33')
+define(`OMAPFB_GET_DISPLAY_INFO', `0x80204f3f')
+define(`OMAPFB_GET_OVERLAY_COLORMODE', `0x803c4f3b')
+define(`OMAPFB_GET_UPDATE_MODE', `0x40044f2b')
+define(`OMAPFB_GET_VRAM_INFO', `0x80204f3d')
+define(`OMAPFB_LCD_TEST', `0x40044f2d')
+define(`OMAPFB_MEMORY_READ', `0x80184f3a')
+define(`OMAPFB_MIRROR', `0x40044f1f')
+define(`OMAPFB_QUERY_MEM', `0x40084f38')
+define(`OMAPFB_QUERY_PLANE', `0x40444f35')
+define(`OMAPFB_SET_COLOR_KEY', `0x40104f32')
+define(`OMAPFB_SET_TEARSYNC', `0x40084f3e')
+define(`OMAPFB_SET_UPDATE_MODE', `0x40044f28')
+define(`OMAPFB_SETUP_MEM', `0x40084f37')
+define(`OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE', `0x40444f34')
+define(`OMAPFB_SYNC_GFX', `0x00004f25')
+define(`OMAPFB_UPDATE_WINDOW', `0x40444f36')
+define(`OMAPFB_UPDATE_WINDOW_OLD', `0x40144f2f')
+define(`OMAPFB_VSYNC', `0x00004f26')
+define(`OMAPFB_WAITFORGO', `0x00004f3c')
+define(`OMAPFB_WAITFORVSYNC', `0x00004f39')
+define(`OSD_GET_CAPABILITY', `0x80106fa1')
+define(`OSD_SEND_CMD', `0x40206fa0')
+define(`OSIOCGNETADDR', `0x800489e1')
+define(`OSIOCSNETADDR', `0x400489e0')
+define(`OSS_GETVERSION', `0x80044d76')
+define(`OTPGETREGIONCOUNT', `0x40044d0e')
+define(`OTPGETREGIONINFO', `0x400c4d0f')
+define(`OTPLOCK', `0x800c4d10')
+define(`OTPSELECT', `0x80044d0d')
+define(`PACKET_CTRL_CMD', `0xc0185801')
+define(`PERF_EVENT_IOC_DISABLE', `0x00002401')
+define(`PERF_EVENT_IOC_ENABLE', `0x00002400')
+define(`PERF_EVENT_IOC_ID', `0x80082407')
+define(`PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD', `0x40082404')
+define(`PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH', `0x00002402')
+define(`PERF_EVENT_IOC_RESET', `0x00002403')
+define(`PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_FILTER', `0x40082406')
+define(`PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT', `0x00002405')
+define(`PHN_GET_REG', `0xc0087000')
+define(`PHN_GETREG', `0xc0087005')
+define(`PHN_GET_REGS', `0xc0087002')
+define(`PHN_GETREGS', `0xc0287007')
+define(`PHN_NOT_OH', `0x00007004')
+define(`PHN_SET_REG', `0x40087001')
+define(`PHN_SETREG', `0x40087006')
+define(`PHN_SET_REGS', `0x40087003')
+define(`PHN_SETREGS', `0x40287008')
+define(`PHONE_BUSY', `0x000071a1')
+define(`PHONE_CAPABILITIES', `0x00007180')
+define(`PHONE_CAPABILITIES_CHECK', `0x40087182')
+define(`PHONE_CAPABILITIES_LIST', `0x80087181')
+define(`PHONE_CPT_STOP', `0x000071a4')
+define(`PHONE_DIALTONE', `0x000071a3')
+define(`PHONE_DTMF_OOB', `0x40047199')
+define(`PHONE_DTMF_READY', `0x80047196')
+define(`PHONE_EXCEPTION', `0x8004719a')
+define(`PHONE_FRAME', `0x4004718d')
+define(`PHONE_GET_DTMF', `0x80047197')
+define(`PHONE_GET_DTMF_ASCII', `0x80047198')
+define(`PHONE_GET_TONE_OFF_TIME', `0x0000719f')
+define(`PHONE_GET_TONE_ON_TIME', `0x0000719e')
+define(`PHONE_GET_TONE_STATE', `0x000071a0')
+define(`PHONE_HOOKSTATE', `0x00007184')
+define(`PHONE_MAXRINGS', `0x40017185')
+define(`PHONE_PLAY_CODEC', `0x40047190')
+define(`PHONE_PLAY_DEPTH', `0x40047193')
+define(`PHONE_PLAY_LEVEL', `0x00007195')
+define(`PHONE_PLAY_START', `0x00007191')
+define(`PHONE_PLAY_STOP', `0x00007192')
+define(`PHONE_PLAY_TONE', `0x4001719b')
+define(`PHONE_PLAY_VOLUME', `0x40047194')
+define(`PHONE_PLAY_VOLUME_LINEAR', `0x400471dc')
+define(`PHONE_PSTN_GET_STATE', `0x000071a5')
+define(`PHONE_PSTN_LINETEST', `0x000071a8')
+define(`PHONE_PSTN_SET_STATE', `0x400471a4')
+define(`PHONE_QUERY_CODEC', `0xc00871a7')
+define(`PHONE_REC_CODEC', `0x40047189')
+define(`PHONE_REC_DEPTH', `0x4004718c')
+define(`PHONE_REC_LEVEL', `0x0000718f')
+define(`PHONE_REC_START', `0x0000718a')
+define(`PHONE_REC_STOP', `0x0000718b')
+define(`PHONE_REC_VOLUME', `0x4004718e')
+define(`PHONE_REC_VOLUME_LINEAR', `0x400471db')
+define(`PHONE_RING', `0x00007183')
+define(`PHONE_RINGBACK', `0x000071a2')
+define(`PHONE_RING_CADENCE', `0x40027186')
+define(`PHONE_RING_START', `0x40087187')
+define(`PHONE_RING_STOP', `0x00007188')
+define(`PHONE_SET_TONE_OFF_TIME', `0x4004719d')
+define(`PHONE_SET_TONE_ON_TIME', `0x4004719c')
+define(`PHONE_VAD', `0x400471a9')
+define(`PHONE_WINK', `0x400471aa')
+define(`PHONE_WINK_DURATION', `0x400471a6')
+define(`PIO_CMAP', `0x00004b71')
+define(`PIO_FONT', `0x00004b61')
+define(`PIO_FONTRESET', `0x00004b6d')
+define(`PIO_FONTX', `0x00004b6c')
+define(`PIO_SCRNMAP', `0x00004b41')
+define(`PIO_UNIMAP', `0x00004b67')
+define(`PIO_UNIMAPCLR', `0x00004b68')
+define(`PIO_UNISCRNMAP', `0x00004b6a')
+define(`PMU_IOC_CAN_SLEEP', `0x80084205')
+define(`PMU_IOC_GET_BACKLIGHT', `0x80084201')
+define(`PMU_IOC_GET_MODEL', `0x80084203')
+define(`PMU_IOC_GRAB_BACKLIGHT', `0x80084206')
+define(`PMU_IOC_HAS_ADB', `0x80084204')
+define(`PMU_IOC_SET_BACKLIGHT', `0x40084202')
+define(`PMU_IOC_SLEEP', `0x00004200')
+define(`PPCLAIM', `0x0000708b')
+define(`PPCLRIRQ', `0x80047093')
+define(`PPDATADIR', `0x40047090')
+define(`PPEXCL', `0x0000708f')
+define(`PPFCONTROL', `0x4002708e')
+define(`PPGETFLAGS', `0x8004709a')
+define(`PPGETMODE', `0x80047098')
+define(`PPGETMODES', `0x80047097')
+define(`PPGETPHASE', `0x80047099')
+define(`PPGETTIME', `0x80107095')
+define(`PPNEGOT', `0x40047091')
+define(`PPPIOCATTACH',       `0x743d')
+define(`PPPIOCATTCHAN',      `0x7438')
+define(`PPPIOCBUNDLE',       `0x7481')
+define(`PPPIOCCONNECT',      `0x743a')
+define(`PPPIOCDETACH',       `0x743c')
+define(`PPPIOCDISCONN',      `0x7439')
+define(`PPPIOCGASYNCMAP',    `0x7458')
+define(`PPPIOCGCALLINFO',    `0x7480')
+define(`PPPIOCGCHAN',        `0x7437')
+define(`PPPIOCGCOMPRESSORS', `0x7486')
+define(`PPPIOCGDEBUG',       `0x7441')
+define(`PPPIOCGFLAGS',       `0x745a')
+define(`PPPIOCGIDLE',        `0x743f')
+define(`PPPIOCGIFNAME',      `0x7488')
+define(`PPPIOCGL2TPSTATS',   `0x7436')
+define(`PPPIOCGMPFLAGS',     `0x7482')
+define(`PPPIOCGMRU',         `0x7453')
+define(`PPPIOCGNPMODE',      `0x744c')
+define(`PPPIOCGRASYNCMAP',   `0x7455')
+define(`PPPIOCGUNIT',        `0x7456')
+define(`PPPIOCGXASYNCMAP',   `0x7450')
+define(`PPPIOCNEWUNIT',      `0x743e')
+define(`PPPIOCSACTIVE',      `0x7446')
+define(`PPPIOCSASYNCMAP',    `0x7457')
+define(`PPPIOCSCOMPRESS',    `0x744d')
+define(`PPPIOCSCOMPRESSOR',  `0x7487')
+define(`PPPIOCSDEBUG',       `0x7440')
+define(`PPPIOCSFLAGS',       `0x7459')
+define(`PPPIOCSMAXCID',      `0x7451')
+define(`PPPIOCSMPFLAGS',     `0x7483')
+define(`PPPIOCSMPMRU',       `0x7485')
+define(`PPPIOCSMPMTU',       `0x7484')
+define(`PPPIOCSMRRU',        `0x743b')
+define(`PPPIOCSMRU',         `0x7452')
+define(`PPPIOCSNPMODE',      `0x744b')
+define(`PPPIOCSPASS',        `0x7447')
+define(`PPPIOCSRASYNCMAP',   `0x7454')
+define(`PPPIOCSXASYNCMAP',   `0x744f')
+define(`PPPIOCXFERUNIT',     `0x744e')
+define(`PPPOEIOCDFWD', `0x0000b101')
+define(`PPPOEIOCSFWD', `0x4008b100')
+define(`PPRCONTROL', `0x80017083')
+define(`PPRDATA', `0x80017085')
+define(`PPRELEASE', `0x0000708c')
+define(`PPRSTATUS', `0x80017081')
+define(`PPSETFLAGS', `0x4004709b')
+define(`PPSETMODE', `0x40047080')
+define(`PPSETPHASE', `0x40047094')
+define(`PPSETTIME', `0x40107096')
+define(`PPS_FETCH', `0xc00870a4')
+define(`PPS_GETCAP', `0x800870a3')
+define(`PPS_GETPARAMS', `0x800870a1')
+define(`PPS_KC_BIND', `0x400870a5')
+define(`PPS_SETPARAMS', `0x400870a2')
+define(`PPWCONTROL', `0x40017084')
+define(`PPWCTLONIRQ', `0x40017092')
+define(`PPWDATA', `0x40017086')
+define(`PPYIELD', `0x0000708d')
+define(`PROTECT_ARRAY', `0x00000927')
+define(`PTP_CLOCK_GETCAPS', `0x80503d01')
+define(`PTP_ENABLE_PPS', `0x40043d04')
+define(`PTP_EXTTS_REQUEST', `0x40103d02')
+define(`PTP_PEROUT_REQUEST', `0x40383d03')
+define(`PTP_PIN_GETFUNC', `0xc0603d06')
+define(`PTP_PIN_SETFUNC', `0x40603d07')
+define(`PTP_SYS_OFFSET', `0x43403d05')
+define(`RAID_AUTORUN', `0x00000914')
+define(`RAID_VERSION', `0x800c0910')
+define(`RAW_GETBIND', `0x0000ac01')
+define(`RAW_SETBIND', `0x0000ac00')
+define(`REISERFS_IOC_UNPACK', `0x4008cd01')
+define(`RESTART_ARRAY_RW', `0x00000934')
+define(`RFCOMMCREATEDEV', `0x400452c8')
+define(`RFCOMMGETDEVINFO', `0x800452d3')
+define(`RFCOMMGETDEVLIST', `0x800452d2')
+define(`RFCOMMRELEASEDEV', `0x400452c9')
+define(`RFCOMMSTEALDLC', `0x400452dc')
+define(`RFKILL_IOCTL_NOINPUT', `0x00005201')
+define(`RNDADDENTROPY', `0x40085203')
+define(`RNDADDTOENTCNT', `0x40045201')
+define(`RNDCLEARPOOL', `0x00005206')
+define(`RNDGETENTCNT', `0x80045200')
+define(`RNDGETPOOL', `0x80085202')
+define(`RNDZAPENTCNT', `0x00005204')
+define(`ROCCATIOCGREPSIZE', `0x800448f1')
+define(`RTC_AIE_OFF', `0x00007002')
+define(`RTC_AIE_ON', `0x00007001')
+define(`RTC_ALM_READ', `0x80247008')
+define(`RTC_ALM_SET', `0x40247007')
+define(`RTC_EPOCH_READ', `0x8008700d')
+define(`RTC_EPOCH_SET', `0x4008700e')
+define(`RTC_IRQP_READ', `0x8008700b')
+define(`RTC_IRQP_SET', `0x4008700c')
+define(`RTC_PIE_OFF', `0x00007006')
+define(`RTC_PIE_ON', `0x00007005')
+define(`RTC_PLL_GET', `0x80207011')
+define(`RTC_PLL_SET', `0x40207012')
+define(`RTC_RD_TIME', `0x80247009')
+define(`RTC_SET_TIME', `0x4024700a')
+define(`RTC_UIE_OFF', `0x00007004')
+define(`RTC_UIE_ON', `0x00007003')
+define(`RTC_VL_CLR', `0x00007014')
+define(`RTC_VL_READ', `0x80047013')
+define(`RTC_WIE_OFF', `0x00007010')
+define(`RTC_WIE_ON', `0x0000700f')
+define(`RTC_WKALM_RD', `0x80287010')
+define(`RTC_WKALM_SET', `0x4028700f')
+define(`RUN_ARRAY', `0x400c0930')
+define(`S5P_FIMC_TX_END_NOTIFY', `0x00006500')
+define(`SAA6588_CMD_CLOSE', `0x40045202')
+define(`SAA6588_CMD_POLL', `0x80045204')
+define(`SAA6588_CMD_READ', `0x80045203')
+define(`SCSI_IOCTL_DOORLOCK', `0x00005380')
+define(`SCSI_IOCTL_DOORUNLOCK', `0x00005381')
+define(`SCSI_IOCTL_GET_BUS_NUMBER', `0x00005386')
+define(`SCSI_IOCTL_GET_IDLUN', `0x00005382')
+define(`SCSI_IOCTL_GET_PCI', `0x00005387')
+define(`SCSI_IOCTL_PROBE_HOST', `0x00005385')
+define(`SET_ARRAY_INFO', `0x40480923')
+define(`SET_BITMAP_FILE', `0x4004092b')
+define(`SET_DISK_FAULTY', `0x00000929')
+define(`SET_DISK_INFO', `0x00000924')
+define(`SG_EMULATED_HOST', `0x00002203')
+define(`SG_GET_ACCESS_COUNT', `0x00002289')
+define(`SG_GET_COMMAND_Q', `0x00002270')
+define(`SG_GET_KEEP_ORPHAN', `0x00002288')
+define(`SG_GET_LOW_DMA', `0x0000227a')
+define(`SG_GET_NUM_WAITING', `0x0000227d')
+define(`SG_GET_PACK_ID', `0x0000227c')
+define(`SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE', `0x00002286')
+define(`SG_GET_RESERVED_SIZE', `0x00002272')
+define(`SG_GET_SCSI_ID', `0x00002276')
+define(`SG_GET_SG_TABLESIZE', `0x0000227f')
+define(`SG_GET_TIMEOUT', `0x00002202')
+define(`SG_GET_TRANSFORM', `0x00002205')
+define(`SG_GET_VERSION_NUM', `0x00002282')
+define(`SG_IO', `0x00002285')
+define(`SG_NEXT_CMD_LEN', `0x00002283')
+define(`SG_SCSI_RESET', `0x00002284')
+define(`SG_SET_COMMAND_Q', `0x00002271')
+define(`SG_SET_DEBUG', `0x0000227e')
+define(`SG_SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA', `0x00002279')
+define(`SG_SET_FORCE_PACK_ID', `0x0000227b')
+define(`SG_SET_KEEP_ORPHAN', `0x00002287')
+define(`SG_SET_RESERVED_SIZE', `0x00002275')
+define(`SG_SET_TIMEOUT', `0x00002201')
+define(`SG_SET_TRANSFORM', `0x00002204')
+define(`SI4713_IOC_MEASURE_RNL', `0xc01c56c0')
+define(`SIOCADDDLCI', `0x00008980')
+define(`SIOCADDMULTI', `0x00008931')
+define(`SIOCADDRT', `0x0000890b')
+define(`SIOCATMARK', `0x00008905')
+define(`SIOCBONDCHANGEACTIVE', `0x00008995')
+define(`SIOCBONDENSLAVE', `0x00008990')
+define(`SIOCBONDINFOQUERY', `0x00008994')
+define(`SIOCBONDRELEASE', `0x00008991')
+define(`SIOCBONDSETHWADDR', `0x00008992')
+define(`SIOCBONDSLAVEINFOQUERY', `0x00008993')
+define(`SIOCBRADDBR', `0x000089a0')
+define(`SIOCBRADDIF', `0x000089a2')
+define(`SIOCBRDELBR', `0x000089a1')
+define(`SIOCBRDELIF', `0x000089a3')
+define(`SIOCDARP', `0x00008953')
+define(`SIOCDELDLCI', `0x00008981')
+define(`SIOCDELMULTI', `0x00008932')
+define(`SIOCDELRT', `0x0000890c')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE', `0x000089f0')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_1', `0x000089f1')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_2', `0x000089f2')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_3', `0x000089f3')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_4', `0x000089f4')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_5', `0x000089f5')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_6', `0x000089f6')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_7', `0x000089f7')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_8', `0x000089f8')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_9', `0x000089f9')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_A', `0x000089fa')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_B', `0x000089fb')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_C', `0x000089fc')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_D', `0x000089fd')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVATE_E', `0x000089fe')
+define(`SIOCDEVPRIVLAST', `0x000089ff')
+define(`SIOCDIFADDR', `0x00008936')
+define(`SIOCDRARP', `0x00008960')
+define(`SIOCETHTOOL', `0x00008946')
+define(`SIOCGARP', `0x00008954')
+define(`SIOCGHWTSTAMP', `0x000089b1')
+define(`SIOCGIFADDR', `0x00008915')
+define(`SIOCGIFBR', `0x00008940')
+define(`SIOCGIFBRDADDR', `0x00008919')
+define(`SIOCGIFCONF', `0x00008912')
+define(`SIOCGIFCOUNT', `0x00008938')
+define(`SIOCGIFDSTADDR', `0x00008917')
+define(`SIOCGIFENCAP', `0x00008925')
+define(`SIOCGIFFLAGS', `0x00008913')
+define(`SIOCGIFHWADDR', `0x00008927')
+define(`SIOCGIFINDEX', `0x00008933')
+define(`SIOCGIFMAP', `0x00008970')
+define(`SIOCGIFMEM', `0x0000891f')
+define(`SIOCGIFMETRIC', `0x0000891d')
+define(`SIOCGIFMTU', `0x00008921')
+define(`SIOCGIFNAME', `0x00008910')
+define(`SIOCGIFNETMASK', `0x0000891b')
+define(`SIOCGIFPFLAGS', `0x00008935')
+define(`SIOCGIFSLAVE', `0x00008929')
+define(`SIOCGIFTXQLEN', `0x00008942')
+define(`SIOCGIFVLAN', `0x00008982')
+define(`SIOCGIWAP', `0x00008b15')
+define(`SIOCGIWAPLIST', `0x00008b17')
+define(`SIOCGIWAUTH', `0x00008b33')
+define(`SIOCGIWENCODE', `0x00008b2b')
+define(`SIOCGIWENCODEEXT', `0x00008b35')
+define(`SIOCGIWESSID', `0x00008b1b')
+define(`SIOCGIWFRAG', `0x00008b25')
+define(`SIOCGIWFREQ', `0x00008b05')
+define(`SIOCGIWGENIE', `0x00008b31')
+define(`SIOCGIWMODE', `0x00008b07')
+define(`SIOCGIWNAME', `0x00008b01')
+define(`SIOCGIWNICKN', `0x00008b1d')
+define(`SIOCGIWNWID', `0x00008b03')
+define(`SIOCGIWPOWER', `0x00008b2d')
+define(`SIOCGIWPRIV', `0x00008b0d')
+define(`SIOCGIWRANGE', `0x00008b0b')
+define(`SIOCGIWRATE', `0x00008b21')
+define(`SIOCGIWRETRY', `0x00008b29')
+define(`SIOCGIWRTS', `0x00008b23')
+define(`SIOCGIWSCAN', `0x00008b19')
+define(`SIOCGIWSENS', `0x00008b09')
+define(`SIOCGIWSPY', `0x00008b11')
+define(`SIOCGIWSTATS', `0x00008b0f')
+define(`SIOCGIWTHRSPY', `0x00008b13')
+define(`SIOCGIWTXPOW', `0x00008b27')
+define(`SIOCGMIIPHY', `0x00008947')
+define(`SIOCGMIIREG', `0x00008948')
+define(`SIOCGNETADDR', `0x800489e1')
+define(`SIOCGPGRP', `0x00008904')
+define(`SIOCGRARP', `0x00008961')
+define(`SIOCGSTAMP', `0x00008906')
+define(`SIOCGSTAMPNS', `0x00008907')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRST', `0x00008b00')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_01', `0x00008be1')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_02', `0x00008be2')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_03', `0x00008be3')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_04', `0x00008be4')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_05', `0x00008be5')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_06', `0x00008be6')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_07', `0x00008be7')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_08', `0x00008be8')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_09', `0x00008be9')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_0A', `0x00008bea')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_0B', `0x00008beb')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_0C', `0x00008bec')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_0D', `0x00008bed')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_0E', `0x00008bee')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_0F', `0x00008bef')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV', `0x00008be0')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_10', `0x00008bf0')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_11', `0x00008bf1')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_12', `0x00008bf2')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_13', `0x00008bf3')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_14', `0x00008bf4')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_15', `0x00008bf5')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_16', `0x00008bf6')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_17', `0x00008bf7')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_18', `0x00008bf8')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_19', `0x00008bf9')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_1A', `0x00008bfa')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_1B', `0x00008bfb')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_1C', `0x00008bfc')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_1D', `0x00008bfd')
+define(`SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV_1E', `0x00008bfe')
+define(`SIOCIWLASTPRIV', `0x00008bff')
+define(`SIOCKILLADDR', `0x00008939')
+define(`SIOCMKCLIP', `0x000061e0')
+define(`SIOCOUTQNSD', `0x0000894b')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE', `0x000089e0')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_1', `0x000089e1')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_2', `0x000089e2')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_3', `0x000089e3')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_4', `0x000089e4')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_5', `0x000089e5')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_6', `0x000089e6')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_7', `0x000089e7')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_8', `0x000089e8')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_9', `0x000089e9')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_A', `0x000089ea')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_B', `0x000089eb')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_C', `0x000089ec')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_D', `0x000089ed')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVATE_E', `0x000089ee')
+define(`SIOCPROTOPRIVLAST', `0x000089ef')
+define(`SIOCRTMSG', `0x0000890d')
+define(`SIOCSARP', `0x00008955')
+define(`SIOCSHWTSTAMP', `0x000089b0')
+define(`SIOCSIFADDR', `0x00008916')
+define(`SIOCSIFATMTCP', `0x00006180')
+define(`SIOCSIFBR', `0x00008941')
+define(`SIOCSIFBRDADDR', `0x0000891a')
+define(`SIOCSIFDSTADDR', `0x00008918')
+define(`SIOCSIFENCAP', `0x00008926')
+define(`SIOCSIFFLAGS', `0x00008914')
+define(`SIOCSIFHWADDR', `0x00008924')
+define(`SIOCSIFHWBROADCAST', `0x00008937')
+define(`SIOCSIFLINK', `0x00008911')
+define(`SIOCSIFMAP', `0x00008971')
+define(`SIOCSIFMEM', `0x00008920')
+define(`SIOCSIFMETRIC', `0x0000891e')
+define(`SIOCSIFMTU', `0x00008922')
+define(`SIOCSIFNAME', `0x00008923')
+define(`SIOCSIFNETMASK', `0x0000891c')
+define(`SIOCSIFPFLAGS', `0x00008934')
+define(`SIOCSIFSLAVE', `0x00008930')
+define(`SIOCSIFTXQLEN', `0x00008943')
+define(`SIOCSIFVLAN', `0x00008983')
+define(`SIOCSIWAP', `0x00008b14')
+define(`SIOCSIWAUTH', `0x00008b32')
+define(`SIOCSIWCOMMIT', `0x00008b00')
+define(`SIOCSIWENCODE', `0x00008b2a')
+define(`SIOCSIWENCODEEXT', `0x00008b34')
+define(`SIOCSIWESSID', `0x00008b1a')
+define(`SIOCSIWFRAG', `0x00008b24')
+define(`SIOCSIWFREQ', `0x00008b04')
+define(`SIOCSIWGENIE', `0x00008b30')
+define(`SIOCSIWMLME', `0x00008b16')
+define(`SIOCSIWMODE', `0x00008b06')
+define(`SIOCSIWNICKN', `0x00008b1c')
+define(`SIOCSIWNWID', `0x00008b02')
+define(`SIOCSIWPMKSA', `0x00008b36')
+define(`SIOCSIWPOWER', `0x00008b2c')
+define(`SIOCSIWPRIV', `0x00008b0c')
+define(`SIOCSIWRANGE', `0x00008b0a')
+define(`SIOCSIWRATE', `0x00008b20')
+define(`SIOCSIWRETRY', `0x00008b28')
+define(`SIOCSIWRTS', `0x00008b22')
+define(`SIOCSIWSCAN', `0x00008b18')
+define(`SIOCSIWSENS', `0x00008b08')
+define(`SIOCSIWSPY', `0x00008b10')
+define(`SIOCSIWSTATS', `0x00008b0e')
+define(`SIOCSIWTHRSPY', `0x00008b12')
+define(`SIOCSIWTXPOW', `0x00008b26')
+define(`SIOCSMIIREG', `0x00008949')
+define(`SIOCSNETADDR', `0x400489e0')
+define(`SIOCSPGRP', `0x00008902')
+define(`SIOCSRARP', `0x00008962')
+define(`SIOCWANDEV', `0x0000894a')
+define(`SISFB_COMMAND', `0xc054f305')
+define(`SISFB_GET_AUTOMAXIMIZE', `0x8004f303')
+define(`SISFB_GET_AUTOMAXIMIZE_OLD', `0x80046efa')
+define(`SISFB_GET_INFO', `0x811cf301')
+define(`SISFB_GET_INFO_OLD', `0x80046ef8')
+define(`SISFB_GET_INFO_SIZE', `0x8004f300')
+define(`SISFB_GET_TVPOSOFFSET', `0x8004f304')
+define(`SISFB_GET_VBRSTATUS', `0x8004f302')
+define(`SISFB_GET_VBRSTATUS_OLD', `0x80046ef9')
+define(`SISFB_SET_AUTOMAXIMIZE', `0x4004f303')
+define(`SISFB_SET_AUTOMAXIMIZE_OLD', `0x40046efa')
+define(`SISFB_SET_LOCK', `0x4004f306')
+define(`SISFB_SET_TVPOSOFFSET', `0x4004f304')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_ALLOC_SWAP_PAGE', `0x80083314')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_ATOMIC_RESTORE', `0x00003304')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_AVAIL_SWAP_SIZE', `0x80083313')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_CREATE_IMAGE', `0x40043311')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_FREE', `0x00003305')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_FREE_SWAP_PAGES', `0x00003309')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_FREEZE', `0x00003301')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_GET_IMAGE_SIZE', `0x8008330e')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_PLATFORM_SUPPORT', `0x0000330f')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_POWER_OFF', `0x00003310')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_PREF_IMAGE_SIZE', `0x00003312')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_S2RAM', `0x0000330b')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_SET_SWAP_AREA', `0x400c330d')
+define(`SNAPSHOT_UNFREEZE', `0x00003302')
+define(`SNDCTL_COPR_HALT', `0xc0144307')
+define(`SNDCTL_COPR_LOAD', `0xcfb04301')
+define(`SNDCTL_COPR_RCODE', `0xc0144303')
+define(`SNDCTL_COPR_RCVMSG', `0x8fa44309')
+define(`SNDCTL_COPR_RDATA', `0xc0144302')
+define(`SNDCTL_COPR_RESET', `0x00004300')
+define(`SNDCTL_COPR_RUN', `0xc0144306')
+define(`SNDCTL_COPR_SENDMSG', `0xcfa44308')
+define(`SNDCTL_COPR_WCODE', `0x40144305')
+define(`SNDCTL_COPR_WDATA', `0x40144304')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_BIND_CHANNEL', `0xc0045041')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_CHANNELS', `0xc0045006')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_GETBLKSIZE', `0xc0045004')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_GETCAPS', `0x8004500f')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_GETCHANNELMASK', `0xc0045040')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_GETFMTS', `0x8004500b')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_GETIPTR', `0x800c5011')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_GETISPACE', `0x8010500d')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_GETODELAY', `0x80045017')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_GETOPTR', `0x800c5012')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_GETOSPACE', `0x8010500c')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_GETSPDIF', `0x80045043')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_GETTRIGGER', `0x80045010')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_MAPINBUF', `0x80105013')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_MAPOUTBUF', `0x80105014')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_NONBLOCK', `0x0000500e')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_POST', `0x00005008')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_PROFILE', `0x40045017')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_RESET', `0x00005000')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_SETDUPLEX', `0x00005016')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_SETFMT', `0xc0045005')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_SETFRAGMENT', `0xc004500a')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_SETSPDIF', `0x40045042')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_SETSYNCRO', `0x00005015')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_SETTRIGGER', `0x40045010')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_SPEED', `0xc0045002')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_STEREO', `0xc0045003')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_SUBDIVIDE', `0xc0045009')
+define(`SNDCTL_DSP_SYNC', `0x00005001')
+define(`SNDCTL_FM_4OP_ENABLE', `0x4004510f')
+define(`SNDCTL_FM_LOAD_INSTR', `0x40285107')
+define(`SNDCTL_MIDI_INFO', `0xc074510c')
+define(`SNDCTL_MIDI_MPUCMD', `0xc0216d02')
+define(`SNDCTL_MIDI_MPUMODE', `0xc0046d01')
+define(`SNDCTL_MIDI_PRETIME', `0xc0046d00')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_CTRLRATE', `0xc0045103')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_GETINCOUNT', `0x80045105')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_GETOUTCOUNT', `0x80045104')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_GETTIME', `0x80045113')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_NRMIDIS', `0x8004510b')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_NRSYNTHS', `0x8004510a')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_OUTOFBAND', `0x40085112')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_PANIC', `0x00005111')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_PERCMODE', `0x40045106')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_RESET', `0x00005100')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_RESETSAMPLES', `0x40045109')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_SYNC', `0x00005101')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_TESTMIDI', `0x40045108')
+define(`SNDCTL_SEQ_THRESHOLD', `0x4004510d')
+define(`SNDCTL_SYNTH_CONTROL', `0xcfa45115')
+define(`SNDCTL_SYNTH_ID', `0xc08c5114')
+define(`SNDCTL_SYNTH_INFO', `0xc08c5102')
+define(`SNDCTL_SYNTH_MEMAVL', `0xc004510e')
+define(`SNDCTL_SYNTH_REMOVESAMPLE', `0xc00c5116')
+define(`SNDCTL_TMR_CONTINUE', `0x00005404')
+define(`SNDCTL_TMR_METRONOME', `0x40045407')
+define(`SNDCTL_TMR_SELECT', `0x40045408')
+define(`SNDCTL_TMR_SOURCE', `0xc0045406')
+define(`SNDCTL_TMR_START', `0x00005402')
+define(`SNDCTL_TMR_STOP', `0x00005403')
+define(`SNDCTL_TMR_TEMPO', `0xc0045405')
+define(`SNDCTL_TMR_TIMEBASE', `0xc0045401')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_AVAIL', `0x801c4321')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_DRAIN', `0x00004334')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_CAPS', `0xc0c44310')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_CODEC_CAPS', `0xeb884311')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_METADATA', `0xc0244315')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_PARAMS', `0x80784313')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_IOCTL_VERSION', `0x80044300')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_NEXT_TRACK', `0x00004335')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_PARTIAL_DRAIN', `0x00004336')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_PAUSE', `0x00004330')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_RESUME', `0x00004331')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_METADATA', `0x40244314')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS', `0x40844312')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_START', `0x00004332')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_STOP', `0x00004333')
+define(`SNDRV_COMPRESS_TSTAMP', `0x80144320')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_CARD_INFO', `0x81785501')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD', `0xc1105517')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_INFO', `0xc1105511')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_LIST', `0xc0505510')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_LOCK', `0x40405514')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_READ', `0xc4c85512')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_REMOVE', `0xc0405519')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_REPLACE', `0xc1105518')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_UNLOCK', `0x40405515')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_WRITE', `0xc4c85513')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_HWDEP_INFO', `0x80dc5521')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_HWDEP_NEXT_DEVICE', `0xc0045520')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_PCM_INFO', `0xc1205531')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_PCM_NEXT_DEVICE', `0x80045530')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_PCM_PREFER_SUBDEVICE', `0x40045532')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_POWER', `0xc00455d0')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_POWER_STATE', `0x800455d1')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_PVERSION', `0x80045500')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_RAWMIDI_INFO', `0xc10c5541')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_RAWMIDI_NEXT_DEVICE', `0xc0045540')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_RAWMIDI_PREFER_SUBDEVICE', `0x40045542')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_SUBSCRIBE_EVENTS', `0xc0045516')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_TLV_COMMAND', `0xc008551c')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_TLV_READ', `0xc008551a')
+define(`SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_TLV_WRITE', `0xc008551b')
+define(`SNDRV_DM_FM_IOCTL_CLEAR_PATCHES', `0x00004840')
+define(`SNDRV_DM_FM_IOCTL_INFO', `0x80024820')
+define(`SNDRV_DM_FM_IOCTL_PLAY_NOTE', `0x400c4822')
+define(`SNDRV_DM_FM_IOCTL_RESET', `0x00004821')
+define(`SNDRV_DM_FM_IOCTL_SET_CONNECTION', `0x40044826')
+define(`SNDRV_DM_FM_IOCTL_SET_MODE', `0x40044825')
+define(`SNDRV_DM_FM_IOCTL_SET_PARAMS', `0x40094824')
+define(`SNDRV_DM_FM_IOCTL_SET_VOICE', `0x40124823')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_CODE_PEEK', `0xc1b04812')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_CODE_POKE', `0x41b04811')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_CONTINUE', `0x00004881')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_DBG_READ', `0x80044884')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO', `0x880c4810')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_PCM_PEEK', `0xc0484831')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_PCM_POKE', `0x40484830')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_PVERSION', `0x80044840')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_SINGLE_STEP', `0x40044883')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_STOP', `0x00004880')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_TRAM_PEEK', `0xc0104822')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_TRAM_POKE', `0x40104821')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_TRAM_SETUP', `0x40044820')
