diff --git a/authfs/tests/common/src/open_then_run.rs b/authfs/tests/common/src/open_then_run.rs
index 6d828e4..a976784 100644
--- a/authfs/tests/common/src/open_then_run.rs
+++ b/authfs/tests/common/src/open_then_run.rs
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@
     android_logger::init_once(
         android_logger::Config::default()
             .with_tag("open_then_run")
-            .with_min_level(log::Level::Debug),
+            .with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug),
     );
 
     if let Err(e) = try_main() {
diff --git a/compos/apex/composd.rc b/compos/apex/composd.rc
index df04642..55f3737 100644
--- a/compos/apex/composd.rc
+++ b/compos/apex/composd.rc
@@ -19,10 +19,7 @@
     interface aidl android.system.composd
     disabled
     oneshot
-    # Explicitly specify empty capabilities, otherwise composd will inherit all
-    # the capabilities from init.
-    # Note: whether a process can use capabilities is controlled by SELinux, so
-    # inheriting all the capabilities from init is not a security issue.
-    # However, for defense-in-depth and just for the sake of bookkeeping it's
-    # better to explicitly state that composd doesn't need any capabilities.
-    capabilities
+    # We need SYS_NICE in order to allow the crosvm child process to use it.
+    # (b/322197421). composd itself never uses it (and isn't allowed to by
+    # SELinux).
+    capabilities SYS_NICE
diff --git a/libs/apkverify/tests/apkverify_test.rs b/libs/apkverify/tests/apkverify_test.rs
index 441b708..96fad5f 100644
--- a/libs/apkverify/tests/apkverify_test.rs
+++ b/libs/apkverify/tests/apkverify_test.rs
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
     android_logger::init_once(
         android_logger::Config::default()
             .with_tag("apkverify_test")
-            .with_min_level(log::Level::Info),
+            .with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Info),
     );
     info!("Test starting");
 }
diff --git a/pvmfw/src/fdt.rs b/pvmfw/src/fdt.rs
index 770fdf0..e0927c8 100644
--- a/pvmfw/src/fdt.rs
+++ b/pvmfw/src/fdt.rs
@@ -41,12 +41,14 @@
 use log::error;
 use log::info;
 use log::warn;
+use static_assertions::const_assert;
 use tinyvec::ArrayVec;
 use vmbase::fdt::SwiotlbInfo;
 use vmbase::layout::{crosvm::MEM_START, MAX_VIRT_ADDR};
 use vmbase::memory::SIZE_4KB;
 use vmbase::util::flatten;
 use vmbase::util::RangeExt as _;
+use zerocopy::AsBytes as _;
 
 /// An enumeration of errors that can occur during the FDT validation.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
@@ -164,39 +166,47 @@
 }
 
 fn patch_memory_range(fdt: &mut Fdt, memory_range: &Range<usize>) -> libfdt::Result<()> {
-    let size = memory_range.len() as u64;
+    let addr = u64::try_from(MEM_START).unwrap();
+    let size = u64::try_from(memory_range.len()).unwrap();
     fdt.node_mut(cstr!("/memory"))?
         .ok_or(FdtError::NotFound)?
-        .setprop_inplace(cstr!("reg"), flatten(&[MEM_START.to_be_bytes(), size.to_be_bytes()]))
+        .setprop_inplace(cstr!("reg"), [addr.to_be(), size.to_be()].as_bytes())
 }
 
-/// Read the number of CPUs from DT
-fn read_num_cpus_from(fdt: &Fdt) -> libfdt::Result<usize> {
-    Ok(fdt.compatible_nodes(cstr!("arm,arm-v8"))?.count())
-}
+#[derive(Debug, Default)]
+struct CpuInfo {}
 
