diff --git a/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/MainActivity.kt b/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/MainActivity.kt
index 33522c0..542265a 100644
--- a/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/MainActivity.kt
+++ b/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/MainActivity.kt
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 import android.content.res.Configuration
 import android.graphics.drawable.Icon
 import android.graphics.fonts.FontStyle
+import android.media.MediaScannerConnection
 import android.net.Uri
 import android.os.Build
 import android.os.Bundle
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@
     private lateinit var terminalTabAdapter: TerminalTabAdapter
     private val terminalInfo = CompletableFuture<TerminalInfo>()
     private val terminalViewModel: TerminalViewModel by viewModels()
+    private var isVmRunning = false
 
     override fun onCreate(savedInstanceState: Bundle?) {
         super.onCreate(savedInstanceState)
@@ -234,6 +236,16 @@
         activityResultLauncher.launch(intent)
     }
 
+    override fun onPause() {
+        super.onPause()
+        MediaScannerConnection.scanFile(
+            this,
+            arrayOf("/storage/emulated/${userId}/Download"),
+            null /* mimeTypes */,
+            null, /* callback */
+        )
+    }
+
     private fun getTerminalServiceUrl(ipAddress: String?, port: Int): URL? {
         val config = resources.configuration
         // TODO: Always enable screenReaderMode (b/395845063)
@@ -269,13 +281,16 @@
         executorService.shutdown()
         getSystemService<AccessibilityManager>(AccessibilityManager::class.java)
             .removeAccessibilityStateChangeListener(this)
-        val intent = VmLauncherService.getIntentForShutdown(this, this)
-        startService(intent)
+        if (isVmRunning) {
+            val intent = VmLauncherService.getIntentForShutdown(this, this)
+            startService(intent)
+        }
         super.onDestroy()
     }
 
     override fun onVmStart() {
         Log.i(TAG, "onVmStart()")
+        isVmRunning = true
     }
 
     override fun onTerminalAvailable(info: TerminalInfo) {
@@ -284,11 +299,13 @@
 
     override fun onVmStop() {
         Log.i(TAG, "onVmStop()")
+        isVmRunning = false
         finish()
     }
 
     override fun onVmError() {
         Log.i(TAG, "onVmError()")
+        isVmRunning = false
         // TODO: error cause is too simple.
         ErrorActivity.start(this, Exception("onVmError"))
     }
diff --git a/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/SettingsDiskResizeActivity.kt b/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/SettingsDiskResizeActivity.kt
index da07b19..00baeef 100644
--- a/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/SettingsDiskResizeActivity.kt
+++ b/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/SettingsDiskResizeActivity.kt
@@ -15,13 +15,15 @@
  */
 package com.android.virtualization.terminal
 
+import android.content.Context
 import android.content.Intent
 import android.icu.text.MeasureFormat
 import android.icu.text.NumberFormat
 import android.icu.util.Measure
 import android.icu.util.MeasureUnit
 import android.os.Bundle
-import android.os.Environment
+import android.os.storage.StorageManager
+import android.os.storage.StorageManager.UUID_DEFAULT
 import android.text.SpannableString
 import android.text.Spanned
 import android.text.TextUtils
@@ -39,7 +41,7 @@
 
 class SettingsDiskResizeActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
     private val numberPattern: Pattern = Pattern.compile("[\\d]*[\\٫.,]?[\\d]+")
-    private val defaultMaxDiskSizeMb: Long = 16 shl 10
+    private val defaultHostReserveSizeMb: Long = 5 shl 10
 
     private var diskSizeStepMb: Long = 0
     private var diskSizeMb: Long = 0
@@ -59,10 +61,10 @@
     }
 
     private fun getAvailableSizeMb(): Long {
-        val usableSpaceMb =
-            bytesToMb(Environment.getDataDirectory().getUsableSpace()) and
-                (diskSizeStepMb - 1).inv()
-        return diskSizeMb + usableSpaceMb
+        var storageManager =
+            applicationContext.getSystemService(Context.STORAGE_SERVICE) as StorageManager
+        val hostAllocatableMb = bytesToMb(storageManager.getAllocatableBytes(UUID_DEFAULT))
+        return diskSizeMb + hostAllocatableMb
     }
 
     private fun mbToProgress(bytes: Long): Int {
@@ -82,7 +84,10 @@
         val image = InstalledImage.getDefault(this)
         diskSizeMb = bytesToMb(image.getApparentSize())
         val minDiskSizeMb = bytesToMb(image.getSmallestSizePossible()).coerceAtMost(diskSizeMb)
-        val maxDiskSizeMb = defaultMaxDiskSizeMb.coerceAtMost(getAvailableSizeMb())
+        var maxDiskSizeMb = getAvailableSizeMb()
+        if (maxDiskSizeMb > defaultHostReserveSizeMb) {
+            maxDiskSizeMb -= defaultHostReserveSizeMb
+        }
 