+define(`SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_ZERO_TRAM_COUNTER', `0x00004882')
+define(`SNDRV_EMUX_IOCTL_LOAD_PATCH', `0xc0104881')
+define(`SNDRV_EMUX_IOCTL_MEM_AVAIL', `0x40044884')
+define(`SNDRV_EMUX_IOCTL_MISC_MODE', `0xc0104884')
+define(`SNDRV_EMUX_IOCTL_REMOVE_LAST_SAMPLES', `0x00004883')
+define(`SNDRV_EMUX_IOCTL_RESET_SAMPLES', `0x00004882')
+define(`SNDRV_EMUX_IOCTL_VERSION', `0x80044880')
+define(`SNDRV_FIREWIRE_IOCTL_GET_INFO', `0x802048f8')
+define(`SNDRV_FIREWIRE_IOCTL_LOCK', `0x000048f9')
+define(`SNDRV_FIREWIRE_IOCTL_UNLOCK', `0x000048fa')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSP_IOCTL_GET_9632_AEB', `0x80084845')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSP_IOCTL_GET_CONFIG_INFO', `0x80244841')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSP_IOCTL_GET_MIXER', `0x90004844')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSP_IOCTL_GET_PEAK_RMS', `0x83b04840')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSP_IOCTL_GET_VERSION', `0x80084843')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSP_IOCTL_UPLOAD_FIRMWARE', `0x40084842')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSPM_IOCTL_GET_CONFIG', `0x80184841')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSPM_IOCTL_GET_LTC', `0x80104846')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSPM_IOCTL_GET_MIXER', `0x80084844')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSPM_IOCTL_GET_PEAK_RMS', `0x89084842')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSPM_IOCTL_GET_STATUS', `0x80204847')
+define(`SNDRV_HDSPM_IOCTL_GET_VERSION', `0x80244848')
+define(`SNDRV_HWDEP_IOCTL_DSP_LOAD', `0x40604803')
+define(`SNDRV_HWDEP_IOCTL_DSP_STATUS', `0x80404802')
+define(`SNDRV_HWDEP_IOCTL_INFO', `0x80dc4801')
+define(`SNDRV_HWDEP_IOCTL_PVERSION', `0x80044800')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_CHANNEL_INFO', `0x80184132')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_DELAY', `0x80084121')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_DRAIN', `0x00004144')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_DROP', `0x00004143')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_FORWARD', `0x40084149')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_HW_FREE', `0x00004112')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_HW_PARAMS', `0xc2604111')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_HW_REFINE', `0xc2604110')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_HWSYNC', `0x00004122')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_INFO', `0x81204101')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_LINK', `0x40044160')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_PAUSE', `0x40044145')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_PREPARE', `0x00004140')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_PVERSION', `0x80044100')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_READI_FRAMES', `0x80184151')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_READN_FRAMES', `0x80184153')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_RESET', `0x00004141')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_RESUME', `0x00004147')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_REWIND', `0x40084146')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_START', `0x00004142')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_STATUS', `0x80984120')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_SW_PARAMS', `0xc0884113')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_SYNC_PTR', `0xc0884123')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_TSTAMP', `0x40044102')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_TTSTAMP', `0x40044103')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_UNLINK', `0x00004161')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_WRITEI_FRAMES', `0x40184150')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_WRITEN_FRAMES', `0x40184152')
+define(`SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_XRUN', `0x00004148')
+define(`SNDRV_RAWMIDI_IOCTL_DRAIN', `0x40045731')
+define(`SNDRV_RAWMIDI_IOCTL_DROP', `0x40045730')
+define(`SNDRV_RAWMIDI_IOCTL_INFO', `0x810c5701')
+define(`SNDRV_RAWMIDI_IOCTL_PARAMS', `0xc0305710')
+define(`SNDRV_RAWMIDI_IOCTL_PVERSION', `0x80045700')
+define(`SNDRV_RAWMIDI_IOCTL_STATUS', `0xc0385720')
+define(`SNDRV_SB_CSP_IOCTL_INFO', `0x80284810')
+define(`SNDRV_SB_CSP_IOCTL_LOAD_CODE', `0x70124811')
+define(`SNDRV_SB_CSP_IOCTL_PAUSE', `0x00004815')
+define(`SNDRV_SB_CSP_IOCTL_RESTART', `0x00004816')
+define(`SNDRV_SB_CSP_IOCTL_START', `0x40084813')
+define(`SNDRV_SB_CSP_IOCTL_STOP', `0x00004814')
+define(`SNDRV_SB_CSP_IOCTL_UNLOAD_CODE', `0x00004812')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_CLIENT_ID', `0x80045301')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_CREATE_PORT', `0xc0a85320')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_CREATE_QUEUE', `0xc08c5332')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_DELETE_PORT', `0x40a85321')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_DELETE_QUEUE', `0x408c5333')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_CLIENT_INFO', `0xc0bc5310')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_CLIENT_POOL', `0xc058534b')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_NAMED_QUEUE', `0xc08c5336')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_PORT_INFO', `0xc0a85322')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_QUEUE_CLIENT', `0xc04c5349')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_QUEUE_INFO', `0xc08c5334')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_QUEUE_OWNER', `0xc0005343')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_QUEUE_STATUS', `0xc05c5340')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_QUEUE_TEMPO', `0xc02c5341')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_QUEUE_TIMER', `0xc0605345')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_SUBSCRIPTION', `0xc0505350')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_PVERSION', `0x80045300')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_QUERY_NEXT_CLIENT', `0xc0bc5351')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_QUERY_NEXT_PORT', `0xc0a85352')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_QUERY_SUBS', `0xc058534f')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_REMOVE_EVENTS', `0x4040534e')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_RUNNING_MODE', `0xc0105303')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SET_CLIENT_INFO', `0x40bc5311')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SET_CLIENT_POOL', `0x4058534c')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SET_PORT_INFO', `0x40a85323')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SET_QUEUE_CLIENT', `0x404c534a')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SET_QUEUE_INFO', `0xc08c5335')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SET_QUEUE_OWNER', `0x40005344')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SET_QUEUE_TEMPO', `0x402c5342')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SET_QUEUE_TIMER', `0x40605346')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SUBSCRIBE_PORT', `0x40505330')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SYSTEM_INFO', `0xc0305302')
+define(`SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_UNSUBSCRIBE_PORT', `0x40505331')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE', `0x000054a2')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GINFO', `0xc0f85403')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GPARAMS', `0x40485404')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GSTATUS', `0xc0505405')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_INFO', `0x80e85411')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_NEXT_DEVICE', `0xc0145401')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS', `0x40505412')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PAUSE', `0x000054a3')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PVERSION', `0x80045400')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT', `0x40345410')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_START', `0x000054a0')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_STATUS', `0x80605414')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_STOP', `0x000054a1')
+define(`SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_TREAD', `0x40045402')
+define(`SONET_CLRDIAG', `0xc0046113')
+define(`SONET_GETDIAG', `0x80046114')
+define(`SONET_GETFRAMING', `0x80046116')
+define(`SONET_GETFRSENSE', `0x80066117')
+define(`SONET_GETSTAT', `0x80246110')
+define(`SONET_GETSTATZ', `0x80246111')
+define(`SONET_SETDIAG', `0xc0046112')
+define(`SONET_SETFRAMING', `0x40046115')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCGBAT1CAP', `0x80027602')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCGBAT1REM', `0x80027603')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCGBAT2CAP', `0x80027604')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCGBAT2REM', `0x80027605')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCGBATFLAGS', `0x80017607')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCGBLUE', `0x80017608')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCGBRT', `0x80017600')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCGFAN', `0x8001760a')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCGTEMP', `0x8001760c')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCSBLUE', `0x40017609')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCSBRT', `0x40017600')
+define(`SONYPI_IOCSFAN', `0x4001760b')
+define(`SOUND_MIXER_3DSE', `0xc0044d68')
+define(`SOUND_MIXER_ACCESS', `0xc0804d66')
+define(`SOUND_MIXER_AGC', `0xc0044d67')
+define(`SOUND_MIXER_GETLEVELS', `0xc0a44d74')
+define(`SOUND_MIXER_INFO', `0x805c4d65')
+define(`SOUND_MIXER_PRIVATE1', `0xc0044d6f')
+define(`SOUND_MIXER_PRIVATE2', `0xc0044d70')
+define(`SOUND_MIXER_PRIVATE3', `0xc0044d71')
+define(`SOUND_MIXER_PRIVATE4', `0xc0044d72')
+define(`SOUND_MIXER_PRIVATE5', `0xc0044d73')
+define(`SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS', `0xc0a44d75')
+define(`SOUND_OLD_MIXER_INFO', `0x80304d65')
+define(`SOUND_PCM_READ_BITS', `0x80045005')
+define(`SOUND_PCM_READ_CHANNELS', `0x80045006')
+define(`SOUND_PCM_READ_FILTER', `0x80045007')
+define(`SOUND_PCM_READ_RATE', `0x80045002')
+define(`SOUND_PCM_WRITE_FILTER', `0xc0045007')
+define(`SPI_IOC_RD_BITS_PER_WORD', `0x80016b03')
+define(`SPI_IOC_RD_LSB_FIRST', `0x80016b02')
+define(`SPI_IOC_RD_MAX_SPEED_HZ', `0x80046b04')
+define(`SPI_IOC_RD_MODE', `0x80016b01')
+define(`SPI_IOC_RD_MODE32', `0x80046b05')
+define(`SPI_IOC_WR_BITS_PER_WORD', `0x40016b03')
+define(`SPI_IOC_WR_LSB_FIRST', `0x40016b02')
+define(`SPI_IOC_WR_MAX_SPEED_HZ', `0x40046b04')
+define(`SPI_IOC_WR_MODE', `0x40016b01')
+define(`SPI_IOC_WR_MODE32', `0x40046b05')
+define(`SPIOCSTYPE', `0x40087101')
+define(`SSTFB_GET_VGAPASS', `0x800446dd')
+define(`SSTFB_SET_VGAPASS', `0x400446dd')
+define(`STOP_ARRAY', `0x00000932')
+define(`STOP_ARRAY_RO', `0x00000933')
+define(`SW_SYNC_IOC_CREATE_FENCE', `0xc0285700')
+define(`SW_SYNC_IOC_INC', `0x40045701')
+define(`SYNC_IOC_FENCE_INFO', `0xc0283e02')
+define(`SYNC_IOC_MERGE', `0xc0283e01')
+define(`SYNC_IOC_WAIT', `0x40043e00')
+define(`TCFLSH', `0x0000540b')
+define(`TCGETA', `0x00005405')
+define(`TCGETS2', `0x802c542a')
+define(`TCGETS', ifelse(target_arch, mips, 0x0000540d, 0x00005401))
+define(`TCGETX', `0x00005432')
+define(`TCSBRK', `0x00005409')
+define(`TCSBRKP', `0x00005425')
+define(`TCSETA', `0x00005406')
+define(`TCSETAF', `0x00005408')
+define(`TCSETAW', `0x00005407')
+define(`TCSETS', `0x00005402')
+define(`TCSETS2', `0x402c542b')
+define(`TCSETSF', `0x00005404')
+define(`TCSETSF2', `0x402c542d')
+define(`TCSETSW', `0x00005403')
+define(`TCSETSW2', `0x402c542c')
+define(`TCSETX', `0x00005433')
+define(`TCSETXF', `0x00005434')
+define(`TCSETXW', `0x00005435')
+define(`TCXONC', `0x0000540a')
+define(`TFD_IOC_SET_TICKS', `0x40085400')
+define(`TIOCCBRK', `0x00005428')
+define(`TIOCCONS', `0x0000541d')
+define(`TIOCEXCL', `0x0000540c')
+define(`TIOCGDEV', `0x80045432')
+define(`TIOCGETD', `0x00005424')
+define(`TIOCGEXCL', `0x80045440')
+define(`TIOCGICOUNT', `0x0000545d')
+define(`TIOCGLCKTRMIOS', `0x00005456')
+define(`TIOCGPGRP', `0x0000540f')
+define(`TIOCGPKT', `0x80045438')
+define(`TIOCGPTLCK', `0x80045439')
+define(`TIOCGPTN', `0x80045430')
+define(`TIOCGRS485', `0x0000542e')
+define(`TIOCGSERIAL', `0x0000541e')
+define(`TIOCGSID', `0x00005429')
+define(`TIOCGSOFTCAR', `0x00005419')
+define(`TIOCGWINSZ', ifelse(target_arch, mips, 0x80087468, 0x00005413))
+define(`TIOCLINUX', `0x0000541c')
+define(`TIOCMBIC', `0x00005417')
+define(`TIOCMBIS', `0x00005416')
+define(`TIOCMGET', `0x00005415')
+define(`TIOCMIWAIT', `0x0000545c')
+define(`TIOCMSET', `0x00005418')
+define(`TIOCNOTTY', `0x00005422')
+define(`TIOCNXCL', `0x0000540d')
+define(`TIOCOUTQ', ifelse(target_arch, mips, 0x00007472, 0x00005411))
+define(`TIOCPKT', `0x00005420')
+define(`TIOCSBRK', `0x00005427')
+define(`TIOCSCTTY', ifelse(target_arch, mips, 0x00005480, 0x0000540e))
+define(`TIOCSERCONFIG', `0x00005453')
+define(`TIOCSERGETLSR', `0x00005459')
+define(`TIOCSERGETMULTI', `0x0000545a')
+define(`TIOCSERGSTRUCT', `0x00005458')
+define(`TIOCSERGWILD', `0x00005454')
+define(`TIOCSERSETMULTI', `0x0000545b')
+define(`TIOCSERSWILD', `0x00005455')
+define(`TIOCSETD', `0x00005423')
+define(`TIOCSIG', `0x40045436')
+define(`TIOCSLCKTRMIOS', `0x00005457')
+define(`TIOCSPGRP', `0x00005410')
+define(`TIOCSPTLCK', `0x40045431')
+define(`TIOCSRS485', `0x0000542f')
+define(`TIOCSSERIAL', `0x0000541f')
+define(`TIOCSSOFTCAR', `0x0000541a')
+define(`TIOCSTI', `0x00005412')
+define(`TIOCSWINSZ', ifelse(target_arch, mips, 0x40087467, 0x00005414))
+define(`TIOCVHANGUP', `0x00005437')
+define(`TOSH_SMM', `0xc0047490')
+define(`TUNATTACHFILTER', `0x401054d5')
+define(`TUNDETACHFILTER', `0x401054d6')
+define(`TUNER_SET_CONFIG', `0x4010645c')
+define(`TUNGETFEATURES', `0x800454cf')
+define(`TUNGETFILTER', `0x801054db')
+define(`TUNGETIFF', `0x800454d2')
+define(`TUNGETSNDBUF', `0x800454d3')
+define(`TUNGETVNETHDRSZ', `0x800454d7')
+define(`TUNGETVNETLE', `0x800454dd')
+define(`TUNSETDEBUG', `0x400454c9')
+define(`TUNSETGROUP', `0x400454ce')
+define(`TUNSETIFF', `0x400454ca')
+define(`TUNSETIFINDEX', `0x400454da')
+define(`TUNSETLINK', `0x400454cd')
+define(`TUNSETNOCSUM', `0x400454c8')
+define(`TUNSETOFFLOAD', `0x400454d0')
+define(`TUNSETOWNER', `0x400454cc')
+define(`TUNSETPERSIST', `0x400454cb')
+define(`TUNSETQUEUE', `0x400454d9')
+define(`TUNSETSNDBUF', `0x400454d4')
+define(`TUNSETTXFILTER', `0x400454d1')
+define(`TUNSETVNETHDRSZ', `0x400454d8')
+define(`TUNSETVNETLE', `0x400454dc')
+define(`UBI_IOCATT', `0x40186f40')
+define(`UBI_IOCDET', `0x40046f41')
+define(`UBI_IOCEBCH', `0x40044f02')
+define(`UBI_IOCEBER', `0x40044f01')
+define(`UBI_IOCEBISMAP', `0x80044f05')
+define(`UBI_IOCEBMAP', `0x40084f03')
+define(`UBI_IOCEBUNMAP', `0x40044f04')
+define(`UBI_IOCMKVOL', `0x40986f00')
+define(`UBI_IOCRMVOL', `0x40046f01')
+define(`UBI_IOCRNVOL', `0x51106f03')
+define(`UBI_IOCRSVOL', `0x400c6f02')
+define(`UBI_IOCSETVOLPROP', `0x40104f06')
+define(`UBI_IOCVOLCRBLK', `0x40804f07')
+define(`UBI_IOCVOLRMBLK', `0x00004f08')
+define(`UBI_IOCVOLUP', `0x40084f00')
+define(`UDF_GETEABLOCK', `0x80086c41')
+define(`UDF_GETEASIZE', `0x80046c40')
+define(`UDF_GETVOLIDENT', `0x80086c42')
+define(`UDF_RELOCATE_BLOCKS', `0xc0086c43')
+define(`UI_BEGIN_FF_ERASE', `0xc00c55ca')
+define(`UI_BEGIN_FF_UPLOAD', `0xc06855c8')
+define(`UI_DEV_CREATE', `0x00005501')
+define(`UI_DEV_DESTROY', `0x00005502')
+define(`UI_END_FF_ERASE', `0x400c55cb')
+define(`UI_END_FF_UPLOAD', `0x406855c9')
+define(`UI_GET_VERSION', `0x8004552d')
+define(`UI_SET_ABSBIT', `0x40045567')
+define(`UI_SET_EVBIT', `0x40045564')
+define(`UI_SET_FFBIT', `0x4004556b')
+define(`UI_SET_KEYBIT', `0x40045565')
+define(`UI_SET_LEDBIT', `0x40045569')
+define(`UI_SET_MSCBIT', `0x40045568')
+define(`UI_SET_PHYS', `0x4008556c')
+define(`UI_SET_PROPBIT', `0x4004556e')
+define(`UI_SET_RELBIT', `0x40045566')
+define(`UI_SET_SNDBIT', `0x4004556a')
+define(`UI_SET_SWBIT', `0x4004556d')
+define(`UNPROTECT_ARRAY', `0x00000926')
+define(`USBDEVFS_ALLOC_STREAMS', `0x8008551c')
+define(`USBDEVFS_BULK', `0xc0185502')
+define(`USBDEVFS_BULK32', `0xc0105502')
+define(`USBDEVFS_CLAIMINTERFACE', `0x8004550f')
+define(`USBDEVFS_CLAIM_PORT', `0x80045518')
+define(`USBDEVFS_CLEAR_HALT', `0x80045515')
+define(`USBDEVFS_CONNECT', `0x00005517')
+define(`USBDEVFS_CONNECTINFO', `0x40085511')
+define(`USBDEVFS_CONTROL', `0xc0185500')
+define(`USBDEVFS_CONTROL32', `0xc0105500')
+define(`USBDEVFS_DISCARDURB', `0x0000550b')
+define(`USBDEVFS_DISCONNECT', `0x00005516')
+define(`USBDEVFS_DISCONNECT_CLAIM', `0x8108551b')
+define(`USBDEVFS_DISCSIGNAL', `0x8010550e')
+define(`USBDEVFS_DISCSIGNAL32', `0x8008550e')
+define(`USBDEVFS_FREE_STREAMS', `0x8008551d')
+define(`USBDEVFS_GET_CAPABILITIES', `0x8004551a')
+define(`USBDEVFS_GETDRIVER', `0x41045508')
+define(`USBDEVFS_HUB_PORTINFO', `0x80805513')
+define(`USBDEVFS_IOCTL', `0xc0105512')
+define(`USBDEVFS_IOCTL32', `0xc00c5512')
+define(`USBDEVFS_REAPURB', `0x4008550c')
+define(`USBDEVFS_REAPURB32', `0x4004550c')
+define(`USBDEVFS_REAPURBNDELAY', `0x4008550d')
+define(`USBDEVFS_REAPURBNDELAY32', `0x4004550d')
+define(`USBDEVFS_RELEASEINTERFACE', `0x80045510')
+define(`USBDEVFS_RELEASE_PORT', `0x80045519')
+define(`USBDEVFS_RESET', `0x00005514')
+define(`USBDEVFS_RESETEP', `0x80045503')
+define(`USBDEVFS_SETCONFIGURATION', `0x80045505')
+define(`USBDEVFS_SETINTERFACE', `0x80085504')
+define(`USBDEVFS_SUBMITURB', `0x8038550a')
+define(`USBDEVFS_SUBMITURB32', `0x802a550a')
+define(`USBTMC_IOCTL_ABORT_BULK_IN', `0x00005b04')
+define(`USBTMC_IOCTL_ABORT_BULK_OUT', `0x00005b03')
+define(`USBTMC_IOCTL_CLEAR', `0x00005b02')
+define(`USBTMC_IOCTL_CLEAR_IN_HALT', `0x00005b07')
+define(`USBTMC_IOCTL_CLEAR_OUT_HALT', `0x00005b06')
+define(`USBTMC_IOCTL_INDICATOR_PULSE', `0x00005b01')
+define(`UVCIOC_CTRL_MAP', `0xc0607520')
+define(`UVCIOC_CTRL_QUERY', `0xc0107521')
+define(`V4L2_SUBDEV_IR_RX_NOTIFY', `0x40047600')
+define(`V4L2_SUBDEV_IR_TX_NOTIFY', `0x40047601')
+define(`VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH', `0x82307201')
+define(`VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_SHORT', `0x82307202')
+define(`VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION', `0x00003b65')
+define(`VFIO_DEVICE_GET_INFO', `0x00003b6b')
+define(`VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO', `0x00003b6d')
+define(`VFIO_DEVICE_GET_PCI_HOT_RESET_INFO', `0x00003b70')
+define(`VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO', `0x00003b6c')
+define(`VFIO_DEVICE_PCI_HOT_RESET', `0x00003b71')
+define(`VFIO_DEVICE_RESET', `0x00003b6f')
+define(`VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS', `0x00003b6e')
+define(`VFIO_EEH_PE_OP', `0x00003b79')
+define(`VFIO_GET_API_VERSION', `0x00003b64')
+define(`VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD', `0x00003b6a')
+define(`VFIO_GROUP_GET_STATUS', `0x00003b67')
+define(`VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER', `0x00003b68')
+define(`VFIO_GROUP_UNSET_CONTAINER', `0x00003b69')
+define(`VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE', `0x00003b74')
+define(`VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE', `0x00003b73')
+define(`VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO', `0x00003b70')
+define(`VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA', `0x00003b71')
+define(`VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO', `0x00003b70')
+define(`VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA', `0x00003b72')
+define(`VFIO_SET_IOMMU', `0x00003b66')
+define(`VHOST_GET_FEATURES', `0x8008af00')
+define(`VHOST_GET_VRING_BASE', `0xc008af12')
+define(`VHOST_NET_SET_BACKEND', `0x4008af30')
+define(`VHOST_RESET_OWNER', `0x0000af02')
+define(`VHOST_SCSI_CLEAR_ENDPOINT', `0x40e8af41')
+define(`VHOST_SCSI_GET_ABI_VERSION', `0x4004af42')
+define(`VHOST_SCSI_GET_EVENTS_MISSED', `0x4004af44')
+define(`VHOST_SCSI_SET_ENDPOINT', `0x40e8af40')
+define(`VHOST_SCSI_SET_EVENTS_MISSED', `0x4004af43')
+define(`VHOST_SET_FEATURES', `0x4008af00')
+define(`VHOST_SET_LOG_BASE', `0x4008af04')
+define(`VHOST_SET_LOG_FD', `0x4004af07')
+define(`VHOST_SET_MEM_TABLE', `0x4008af03')
+define(`VHOST_SET_OWNER', `0x0000af01')
+define(`VHOST_SET_VRING_ADDR', `0x4028af11')
+define(`VHOST_SET_VRING_BASE', `0x4008af12')
+define(`VHOST_SET_VRING_CALL', `0x4008af21')
+define(`VHOST_SET_VRING_ERR', `0x4008af22')
+define(`VHOST_SET_VRING_KICK', `0x4008af20')
+define(`VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM', `0x4008af10')
+define(`VIDEO_CLEAR_BUFFER', `0x00006f22')
+define(`VIDEO_COMMAND', `0xc0486f3b')
+define(`VIDEO_CONTINUE', `0x00006f18')
+define(`VIDEO_FAST_FORWARD', `0x00006f1f')
+define(`VIDEO_FREEZE', `0x00006f17')
+define(`VIDEO_GET_CAPABILITIES', `0x80046f21')
+define(`VIDEO_GET_EVENT', `0x80206f1c')
+define(`VIDEO_GET_FRAME_COUNT', `0x80086f3a')
+define(`VIDEO_GET_FRAME_RATE', `0x80046f38')
+define(`VIDEO_GET_NAVI', `0x84046f34')
+define(`VIDEO_GET_PTS', `0x80086f39')
+define(`VIDEO_GET_SIZE', `0x800c6f37')
+define(`VIDEO_GET_STATUS', `0x80146f1b')
+define(`VIDEO_PLAY', `0x00006f16')
+define(`VIDEO_SELECT_SOURCE', `0x00006f19')
+define(`VIDEO_SET_ATTRIBUTES', `0x00006f35')
+define(`VIDEO_SET_BLANK', `0x00006f1a')
+define(`VIDEO_SET_DISPLAY_FORMAT', `0x00006f1d')
+define(`VIDEO_SET_FORMAT', `0x00006f25')
+define(`VIDEO_SET_HIGHLIGHT', `0x40106f27')
+define(`VIDEO_SET_ID', `0x00006f23')
+define(`VIDEO_SET_SPU', `0x40086f32')
+define(`VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE', `0x40106f33')
+define(`VIDEO_SET_STREAMTYPE', `0x00006f24')
+define(`VIDEO_SET_SYSTEM', `0x00006f26')
+define(`VIDEO_SLOWMOTION', `0x00006f20')
+define(`VIDEO_STILLPICTURE', `0x40106f1e')
+define(`VIDEO_STOP', `0x00006f15')
+define(`VIDEO_TRY_COMMAND', `0xc0486f3c')
+define(`VIDIOC_CREATE_BUFS', `0xc100565c')
+define(`VIDIOC_CROPCAP', `0xc02c563a')
+define(`VIDIOC_DBG_G_CHIP_INFO', `0xc0c85666')
+define(`VIDIOC_DBG_G_REGISTER', `0xc0385650')
+define(`VIDIOC_DBG_S_REGISTER', `0x4038564f')
+define(`VIDIOC_DECODER_CMD', `0xc0485660')
+define(`VIDIOC_DQBUF', `0xc0585611')
+define(`VIDIOC_DQEVENT', `0x80885659')
+define(`VIDIOC_DV_TIMINGS_CAP', `0xc0905664')
+define(`VIDIOC_ENCODER_CMD', `0xc028564d')
+define(`VIDIOC_ENUMAUDIO', `0xc0345641')
+define(`VIDIOC_ENUMAUDOUT', `0xc0345642')
+define(`VIDIOC_ENUM_DV_TIMINGS', `0xc0945662')
+define(`VIDIOC_ENUM_FMT', `0xc0405602')
+define(`VIDIOC_ENUM_FRAMEINTERVALS', `0xc034564b')
+define(`VIDIOC_ENUM_FRAMESIZES', `0xc02c564a')
+define(`VIDIOC_ENUM_FREQ_BANDS', `0xc0405665')
+define(`VIDIOC_ENUMINPUT', `0xc050561a')
+define(`VIDIOC_ENUMOUTPUT', `0xc0485630')
+define(`VIDIOC_ENUMSTD', `0xc0485619')
+define(`VIDIOC_EXPBUF', `0xc0405610')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_AUDIO', `0x80345621')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_AUDOUT', `0x80345631')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_CROP', `0xc014563b')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_CTRL', `0xc008561b')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_DV_TIMINGS', `0xc0845658')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_EDID', `0xc0285628')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_ENC_INDEX', `0x8818564c')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_EXT_CTRLS', `0xc0205647')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_FBUF', `0x8030560a')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_FMT', `0xc0d05604')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_FREQUENCY', `0xc02c5638')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_INPUT', `0x80045626')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_JPEGCOMP', `0x808c563d')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_MODULATOR', `0xc0445636')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_OUTPUT', `0x8004562e')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_PARM', `0xc0cc5615')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_PRIORITY', `0x80045643')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_SELECTION', `0xc040565e')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_SLICED_VBI_CAP', `0xc0745645')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_STD', `0x80085617')
+define(`VIDIOC_G_TUNER', `0xc054561d')
+define(`VIDIOC_INT_RESET', `0x40046466')
+define(`VIDIOC_LOG_STATUS', `0x00005646')
+define(`VIDIOC_OMAP3ISP_AEWB_CFG', `0xc02056c3')
+define(`VIDIOC_OMAP3ISP_AF_CFG', `0xc04c56c5')
+define(`VIDIOC_OMAP3ISP_CCDC_CFG', `0xc03856c1')
+define(`VIDIOC_OMAP3ISP_HIST_CFG', `0xc03056c4')
+define(`VIDIOC_OMAP3ISP_PRV_CFG', `0xc07056c2')
+define(`VIDIOC_OMAP3ISP_STAT_EN', `0xc00856c7')
+define(`VIDIOC_OMAP3ISP_STAT_REQ', `0xc02856c6')
+define(`VIDIOC_OVERLAY', `0x4004560e')
+define(`VIDIOC_PREPARE_BUF', `0xc058565d')
+define(`VIDIOC_QBUF', `0xc058560f')
+define(`VIDIOC_QUERYBUF', `0xc0585609')
+define(`VIDIOC_QUERYCAP', `0x80685600')
+define(`VIDIOC_QUERYCTRL', `0xc0445624')
+define(`VIDIOC_QUERY_DV_TIMINGS', `0x80845663')
+define(`VIDIOC_QUERY_EXT_CTRL', `0xc0e85667')
+define(`VIDIOC_QUERYMENU', `0xc02c5625')
+define(`VIDIOC_QUERYSTD', `0x8008563f')
+define(`VIDIOC_REQBUFS', `0xc0145608')
+define(`VIDIOC_RESERVED', `0x00005601')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_AUDIO', `0x40345622')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_AUDOUT', `0x40345632')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_CROP', `0x4014563c')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_CTRL', `0xc008561c')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_DV_TIMINGS', `0xc0845657')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_EDID', `0xc0285629')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_EXT_CTRLS', `0xc0205648')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_FBUF', `0x4030560b')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_FMT', `0xc0d05605')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_FREQUENCY', `0x402c5639')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_HW_FREQ_SEEK', `0x40305652')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_INPUT', `0xc0045627')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_JPEGCOMP', `0x408c563e')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_MODULATOR', `0x40445637')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_OUTPUT', `0xc004562f')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_PARM', `0xc0cc5616')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_PRIORITY', `0x40045644')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_SELECTION', `0xc040565f')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_STD', `0x40085618')
+define(`VIDIOC_STREAMOFF', `0x40045613')
+define(`VIDIOC_STREAMON', `0x40045612')
+define(`VIDIOC_S_TUNER', `0x4054561e')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_DV_TIMINGS_CAP', `0xc0905664')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_ENUM_DV_TIMINGS', `0xc0945662')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_ENUM_FRAME_INTERVAL', `0xc040564b')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_ENUM_FRAME_SIZE', `0xc040564a')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_ENUM_MBUS_CODE', `0xc0305602')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_G_CROP', `0xc038563b')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_G_DV_TIMINGS', `0xc0845658')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_G_EDID', `0xc0285628')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_G_FMT', `0xc0585604')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_G_FRAME_INTERVAL', `0xc0305615')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_G_SELECTION', `0xc040563d')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_QUERY_DV_TIMINGS', `0x80845663')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_S_CROP', `0xc038563c')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_S_DV_TIMINGS', `0xc0845657')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_S_EDID', `0xc0285629')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_S_FMT', `0xc0585605')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_S_FRAME_INTERVAL', `0xc0305616')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBDEV_S_SELECTION', `0xc040563e')
+define(`VIDIOC_SUBSCRIBE_EVENT', `0x4020565a')
+define(`VIDIOC_TRY_DECODER_CMD', `0xc0485661')
+define(`VIDIOC_TRY_ENCODER_CMD', `0xc028564e')
+define(`VIDIOC_TRY_EXT_CTRLS', `0xc0205649')
+define(`VIDIOC_TRY_FMT', `0xc0d05640')
+define(`VIDIOC_UNSUBSCRIBE_EVENT', `0x4020565b')
+define(`VIDIOC_VSP1_LUT_CONFIG', `0xc40056c1')
+define(`VPFE_CMD_S_CCDC_RAW_PARAMS', `0x400856c1')
+define(`VT_ACTIVATE', `0x00005606')
+define(`VT_DISALLOCATE', `0x00005608')
+define(`VT_GETHIFONTMASK', `0x0000560d')
+define(`VT_GETMODE', `0x00005601')
+define(`VT_GETSTATE', `0x00005603')
+define(`VT_LOCKSWITCH', `0x0000560b')
+define(`VT_OPENQRY', `0x00005600')
+define(`VT_RELDISP', `0x00005605')
+define(`VT_RESIZE', `0x00005609')
+define(`VT_RESIZEX', `0x0000560a')
+define(`VT_SENDSIG', `0x00005604')
+define(`VT_SETACTIVATE', `0x0000560f')
+define(`VT_SETMODE', `0x00005602')
+define(`VT_UNLOCKSWITCH', `0x0000560c')
+define(`VT_WAITACTIVE', `0x00005607')
+define(`VT_WAITEVENT', `0x0000560e')
+define(`WAN_IOC_ADD_FLT_INDEX', `0x00006902')
+define(`WAN_IOC_ADD_FLT_RULE', `0x00006900')
+define(`WDIOC_GETBOOTSTATUS', `0x80045702')
+define(`WDIOC_GETPRETIMEOUT', `0x80045709')
+define(`WDIOC_GETSTATUS', `0x80045701')
+define(`WDIOC_GETSUPPORT', `0x80285700')
+define(`WDIOC_GETTEMP', `0x80045703')
+define(`WDIOC_GETTIMELEFT', `0x8004570a')
+define(`WDIOC_GETTIMEOUT', `0x80045707')
+define(`WDIOC_KEEPALIVE', `0x80045705')
+define(`WDIOC_SETOPTIONS', `0x80045704')
+define(`WDIOC_SETPRETIMEOUT', `0xc0045708')
+define(`WDIOC_SETTIMEOUT', `0xc0045706')
+define(`WRITE_RAID_INFO', `0x00000925')
+define(`X86_IOC_RDMSR_REGS', `0xc02063a0')
+define(`X86_IOC_WRMSR_REGS', `0xc02063a1')
+define(`ZATM_GETPOOL', `0x40106161')
+define(`ZATM_GETPOOLZ', `0x40106162')
+define(`ZATM_SETPOOL', `0x40106163')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ioctl_macros b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ioctl_macros
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47a5157
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ioctl_macros
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+# socket ioctls allowed to unprivileged apps
+define(`unpriv_sock_ioctls', `
+{
+# Socket ioctls for gathering information about the interface
+SIOCGSTAMP SIOCGSTAMPNS
+SIOCGIFNAME SIOCGIFCONF SIOCGIFFLAGS SIOCGIFADDR SIOCGIFDSTADDR SIOCGIFBRDADDR
+SIOCGIFNETMASK SIOCGIFMTU SIOCGIFINDEX SIOCGIFCOUNT SIOCGIFTXQLEN
+# Wireless extension ioctls. Primarily get functions.