-/// Validate number of CPUs
-fn validate_num_cpus(num_cpus: usize) -> Result<(), FdtValidationError> {
-    if num_cpus == 0 || DeviceTreeInfo::gic_patched_size(num_cpus).is_none() {
-        Err(FdtValidationError::InvalidCpuCount(num_cpus))
-    } else {
-        Ok(())
+fn read_cpu_info_from(fdt: &Fdt) -> libfdt::Result<ArrayVec<[CpuInfo; DeviceTreeInfo::MAX_CPUS]>> {
+    let mut cpus = ArrayVec::new();
+
+    let mut cpu_nodes = fdt.compatible_nodes(cstr!("arm,arm-v8"))?;
+    for _cpu in cpu_nodes.by_ref().take(cpus.capacity()) {
+        let info = CpuInfo {};
+        cpus.push(info);
     }
+    if cpu_nodes.next().is_some() {
+        warn!("DT has more than {} CPU nodes: discarding extra nodes.", cpus.capacity());
+    }
+
+    Ok(cpus)
 }
 
-/// Patch DT by keeping `num_cpus` number of arm,arm-v8 compatible nodes, and pruning the rest.
-fn patch_num_cpus(fdt: &mut Fdt, num_cpus: usize) -> libfdt::Result<()> {
-    let cpu = cstr!("arm,arm-v8");
-    let mut next = fdt.root_mut()?.next_compatible(cpu)?;
-    for _ in 0..num_cpus {
-        next = if let Some(current) = next {
-            current.next_compatible(cpu)?
-        } else {
-            return Err(FdtError::NoSpace);
-        };
+fn validate_cpu_info(cpus: &[CpuInfo]) -> Result<(), FdtValidationError> {
+    if cpus.is_empty() {
+        return Err(FdtValidationError::InvalidCpuCount(0));
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn patch_cpus(fdt: &mut Fdt, cpus: &[CpuInfo]) -> libfdt::Result<()> {
+    const COMPAT: &CStr = cstr!("arm,arm-v8");
+    let mut next = fdt.root_mut()?.next_compatible(COMPAT)?;
+    for _cpu in cpus {
+        next = next.ok_or(FdtError::NoSpace)?.next_compatible(COMPAT)?;
     }
     while let Some(current) = next {
-        next = current.delete_and_next_compatible(cpu)?;
+        next = current.delete_and_next_compatible(COMPAT)?;
     }
     Ok(())
 }
@@ -486,11 +496,17 @@
 }
 
 fn read_serial_info_from(fdt: &Fdt) -> libfdt::Result<SerialInfo> {
-    let mut addrs: ArrayVec<[u64; SerialInfo::MAX_SERIALS]> = Default::default();
-    for node in fdt.compatible_nodes(cstr!("ns16550a"))?.take(SerialInfo::MAX_SERIALS) {
+    let mut addrs = ArrayVec::new();
+
+    let mut serial_nodes = fdt.compatible_nodes(cstr!("ns16550a"))?;
+    for node in serial_nodes.by_ref().take(addrs.capacity()) {
         let reg = node.first_reg()?;
         addrs.push(reg.addr);
     }
+    if serial_nodes.next().is_some() {
+        warn!("DT has more than {} UART nodes: discarding extra nodes.", addrs.capacity());
+    }
+
     Ok(SerialInfo { addrs })
 }
 
@@ -574,7 +590,8 @@
     let mut range1 = ranges.next().ok_or(FdtError::NotFound)?;
 
     let addr = range0.addr;
-    // `validate_num_cpus()` checked that this wouldn't panic
+    // `read_cpu_info_from()` guarantees that we have at most MAX_CPUS.
+    const_assert!(DeviceTreeInfo::gic_patched_size(DeviceTreeInfo::MAX_CPUS).is_some());
     let size = u64::try_from(DeviceTreeInfo::gic_patched_size(num_cpus).unwrap()).unwrap();
 
     // range1 is just below range0
@@ -607,17 +624,11 @@
         *v = v.to_be();
     }
 