         diskSizeText = findViewById<TextView>(R.id.settings_disk_resize_resize_gb_assigned)!!
         diskMaxSizeText = findViewById<TextView>(R.id.settings_disk_resize_resize_gb_max)
diff --git a/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/TerminalTabFragment.kt b/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/TerminalTabFragment.kt
index 72dea5c..8106f6e 100644
--- a/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/TerminalTabFragment.kt
+++ b/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/TerminalTabFragment.kt
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@
     }
 
     private fun updateMainActivity() {
-        val mainActivity = (activity as MainActivity)
+        val mainActivity = activity as MainActivity ?: return
         if (terminalGuiSupport()) {
             mainActivity.displayMenu!!.visibility = View.VISIBLE
             mainActivity.displayMenu!!.isEnabled = true
diff --git a/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/VmLauncherService.kt b/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/VmLauncherService.kt
index 0b34a8d..f1ad561 100644
--- a/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/VmLauncherService.kt
+++ b/android/TerminalApp/java/com/android/virtualization/terminal/VmLauncherService.kt
@@ -465,7 +465,6 @@
     private fun doShutdown(resultReceiver: ResultReceiver?) {
         runner?.exitStatus?.thenAcceptAsync { success: Boolean ->
             resultReceiver?.send(if (success) RESULT_STOP else RESULT_ERROR, null)
-            stopSelf()
         }
         if (debianService != null && debianService!!.shutdownDebian()) {
             // During shutdown, change the notification content to indicate that it's closing
@@ -494,7 +493,6 @@
         } else {
             // If there is no Debian service or it fails to shutdown, just stop the service.
             runner?.vm?.stop()
-            stopSelf()
         }
     }
 
diff --git a/build/apex/Android.bp b/build/apex/Android.bp
index f0eba7f..7496f4d 100644
--- a/build/apex/Android.bp
+++ b/build/apex/Android.bp
@@ -69,10 +69,7 @@
         default: [],
     }),
 
-    canned_fs_config: select(release_flag("RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_VIRT_CPUFREQ"), {
-        true: "canned_fs_config_sys_nice",
-        default: "canned_fs_config",
-    }),
+    canned_fs_config: "canned_fs_config",
 }
 
 vintf_fragment {
diff --git a/build/apex/canned_fs_config b/build/apex/canned_fs_config
index 5afd9d6..90c9747 100644
--- a/build/apex/canned_fs_config
+++ b/build/apex/canned_fs_config
@@ -1 +1,3 @@
 /bin/virtualizationservice 0 2000 0755 capabilities=0x1000001  # CAP_CHOWN, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
+/bin/crosvm 0 3013 0755 capabilities=0x800000  # CAP_SYS_NICE
+/bin/virtmgr 0 3013 0755 capabilities=0x800000 # CAP_SYS_NICE
diff --git a/build/apex/canned_fs_config_sys_nice b/build/apex/canned_fs_config_sys_nice
deleted file mode 100644
index 90c9747..0000000
--- a/build/apex/canned_fs_config_sys_nice
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-/bin/virtualizationservice 0 2000 0755 capabilities=0x1000001  # CAP_CHOWN, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
-/bin/crosvm 0 3013 0755 capabilities=0x800000  # CAP_SYS_NICE
-/bin/virtmgr 0 3013 0755 capabilities=0x800000 # CAP_SYS_NICE
diff --git a/guest/pvmfw/src/arch/aarch64/payload.rs b/guest/pvmfw/src/arch/aarch64/payload.rs
index 9a7d864..77e9a31 100644
--- a/guest/pvmfw/src/arch/aarch64/payload.rs
+++ b/guest/pvmfw/src/arch/aarch64/payload.rs
@@ -23,13 +23,10 @@
 /// Function boot payload after cleaning all secret from pvmfw memory
 pub fn jump_to_payload(entrypoint: usize, slices: &MemorySlices) -> ! {
     let fdt_address = slices.fdt.as_ptr() as usize;
-    let dice_handover = slices
-        .dice_handover
-        .map(|slice| {
-            let r = slice.as_ptr_range();
-            (r.start as usize)..(r.end as usize)
-        })
-        .expect("Missing DICE handover");
+    let dice_handover = slices.dice_handover.map(|slice| {
+        let r = slice.as_ptr_range();
+        (r.start as usize)..(r.end as usize)
+    });
 
     deactivate_dynamic_page_tables();
 
@@ -51,7 +48,9 @@
     assert_eq!(scratch.end.0 % ASM_STP_ALIGN, 0, "scratch memory is misaligned.");
 