+SIOCGIWNAME SIOCGIWFREQ SIOCGIWMODE SIOCGIWSENS SIOCGIWRANGE SIOCGIWPRIV
+SIOCGIWSTATS SIOCGIWSPY SIOCSIWTHRSPY SIOCGIWTHRSPY SIOCGIWRATE SIOCGIWRTS
+SIOCGIWFRAG SIOCGIWTXPOW SIOCGIWRETRY SIOCGIWPOWER
+}')
+
+# socket ioctls never allowed to unprivileged apps
+define(`priv_sock_ioctls', `
+{
+# qualcomm rmnet ioctls
+WAN_IOC_ADD_FLT_RULE WAN_IOC_ADD_FLT_INDEX
+# socket ioctls
+SIOCADDRT SIOCDELRT SIOCRTMSG SIOCSIFLINK SIOCSIFFLAGS SIOCSIFADDR
+SIOCSIFDSTADDR SIOCSIFBRDADDR SIOCSIFNETMASK SIOCGIFMETRIC SIOCSIFMETRIC SIOCGIFMEM
+SIOCSIFMEM SIOCSIFMTU SIOCSIFNAME SIOCSIFHWADDR SIOCGIFENCAP SIOCSIFENCAP
+SIOCGIFHWADDR SIOCGIFSLAVE SIOCSIFSLAVE SIOCADDMULTI SIOCDELMULTI
+SIOCSIFPFLAGS SIOCGIFPFLAGS SIOCDIFADDR SIOCSIFHWBROADCAST SIOCKILLADDR SIOCGIFBR SIOCSIFBR
+SIOCSIFTXQLEN SIOCETHTOOL SIOCGMIIPHY SIOCGMIIREG SIOCSMIIREG SIOCWANDEV
+SIOCOUTQNSD SIOCDARP SIOCGARP SIOCSARP SIOCDRARP SIOCGRARP SIOCSRARP SIOCGIFMAP
+SIOCSIFMAP SIOCADDDLCI SIOCDELDLCI SIOCGIFVLAN SIOCSIFVLAN SIOCBONDENSLAVE
+SIOCBONDRELEASE SIOCBONDSETHWADDR SIOCBONDSLAVEINFOQUERY SIOCBONDINFOQUERY
+SIOCBONDCHANGEACTIVE SIOCBRADDBR SIOCBRDELBR SIOCBRADDIF SIOCBRDELIF SIOCSHWTSTAMP
+# device and protocol specific ioctls
+SIOCDEVPRIVATE-SIOCDEVPRIVLAST
+SIOCPROTOPRIVATE-SIOCPROTOPRIVLAST
+# Wireless extension ioctls
+SIOCSIWCOMMIT SIOCSIWNWID SIOCSIWFREQ SIOCSIWMODE SIOCSIWSENS SIOCSIWRANGE
+SIOCSIWPRIV SIOCSIWSTATS SIOCSIWSPY SIOCSIWAP SIOCGIWAP SIOCSIWMLME SIOCGIWAPLIST
+SIOCSIWSCAN SIOCGIWSCAN SIOCSIWESSID SIOCGIWESSID SIOCSIWNICKN SIOCGIWNICKN
+SIOCSIWRATE SIOCSIWRTS SIOCSIWFRAG SIOCSIWTXPOW SIOCSIWRETRY SIOCSIWENCODE
+SIOCGIWENCODE SIOCSIWPOWER SIOCSIWGENIE SIOCGIWGENIE SIOCSIWAUTH SIOCGIWAUTH
+SIOCSIWENCODEEXT SIOCGIWENCODEEXT SIOCSIWPMKSA
+# Dev private ioctl i.e. hardware specific ioctls
+SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV-SIOCIWLASTPRIV
+}')
+
+# commonly used ioctls on unix sockets
+define(`unpriv_unix_sock_ioctls', `{
+  TIOCOUTQ FIOCLEX FIONCLEX TCGETS TIOCGWINSZ TIOCSWINSZ FIONREAD
+}')
+
+# commonly used TTY ioctls
+# merge with unpriv_unix_sock_ioctls?
+define(`unpriv_tty_ioctls', `{
+  TIOCOUTQ FIOCLEX FIONCLEX TCGETS TCSETS TCSETSW TCSETSF TIOCGWINSZ TIOCSWINSZ
+  TIOCSCTTY TCFLSH TIOCSPGRP TIOCGPGRP
+}')
+
+# point to point ioctls
+define(`ppp_ioctls', `{
+PPPIOCGL2TPSTATS PPPIOCGCHAN PPPIOCATTCHAN PPPIOCDISCONN
+PPPIOCCONNECT PPPIOCSMRRU PPPIOCDETACH PPPIOCATTACH
+PPPIOCNEWUNIT PPPIOCGIDLE PPPIOCSDEBUG PPPIOCGDEBUG
+PPPIOCSACTIVE PPPIOCSPASS PPPIOCSNPMODE PPPIOCGNPMODE
+PPPIOCSCOMPRESS PPPIOCXFERUNIT PPPIOCSXASYNCMAP
+PPPIOCGXASYNCMAP PPPIOCSMAXCID PPPIOCSMRU PPPIOCGMRU
+PPPIOCSRASYNCMAP PPPIOCGRASYNCMAP PPPIOCGUNIT PPPIOCSASYNCMAP
+PPPIOCGASYNCMAP PPPIOCSFLAGS PPPIOCGFLAGS PPPIOCGCALLINFO
+PPPIOCBUNDLE PPPIOCGMPFLAGS PPPIOCSMPFLAGS PPPIOCSMPMTU
+PPPIOCSMPMRU PPPIOCGCOMPRESSORS PPPIOCSCOMPRESSOR PPPIOCGIFNAME
+}')
+
+# unprivileged binder ioctls
+define(`unpriv_binder_ioctls', `{
+BINDER_WRITE_READ BINDER_SET_IDLE_TIMEOUT BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS
+BINDER_SET_IDLE_PRIORITY BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR BINDER_THREAD_EXIT
+BINDER_VERSION BINDER_GET_NODE_DEBUG_INFO BINDER_GET_NODE_INFO_FOR_REF
+BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR_EXT BINDER_ENABLE_ONEWAY_SPAM_DETECTION
+}')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/iorap_inode2filename.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/iorap_inode2filename.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f119ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/iorap_inode2filename.te
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# iorap.inode2filename -> look up file paths from an inode
+type iorap_inode2filename, domain;
+type iorap_inode2filename_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+type iorap_inode2filename_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+r_dir_file(iorap_inode2filename, rootfs)
+
+# Allow usage of pipes (child stdout -> parent pipe).
+allow iorap_inode2filename iorapd:fd use;
+allow iorap_inode2filename iorapd:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# Allow reading most files under / ignoring usual access controls.
+allow iorap_inode2filename self:capability dac_read_search;
+
+typeattribute iorap_inode2filename mlstrustedsubject;
+
+# Grant access to open most of the files under /
+allow iorap_inode2filename apex_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename apex_data_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename apex_mnt_dir:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename apex_mnt_dir:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename apk_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename apk_data_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename app_data_file_type:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename app_data_file_type:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename backup_data_file:dir  { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename backup_data_file:file  { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename bootchart_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename bootchart_data_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename metadata_file:dir { getattr open read search search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename metadata_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename packages_list_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename packages_list_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename property_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename property_data_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename resourcecache_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename resourcecache_data_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename recovery_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename ringtone_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename ringtone_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename same_process_hal_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename same_process_hal_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename sepolicy_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename staging_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename staging_data_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename system_bootstrap_lib_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename system_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename system_data_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename system_data_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };
+allow iorap_inode2filename system_data_root_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename textclassifier_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename textclassifier_data_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename toolbox_exec:file getattr;
+allow iorap_inode2filename user_profile_root_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename user_profile_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename user_profile_data_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename unencrypted_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename unlabeled:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename vendor_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow iorap_inode2filename vendor_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename vendor_overlay_file:file { getattr };
+allow iorap_inode2filename zygote_exec:file { getattr };
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow { domain -init -iorapd } iorap_inode2filename:process { transition dyntransition };
+neverallow iorap_inode2filename domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/iorap_prefetcherd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/iorap_prefetcherd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b218fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/iorap_prefetcherd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# volume manager
+type iorap_prefetcherd, domain;
+type iorap_prefetcherd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+type iorap_prefetcherd_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+r_dir_file(iorap_prefetcherd, rootfs)
+
+# Allow read/write /proc/sys/vm/drop/caches
+allow iorap_prefetcherd proc_drop_caches:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# iorap_prefetcherd temporarily changes its priority when running benchmarks
+allow iorap_prefetcherd self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+
+# Allow usage of pipes (--input-fd=# and --output-fd=# command line parameters).
+allow iorap_prefetcherd iorapd:fd use;
+allow iorap_prefetcherd iorapd:fifo_file { read write };
+
+# Allow reading most files under / ignoring usual access controls.
+allow iorap_prefetcherd self:capability dac_read_search;
+
+typeattribute iorap_prefetcherd mlstrustedsubject;
+
+# Grant logcat access
+allow iorap_prefetcherd logcat_exec:file { open read };
+
+# Grant access to open most of the files under /
+allow iorap_prefetcherd apk_data_file:dir { open read search };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd apk_data_file:file { open read };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd app_data_file:dir { open read search };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd app_data_file:file { open read };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd dalvikcache_data_file:dir { open read search };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd dalvikcache_data_file:file{ open read };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd packages_list_file:dir { open read search };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd packages_list_file:file { open read };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd privapp_data_file:dir { open read search };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd privapp_data_file:file { open read };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd same_process_hal_file:dir{ open read search };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd same_process_hal_file:file { open read };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd system_data_file:dir { open read search };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd system_data_file:file { open read };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd system_data_file:lnk_file { open read };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd user_profile_root_file:dir { open read search };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd user_profile_data_file:dir { open read search };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd user_profile_data_file:file { open read };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd vendor_overlay_file:dir { open read search };
+allow iorap_prefetcherd vendor_overlay_file:file { open read };
+# Note: Do not add any /vendor labels because they can be customized
+# by the vendor and we won't know about them beforehand.
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow { domain -init -iorapd } iorap_prefetcherd:process { transition dyntransition };
+neverallow iorap_prefetcherd domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/iorapd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/iorapd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b970699
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/iorapd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# volume manager
+type iorapd, domain;
+type iorapd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+type iorapd_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+r_dir_file(iorapd, rootfs)
+
+# Allow read/write /proc/sys/vm/drop/caches
+allow iorapd proc_drop_caches:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Give iorapd a place where only iorapd can store files; everyone else is off limits
+allow iorapd iorapd_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow iorapd iorapd_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow iorapd to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
+binder_use(iorapd)
+add_service(iorapd, iorapd_service)
+
+# Allow iorapd to call into the system server so it can check permissions.
+binder_call(iorapd, system_server)
+allow iorapd permission_service:service_manager find;
+# IUserManager
+allow iorapd user_service:service_manager find;
+# IPackageManagerNative
+allow iorapd package_native_service:service_manager find;
+# Allow dumpstate (bugreport) to call into iorapd.
+allow iorapd dumpstate:fd use;
+allow iorapd dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+# talk to batteryservice
+binder_call(iorapd, healthd)
+
+# TODO: does each of the service_manager allow finds above need the binder_call?
+
+# iorapd temporarily changes its priority when running benchmarks
+allow iorapd self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+
+# Allow to access Perfetto traced's privileged consumer socket to start/stop
+# tracing sessions and read trace data.
+unix_socket_connect(iorapd, traced_consumer, traced)
+
+# Allow iorapd to execute compilation (iorap.cmd.compiler) in idle time.
+allow iorapd system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow iorapd to send signull to iorap_inode2filename and iorap_prefetcherd.
+allow iorapd iorap_inode2filename:process signull;
+allow iorapd iorap_prefetcherd:process signull;
+
+# Allowing system_server to check for the existence and size of files under iorapd
+# dir without collecting any sensitive app data.
+# This is used to predict if iorapd is doing prefetching or not.
+allow system_server iorapd_data_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+allow system_server iorapd_data_file:file getattr;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -iorapd
+} iorapd_data_file:dir ~{ open create read getattr setattr search relabelto ioctl };
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -iorapd
+    -system_server
+} iorapd_data_file:dir *;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -kernel
+    -iorapd
+} iorapd_data_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -kernel
+    -vendor_init
+    -iorapd
+    -system_server
+} { iorapd_data_file }:notdevfile_class_set *;
+
+# Only system_server and shell (for dumpsys) can interact with iorapd over binder
+neverallow { domain -dumpstate -system_server -iorapd } iorapd_service:service_manager find;
+neverallow iorapd {
+  domain
+  -healthd
+  -servicemanager
+  -system_server
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+}:binder call;
+
+neverallow { domain -init } iorapd:process { transition dyntransition };
+neverallow iorapd domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/isolated_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/isolated_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a907dac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/isolated_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+###
+### Services with isolatedProcess=true in their manifest.
+###
+### This file defines the rules for isolated apps. An "isolated
+### app" is an APP with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000)
+### and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
+###
+
+type isolated_app, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/kernel.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/kernel.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9aa40cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/kernel.te
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+# Life begins with the kernel.
+type kernel, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+
+allow kernel self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+
+# Root fs.
+r_dir_file(kernel, rootfs)
+
+# Used to read androidboot.selinux property
+allow kernel {
+  proc_bootconfig
+  proc_cmdline
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Get SELinux enforcing status.
+allow kernel selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow kernel selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Get file contexts during first stage
+allow kernel file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow init relabel itself.
+allow kernel rootfs:file relabelfrom;
+allow kernel init_exec:file relabelto;
+# TODO: investigate why we need this.
+allow kernel init:process share;
+
+# cgroup filesystem initialization prior to setting the cgroup root directory label.
+allow kernel unlabeled:dir search;
+
+# Mount usbfs.
+allow kernel usbfs:filesystem mount;
+allow kernel usbfs:dir search;
+
+# Initial setenforce by init prior to switching to init domain.
+# We use dontaudit instead of allow to prevent a kernel spawned userspace
+# process from turning off SELinux once enabled.
+dontaudit kernel self:security setenforce;
+
+# Write to /proc/1/oom_adj prior to switching to init domain.
+allow kernel self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
+
+# Init reboot before switching selinux domains under certain error
+# conditions. Allow it.
+# As part of rebooting, init writes "u" to /proc/sysrq-trigger to
+# remount filesystems read-only. /data is not mounted at this point,
+# so we could ignore this. For now, we allow it.
+allow kernel self:global_capability_class_set sys_boot;
+allow kernel proc_sysrq:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Allow writing to /dev/kmsg which was created prior to loading policy.
+allow kernel tmpfs:chr_file write;
+
+# Set checkreqprot by init.rc prior to switching to init domain.
+allow kernel selinuxfs:file write;
+allow kernel self:security setcheckreqprot;
+
+# kernel thread "loop0", used by the loop block device, for ASECs (b/17158723)
+allow kernel sdcard_type:file { read write };
+
+# f_mtp driver accesses files from kernel context.
+allow kernel mediaprovider:fd use;
+
+# Allow the kernel to read OBB files from app directories. (b/17428116)
+# Kernel thread "loop0" reads a vold supplied file descriptor.
+# Fixes CTS tests:
+#  * android.os.storage.cts.StorageManagerTest#testMountAndUnmountObbNormal
+#  * android.os.storage.cts.StorageManagerTest#testMountAndUnmountTwoObbs
+allow kernel vold:fd use;
+allow kernel { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file read;
+allow kernel asec_image_file:file read;
+
+# Allow mounting loop device in update_engine_unittests. (b/28319454)
+# and for LTP kernel tests (b/73220071)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow kernel update_engine_data_file:file { read write };
+  allow kernel nativetest_data_file:file { read write };
+')
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
+# accesses to the underlying FS.
+allow kernel media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow kernel media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /data/misc/vold/virtual_disk.
+allow kernel vold_data_file:file { read write };
+
+# Allow the kernel to read APEX file descriptors and (staged) data files;
+# Needed because APEX uses the loopback driver, which issues requests from
+# a kernel thread in earlier kernel version.
+allow kernel apexd:fd use;
+allow kernel {
+  apex_data_file
+  staging_data_file
+  vendor_apex_file
+}:file read;
+
+# Allow the first-stage init (which is running in the kernel domain) to execute the
+# dynamic linker when it re-executes /init to switch into the second stage.
+# Until Linux 4.8, the program interpreter (dynamic linker in this case) is executed
+# before the domain is switched to the target domain. So, we need to allow the kernel
+# domain (the source domain) to execute the dynamic linker (system_file type).
+# TODO(b/110147943) remove these allow rules when we no longer need to support Linux
+# kernel older than 4.8.
+allow kernel system_file:file execute;
+# The label for the dynamic linker is rootfs in the recovery partition. This is because
+# the recovery partition which is rootfs does not support xattr and thus labeling can't be
+# done at build-time. All files are by default labeled as rootfs upon booting.
+recovery_only(`
+  allow kernel rootfs:file execute;
+')
+
+# required by VTS lidbm unit test
+allow kernel appdomain_tmpfs:file { read write };
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# The initial task starts in the kernel domain (assigned via
+# initial_sid_contexts), but nothing ever transitions to it.
+neverallow * kernel:process { transition dyntransition };
+
+# The kernel domain is never entered via an exec, nor should it
+# ever execute a program outside the rootfs without changing to another domain.
+# If you encounter an execute_no_trans denial on the kernel domain, then
+# possible causes include:
+# - The program is a kernel usermodehelper.  In this case, define a domain
+#   for the program and domain_auto_trans() to it.
+# - You are running an exploit which switched to the init task credentials
+#   and is then trying to exec a shell or other program.  You lose!
+neverallow kernel *:file { entrypoint execute_no_trans };
+
+# the kernel should not be accessing files owned by other users.
+# Instead of adding dac_{read_search,override}, fix the unix permissions
+# on files being accessed.
+neverallow kernel self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
+
+# Nobody should be ptracing kernel threads
+neverallow * kernel:process ptrace;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/keystore.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/keystore.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..155322c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/keystore.te
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+type keystore, domain, keystore2_key_type;
+type keystore_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# keystore daemon
+typeattribute keystore mlstrustedsubject;
+binder_use(keystore)
+binder_service(keystore)
+binder_call(keystore, system_server)
+binder_call(keystore, wificond)
+
+allow keystore keystore_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow keystore keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
+allow keystore keystore_exec:file { getattr };
+
+add_service(keystore, keystore_service)
+add_service(keystore, remoteprovisioning_service)
+allow keystore sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service:service_manager find;
+allow keystore dropbox_service:service_manager find;
+add_service(keystore, apc_service)
+add_service(keystore, keystore_compat_hal_service)
+add_service(keystore, authorization_service)
+add_service(keystore, keystore_maintenance_service)
+add_service(keystore, vpnprofilestore_service)
+
+# Check SELinux permissions.
+selinux_check_access(keystore)
+
+r_dir_file(keystore, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(keystore, cgroup_v2)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### Protect ourself from others
+###
+
+neverallow { domain -keystore } keystore_data_file:dir ~{ open create read getattr setattr search relabelto ioctl };
+neverallow { domain -keystore } keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
+
+neverallow { domain -keystore -init } keystore_data_file:dir *;
+neverallow { domain -keystore -init } keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set *;
+
+# TODO(b/186868271): Remove the crash dump exception soon-ish (maybe by May 14, 2021?)
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-crash_dump') } keystore:process ptrace;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/keystore_keys.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/keystore_keys.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c35984
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/keystore_keys.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# A keystore2 namespace for WI-FI.
+type wifi_key, keystore2_key_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/llkd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/llkd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1faa429
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/llkd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# llkd Live LocK Daemon
+type llkd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type llkd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/lmkd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/lmkd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de6052d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/lmkd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# lmkd low memory killer daemon
+type lmkd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type lmkd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow lmkd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search sys_resource kill };
+
+# lmkd locks itself in memory, to prevent it from being
+# swapped out and unable to kill other memory hogs.
+# system/core commit b28ff9131363f7b4a698990da5748b2a88c3ed35
+# b/16236289
+allow lmkd self:global_capability_class_set ipc_lock;
+
+## Open and write to /proc/PID/oom_score_adj and /proc/PID/timerslack_ns
+## TODO: maybe scope this down?
+r_dir_file(lmkd, domain)
+allow lmkd domain:file write;
+
+## Writes to /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/parameters/minfree
+r_dir_file(lmkd, sysfs_lowmemorykiller)
+allow lmkd sysfs_lowmemorykiller:file w_file_perms;
+
+# setsched and send kill signals to any registered process
+allow lmkd domain:process { setsched sigkill };
+# TODO: delete this line b/131761776
+allow lmkd kernel:process { setsched };
+
+# Clean up old cgroups
+allow lmkd cgroup:dir { remove_name rmdir };
+allow lmkd cgroup_v2:dir { remove_name rmdir };
+
+# Allow to read memcg stats
+allow lmkd cgroup:file r_file_perms;
+allow lmkd cgroup_v2:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Set self to SCHED_FIFO
+allow lmkd self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+
+allow lmkd proc_zoneinfo:file r_file_perms;
+allow lmkd proc_vmstat:file r_file_perms;
+
+# live lock watchdog process allowed to look through /proc/
+allow lmkd domain:dir { search open read };
+allow lmkd domain:file { open read };
+
+# live lock watchdog process allowed to dump process trace and
+# reboot because orderly shutdown may not be possible.
+allow lmkd proc_sysrq:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Read /proc/lowmemorykiller
+allow lmkd proc_lowmemorykiller:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read /proc/meminfo
+allow lmkd proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read /proc/pressure/cpu and /proc/pressure/io
+allow lmkd proc_pressure_cpu:file r_file_perms;
+allow lmkd proc_pressure_io:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read/Write /proc/pressure/memory
+allow lmkd proc_pressure_mem:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow lmkd to connect during reinit.
+allow lmkd lmkd_socket:sock_file write;
+
+# Allow lmkd to write to statsd.
+unix_socket_send(lmkd, statsdw, statsd)
+
+### neverallow rules
+
+# never honor LD_PRELOAD
+neverallow * lmkd:process noatsecure;
+neverallow lmkd self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/logd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/logd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8187179
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/logd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# android user-space log manager
+type logd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type logd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
+r_dir_file(logd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(logd, cgroup_v2)
+r_dir_file(logd, proc_kmsg)
+r_dir_file(logd, proc_meminfo)
+
+allow logd self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid setpcap sys_nice audit_control };
+allow logd self:global_capability2_class_set syslog;
+allow logd self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write };
+allow logd kernel:system syslog_read;
+allow logd kmsg_device:chr_file { getattr w_file_perms };
+allow logd system_data_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+allow logd packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow logd pstorefs:dir search;
+allow logd pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # Access to /data/misc/logd/event-log-tags
+  allow logd misc_logd_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow logd misc_logd_file:file rw_file_perms;
+')
+allow logd runtime_event_log_tags_file:file rw_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(logd, domain)
+
+allow logd kernel:system syslog_mod;
+
+control_logd(logd)
+read_runtime_log_tags(logd)
+
+allow runtime_event_log_tags_file tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+# Typically harmlessly blindly trying to access via liblog
+# event tag mapping while in the untrusted_app domain.
+# Access for that domain is controlled and gated via the
+# event log tag service (albeit at a performance penalty,
+# expected to be locally cached).
+dontaudit domain runtime_event_log_tags_file:file { map open read };
+
+# Logd sets defaults if certain properties are empty.
+set_prop(logd, logd_prop)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### logd should NEVER do any of this
+
+# Block device access.
+neverallow logd dev_type:blk_file { read write };
+
+# ptrace any other app
+neverallow logd domain:process ptrace;
+
+# ... and nobody may ptrace me (except on userdebug or eng builds)
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-crash_dump -llkd') } logd:process ptrace;
+
+# Write to /system.
+neverallow logd system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
+
+# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
+neverallow logd { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_data_file packages_list_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
+
+# Only init is allowed to enter the logd domain via exec()
+neverallow { domain -init } logd:process transition;
+neverallow * logd:process dyntransition;
+
+# protect the event-log-tags file
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -logd
+} runtime_event_log_tags_file:file no_w_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/logpersist.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/logpersist.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8e6af4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/logpersist.te
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# android debug logging, logpersist domains
+type logpersist, domain;
+
+# logcatd is a shell script that execs logcat with various parameters.
+allow logpersist shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow logpersist logcat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### logpersist should NEVER do any of this
+
+# Block device access.
+neverallow logpersist dev_type:blk_file { read write };
+
+# ptrace any other app
+neverallow logpersist domain:process ptrace;
+
+# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data except misc_logd_file
+neverallow logpersist { privapp_data_file app_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
+
+# Only init should be allowed to enter the logpersist domain via exec()
+# Following is a list of debug domains we know that transition to logpersist
+# neverallow_with_undefined_domains {
+#   domain
+#   -init       # goldfish, logcatd, raft
+#   -mmi        # bat, mtp8996, msmcobalt
+#   -system_app # Smith.apk
+# } logpersist:process transition;
+neverallow * logpersist:process dyntransition;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mdnsd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mdnsd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef7b065
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mdnsd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# mdns daemon
+type mdnsd, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediadrmserver.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediadrmserver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a52295e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediadrmserver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# mediadrmserver - mediadrm daemon
+type mediadrmserver, domain;
+type mediadrmserver_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+typeattribute mediadrmserver mlstrustedsubject;
+
+net_domain(mediadrmserver)
+binder_use(mediadrmserver)
+binder_call(mediadrmserver, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(mediadrmserver, appdomain)
+binder_service(mediadrmserver)
+hal_client_domain(mediadrmserver, hal_drm)
+
+add_service(mediadrmserver, mediadrmserver_service)
+allow mediadrmserver mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediadrmserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediadrmserver processinfo_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediadrmserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediadrmserver system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# TODO(b/80317992): remove
+binder_call(mediadrmserver, hal_omx_server)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# mediadrmserver should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow mediadrmserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands
+neverallowxperm mediadrmserver domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaextractor.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaextractor.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06f7928
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaextractor.te
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# mediaextractor - multimedia daemon
+type mediaextractor, domain;
+type mediaextractor_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type mediaextractor_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+typeattribute mediaextractor mlstrustedsubject;
+
+binder_use(mediaextractor)
+binder_call(mediaextractor, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(mediaextractor, appdomain)
+binder_service(mediaextractor)
+
+add_service(mediaextractor, mediaextractor_service)
+allow mediaextractor mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaextractor hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+allow mediaextractor system_server:fd use;
+
+hal_client_domain(mediaextractor, hal_cas)
+hal_client_domain(mediaextractor, hal_allocator)
+
+r_dir_file(mediaextractor, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(mediaextractor, cgroup_v2)
+allow mediaextractor proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+crash_dump_fallback(mediaextractor)
+
+# allow mediaextractor read permissions for file sources
+allow mediaextractor sdcard_type:file { getattr read };
+allow mediaextractor media_rw_data_file:file { getattr read };
+allow mediaextractor { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { getattr read };
+
+# Read resources from open apk files passed over Binder
+allow mediaextractor apk_data_file:file { read getattr };
+allow mediaextractor asec_apk_file:file { read getattr };
+allow mediaextractor ringtone_file:file { read getattr };
+
+# overlay package access
+allow mediaextractor vendor_overlay_file:file { read map };
+
+# scan extractor library directory to dynamically load extractors
+allow mediaextractor system_file:dir { read open };
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# mediaextractor should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow mediaextractor { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
+# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
+# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
+# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
+# hardware/content. Etc.
+#
+# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
+# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
+# Lengthier explanation here:
+# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
+neverallow mediaextractor domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+
+# mediaextractor should not be opening /data files directly. Any files
+# it touches (with a few exceptions) need to be passed to it via a file
+# descriptor opened outside the process.
+neverallow mediaextractor {
+  data_file_type
+  -zoneinfo_data_file # time zone data from /data/misc/zoneinfo
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-apk_data_file') # for loading media extractor plugins
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:file open;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediametrics.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediametrics.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..468c0d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediametrics.te
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# mediametrics - daemon for collecting media.metrics data
+type mediametrics, domain;
+type mediametrics_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+
+binder_use(mediametrics)
+binder_call(mediametrics, binderservicedomain)
+binder_service(mediametrics)
+
+add_service(mediametrics, mediametrics_service)
+
+allow mediametrics system_server:fd use;
+
+r_dir_file(mediametrics, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(mediametrics, cgroup_v2)
+allow mediametrics proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# allows interactions with dumpsys to GMScore
+allow mediametrics { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file write;
+
+# allow access to package manager for uid->apk mapping
+allow mediametrics package_native_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow metrics service to send information to statsd socket.