-    // SAFETY: array size is the same
-    let value = unsafe {
-        core::mem::transmute::<
-            [u32; NUM_INTERRUPTS * CELLS_PER_INTERRUPT],
-            [u8; NUM_INTERRUPTS * CELLS_PER_INTERRUPT * size_of::<u32>()],
-        >(value.into_inner())
-    };
+    let value = value.into_inner();
 
     let mut node =
         fdt.root_mut()?.next_compatible(cstr!("arm,armv8-timer"))?.ok_or(FdtError::NotFound)?;
-    node.setprop_inplace(cstr!("interrupts"), value.as_slice())
+    node.setprop_inplace(cstr!("interrupts"), value.as_bytes())
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug)]
@@ -626,7 +637,7 @@
     pub initrd_range: Option<Range<usize>>,
     pub memory_range: Range<usize>,
     bootargs: Option<CString>,
-    num_cpus: usize,
+    cpus: ArrayVec<[CpuInfo; DeviceTreeInfo::MAX_CPUS]>,
     pci_info: PciInfo,
     serial_info: SerialInfo,
     pub swiotlb_info: SwiotlbInfo,
@@ -635,7 +646,9 @@
 }
 
 impl DeviceTreeInfo {
-    fn gic_patched_size(num_cpus: usize) -> Option<usize> {
+    const MAX_CPUS: usize = 16;
+
+    const fn gic_patched_size(num_cpus: usize) -> Option<usize> {
         const GIC_REDIST_SIZE_PER_CPU: usize = 32 * SIZE_4KB;
 
         GIC_REDIST_SIZE_PER_CPU.checked_mul(num_cpus)
@@ -731,12 +744,12 @@
         RebootReason::InvalidFdt
     })?;
 
-    let num_cpus = read_num_cpus_from(fdt).map_err(|e| {
-        error!("Failed to read num cpus from DT: {e}");
+    let cpus = read_cpu_info_from(fdt).map_err(|e| {
+        error!("Failed to read CPU info from DT: {e}");
         RebootReason::InvalidFdt
     })?;
-    validate_num_cpus(num_cpus).map_err(|e| {
-        error!("Failed to validate num cpus from DT: {e}");
+    validate_cpu_info(&cpus).map_err(|e| {
+        error!("Failed to validate CPU info from DT: {e}");
         RebootReason::InvalidFdt
     })?;
 
@@ -784,7 +797,7 @@
         initrd_range,
         memory_range,
         bootargs,
-        num_cpus,
+        cpus,
         pci_info,
         serial_info,
         swiotlb_info,
@@ -810,7 +823,7 @@
             RebootReason::InvalidFdt
         })?;
     }
-    patch_num_cpus(fdt, info.num_cpus).map_err(|e| {
+    patch_cpus(fdt, &info.cpus).map_err(|e| {
         error!("Failed to patch cpus to DT: {e}");
         RebootReason::InvalidFdt
     })?;
@@ -826,11 +839,11 @@
         error!("Failed to patch swiotlb info to DT: {e}");
         RebootReason::InvalidFdt
     })?;
-    patch_gic(fdt, info.num_cpus).map_err(|e| {
+    patch_gic(fdt, info.cpus.len()).map_err(|e| {
         error!("Failed to patch gic info to DT: {e}");
         RebootReason::InvalidFdt
     })?;
-    patch_timer(fdt, info.num_cpus).map_err(|e| {
+    patch_timer(fdt, info.cpus.len()).map_err(|e| {
         error!("Failed to patch timer info to DT: {e}");
         RebootReason::InvalidFdt
     })?;
diff --git a/rialto/tests/test.rs b/rialto/tests/test.rs
index c918db5..1302bcd 100644
--- a/rialto/tests/test.rs
+++ b/rialto/tests/test.rs
@@ -287,7 +287,9 @@
 