     // A sub-region of the scratch memory might contain data for the next stage so skip zeroing it.
-    let skipped = dice_handover;
+    // Alternatively, an empty region at the start of the scratch region is compatible with the ASM
+    // implementation and results in the whole scratch region being zeroed.
+    let skipped = dice_handover.unwrap_or(scratch.start.0..scratch.start.0);
 
     assert!(skipped.is_within(&(scratch.start.0..scratch.end.0)));
     assert_eq!(skipped.start % ASM_STP_ALIGN, 0, "Misaligned skipped region.");
diff --git a/guest/pvmfw/src/config.rs b/guest/pvmfw/src/config.rs
index 1f9eacf..a16da35 100644
--- a/guest/pvmfw/src/config.rs
+++ b/guest/pvmfw/src/config.rs
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@
 
 #[derive(Default)]
 pub struct Entries<'a> {
-    pub dice_handover: &'a mut [u8],
+    pub dice_handover: Option<&'a mut [u8]>,
     pub debug_policy: Option<&'a [u8]>,
     pub vm_dtbo: Option<&'a mut [u8]>,
     pub vm_ref_dt: Option<&'a [u8]>,
@@ -295,9 +295,6 @@
         }
         let [dice_handover, debug_policy, vm_dtbo, vm_ref_dt] = entries;
 
-        // The platform DICE handover has always been required.
-        let dice_handover = dice_handover.unwrap();
-
         // We have no reason to mutate so drop the `mut`.
         let debug_policy = debug_policy.map(|x| &*x);
         let vm_ref_dt = vm_ref_dt.map(|x| &*x);
diff --git a/guest/pvmfw/src/dice/mod.rs b/guest/pvmfw/src/dice/mod.rs
index 8317e48..dc7b64e 100644
--- a/guest/pvmfw/src/dice/mod.rs
+++ b/guest/pvmfw/src/dice/mod.rs
@@ -87,11 +87,12 @@
     pub mode: DiceMode,
     pub security_version: u64,
     pub rkp_vm_marker: bool,
+    pub instance_hash: Option<Hash>,
     component_name: String,
 }
 
 impl PartialInputs {
-    pub fn new(data: &VerifiedBootData) -> Result<Self> {
+    pub fn new(data: &VerifiedBootData, instance_hash: Option<Hash>) -> Result<Self> {
         let code_hash = to_dice_hash(data)?;
         let auth_hash = hash(data.public_key)?;
         let mode = to_dice_mode(data.debug_level);
@@ -101,20 +102,27 @@
         let rkp_vm_marker = data.has_capability(Capability::RemoteAttest)
             || data.has_capability(Capability::TrustySecurityVm);
 
-        Ok(Self { code_hash, auth_hash, mode, security_version, rkp_vm_marker, component_name })
+        Ok(Self {
+            code_hash,
+            auth_hash,
+            mode,
+            security_version,
+            rkp_vm_marker,
+            instance_hash,
+            component_name,
+        })
     }
 
     pub fn write_next_handover(
         self,
         current_handover: &[u8],
         salt: &[u8; HIDDEN_SIZE],
-        instance_hash: Option<Hash>,
         deferred_rollback_protection: bool,
         next_handover: &mut [u8],
         context: DiceContext,
     ) -> Result<()> {
         let config = self
-            .generate_config_descriptor(instance_hash)
+            .generate_config_descriptor()
             .map_err(|_| diced_open_dice::DiceError::InvalidInput)?;
 
         let dice_inputs = InputValues::new(
@@ -160,14 +168,14 @@
         )
     }
 
-    fn generate_config_descriptor(&self, instance_hash: Option<Hash>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    fn generate_config_descriptor(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
         let mut config = Vec::with_capacity(4);
         config.push((cbor!(COMPONENT_NAME_KEY)?, cbor!(self.component_name.as_str())?));
         config.push((cbor!(SECURITY_VERSION_KEY)?, cbor!(self.security_version)?));
         if self.rkp_vm_marker {
             config.push((cbor!(RKP_VM_MARKER_KEY)?, Value::Null))
         }
-        if let Some(instance_hash) = instance_hash {
+        if let Some(instance_hash) = self.instance_hash {
             config.push((cbor!(INSTANCE_HASH_KEY)?, Value::from(instance_hash.as_slice())));
         }
         let config = Value::Map(config);
@@ -217,7 +225,7 @@
     #[test]
     fn base_data_conversion() {
         let vb_data = BASE_VB_DATA;
-        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data).unwrap();
+        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data, None).unwrap();
 
         assert_eq!(inputs.mode, DiceMode::kDiceModeNormal);
         assert_eq!(inputs.security_version, 42);
@@ -229,7 +237,7 @@
     #[test]
     fn debuggable_conversion() {
         let vb_data = VerifiedBootData { debug_level: DebugLevel::Full, ..BASE_VB_DATA };
-        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data).unwrap();
+        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data, None).unwrap();
 