+unix_socket_send(mediametrics, statsdw, statsd)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# mediametrics should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow mediametrics { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
+# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
+# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
+# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
+# hardware/content. Etc.
+#
+# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
+# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
+# Lengthier explanation here:
+# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
+neverallow mediametrics domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaprovider.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaprovider.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24170a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaprovider.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+###
+### A domain for android.process.media, which contains both
+### MediaProvider and DownloadProvider and associated services.
+###
+
+type mediaprovider, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaserver.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaserver.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad460e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaserver.te
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+# mediaserver - multimedia daemon
+type mediaserver, domain;
+type mediaserver_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type mediaserver_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+typeattribute mediaserver mlstrustedsubject;
+
+net_domain(mediaserver)
+
+r_dir_file(mediaserver, sdcard_type)
+r_dir_file(mediaserver, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(mediaserver, cgroup_v2)
+
+# stat /proc/self
+allow mediaserver proc:lnk_file getattr;
+
+# open /vendor/lib/mediadrm
+allow mediaserver system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # ptrace to processes in the same domain for memory leak detection
+  allow mediaserver self:process ptrace;
+')
+
+binder_use(mediaserver)
+binder_call(mediaserver, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(mediaserver, appdomain)
+binder_service(mediaserver)
+
+allow mediaserver media_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow mediaserver media_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow mediaserver { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { append getattr ioctl lock map read write };
+allow mediaserver sdcard_type:file write;
+allow mediaserver gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow mediaserver video_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow mediaserver video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Read resources from open apk files passed over Binder.
+allow mediaserver apk_data_file:file { read getattr };
+allow mediaserver asec_apk_file:file { read getattr };
+allow mediaserver ringtone_file:file { read getattr };
+
+# Read /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
+allow mediaserver radio_data_file:file { read getattr };
+
+# Use pipes passed over Binder from app domains.
+allow mediaserver appdomain:fifo_file { getattr read write };
+
+allow mediaserver rpmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Inter System processes communicate over named pipe (FIFO)
+allow mediaserver system_server:fifo_file r_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(mediaserver, media_rw_data_file)
+
+# Grant access to read files on appfuse.
+allow mediaserver app_fuse_file:file { read getattr };
+
+# Needed on some devices for playing DRM protected content,
+# but seems expected and appropriate for all devices.
+unix_socket_connect(mediaserver, drmserver, drmserver)
+
+# Needed on some devices for playing audio on paired BT device,
+# but seems appropriate for all devices.
+unix_socket_connect(mediaserver, bluetooth, bluetooth)
+
+add_service(mediaserver, mediaserver_service)
+allow mediaserver activity_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver appops_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver audio_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver batterystats_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver media_session_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver permission_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver permission_checker_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver power_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver processinfo_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+
+# for ModDrm/MediaPlayer
+allow mediaserver mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+
+# For hybrid interfaces
+allow mediaserver hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# /oem access
+allow mediaserver oemfs:dir search;
+allow mediaserver oemfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# /vendor apk access
+allow mediaserver vendor_app_file:file { read map getattr };
+
+use_drmservice(mediaserver)
+allow mediaserver drmserver:drmservice {
+    consumeRights
+    setPlaybackStatus
+    openDecryptSession
+    closeDecryptSession
+    initializeDecryptUnit
+    decrypt
+    finalizeDecryptUnit
+    pread
+};
+
+# only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
+allowxperm mediaserver self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
+  ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
+# accesses to the underlying FS.
+allow mediaserver media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow mediaserver media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Access to media in /data/preloads
+allow mediaserver preloads_media_file:file { getattr read ioctl };
+
+allow mediaserver ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow mediaserver dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow mediaserver dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow mediaserver hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
+allow mediaserver hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+allow mediaserver hal_camera:fd use;
+
+allow mediaserver system_server:fd use;
+
+# b/120491318 allow mediaserver to access void:fd
+allow mediaserver vold:fd use;
+
+# overlay package access
+allow mediaserver vendor_overlay_file:file { read getattr map };
+
+hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_allocator)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# mediaserver should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow mediaserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands
+neverallowxperm mediaserver domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaswcodec.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaswcodec.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5726842
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mediaswcodec.te
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+type mediaswcodec, domain;
+type mediaswcodec_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+hal_server_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_codec2)
+
+# mediaswcodec may use an input surface from a different Codec2 service or an
+# OMX service
+hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_codec2)
+hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_omx)
+
+hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_allocator)
+hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+crash_dump_fallback(mediaswcodec)
+
+# mediaswcodec_server should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow mediaswcodec { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
+# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
+# Lengthier explanation here:
+# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
+neverallow mediaswcodec domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+
+allow mediaswcodec dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow mediaswcodec dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/modprobe.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/modprobe.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c7d64b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/modprobe.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+type modprobe, domain;
+
+allow modprobe proc_modules:file r_file_perms;
+allow modprobe proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+allow modprobe self:global_capability_class_set sys_module;
+allow modprobe kernel:key search;
+recovery_only(`
+  allow modprobe rootfs:system module_load;
+  allow modprobe rootfs:file r_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mtp.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mtp.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..add63c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/mtp.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# vpn tunneling protocol manager
+type mtp, domain;
+type mtp_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+net_domain(mtp)
+
+# pptp policy
+allow mtp self:{ socket pppox_socket } create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow mtp self:global_capability_class_set net_raw;
+allow mtp ppp:process signal;
+allow mtp vpn_data_file:dir search;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/net.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/net.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e90715e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/net.te
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+## Network types
+type node, node_type;
+type netif, netif_type;
+type port, port_type;
+
+###
+### Domain with network access
+###
+
+# Use network sockets.
+allow netdomain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+allow netdomain self:{ icmp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } create_socket_perms;
+
+# Connect to ports.
+allow netdomain port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
+# Bind to ports.
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} node_type:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } node_bind;
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} port_type:udp_socket name_bind;
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
+# See changes to the routing table.
+allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket { create read getattr write setattr lock append connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read };
+# b/141455849 gate RTM_GETLINK with a new permission nlmsg_readpriv and block access from
+# untrusted_apps. Some untrusted apps (e.g. untrusted_app_25-29) are granted access elsewhere
+# to avoid app-compat breakage.
+allow {
+  netdomain
+  -ephemeral_app
+  -mediaprovider
+  -untrusted_app_all
+} self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
+
+# Talks to netd via dnsproxyd socket.
+unix_socket_connect(netdomain, dnsproxyd, netd)
+
+# Talks to netd via fwmarkd socket.
+unix_socket_connect(netdomain, fwmarkd, netd)
+
+# Connect to mdnsd via mdnsd socket.
+unix_socket_connect(netdomain, mdnsd, mdnsd)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/netd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/netd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff0bff6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/netd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+# network manager
+type netd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type netd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+net_domain(netd)
+# in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, grant netd priv_sock_ioctls.
+allowxperm netd self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+
+r_dir_file(netd, cgroup)
+
+allow netd system_server:fd use;
+
+allow netd self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw kill };
+# Note: fsetid is deliberately not included above. fsetid checks are
+# triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by a group other
+# than one of the groups assigned to the current process to see if
+# the setgid bit should be cleared, regardless of whether the setgid
+# bit was even set.  We do not appear to truly need this capability
+# for netd to operate.
+dontaudit netd self:global_capability_class_set fsetid;
+
+# Allow netd to open /dev/tun, set it up and pass it to clatd
+allow netd tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm netd tun_device:chr_file ioctl { TUNGETIFF TUNSETIFF };
+allow netd self:tun_socket create;
+
+allow netd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow netd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
+allow netd self:netlink_nflog_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow netd self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow netd self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read nlmsg_write };
+allow netd self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow netd self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow netd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow netd system_file:file x_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow netd vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
+allow netd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Acquire advisory lock on /system/etc/xtables.lock. If this file doesn't
+# exist, suppress the denial.
+allow netd system_file:file lock;
+dontaudit netd system_file:dir write;
+
+# Allow netd to write to qtaguid ctrl file.
+# TODO: Add proper rules to prevent other process to access qtaguid_proc file
+# after migration complete
+allow netd proc_qtaguid_ctrl:file rw_file_perms;
+# Allow netd to read /dev/qtaguid. This is the same privilege level that normal apps have.
+allow netd qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(netd, proc_net_type)
+# For /proc/sys/net/ipv[46]/route/flush.
+allow netd proc_net_type:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Enables PppController and interface enumeration (among others)
+allow netd sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+r_dir_file(netd, sysfs_net)
+
+# Allows setting interface MTU
+allow netd sysfs_net:file w_file_perms;
+
+# TODO: added to match above sysfs rule. Remove me?
+allow netd sysfs_usb:file write;
+
+r_dir_file(netd, cgroup_v2)
+
+allow netd fs_bpf:dir search;
+allow netd fs_bpf:file { read write };
+
+# TODO: netd previously thought it needed these permissions to do WiFi related
+#       work.  However, after all the WiFi stuff is gone, we still need them.
+#       Why?
+allow netd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search chown };
+
+# Needed to update /data/misc/net/rt_tables
+allow netd net_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow netd net_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow netd self:global_capability_class_set fowner;
+
+# Needed to lock the iptables lock.
+allow netd system_file:file lock;
+
+# Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain
+allow netd dnsmasq:process signal;
+
+# Allow netd to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
+binder_use(netd)
+add_service(netd, netd_service)
+add_service(netd, dnsresolver_service)
+allow netd dumpstate:fifo_file  { getattr write };
+
+# Allow netd to call into the system server so it can check permissions.
+allow netd system_server:binder call;
+allow netd permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow netd to talk to the framework service which collects netd events.
+allow netd netd_listener_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow netd to operate on sockets that are passed to it.
+allow netd netdomain:{
+  icmp_socket
+  tcp_socket
+  udp_socket
+  rawip_socket
+  tun_socket
+} { read write getattr setattr getopt setopt };
+allow netd netdomain:fd use;
+
+# give netd permission to read and write netlink xfrm
+allow netd self:netlink_xfrm_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write nlmsg_read };
+
+# Allow netd to register as hal server.
+add_hwservice(netd, system_net_netd_hwservice)
+hwbinder_use(netd)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### netd should NEVER do any of this
+
+# Block device access.
+neverallow netd dev_type:blk_file { read write };
+
+# ptrace any other app
+neverallow netd { domain }:process ptrace;
+
+# Write to /system.
+neverallow netd system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
+
+# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
+neverallow netd { app_data_file_type system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
+
+# only system_server, dumpstate and network stack app may find netd service
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -system_server
+    -dumpstate
+    -network_stack
+    -netd
+    -netutils_wrapper
+} netd_service:service_manager find;
+
+# only system_server, dumpstate and network stack app may find dnsresolver service
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -system_server
+    -dumpstate
+    -network_stack
+    -netd
+    -netutils_wrapper
+} dnsresolver_service:service_manager find;
+
+# apps may not interact with netd over binder.
+neverallow { appdomain -network_stack } netd:binder call;
+neverallow netd { appdomain -network_stack userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:binder call;
+
+# If an already existing file is opened with O_CREATE, the kernel might generate
+# a false report of a create denial. Silence these denials and make sure that
+# inappropriate permissions are not granted.
+neverallow netd proc_net:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+dontaudit netd proc_net:dir write;
+
+neverallow netd sysfs_net:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+dontaudit netd sysfs_net:dir write;
+
+# Netd should not have SYS_ADMIN privs.
+neverallow netd self:capability sys_admin;
+dontaudit netd self:capability sys_admin;
+
+# Netd should not have SYS_MODULE privs, nor should it be requesting module loads
+# (things it requires should be built directly into the kernel)
+dontaudit netd self:capability sys_module;
+
+dontaudit netd kernel:system module_request;
+
+dontaudit netd appdomain:unix_stream_socket { read write };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/netutils_wrapper.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/netutils_wrapper.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27aa749
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/netutils_wrapper.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+type netutils_wrapper, domain;
+type netutils_wrapper_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+neverallow domain netutils_wrapper_exec:file execute_no_trans;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/network_stack.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/network_stack.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..feff664
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/network_stack.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Network stack service app
+type network_stack, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/neverallow_macros b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/neverallow_macros
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59fa441
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/neverallow_macros
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#
+# Common neverallow permissions
+define(`no_w_file_perms', `{ append create link unlink relabelfrom rename setattr write }')
+define(`no_rw_file_perms', `{ no_w_file_perms open read ioctl lock watch watch_mount watch_sb watch_with_perm watch_reads }')
+define(`no_x_file_perms', `{ execute execute_no_trans }')
+define(`no_w_dir_perms',  `{ add_name create link relabelfrom remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr write }')
+
+#####################################
+# neverallow_establish_socket_comms(src, dst)
+# neverallow src domain establishing socket connections to dst domain.
+#
+define(`neverallow_establish_socket_comms', `
+  neverallow $1 $2:socket_class_set { connect sendto };
+  neverallow $1 $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/nfc.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/nfc.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3a03e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/nfc.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# nfc subsystem
+type nfc, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/otapreopt_chroot.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/otapreopt_chroot.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db8dd1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/otapreopt_chroot.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# otapreopt_chroot seclabel
+
+# TODO: Only present to allow mediatek/wembley-sepolicy to see it for validation reasons.
+type otapreopt_chroot, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/perfetto.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/perfetto.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cec0e6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/perfetto.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type perfetto, domain, coredomain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/performanced.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/performanced.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d694fda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/performanced.te
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# performanced
+type performanced, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type performanced_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Needed to check for app permissions.
+binder_use(performanced)
+binder_call(performanced, system_server)
+allow performanced permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+pdx_server(performanced, performance_client)
+
+# TODO: use file caps to obtain sys_nice instead of setuid / setgid.
+allow performanced self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid sys_nice };
+
+# Access /proc to validate we're only affecting threads in the same thread group.
+# Performanced also shields unbound kernel threads.  It scans every task in the
+# root cpu set, but only affects the kernel threads.
+r_dir_file(performanced, { appdomain bufferhubd kernel surfaceflinger })
+dontaudit performanced domain:dir read;
+allow performanced { appdomain bufferhubd kernel surfaceflinger }:process setsched;
+
+# These /proc accesses only show up in permissive mode but they
+# generate a lot of noise in the log.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  dontaudit performanced domain:dir open;
+  dontaudit performanced domain:file { open read getattr };
+')
+
+# Access /dev/cpuset/cpuset.cpus
+r_dir_file(performanced, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(performanced, cgroup_v2)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/platform_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/platform_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b1faf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/platform_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+###
+### Apps signed with the platform key.
+###
+
+type platform_app, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/postinstall.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/postinstall.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bcea2dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/postinstall.te
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# Domain where the postinstall program runs during the update.
+# Extend the permissions in this domain to allow this program to access other
+# files needed by the specific device on your device's sepolicy directory.
+type postinstall, domain;
+
+# Allow postinstall to write to its stdout/stderr when redirected via pipes to
+# update_engine.
+allow postinstall update_engine_common:fd use;
+allow postinstall update_engine_common:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow postinstall to read and execute directories and files in the same
+# mounted location.
+allow postinstall postinstall_file:file rx_file_perms;
+allow postinstall postinstall_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow postinstall postinstall_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow postinstall to execute the shell or other system executables.
+allow postinstall shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow postinstall system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+allow postinstall toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow postinstall to execute shell in recovery.
+recovery_only(`
+  allow postinstall rootfs:file rx_file_perms;
+')
+
+#
+# For OTA dexopt.
+#
+
+# Allow postinstall scripts to talk to the system server.
+binder_use(postinstall)
+binder_call(postinstall, system_server)
+
+# Need to talk to the otadexopt service.
+allow postinstall otadexopt_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow postinstall scripts to trigger f2fs garbage collection
+allow postinstall sysfs_fs_f2fs:file rw_file_perms;
+allow postinstall sysfs_fs_f2fs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# No domain other than update_engine and recovery (via update_engine_sideload)
+# should transition to postinstall, as it is only meant to run during the
+# update.
+neverallow { domain -update_engine -recovery } postinstall:process { transition dyntransition };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ppp.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ppp.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b736def
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ppp.te
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Point to Point Protocol daemon
+type ppp, domain;
+type ppp_device, dev_type;
+type ppp_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+net_domain(ppp)
+
+r_dir_file(ppp, proc_net_type)
+
+allow ppp mtp:{ socket pppox_socket } rw_socket_perms;
+
+# ioctls needed for VPN.
+allowxperm ppp self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+allowxperm ppp mtp:{ socket pppox_socket } ioctl ppp_ioctls;
+
+allow ppp mtp:unix_dgram_socket rw_socket_perms;
+allow ppp ppp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow ppp self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
+allow ppp system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow ppp vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;')
+allow ppp vpn_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
+allow ppp vpn_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow ppp mtp:fd use;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/priv_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/priv_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0761fc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/priv_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+###
+### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
+###
+
+type priv_app, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/profman.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/profman.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c014d79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/profman.te
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# profman
+type profman, domain;
+type profman_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow profman user_profile_data_file:file { getattr read write lock map };
+
+# Dumping profile info opens the application APK file for pretty printing.
+allow profman asec_apk_file:file { read map };
+allow profman apk_data_file:file { getattr read map };
+allow profman apk_data_file:dir { getattr read search };
+
+allow profman oemfs:file { read map };
+# Reading an APK opens a ZipArchive, which unpack to tmpfs.
+allow profman tmpfs:file { read map };
+allow profman profman_dump_data_file:file { write map };
+
+allow profman installd:fd use;
+
+# Allow profman to analyze profiles for the secondary dex files. These
+# are application dex files reported back to the framework when using
+# BaseDexClassLoader.
+allow profman { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file { getattr read write lock map };
+allow profman { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir { getattr read search };
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(profman, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(profman, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow profman { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:notdevfile_class_set open;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/property.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/property.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57146a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/property.te
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+# Properties used only in /system
+#
+# DO NOT ADD system_internal_prop here.
+# Instead, add to private/property.te.
+# TODO(b/150331497): move these to private/property.te
+system_internal_prop(apexd_prop)
+system_internal_prop(bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_activity_manager_native_boot_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_boot_count_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_input_native_boot_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_media_native_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_netd_native_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_reset_performed_prop)
+system_internal_prop(firstboot_prop)
+
+compatible_property_only(`
+    # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
+    system_internal_prop(boottime_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(charger_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(cold_boot_done_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_adbd_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_apexd_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_bootanim_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_bugreport_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_console_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_dumpstate_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_fuse_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_gsid_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_interface_restart_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_interface_stop_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_mdnsd_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_restart_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_rildaemon_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(ctl_sigstop_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(dynamic_system_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(heapprofd_enabled_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(llkd_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(lpdumpd_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(mmc_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(mock_ota_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(net_dns_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(overlay_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(persistent_properties_ready_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(safemode_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(system_lmk_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(system_trace_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(test_boot_reason_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(time_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(traced_enabled_prop)
+    system_internal_prop(traced_lazy_prop)
+')
+
+# Properties which can't be written outside system
+system_restricted_prop(aac_drc_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(arm64_memtag_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(binder_cache_system_server_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(binder_cache_telephony_server_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(boot_status_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(bootanim_system_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(bootloader_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(boottime_public_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(bq_config_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(build_bootimage_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(build_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(charger_status_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(fingerprint_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(hal_instrumentation_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(init_service_status_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(libc_debug_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(module_sdkextensions_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(nnapi_ext_deny_product_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(power_debug_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(property_service_version_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(provisioned_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(restorecon_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(retaildemo_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(socket_hook_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(sqlite_log_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(surfaceflinger_display_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(system_boot_reason_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(system_jvmti_agent_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(ab_update_gki_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(usb_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(vold_status_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(vts_status_prop)
+
+compatible_property_only(`
+    # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
+    system_restricted_prop(config_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(cppreopt_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(dalvik_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(debuggerd_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(device_logging_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(dhcp_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(dumpstate_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(exported3_system_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(exported_dumpstate_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(exported_secure_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(heapprofd_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(net_radio_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(pan_result_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(persist_debug_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(shell_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(test_harness_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(theme_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(use_memfd_prop)
+    system_restricted_prop(vold_prop)
+')
+
+# Properties which can be written only by vendor_init
+system_vendor_config_prop(apexd_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(aaudio_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(apk_verity_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(audio_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(bootanim_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(build_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(build_odm_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(build_vendor_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(camera_calibration_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(camera_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(camerax_extensions_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(charger_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(codec2_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(cpu_variant_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(dalvik_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(debugfs_restriction_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(drm_service_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(exported_camera_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(exported_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(exported_default_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(ffs_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(framework_watchdog_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(graphics_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(hdmi_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(hw_timeout_multiplier_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(incremental_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(keyguard_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(lmkd_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(media_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(media_variant_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(mediadrm_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(mm_events_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(oem_unlock_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(packagemanager_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(recovery_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(sendbug_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(soc_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(storage_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(storagemanager_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(surfaceflinger_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(suspend_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(systemsound_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(telephony_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(tombstone_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(usb_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(userspace_reboot_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(vehicle_hal_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(vendor_socket_hook_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(virtual_ab_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(vndk_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(vts_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(vold_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(wifi_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(zram_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(zygote_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(dck_prop)
+
+# Properties with no restrictions
+system_public_prop(adbd_config_prop)
+system_public_prop(audio_prop)
+system_public_prop(bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
+system_public_prop(bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
+system_public_prop(bluetooth_prop)
+system_public_prop(ctl_default_prop)
+system_public_prop(ctl_interface_start_prop)
+system_public_prop(ctl_start_prop)
+system_public_prop(ctl_stop_prop)
+system_public_prop(dalvik_runtime_prop)
+system_public_prop(debug_prop)
+system_public_prop(dumpstate_options_prop)
+system_public_prop(exported_system_prop)
+system_public_prop(exported_bluetooth_prop)
+system_public_prop(exported_overlay_prop)
+system_public_prop(exported_pm_prop)
+system_public_prop(ffs_control_prop)
+system_public_prop(hal_dumpstate_config_prop)
+system_public_prop(sota_prop)
+system_public_prop(hwservicemanager_prop)
+system_public_prop(lmkd_prop)
+system_public_prop(logd_prop)
+system_public_prop(logpersistd_logging_prop)
+system_public_prop(log_prop)
+system_public_prop(log_tag_prop)
+system_public_prop(lowpan_prop)
+system_public_prop(nfc_prop)
+system_public_prop(ota_prop)
+system_public_prop(powerctl_prop)
+system_public_prop(qemu_hw_prop)
+system_public_prop(qemu_sf_lcd_density_prop)
+system_public_prop(radio_control_prop)
+system_public_prop(radio_prop)
+system_public_prop(serialno_prop)
+system_public_prop(surfaceflinger_color_prop)
+system_public_prop(system_prop)
+system_public_prop(telephony_status_prop)
+system_public_prop(usb_control_prop)
+system_public_prop(vold_post_fs_data_prop)
+system_public_prop(wifi_hal_prop)
+system_public_prop(wifi_log_prop)
+system_public_prop(wifi_prop)
+system_public_prop(zram_control_prop)
+
+# Properties which don't have entries on property_contexts
+system_internal_prop(default_prop)
+
+# Properties used in default HAL implementations
+vendor_internal_prop(rebootescrow_hal_prop)
+
+vendor_public_prop(persist_vendor_debug_wifi_prop)
+
+# Properties which are public for devices launching with Android O or earlier
+# This should not be used for any new properties.
+not_compatible_property(`
+    # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
+    system_public_prop(boottime_prop)
+    system_public_prop(bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
+    system_public_prop(charger_prop)
+    system_public_prop(cold_boot_done_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_adbd_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_apexd_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_bootanim_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_bugreport_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_console_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_dumpstate_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_fuse_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_gsid_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_interface_restart_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_interface_stop_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_mdnsd_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_restart_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_rildaemon_prop)
+    system_public_prop(ctl_sigstop_prop)
+    system_public_prop(dynamic_system_prop)
+    system_public_prop(heapprofd_enabled_prop)
+    system_public_prop(llkd_prop)
+    system_public_prop(lpdumpd_prop)
+    system_public_prop(mmc_prop)
+    system_public_prop(mock_ota_prop)
+    system_public_prop(net_dns_prop)
+    system_public_prop(overlay_prop)
+    system_public_prop(persistent_properties_ready_prop)
+    system_public_prop(safemode_prop)
+    system_public_prop(system_lmk_prop)
+    system_public_prop(system_trace_prop)
+    system_public_prop(test_boot_reason_prop)
+    system_public_prop(time_prop)
+    system_public_prop(traced_enabled_prop)
+    system_public_prop(traced_lazy_prop)
+
+    system_public_prop(config_prop)
+    system_public_prop(cppreopt_prop)
+    system_public_prop(dalvik_prop)
+    system_public_prop(debuggerd_prop)
+    system_public_prop(device_logging_prop)
+    system_public_prop(dhcp_prop)
+    system_public_prop(dumpstate_prop)
+    system_public_prop(exported3_system_prop)
+    system_public_prop(exported_dumpstate_prop)
+    system_public_prop(exported_secure_prop)
+    system_public_prop(heapprofd_prop)
+    system_public_prop(net_radio_prop)
+    system_public_prop(pan_result_prop)
+    system_public_prop(persist_debug_prop)
+    system_public_prop(shell_prop)
+    system_public_prop(test_harness_prop)
+    system_public_prop(theme_prop)
+    system_public_prop(use_memfd_prop)
+    system_public_prop(vold_prop)
+')
+
+not_compatible_property(`
+    vendor_public_prop(vendor_default_prop)
+')
+
+compatible_property_only(`
+    vendor_internal_prop(vendor_default_prop)
+')
+
+typeattribute log_prop log_property_type;
+typeattribute log_tag_prop log_property_type;
+typeattribute wifi_log_prop log_property_type;
+
+allow property_type tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+
+# core_property_type should not be used for new properties or
+# device specific properties. Properties with this attribute
+# are readable to everyone, which is overly broad and should
+# be avoided.
+# New properties should have appropriate read / write access
+# control rules written.
+
+typeattribute audio_prop         core_property_type;
+typeattribute config_prop        core_property_type;
+typeattribute cppreopt_prop      core_property_type;
+typeattribute dalvik_prop        core_property_type;
+typeattribute debuggerd_prop     core_property_type;
+typeattribute debug_prop         core_property_type;
+typeattribute dhcp_prop          core_property_type;
+typeattribute dumpstate_prop     core_property_type;
+typeattribute logd_prop          core_property_type;
+typeattribute net_radio_prop     core_property_type;
+typeattribute nfc_prop           core_property_type;
+typeattribute ota_prop           core_property_type;
+typeattribute pan_result_prop    core_property_type;
+typeattribute persist_debug_prop core_property_type;
+typeattribute powerctl_prop      core_property_type;
+typeattribute radio_prop         core_property_type;
+typeattribute restorecon_prop    core_property_type;
+typeattribute shell_prop         core_property_type;
+typeattribute system_prop        core_property_type;
+typeattribute usb_prop           core_property_type;
+typeattribute vold_prop          core_property_type;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/racoon.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/racoon.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4b299e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/racoon.te
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# IKE key management daemon
+type racoon, domain;
+type racoon_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+typeattribute racoon mlstrustedsubject;
+
+net_domain(racoon)
+allowxperm racoon self:udp_socket ioctl { SIOCSIFFLAGS SIOCSIFADDR SIOCSIFNETMASK };
+
+binder_use(racoon)
+
+allow racoon tun_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allowxperm racoon tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNSETIFF;
+allow racoon cgroup:dir { add_name create };
+allow racoon cgroup_v2:dir { add_name create };
+allow racoon kernel:system module_request;
+
+allow racoon self:key_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow racoon self:tun_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow racoon self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_bind_service net_raw };
+
+# XXX: should we give ip-up-vpn its own label (currently racoon domain)
+allow racoon system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow racoon vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;')
+allow racoon vpn_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow racoon vpn_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
+
+use_keystore(racoon)
+
+# Racoon (VPN) has a restricted set of permissions from the default.
+allow racoon keystore:keystore_key {
+	get
+	sign
+	verify
+};
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/radio.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/radio.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e03b706
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/radio.te
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# phone subsystem
+type radio, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+
+net_domain(radio)
+bluetooth_domain(radio)
+binder_service(radio)
+
+# Talks to hal_telephony_server via the rild socket only for devices without full treble
+not_full_treble(`unix_socket_connect(radio, rild, hal_telephony_server)')
+
+# Data file accesses.
+allow radio radio_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow radio radio_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
+allow radio radio_core_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow radio radio_core_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow radio net_data_file:dir search;
+allow radio net_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+add_service(radio, radio_service)
+allow radio audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow radio cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow radio drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow radio mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow radio nfc_service:service_manager find;
+allow radio app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow radio system_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow radio timedetector_service:service_manager find;
+allow radio timezonedetector_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Perform HwBinder IPC.
+hwbinder_use(radio)
+hal_client_domain(radio, hal_telephony)
+
+# Used by TelephonyManager
+allow radio proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/recovery.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/recovery.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3649888
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/recovery.te
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+# recovery console (used in recovery init.rc for /sbin/recovery)
+
+# Declare the domain unconditionally so we can always reference it
+# in neverallow rules.
+type recovery, domain;
+
+# But the allow rules are only included in the recovery policy.
+# Otherwise recovery is only allowed the domain rules.
+recovery_only(`
+  # Allow recovery to perform an update as update_engine would do.
+  typeattribute recovery update_engine_common;
+  # Recovery can only use HALs in passthrough mode
+  passthrough_hal_client_domain(recovery, hal_bootctl)
+
+  allow recovery self:global_capability_class_set {
+    chown
+    dac_override
+    dac_read_search
+    fowner
+    setuid
+    setgid
+    sys_admin
+    sys_tty_config
+  };
+
+  # Run helpers from / or /system without changing domain.
+  r_dir_file(recovery, rootfs)
+  allow recovery rootfs:file execute_no_trans;
+  allow recovery system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+  allow recovery toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+  # Mount filesystems.
+  allow recovery rootfs:dir mounton;
+  allow recovery tmpfs:dir mounton;
+  allow recovery { fs_type enforce_debugfs_restriction(`-debugfs_type') }:filesystem ~relabelto;
+  allow recovery unlabeled:filesystem ~relabelto;
+  allow recovery contextmount_type:filesystem relabelto;
+
+  # We may be asked to set an SELinux label for a type not known to the
+  # currently loaded policy. Allow it.
+  allow recovery unlabeled:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
+  allow recovery unlabeled:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
+
+  # Get file contexts
+  allow recovery file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+  # Write to /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
+  allow recovery proc_drop_caches:file w_file_perms;
+
+  # Read /proc/swaps
+  allow recovery proc_swaps:file r_file_perms;
+
+  # Read kernel config through libvintf for OTA matching
+  allow recovery config_gz:file { open read getattr };
+
+  # Write to /sys/class/android_usb/android0/enable.
+  r_dir_file(recovery, sysfs_android_usb)
+  allow recovery sysfs_android_usb:file w_file_perms;
+
+  # Write to /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_max_freq.
+  allow recovery sysfs_devices_system_cpu:file w_file_perms;
+
+  allow recovery sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+  # Read /sysfs/fs/ext4/features
+  r_dir_file(recovery, sysfs_fs_ext4_features)
+
+  # Read from /sys/class/leds/lcd-backlight/max_brightness and write to /s/c/l/l/brightness to
+  # control backlight brightness.
+  allow recovery sysfs_leds:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow recovery sysfs_leds:file rw_file_perms;
+  allow recovery sysfs_leds:lnk_file read;
+
+  allow recovery kernel:system syslog_read;
+
+  # Access /dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep0
+  allow recovery functionfs:dir search;
+  allow recovery functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
+  allowxperm recovery functionfs:file ioctl FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_DESC;
+
+  # Access to /sys/fs/selinux/policyvers for compatibility check
+  allow recovery selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+  # Required to e.g. wipe userdata/cache.
+  allow recovery device:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow recovery block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow recovery dev_type:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+  allowxperm recovery { userdata_block_device metadata_block_device cache_block_device }:blk_file ioctl BLKPBSZGET;
+
+  # GUI
+  allow recovery graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+  allow recovery graphics_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow recovery input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow recovery input_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+  allow recovery tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+  # Create /tmp/recovery.log and execute /tmp/update_binary.
+  allow recovery tmpfs:file { create_file_perms x_file_perms };
+  allow recovery tmpfs:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+  # Manage files on /cache and /cache/recovery
+  allow recovery { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+  allow recovery { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
+
+  # Read /sys/class/thermal/*/temp for thermal info.
+  r_dir_file(recovery, sysfs_thermal)
+
+  # Read files on /oem.
+  r_dir_file(recovery, oemfs);
+
+  # Use setfscreatecon() to label files for OTA updates.
+  allow recovery self:process setfscreate;
+
+  # Allow recovery to create a fuse filesystem, and read files from it.
+  allow recovery fuse_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+  allow recovery fuse:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow recovery fuse:file r_file_perms;
+
+  wakelock_use(recovery)
+
+  # This line seems suspect, as it should not really need to
+  # set scheduling parameters for a kernel domain task.
+  allow recovery kernel:process setsched;
+
+  # These are needed to update dynamic partitions in recovery.
