diff --git a/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs b/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs
index c94a937..9e167a4 100644
--- a/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs
+++ b/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@
             MicrodroidError::PayloadInvalidConfig(msg) => {
                 (ErrorCode::PAYLOAD_INVALID_CONFIG, msg.to_string())
             }
+
             // Connection failure won't be reported to VS; return the default value
             MicrodroidError::FailedToConnectToVirtualizationService(msg) => {
                 (ErrorCode::UNKNOWN, msg.to_string())
@@ -281,8 +282,7 @@
     // To minimize the exposure to untrusted data, derive dice profile as soon as possible.
     info!("DICE derivation for payload");
     let dice_artifacts = dice_derivation(dice, &instance_data, &payload_metadata)?;
-    let vm_secret =
-        VmSecret::new(dice_artifacts, service).context("Failed to create VM secrets")?;
+    let vm_secret = VmSecret::new(dice_artifacts).context("Failed to create VM secrets")?;
 
     if cfg!(dice_changes) {
         // Now that the DICE derivation is done, it's ok to allow payload code to run.
diff --git a/microdroid_manager/src/vm_secret.rs b/microdroid_manager/src/vm_secret.rs
index 5d234dd..d84c2e2 100644
--- a/microdroid_manager/src/vm_secret.rs
+++ b/microdroid_manager/src/vm_secret.rs
@@ -14,28 +14,18 @@
 
 //! Class for encapsulating & managing represent VM secrets.
 
-use anyhow::{anyhow, ensure, Result};
-use android_system_virtualmachineservice::aidl::android::system::virtualmachineservice::IVirtualMachineService::IVirtualMachineService;
-use android_hardware_security_secretkeeper::aidl::android::hardware::security::secretkeeper::ISecretkeeper::ISecretkeeper;
-use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::request::Request;
-use binder::{Strong};
-use coset::CborSerializable;
+use anyhow::Result;
 use diced_open_dice::{DiceArtifacts, OwnedDiceArtifacts};
 use keystore2_crypto::ZVec;
 use openssl::hkdf::hkdf;
 use openssl::md::Md;
 use openssl::sha;
-use secretkeeper_client::SkSession;
-use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::{Id, ID_SIZE, Secret, SECRET_SIZE};
-use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::response::Response;
-use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::packet::{ResponsePacket, ResponseType};
-use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::request_response_impl::{
-    StoreSecretRequest, GetSecretResponse, GetSecretRequest};
-use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::error::SecretkeeperError;
-use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 
 const ENCRYPTEDSTORE_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "encryptedstore_key";
 
+// Size of the secret stored in Secretkeeper.
+const SK_SECRET_SIZE: usize = 64;
+
 // Generated using hexdump -vn32 -e'14/1 "0x%02X, " 1 "\n"' /dev/urandom
 const SALT_ENCRYPTED_STORE: &[u8] = &[
     0xFC, 0x1D, 0x35, 0x7B, 0x96, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0x17, 0x78, 0x7D, 0x70, 0xED, 0xEA, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0x6F,
@@ -46,24 +36,6 @@
     0x55, 0xF8, 0x08, 0x23, 0x81, 0x5F, 0xF5, 0x16, 0x20, 0x3E, 0xBE, 0xBA, 0xB7, 0xA8, 0x43, 0x92,
 ];
 