         assert_eq!(inputs.mode, DiceMode::kDiceModeDebug);
     }
@@ -238,7 +246,7 @@
     fn rkp_vm_conversion() {
         let vb_data =
             VerifiedBootData { capabilities: vec![Capability::RemoteAttest], ..BASE_VB_DATA };
-        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data).unwrap();
+        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data, None).unwrap();
 
         assert!(inputs.rkp_vm_marker);
     }
@@ -246,22 +254,23 @@
     #[test]
     fn base_config_descriptor() {
         let vb_data = BASE_VB_DATA;
-        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data).unwrap();
-        let config_map = decode_config_descriptor(&inputs, None);
+        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data, None).unwrap();
+        let config_map = decode_config_descriptor(&inputs);
 
         assert_eq!(config_map.get(&COMPONENT_NAME_KEY).unwrap().as_text().unwrap(), "vm_entry");
         assert_eq!(config_map.get(&COMPONENT_VERSION_KEY), None);
         assert_eq!(config_map.get(&RESETTABLE_KEY), None);
         assert_eq!(config_map.get(&SECURITY_VERSION_KEY).unwrap().as_integer().unwrap(), 42.into());
         assert_eq!(config_map.get(&RKP_VM_MARKER_KEY), None);
+        assert_eq!(config_map.get(&INSTANCE_HASH_KEY), None);
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn rkp_vm_config_descriptor_has_rkp_vm_marker_and_component_name() {
         let vb_data =
             VerifiedBootData { capabilities: vec![Capability::RemoteAttest], ..BASE_VB_DATA };
-        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data).unwrap();
-        let config_map = decode_config_descriptor(&inputs, Some(HASH));
+        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data, Some(HASH)).unwrap();
+        let config_map = decode_config_descriptor(&inputs);
 
         assert_eq!(config_map.get(&COMPONENT_NAME_KEY).unwrap().as_text().unwrap(), "vm_entry");
         assert!(config_map.get(&RKP_VM_MARKER_KEY).unwrap().is_null());
@@ -271,8 +280,8 @@
     fn security_vm_config_descriptor_has_rkp_vm_marker() {
         let vb_data =
             VerifiedBootData { capabilities: vec![Capability::TrustySecurityVm], ..BASE_VB_DATA };
-        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data).unwrap();
-        let config_map = decode_config_descriptor(&inputs, Some(HASH));
+        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data, Some(HASH)).unwrap();
+        let config_map = decode_config_descriptor(&inputs);
 
         assert!(config_map.get(&RKP_VM_MARKER_KEY).unwrap().is_null());
     }
@@ -281,8 +290,8 @@
     fn config_descriptor_with_instance_hash() {
         let vb_data =
             VerifiedBootData { capabilities: vec![Capability::RemoteAttest], ..BASE_VB_DATA };
-        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data).unwrap();
-        let config_map = decode_config_descriptor(&inputs, Some(HASH));
+        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data, Some(HASH)).unwrap();
+        let config_map = decode_config_descriptor(&inputs);
         assert_eq!(*config_map.get(&INSTANCE_HASH_KEY).unwrap(), Value::from(HASH.as_slice()));
     }
 
@@ -290,16 +299,13 @@
     fn config_descriptor_without_instance_hash() {
         let vb_data =
             VerifiedBootData { capabilities: vec![Capability::RemoteAttest], ..BASE_VB_DATA };
-        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data).unwrap();
-        let config_map = decode_config_descriptor(&inputs, None);
+        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data, None).unwrap();
+        let config_map = decode_config_descriptor(&inputs);
         assert!(!config_map.contains_key(&INSTANCE_HASH_KEY));
     }
 
-    fn decode_config_descriptor(
-        inputs: &PartialInputs,
-        instance_hash: Option<Hash>,
-    ) -> HashMap<i64, Value> {
-        let config_descriptor = inputs.generate_config_descriptor(instance_hash).unwrap();
+    fn decode_config_descriptor(inputs: &PartialInputs) -> HashMap<i64, Value> {
+        let config_descriptor = inputs.generate_config_descriptor().unwrap();
 
