diff --git a/android/virtmgr/src/aidl.rs b/android/virtmgr/src/aidl.rs
index eefaa65..28f36fd 100644
--- a/android/virtmgr/src/aidl.rs
+++ b/android/virtmgr/src/aidl.rs
@@ -1592,9 +1592,8 @@
         | "virtualizationservice_data_file" // files created by VS / VirtMgr
         | "vendor_microdroid_file" // immutable dm-verity protected partition (/vendor/etc/avf/microdroid/.*)
          => Ok(()),
-        // It is difficult to require specific label types for vendor initiated VM's files, so we
-        // allow anything with a vendor prefix.
-        t if calling_partition == CallingPartition::Vendor && t.starts_with("vendor_")  => Ok(()),
+        // It is difficult to require specific label types for vendor initiated VM's files.
+        _ if calling_partition == CallingPartition::Vendor => Ok(()),
         _ => bail!("Label {} is not allowed", context),
     }
 }
diff --git a/build/apex/Android.bp b/build/apex/Android.bp
index 5323296..8934de0 100644
--- a/build/apex/Android.bp
+++ b/build/apex/Android.bp
@@ -259,11 +259,6 @@
     srcs: [
         "sign_virt_apex.py",
     ],
-    version: {
-        py3: {
-            embedded_launcher: true,
-        },
-    },
     required: [
         // sign_virt_apex should be runnable from outside the source tree,
         // therefore, any required tool should be listed in build/make/core/Makefile as well.
@@ -332,11 +327,6 @@
     srcs: [
         "replace_bytes.py",
     ],
-    version: {
-        py3: {
-            embedded_launcher: true,
-        },
-    },
 }
 
 // Encapsulate the contributions made by the com.android.virt to the bootclasspath.
diff --git a/build/debian/build.sh b/build/debian/build.sh
index 5aa3f28..9c4d4b1 100755
--- a/build/debian/build.sh
+++ b/build/debian/build.sh
@@ -318,9 +318,8 @@
 
 generate_output_package() {
 	fdisk -l "${raw_disk_image}"
-	local vm_config="$SCRIPT_DIR/vm_config.json.${arch}"
+	local vm_config="$SCRIPT_DIR/vm_config.json"
 	local root_partition_num=1
-	local bios_partition_num=14
 	local efi_partition_num=15
 
 	pushd ${workdir} > /dev/null
@@ -329,9 +328,6 @@
 
 	loop=$(losetup -f --show --partscan $raw_disk_image)
 	dd if="${loop}p$root_partition_num" of=root_part
-	if [[ "$arch" == "x86_64" ]]; then
-		dd if="${loop}p$bios_partition_num" of=bios_part
-	fi
 	dd if="${loop}p$efi_partition_num" of=efi_part
 	losetup -d "${loop}"
 
@@ -342,9 +338,6 @@
 	fi
 
 	sed -i "s/{root_part_guid}/$(sfdisk --part-uuid $raw_disk_image $root_partition_num)/g" vm_config.json
-	if [[ "$arch" == "x86_64" ]]; then
-		sed -i "s/{bios_part_guid}/$(sfdisk --part-uuid $raw_disk_image $bios_partition_num)/g" vm_config.json
-	fi
 	sed -i "s/{efi_part_guid}/$(sfdisk --part-uuid $raw_disk_image $efi_partition_num)/g" vm_config.json
 
 	popd > /dev/null
diff --git a/build/debian/vm_config.json.aarch64 b/build/debian/vm_config.json
similarity index 100%
rename from build/debian/vm_config.json.aarch64
rename to build/debian/vm_config.json
diff --git a/build/debian/vm_config.json.x86_64 b/build/debian/vm_config.json.x86_64
deleted file mode 100644
index 463583f..0000000
--- a/build/debian/vm_config.json.x86_64
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "name": "debian",
-    "disks": [
-        {
-            "partitions": [
-                {
-                    "label": "ROOT",
-                    "path": "$PAYLOAD_DIR/root_part",
-                    "writable": true,
-                    "guid": "{root_part_guid}"
-                },
-                {
-                    "label": "EFI",
-                    "path": "$PAYLOAD_DIR/efi_part",
-                    "writable": false,
-                    "guid": "{efi_part_guid}"
-                }
-            ],
-            "writable": true
-        }
-    ],
-    "sharedPath": [
-        {
-            "sharedPath": "/storage/emulated"
-        },
-        {
-            "sharedPath": "$APP_DATA_DIR/files"
-        }
-    ],
-    "protected": false,
-    "cpu_topology": "match_host",
-    "platform_version": "~1.0",
-    "memory_mib": 4096,
-    "debuggable": true,
-    "console_out": true,
-    "console_input_device": "ttyS0",
-    "network": true,
-    "auto_memory_balloon": true,
-    "gpu": {
-        "backend": "2d"
-    }
-}
diff --git a/guest/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs b/guest/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs
index d665c87..4537834 100644
--- a/guest/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs
+++ b/guest/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs
@@ -244,13 +244,14 @@
 fn verify_payload_with_instance_img(
     metadata: &Metadata,
     dice: &DiceDriver,
+    state: &mut VmInstanceState,
 ) -> Result<MicrodroidData> {
     let mut instance = InstanceDisk::new().context("Failed to load instance.img")?;
     let saved_data = instance.read_microdroid_data(dice).context("Failed to read identity data")?;
 
     if is_strict_boot() {
         // Provisioning must happen on the first boot and never again.
-        if is_new_instance_legacy() {
+        if Path::new(AVF_NEW_INSTANCE).exists() {
             ensure!(
                 saved_data.is_none(),
                 MicrodroidError::PayloadInvalidConfig(
@@ -286,12 +287,14 @@
             );
             info!("Saved data is verified.");
         }
+        *state = VmInstanceState::PreviouslySeen;
         saved_data
     } else {
         info!("Saving verified data.");
         instance
             .write_microdroid_data(&extracted_data, dice)
             .context("Failed to write identity data")?;
+        *state = VmInstanceState::NewlyCreated;
         extracted_data
     };
     Ok(instance_data)
@@ -321,13 +324,14 @@
             .context("Failed to load DICE from driver")?
     };
 
