diff --git a/libs/bssl/Android.bp b/libs/bssl/Android.bp
index 5eda389..229f594 100644
--- a/libs/bssl/Android.bp
+++ b/libs/bssl/Android.bp
@@ -26,5 +26,7 @@
     rustlibs: [
         "libbssl_avf_error_nostd",
         "libbssl_ffi_nostd",
+        "libcoset_nostd",
+        "libzeroize_nostd",
     ],
 }
diff --git a/libs/bssl/src/ec_key.rs b/libs/bssl/src/ec_key.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fdd6f61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libs/bssl/src/ec_key.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+// Copyright 2023, The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+//! Contains struct and functions that wraps the API related to EC_KEY in
+//! BoringSSL.
+
+use crate::cbb::CbbFixed;
+use alloc::vec::Vec;
+use bssl_avf_error::{ApiName, Error, Result};
+use bssl_ffi::{
+    BN_bn2bin_padded, BN_clear_free, BN_new, CBB_flush, CBB_len, EC_KEY_free, EC_KEY_generate_key,
+    EC_KEY_get0_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key, EC_KEY_marshal_private_key,
+    EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name, EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, BIGNUM,
+    EC_GROUP, EC_KEY, EC_POINT,
+};
+use core::ptr::{self, NonNull};
+use core::result;
+use coset::{iana, CoseKey, CoseKeyBuilder};
+use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop, Zeroizing};
+
+const P256_AFFINE_COORDINATE_SIZE: usize = 32;
+
+type Coordinate = [u8; P256_AFFINE_COORDINATE_SIZE];
+
+/// Wrapper of an `EC_KEY` object, representing a public or private EC key.
+pub struct EcKey(NonNull<EC_KEY>);
+
+impl Drop for EcKey {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        // SAFETY: It is safe because the key has been allocated by BoringSSL and isn't
+        // used after this.
+        unsafe { EC_KEY_free(self.0.as_ptr()) }
+    }
+}
+
+impl EcKey {
+    /// Creates a new EC P-256 key pair.
+    pub fn new_p256() -> Result<Self> {
+        // SAFETY: The returned pointer is checked below.
+        let ec_key = unsafe {
+            EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1) // EC P-256 CURVE Nid
+        };
+        let mut ec_key = NonNull::new(ec_key)
+            .map(Self)
+            .ok_or(Error::CallFailed(ApiName::EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name))?;
+        ec_key.generate_key()?;
+        Ok(ec_key)
+    }
+
+    /// Generates a random, private key, calculates the corresponding public key and stores both
+    /// in the `EC_KEY`.
+    fn generate_key(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
+        // SAFETY: The non-null pointer is created with `EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name` and should
+        // point to a valid `EC_KEY`.
+        // The randomness is provided by `getentropy()` in `vmbase`.
+        let ret = unsafe { EC_KEY_generate_key(self.0.as_ptr()) };
+        check_int_result(ret, ApiName::EC_KEY_generate_key)
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the `CoseKey` for the public key.
+    pub fn cose_public_key(&self) -> Result<CoseKey> {
+        const ALGO: iana::Algorithm = iana::Algorithm::ES256;
+        const CURVE: iana::EllipticCurve = iana::EllipticCurve::P_256;
+
+        let (x, y) = self.public_key_coordinates()?;
+        let key =
+            CoseKeyBuilder::new_ec2_pub_key(CURVE, x.to_vec(), y.to_vec()).algorithm(ALGO).build();
+        Ok(key)
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the x and y coordinates of the public key.
+    fn public_key_coordinates(&self) -> Result<(Coordinate, Coordinate)> {
+        let ec_group = self.ec_group()?;
+        let ec_point = self.public_key_ec_point()?;
+        let mut x = BigNum::new()?;
+        let mut y = BigNum::new()?;
+        let ctx = ptr::null_mut();
+        // SAFETY: All the parameters are checked non-null and initialized when needed.
+        // The last parameter `ctx` is generated when needed inside the function.
+        let ret = unsafe {
+            EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(ec_group, ec_point, x.as_mut_ptr(), y.as_mut_ptr(), ctx)
+        };
+        check_int_result(ret, ApiName::EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates)?;
+        Ok((x.try_into()?, y.try_into()?))
+    }
+
+    /// Returns a pointer to the public key point inside `EC_KEY`. The memory region pointed
+    /// by the pointer is owned by the `EC_KEY`.
+    fn public_key_ec_point(&self) -> Result<*const EC_POINT> {
+        let ec_point =