         let cbor_map =
             cbor_util::deserialize::<Value>(&config_descriptor).unwrap().into_map().unwrap();
@@ -313,7 +319,7 @@
     #[test]
     fn changing_deferred_rpb_changes_secrets() {
         let vb_data = VerifiedBootData { debug_level: DebugLevel::Full, ..BASE_VB_DATA };
-        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data).unwrap();
+        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data, Some([0u8; 64])).unwrap();
         let mut buffer_without_defer = [0; 4096];
         let mut buffer_with_defer = [0; 4096];
         let mut buffer_without_defer_retry = [0; 4096];
@@ -341,7 +347,6 @@
             .write_next_handover(
                 sample_dice_input,
                 &[0u8; HIDDEN_SIZE],
-                Some([0u8; 64]),
                 false,
                 &mut buffer_without_defer,
                 context.clone(),
@@ -354,7 +359,6 @@
             .write_next_handover(
                 sample_dice_input,
                 &[0u8; HIDDEN_SIZE],
-                Some([0u8; 64]),
                 true,
                 &mut buffer_with_defer,
                 context.clone(),
@@ -367,7 +371,6 @@
             .write_next_handover(
                 sample_dice_input,
                 &[0u8; HIDDEN_SIZE],
-                Some([0u8; 64]),
                 false,
                 &mut buffer_without_defer_retry,
                 context.clone(),
@@ -384,7 +387,7 @@
         let dice_artifacts = make_sample_bcc_and_cdis().unwrap();
         let handover0_bytes = to_serialized_handover(&dice_artifacts);
         let vb_data = VerifiedBootData { debug_level: DebugLevel::Full, ..BASE_VB_DATA };
-        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data).unwrap();
+        let inputs = PartialInputs::new(&vb_data, Some([0u8; 64])).unwrap();
         let mut buffer = [0; 4096];
 
         inputs
@@ -392,7 +395,6 @@
             .write_next_handover(
                 &handover0_bytes,
                 &[0u8; HIDDEN_SIZE],
-                Some([0u8; 64]),
                 true,
                 &mut buffer,
                 DiceContext {
@@ -410,7 +412,6 @@
             .write_next_handover(
                 &handover1_bytes,
                 &[0u8; HIDDEN_SIZE],
-                Some([0u8; 64]),
                 true,
                 &mut buffer,
                 DiceContext {
@@ -428,7 +429,6 @@
             .write_next_handover(
                 &handover2_bytes,
                 &[0u8; HIDDEN_SIZE],
-                Some([0u8; 64]),
                 true,
                 &mut buffer,
                 DiceContext {
diff --git a/guest/pvmfw/src/entry.rs b/guest/pvmfw/src/entry.rs
index 46b1971..cb6c64e 100644
--- a/guest/pvmfw/src/entry.rs
+++ b/guest/pvmfw/src/entry.rs
@@ -139,17 +139,22 @@
         slices.fdt,
         slices.kernel,
         slices.ramdisk,
-        config_entries.dice_handover,
+        config_entries.dice_handover.as_deref(),
         config_entries.debug_policy,
         config_entries.vm_dtbo,
         config_entries.vm_ref_dt,
     )?;
-    slices.add_dice_handover(next_dice_handover);
+    if let Some(r) = next_dice_handover {
+        slices.add_dice_handover(r);
+    }
+
     // Keep UART MMIO_GUARD-ed for debuggable payloads, to enable earlycon.
     let keep_uart = cfg!(debuggable_vms_improvements) && debuggable_payload;
 
     // Writable-dirty regions will be flushed when MemoryTracker is dropped.
-    config_entries.dice_handover.zeroize();
+    if let Some(r) = config_entries.dice_handover {
+        r.zeroize();
+    }
 
     unshare_all_mmio_except_uart().map_err(|e| {
         error!("Failed to unshare MMIO ranges: {e}");
@@ -218,8 +223,8 @@
     fn get_entries(self) -> config::Entries<'a> {
         match self {
             Self::Config(cfg) => cfg.get_entries(),
-            Self::LegacyDiceHandover(dice_handover) => {
-                config::Entries { dice_handover, ..Default::default() }
+            Self::LegacyDiceHandover(d) => {
+                config::Entries { dice_handover: Some(d), ..Default::default() }
             }
         }
     }
diff --git a/guest/pvmfw/src/fdt.rs b/guest/pvmfw/src/fdt.rs
index 4853e85..b5d3b28 100644
--- a/guest/pvmfw/src/fdt.rs
+++ b/guest/pvmfw/src/fdt.rs
@@ -1375,7 +1375,7 @@
 /// Modifies the input DT according to the fields of the configuration.
 pub fn modify_for_next_stage(
     fdt: &mut Fdt,
-    dice_handover: &[u8],
+    dice_handover: Option<&[u8]>,
     new_instance: bool,
     strict_boot: bool,
     debug_policy: Option<&[u8]>,
@@ -1416,14 +1416,18 @@
 }
 
 /// Patch the "google,open-dice"-compatible reserved-memory node to point to the DICE handover.
-fn patch_dice_node(fdt: &mut Fdt, handover: &[u8]) -> libfdt::Result<()> {
+fn patch_dice_node(fdt: &mut Fdt, handover: Option<&[u8]>) -> libfdt::Result<()> {
     // The node is assumed to be present in the template DT.
     let node = fdt.node_mut(c"/reserved-memory")?.ok_or(FdtError::NotFound)?;
     let mut node = node.next_compatible(c"google,open-dice")?.ok_or(FdtError::NotFound)?;
 