 fn start_service_vm(vm_type: VmType) -> Result<ServiceVm> {
     android_logger::init_once(
-        android_logger::Config::default().with_tag("rialto").with_min_level(log::Level::Debug),
+        android_logger::Config::default()
+            .with_tag("rialto")
+            .with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug),
     );
     // Redirect panic messages to logcat.
     panic::set_hook(Box::new(|panic_info| {
diff --git a/service_vm/test_apk/src/main.rs b/service_vm/test_apk/src/main.rs
index ba65aca..df60325 100644
--- a/service_vm/test_apk/src/main.rs
+++ b/service_vm/test_apk/src/main.rs
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
     android_logger::init_once(
         android_logger::Config::default()
             .with_tag("service_vm_client")
-            .with_min_level(log::Level::Debug),
+            .with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug),
     );
     // Redirect panic messages to logcat.
     panic::set_hook(Box::new(|panic_info| {
diff --git a/tests/benchmark/src/java/com/android/microdroid/benchmark/MicrodroidBenchmarks.java b/tests/benchmark/src/java/com/android/microdroid/benchmark/MicrodroidBenchmarks.java
index b9faa85..e9c84fb 100644
--- a/tests/benchmark/src/java/com/android/microdroid/benchmark/MicrodroidBenchmarks.java
+++ b/tests/benchmark/src/java/com/android/microdroid/benchmark/MicrodroidBenchmarks.java
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 
 import org.junit.After;
 import org.junit.Before;
+import org.junit.Ignore;
 import org.junit.Rule;
 import org.junit.Test;
 import org.junit.rules.Timeout;
@@ -276,6 +277,10 @@
                 (builder) -> builder);
     }
 
+    // TODO(b/323768068): Enable this test when we can inject vendor digest for test purpose.
+    // After introducing VM reference DT, non-pVM cannot trust test_microdroid_vendor_image.img
+    // as well, because it doesn't pass the hashtree digest of testing image into VM.
+    @Ignore
     @Test
     public void testMicrodroidDebugBootTime_withVendorPartition() throws Exception {
         assume().withMessage("Cuttlefish doesn't support device tree under" + " /proc/device-tree")
@@ -286,11 +291,6 @@
         assume().withMessage("Boot with vendor partition is failing in HWASAN enabled Microdroid.")
                 .that(isHwasan())
                 .isFalse();
-        assume().withMessage(
-                        "Skip test for protected VM, pvmfw config data doesn't contain any"
-                                + " information of test images, such as root digest.")
-                .that(mProtectedVm)
-                .isFalse();
         assumeFeatureEnabled(VirtualMachineManager.FEATURE_VENDOR_MODULES);
 
         File vendorDiskImage =
diff --git a/tests/hostside/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidHostTests.java b/tests/hostside/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidHostTests.java
index 7a5d69b..2cd4577 100644
--- a/tests/hostside/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidHostTests.java
+++ b/tests/hostside/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidHostTests.java
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
     private static final String SHELL_PACKAGE_NAME = "com.android.shell";
     private static final String VIRT_APEX = "/apex/com.android.virt/";
 
-    private static final int MIN_MEM_ARM64 = 160;
+    private static final int MIN_MEM_ARM64 = 170;
     private static final int MIN_MEM_X86_64 = 196;
 
     private static final int BOOT_COMPLETE_TIMEOUT = 30000; // 30 seconds
diff --git a/tests/testapk/src/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidTests.java b/tests/testapk/src/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidTests.java
index 695e638..1dd0309 100644
--- a/tests/testapk/src/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidTests.java
+++ b/tests/testapk/src/java/com/android/microdroid/test/MicrodroidTests.java
@@ -142,7 +142,6 @@
 
     @Before
     public void setup() {
-        grantPermission(VirtualMachine.MANAGE_VIRTUAL_MACHINE_PERMISSION);
         prepareTestSetup(mProtectedVm, mGki);
         // USE_CUSTOM_VIRTUAL_MACHINE permission has protection level signature|development, meaning
         // that it will be automatically granted when test apk is installed. We have some tests
@@ -155,13 +154,12 @@
 
     @After
     public void tearDown() {
-        revokePermission(VirtualMachine.MANAGE_VIRTUAL_MACHINE_PERMISSION);
         revokePermission(VirtualMachine.USE_CUSTOM_VIRTUAL_MACHINE_PERMISSION);
     }
 
     private static final long ONE_MEBI = 1024 * 1024;
 
-    private static final long MIN_MEM_ARM64 = 160 * ONE_MEBI;
+    private static final long MIN_MEM_ARM64 = 170 * ONE_MEBI;
     private static final long MIN_MEM_X86_64 = 196 * ONE_MEBI;
     private static final String EXAMPLE_STRING = "Literally any string!! :)";
 