+  r_dir_file(recovery, sysfs_dm)
+  allowxperm recovery super_block_device_type:blk_file ioctl { BLKIOMIN BLKALIGNOFF };
+
+  # Allow using libfiemap/gsid directly (no binder in recovery).
+  allow recovery gsi_metadata_file_type:dir search;
+  allow recovery ota_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow recovery ota_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+  # Allow mounting /metadata for writing update states
+  allow recovery metadata_file:dir { getattr mounton };
+')
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Recovery should never touch /data.
+#
+# In particular, if /data is encrypted, it is not accessible
+# to recovery anyway.
+#
+# For now, we only enforce write/execute restrictions, as domain.te
+# contains a number of read-only rules that apply to all
+# domains, including recovery.
+#
+# TODO: tighten this up further.
+neverallow recovery {
+   data_file_type
+   -cache_file
+   -cache_recovery_file
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+neverallow recovery {
+   data_file_type
+   -cache_file
+   -cache_recovery_file
+  with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
+}:dir no_w_dir_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/recovery_persist.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/recovery_persist.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4b4562
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/recovery_persist.te
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# android recovery persistent log manager
+type recovery_persist, domain;
+type recovery_persist_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow recovery_persist pstorefs:dir search;
+allow recovery_persist pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow recovery_persist recovery_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow recovery_persist recovery_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+allow recovery_persist cache_file:dir search;
+allow recovery_persist cache_file:lnk_file read;
+allow recovery_persist cache_recovery_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow recovery_persist cache_recovery_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### recovery_persist should NEVER do any of this
+
+# Block device access.
+neverallow recovery_persist dev_type:blk_file { read write };
+
+# ptrace any other app
+neverallow recovery_persist domain:process ptrace;
+
+# Write to /system.
+neverallow recovery_persist system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
+
+# Write to files in /data/data
+neverallow recovery_persist { privapp_data_file app_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/recovery_refresh.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/recovery_refresh.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6870dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/recovery_refresh.te
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# android recovery refresh log manager
+type recovery_refresh, domain;
+type recovery_refresh_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow recovery_refresh pstorefs:dir search;
+allow recovery_refresh pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+# NB: domain inherits write_logd which hands us write to pmsg_device
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### recovery_refresh should NEVER do any of this
+
+# Block device access.
+neverallow recovery_refresh dev_type:blk_file { read write };
+
+# ptrace any other app
+neverallow recovery_refresh domain:process ptrace;
+
+# Write to /system.
+neverallow recovery_refresh system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
+
+# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
+neverallow recovery_refresh { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/roles b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/roles
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca92934
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/roles
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+role r types domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/rs.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/rs.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16b6e96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/rs.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+type rs, domain, coredomain;
+type rs_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/rss_hwm_reset.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/rss_hwm_reset.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..163e1ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/rss_hwm_reset.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# rss_hwm_reset resets RSS high-water mark counters for all procesess.
+type rss_hwm_reset, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/runas.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/runas.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..356a019
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/runas.te
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+type runas, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type runas_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow runas adbd:fd use;
+allow runas adbd:process sigchld;
+allow runas adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow runas shell:fd use;
+allow runas shell:fifo_file { read write };
+allow runas shell:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow runas devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl };
+allow runas shell_data_file:file { read write };
+
+# run-as reads package information.
+allow runas system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow runas system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;
+allow runas packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# The app's data dir may be accessed through a symlink.
+allow runas system_data_file:lnk_file read;
+
+# run-as checks and changes to the app data dir.
+dontaudit runas self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
+allow runas app_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+# run-as switches to the app UID/GID.
+allow runas self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid };
+
+# run-as switches to the app security context.
+selinux_check_context(runas) # validate context
+allow runas self:process setcurrent;
+allow runas non_system_app_set:process dyntransition; # setcon
+
+# runas/libselinux needs access to seapp_contexts_file to
+# determine which domain to transition to.
+allow runas seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# run-as cannot have capabilities other than CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID
+neverallow runas self:global_capability_class_set ~{ setuid setgid };
+neverallow runas self:global_capability2_class_set *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/runas_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/runas_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdaa799
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/runas_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type runas_app, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/scheduler_service_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/scheduler_service_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3cede1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/scheduler_service_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+add_hwservice(scheduler_service_server, fwk_scheduler_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/sdcardd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/sdcardd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb1c919
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/sdcardd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+type sdcardd, domain;
+type sdcardd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow sdcardd cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow sdcardd cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow sdcardd fuse_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow sdcardd rootfs:dir mounton;  # TODO: deprecated in M
+allow sdcardd sdcardfs:filesystem remount;
+allow sdcardd tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow sdcardd mnt_media_rw_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow sdcardd storage_file:dir search;
+allow sdcardd storage_stub_file:dir { search mounton };
+allow sdcardd sdcard_type:filesystem { mount unmount };
+allow sdcardd self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid dac_override dac_read_search sys_admin sys_resource };
+
+allow sdcardd sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow sdcardd sdcard_type:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow sdcardd media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow sdcardd media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Read /data/system/packages.list.
+allow sdcardd system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow sdcardd packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read /data/misc/installd/layout_version
+allow sdcardd install_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow sdcardd install_data_file:dir search;
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow sdcardd vold:fd use;
+allow sdcardd vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# Allow running on top of expanded storage
+allow sdcardd mnt_expand_file:dir search;
+
+# access /proc/filesystems
+allow sdcardd proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# The sdcard daemon should no longer be started from init
+neverallow init sdcardd_exec:file execute;
+neverallow init sdcardd:process { transition dyntransition };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/secure_element.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/secure_element.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ce6714
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/secure_element.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# secure_element subsystem
+type secure_element, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/sensor_service_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/sensor_service_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c526a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/sensor_service_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+add_hwservice(sensor_service_server, fwk_sensor_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/service.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/service.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74dc104
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/service.te
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+type aidl_lazy_test_service,    service_manager_type;
+type apc_service,               service_manager_type;
+type apex_service,              service_manager_type;
+type artd_service,              service_manager_type;
+type audioserver_service,       service_manager_type;
+type authorization_service,     service_manager_type;
+type batteryproperties_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, service_manager_type;
+type bluetooth_service,         service_manager_type;
+type cameraserver_service,      service_manager_type;
+type default_android_service,   service_manager_type;
+type dnsresolver_service,       service_manager_type;
+type drmserver_service,         service_manager_type;
+type dumpstate_service,         service_manager_type;
+type fingerprintd_service,      service_manager_type;
+type gatekeeper_service,        app_api_service, service_manager_type;
+type gpu_service,               app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, service_manager_type;
+type idmap_service,             service_manager_type;
+type iorapd_service,            service_manager_type;
+type incident_service,          service_manager_type;
+type installd_service,          service_manager_type;
+type credstore_service,         app_api_service, service_manager_type;
+type keystore_compat_hal_service, service_manager_type;
+type keystore_maintenance_service, service_manager_type;
+type keystore_service,          service_manager_type;
+type lpdump_service,            service_manager_type;
+type mediaserver_service,       service_manager_type;
+type mediametrics_service,      service_manager_type;
+type mediaextractor_service,    service_manager_type;
+type mediadrmserver_service,    service_manager_type;
+type mediatranscoding_service,  app_api_service, service_manager_type;
+type netd_service,              service_manager_type;
+type nfc_service,               service_manager_type;
+type radio_service,             service_manager_type;
+type remoteprovisioning_service,   service_manager_type;
+type secure_element_service,    service_manager_type;
+type service_manager_service,   service_manager_type;
+type storaged_service,          service_manager_type;
+type surfaceflinger_service,    app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, service_manager_type;
+type system_app_service,        service_manager_type;
+type system_suspend_control_internal_service, service_manager_type;
+type system_suspend_control_service, service_manager_type;
+type update_engine_service,     service_manager_type;
+type update_engine_stable_service, service_manager_type;
+type virtualization_service,    service_manager_type;
+type virtual_touchpad_service,  service_manager_type;
+type vold_service,              service_manager_type;
+type vpnprofilestore_service,   service_manager_type;
+type vr_hwc_service,            service_manager_type;
+type vrflinger_vsync_service,   service_manager_type;
+
+# system_server_services broken down
+type accessibility_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type account_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type activity_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type activity_task_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type adb_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type alarm_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type app_binding_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type app_hibernation_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type app_integrity_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type app_prediction_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type app_search_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type appops_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type appwidget_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type assetatlas_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type audio_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type auth_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type autofill_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type backup_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type batterystats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type battery_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type binder_calls_stats_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type blob_store_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type bluetooth_manager_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type broadcastradio_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type cacheinfo_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type cameraproxy_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type clipboard_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type contexthub_service, app_api_service,  system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type crossprofileapps_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type IProxyService_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type companion_device_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type connectivity_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type connmetrics_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type consumer_ir_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type content_capture_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type content_suggestions_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type content_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type country_detector_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+# Note: The coverage_service should only be enabled for userdebug / eng builds that were compiled
+# with EMMA_INSTRUMENT=true. We should consider locking this down in the future.
+type coverage_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type cpuinfo_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type dataloader_manager_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type dbinfo_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type device_config_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type device_policy_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type device_state_service, app_api_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type deviceidle_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type device_identifiers_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type devicestoragemonitor_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type diskstats_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type display_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type domain_verification_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type color_display_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type external_vibrator_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type file_integrity_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type font_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type netd_listener_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type network_watchlist_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type DockObserver_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type dreams_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type dropbox_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type lowpan_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type ethernet_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type biometric_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type bugreport_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type platform_compat_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type face_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type fingerprint_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type fwk_stats_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type game_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type gfxinfo_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type graphicsstats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type hardware_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type hardware_properties_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type hdmi_control_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type hint_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type imms_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type incremental_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type input_method_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type input_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type ipsec_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type iris_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type jobscheduler_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type launcherapps_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type legacy_permission_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type light_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type location_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type location_time_zone_manager_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type lock_settings_service, app_api_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type looper_stats_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type media_communication_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type media_metrics_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type media_projection_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type media_router_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type media_session_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type meminfo_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type memtrackproxy_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type midi_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type mount_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type music_recognition_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type netpolicy_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type netstats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type network_management_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type network_score_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type network_stack_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type network_time_update_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type notification_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type oem_lock_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type otadexopt_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type overlay_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type pac_proxy_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type package_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type package_native_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type people_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type permission_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type permissionmgr_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type permission_checker_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type persistent_data_block_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type pinner_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type power_stats_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type power_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type print_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type processinfo_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type procstats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type reboot_readiness_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type recovery_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type registry_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type restrictions_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type role_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type rollback_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type runtime_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type rttmanager_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type samplingprofiler_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type scheduling_policy_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type search_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type search_ui_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type sensorservice_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type sensor_privacy_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type serial_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type servicediscovery_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type settings_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type shortcut_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type slice_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type smartspace_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type statusbar_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type storagestats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type system_config_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type system_server_dumper_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type system_update_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type soundtrigger_middleware_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type speech_recognition_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type task_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type testharness_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type textclassification_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type textservices_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type texttospeech_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type telecom_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type thermal_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type timedetector_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type timezone_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type timezonedetector_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type transformer_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type trust_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type tv_input_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type tv_tuner_resource_mgr_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type uimode_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type updatelock_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type uri_grants_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type usagestats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type usb_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type user_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type uwb_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type vcn_management_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type vibrator_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type vibrator_manager_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type voiceinteraction_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type vpn_management_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type vr_manager_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type wallpaper_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type webviewupdate_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type wifip2p_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type wifiscanner_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type wifi_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type wifinl80211_service, service_manager_type;
+type wifiaware_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type window_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type inputflinger_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type wpantund_service, system_api_service, service_manager_type;
+type tethering_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type emergency_affordance_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+
+###
+### HAL Services
+###
+
+type hal_audio_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_audiocontrol_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_authsecret_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_face_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_fingerprint_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_gnss_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_health_storage_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_identity_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_keymint_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_light_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_memtrack_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_neuralnetworks_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_oemlock_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_power_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_power_stats_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_rebootescrow_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_secureclock_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_sharedsecret_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_vibrator_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_weaver_service, vendor_service, protected_service, service_manager_type;
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# servicemanager handles registering or looking up named services.
+# It does not make sense to register or lookup something which is not a service.
+# Trigger a compile error if this occurs.
+neverallow domain ~{ service_manager_type vndservice_manager_type }:service_manager { add find };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/servicemanager.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/servicemanager.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63fc227
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/servicemanager.te
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# servicemanager - the Binder context manager
+type servicemanager, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type servicemanager_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Note that we do not use the binder_* macros here.
+# servicemanager is unique in that it only provides
+# name service (aka context manager) for Binder.
+# As such, it only ever receives and transfers other references
+# created by other domains.  It never passes its own references
+# or initiates a Binder IPC.
+allow servicemanager self:binder set_context_mgr;
+allow servicemanager {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+  -hwservicemanager
+  -vndservicemanager
+}:binder transfer;
+
+allow servicemanager service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow servicemanager vendor_service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# nonplat_service_contexts only accessible on non full-treble devices
+not_full_treble(`allow servicemanager nonplat_service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;')
+
+add_service(servicemanager, service_manager_service)
+allow servicemanager dumpstate:fd use;
+allow servicemanager dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+# Check SELinux permissions.
+selinux_check_access(servicemanager)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/sgdisk.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/sgdisk.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5a9152
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/sgdisk.te
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# sgdisk called from vold
+type sgdisk, domain;
+type sgdisk_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Allowed to read/write low-level partition tables
+allow sgdisk block_device:dir search;
+allow sgdisk vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+# HDIO_GETGEO needed to get the number of disk heads
+# on vold_device. How quaint.
+allowxperm sgdisk vold_device:blk_file ioctl { HDIO_GETGEO };
+# sgdisk also uses BLKGETSIZE and BLKGETSIZE64. BLKGETSIZE64
+# is granted to all block device users in domain.te, so
+# no need to mention it here. sgdisk should not be
+# using the BLKGETSIZE ioctl as it is useless for devices over
+# 2T in size, but we allow it for now and hope that sgdisk
+# will fix their bug.
+allowxperm sgdisk vold_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKGETSIZE };
+# Force a re-read of the partition table.
+allowxperm sgdisk vold_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKRRPART };
+# Allow reading of the physical block size.
+allowxperm sgdisk vold_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKPBSZGET };
+
+# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp()
+allow sgdisk devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow sgdisk vold:fd use;
+allow sgdisk vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# Used to probe kernel to reload partition tables
+allow sgdisk self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+
+# Only allow entry from vold
+neverallow { domain -vold } sgdisk:process transition;
+neverallow * sgdisk:process dyntransition;
+neverallow sgdisk { file_type fs_type -sgdisk_exec }:file entrypoint;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/shared_relro.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/shared_relro.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dd5bd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/shared_relro.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Process which creates/updates shared RELRO files to be used by other apps.
+type shared_relro, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/shell.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/shell.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29c07a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/shell.te
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+# Domain for shell processes spawned by ADB or console service.
+type shell, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type shell_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Create and use network sockets.
+net_domain(shell)
+
+# logcat
+read_logd(shell)
+control_logd(shell)
+# logcat -L (directly, or via dumpstate)
+allow shell pstorefs:dir search;
+allow shell pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Root fs.
+allow shell rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# read files in /data/anr
+allow shell anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow shell anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access /data/local/tmp.
+allow shell shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow shell shell_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow shell shell_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
+allow shell shell_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+
+# Access /data/local/tests.
+allow shell shell_test_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow shell shell_test_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow shell shell_test_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
+allow shell shell_test_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+allow shell shell_test_data_file:sock_file create_file_perms;
+
+# Read and delete from /data/local/traces.
+allow shell trace_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+allow shell trace_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms remove_name write };
+
+# Access /data/misc/profman.
+allow shell profman_dump_data_file:dir { write remove_name r_dir_perms };
+allow shell profman_dump_data_file:file { unlink r_file_perms };
+
+# Read/execute files in /data/nativetest
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow shell nativetest_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow shell nativetest_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
+')
+
+# adb bugreport
+unix_socket_connect(shell, dumpstate, dumpstate)
+
+allow shell devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow shell tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow shell console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow shell input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow shell input_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(shell, system_file)
+allow shell system_file:file x_file_perms;
+allow shell toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow shell tzdatacheck_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow shell shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow shell zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(shell, apk_data_file)
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # "systrace --boot" support - allow boottrace service to run
+  allow shell boottrace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow shell boottrace_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+')
+
+# allow shell access to services
+allow shell servicemanager:service_manager list;
+# don't allow shell to access GateKeeper service
+# TODO: why is this so broad? Tightening candidate? It needs at list:
+# - dumpstate_service (so it can receive dumpstate progress updates)
+allow shell {
+  service_manager_type
+  -apex_service
+  -dnsresolver_service
+  -gatekeeper_service
+  -incident_service
+  -installd_service
+  -iorapd_service
+  -netd_service
+  -system_suspend_control_internal_service
+  -system_suspend_control_service
+  -virtual_touchpad_service
+  -vold_service
+  -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
+}:service_manager find;
+allow shell dumpstate:binder call;
+
+# allow shell to get information from hwservicemanager
+# for instance, listing hardware services with lshal
+hwbinder_use(shell)
+allow shell hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
+
+# allow shell to look through /proc/ for lsmod, ps, top, netstat, vmstat.
+r_dir_file(shell, proc_net_type)
+
+allow shell {
+  proc_asound
+  proc_filesystems
+  proc_interrupts
+  proc_loadavg # b/124024827
+  proc_meminfo
+  proc_modules
+  proc_pid_max
+  proc_slabinfo
+  proc_stat
+  proc_timer
+  proc_uptime
+  proc_version
+  proc_vmstat
+  proc_zoneinfo
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow listing network interfaces under /sys/class/net.
+allow shell sysfs_net:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(shell, cgroup)
+allow shell cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell cgroup_desc_api_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell vendor_cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(shell, cgroup_v2)
+allow shell domain:dir { search open read getattr };
+allow shell domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };
+
+# statvfs() of /proc and other labeled filesystems
+# (yaffs2, jffs2, ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs, btrfs, f2fs, squashfs, overlay)
+allow shell { proc labeledfs }:filesystem getattr;
+
+# stat() of /dev
+allow shell device:dir getattr;
+
+# allow shell to read /proc/pid/attr/current for ps -Z
+allow shell domain:process getattr;
+
+# Allow pulling the SELinux policy for CTS purposes
+allow shell selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow shell selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# enable shell domain to read/write files/dirs for bootchart data
+# User will creates the start and stop file via adb shell
+# and read other files created by init process under /data/bootchart
+allow shell bootchart_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow shell bootchart_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Make sure strace works for the non-privileged shell user
+allow shell self:process ptrace;
+
+# allow shell to get battery info
+allow shell sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow access to ion memory allocation device.
+allow shell ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+#
+# filesystem test for insecure chr_file's is done
+# via a host side test
+#
+allow shell dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow shell dev_type:chr_file getattr;
+
+# /dev/fd is a symlink
+allow shell proc:lnk_file getattr;
+
+#
+# filesystem test for insucre blk_file's is done
+# via hostside test
+#
+allow shell dev_type:blk_file getattr;
+
+# read selinux policy files
+allow shell file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow shell sepolicy_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow shell to start up vendor shell
+allow shell vendor_shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Everything is labeled as rootfs in recovery mode. Allow shell to
+# execute them.
+recovery_only(`
+  allow shell rootfs:file rx_file_perms;
+')
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Do not allow shell to hard link to any files.
+# In particular, if shell hard links to app data
+# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
+# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
+# bugs, so we want to ensure the shell user never has this
+# capability.
+neverallow shell file_type:file link;
+
+# Do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands
+neverallowxperm shell domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+
+# limit shell access to sensitive char drivers to
+# only getattr required for host side test.
+neverallow shell {
+  fuse_device
+  hw_random_device
+  port_device
+}:chr_file ~getattr;
+
+# Limit shell to only getattr on blk devices for host side tests.
+neverallow shell dev_type:blk_file ~getattr;
+
+# b/30861057: Shell access to existing input devices is an abuse
+# vector. The shell user can inject events that look like they
+# originate from the touchscreen etc.
+# Everyone should have already moved to UiAutomation#injectInputEvent
+# if they are running instrumentation tests (i.e. CTS), Monkey for
+# their stress tests, and the input command (adb shell input ...) for
+# injecting swipes and things.
+neverallow shell input_device:chr_file no_w_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/simpleperf.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/simpleperf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..218fee7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/simpleperf.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type simpleperf, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/simpleperf_app_runner.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/simpleperf_app_runner.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ed007e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/simpleperf_app_runner.te
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+type simpleperf_app_runner, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type simpleperf_app_runner_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# run simpleperf_app_runner in adb shell.
+allow simpleperf_app_runner adbd:fd use;
+allow simpleperf_app_runner shell:fd use;
+allow simpleperf_app_runner devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl };
+
+# simpleperf_app_runner reads package information.
+allow simpleperf_app_runner system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow simpleperf_app_runner system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;
+allow simpleperf_app_runner packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# The app's data dir may be accessed through a symlink.
+allow simpleperf_app_runner system_data_file:lnk_file read;
+
+# simpleperf_app_runner switches to the app UID/GID.
+allow simpleperf_app_runner self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid };
+
+# simpleperf_app_runner switches to the app security context.
+selinux_check_context(simpleperf_app_runner) # validate context
+allow simpleperf_app_runner self:process setcurrent;
+allow simpleperf_app_runner untrusted_app_all:process dyntransition; # setcon
+
+# simpleperf_app_runner/libselinux needs access to seapp_contexts_file to
+# determine which domain to transition to.
+allow simpleperf_app_runner seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# simpleperf_app_runner passes pipe fds.
+# simpleperf_app_runner writes app type (debuggable or profileable) to pipe fds.
+allow simpleperf_app_runner shell:fifo_file { read write };
+
+# simpleperf_app_runner checks shell data paths.
+# simpleperf_app_runner passes shell data fds.
+allow simpleperf_app_runner shell_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow simpleperf_app_runner shell_data_file:file { getattr write };
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# simpleperf_app_runner cannot have capabilities other than CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID
+neverallow simpleperf_app_runner self:global_capability_class_set ~{ setuid setgid };
+neverallow simpleperf_app_runner self:global_capability2_class_set *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/slideshow.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/slideshow.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10fbbb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/slideshow.te
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# slideshow seclabel is specified in init.rc since
+# it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
+type slideshow, domain;
+
+allow slideshow kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+wakelock_use(slideshow)
+allow slideshow device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow slideshow self:global_capability_class_set sys_tty_config;
+allow slideshow graphics_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow slideshow graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow slideshow input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow slideshow input_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow slideshow tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/stats_service_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/stats_service_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab8e58a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/stats_service_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+add_hwservice(stats_service_server, fwk_stats_hwservice)
+add_service(stats_service_server, fwk_stats_service)
+
+binder_use(stats_service_server)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/statsd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/statsd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..670f4c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/statsd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+type statsd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+
+type statsd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+binder_use(statsd)
+
+# Allow statsd to scan through /proc/pid for all processes.
+r_dir_file(statsd, domain)
+
+# Allow executing files on system, such as running a shell or running:
+#   /system/bin/toolbox
+#   /system/bin/logcat
+#   /system/bin/dumpsys
+allow statsd devpts:chr_file { getattr ioctl read write };
+allow statsd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow statsd system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+allow statsd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow statsd su:fifo_file read;
+')
+
+# Create, read, and write into /data/misc/stats-data, /data/misc/stats-system.
+allow statsd stats_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow statsd stats_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow statsd to make binder calls to any binder service.
+binder_call(statsd, appdomain)
+binder_call(statsd, healthd)
+binder_call(statsd, incidentd)
+binder_call(statsd, system_server)
+
+# Allow statsd to interact with gpuservice
+allow statsd gpu_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(statsd, gpuservice)
+
+# Allow statsd to interact with keystore to pull atoms
+allow statsd keystore_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(statsd, keystore)
+
+# Allow statsd to interact with mediametrics
+allow statsd mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(statsd, mediametrics)
+
+# Allow logd access.
+read_logd(statsd)
+control_logd(statsd)
+
+# Grant statsd with permissions to register the services.
+allow statsd {
+  app_api_service
+  incident_service
+  system_api_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# Grant statsd to access health hal to access battery metrics.
+allow statsd hal_health_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# Allow statsd to send dump info to dumpstate
+allow statsd dumpstate:fd use;
+allow statsd dumpstate:fifo_file { getattr write };
+
+# Allow access to with hardware layer and process stats.
+allow statsd proc_uid_cputime_showstat:file { getattr open read };
+hal_client_domain(statsd, hal_health)
+hal_client_domain(statsd, hal_power)
+hal_client_domain(statsd, hal_power_stats)
+hal_client_domain(statsd, hal_thermal)
+
+# Allow 'adb shell cmd' to upload configs and download output.
+allow statsd adbd:fd use;
+allow statsd adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
+allow statsd shell:fifo_file { getattr read write };
+
+unix_socket_send(statsd, statsdw, statsd)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Only statsd and the other root services in limited circumstances.
+# can get to the files in /data/misc/stats-data, /data/misc/stats-service.
+# Other services are prohibitted from accessing the file.
+neverallow { domain -statsd -system_server -init -vold } stats_data_file:file *;
+
+# Limited access to the directory itself.
+neverallow { domain -statsd -system_server -init -vold } stats_data_file:dir *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/su.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/su.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..074ff2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/su.te
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+# All types must be defined regardless of build variant to ensure
+# policy compilation succeeds with userdebug/user combination at boot
+type su, domain;
+
+# File types must be defined for file_contexts.
+type su_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # Domain used for su processes, as well as for adbd and adb shell
+  # after performing an adb root command.  The domain definition is
+  # wrapped to ensure that it does not exist at all on -user builds.
+  typeattribute su mlstrustedsubject;
+
+  # Add su to various domains
+  net_domain(su)
+
+  # grant su access to vndbinder
+  vndbinder_use(su)
+
+  dontaudit su self:capability_class_set *;
+  dontaudit su self:capability2 *;
+  dontaudit su kernel:security *;
+  dontaudit su { kernel file_type }:system *;
+  dontaudit su self:memprotect *;
+  dontaudit su domain:{ process process2 } *;
+  dontaudit su domain:fd *;
+  dontaudit su domain:dir *;
+  dontaudit su domain:lnk_file *;
+  dontaudit su domain:{ fifo_file file } *;
+  dontaudit su domain:socket_class_set *;
+  dontaudit su domain:ipc_class_set *;
+  dontaudit su domain:key *;
+  dontaudit su fs_type:filesystem *;
+  dontaudit su {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set *;
+  dontaudit su node_type:node *;
+  dontaudit su node_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+  dontaudit su netif_type:netif *;
+  dontaudit su port_type:socket_class_set *;
+  dontaudit su port_type:{ tcp_socket dccp_socket } *;
+  dontaudit su domain:peer *;
+  dontaudit su domain:binder *;
+  dontaudit su property_type:property_service *;
+  dontaudit su property_type:file *;
+  dontaudit su service_manager_type:service_manager *;
+  dontaudit su hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager *;
+  dontaudit su vndservice_manager_type:service_manager *;
+  dontaudit su servicemanager:service_manager list;
+  dontaudit su hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
+  dontaudit su vndservicemanager:service_manager list;
+  dontaudit su keystore:keystore_key *;
+  dontaudit su keystore:keystore2 *;
+  dontaudit su domain:drmservice *;
+  dontaudit su unlabeled:filesystem *;
+  dontaudit su postinstall_file:filesystem *;
+  dontaudit su domain:bpf *;
+  dontaudit su unlabeled:vsock_socket *;
+  dontaudit su self:perf_event *;
+
+  # VTS tests run in the permissive su domain on debug builds, but the HALs
+  # being tested run in enforcing mode. Because hal_foo_server is enforcing
+  # su needs to be declared as hal_foo_client to grant hal_foo_server
+  # permission to interact with it.
+  typeattribute su halclientdomain;
+  typeattribute su hal_allocator_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_atrace_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_audio_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_authsecret_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_bluetooth_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_bootctl_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_camera_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_configstore_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_confirmationui_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_contexthub_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_drm_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_cas_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_dumpstate_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_fingerprint_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_gatekeeper_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_gnss_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_graphics_allocator_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_graphics_composer_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_health_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_input_classifier_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_ir_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_keymaster_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_light_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_memtrack_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_neuralnetworks_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_nfc_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_oemlock_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_power_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_rebootescrow_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_secure_element_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_sensors_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_telephony_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_tetheroffload_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_thermal_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_tv_cec_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_tv_input_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_tv_tuner_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_usb_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_vibrator_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_vr_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_weaver_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_wifi_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_wifi_hostapd_client;
+  typeattribute su hal_wifi_supplicant_client;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/surfaceflinger.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/surfaceflinger.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1e4844
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/surfaceflinger.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# surfaceflinger - display compositor service
+type surfaceflinger, domain;
+type surfaceflinger_tmpfs, file_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..023058e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+###
+### Apps that run with the system UID, e.g. com.android.system.ui,
+### com.android.settings.  These are not as privileged as the system
+### server.
+###
+
+type system_app, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..edefadf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#
+# System Server aka system_server spawned by zygote.
+# Most of the framework services run in this process.
+#
+type system_server, domain;
+type system_server_tmpfs, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+
+# Power controls for debugging/diagnostics
+get_prop(system_server, power_debug_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, power_debug_prop)
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+  -system_server
+} power_debug_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_suspend_internal_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_suspend_internal_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..67bff77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_suspend_internal_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# To serve ISuspendControlServiceInternal.
+add_service(system_suspend_internal_server, system_suspend_control_internal_service)
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -atrace # tracing
+    -dumpstate # bug reports
+    -system_suspend_internal_server # implements system_suspend_control_internal_service
+    -system_server # configures system_suspend via ISuspendControlServiceInternal
+    -traceur_app # tracing
+} system_suspend_control_internal_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_suspend_server.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_suspend_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e8310d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/system_suspend_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Required to export a HIDL interface.
+hwbinder_use(system_suspend_server)
+get_prop(system_suspend_server, hwservicemanager_prop)
+
+# To serve ISystemSuspend.hal.
+add_hwservice(system_suspend_server, system_suspend_hwservice)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/te_macros b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/te_macros
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d15d47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/te_macros
@@ -0,0 +1,993 @@
+#####################################
+# domain_trans(olddomain, type, newdomain)
+# Allow a transition from olddomain to newdomain
+# upon executing a file labeled with type.
+# This only allows the transition; it does not
+# cause it to occur automatically - use domain_auto_trans
+# if that is what you want.
+#
+define(`domain_trans', `
+# Old domain may exec the file and transition to the new domain.
+allow $1 $2:file { getattr open read execute map };
+allow $1 $3:process transition;
+# New domain is entered by executing the file.
+allow $3 $2:file { entrypoint open read execute getattr map };
+# New domain can send SIGCHLD to its caller.
+ifelse($1, `init', `', `allow $3 $1:process sigchld;')
+# Enable AT_SECURE, i.e. libc secure mode.
+dontaudit $1 $3:process noatsecure;
+# XXX dontaudit candidate but requires further study.
+allow $1 $3:process { siginh rlimitinh };
+')
+
+#####################################
+# domain_auto_trans(olddomain, type, newdomain)
+# Automatically transition from olddomain to newdomain
+# upon executing a file labeled with type.
+#
+define(`domain_auto_trans', `
+# Allow the necessary permissions.
+domain_trans($1,$2,$3)
+# Make the transition occur by default.
+type_transition $1 $2:process $3;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# file_type_trans(domain, dir_type, file_type)
+# Allow domain to create a file labeled file_type in a
+# directory labeled dir_type.
+# This only allows the transition; it does not
+# cause it to occur automatically - use file_type_auto_trans
+# if that is what you want.
+#
+define(`file_type_trans', `
+# Allow the domain to add entries to the directory.
+allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms;
+# Allow the domain to create the file.
+allow $1 $3:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
+allow $1 $3:dir create_dir_perms;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# file_type_auto_trans(domain, dir_type, file_type)
+# Automatically label new files with file_type when
+# they are created by domain in directories labeled dir_type.
+#
+define(`file_type_auto_trans', `
+# Allow the necessary permissions.
+file_type_trans($1, $2, $3)
+# Make the transition occur by default.
+type_transition $1 $2:dir $3;
+type_transition $1 $2:notdevfile_class_set $3;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# r_dir_file(domain, type)
+# Allow the specified domain to read directories, files
+# and symbolic links of the specified type.
+define(`r_dir_file', `
+allow $1 $2:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $1 $2:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# tmpfs_domain(domain)
+# Allow access to a unique type for this domain when creating tmpfs / ashmem files.
+define(`tmpfs_domain', `
+type_transition $1 tmpfs:file $1_tmpfs;
+allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
+')
+
+# pdx macros for IPC. pdx is a high-level name which contains transport-specific
+# rules from underlying transport (e.g. UDS-based implementation).
+
+#####################################
+# pdx_service_attributes(service)
+# Defines type attribute used to identify various service-related types.