-    let addr = (handover.as_ptr() as usize).try_into().unwrap();
-    let size = handover.len().try_into().unwrap();
-    node.setprop_addrrange_inplace(c"reg", addr, size)
+    if let Some(r) = handover {
+        let addr = (r.as_ptr() as usize).try_into().unwrap();
+        let size = r.len().try_into().unwrap();
+        node.setprop_addrrange_inplace(c"reg", addr, size)
+    } else {
+        node.nop()
+    }
 }
 
 fn empty_or_delete_prop(
diff --git a/guest/pvmfw/src/main.rs b/guest/pvmfw/src/main.rs
index 9f1b5e6..db60849 100644
--- a/guest/pvmfw/src/main.rs
+++ b/guest/pvmfw/src/main.rs
@@ -37,12 +37,16 @@
 use crate::rollback::perform_rollback_protection;
 use alloc::borrow::Cow;
 use alloc::boxed::Box;
+use alloc::vec::Vec;
 use bssl_avf::Digester;
-use diced_open_dice::{bcc_handover_parse, DiceArtifacts, DiceContext, Hidden, VM_KEY_ALGORITHM};
+use diced_open_dice::{
+    bcc_handover_parse, DiceArtifacts, DiceContext, Hidden, HIDDEN_SIZE, VM_KEY_ALGORITHM,
+};
 use libfdt::Fdt;
 use log::{debug, error, info, trace, warn};
 use pvmfw_avb::verify_payload;
 use pvmfw_avb::DebugLevel;
+use pvmfw_avb::VerifiedBootData;
 use pvmfw_embedded_key::PUBLIC_KEY;
 use vmbase::heap;
 use vmbase::memory::{flush, SIZE_4KB};
@@ -52,11 +56,11 @@
     untrusted_fdt: &mut Fdt,
     signed_kernel: &[u8],
     ramdisk: Option<&[u8]>,
-    current_dice_handover: &[u8],
+    current_dice_handover: Option<&[u8]>,
     mut debug_policy: Option<&[u8]>,
     vm_dtbo: Option<&mut [u8]>,
     vm_ref_dt: Option<&[u8]>,
-) -> Result<(&'a [u8], bool), RebootReason> {
+) -> Result<(Option<&'a [u8]>, bool), RebootReason> {
     info!("pVM firmware");
     debug!("FDT: {:?}", untrusted_fdt.as_ptr());
     debug!("Signed kernel: {:?} ({:#x} bytes)", signed_kernel.as_ptr(), signed_kernel.len());
@@ -67,103 +71,57 @@
         debug!("Ramdisk: None");
     }
 
-    let dice_handover = bcc_handover_parse(current_dice_handover).map_err(|e| {
-        error!("Invalid DICE Handover: {e:?}");
-        RebootReason::InvalidDiceHandover
-    })?;
-    trace!("DICE handover: {dice_handover:x?}");
-
-    let dice_chain_info = DiceChainInfo::new(dice_handover.bcc()).map_err(|e| {
-        error!("{e}");
-        RebootReason::InvalidDiceHandover
-    })?;
+    let (parsed_dice, dice_debug_mode) = parse_dice_handover(current_dice_handover)?;
 
     // The bootloader should never pass us a debug policy when the boot is secure (the bootloader
     // is locked). If it gets it wrong, disregard it & log it, to avoid it causing problems.
-    if debug_policy.is_some() && !dice_chain_info.is_debug_mode() {
+    if debug_policy.is_some() && !dice_debug_mode {
         warn!("Ignoring debug policy, DICE handover does not indicate Debug mode");
         debug_policy = None;
     }
 
-    let verified_boot_data = verify_payload(signed_kernel, ramdisk, PUBLIC_KEY).map_err(|e| {
-        error!("Failed to verify the payload: {e}");
-        RebootReason::PayloadVerificationError
-    })?;
-    let debuggable = verified_boot_data.debug_level != DebugLevel::None;
-    if debuggable {
-        info!("Successfully verified a debuggable payload.");
-        info!("Please disregard any previous libavb ERROR about initrd_normal.");
-    }
+    // Policy/Hidden ABI: If the pvmfw loader (typically ABL) didn't pass a DICE handover (which is
+    // technically still mandatory, as per the config data specification), skip DICE, AVB, and RBP.
+    // This is to support Qualcomm QTVMs, which perform guest image verification in TrustZone.
+    let (verified_boot_data, debuggable, guest_page_size) = if current_dice_handover.is_none() {
+        warn!("Verified boot is disabled!");
+        (None, false, SIZE_4KB)
+    } else {
+        let (dat, debug, sz) = perform_verified_boot(signed_kernel, ramdisk)?;
+        (Some(dat), debug, sz)
+    };
 
-    let guest_page_size = verified_boot_data.page_size.unwrap_or(SIZE_4KB);
     let hyp_page_size = hypervisor_backends::get_granule_size();
     let _ =
         sanitize_device_tree(untrusted_fdt, vm_dtbo, vm_ref_dt, guest_page_size, hyp_page_size)?;
     let fdt = untrusted_fdt; // DT has now been sanitized.
 