+    let mut state = VmInstanceState::Unknown;
     // Microdroid skips checking payload against instance image iff the device supports
-    // secretkeeper. In that case Microdroid use VmSecret::V2, which provide protection against
-    // rollback of boot images and packages.
+    // secretkeeper. In that case Microdroid use VmSecret::V2, which provides instance state
+    // and protection against rollback of boot images and packages.
     let instance_data = if should_defer_rollback_protection() {
         verify_payload(&metadata, None)?
     } else {
-        verify_payload_with_instance_img(&metadata, &dice)?
+        verify_payload_with_instance_img(&metadata, &dice, &mut state)?
     };
 
     let payload_metadata = metadata.payload.ok_or_else(|| {
@@ -337,7 +341,6 @@
     // To minimize the exposure to untrusted data, derive dice profile as soon as possible.
     info!("DICE derivation for payload");
     let dice_artifacts = dice_derivation(dice, &instance_data, &payload_metadata)?;
-    let mut state = VmInstanceState::Unknown;
     let vm_secret = VmSecret::new(dice_artifacts, service, &mut state)
         .context("Failed to create VM secrets")?;
 
@@ -345,15 +348,7 @@
         VmInstanceState::NewlyCreated => true,
         VmInstanceState::PreviouslySeen => false,
         VmInstanceState::Unknown => {
-            // VmSecret instantiation was not able to determine the state. This should only happen
-            // for legacy secret mechanism (V1) - in which case fallback to legacy
-            // instance.img based determination of state.
-            ensure!(
-                !should_defer_rollback_protection(),
-                "VmInstanceState is Unknown whilst guest is expected to use V2 based secrets.
-                This should've never happened"
-            );
-            is_new_instance_legacy()
+            bail!("Vm instance state is still unknown, this should not have happened");
         }
     };
 
@@ -519,10 +514,6 @@
     Path::new(AVF_STRICT_BOOT).exists()
 }
 
-fn is_new_instance_legacy() -> bool {
-    Path::new(AVF_NEW_INSTANCE).exists()
-}
-
 fn is_verified_boot() -> bool {
     !Path::new(DEBUG_MICRODROID_NO_VERIFIED_BOOT).exists()
 }
diff --git a/guest/trusty/common/early_vms.xml b/guest/trusty/common/early_vms.xml
index 1ed324c..e9d4c61 100644
--- a/guest/trusty/common/early_vms.xml
+++ b/guest/trusty/common/early_vms.xml
@@ -19,4 +19,9 @@
         <cid>200</cid>
         <path>/system_ext/bin/trusty_security_vm_launcher</path>
     </early_vm>
+    <early_vm>
+        <name>trusty_security_vm_launcher_protected</name>
+        <cid>210</cid>
+        <path>/system_ext/bin/trusty_security_vm_launcher</path>
+    </early_vm>
 </early_vms>
diff --git a/guest/trusty/security_vm/launcher/security_vm_launcher-arm64.rc b/guest/trusty/security_vm/launcher/security_vm_launcher-arm64.rc
index c0e0537..3f3e48d 100644
--- a/guest/trusty/security_vm/launcher/security_vm_launcher-arm64.rc
+++ b/guest/trusty/security_vm/launcher/security_vm_launcher-arm64.rc
@@ -18,3 +18,30 @@
     setprop trusty.security_vm.nonsecure_vm_ready 1
     setprop trusty.security_vm.vm_cid 200
     start trusty_security_vm_launcher
+
+##########################
+# BELOW IS FOR TEST ONLY #
+##########################
+
+service trusty_security_vm_launcher_protected /system_ext/bin/trusty_security_vm_launcher \
+--name trusty_security_vm_launcher_protected \
+--kernel /system_ext/etc/vm/trusty_vm/trusty-security_vm.elf \
+--memory-size-mib 32 \
+--protected
+    disabled
+    user system
+    group system virtualmachine
+    capabilities IPC_LOCK NET_BIND_SERVICE SYS_RESOURCE SYS_NICE
+    stdio_to_kmsg
+    oneshot
+
+# Testing protected vm during early boot
+# TODO(b/): solve the MMIO guard issue preventing Host/VM communications
+# to reproduce: uncomment the `on post-fs` section
+#on post-fs
+#    start trusty_security_vm_launcher_protected
+
+# TODO(b/): solve the pKVM crash
+# to reproduce: uncomment the `on init` section
+#on init
+#    start trusty_security_vm_launcher_protected
diff --git a/tests/testapk/src/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidTests.java b/tests/testapk/src/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidTests.java
index 418a88e..9d08ed7 100644
--- a/tests/testapk/src/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidTests.java
+++ b/tests/testapk/src/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidTests.java
@@ -2166,11 +2166,6 @@
         assumeFalse(
                 "Cuttlefish/Goldfish doesn't support device tree under /proc/device-tree",
                 isCuttlefish() || isGoldfish());
-        if (!isUpdatableVmSupported()) {
-            // TODO(b/389611249): Non protected VMs using legacy secret mechanisms do not reliably
-            // implement `AVmPayload_isNewInstance`.
-            assumeProtectedVM();
-        }
         VirtualMachine vm = forceCreateNewVirtualMachine("test_vm_a", config);
         TestResults testResults =
                 runVmTestService(