diff --git a/libs/apkverify/src/bytes_ext.rs b/libs/apkverify/src/bytes_ext.rs
index 22a3085..8fb36ee 100644
--- a/libs/apkverify/src/bytes_ext.rs
+++ b/libs/apkverify/src/bytes_ext.rs
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 //! Provides extension methods Bytes::read<T>(), which calls back ReadFromBytes::read_from_byte()
 
-use anyhow::{bail, Result};
+use anyhow::{ensure, Result};
 use bytes::{Buf, Bytes};
 use std::ops::Deref;
 
@@ -79,20 +79,18 @@
 }
 
 fn read_length_prefixed_slice(buf: &mut Bytes) -> Result<Bytes> {
-    if buf.remaining() < 4 {
-        bail!(
-            "Remaining buffer too short to contain length of length-prefixed field. Remaining: {}",
-            buf.remaining()
-        );
-    }
+    ensure!(
+        buf.remaining() >= 4,
+        "Remaining buffer too short to contain length of length-prefixed field. Remaining: {}",
+        buf.remaining()
+    );
     let len = buf.get_u32_le() as usize;
-    if len > buf.remaining() {
-        bail!(
-            "length-prefixed field longer than remaining buffer. Field length: {}, remaining: {}",
-            len,
-            buf.remaining()
-        );
-    }
+    ensure!(
+        buf.remaining() >= len,
+        "length-prefixed field longer than remaining buffer. Field length: {}, remaining: {}",
+        len,
+        buf.remaining()
+    );
     Ok(buf.split_to(len))
 }
 
diff --git a/libs/apkverify/src/v3.rs b/libs/apkverify/src/v3.rs
index 557abcd..5313a9b 100644
--- a/libs/apkverify/src/v3.rs
+++ b/libs/apkverify/src/v3.rs
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 //!
 //! [v3 verification]: https://source.android.com/security/apksigning/v3#verification
 
-use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, ensure, Context, Result};
+use anyhow::{ensure, Context, Result};
 use bytes::Bytes;
 use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
 use openssl::pkey::{self, PKey};
@@ -105,12 +105,11 @@
     let supported = signers.iter().filter(|s| s.sdk_range().contains(&SDK_INT)).collect::<Vec<_>>();
 
     // there should be exactly one
-    if supported.len() != 1 {
-        bail!(
-            "APK Signature Scheme V3 only supports one signer: {} signers found.",
-            supported.len()
-        )
-    }
+    ensure!(
+        supported.len() == 1,
+        "APK Signature Scheme V3 only supports one signer: {} signers found.",
+        supported.len()
+    );
 
     // Call the supplied function
     f((supported[0], sections))
@@ -145,7 +144,7 @@
             .iter()
             .filter(|sig| SignatureAlgorithmID::from_u32(sig.signature_algorithm_id).is_some())
             .max_by_key(|sig| SignatureAlgorithmID::from_u32(sig.signature_algorithm_id).unwrap())
-            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("No supported signatures found"))?)
+            .context("No supported signatures found")?)
     }
 
     fn pick_v4_apk_digest(&self) -> Result<(u32, Box<[u8]>)> {
@@ -155,7 +154,7 @@
             .digests
             .iter()
             .find(|&dig| dig.signature_algorithm_id == strongest.signature_algorithm_id)
-            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Digest not found"))?;
+            .context("Digest not found")?;
         Ok((digest.signature_algorithm_id, digest.digest.as_ref().to_vec().into_boxed_slice()))
     }
 
@@ -174,20 +173,20 @@
 
         // 3. Verify the min and max SDK versions in the signed data match those specified for the
         //    signer.
-        if self.sdk_range() != signed_data.sdk_range() {
-            bail!("SDK versions mismatch between signed and unsigned in v3 signer block.");
-        }
+        ensure!(
+            self.sdk_range() == signed_data.sdk_range(),
+            "SDK versions mismatch between signed and unsigned in v3 signer block."
+        );
 
         // 4. Verify that the ordered list of signature algorithm IDs in digests and signatures is
         //    identical. (This is to prevent signature stripping/addition.)
-        if !self
-            .signatures
-            .iter()
-            .map(|sig| sig.signature_algorithm_id)
-            .eq(signed_data.digests.iter().map(|dig| dig.signature_algorithm_id))
-        {
-            bail!("Signature algorithms don't match between digests and signatures records");
-        }
+        ensure!(
+            self.signatures
+                .iter()
+                .map(|sig| sig.signature_algorithm_id)
+                .eq(signed_data.digests.iter().map(|dig| dig.signature_algorithm_id)),
+            "Signature algorithms don't match between digests and signatures records"
+        );
 
         // 5. Compute the digest of APK contents using the same digest algorithm as the digest
         //    algorithm used by the signature algorithm.
@@ -199,21 +198,21 @@
         let computed = sections.compute_digest(digest.signature_algorithm_id)?;
 