@@ -229,32 +227,6 @@
         testResults.assertNoException();
         assertThat(testResults.mAddInteger).isEqualTo(37 + 73);
     }
-
-    @Test
-    @CddTest(
-            requirements = {
-                "9.17/C-1-1",
-                "9.17/C-1-2",
-                "9.17/C-1-4",
-            })
-    public void createVmRequiresPermission() {
-        assumeSupportedDevice();
-
-        revokePermission(VirtualMachine.MANAGE_VIRTUAL_MACHINE_PERMISSION);
-
-        VirtualMachineConfig config =
-                newVmConfigBuilderWithPayloadBinary("MicrodroidTestNativeLib.so")
-                        .setMemoryBytes(minMemoryRequired())
-                        .build();
-
-        SecurityException e =
-                assertThrows(
-                        SecurityException.class,
-                        () -> forceCreateNewVirtualMachine("test_vm_requires_permission", config));
-        assertThat(e).hasMessageThat()
-                .contains("android.permission.MANAGE_VIRTUAL_MACHINE permission");
-    }
-
     @Test
     @CddTest(requirements = {"9.17/C-1-1"})
     public void autoCloseVm() throws Exception {
@@ -1194,18 +1166,6 @@
         assertThrows(Exception.class, () -> launchVmAndGetCdis("test_vm"));
     }
 
-    @Test
-    public void isFeatureEnabled_requiresManagePermission() throws Exception {
-        revokePermission(VirtualMachine.MANAGE_VIRTUAL_MACHINE_PERMISSION);
-
-        VirtualMachineManager vmm = getVirtualMachineManager();
-        SecurityException e =
-                assertThrows(SecurityException.class, () -> vmm.isFeatureEnabled("whatever"));
-        assertThat(e)
-                .hasMessageThat()
-                .contains("android.permission.MANAGE_VIRTUAL_MACHINE permission");
-    }
-
     private static final UUID MICRODROID_PARTITION_UUID =
             UUID.fromString("cf9afe9a-0662-11ec-a329-c32663a09d75");
     private static final UUID PVM_FW_PARTITION_UUID =
@@ -2168,7 +2128,7 @@
                 .contains("android.permission.USE_CUSTOM_VIRTUAL_MACHINE permission");
     }
 