+define(`pdx_service_attributes', `
+attribute pdx_$1_endpoint_dir_type;
+attribute pdx_$1_endpoint_socket_type;
+attribute pdx_$1_channel_socket_type;
+attribute pdx_$1_server_type;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# pdx_service_socket_types(service, endpoint_dir_t)
+# Define types for endpoint and channel sockets.
+define(`pdx_service_socket_types', `
+typeattribute $2 pdx_$1_endpoint_dir_type;
+type pdx_$1_endpoint_socket, pdx_$1_endpoint_socket_type, pdx_endpoint_socket_type, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject, mlstrustedsubject;
+type pdx_$1_channel_socket, pdx_$1_channel_socket_type, pdx_channel_socket_type, coredomain_socket;
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+dontaudit su pdx_$1_endpoint_socket:unix_stream_socket *;
+dontaudit su pdx_$1_channel_socket:unix_stream_socket *;
+')
+')
+
+#####################################
+# pdx_server(server_domain, service)
+define(`pdx_server', `
+# Mark the server domain as a PDX server.
+typeattribute $1 pdx_$2_server_type;
+# Allow the init process to create the initial endpoint socket.
+allow init pdx_$2_endpoint_socket_type:unix_stream_socket { create bind };
+# Allow the server domain to use the endpoint socket and accept connections on it.
+# Not using macro like "rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl" because it provides more rights
+# than we need (e.g. we don"t need "bind" or "connect").
+allow $1 pdx_$2_endpoint_socket_type:unix_stream_socket { read getattr write setattr lock append getopt setopt shutdown listen accept };
+# Allow the server domain to apply security context label to the channel socket pair (allow process to use setsockcreatecon_raw()).
+allow $1 self:process setsockcreate;
+# Allow the server domain to create a client channel socket.
+allow $1 pdx_$2_channel_socket_type:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+# Prevent other processes from claiming to be a server for the same service.
+neverallow {domain -$1} pdx_$2_endpoint_socket_type:unix_stream_socket { listen accept };
+')
+
+#####################################
+# pdx_connect(client, service)
+define(`pdx_connect', `
+# Allow client to open the service endpoint file.
+allow $1 pdx_$2_endpoint_dir_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $1 pdx_$2_endpoint_socket_type:sock_file rw_file_perms;
+# Allow the client to connect to endpoint socket.
+allow $1 pdx_$2_endpoint_socket_type:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write shutdown };
+')
+
+#####################################
+# pdx_use(client, service)
+define(`pdx_use', `
+# Allow the client to use the PDX channel socket.
+# Not using macro like "rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl" because it provides more rights
+# than we need (e.g. we don"t need "bind" or "connect").
+allow $1 pdx_$2_channel_socket_type:unix_stream_socket { read getattr write setattr lock append getopt setopt shutdown };
+# Client needs to use an channel event fd from the server.
+allow $1 pdx_$2_server_type:fd use;
+# Servers may receive sync fences, gralloc buffers, etc, from clients.
+# This could be tightened on a per-server basis, but keeping track of service
+# clients is error prone.
+allow pdx_$2_server_type $1:fd use;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# pdx_client(client, service)
+define(`pdx_client', `
+pdx_connect($1, $2)
+pdx_use($1, $2)
+')
+
+#####################################
+# init_daemon_domain(domain)
+# Set up a transition from init to the daemon domain
+# upon executing its binary.
+define(`init_daemon_domain', `
+domain_auto_trans(init, $1_exec, $1)
+')
+
+####################################
+# userfaultfd_use(domain)
+# Allow domain to create/use userfaultfd.
+define(`userfaultfd_use', `
+# Set up a type_transition to "userfaultfd" named anonymous inode object.
+type $1_userfaultfd;
+type_transition $1 $1:anon_inode $1_userfaultfd "[userfaultfd]";
+# Allow domain to create/use userfaultfd anon_inode.
+allow $1 $1_userfaultfd:anon_inode { create ioctl read };
+# Other domains may not use userfaultfd anon_inodes created by this domain.
+neverallow { domain -$1 } $1_userfaultfd:anon_inode *;
+# This domain may not use userfaultfd anon_inodes created by other domains.
+neverallow $1 ~$1_userfaultfd:anon_inode *;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# app_domain(domain)
+# Allow a base set of permissions required for all apps.
+define(`app_domain', `
+typeattribute $1 appdomain;
+# Label tmpfs objects for all apps.
+type_transition $1 tmpfs:file appdomain_tmpfs;
+userfaultfd_use($1)
+allow $1 appdomain_tmpfs:file { execute getattr map read write };
+neverallow { $1 -runas_app -shell -simpleperf } { domain -$1 }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { appdomain -runas_app -shell -simpleperf -$1 } $1:file no_rw_file_perms;
+# The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
+# of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
+# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components to
+# apps. crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to produce stack
+# traces. runas_app is excluded, as it operates only on debuggable apps.
+# simpleperf is excluded, as it operates only on debuggable or profileable
+# apps. llkd is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to inspect stack traces for
+# live lock conditions.
+neverallow { domain -$1 -crash_dump userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') -runas_app -simpleperf } $1:process ptrace;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# untrusted_app_domain(domain)
+# Allow a base set of permissions required for all untrusted apps.
+define(`untrusted_app_domain', `
+typeattribute $1 untrusted_app_all;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# net_domain(domain)
+# Allow a base set of permissions required for network access.
+define(`net_domain', `
+typeattribute $1 netdomain;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# bluetooth_domain(domain)
+# Allow a base set of permissions required for bluetooth access.
+define(`bluetooth_domain', `
+typeattribute $1 bluetoothdomain;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# hal_attribute(hal_name)
+# Add an attribute for hal implementations along with necessary
+# restrictions.
+define(`hal_attribute', `
+attribute hal_$1;
+expandattribute hal_$1 true;
+attribute hal_$1_client;
+expandattribute hal_$1_client true;
+attribute hal_$1_server;
+expandattribute hal_$1_server false;
+
+neverallow { hal_$1_server -halserverdomain } domain:process fork;
+# hal_*_client and halclientdomain attributes are always expanded for
+# performance reasons. Neverallow rules targeting expanded attributes can not be
+# verified by CTS since these attributes are already expanded by that time.
+build_test_only(`
+neverallow { hal_$1_server -hal_$1 } domain:process fork;
+neverallow { hal_$1_client -halclientdomain } domain:process fork;
+')
+')
+
+#####################################
+# hal_server_domain(domain, hal_type)
+# Allow a base set of permissions required for a domain to offer a
+# HAL implementation of the specified type over HwBinder.
+#
+# For example, default implementation of Foo HAL:
+#   type hal_foo_default, domain;
+#   hal_server_domain(hal_foo_default, hal_foo)
+#
+define(`hal_server_domain', `
+typeattribute $1 halserverdomain;
+typeattribute $1 $2_server;
+typeattribute $1 $2;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# hal_client_domain(domain, hal_type)
+# Allow a base set of permissions required for a domain to be a
+# client of a HAL of the specified type.
+#
+# For example, make some_domain a client of Foo HAL:
+#   hal_client_domain(some_domain, hal_foo)
+#
+define(`hal_client_domain', `
+typeattribute $1 halclientdomain;
+typeattribute $1 $2_client;
+
+# TODO(b/34170079): Make the inclusion of the rules below conditional also on
+# non-Treble devices. For now, on non-Treble device, always grant clients of a
+# HAL sufficient access to run the HAL in passthrough mode (i.e., in-process).
+not_full_treble(`
+typeattribute $1 $2;
+# Find passthrough HAL implementations
+allow $2 system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $2 vendor_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $2 vendor_file:file { read open getattr execute map };
+')
+')
+
+#####################################
+# passthrough_hal_client_domain(domain, hal_type)
+# Allow a base set of permissions required for a domain to be a
+# client of a passthrough HAL of the specified type.
+#
+# For example, make some_domain a client of passthrough Foo HAL:
+#   passthrough_hal_client_domain(some_domain, hal_foo)
+#
+define(`passthrough_hal_client_domain', `
+typeattribute $1 halclientdomain;
+typeattribute $1 $2_client;
+typeattribute $1 $2;
+# Find passthrough HAL implementations
+allow $2 system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $2 vendor_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $2 vendor_file:file { read open getattr execute map };
+')
+
+#####################################
+# unix_socket_connect(clientdomain, socket, serverdomain)
+# Allow a local socket connection from clientdomain via
+# socket to serverdomain.
+#
+# Note: If you see denial records that distill to the
+# following allow rules:
+# allow clientdomain property_socket:sock_file write;
+# allow clientdomain init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+# allow clientdomain something_prop:property_service set;
+#
+# This sequence is indicative of attempting to set a property.
+# use set_prop(sourcedomain, targetproperty)
+#
+define(`unix_socket_connect', `
+allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write;
+allow $1 $3:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# set_prop(sourcedomain, targetproperty)
+# Allows source domain to set the
+# targetproperty.
+#
+define(`set_prop', `
+unix_socket_connect($1, property, init)
+allow $1 $2:property_service set;
+get_prop($1, $2)
+')
+
+#####################################
+# get_prop(sourcedomain, targetproperty)
+# Allows source domain to read the
+# targetproperty.
+#
+define(`get_prop', `
+allow $1 $2:file { getattr open read map };
+')
+
+#####################################
+# unix_socket_send(clientdomain, socket, serverdomain)
+# Allow a local socket send from clientdomain via
+# socket to serverdomain.
+define(`unix_socket_send', `
+allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write;
+allow $1 $3:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# binder_use(domain)
+# Allow domain to use Binder IPC.
+define(`binder_use', `
+# Call the servicemanager and transfer references to it.
+allow $1 servicemanager:binder { call transfer };
+# Allow servicemanager to send out callbacks
+allow servicemanager $1:binder { call transfer };
+# servicemanager performs getpidcon on clients.
+allow servicemanager $1:dir search;
+allow servicemanager $1:file { read open };
+allow servicemanager $1:process getattr;
+# rw access to /dev/binder and /dev/ashmem is presently granted to
+# all domains in domain.te.
+')
+
+#####################################
+# hwbinder_use(domain)
+# Allow domain to use HwBinder IPC.
+define(`hwbinder_use', `
+# Call the hwservicemanager and transfer references to it.
+allow $1 hwservicemanager:binder { call transfer };
+# Allow hwservicemanager to send out callbacks
+allow hwservicemanager $1:binder { call transfer };
+# hwservicemanager performs getpidcon on clients.
+allow hwservicemanager $1:dir search;
+allow hwservicemanager $1:file { read open map };
+allow hwservicemanager $1:process getattr;
+# rw access to /dev/hwbinder and /dev/ashmem is presently granted to
+# all domains in domain.te.
+')
+
+#####################################
+# vndbinder_use(domain)
+# Allow domain to use Binder IPC.
+define(`vndbinder_use', `
+# Talk to the vndbinder device node
+allow $1 vndbinder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+# Call the vndservicemanager and transfer references to it.
+allow $1 vndservicemanager:binder { call transfer };
+# vndservicemanager performs getpidcon on clients.
+allow vndservicemanager $1:dir search;
+allow vndservicemanager $1:file { read open map };
+allow vndservicemanager $1:process getattr;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# binder_call(clientdomain, serverdomain)
+# Allow clientdomain to perform binder IPC to serverdomain.
+define(`binder_call', `
+# Call the server domain and optionally transfer references to it.
+allow $1 $2:binder { call transfer };
+# Allow the serverdomain to transfer references to the client on the reply.
+allow $2 $1:binder transfer;
+# Receive and use open files from the server.
+allow $1 $2:fd use;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# binder_service(domain)
+# Mark a domain as being a Binder service domain.
+# Used to allow binder IPC to the various system services.
+define(`binder_service', `
+typeattribute $1 binderservicedomain;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# wakelock_use(domain)
+# Allow domain to manage wake locks
+define(`wakelock_use', `
+# TODO(b/115946999): Remove /sys/power/* permissions once CONFIG_PM_WAKELOCKS is
+# deprecated.
+# Access /sys/power/wake_lock and /sys/power/wake_unlock
+allow $1 sysfs_wake_lock:file rw_file_perms;
+# Accessing these files requires CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
+allow $1 self:global_capability2_class_set block_suspend;
+# system_suspend permissions
+binder_call($1, system_suspend_server)
+allow $1 system_suspend_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+# halclientdomain permissions
+hwbinder_use($1)
+get_prop($1, hwservicemanager_prop)
+allow $1 hidl_manager_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# selinux_check_access(domain)
+# Allow domain to check SELinux permissions via selinuxfs.
+define(`selinux_check_access', `
+r_dir_file($1, selinuxfs)
+allow $1 selinuxfs:file w_file_perms;
+allow $1 kernel:security compute_av;
+allow $1 self:netlink_selinux_socket { read write create getattr setattr lock relabelfrom relabelto append bind connect listen accept getopt setopt shutdown recvfrom sendto name_bind };
+')
+
+#####################################
+# selinux_check_context(domain)
+# Allow domain to check SELinux contexts via selinuxfs.
+define(`selinux_check_context', `
+r_dir_file($1, selinuxfs)
+allow $1 selinuxfs:file w_file_perms;
+allow $1 kernel:security check_context;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# create_pty(domain)
+# Allow domain to create and use a pty, isolated from any other domain ptys.
+define(`create_pty', `
+# Each domain gets a unique devpts type.
+type $1_devpts, fs_type;
+# Label the pty with the unique type when created.
+type_transition $1 devpts:chr_file $1_devpts;
+# Allow use of the pty after creation.
+allow $1 $1_devpts:chr_file { open getattr read write ioctl };
+allowxperm $1 $1_devpts:chr_file ioctl unpriv_tty_ioctls;
+# TIOCSTI is only ever used for exploits. Block it.
+# b/33073072, b/7530569
+# http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/26/14
+neverallowxperm * $1_devpts:chr_file ioctl TIOCSTI;
+# Note: devpts:dir search and ptmx_device:chr_file rw_file_perms
+# allowed to everyone via domain.te.
+')
+
+#####################################
+# Non system_app application set
+#
+define(`non_system_app_set', `{ appdomain -system_app }')
+
+#####################################
+# Recovery only
+# SELinux rules which apply only to recovery mode
+#
+define(`recovery_only', ifelse(target_recovery, `true', $1, ))
+
+#####################################
+# Not recovery
+# SELinux rules which apply only to non-recovery (normal) mode
+#
+define(`not_recovery', ifelse(target_recovery, `true', , $1))
+
+#####################################
+# Full TREBLE only
+# SELinux rules which apply only to full TREBLE devices
+#
+define(`full_treble_only', ifelse(target_full_treble, `true', $1,
+ifelse(target_full_treble, `cts',
+# BEGIN_TREBLE_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+$1
+# END_TREBLE_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+, )))
+
+#####################################
+# Not full TREBLE
+# SELinux rules which apply only to devices which are not full TREBLE devices
+#
+define(`not_full_treble', ifelse(target_full_treble, `true', , $1))
+
+#####################################
+# enforce_debugfs_restriction
+# SELinux rules which apply to devices that enable debugfs restrictions.
+# The keyword "cts" is used to insert markers to only CTS test the neverallows
+# added by the macro for S-launch devices and newer.
+define(`enforce_debugfs_restriction', ifelse(target_enforce_debugfs_restriction, `true', $1,
+ifelse(target_enforce_debugfs_restriction, `cts',
+# BEGIN_LAUNCHING_WITH_S_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+$1
+# END_LAUNCHING_WITH_S_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+, )))
+
+#####################################
+# no_debugfs_restriction
+# SELinux rules which apply to devices that do not have debugfs restrictions in non-user builds.
+define(`no_debugfs_restriction', ifelse(target_enforce_debugfs_restriction, `true', , $1))
+
+#####################################
+# Compatible property only
+# SELinux rules which apply only to devices with compatible property
+#
+define(`compatible_property_only', ifelse(target_compatible_property, `true', $1,
+ifelse(target_compatible_property, `cts',
+# BEGIN_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+$1
+# END_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+, )))
+
+#####################################
+# Not compatible property
+# SELinux rules which apply only to devices without compatible property
+#
+define(`not_compatible_property', ifelse(target_compatible_property, `true', , $1))
+
+#####################################
+# Userdebug or eng builds
+# SELinux rules which apply only to userdebug or eng builds
+#
+define(`userdebug_or_eng', ifelse(target_build_variant, `eng', $1, ifelse(target_build_variant, `userdebug', $1)))
+
+#####################################
+# asan builds
+# SELinux rules which apply only to asan builds
+#
+define(`with_asan', ifelse(target_with_asan, `true', userdebug_or_eng(`$1'), ))
+
+#####################################
+# native coverage builds
+# SELinux rules which apply only to builds with native coverage
+#
+define(`with_native_coverage', ifelse(target_with_native_coverage, `true', userdebug_or_eng(`$1'), ))
+
+#####################################
+# Build-time-only test
+# SELinux rules which are verified during build, but not as part of *TS testing.
+#
+define(`build_test_only', ifelse(target_exclude_build_test, `true', , $1))
+
+####################################
+# Fallback crash handling for processes that can't exec crash_dump (e.g. because of seccomp).
+#
+define(`crash_dump_fallback', `
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow $1 su:fifo_file append;
+')
+allow $1 anr_data_file:file append;
+allow $1 dumpstate:fd use;
+allow $1 incidentd:fd use;
+# TODO: Figure out why write is needed.
+allow $1 dumpstate:fifo_file { append write };
+allow $1 incidentd:fifo_file { append write };
+allow $1 system_server:fifo_file { append write };
+allow $1 tombstoned:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+allow $1 tombstoned:fd use;
+allow $1 tombstoned_crash_socket:sock_file write;
+allow $1 tombstone_data_file:file append;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# WITH_DEXPREOPT builds
+# SELinux rules which apply only when pre-opting.
+#
+define(`with_dexpreopt', ifelse(target_with_dexpreopt, `true', $1))
+
+#####################################
+# write_logd(domain)
+# Ability to write to android log
+# daemon via sockets
+define(`write_logd', `
+unix_socket_send($1, logdw, logd)
+allow $1 pmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# read_logd(domain)
+# Ability to run logcat and read from android
+# log daemon via sockets
+define(`read_logd', `
+allow $1 logcat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+unix_socket_connect($1, logdr, logd)
+')
+
+#####################################
+# read_runtime_log_tags(domain)
+# ability to directly map the runtime event log tags
+define(`read_runtime_log_tags', `
+allow $1 runtime_event_log_tags_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# control_logd(domain)
+# Ability to control
+# android log daemon via sockets
+define(`control_logd', `
+# Group AID_LOG checked by filesystem & logd
+# to permit control commands
+unix_socket_connect($1, logd, logd)
+')
+
+#####################################
+# use_keystore(domain)
+# Ability to use keystore.
+# Keystore is requires the following permissions
+# to call getpidcon.
+define(`use_keystore', `
+  allow keystore $1:dir search;
+  allow keystore $1:file { read open };
+  allow keystore $1:process getattr;
+  allow $1 apc_service:service_manager find;
+  allow $1 keystore_service:service_manager find;
+  allow $1 vpnprofilestore_service:service_manager find;
+  binder_call($1, keystore)
+  binder_call(keystore, $1)
+')
+
+#####################################
+# use_credstore(domain)
+# Ability to use credstore.
+define(`use_credstore', `
+  allow credstore $1:dir search;
+  allow credstore $1:file { read open };
+  allow credstore $1:process getattr;
+  allow $1 credstore_service:service_manager find;
+  binder_call($1, credstore)
+  binder_call(credstore, $1)
+')
+
+###########################################
+# use_drmservice(domain)
+# Ability to use DrmService which requires
+# DrmService to call getpidcon.
+define(`use_drmservice', `
+  allow drmserver $1:dir search;
+  allow drmserver $1:file { read open };
+  allow drmserver $1:process getattr;
+')
+
+###########################################
+# add_service(domain, service)
+# Ability for domain to add a service to service_manager
+# and find it. It also creates a neverallow preventing
+# others from adding it.
+define(`add_service', `
+  allow $1 $2:service_manager { add find };
+  neverallow { domain -$1 } $2:service_manager add;
+')
+
+###########################################
+# add_hwservice(domain, service)
+# Ability for domain to add a service to hwservice_manager
+# and find it. It also creates a neverallow preventing
+# others from adding it.
+define(`add_hwservice', `
+  allow $1 $2:hwservice_manager { add find };
+  allow $1 hidl_base_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;
+  neverallow { domain -$1 } $2:hwservice_manager add;
+')
+
+###########################################
+# hal_attribute_hwservice(attribute, service)
+# Ability for domain to get a service to hwservice_manager
+# and find it. It also creates a neverallow preventing
+# others from adding it.
+#
+# Used to pair hal_foo_client with hal_foo_hwservice
+define(`hal_attribute_hwservice', `
+  allow $1_client $2:hwservice_manager find;
+  add_hwservice($1_server, $2)
+
+  build_test_only(`
+    # if you are hitting this neverallow, try using:
+    #     hal_client_domain(<your domain>, hal_<foo>)
+    # instead
+    neverallow { domain -$1_client -$1_server } $2:hwservice_manager find;
+  ')
+')
+
+###########################################
+# hal_attribute_service(attribute, service)
+# Ability for domain to get a service to service_manager
+# and find it. It also creates a neverallow preventing
+# others from adding it.
+#
+# Used to pair hal_foo_client with hal_foo_service
+define(`hal_attribute_service', `
+  allow $1_client $2:service_manager find;
+  add_service($1_server, $2)
+
+  build_test_only(`
+    # if you are hitting this neverallow, try using:
+    #     hal_client_domain(<your domain>, hal_<foo>)
+    # instead
+    neverallow {
+        domain
+        -$1_client
+        -$1_server
+        # some services are allowed to find all services
+        -atrace
+        -dumpstate
+        -shell
+        -system_app
+        -traceur_app
+    } $2:service_manager find;
+  ')
+')
+
+###################################
+# can_profile_heap(domain)
+# Allow processes within the domain to have their heap profiled by central
+# heapprofd.
+define(`can_profile_heap', `
+  # Allow central daemon to send signal for client initialization.
+  allow heapprofd $1:process signal;
+  # Allow connecting to the daemon.
+  unix_socket_connect($1, heapprofd, heapprofd)
+  # Allow daemon to use the passed fds.
+  allow heapprofd $1:fd use;
+  # Allow to read and write to heapprofd shmem.
+  # The client needs to read the read and write pointers in order to write.
+  allow $1 heapprofd_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
+  # Use shared memory received over the unix socket.
+  allow $1 heapprofd:fd use;
+
+  # To read and write from the received file descriptors.
+  # /proc/[pid]/maps and /proc/[pid]/mem have the same SELinux label as the
+  # process they relate to.
+  # We need to write to /proc/$PID/page_idle to find idle allocations.
+  # The client only opens /proc/self/page_idle with RDWR, everything else
+  # with RDONLY.
+  # heapprofd cannot open /proc/$PID/mem itself, as it does not have
+  # sys_ptrace.
+  allow heapprofd $1:file rw_file_perms;
+  # Allow searching the /proc/[pid] directory for cmdline.
+  allow heapprofd $1:dir r_dir_perms;
+')
+
+###################################
+# never_profile_heap(domain)
+# Opt out of heap profiling by heapprofd.
+define(`never_profile_heap', `
+  neverallow heapprofd $1:file read;
+  neverallow heapprofd $1:process signal;
+')
+
+###################################
+# can_profile_perf(domain)
+# Allow processes within the domain to be profiled, and have their stacks
+# sampled, by traced_perf.
+define(`can_profile_perf', `
+  # Allow directory & file read to traced_perf, as it stat(2)s /proc/[pid], and
+  # reads /proc/[pid]/cmdline.
+  allow traced_perf $1:file r_file_perms;
+  allow traced_perf $1:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # Allow central daemon to send signal to request /proc/[pid]/maps and
+  # /proc/[pid]/mem fds from this process.
+  allow traced_perf $1:process signal;
+
+  # Allow connecting to the daemon.
+  unix_socket_connect($1, traced_perf, traced_perf)
+  # Allow daemon to use the passed fds.
+  allow traced_perf $1:fd use;
+')
+
+###################################
+# never_profile_perf(domain)
+# Opt out of profiling by traced_perf.
+define(`never_profile_perf', `
+  neverallow traced_perf $1:file read;
+  neverallow traced_perf $1:process signal;
+')
+
+###################################
+# perfetto_producer(domain)
+# Allow processes within the domain to write data to Perfetto.
+# When applying this macro, you might need to also allow traced to use the
+# producer tmpfs domain, if the producer will be the one creating the shared
+# memory.
+define(`perfetto_producer', `
+  allow $1 traced:fd use;
+  allow $1 traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
+  unix_socket_connect($1, traced_producer, traced)
+
+  # Also allow the service to use the producer file descriptors. This is
+  # necessary when the producer is creating the shared memory, as it will be
+  # passed to the service as a file descriptor (obtained from memfd_create).
+  allow traced $1:fd use;
+')
+
+###########################################
+# dump_hal(hal_type)
+# Ability to dump the hal debug info
+#
+define(`dump_hal', `
+  hal_client_domain(dumpstate, $1);
+  allow $1_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+  allow $1_server dumpstate:fd use;
+')
+
+#####################################
+# treble_sysprop_neverallow(rules)
+# SELinux neverallow rules which enforces the accessibility of each property
+# outside the owner.
+#
+# For devices launching with R or later, exported properties must be explicitly marked as
+# "restricted" or "public", depending on the accessibility outside the owner.
+# For devices launching with Q or eariler, this neverallow rules can be relaxed with defining
+# BUILD_BROKEN_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW := true on BoardConfig.mk.
+# See {partition}_{accessibility}_prop macros below.
+#
+# CTS uses these rules only for devices launching with R or later.
+#
+# TODO(b/131162102): deprecate BUILD_BROKEN_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW
+#
+define(`treble_sysprop_neverallow', ifelse(target_treble_sysprop_neverallow, `true', $1,
+ifelse(target_treble_sysprop_neverallow, `cts',
+# BEGIN_LAUNCHING_WITH_R_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+$1
+# END_LAUNCHING_WITH_R_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+, )))
+
+#####################################
+# enforce_sysprop_owner(rules)
+# SELinux neverallow rules which enforces the owner of each property.
+#
+# For devices launching with S or later, all properties must be explicitly marked as one of:
+# system_property_type, vendor_property_type, or product_property_type.
+# For devices launching with R or eariler, this neverallow rules can be relaxed with defining
+# BUILD_BROKEN_ENFORCE_SYSPROP_OWNER := true on BoardConfig.mk.
+# See {partition}_{accessibility}_prop macros below.
+#
+# CTS uses these ules only for devices launching with S or later.
+#
+define(`enforce_sysprop_owner', ifelse(target_enforce_sysprop_owner, `true', $1,
+ifelse(target_enforce_sysprop_owner, `cts',
+# BEGIN_LAUNCHING_WITH_S_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+$1
+# END_LAUNCHING_WITH_S_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
+, )))
+
+###########################################
+# define_prop(name, owner, scope)
+# Define a property with given owner and scope
+#
+define(`define_prop', `
+  type $1, property_type, $2_property_type, $2_$3_property_type;
+')
+
+###########################################
+# system_internal_prop(name)
+# Define a /system-owned property used only in /system
+# For devices launching with Q or eariler, this restriction can be relaxed with
+# BUILD_BROKEN_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW := true
+#
+define(`system_internal_prop', `
+  define_prop($1, system, internal)
+  treble_sysprop_neverallow(`
+    neverallow { domain -coredomain } $1:file no_rw_file_perms;
+  ')
+')
+
+###########################################
+# system_restricted_prop(name)
+# Define a /system-owned property which can't be written outside /system
+# For devices launching with Q or eariler, this restriction can be relaxed with
+# BUILD_BROKEN_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW := true
+#
+define(`system_restricted_prop', `
+  define_prop($1, system, restricted)
+  treble_sysprop_neverallow(`
+    neverallow { domain -coredomain } $1:property_service set;
+  ')
+')
+
+###########################################
+# system_public_prop(name)
+# Define a /system-owned property with no restrictions
+#
+define(`system_public_prop', `define_prop($1, system, public)')
+
+###########################################
+# system_vendor_config_prop(name)
+# Define a /system-owned property which can only be written by vendor_init
+# This is a macro for vendor-specific configuration properties which is meant
+# to be set once from vendor_init.
+#
+define(`system_vendor_config_prop', `
+  system_public_prop($1)
+  set_prop(vendor_init, $1)
+  neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } $1:property_service set;
+')
+
+###########################################
+# product_internal_prop(name)
+# Define a /product-owned property used only in /product
+# For devices launching with Q or eariler, this restriction can be relaxed with
+# BUILD_BROKEN_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW := true
+#
+define(`product_internal_prop', `
+  define_prop($1, product, internal)
+  treble_sysprop_neverallow(`
+    neverallow { domain -coredomain } $1:file no_rw_file_perms;
+  ')
+')
+
+###########################################
+# product_restricted_prop(name)
+# Define a /product-owned property which can't be written outside /product
+# For devices launching with Q or eariler, this restriction can be relaxed with
+# BUILD_BROKEN_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW := true
+#
+define(`product_restricted_prop', `
+  define_prop($1, product, restricted)
+  treble_sysprop_neverallow(`
+    neverallow { domain -coredomain } $1:property_service set;
+  ')
+')
+
+###########################################
+# product_public_prop(name)
+# Define a /product-owned property with no restrictions
+#
+define(`product_public_prop', `define_prop($1, product, public)')
+
+###########################################
+# vendor_internal_prop(name)
+# Define a /vendor-owned property used only in /vendor
+# For devices launching with Q or eariler, this restriction can be relaxed with
+# BUILD_BROKEN_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW := true
+#
+define(`vendor_internal_prop', `
+  define_prop($1, vendor, internal)
+  treble_sysprop_neverallow(`
+# init and dumpstate are in coredomain, but should be able to read all props.
+    neverallow { coredomain -init -dumpstate } $1:file no_rw_file_perms;
+  ')
+')
+
+###########################################
+# vendor_restricted_prop(name)
+# Define a /vendor-owned property which can't be written outside /vendor
+# For devices launching with Q or eariler, this restriction can be relaxed with
+# BUILD_BROKEN_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW := true
+#
+define(`vendor_restricted_prop', `
+  define_prop($1, vendor, restricted)
+  treble_sysprop_neverallow(`
+# init is in coredomain, but should be able to write all props.
+    neverallow { coredomain -init } $1:property_service set;
+  ')
+')
+
+###########################################
+# vendor_public_prop(name)
+# Define a /vendor-owned property with no restrictions
+#
+define(`vendor_public_prop', `define_prop($1, vendor, public)')
+
+#####################################
+# read_fstab(domain)
+# Ability to call ReadDefaultFstab() and ReadFstabFromFile().
+#
+define(`read_fstab', `
+  allow $1 { metadata_file gsi_metadata_file_type }:dir search;
+  allow $1 gsi_public_metadata_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/tee.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/tee.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f9b32d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/tee.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+##
+# trusted execution environment (tee) daemon
+#
+type tee, domain;
+
+# Device(s) for communicating with the TEE
+type tee_device, dev_type;
+
+allow tee fingerprint_vendor_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow tee fingerprint_vendor_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/tombstoned.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/tombstoned.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea2abbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/tombstoned.te
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# debugger interface
+type tombstoned, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type tombstoned_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Write to arbitrary pipes given to us.
+allow tombstoned domain:fd use;
+allow tombstoned domain:fifo_file write;
+
+allow tombstoned domain:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow tombstoned domain:file r_file_perms;
+allow tombstoned tombstone_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow tombstoned tombstone_data_file:file { create_file_perms link };
+
+# Changes for the new stack dumping mechanism. Each trace goes into a
+# separate file, and these files are managed by tombstoned.
+allow tombstoned anr_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow tombstoned anr_data_file:file { append create getattr open link unlink };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/toolbox.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/toolbox.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c2cc3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/toolbox.te
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# Any toolbox command run by init.
+# At present, the only known usage is for running mkswap via fs_mgr.
+# Do NOT use this domain for toolbox when run by any other domain.
+type toolbox, domain;
+type toolbox_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
+# open fd inherited by fsck.
+allow toolbox tmpfs:chr_file { read write ioctl };
+
+# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
+allow toolbox devpts:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
+
+# mkswap-specific.
+# Read/write block devices used for swap partitions.
+# Assign swap_block_device type any such partition in your
+# device/<vendor>/<product>/sepolicy/file_contexts file.
+allow toolbox block_device:dir search;
+allow toolbox swap_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from init via the toolbox binary.