         // 6. Verify that the computed digest is identical to the corresponding digest from digests.
-        if computed != digest.digest.as_ref() {
-            bail!(
-                "Digest mismatch: computed={:?} vs expected={:?}",
-                to_hex_string(&computed),
-                to_hex_string(&digest.digest),
-            );
-        }
+        ensure!(
+            computed == digest.digest.as_ref(),
+            "Digest mismatch: computed={:?} vs expected={:?}",
+            to_hex_string(&computed),
+            to_hex_string(&digest.digest),
+        );
 
         // 7. Verify that public key of the first certificate of certificates is identical
         //    to public key.
         let cert = signed_data.certificates.first().context("No certificates listed")?;
         let cert = X509::from_der(cert.as_ref())?;
-        if !cert.public_key()?.public_eq(&public_key) {
-            bail!("Public key mismatch between certificate and signature record");
-        }
+        ensure!(
+            cert.public_key()?.public_eq(&public_key),
+            "Public key mismatch between certificate and signature record"
+        );
 
         // TODO(b/245914104)
         // 8. If the proof-of-rotation attribute exists for the signer verify that the
diff --git a/libs/apkverify/src/ziputil.rs b/libs/apkverify/src/ziputil.rs
index 8badff2..eb2826a 100644
--- a/libs/apkverify/src/ziputil.rs
+++ b/libs/apkverify/src/ziputil.rs
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 //! Utilities for zip handling of APK files.
 
-use anyhow::{bail, Result};
+use anyhow::{ensure, Result};
 use bytes::{Buf, BufMut};
 use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom};
 use zip::ZipArchive;
@@ -41,25 +41,26 @@
     // open a zip to parse EOCD
     let archive = ZipArchive::new(reader)?;
     let eocd_size = archive.comment().len() + EOCD_SIZE_WITHOUT_COMMENT;
-    if archive.offset() != 0 {
-        bail!("Invalid ZIP: offset should be 0, but {}.", archive.offset());
-    }
+    ensure!(archive.offset() == 0, "Invalid ZIP: offset should be 0, but {}.", archive.offset());
     // retrieve reader back
     reader = archive.into_inner();
     // the current position should point EOCD offset
     let eocd_offset = reader.seek(SeekFrom::Current(0))? as u32;
     let mut eocd = vec![0u8; eocd_size as usize];
     reader.read_exact(&mut eocd)?;
-    if (&eocd[0..]).get_u32_le() != EOCD_SIGNATURE {
-        bail!("Invalid ZIP: ZipArchive::new() should point EOCD after reading.");
-    }
+    ensure!(
+        (&eocd[0..]).get_u32_le() == EOCD_SIGNATURE,
+        "Invalid ZIP: ZipArchive::new() should point EOCD after reading."
+    );
     let (central_directory_size, central_directory_offset) = get_central_directory(&eocd)?;
-    if central_directory_offset == ZIP64_MARK || central_directory_size == ZIP64_MARK {
-        bail!("Unsupported ZIP: ZIP64 is not supported.");
-    }
-    if central_directory_offset + central_directory_size != eocd_offset {
-        bail!("Invalid ZIP: EOCD should follow CD with no extra data or overlap.");
-    }
+    ensure!(
+        central_directory_offset != ZIP64_MARK && central_directory_size != ZIP64_MARK,
+        "Unsupported ZIP: ZIP64 is not supported."
+    );
+    ensure!(
+        central_directory_offset + central_directory_size == eocd_offset,
+        "Invalid ZIP: EOCD should follow CD with no extra data or overlap."
+    );
 
     Ok((
         reader,
@@ -73,9 +74,7 @@
 }
 
 fn get_central_directory(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(u32, u32)> {
-    if buf.len() < EOCD_SIZE_WITHOUT_COMMENT {
-        bail!("Invalid EOCD size: {}", buf.len());
-    }
+    ensure!(buf.len() >= EOCD_SIZE_WITHOUT_COMMENT, "Invalid EOCD size: {}", buf.len());
     let mut buf = &buf[EOCD_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_SIZE_FIELD_OFFSET..];
     let size = buf.get_u32_le();
     let offset = buf.get_u32_le();
@@ -84,9 +83,7 @@
 
 /// Update EOCD's central_directory_offset field.
 pub fn set_central_directory_offset(buf: &mut [u8], value: u32) -> Result<()> {
-    if buf.len() < EOCD_SIZE_WITHOUT_COMMENT {
-        bail!("Invalid EOCD size: {}", buf.len());
-    }
+    ensure!(buf.len() >= EOCD_SIZE_WITHOUT_COMMENT, "Invalid EOCD size: {}", buf.len());
     (&mut buf[EOCD_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_OFFSET_FIELD_OFFSET..]).put_u32_le(value);
     Ok(())
 }