-    // TODO(b/323768068): Enable this test when we can inject vendor hashkey for test purpose.
+    // TODO(b/323768068): Enable this test when we can inject vendor digest for test purpose.
     // After introducing VM reference DT, non-pVM cannot trust test_microdroid_vendor_image.img
     // as well, because it doesn't pass the hashtree digest of testing image into VM.
     @Ignore
diff --git a/vm_payload/src/api.rs b/vm_payload/src/api.rs
deleted file mode 100644
index 7978059..0000000
--- a/vm_payload/src/api.rs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,509 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2022, The Android Open Source Project
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-//
-//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-
-//! This module handles the interaction with virtual machine payload service.
-
-use android_system_virtualization_payload::aidl::android::system::virtualization::payload:: IVmPayloadService::{
-    IVmPayloadService, ENCRYPTEDSTORE_MOUNTPOINT, VM_APK_CONTENTS_PATH,
-    VM_PAYLOAD_SERVICE_SOCKET_NAME, AttestationResult::AttestationResult,
-};
-use anyhow::{bail, ensure, Context, Result};
-use binder::{
-    unstable_api::{new_spibinder, AIBinder},
-    Strong, ExceptionCode,
-};
-use lazy_static::lazy_static;
-use log::{error, info, LevelFilter};
-use rpcbinder::{RpcServer, RpcSession};
-use openssl::{ec::EcKey, sha::sha256, ecdsa::EcdsaSig};
-use std::convert::Infallible;
-use std::ffi::{CString, CStr};
-use std::fmt::Debug;
-use std::os::raw::{c_char, c_void};
-use std::path::Path;
-use std::ptr::{self, NonNull};
-use std::sync::{
-    atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
-    Mutex,
-};
-use vm_payload_status_bindgen::attestation_status_t;
-
-lazy_static! {
-    static ref VM_APK_CONTENTS_PATH_C: CString =
-        CString::new(VM_APK_CONTENTS_PATH).expect("CString::new failed");
-    static ref PAYLOAD_CONNECTION: Mutex<Option<Strong<dyn IVmPayloadService>>> = Mutex::default();
-    static ref VM_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE_PATH_C: CString =
-        CString::new(ENCRYPTEDSTORE_MOUNTPOINT).expect("CString::new failed");
-}
-
-static ALREADY_NOTIFIED: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
-
-/// Return a connection to the payload service in Microdroid Manager. Uses the existing connection
-/// if there is one, otherwise attempts to create a new one.
-fn get_vm_payload_service() -> Result<Strong<dyn IVmPayloadService>> {
-    let mut connection = PAYLOAD_CONNECTION.lock().unwrap();
-    if let Some(strong) = &*connection {
-        Ok(strong.clone())
-    } else {
-        let new_connection: Strong<dyn IVmPayloadService> = RpcSession::new()
-            .setup_unix_domain_client(VM_PAYLOAD_SERVICE_SOCKET_NAME)
-            .context(format!("Failed to connect to service: {}", VM_PAYLOAD_SERVICE_SOCKET_NAME))?;
-        *connection = Some(new_connection.clone());
-        Ok(new_connection)
-    }
-}
-
-/// Make sure our logging goes to logcat. It is harmless to call this more than once.
-fn initialize_logging() {
-    android_logger::init_once(
-        android_logger::Config::default().with_tag("vm_payload").with_max_level(LevelFilter::Info),
-    );
-}
-
-/// In many cases clients can't do anything useful if API calls fail, and the failure
-/// generally indicates that the VM is exiting or otherwise doomed. So rather than
-/// returning a non-actionable error indication we just log the problem and abort
-/// the process.
-fn unwrap_or_abort<T, E: Debug>(result: Result<T, E>) -> T {
-    result.unwrap_or_else(|e| {
-        let msg = format!("{:?}", e);
-        error!("{msg}");
-        panic!("{msg}")
-    })
-}
-
-/// Notifies the host that the payload is ready.
-/// Panics on failure.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn AVmPayload_notifyPayloadReady() {
-    initialize_logging();
-
-    if !ALREADY_NOTIFIED.swap(true, Ordering::Relaxed) {
-        unwrap_or_abort(try_notify_payload_ready());
-
-        info!("Notified host payload ready successfully");
-    }
-}
-
-/// Notifies the host that the payload is ready.
-/// Returns a `Result` containing error information if failed.
-fn try_notify_payload_ready() -> Result<()> {
-    get_vm_payload_service()?.notifyPayloadReady().context("Cannot notify payload ready")
-}
-
-/// Runs a binder RPC server, serving the supplied binder service implementation on the given vsock
-/// port.
-///
-/// If and when the server is ready for connections (it is listening on the port), `on_ready` is
-/// called to allow appropriate action to be taken - e.g. to notify clients that they may now
-/// attempt to connect.
-///
-/// The current thread joins the binder thread pool to handle incoming messages.
-/// This function never returns.
-///
-/// Panics on error (including unexpected server exit).
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// If present, the `on_ready` callback must be a valid function pointer, which will be called at
-/// most once, while this function is executing, with the `param` parameter.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmPayload_runVsockRpcServer(
-    service: *mut AIBinder,
-    port: u32,