+neverallow { domain -init } toolbox:process transition;
+neverallow * toolbox:process dyntransition;
+neverallow toolbox { file_type fs_type -toolbox_exec}:file entrypoint;
+
+# rm -rf directories in /data
+allow toolbox system_data_root_file:dir { remove_name write };
+allow toolbox system_data_file:dir { rmdir rw_dir_perms };
+allow toolbox system_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
+
+# chattr +F and chattr +P /data/media in init
+allow toolbox media_rw_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms setattr };
+allowxperm toolbox media_rw_data_file:dir ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+  FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+};
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traced.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traced.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..922d46e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traced.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+type traced, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type traced_tmpfs, file_type;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traced_perf.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traced_perf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9a0324
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traced_perf.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type traced_perf, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traced_probes.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traced_probes.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e587c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traced_probes.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type traced_probes, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traceur_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traceur_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce9b844
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/traceur_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+type traceur_app, domain;
+
+allow traceur_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
+allow traceur_app hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
+
+allow traceur_app {
+  service_manager_type
+  -apex_service
+  -dnsresolver_service
+  -gatekeeper_service
+  -incident_service
+  -installd_service
+  -iorapd_service
+  -lpdump_service
+  -netd_service
+  -virtual_touchpad_service
+  -vold_service
+  -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow traceur_app to use atrace HAL
+hal_client_domain(traceur_app, hal_atrace)
+
+dontaudit traceur_app service_manager_type:service_manager find;
+dontaudit traceur_app hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager find;
+dontaudit traceur_app domain:binder call;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/tzdatacheck.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/tzdatacheck.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf9b95d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/tzdatacheck.te
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# The tzdatacheck command run by init.
+type tzdatacheck, domain;
+type tzdatacheck_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow tzdatacheck zoneinfo_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow tzdatacheck zoneinfo_data_file:file unlink;
+
+# Below are strong assertion that only init, system_server and tzdatacheck
+# can modify the /data time zone rules directories. This is to make it very
+# clear that only these domains should modify the actual time zone rules data.
+# The tzdatacheck binary itself may be executed by shell for tests but it must
+# not be able to modify the real rules.
+# If other users / binaries could modify time zone rules on device this might
+# have negative implications for users (who may get incorrect local times)
+# or break assumptions made / invalidate data held by the components actually
+# responsible for updating time zone rules.
+neverallow { domain -system_server -init -tzdatacheck } zoneinfo_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -system_server -init -tzdatacheck } zoneinfo_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ueventd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ueventd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5d4301
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/ueventd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# ueventd seclabel is specified in init.rc since
+# it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
+type ueventd, domain;
+type ueventd_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+# Write to /dev/kmsg.
+allow ueventd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow ueventd self:global_capability_class_set { chown mknod net_admin setgid fsetid sys_rawio dac_override dac_read_search fowner setuid };
+allow ueventd device:file create_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(ueventd, rootfs)
+
+# ueventd needs write access to files in /sys to regenerate uevents
+allow ueventd sysfs_type:file w_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(ueventd, sysfs_type)
+allow ueventd sysfs_type:{ file lnk_file } { relabelfrom relabelto setattr };
+allow ueventd sysfs_type:dir { relabelfrom relabelto setattr };
+allow ueventd tmpfs:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow ueventd dev_type:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow ueventd dev_type:lnk_file { create unlink };
+allow ueventd dev_type:chr_file { getattr create setattr unlink };
+allow ueventd dev_type:blk_file { getattr relabelfrom relabelto create setattr unlink };
+allow ueventd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow ueventd efs_file:dir search;
+allow ueventd efs_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Get SELinux enforcing status.
+r_dir_file(ueventd, selinuxfs)
+
+# Access for /vendor/ueventd.rc and /vendor/firmware
+r_dir_file(ueventd, { vendor_file_type -vendor_app_file -vendor_overlay_file })
+
+# Access for /apex/*/firmware
+allow ueventd apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Get file contexts for new device nodes
+allow ueventd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Use setfscreatecon() to label /dev directories and files.
+allow ueventd self:process setfscreate;
+
+# Allow ueventd to read androidboot.android_dt_dir from kernel cmdline or bootconfig.
+allow ueventd proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+allow ueventd proc_bootconfig:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Everything is labeled as rootfs in recovery mode. ueventd has to execute
+# the dynamic linker and shared libraries.
+recovery_only(`
+  allow ueventd rootfs:file { r_file_perms execute };
+')
+
+# Suppress denials for ueventd to getattr /postinstall. This occurs when the
+# linker tries to resolve paths in ld.config.txt.
+dontaudit ueventd postinstall_mnt_dir:dir getattr;
+
+# ueventd loads modules in response to modalias events.
+allow ueventd self:global_capability_class_set sys_module;
+allow ueventd vendor_file:system module_load;
+allow ueventd kernel:key search;
+
+# ueventd is using bootstrap bionic
+allow ueventd system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow ueventd system_bootstrap_lib_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# Allow ueventd to run shell scripts from vendor
+allow ueventd vendor_shell_exec:file execute;
+
+#####
+##### neverallow rules
+#####
+
+# Restrict ueventd access on block devices to maintenence operations.
+neverallow ueventd dev_type:blk_file ~{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto create setattr unlink };
+
+# Only relabelto as we would never want to relabelfrom port_device
+neverallow ueventd port_device:chr_file ~{ getattr create setattr unlink relabelto };
+
+# Nobody should be able to ptrace ueventd
+neverallow * ueventd:process ptrace;
+
+# ueventd should never execute a program without changing to another domain.
+neverallow ueventd { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/uncrypt.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/uncrypt.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b04671
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/uncrypt.te
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# uncrypt
+type uncrypt, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type uncrypt_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow uncrypt self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # For debugging, allow /data/local/tmp access
+  r_dir_file(uncrypt, shell_data_file)
+')
+
+# Read /cache/recovery/command
+# Read /cache/recovery/uncrypt_file
+allow uncrypt cache_file:dir search;
+allow uncrypt cache_recovery_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow uncrypt cache_recovery_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Read and write(for f2fs_pin_file) on OTA zip file at /data/ota_package/.
+allow uncrypt ota_package_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow uncrypt ota_package_file:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /dev/socket/uncrypt
+unix_socket_connect(uncrypt, uncrypt, uncrypt)
+
+# Raw writes to block device
+allow uncrypt self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
+allow uncrypt misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
+allow uncrypt block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Access userdata block device.
+allow uncrypt userdata_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(uncrypt, rootfs)
+
+# Access to bootconfig is needed when calling ReadDefaultFstab.
+allow uncrypt {
+  proc_bootconfig
+  proc_cmdline
+
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read files in /sys
+r_dir_file(uncrypt, sysfs_dt_firmware_android)
+
+# Allow ReadDefaultFstab().
+read_fstab(uncrypt)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/untrusted_app.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/untrusted_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43fe19a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/untrusted_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+###
+### Untrusted apps.
+###
+### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
+### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
+### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
+### directory).  The untrusted_app domain is the default assignment in
+### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
+### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
+### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
+### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
+### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
+### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
+### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
+### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
+### seapp_contexts.
+###
+
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# targetSdkVersion >= 30.
+type untrusted_app, domain;
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# targetSdkVersion = 29.
+type untrusted_app_29, domain;
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# 25 < targetSdkVersion <= 28.
+type untrusted_app_27, domain;
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# targetSdkVersion <= 25.
+type untrusted_app_25, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/update_engine.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/update_engine.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab7090b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/update_engine.te
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# Domain for update_engine daemon.
+type update_engine, domain, update_engine_common;
+type update_engine_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+net_domain(update_engine);
+
+# Following permissions are needed for update_engine.
+allow update_engine self:process { setsched };
+allow update_engine self:global_capability_class_set { fowner sys_admin };
+# Note: fsetid checks are triggered when creating a file in a directory with
+# the setgid bit set to determine if the file should inherit setgid. In this
+# case, setgid on the file is undesirable so we should just suppress the
+# denial.
+dontaudit update_engine self:global_capability_class_set fsetid;
+
+allow update_engine kmsg_device:chr_file { getattr w_file_perms };
+allow update_engine update_engine_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+wakelock_use(update_engine);
+
+# Ignore these denials.
+dontaudit update_engine kernel:process setsched;
+dontaudit update_engine self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
+
+# Allow using persistent storage in /data/misc/update_engine.
+allow update_engine update_engine_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow update_engine update_engine_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow using persistent storage in /data/misc/update_engine_log.
+allow update_engine update_engine_log_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow update_engine update_engine_log_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Don't allow kernel module loading, just silence the logs.
+dontaudit update_engine kernel:system module_request;
+
+# Register the service to perform Binder IPC.
+binder_use(update_engine)
+add_service(update_engine, update_engine_service)
+add_service(update_engine, update_engine_stable_service)
+
+# Allow update_engine to call the callback function provided by priv_app/GMS core.
+binder_call(update_engine, priv_app)
+# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  auditallow update_engine priv_app:binder { call transfer };
+  auditallow priv_app update_engine:binder transfer;
+  auditallow update_engine priv_app:fd use;
+')
+
+binder_call(update_engine, gmscore_app)
+
+# Allow update_engine to call the callback function provided by system_server.
+binder_call(update_engine, system_server)
+
+# Read OTA zip file at /data/ota_package/.
+allow update_engine ota_package_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow update_engine ota_package_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Use Boot Control HAL
+hal_client_domain(update_engine, hal_bootctl)
+
+# access /proc/misc
+allow update_engine proc_misc:file r_file_perms;
+
+# read directories on /system and /vendor
+allow update_engine system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow ReadDefaultFstab().
+# update_engine tries to determine the parent path for all devices (e.g.
+# /dev/block/by-name) by reading the default fstab and looking for the misc
+# device.
+read_fstab(update_engine)
+
+# Allow to write to snapshotctl_log logs.
+# TODO(b/148818798) revert when parent bug is fixed.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+allow update_engine snapshotctl_log_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow update_engine snapshotctl_log_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/update_engine_common.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/update_engine_common.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8fd29e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/update_engine_common.te
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# update_engine payload application permissions. These are shared between the
+# background daemon and the recovery tool to sideload an update.
+
+# Allow update_engine to reach block devices in /dev/block.
+allow update_engine_common block_device:dir search;
+
+# Allow read/write on system and boot partitions.
+allow update_engine_common boot_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow update_engine_common system_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Where ioctls are granted via standard allow rules to block devices,
+# automatically allow common ioctls that are generally needed by
+# update_engine.
+allowxperm update_engine_common dev_type:blk_file ioctl {
+  BLKDISCARD
+  BLKDISCARDZEROES
+  BLKROGET
+  BLKROSET
+  BLKSECDISCARD
+  BLKZEROOUT
+};
+
+# Allow to set recovery options in the BCB. Used to trigger factory reset when
+# the update to an older version (channel change) or incompatible version
+# requires it.
+allow update_engine_common misc_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# read fstab
+allow update_engine_common rootfs:dir getattr;
+allow update_engine_common rootfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow update_engine_common to mount on the /postinstall directory and reset the
+# labels on the mounted filesystem to postinstall_file.
+allow update_engine_common postinstall_mnt_dir:dir { mounton getattr search };
+allow update_engine_common postinstall_file:filesystem { mount unmount relabelfrom relabelto };
+allow update_engine_common labeledfs:filesystem { mount unmount relabelfrom };
+
+# Allow update_engine_common to read and execute postinstall_file.
+allow update_engine_common postinstall_file:file rx_file_perms;
+allow update_engine_common postinstall_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow update_engine_common postinstall_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# install update.zip from cache
+r_dir_file(update_engine_common, cache_file)
+
+# A postinstall program is typically a shell script (with a #!), so we allow
+# to execute those.
+allow update_engine_common shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow update_engine_common to suspend, resume and kill the postinstall program.
+allow update_engine_common postinstall:process { signal sigstop sigkill };
+
+# access /proc/cmdline
+allow update_engine_common proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read files in /sys/firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android/
+r_dir_file(update_engine_common, sysfs_dt_firmware_android)
+
+# Needed because libdm reads sysfs to validate when a dm path is ready.
+r_dir_file(update_engine_common, sysfs_dm)
+
+# Scan files in /sys/fs/ext4 and /sys/fs/f2fs for device-mapper diagnostics.
+allow update_engine_common sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow update_engine_common sysfs_fs_f2fs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# read / write on /dev/device-mapper to map / unmap devices
+allow update_engine_common dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# apply / verify updates on devices mapped via device mapper
+allow update_engine_common dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# read /dev/dm-user, so that we can inotify wait for control devices to be
+# asynchronously created by ueventd.
+allow update_engine dm_user_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# read / write metadata on super device to resize partitions
+allow update_engine_common super_block_device_type:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# ioctl on super device to get block device alignment and alignment offset
+allowxperm update_engine_common super_block_device_type:blk_file ioctl { BLKIOMIN BLKALIGNOFF };
+
+# get physical block device to map logical partitions on device mapper
+allow update_engine_common block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow update_engine_common to write to statsd socket.
+unix_socket_send(update_engine_common, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# Allow to read Virtual A/B feature flags.
+get_prop(update_engine_common, virtual_ab_prop)
+
+# Allow to read GKI related flags.
+get_prop(update_engine_common, ab_update_gki_prop)
+get_prop(update_engine_common, build_bootimage_prop)
+
+# Allow to read/write/create OTA metadata files for snapshot status and COW file status.
+allow update_engine_common metadata_file:dir search;
+allow update_engine_common ota_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow update_engine_common ota_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/update_verifier.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/update_verifier.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68b43f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/update_verifier.te
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# update_verifier
+type update_verifier, domain;
+type update_verifier_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Allow update_verifier to reach block devices in /dev/block.
+allow update_verifier block_device:dir search;
+
+# Read care map in /data/ota_package/.
+allow update_verifier ota_package_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow update_verifier ota_package_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read /sys/block to find all the DM directories like (/sys/block/dm-X).
+allow update_verifier sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Read /sys/block/dm-X/dm/name (which is a symlink to
+# /sys/devices/virtual/block/dm-X/dm/name) to identify the mapping between
+# dm-X and system/vendor partitions.
+allow update_verifier sysfs_dm:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow update_verifier sysfs_dm:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read all blocks in DM wrapped system partition.
+allow update_verifier dm_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Write to kernel message.
+allow update_verifier kmsg_device:chr_file { getattr w_file_perms };
+
+# Use Boot Control HAL
+hal_client_domain(update_verifier, hal_bootctl)
+
+# Access Checkpoint commands over binder
+allow update_verifier vold_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(update_verifier, servicemanager)
+binder_call(update_verifier, vold)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/usbd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/usbd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f34954
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/usbd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+type usbd, domain;
+type usbd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/userdata_sysdev.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/userdata_sysdev.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9974f36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/userdata_sysdev.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+allow userdata_sysdev sysfs:filesystem associate;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vdc.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vdc.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e638e50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vdc.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# vdc spawned from init for the following services:
+#  defaultcrypto
+#  encrypt
+#
+# We also transition into this domain from dumpstate, when
+# collecting bug reports.
+
+type vdc, domain;
+type vdc_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# vdc can be invoked with logwrapper, so let it write to pty
+allow vdc devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# vdc writes directly to kmsg during the boot process
+allow vdc kmsg_device:chr_file { getattr w_file_perms };
+
+# vdc talks to vold over Binder
+binder_use(vdc)
+binder_call(vdc, vold)
+allow vdc vold_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_init.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_init.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0e1da5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_init.te
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+# vendor_init is its own domain.
+type vendor_init, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+
+# Communication to the main init process
+allow vendor_init init:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+
+# Logging to kmsg
+allow vendor_init kmsg_device:chr_file { open getattr write };
+
+# Mount on /dev/usb-ffs/adb.
+allow vendor_init device:dir mounton;
+
+# Create and remove symlinks in /.
+allow vendor_init rootfs:lnk_file { create unlink };
+
+# Create cgroups mount points in tmpfs and mount cgroups on them.
+allow vendor_init cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vendor_init cgroup:file w_file_perms;
+allow vendor_init cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vendor_init cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
+# /config
+allow vendor_init configfs:dir mounton;
+allow vendor_init configfs:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vendor_init configfs:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms;
+
+# Create directories under /dev/cpuctl after chowning it to system.
+allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
+
+# mkdir, symlink, write, rm/rmdir, chown/chmod, restorecon/restorecon_recursive from init.rc files.
+# chown/chmod require open+read+setattr required for open()+fchown/fchmod().
+# system/core/init.rc requires at least cache_file and data_file_type.
+# init.<board>.rc files often include device-specific types, so
+# we just allow all file types except /system files here.
+allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set { chown fowner fsetid };
+
+# mkdir with FBE requires reading /data/unencrypted/{ref,mode}.
+allow vendor_init unencrypted_data_file:dir search;
+allow vendor_init unencrypted_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Set encryption policy on dirs in /data
+allowxperm vendor_init data_file_type:dir ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
+  FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
+};
+
+allow vendor_init system_data_file:dir getattr;
+
+allow vendor_init {
+  file_type
+  -core_data_file_type
+  -exec_type
+  -system_file_type
+  -mnt_product_file
+  -password_slot_metadata_file
+  -ota_metadata_file
+  -unlabeled
+  -vendor_file_type
+  -vold_metadata_file
+  -gsi_metadata_file_type
+  -apex_metadata_file
+  -userspace_reboot_metadata_file
+}:dir { create search getattr open read setattr ioctl write add_name remove_name rmdir relabelfrom };
+
+allow vendor_init unlabeled:{ dir notdevfile_class_set } { getattr relabelfrom };
+
+allow vendor_init {
+  file_type
+  -core_data_file_type
+  -exec_type
+  -password_slot_metadata_file
+  -ota_metadata_file
+  -runtime_event_log_tags_file
+  -system_file_type
+  -unlabeled
+  -vendor_file_type
+  -vold_metadata_file
+  -gsi_metadata_file_type
+  -apex_metadata_file
+  -apex_info_file
+  -userspace_reboot_metadata_file
+  enforce_debugfs_restriction(`-debugfs_type')
+}:file { create getattr open read write setattr relabelfrom unlink map };
+
+allow vendor_init {
+  file_type
+  -core_data_file_type
+  -exec_type
+  -password_slot_metadata_file
+  -ota_metadata_file
+  -system_file_type
+  -unlabeled
+  -vendor_file_type
+  -vold_metadata_file
+  -gsi_metadata_file_type
+  -apex_metadata_file
+  -userspace_reboot_metadata_file
+}:{ sock_file fifo_file } { create getattr open read setattr relabelfrom unlink };
+
+allow vendor_init {
+  file_type
+  -apex_mnt_dir
+  -core_data_file_type
+  -exec_type
+  -password_slot_metadata_file
+  -ota_metadata_file
+  -system_file_type
+  -unlabeled
+  -vendor_file_type
+  -vold_metadata_file
+  -gsi_metadata_file_type
+  -apex_metadata_file
+  -userspace_reboot_metadata_file
+}:lnk_file { create getattr setattr relabelfrom unlink };
+
+allow vendor_init {
+  file_type
+  -core_data_file_type
+  -exec_type
+  -mnt_product_file
+  -password_slot_metadata_file
+  -ota_metadata_file
+  -system_file_type
+  -vendor_file_type
+  -vold_metadata_file
+  -gsi_metadata_file_type
+  -apex_metadata_file
+  -userspace_reboot_metadata_file
+}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
+
+allow vendor_init dev_type:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vendor_init dev_type:lnk_file create;
+
+# Disable tracing by writing to /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on
+allow vendor_init debugfs_tracing:file w_file_perms;
+
+# chown/chmod on pseudo files.
+allow vendor_init {
+  fs_type
+  -contextmount_type
+  -keychord_device
+  -sdcard_type
+  -rootfs
+  -proc_uid_time_in_state
+  -proc_uid_concurrent_active_time
+  -proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time
+  enforce_debugfs_restriction(`-debugfs_type')
+}:file { open read setattr map };
+
+allow vendor_init tracefs_type:file { open read setattr map };
+
+allow vendor_init {
+  fs_type
+  -contextmount_type
+  -sdcard_type
+  -rootfs
+  -proc_uid_time_in_state
+  -proc_uid_concurrent_active_time
+  -proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time
+}:dir  { open read setattr search };
+
+allow vendor_init dev_type:blk_file getattr;
+
+# Write to /proc/sys/net/ping_group_range and other /proc/sys/net files.
+r_dir_file(vendor_init, proc_net_type)
+allow vendor_init proc_net_type:file w_file_perms;
+allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
+
+# Write to /proc/sys/vm/page-cluster
+allow vendor_init proc_page_cluster:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Write to sysfs nodes.
+allow vendor_init sysfs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow vendor_init sysfs_type:lnk_file read;
+allow vendor_init { sysfs_type -sysfs_usermodehelper }:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# setfscreatecon() for labeling directories and socket files.
+allow vendor_init self:process { setfscreate };
+
+r_dir_file(vendor_init, vendor_file_type)
+
+# Vendor init can read properties
+allow vendor_init serialno_prop:file { getattr open read map };
+
+# Vendor init can perform operations on trusted and security Extended Attributes
+allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+
+# Raw writes to misc block device
+allow vendor_init misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
+
+# vendor_init is using bootstrap bionic
+allow vendor_init system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow vendor_init system_bootstrap_lib_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# allow filesystem tuning
+allow vendor_init userdata_sysdev:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Everything is labeled as rootfs in recovery mode. Vendor init has to execute
+# the dynamic linker and shared libraries.
+recovery_only(`
+  allow vendor_init rootfs:file { r_file_perms execute };
+')
+
+not_compatible_property(`
+    set_prop(vendor_init, {
+      property_type
+      -system_internal_property_type
+      -system_restricted_property_type
+    })
+')
+
+# Get file context
+allow vendor_init file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow vendor_init to (re)set nice
+allow vendor_init self:capability sys_nice;
+
+set_prop(vendor_init, apk_verity_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, camerax_extensions_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, cpu_variant_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, dalvik_runtime_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, debug_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, exported_bluetooth_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, exported_camera_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, exported_config_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, exported_default_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, exported_overlay_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, exported_pm_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, ffs_control_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, hw_timeout_multiplier_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, incremental_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, lmkd_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, logd_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, log_tag_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, log_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, qemu_hw_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, radio_control_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, rebootescrow_hal_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, serialno_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, soc_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, surfaceflinger_color_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, usb_control_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, userspace_reboot_config_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, vehicle_hal_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, vendor_default_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, vndk_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, virtual_ab_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, vold_post_fs_data_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, wifi_hal_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, wifi_log_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, zram_control_prop)
+
+get_prop(vendor_init, boot_status_prop)
+get_prop(vendor_init, exported3_system_prop)
+get_prop(vendor_init, ota_prop)
+get_prop(vendor_init, power_debug_prop)
+get_prop(vendor_init, provisioned_prop)
+get_prop(vendor_init, retaildemo_prop)
+get_prop(vendor_init, surfaceflinger_display_prop)
+get_prop(vendor_init, test_harness_prop)
+get_prop(vendor_init, theme_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, dck_prop)
+
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Vendor init shouldn't communicate with any vendor process, nor most system processes.
+neverallow_establish_socket_comms(vendor_init, { domain -init -logd -su -vendor_init });
+
+# The vendor_init domain is only entered via an exec based transition from the
+# init domain, never via setcon().
+neverallow domain vendor_init:process dyntransition;
+neverallow { domain -init } vendor_init:process transition;
+neverallow vendor_init { file_type fs_type -init_exec }:file entrypoint;
+
+# Never read/follow symlinks created by shell or untrusted apps.
+neverallow vendor_init { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:lnk_file read;
+neverallow vendor_init shell_data_file:lnk_file read;
+# Init should not be creating subdirectories in /data/local/tmp
+neverallow vendor_init shell_data_file:dir { write add_name remove_name };
+
+# init should never execute a program without changing to another domain.
+neverallow vendor_init { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Init never adds or uses services via service_manager.
+neverallow vendor_init service_manager_type:service_manager { add find };
+neverallow vendor_init servicemanager:service_manager list;
+
+# vendor_init should never be ptraced
+neverallow * vendor_init:process ptrace;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_misc_writer.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_misc_writer.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3bc3a9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_misc_writer.te
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# vendor_misc_writer
+type vendor_misc_writer, domain;
+type vendor_misc_writer_exec, vendor_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Raw writes to misc_block_device
+allow vendor_misc_writer misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
+allow vendor_misc_writer block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Silence the denial when calling libfstab's ReadDefaultFstab, which tries to
+# load DT fstab.
+dontaudit vendor_misc_writer proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit vendor_misc_writer sysfs_dt_firmware_android:dir search;
+dontaudit vendor_misc_writer proc_bootconfig:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow ReadDefaultFstab().
+read_fstab(vendor_misc_writer)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_modprobe.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_modprobe.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..529c4aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_modprobe.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type vendor_modprobe, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_shell.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_shell.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d7cb31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_shell.te
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+type vendor_shell, domain;
+type vendor_shell_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+allow vendor_shell vendor_shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow vendor_shell vendor_toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Use fd from shell when vendor_shell is started from shell
+allow vendor_shell shell:fd use;
+
+# adbd: allow `adb shell /vendor/bin/sh` and `adb shell` then `/vendor/bin/sh`
+allow vendor_shell adbd:fd use;
+allow vendor_shell adbd:process sigchld;
+allow vendor_shell adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr ioctl read write };
+
+allow vendor_shell devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow vendor_shell tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow vendor_shell console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow vendor_shell input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow vendor_shell input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(vendor_shell, persist_vendor_debug_wifi_prop)')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_toolbox.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_toolbox.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63f938d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vendor_toolbox.te
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Toolbox installation for vendor binaries / scripts
+# Non-vendor processes are not allowed to execute the binary
+# and is always executed without transition.
+type vendor_toolbox_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+# Do not allow domains to transition to vendor toolbox
+# or read, execute the vendor_toolbox file.
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Do not allow non-vendor domains to transition
+    # to vendor toolbox except for the allowlisted domains.
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -init
+        -modprobe
+    } vendor_toolbox_exec:file { entrypoint execute execute_no_trans };
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/virtual_touchpad.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/virtual_touchpad.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49c8704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/virtual_touchpad.te
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+type virtual_touchpad, domain;
+type virtual_touchpad_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+binder_use(virtual_touchpad)
+binder_service(virtual_touchpad)
+add_service(virtual_touchpad, virtual_touchpad_service)
+
+# Needed to check app permissions.
+binder_call(virtual_touchpad, system_server)
+
+# Requires access to /dev/uinput to create and feed the virtual device.
+allow virtual_touchpad uhid_device:chr_file { w_file_perms ioctl };
+
+# Requires access to the permission service to validate that clients have the
+# appropriate VR permissions.
+allow virtual_touchpad permission_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vndservice.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vndservice.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..efd9adf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vndservice.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+type service_manager_vndservice, vndservice_manager_type;
+type default_android_vndservice, vndservice_manager_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vndservicemanager.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vndservicemanager.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b9f73d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vndservicemanager.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# vndservicemanager - the Binder context manager for vendor processes
+type vndservicemanager, domain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vold.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vold.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7796ba8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vold.te
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+# volume manager
+type vold, domain;
+type vold_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+# Read already opened /cache files.
+allow vold cache_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow vold cache_file:file { getattr read };
+allow vold cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(vold, { sysfs_type -sysfs_batteryinfo })
+# XXX Label sysfs files with a specific type?
+allow vold {
+  sysfs # writing to /sys/*/uevent during coldboot.
+  sysfs_devices_block
+  sysfs_dm
+  sysfs_loop # writing to /sys/block/loop*/uevent during coldboot.
+  sysfs_usb
+  sysfs_zram_uevent
+  sysfs_fs_f2fs
+}:file w_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(vold, rootfs)
+r_dir_file(vold, metadata_file)
+allow vold {
+  proc # b/67049235 processes /proc/<pid>/* files are mislabeled.
+  proc_bootconfig
+  proc_cmdline
+  proc_drop_caches
+  proc_filesystems
+  proc_meminfo
+  proc_mounts
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+#Get file contexts
+allow vold file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow us to jump into execution domains of above tools
+allow vold self:process setexec;
+
+# For formatting adoptable storage devices
+allow vold e2fs_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Run fstrim on mounted partitions
+# allowxperm still requires the ioctl permission for the individual type
+allowxperm vold { fs_type file_type }:dir ioctl FITRIM;
+
+# Get/set file-based encryption policies on dirs in /data and adoptable storage,
+# and add/remove file-based encryption keys.
+allowxperm vold data_file_type:dir ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
+  FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
+  FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY
+  FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
+};
+
+# Only vold and init should ever set file-based encryption policies.
+neverallowxperm {
+  domain
+  -vold
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+} data_file_type:dir ioctl { FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY };
+
+# Only vold should ever add/remove file-based encryption keys.
+neverallowxperm {
+  domain
+  -vold
+} data_file_type:dir ioctl { FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY };
+
+# Allow securely erasing crypto key files. F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE is
+# tried first. Otherwise, FS_IOC_FIEMAP is needed to get the
+# location of the file's blocks on the raw block device to erase.
+allowxperm vold {
+  vold_data_file
+  vold_metadata_file
+}:file ioctl {
+  F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE
+  FS_IOC_FIEMAP
+};
+
+typeattribute vold mlstrustedsubject;
+allow vold self:process setfscreate;
+allow vold system_file:file x_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow vold vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
+allow vold block_device:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vold device:dir write;
+allow vold devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow vold rootfs:dir mounton;
+allow vold sdcard_type:dir mounton; # TODO: deprecated in M
+allow vold sdcard_type:filesystem { mount remount unmount }; # TODO: deprecated in M
+allow vold sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms; # TODO: deprecated in M
+allow vold sdcard_type:file create_file_perms; # TODO: deprecated in M
+
+# Manage locations where storage is mounted
+allow vold { mnt_media_rw_file storage_file sdcard_type }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vold { mnt_media_rw_file storage_file sdcard_type }:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Access to storage that backs emulated FUSE daemons for migration optimization
+allow vold media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vold media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+# Allow mounting (lower filesystem) on parts of media for performance
+allow vold media_rw_data_file:dir mounton;
+
+# Allow setting extended attributes (for project quota IDs) on files and dirs
+# and to enable project ID inheritance through FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+allowxperm vold media_rw_data_file:{ dir file } ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+  FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+};
+
+# Allow mounting of storage devices
+allow vold { mnt_media_rw_stub_file storage_stub_file }:dir { mounton create rmdir getattr setattr };
+
+# Manage per-user primary symlinks
+allow vold mnt_user_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+allow vold mnt_user_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+allow vold mnt_user_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Manage per-user pass_through primary symlinks
+allow vold mnt_pass_through_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+allow vold mnt_pass_through_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow to create and mount expanded storage
+allow vold mnt_expand_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+allow vold apk_data_file:dir { create getattr setattr };
+allow vold shell_data_file:dir { create getattr setattr };
+
+# Allow to mount incremental file system on /data/incremental and create files
+allow vold apk_data_file:dir { mounton rw_dir_perms };
+# Allow to create and write files in /data/incremental
+allow vold apk_data_file:file { rw_file_perms unlink };
+# Allow to bind-mount incremental file system on /data/app/vmdl*.tmp and read files
+allow vold apk_tmp_file:dir { mounton r_dir_perms };
+# Allow to read incremental control file and call selinux restorecon on it
+allow vold incremental_control_file:file { r_file_perms relabelto };
+
+allow vold tmpfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
+allow vold tmpfs:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vold tmpfs:dir mounton;
+allow vold self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin dac_override dac_read_search mknod sys_admin chown fowner fsetid };
+allow vold self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow vold loop_control_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow vold loop_device:blk_file { create setattr unlink rw_file_perms };
+allowxperm vold loop_device:blk_file ioctl {
+  LOOP_CLR_FD
+  LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE
+  LOOP_GET_STATUS64
+  LOOP_SET_FD
+  LOOP_SET_STATUS64
+};
+allow vold vold_device:blk_file { create setattr unlink rw_file_perms };
+allowxperm vold vold_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKDISCARD BLKGETSIZE };
+allow vold dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow vold dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm vold dm_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKDISCARD BLKSECDISCARD };
+# For vold Process::killProcessesWithOpenFiles function.
+allow vold domain:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow vold domain:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+allow vold domain:process { signal sigkill };
+allow vold self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace kill };
+
+allow vold kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Run fsck in the fsck domain.
+allow vold fsck_exec:file { r_file_perms execute };
+
+# Log fsck results
+allow vold fscklogs:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow vold fscklogs:file create_file_perms;
+
+#
+# Rules to support encrypted fs support.
+#
+
+# Unmount and mount the fs.
+allow vold labeledfs:filesystem { mount unmount remount };
+
+# Access /efs/userdata_footer.
+# XXX Split into a separate type?
+allow vold efs_file:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Create and mount on /data/tmp_mnt and management of expansion mounts
+allow vold {
+    system_data_file
+    system_data_root_file
+}:dir { create rw_dir_perms mounton setattr rmdir };
+allow vold system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;
+
+# Vold create users in /data/vendor_{ce,de}/[0-9]+
+allow vold vendor_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+# for secdiscard
+allow vold system_data_file:file read;
+
+# Set scheduling policy of kernel processes
+allow vold kernel:process setsched;
+
+# ASEC
+allow vold asec_image_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow vold asec_image_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow vold asec_apk_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton relabelfrom relabelto };
+allow vold asec_public_file:dir { relabelto setattr };
+allow vold asec_apk_file:file { r_file_perms setattr relabelfrom relabelto };
+allow vold asec_public_file:file { relabelto setattr };
+# restorecon files in asec containers created on 4.2 or earlier.
