Merge "[dice] Use libdice_open_dice_nostd for DICE functions in pvmfw"
diff --git a/microdroid_manager/src/dice.rs b/microdroid_manager/src/dice.rs
index 9a2648f..fd22198 100644
--- a/microdroid_manager/src/dice.rs
+++ b/microdroid_manager/src/dice.rs
@@ -14,10 +14,11 @@
//! Logic for handling the DICE values and boot operations.
-use anyhow::{bail, Context, Error, Result};
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Error, Result};
use byteorder::{NativeEndian, ReadBytesExt};
use diced_open_dice::{
- retry_bcc_main_flow, Cdi, Config, DiceMode, Hash, Hidden, InputValues, OwnedDiceArtifacts,
+ bcc_handover_parse, retry_bcc_main_flow, BccHandover, Cdi, Config, DiceMode, Hash, Hidden,
+ InputValues, OwnedDiceArtifacts,
};
use keystore2_crypto::ZVec;
use libc::{c_void, mmap, munmap, MAP_FAILED, MAP_PRIVATE, PROT_READ};
@@ -47,9 +48,7 @@
driver_path: PathBuf,
mmap_addr: *mut c_void,
mmap_size: usize,
- cdi_attest: &'a Cdi,
- cdi_seal: &'a Cdi,
- bcc: &'a [u8],
+ bcc_handover: BccHandover<'a>,
},
Fake(OwnedDiceArtifacts),
}
@@ -86,27 +85,13 @@
// accessible and not referenced from anywhere else.
let mmap_buf =
unsafe { slice::from_raw_parts((mmap_addr as *const u8).as_ref().unwrap(), mmap_size) };
- // Very inflexible parsing / validation of the BccHandover data. Assumes deterministically
- // encoded CBOR.
- //
- // BccHandover = {
- // 1 : bstr .size 32, ; CDI_Attest
- // 2 : bstr .size 32, ; CDI_Seal
- // 3 : Bcc, ; Certificate chain
- // }
- if mmap_buf[0..4] != [0xa3, 0x01, 0x58, 0x20]
- || mmap_buf[36..39] != [0x02, 0x58, 0x20]
- || mmap_buf[71] != 0x03
- {
- bail!("BccHandover format mismatch");
- }
+ let bcc_handover =
+ bcc_handover_parse(mmap_buf).map_err(|_| anyhow!("Failed to parse Bcc Handover"))?;
Ok(Self::Real {
driver_path: driver_path.to_path_buf(),
mmap_addr,
mmap_size,
- cdi_attest: mmap_buf[4..36].try_into().unwrap(),
- cdi_seal: mmap_buf[39..71].try_into().unwrap(),
- bcc: &mmap_buf[72..],
+ bcc_handover,
})
}
@@ -115,7 +100,7 @@
// directly, so we have the chance to rotate the key if needed. A salt isn't needed as the
// input key material is already cryptographically strong.
let cdi_seal = match self {
- Self::Real { cdi_seal, .. } => cdi_seal,
+ Self::Real { bcc_handover, .. } => bcc_handover.cdi_seal,
Self::Fake(fake) => &fake.cdi_values.cdi_seal,
};
let salt = &[];
@@ -138,7 +123,11 @@
hidden,
);
let (cdi_attest, cdi_seal, bcc) = match &self {
- Self::Real { cdi_attest, cdi_seal, bcc, .. } => (*cdi_attest, *cdi_seal, *bcc),
+ Self::Real { bcc_handover, .. } => (
+ bcc_handover.cdi_attest,
+ bcc_handover.cdi_seal,
+ bcc_handover.bcc.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("bcc is none"))?,
+ ),
Self::Fake(fake) => {
(&fake.cdi_values.cdi_attest, &fake.cdi_values.cdi_seal, fake.bcc.as_slice())
}