-    let next_dice_handover_size = guest_page_size;
-    let next_dice_handover = heap::aligned_boxed_slice(next_dice_handover_size, guest_page_size)
-        .ok_or_else(|| {
-            error!("Failed to allocate the next-stage DICE handover");
+    let (next_dice_handover, new_instance) = if let Some(ref data) = verified_boot_data {
+        let instance_hash = salt_from_instance_id(fdt)?;
+        let dice_inputs = PartialInputs::new(data, instance_hash).map_err(|e| {
+            error!("Failed to compute partial DICE inputs: {e:?}");
             RebootReason::InternalError
         })?;
-    // By leaking the slice, its content will be left behind for the next stage.
-    let next_dice_handover = Box::leak(next_dice_handover);
+        let (dice_handover_bytes, dice_cdi_seal, dice_context) =
+            parsed_dice.expect("Missing DICE values with VB data");
+        let (new_instance, salt, defer_rollback_protection) =
+            perform_rollback_protection(fdt, data, &dice_inputs, &dice_cdi_seal)?;
+        trace!("Got salt for instance: {salt:x?}");
 
-    let dice_inputs = PartialInputs::new(&verified_boot_data).map_err(|e| {
-        error!("Failed to compute partial DICE inputs: {e:?}");
-        RebootReason::InternalError
-    })?;
-
-    let instance_hash = salt_from_instance_id(fdt)?;
-    let (new_instance, salt, defer_rollback_protection) = perform_rollback_protection(
-        fdt,
-        &verified_boot_data,
-        &dice_inputs,
-        dice_handover.cdi_seal(),
-        instance_hash,
-    )?;
-    trace!("Got salt for instance: {salt:x?}");
-
-    let new_dice_handover = if cfg!(dice_changes) {
-        Cow::Borrowed(current_dice_handover)
-    } else {
-        // It is possible that the DICE chain we were given is rooted in the UDS. We do not want to
-        // give such a chain to the payload, or even the associated CDIs. So remove the
-        // entire chain we were given and taint the CDIs. Note that the resulting CDIs are
-        // still deterministically derived from those we received, so will vary iff they do.
-        // TODO(b/280405545): Remove this post Android 14.
-        let truncated_dice_handover = dice::chain::truncate(dice_handover).map_err(|e| {
-            error!("{e}");
-            RebootReason::InternalError
-        })?;
-        Cow::Owned(truncated_dice_handover)
-    };
-
-    let cose_alg = dice_chain_info.leaf_subject_pubkey().cose_alg;
-    trace!("DICE chain leaf subject public key algorithm: {:?}", cose_alg);
-
-    let dice_context = DiceContext {
-        authority_algorithm: cose_alg.try_into().map_err(|e| {
-            error!("{e}");
-            RebootReason::InternalError
-        })?,
-        subject_algorithm: VM_KEY_ALGORITHM,
-    };
-    dice_inputs
-        .write_next_handover(
-            new_dice_handover.as_ref(),
-            &salt,
-            instance_hash,
-            defer_rollback_protection,
-            next_dice_handover,
+        let next_dice_handover = perform_dice_derivation(
+            dice_handover_bytes.as_ref(),
             dice_context,
-        )
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            error!("Failed to derive next-stage DICE secrets: {e:?}");
-            RebootReason::SecretDerivationError
-        })?;
-    flush(next_dice_handover);
+            dice_inputs,
+            &salt,
+            defer_rollback_protection,
+            guest_page_size,
+            guest_page_size,
+        )?;
+
+        (Some(next_dice_handover), new_instance)
+    } else {
+        (None, true)
+    };
 
     let kaslr_seed = u64::from_ne_bytes(rand::random_array().map_err(|e| {
         error!("Failed to generated guest KASLR seed: {e}");
@@ -188,6 +146,105 @@
     Ok((next_dice_handover, debuggable))
 }
 