+allow vold unlabeled:dir { r_dir_perms setattr relabelfrom };
+allow vold unlabeled:file { r_file_perms setattr relabelfrom };
+
+# Access to FUSE control filesystem to hard-abort FUSE mounts
+allow vold fusectlfs:file rw_file_perms;
+allow vold fusectlfs:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+# Handle wake locks (used for device encryption)
+wakelock_use(vold)
+
+# Allow vold to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
+binder_use(vold)
+add_service(vold, vold_service)
+
+# Allow vold to call into the system server so it can check permissions.
+binder_call(vold, system_server)
+allow vold permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+# talk to batteryservice
+binder_call(vold, healthd)
+
+# talk to keymaster
+hal_client_domain(vold, hal_keymaster)
+
+# talk to health storage HAL
+hal_client_domain(vold, hal_health_storage)
+
+# talk to bootloader HAL
+full_treble_only(`hal_client_domain(vold, hal_bootctl)')
+
+# Access userdata block device.
+allow vold userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm vold userdata_block_device:blk_file ioctl BLKSECDISCARD;
+
+# Access metadata block device used for encryption meta-data.
+allow vold metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm vold metadata_block_device:blk_file ioctl BLKSECDISCARD;
+
+# Allow vold to manipulate /data/unencrypted
+allow vold unencrypted_data_file:{ file } create_file_perms;
+allow vold unencrypted_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+# Write to /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
+allow vold proc_drop_caches:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Give vold a place where only vold can store files; everyone else is off limits
+allow vold vold_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vold vold_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# And a similar place in the metadata partition
+allow vold vold_metadata_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vold vold_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# linux keyring configuration
+allow vold init:key { write search setattr };
+allow vold vold:key { write search setattr };
+
+# vold temporarily changes its priority when running benchmarks
+allow vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+
+# vold needs to chroot into app namespaces to remount when runtime permissions change
+allow vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_chroot;
+allow vold storage_file:dir mounton;
+
+# For AppFuse.
+allow vold fuse_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow vold fuse:filesystem { relabelfrom };
+allow vold app_fusefs:filesystem { relabelfrom relabelto };
+allow vold app_fusefs:filesystem { mount unmount };
+allow vold app_fuse_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow vold app_fuse_file:file { read write open getattr append };
+
+# MoveTask.cpp executes cp and rm
+allow vold toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Prepare profile dir for users.
+allow vold { user_profile_data_file user_profile_root_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+# Raw writes to misc block device
+allow vold misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
+
+# vold might need to search or mount /mnt/vendor/*
+allow vold mnt_vendor_file:dir search;
+
+dontaudit vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
+
+# Allow ReadDefaultFstab().
+read_fstab(vold)
+
+# vold might need to search loopback apex files
+allow vold vendor_apex_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -vold
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} vold_data_file:dir ~{ open create read getattr setattr search relabelfrom relabelto ioctl };
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -vold
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} vold_data_file:dir *;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -vold
+} vold_metadata_file:dir *;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -kernel
+    -vold
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} vold_data_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -vold
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} vold_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -kernel
+    -vold
+    -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} { vold_data_file vold_metadata_file }:notdevfile_class_set *;
+
+neverallow { domain -vold -init } restorecon_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow vold {
+  domain
+  -hal_health_storage_server
+  -hal_keymaster_server
+  -system_suspend_server
+  -hal_bootctl_server
+  -healthd
+  -hwservicemanager
+  -iorapd_service
+  -keystore
+  -servicemanager
+  -system_server
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+}:binder call;
+
+neverallow vold fsck_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+neverallow { domain -init } vold:process { transition dyntransition };
+neverallow vold *:process ptrace;
+neverallow vold *:rawip_socket *;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vold_prepare_subdirs.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3087fa8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# SELinux directory creation and labelling for vold-managed directories
+
+type vold_prepare_subdirs, domain;
+type vold_prepare_subdirs_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+typeattribute vold_prepare_subdirs coredomain;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vr_hwc.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vr_hwc.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c146887
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/vr_hwc.te
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+type vr_hwc, domain;
+type vr_hwc_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Get buffer metadata.
+hal_client_domain(vr_hwc, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+binder_use(vr_hwc)
+binder_service(vr_hwc)
+
+binder_call(vr_hwc, surfaceflinger)
+# Needed to check for app permissions.
+binder_call(vr_hwc, system_server)
+
+add_service(vr_hwc, vr_hwc_service)
+
+# Hosts the VR HWC implementation and provides a simple Binder interface for VR
+# Window Manager to receive the layers/buffers.
+hwbinder_use(vr_hwc)
+
+# Load vendor libraries.
+allow vr_hwc system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+allow vr_hwc ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow connection to VR DisplayClient to get the primary display metadata
+# (ie: size).
+pdx_client(vr_hwc, display_client)
+
+# Requires access to the permission service to validate that clients have the
+# appropriate VR permissions.
+allow vr_hwc permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow vr_hwc vrflinger_vsync_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/watchdogd.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/watchdogd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72e3685
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/watchdogd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# watchdogd seclabel is specified in init.<board>.rc
+type watchdogd, domain;
+type watchdogd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow watchdogd watchdog_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow watchdogd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/webview_zygote.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/webview_zygote.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ace3a01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/webview_zygote.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# webview_zygote is an auxiliary zygote process that is used to spawn
+# isolated_app processes for rendering untrusted web content.
+
+type webview_zygote, domain;
+type webview_zygote_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+type webview_zygote_tmpfs, file_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/wificond.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/wificond.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..254fcbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/wificond.te
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# wificond
+type wificond, domain;
+type wificond_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+binder_use(wificond)
+binder_call(wificond, system_server)
+binder_call(wificond, keystore)
+
+add_service(wificond, wifinl80211_service)
+
+# create sockets to set interfaces up and down
+allow wificond self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+# setting interface state up/down is a privileged ioctl
+allowxperm wificond self:udp_socket ioctl { SIOCSIFFLAGS SIOCSIFHWADDR };
+allow wificond self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
+# allow wificond to speak to nl80211 in the kernel
+allow wificond self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+# newer kernels (e.g. 4.4 but not 4.1) have a new class for sockets
+allow wificond self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+r_dir_file(wificond, proc_net_type)
+
+# allow wificond to check permission for dumping logs
+allow wificond permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+# dumpstate support
+allow wificond dumpstate:fd use;
+allow wificond dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+#### Offer the Wifi Keystore HwBinder service ###
+hwbinder_use(wificond)
+typeattribute wificond wifi_keystore_service_server;
+add_hwservice(wificond, system_wifi_keystore_hwservice)
+
+# Allow keystore binder access to serve the HwBinder service.
+allow wificond keystore_service:service_manager find;
+allow wificond keystore:keystore_key get;
+
+# Allow keystore2 binder access to serve the HwBinder service.
+allow wificond wifi_key:keystore2_key {
+    get_info
+    use
+};
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/wpantund.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/wpantund.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ddd693
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/wpantund.te
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+type wpantund, domain;
+type wpantund_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+hal_client_domain(wpantund, hal_lowpan)
+net_domain(wpantund)
+
+binder_use(wpantund)
+binder_call(wpantund, system_server)
+
+# wpantund needs to be able to check in with the lowpan_service
+allow wpantund lowpan_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow wpantund to call any callbacks that have been registered with it.
+# Generally, only privileged apps are able to register callbacks with
+# wpantund, so we are limiting the scope for callbacks to only privileged
+# apps. We also add shell to allow the command-line utility `lowpanctl`
+# to work properly from `adb shell`.
+allow wpantund {priv_app shell}:binder call;
+
+# create sockets to set interfaces up and down, add multicast groups, etc.
+allow wpantund self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+# setting interface state up/down and changing MTU are privileged ioctls
+allowxperm wpantund self:udp_socket ioctl { SIOCSIFFLAGS SIOCSIFMTU };
+
+# Allow us to bring up a TUN network interface.
+allow wpantund tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow wpantund self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
+allow wpantund self:tun_socket create;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/zygote.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/zygote.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..071354e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/system/public/zygote.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# zygote
+type zygote, domain;
+type zygote_tmpfs, file_type;
+type zygote_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/file.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/file.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b1fd74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/file.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+type hostapd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+type wpa_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/file_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/file_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71b4fcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/file_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# TODO(jiyong): clean this up
+#############################
+# Vendor files
+#
+(/.*)?                  u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/bin/sh                 u:object_r:vendor_shell_exec:s0
+/bin/toybox_vendor      u:object_r:vendor_toolbox_exec:s0
+/bin/toolbox            u:object_r:vendor_toolbox_exec:s0
+/etc(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/etc/cgroups\.json      u:object_r:vendor_cgroup_desc_file:s0
+/etc/task_profiles\.json    u:object_r:vendor_task_profiles_file:s0
+
+/lib(64)?/egl(/.*)?     u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
+
+/lib(64)?/vndk-sp(/.*)? u:object_r:vndk_sp_file:s0
+
+/manifest\.xml           u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/compatibility_matrix\.xml u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/etc/vintf(/.*)?        u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/app(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
+/priv-app(/.*)?         u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
+/overlay(/.*)?          u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
+/framework(/.*)?        u:object_r:vendor_framework_file:s0
+
+/apex(/[^/]+){0,2}                      u:object_r:vendor_apex_file:s0
+/bin/misc_writer                        u:object_r:vendor_misc_writer_exec:s0
+/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64)         u:object_r:vendor_boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
+
+# HAL location
+/lib(64)?/hw            u:object_r:vendor_hal_file:s0
+
+/etc/selinux/nonplat_service_contexts u:object_r:nonplat_service_contexts_file:s0
+
+/etc/selinux/vendor_service_contexts u:object_r:vendor_service_contexts_file:s0
+
+/bin/install-recovery\.sh u:object_r:vendor_install_recovery_exec:s0
+
+/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.security\.keymint-service u:object_r:hal_keymint_default_exec:s0
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_atrace_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_atrace_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55c9730
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_atrace_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+type hal_atrace_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_atrace_default, hal_atrace)
+
+type hal_atrace_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_atrace_default)
+
+# Allow atrace HAL to access tracefs.
+allow hal_atrace_default debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow hal_atrace_default debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow hal_atrace_default debugfs_tracing_debug:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow hal_atrace_default debugfs_tracing_debug:file rw_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_audio_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_audio_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82cbf8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_audio_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+type hal_audio_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_audio_default, hal_audio)
+
+type hal_audio_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_audio_default)
+
+hal_client_domain(hal_audio_default, hal_allocator)
+
+# allow audioserver to call hal_audio dump with its own fd to retrieve status
+allow hal_audio_default audioserver:fifo_file write;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_audiocontrol_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_audiocontrol_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1940c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_audiocontrol_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# audiocontrol subsystem
+type hal_audiocontrol_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_audiocontrol_default, hal_audiocontrol)
+
+# may be started by init
+type hal_audiocontrol_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_audiocontrol_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_authsecret_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_authsecret_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46f5291
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_authsecret_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_authsecret_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_authsecret_default, hal_authsecret)
+
+type hal_authsecret_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_authsecret_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_bluetooth_btlinux.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_bluetooth_btlinux.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22d9cf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_bluetooth_btlinux.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+type hal_bluetooth_btlinux, domain;
+type hal_bluetooth_btlinux_exec, exec_type, file_type, vendor_file_type;
+
+hal_server_domain(hal_bluetooth_btlinux, hal_bluetooth)
+init_daemon_domain(hal_bluetooth_btlinux)
+
+allow hal_bluetooth_btlinux self:socket { create bind read write };
+allow hal_bluetooth_btlinux self:bluetooth_socket { create bind read write };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_bluetooth_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_bluetooth_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01d60db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_bluetooth_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_bluetooth_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_bluetooth_default, hal_bluetooth)
+
+type hal_bluetooth_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_bluetooth_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_bootctl_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_bootctl_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b94313
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_bootctl_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Boot control subsystem
+type hal_bootctl_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_bootctl_default, hal_bootctl)
+
+type hal_bootctl_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_bootctl_default)
+
+# Needed for ReadDefaultFstab.
+allow hal_bootctl_default proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+allow hal_bootctl_default sysfs_dt_firmware_android:dir search;
+allow hal_bootctl_default sysfs_dt_firmware_android:file r_file_perms;
+read_fstab(hal_bootctl_default)
+
+# Needed for reading/writing misc partition.
+allow hal_bootctl_default block_device:dir search;
+allow hal_bootctl_default misc_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_broadcastradio_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_broadcastradio_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37f65f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_broadcastradio_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_broadcastradio_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_broadcastradio_default, hal_broadcastradio)
+
+type hal_broadcastradio_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_broadcastradio_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_camera_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_camera_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5bc4a61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_camera_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+type hal_camera_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_camera_default, hal_camera)
+
+type hal_camera_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_camera_default)
+
+allow hal_camera_default fwk_sensor_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# For collecting bugreports.
+allow hal_camera_default dumpstate:fd use;
+allow hal_camera_default dumpstate:fifo_file write;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_can_socketcan.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_can_socketcan.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7498788
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_can_socketcan.te
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+type hal_can_socketcan, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_can_socketcan, hal_can_controller)
+hal_server_domain(hal_can_socketcan, hal_can_bus)
+
+type hal_can_socketcan_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_can_socketcan)
+
+# Managing SocketCAN interfaces
+allow hal_can_socketcan self:capability net_admin;
+allow hal_can_socketcan self:netlink_route_socket { create bind write nlmsg_write read };
+
+# Calling if_nametoindex(3) to open CAN sockets
+allow hal_can_socketcan self:udp_socket { create ioctl };
+allowxperm hal_can_socketcan self:udp_socket ioctl {
+    SIOCGIFINDEX
+};
+
+# Communicating with SocketCAN interfaces and bringing them up/down
+allow hal_can_socketcan self:can_socket { bind create read write ioctl setopt };
+allowxperm hal_can_socketcan self:can_socket ioctl {
+    SIOCGIFFLAGS
+    SIOCSIFFLAGS
+};
+
+# Un-publishing ICanBus interfaces
+allow hal_can_socketcan hidl_manager_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+allow hal_can_socketcan sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+allow hal_can_socketcan usb_serial_device:chr_file { ioctl read write open };
+allowxperm hal_can_socketcan usb_serial_device:chr_file ioctl {
+    TCGETS
+    TCSETSW
+    TIOCGSERIAL
+    TIOCSSERIAL
+    TIOCSETD
+    SIOCGIFNAME
+};
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_cas_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_cas_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc1a2c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_cas_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+type hal_cas_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_cas_default, hal_cas)
+
+type hal_cas_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_cas_default)
+
+# Allow CAS HAL's default implementation to use vendor-binder service
+vndbinder_use(hal_cas_default);
+
+allow hal_cas_default hal_allocator:fd use;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_configstore_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_configstore_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc61a16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_configstore_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_configstore_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_configstore_default, hal_configstore)
+
+type hal_configstore_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_configstore_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_confirmationui_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_confirmationui_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..832c687
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_confirmationui_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_confirmationui_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_confirmationui_default, hal_confirmationui)
+
+type hal_confirmationui_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_confirmationui_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_contexthub_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_contexthub_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b29808d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_contexthub_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_contexthub_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_contexthub_default, hal_contexthub)
+
+type hal_contexthub_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_contexthub_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_drm_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_drm_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e534762
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_drm_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+type hal_drm_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_drm_default, hal_drm)
+
+type hal_drm_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_drm_default)
+
+allow hal_drm_default hal_codec2_server:fd use;
+allow hal_drm_default hal_omx_server:fd use;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_dumpstate_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_dumpstate_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fbf40f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_dumpstate_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_dumpstate_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_dumpstate_default, hal_dumpstate)
+
+type hal_dumpstate_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_dumpstate_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_evs_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_evs_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57a0299
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_evs_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# evs_mock mock hardware driver service
+type hal_evs_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_evs_default, hal_evs)
+
+# allow init to launch processes in this context
+type hal_evs_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_evs_default)
+
+allow hal_evs_default hal_graphics_allocator_server:fd use;
+
+# allow to use surface flinger
+allow hal_evs_default automotive_display_service_server:fd use;
+
+# allow to use automotive display service
+allow hal_evs_default fwk_automotive_display_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_face_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_face_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..891d1f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_face_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_face_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_face_default, hal_face)
+
+type hal_face_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_face_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_fingerprint_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_fingerprint_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..638b603
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_fingerprint_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_fingerprint_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_fingerprint_default, hal_fingerprint)
+
+type hal_fingerprint_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_fingerprint_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_gatekeeper_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_gatekeeper_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3654cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_gatekeeper_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_gatekeeper_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_gatekeeper_default, hal_gatekeeper)
+
+type hal_gatekeeper_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_gatekeeper_default);
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_gnss_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_gnss_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cea362f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_gnss_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+type hal_gnss_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_gnss_default, hal_gnss)
+
+type hal_gnss_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_gnss_default)
+
+allow hal_gnss_default gnss_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_graphics_allocator_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_graphics_allocator_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a129ad4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_graphics_allocator_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+type hal_graphics_allocator_default, domain;
+type hal_graphics_allocator_default_tmpfs, file_type;
+hal_server_domain(hal_graphics_allocator_default, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+type hal_graphics_allocator_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_graphics_allocator_default)
+tmpfs_domain(hal_graphics_allocator_default)
+
+# b/70180742
+dontaudit hal_graphics_allocator_default unlabeled:dir search;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_graphics_composer_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_graphics_composer_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7dcd2b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_graphics_composer_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+type hal_graphics_composer_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_graphics_composer_default, hal_graphics_composer)
+
+type hal_graphics_composer_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_graphics_composer_default)
+type_transition hal_graphics_composer_default tmpfs:file hal_graphics_composer_server_tmpfs;
+allow hal_graphics_composer_default hal_graphics_composer_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+
+# b/68864350
+dontaudit hal_graphics_composer_default unlabeled:dir search;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_health_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_health_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b2b921
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_health_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# health info abstraction
+type hal_health_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_health_default, hal_health)
+
+type hal_health_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_health_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_health_storage_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_health_storage_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37b3e24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_health_storage_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+type hal_health_storage_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_health_storage_default, hal_health_storage)
+
+type hal_health_storage_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_health_storage_default)
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_identity_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_identity_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f84687
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_identity_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_identity_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_identity_default, hal_identity)
+
+type hal_identity_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_identity_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_input_classifier_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_input_classifier_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..915cc78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_input_classifier_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_input_classifier_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_input_classifier_default, hal_input_classifier)
+
+type hal_input_classifier_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_input_classifier_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_ir_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_ir_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..943aab0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_ir_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_ir_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_ir_default, hal_ir)
+
+type hal_ir_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_ir_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_keymaster_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_keymaster_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f0d82a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_keymaster_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+type hal_keymaster_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_keymaster_default, hal_keymaster)
+
+type hal_keymaster_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_keymaster_default)
+
+get_prop(hal_keymaster_default, vendor_security_patch_level_prop);
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_keymint_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_keymint_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b86a1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_keymint_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+type hal_keymint_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_keymint_default, hal_keymint)
+
+type hal_keymint_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_keymint_default)
+
+hal_attribute_service(hal_keymint, hal_secureclock_service)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_keymint, hal_sharedsecret_service)
+
+get_prop(hal_keymint_default, vendor_security_patch_level_prop);
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_light_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_light_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7fa9a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_light_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_light_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_light_default, hal_light)
+
+type hal_light_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_light_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_lowpan_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_lowpan_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a49bf24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_lowpan_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_lowpan_default, domain;
+type hal_lowpan_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+hal_server_domain(hal_lowpan_default, hal_lowpan)
+init_daemon_domain(hal_lowpan_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_memtrack_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_memtrack_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c547699
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_memtrack_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_memtrack_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_memtrack_default, hal_memtrack)
+
+type hal_memtrack_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_memtrack_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_nfc_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_nfc_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c13baa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_nfc_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_nfc_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_nfc_default, hal_nfc)
+
+type hal_nfc_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_nfc_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_oemlock_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_oemlock_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8597f2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_oemlock_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_oemlock_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_oemlock_default, hal_oemlock)
+
+type hal_oemlock_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_oemlock_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_power_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_power_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3be4f22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_power_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_power_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_power_default, hal_power)
+
+type hal_power_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_power_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_power_stats_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_power_stats_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b7a2c02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_power_stats_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_power_stats_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_power_stats_default, hal_power_stats)
+
+type hal_power_stats_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_power_stats_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_radio_config_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_radio_config_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ccbe5bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_radio_config_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+type hal_radio_config_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_radio_config_default, hal_telephony)
+
+type hal_radio_config_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_radio_config_default)
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_radio_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_radio_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82fd40e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_radio_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+type hal_radio_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_radio_default, hal_telephony)
+
+type hal_radio_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_radio_default)
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_rebootescrow_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_rebootescrow_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2625693
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_rebootescrow_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+type hal_rebootescrow_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_rebootescrow_default, hal_rebootescrow)
+get_prop(hal_rebootescrow_default, rebootescrow_hal_prop);
+
+type hal_rebootescrow_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_rebootescrow_default)
+
+type rebootescrow_device, dev_type;
+allow hal_rebootescrow_default rebootescrow_device:{ chr_file blk_file } rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_rebootescrow_default block_device:dir search;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_secure_element_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_secure_element_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1a94a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_secure_element_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+type hal_secure_element_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_secure_element_default, hal_secure_element)
+type hal_secure_element_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+allow hal_secure_element_default secure_element_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+init_daemon_domain(hal_secure_element_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_sensors_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_sensors_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8752364
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_sensors_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+type hal_sensors_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_sensors_default, hal_sensors)
+
+type hal_sensors_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_sensors_default)
+
+allow hal_sensors_default fwk_scheduler_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+allow hal_sensors_default input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow hal_sensors_default input_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow sensor hals to access and use gralloc memory allocated by
+# android.hardware.graphics.allocator
+allow hal_sensors_default hal_graphics_allocator_default:fd use;
+allow hal_sensors_default ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow hal_sensors_default dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow sensor hal to use lock for keeping system awake for wake up
+# events delivery.
+wakelock_use(hal_sensors_default);
+
+# allow sensor hal to use ashmem fd from system_server.
+allow hal_sensors_default system_server:fd use;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tetheroffload_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tetheroffload_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..03c542b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tetheroffload_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_tetheroffload_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_tetheroffload_default, hal_tetheroffload)
+
+type hal_tetheroffload_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_tetheroffload_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_thermal_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_thermal_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73b2eff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_thermal_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_thermal_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_thermal_default, hal_thermal)
+
+type hal_thermal_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_thermal_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tv_cec_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tv_cec_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..080e73b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tv_cec_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_tv_cec_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_tv_cec_default, hal_tv_cec)
+
+type hal_tv_cec_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_tv_cec_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tv_input_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tv_input_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12d9743
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tv_input_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+type hal_tv_input_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_tv_input_default, hal_tv_input)
+
+type hal_tv_input_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_tv_input_default)
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tv_tuner_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tv_tuner_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..639c7bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_tv_tuner_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+type hal_tv_tuner_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_tv_tuner_default, hal_tv_tuner)
+
+type hal_tv_tuner_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_tv_tuner_default)
+
+allow hal_tv_tuner_default ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /dev/dma_heap/system
+allow hal_tv_tuner_default dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_usb_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_usb_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5642a2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_usb_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_usb_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_usb_default, hal_usb)
+
+type hal_usb_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_usb_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1486b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_usb_gadget_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_usb_gadget_default, hal_usb_gadget)
+
+type hal_usb_gadget_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_usb_gadget_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_vehicle_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_vehicle_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56a47b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_vehicle_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# vehicle subsystem
+type hal_vehicle_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_vehicle_default, hal_vehicle)
+
+# may be started by init
+type hal_vehicle_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_vehicle_default)
+
+# communication with CAN bus HAL
+hal_client_domain(hal_vehicle_default, hal_can_bus)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_vibrator_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_vibrator_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c10d8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_vibrator_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_vibrator_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_vibrator_default, hal_vibrator)
+
+type hal_vibrator_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_vibrator_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_vr_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_vr_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a60192
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_vr_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_vr_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_vr_default, hal_vr)
+
+type hal_vr_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_vr_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_weaver_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_weaver_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dd7679
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_weaver_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_weaver_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_weaver_default, hal_weaver)
+
+type hal_weaver_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_weaver_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_wifi_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_wifi_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75a9842
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_wifi_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_wifi_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_wifi_default, hal_wifi)
+
+type hal_wifi_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_wifi_default)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_wifi_hostapd_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_wifi_hostapd_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e0dcb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_wifi_hostapd_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# hostapd or equivalent
+type hal_wifi_hostapd_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_wifi_hostapd_default, hal_wifi_hostapd)
+type hal_wifi_hostapd_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_wifi_hostapd_default)
+
+net_domain(hal_wifi_hostapd_default)
+
+# Allow hostapd to access it's data folder
+allow hal_wifi_hostapd_default hostapd_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow hal_wifi_hostapd_default hostapd_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow hal_wifi_hostapd_default hostapd_data_file:sock_file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_wifi_supplicant_default.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_wifi_supplicant_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6b9e09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/hal_wifi_supplicant_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# wpa supplicant or equivalent
+type hal_wifi_supplicant_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_wifi_supplicant_default, hal_wifi_supplicant)
+type hal_wifi_supplicant_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_wifi_supplicant_default)
+
+net_domain(hal_wifi_supplicant_default)
+# Create a socket for receiving info from wpa
+type_transition hal_wifi_supplicant_default wifi_data_file:dir wpa_socket "sockets";
+
+# Allow wpa_supplicant to configure nl80211
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant_default proc_net_type:file write;
+
+# Allow wpa_supplicant to talk to Wifi Keystore HwBinder service.
+hwbinder_use(hal_wifi_supplicant_default)
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant_default system_wifi_keystore_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+binder_call(hal_wifi_supplicant_default, wifi_keystore_service_server)
+
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant_default wpa_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant_default wpa_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant_default wpa_data_file:sock_file create_file_perms;
+
+# Write to security logs for audit.
+get_prop(hal_wifi_supplicant_default, device_logging_prop)
+
+# Devices upgrading to P may grant this permission in device-specific
+# policy along with the data_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+# attribute needed for an exemption.  However, devices that launch with
+# P should use /data/vendor/wifi, which is already granted in core
+# policy.  This is dontaudited here to avoid conditional
+# device-specific behavior in wpa_supplicant.
+dontaudit hal_wifi_supplicant_default wifi_data_file:dir search;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/keys.conf b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/keys.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71ad2c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/keys.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#
+# Maps an arbitrary tag [TAGNAME] with the string contents found in
+# TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT. Common convention is to start TAGNAME with an @ and
+# name it after the base file name of the pem file.
+#
+# Each tag (section) then allows one to specify any string found in
+# TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT. Typcially this is user, eng, and userdebug. Another
+# option is to use ALL which will match ANY TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT string.
+#
+
+# Some vendor apps are using platform key for signing.
+# This moves them to untrusted_app domain when the system partition is
+# switched to a Generic System Image (GSI), because the value of platform's
+# seinfo in /system/etc/selinux/plat_mac_permissions.xml has been changed.
+# Duplicating the device-specific platform seinfo into
+# /vendor/etc/selinux/vendor_mac_permissions.xml to make it self-contained
+# within the vendor partition.
+[@PLATFORM]
+ALL : $DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE/platform.x509.pem
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/mac_permissions.xml b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/mac_permissions.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d6fab0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/mac_permissions.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<policy>
+
+<!--
+
+    * A signature is a hex encoded X.509 certificate or a tag defined in
+      keys.conf and is required for each signer tag. The signature can
+      either appear as a set of attached cert child tags or as an attribute.
+    * A signer tag must contain a seinfo tag XOR multiple package stanzas.
+    * Each signer/package tag is allowed to contain one seinfo tag. This tag
+      represents additional info that each app can use in setting a SELinux security
+      context on the eventual process as well as the apps data directory.
+    * seinfo assignments are made according to the following rules:
+      - Stanzas with package name refinements will be checked first.
+      - Stanzas w/o package name refinements will be checked second.
+      - The "default" seinfo label is automatically applied.
+
+    * valid stanzas can take one of the following forms:
+
+     // single cert protecting seinfo
+     <signer signature="@PLATFORM" >
+       <seinfo value="platform" />
+     </signer>
+
+     // multiple certs protecting seinfo (all contained certs must match)
+     <signer>
+       <cert signature="@PLATFORM1"/>
+       <cert signature="@PLATFORM2"/>
+       <seinfo value="platform" />
+     </signer>
+
+     // single cert protecting explicitly named app
+     <signer signature="@PLATFORM" >
+       <package name="com.android.foo">
+         <seinfo value="bar" />
+       </package>
+     </signer>
+
+     // multiple certs protecting explicitly named app (all certs must match)
+     <signer>
+       <cert signature="@PLATFORM1"/>
+       <cert signature="@PLATFORM2"/>
+       <package name="com.android.foo">
+         <seinfo value="bar" />
+       </package>
+     </signer>
+-->
+
+    <!-- Vendor dev key in AOSP -->
+    <signer signature="@PLATFORM" >
+      <seinfo value="platform" />
+    </signer>
+</policy>
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/mediacodec.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/mediacodec.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f78b58f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/mediacodec.te
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+type mediacodec, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type mediacodec_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(mediacodec)
+
+# can route /dev/binder traffic to /dev/vndbinder
+vndbinder_use(mediacodec)
+
+hal_server_domain(mediacodec, hal_codec2)
+hal_server_domain(mediacodec, hal_omx)
+
+# mediacodec may use an input surface from a different Codec2 or OMX service
+hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_codec2)
+hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_omx)
+
+hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_allocator)
+hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+allow mediacodec gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow mediacodec ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow mediacodec dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow mediacodec video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow mediacodec video_device:dir search;
+
+crash_dump_fallback(mediacodec)
+
+# get aac_drc_* properties
+get_prop(mediacodec, aac_drc_prop)
+
+# mediacodec should never execute any executable without a domain transition
+neverallow mediacodec { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
+# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
+# Lengthier explanation here:
+# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
+neverallow mediacodec domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/rild.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/rild.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc84ef7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/rild.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# rild - radio interface layer daemon
+type rild, domain;
+hal_server_domain(rild, hal_telephony)
+net_domain(rild)
+
+# type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
+# public, but conceptually should go with this
+type rild_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(rild)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/tee.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/tee.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b2e6c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/tee.te
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+##
+# trusted execution environment (tee) daemon
+#
+type tee_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(tee)
+
+allow tee self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override };
+allow tee tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow tee tee_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow tee tee_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow tee self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow tee self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow tee ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(tee, sysfs_type)
+
+allow tee system_data_file:file { getattr read };
+allow tee system_data_file:lnk_file { getattr read };
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vendor_install_recovery.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vendor_install_recovery.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff63f75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vendor_install_recovery.te
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+init_daemon_domain(vendor_install_recovery)
+
+# service vendor_flash_recovery in
+# bootable/recovery/applypatch/vendor_flash_recovery.rc
+type vendor_install_recovery, domain;
+type vendor_install_recovery_exec, vendor_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# /vendor/bin/install-recovery.sh is a shell script.
+# Needs to execute /vendor/bin/sh
+allow vendor_install_recovery vendor_shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Execute /vendor/bin/applypatch
+allow vendor_install_recovery vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow vendor_install_recovery vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;')
+
+allow vendor_install_recovery vendor_toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Update the recovery block device based off a diff of the boot block device
+allow vendor_install_recovery block_device:dir search;
+allow vendor_install_recovery boot_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+allow vendor_install_recovery recovery_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
+allow vendor_install_recovery proc_drop_caches:file w_file_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vendor_misc_writer.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vendor_misc_writer.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..245749e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vendor_misc_writer.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+init_daemon_domain(vendor_misc_writer)
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vendor_modprobe.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vendor_modprobe.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f5918c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vendor_modprobe.te
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# For the use of /vendor/bin/modprobe from vendor init.rc fragments
+domain_trans(init, vendor_toolbox_exec, vendor_modprobe)
+
+allow vendor_modprobe proc_modules:file r_file_perms;
+allow vendor_modprobe proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+allow vendor_modprobe kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
+allow vendor_modprobe self:global_capability_class_set sys_module;
+allow vendor_modprobe kernel:key search;
+
+allow vendor_modprobe { vendor_file }:system module_load;
+r_dir_file(vendor_modprobe, { vendor_file })
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vndservice_contexts b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vndservice_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..068056f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vndservice_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+manager                 u:object_r:service_manager_vndservice:s0
+*                       u:object_r:default_android_vndservice:s0
diff --git a/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vndservicemanager.te b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vndservicemanager.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..497e027
--- /dev/null
+++ b/microdroid/sepolicy/vendor/vndservicemanager.te
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# vndservicemanager - the Binder context manager for vendor processes
+type vndservicemanager_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(vndservicemanager);
+
+allow vndservicemanager self:binder set_context_mgr;
+
+# transfer binder objects to other processes (TODO b/35870313 limit this to vendor-only)
+allow vndservicemanager { domain -coredomain -init -vendor_init }:binder transfer;
+
+allow vndservicemanager vndbinder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Read vndservice_contexts
+allow vndservicemanager vndservice_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+add_service(vndservicemanager, service_manager_vndservice)
+
+# Start lazy services
+set_prop(vndservicemanager, ctl_interface_start_prop)
+
+# Check SELinux permissions.
+selinux_check_access(vndservicemanager)