+           // SAFETY: It is safe since the key pair has been generated and stored in the
+           // `EC_KEY` pointer.
+           unsafe { EC_KEY_get0_public_key(self.0.as_ptr()) };
+        if ec_point.is_null() {
+            Err(Error::CallFailed(ApiName::EC_KEY_get0_public_key))
+        } else {
+            Ok(ec_point)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Returns a pointer to the `EC_GROUP` object inside `EC_KEY`. The memory region pointed
+    /// by the pointer is owned by the `EC_KEY`.
+    fn ec_group(&self) -> Result<*const EC_GROUP> {
+        let group =
+           // SAFETY: It is safe since the key pair has been generated and stored in the
+           // `EC_KEY` pointer.
+           unsafe { EC_KEY_get0_group(self.0.as_ptr()) };
+        if group.is_null() {
+            Err(Error::CallFailed(ApiName::EC_KEY_get0_group))
+        } else {
+            Ok(group)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the DER-encoded ECPrivateKey structure described in RFC 5915 Section 3:
+    ///
+    /// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5915#section-3
+    pub fn private_key(&self) -> Result<ZVec> {
+        const CAPACITY: usize = 256;
+        let mut buf = Zeroizing::new([0u8; CAPACITY]);
+        let mut cbb = CbbFixed::new(buf.as_mut());
+        let enc_flags = 0;
+        let ret =
+            // SAFETY: The function only write bytes to the buffer managed by the valid `CBB`
+            // object, and the key has been allocated by BoringSSL.
+            unsafe { EC_KEY_marshal_private_key(cbb.as_mut(), self.0.as_ptr(), enc_flags) };
+
+        check_int_result(ret, ApiName::EC_KEY_marshal_private_key)?;
+        // SAFETY: This is safe because the CBB pointer is a valid pointer initialized with
+        // `CBB_init_fixed()`.
+        check_int_result(unsafe { CBB_flush(cbb.as_mut()) }, ApiName::CBB_flush)?;
+        // SAFETY: This is safe because the CBB pointer is initialized with `CBB_init_fixed()`,
+        // and it has been flushed, thus it has no active children.
+        let len = unsafe { CBB_len(cbb.as_ref()) };
+        Ok(buf.get(0..len).ok_or(Error::CallFailed(ApiName::CBB_len))?.to_vec().into())
+    }
+}
+
+/// A u8 vector that is zeroed when dropped.
+#[derive(Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct ZVec(Vec<u8>);
+
+impl ZVec {
+    /// Extracts a slice containing the entire vector.
+    pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        &self.0[..]
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<Vec<u8>> for ZVec {
+    fn from(v: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
+        Self(v)
+    }
+}
+
+struct BigNum(NonNull<BIGNUM>);
+
+impl Drop for BigNum {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        // SAFETY: The pointer has been created with `BN_new`.
+        unsafe { BN_clear_free(self.as_mut_ptr()) }
+    }
+}
+
+impl BigNum {
+    fn new() -> Result<Self> {
+        // SAFETY: The returned pointer is checked below.
+        let bn = unsafe { BN_new() };
+        NonNull::new(bn).map(Self).ok_or(Error::CallFailed(ApiName::BN_new))
+    }
+
+    fn as_mut_ptr(&mut self) -> *mut BIGNUM {
+        self.0.as_ptr()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Converts the `BigNum` to a big-endian integer. The integer is padded with leading zeros up to
+/// size `N`. The conversion fails if `N` is smaller thanthe size of the integer.
+impl<const N: usize> TryFrom<BigNum> for [u8; N] {
+    type Error = Error;
+
+    fn try_from(bn: BigNum) -> result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        let mut num = [0u8; N];
+        // SAFETY: The `BIGNUM` pointer has been created with `BN_new`.
+        let ret = unsafe { BN_bn2bin_padded(num.as_mut_ptr(), num.len(), bn.0.as_ptr()) };
+        check_int_result(ret, ApiName::BN_bn2bin_padded)?;
+        Ok(num)
+    }
+}
+
+fn check_int_result(ret: i32, api_name: ApiName) -> Result<()> {
+    if ret == 1 {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        assert_eq!(ret, 0, "Unexpected return value {ret} for {api_name:?}");
+        Err(Error::CallFailed(api_name))
+    }
+}
+
+// TODO(b/301068421): Unit tests the EcKey.
diff --git a/libs/bssl/src/lib.rs b/libs/bssl/src/lib.rs
index a4e00f0..85890ee 100644
--- a/libs/bssl/src/lib.rs
+++ b/libs/bssl/src/lib.rs
@@ -16,7 +16,11 @@
 
 #![cfg_attr(not(feature = "std"), no_std)]
 
+extern crate alloc;
+
 mod cbb;
+mod ec_key;
 
 pub use bssl_avf_error::{ApiName, Error, Result};
 pub use cbb::CbbFixed;
+pub use ec_key::{EcKey, ZVec};