+fn parse_dice_handover(
+    bytes: Option<&[u8]>,
+) -> Result<(Option<(Cow<'_, [u8]>, Vec<u8>, DiceContext)>, bool), RebootReason> {
+    let Some(bytes) = bytes else {
+        return Ok((None, false));
+    };
+    let dice_handover = bcc_handover_parse(bytes).map_err(|e| {
+        error!("Invalid DICE Handover: {e:?}");
+        RebootReason::InvalidDiceHandover
+    })?;
+    trace!("DICE handover: {dice_handover:x?}");
+
+    let dice_chain_info = DiceChainInfo::new(dice_handover.bcc()).map_err(|e| {
+        error!("{e}");
+        RebootReason::InvalidDiceHandover
+    })?;
+    let is_debug_mode = dice_chain_info.is_debug_mode();
+    let cose_alg = dice_chain_info.leaf_subject_pubkey().cose_alg;
+    trace!("DICE chain leaf subject public key algorithm: {:?}", cose_alg);
+
+    let dice_context = DiceContext {
+        authority_algorithm: cose_alg.try_into().map_err(|e| {
+            error!("{e}");
+            RebootReason::InternalError
+        })?,
+        subject_algorithm: VM_KEY_ALGORITHM,
+    };
+
+    let cdi_seal = dice_handover.cdi_seal().to_vec();
+
+    let bytes_for_next = if cfg!(dice_changes) {
+        Cow::Borrowed(bytes)
+    } else {
+        // It is possible that the DICE chain we were given is rooted in the UDS. We do not want to
+        // give such a chain to the payload, or even the associated CDIs. So remove the
+        // entire chain we were given and taint the CDIs. Note that the resulting CDIs are
+        // still deterministically derived from those we received, so will vary iff they do.
+        // TODO(b/280405545): Remove this post Android 14.
+        let truncated_bytes = dice::chain::truncate(dice_handover).map_err(|e| {
+            error!("{e}");
+            RebootReason::InternalError
+        })?;
+        Cow::Owned(truncated_bytes)
+    };
+
+    Ok((Some((bytes_for_next, cdi_seal, dice_context)), is_debug_mode))
+}
+
+fn perform_dice_derivation<'a>(
+    dice_handover_bytes: &[u8],
+    dice_context: DiceContext,
+    dice_inputs: PartialInputs,
+    salt: &[u8; HIDDEN_SIZE],
+    defer_rollback_protection: bool,
+    next_handover_size: usize,
+    next_handover_align: usize,
+) -> Result<&'a [u8], RebootReason> {
+    let next_dice_handover = heap::aligned_boxed_slice(next_handover_size, next_handover_align)
+        .ok_or_else(|| {
+            error!("Failed to allocate the next-stage DICE handover");
+            RebootReason::InternalError
+        })?;
+    // By leaking the slice, its content will be left behind for the next stage.
+    let next_dice_handover = Box::leak(next_dice_handover);
+
+    dice_inputs
+        .write_next_handover(
+            dice_handover_bytes.as_ref(),
+            salt,
+            defer_rollback_protection,
+            next_dice_handover,
+            dice_context,
+        )
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            error!("Failed to derive next-stage DICE secrets: {e:?}");
+            RebootReason::SecretDerivationError
+        })?;
+    flush(next_dice_handover);
+    Ok(next_dice_handover)
+}
+
+fn perform_verified_boot<'a>(
+    signed_kernel: &[u8],
+    ramdisk: Option<&[u8]>,
+) -> Result<(VerifiedBootData<'a>, bool, usize), RebootReason> {
+    let verified_boot_data = verify_payload(signed_kernel, ramdisk, PUBLIC_KEY).map_err(|e| {
+        error!("Failed to verify the payload: {e}");
+        RebootReason::PayloadVerificationError
+    })?;
+    let debuggable = verified_boot_data.debug_level != DebugLevel::None;
+    if debuggable {
+        info!("Successfully verified a debuggable payload.");
+        info!("Please disregard any previous libavb ERROR about initrd_normal.");
+    }
+    let guest_page_size = verified_boot_data.page_size.unwrap_or(SIZE_4KB);
+
+    Ok((verified_boot_data, debuggable, guest_page_size))
+}
+
 // Get the "salt" which is one of the input for DICE derivation.
 // This provides differentiation of secrets for different VM instances with same payloads.
 fn salt_from_instance_id(fdt: &Fdt) -> Result<Option<Hidden>, RebootReason> {
diff --git a/guest/pvmfw/src/rollback.rs b/guest/pvmfw/src/rollback.rs
index e51b6d5..c2848a2 100644
--- a/guest/pvmfw/src/rollback.rs
+++ b/guest/pvmfw/src/rollback.rs
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@
     verified_boot_data: &VerifiedBootData,
     dice_inputs: &PartialInputs,
     cdi_seal: &[u8],
-    instance_hash: Option<Hidden>,
 ) -> Result<(bool, Hidden, bool), RebootReason> {
+    let instance_hash = dice_inputs.instance_hash;
     if let Some(fixed) = get_fixed_rollback_protection(verified_boot_data) {
         // Prevent attackers from impersonating well-known images.
         perform_fixed_index_rollback_protection(verified_boot_data, fixed)?;