-// TODO(b/291213394): Remove this once policy is generated from dice_chain
-const HYPOTHETICAL_DICE_POLICY: [u8; 43] = [
-    0x83, 0x01, 0x81, 0x83, 0x01, 0x80, 0xA1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x82, 0x83, 0x01, 0x81, 0x01, 0x73, 0x74,
-    0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x5F, 0x64, 0x69, 0x63, 0x65, 0x5F, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x6C, 0x69,
-    0x63, 0x79, 0x83, 0x02, 0x82, 0x03, 0x18, 0x64, 0x19, 0xE9, 0x75,
-];
-// TODO(b/291213394): Differentiate the Id of nPVM based on 'salt'
-const ID_NP_VM: [u8; ID_SIZE] = [
-    0xF1, 0xB2, 0xED, 0x3B, 0xD1, 0xBD, 0xF0, 0x7D, 0xE1, 0xF0, 0x01, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x71, 0xD3, 0x42,
-    0xE5, 0x8A, 0xAF, 0x33, 0x6C, 0x11, 0xDC, 0xC8, 0x6F, 0xAE, 0x12, 0x5C, 0x26, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x86,
-    0xCC, 0x24, 0xFD, 0xBF, 0x91, 0x4A, 0x54, 0x84, 0xF9, 0x01, 0x59, 0x25, 0x70, 0x89, 0x38, 0x8D,
-    0x5E, 0xE6, 0x91, 0xDF, 0x68, 0x60, 0x69, 0x26, 0xBE, 0xFE, 0x79, 0x58, 0xF7, 0xEA, 0x81, 0x7D,
-];
-const SKP_SECRET_NP_VM: [u8; SECRET_SIZE] = [
-    0xA9, 0x89, 0x97, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x97, 0x55, 0x4B, 0x32, 0x35, 0xF0, 0xE8, 0x93, 0xDA, 0xEA, 0x24,
-    0x06, 0xAC, 0x36, 0x8B, 0x3C, 0x95, 0x50, 0x16, 0x67, 0x71, 0x65, 0x26, 0xEB, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0x98,
-];
-
 pub enum VmSecret {
     // V2 secrets are derived from 2 independently secured secrets:
     //      1. Secretkeeper protected secrets (skp secret).
@@ -82,47 +54,15 @@
     V1 { dice: OwnedDiceArtifacts },
 }
 
-fn get_id() -> [u8; ID_SIZE] {
-    if super::is_strict_boot() {
-        todo!("Id for protected VM is not implemented");
-    } else {
-        ID_NP_VM
-    }
-}
-
 impl VmSecret {
-    pub fn new(
-        dice_artifacts: OwnedDiceArtifacts,
-        vm_service: &Strong<dyn IVirtualMachineService>,
-    ) -> Result<VmSecret> {
-        ensure!(dice_artifacts.bcc().is_some(), "Dice chain missing");
-
-        if let Some(sk_service) = is_sk_supported(vm_service)? {
-            let id = get_id();
-            let mut skp_secret = Zeroizing::new([0u8; SECRET_SIZE]);
-            if super::is_strict_boot() {
-                if super::is_new_instance() {
-                    *skp_secret = rand::random();
-                    store_secret(sk_service.clone(), id, skp_secret.clone(), &dice_artifacts)?;
-                } else {
-                    // Subsequent run of the pVM -> get the secret stored in Secretkeeper.
-                    *skp_secret = get_secret(sk_service.clone(), id, &dice_artifacts)?;
-                }
-            } else {
-                // TODO(b/291213394): Non protected VM don't need to use Secretkeeper, remove this
-                // once we have sufficient testing on protected VM.
-                store_secret(sk_service.clone(), id, SKP_SECRET_NP_VM.into(), &dice_artifacts)?;
-                *skp_secret = get_secret(sk_service.clone(), id, &dice_artifacts)?;
-            }
-            return Ok(Self::V2 {
-                dice: dice_artifacts,
-                skp_secret: ZVec::try_from(skp_secret.to_vec())?,
-            });
+    pub fn new(dice_artifacts: OwnedDiceArtifacts) -> Result<VmSecret> {
+        if is_sk_supported() {
+            // TODO(b/291213394): Change this to real Sk protected secret.
+            let fake_skp_secret = ZVec::new(SK_SECRET_SIZE)?;
+            return Ok(Self::V2 { dice: dice_artifacts, skp_secret: fake_skp_secret });
         }
-        //  Use V1 secrets if Secretkeeper is not supported.
         Ok(Self::V1 { dice: dice_artifacts })
     }
-
     pub fn dice(&self) -> &OwnedDiceArtifacts {
         match self {
             Self::V2 { dice, .. } => dice,
@@ -154,86 +94,13 @@
     }
 }
 
-fn store_secret(
-    secretkeeper: binder::Strong<dyn ISecretkeeper>,
-    id: [u8; ID_SIZE],
-    secret: Zeroizing<[u8; SECRET_SIZE]>,
-    _dice_chain: &OwnedDiceArtifacts,
-) -> Result<()> {
-    // Start a new secretkeeper session!
-    let session = SkSession::new(secretkeeper).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
-    let store_request = StoreSecretRequest {
-        id: Id(id),
-        secret: Secret(*secret),
-        // TODO(b/291233371): Construct policy out of dice_chain.
-        sealing_policy: HYPOTHETICAL_DICE_POLICY.to_vec(),
+// Does the hardware support Secretkeeper.
+fn is_sk_supported() -> bool {
+    if cfg!(llpvm_changes) {
+        return false;
     };
-    log::info!("Secretkeeper operation: {:?}", store_request);
-
-    let store_request = store_request.serialize_to_packet().to_vec().map_err(anyhow_err)?;
-    let store_response = session.secret_management_request(&store_request).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
-    let store_response = ResponsePacket::from_slice(&store_response).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
-    let response_type = store_response.response_type().map_err(anyhow_err)?;
-    ensure!(
-        response_type == ResponseType::Success,
-        "Secretkeeper store failed with error: {:?}",
-        *SecretkeeperError::deserialize_from_packet(store_response).map_err(anyhow_err)?
-    );
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-fn get_secret(
-    secretkeeper: binder::Strong<dyn ISecretkeeper>,
-    id: [u8; ID_SIZE],
-    _dice_chain: &OwnedDiceArtifacts,
-) -> Result<[u8; SECRET_SIZE]> {
-    // Start a new secretkeeper session!
-    let session = SkSession::new(secretkeeper).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
-    let get_request = GetSecretRequest {
-        id: Id(id),
-        // TODO(b/291233371): Construct policy out of dice_chain.
-        updated_sealing_policy: None,
-    };
-    log::info!("Secretkeeper operation: {:?}", get_request);
-
-    let get_request = get_request.serialize_to_packet().to_vec().map_err(anyhow_err)?;
-    let get_response = session.secret_management_request(&get_request).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
-    let get_response = ResponsePacket::from_slice(&get_response).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
-    let response_type = get_response.response_type().map_err(anyhow_err)?;
-    ensure!(
-        response_type == ResponseType::Success,
-        "Secretkeeper get failed with error: {:?}",
-        *SecretkeeperError::deserialize_from_packet(get_response).map_err(anyhow_err)?
-    );
-    let get_response = *GetSecretResponse::deserialize_from_packet(get_response).unwrap();
-    Ok(get_response.secret.0)
-}
-
-#[inline]
-fn anyhow_err<E: core::fmt::Debug>(err: E) -> anyhow::Error {
-    anyhow!("{:?}", err)
-}
-
-// Get the secretkeeper connection if supported. Host can be consulted whether the device supports
-// secretkeeper but that should be used with caution for protected VM.
-fn is_sk_supported(
-    host: &Strong<dyn IVirtualMachineService>,
-) -> Result<Option<Strong<dyn ISecretkeeper>>> {
-    let sk = if cfg!(llpvm_changes) {
-        if super::is_strict_boot() {
-            // TODO: For protected VM check for Secretkeeper authentication data in device tree.
-            None
-        } else {
-            // For non-protected VM, believe what host claims.
-            host.getSecretkeeper()
-                // TODO rename this error!
-                .map_err(|e| {
-                    super::MicrodroidError::FailedToConnectToVirtualizationService(e.to_string())
-                })?
-        }
-    } else {
-        // LLPVM flag is disabled
-        None
-    };
-    Ok(sk)
+    // TODO(b/292209416): This value should be extracted from device tree.
+    // Note: this does not affect the security of pVM. pvmfw & microdroid_manager continue to block
+    // upgraded images. Setting this true is equivalent to including constant salt in vm secrets.
+    true
 }