-    on_ready: Option<unsafe extern "C" fn(param: *mut c_void)>,
-    param: *mut c_void,
-) -> Infallible {
-    initialize_logging();
-
-    // SAFETY: try_run_vsock_server has the same requirements as this function
-    unwrap_or_abort(unsafe { try_run_vsock_server(service, port, on_ready, param) })
-}
-
-/// # Safety: Same as `AVmPayload_runVsockRpcServer`.
-unsafe fn try_run_vsock_server(
-    service: *mut AIBinder,
-    port: u32,
-    on_ready: Option<unsafe extern "C" fn(param: *mut c_void)>,
-    param: *mut c_void,
-) -> Result<Infallible> {
-    // SAFETY: AIBinder returned has correct reference count, and the ownership can
-    // safely be taken by new_spibinder.
-    let service = unsafe { new_spibinder(service) };
-    if let Some(service) = service {
-        match RpcServer::new_vsock(service, libc::VMADDR_CID_HOST, port) {
-            Ok(server) => {
-                if let Some(on_ready) = on_ready {
-                    // SAFETY: We're calling the callback with the parameter specified within the
-                    // allowed lifetime.
-                    unsafe { on_ready(param) };
-                }
-                server.join();
-                bail!("RpcServer unexpectedly terminated");
-            }
-            Err(err) => {
-                bail!("Failed to start RpcServer: {:?}", err);
-            }
-        }
-    } else {
-        bail!("Failed to convert the given service from AIBinder to SpIBinder.");
-    }
-}
-
-/// Get a secret that is uniquely bound to this VM instance.
-/// Panics on failure.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
-///
-/// * `identifier` must be [valid] for reads of `identifier_size` bytes.
-/// * `secret` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes.
-///
-/// [valid]: ptr#safety
-#[no_mangle]
-pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmPayload_getVmInstanceSecret(
-    identifier: *const u8,
-    identifier_size: usize,
-    secret: *mut u8,
-    size: usize,
-) {
-    initialize_logging();
-
-    // SAFETY: See the requirements on `identifier` above.
-    let identifier = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(identifier, identifier_size) };
-    let vm_secret = unwrap_or_abort(try_get_vm_instance_secret(identifier, size));
-
-    // SAFETY: See the requirements on `secret` above; `vm_secret` is known to have length `size`,
-    // and cannot overlap `secret` because we just allocated it.
-    unsafe {
-        ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(vm_secret.as_ptr(), secret, size);
-    }
-}
-
-fn try_get_vm_instance_secret(identifier: &[u8], size: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let vm_secret = get_vm_payload_service()?
-        .getVmInstanceSecret(identifier, i32::try_from(size)?)
-        .context("Cannot get VM instance secret")?;
-    ensure!(
-        vm_secret.len() == size,
-        "Returned secret has {} bytes, expected {}",
-        vm_secret.len(),
-        size
-    );
-    Ok(vm_secret)
-}
-
-/// Get the VM's attestation chain.
-/// Panics on failure.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
-///
-/// * `data` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes, if size > 0.
-///
-/// [valid]: ptr#safety
-#[no_mangle]
-pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmPayload_getDiceAttestationChain(data: *mut u8, size: usize) -> usize {
-    initialize_logging();
-
-    let chain = unwrap_or_abort(try_get_dice_attestation_chain());
-    if size != 0 {
-        // SAFETY: See the requirements on `data` above. The number of bytes copied doesn't exceed
-        // the length of either buffer, and `chain` cannot overlap `data` because we just allocated
-        // it. We allow data to be null, which is never valid, but only if size == 0 which is
-        // checked above.
-        unsafe { ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(chain.as_ptr(), data, std::cmp::min(chain.len(), size)) };
-    }
-    chain.len()
-}
-
-fn try_get_dice_attestation_chain() -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    get_vm_payload_service()?.getDiceAttestationChain().context("Cannot get attestation chain")
-}
-
-/// Get the VM's attestation CDI.
-/// Panics on failure.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
-///
-/// * `data` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes, if size > 0.
-///
-/// [valid]: ptr#safety
-#[no_mangle]
-pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmPayload_getDiceAttestationCdi(data: *mut u8, size: usize) -> usize {
-    initialize_logging();
-
-    let cdi = unwrap_or_abort(try_get_dice_attestation_cdi());
-    if size != 0 {
-        // SAFETY: See the requirements on `data` above. The number of bytes copied doesn't exceed
-        // the length of either buffer, and `cdi` cannot overlap `data` because we just allocated
-        // it. We allow data to be null, which is never valid, but only if size == 0 which is
-        // checked above.
-        unsafe { ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(cdi.as_ptr(), data, std::cmp::min(cdi.len(), size)) };
-    }
-    cdi.len()
-}
-
-fn try_get_dice_attestation_cdi() -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    get_vm_payload_service()?.getDiceAttestationCdi().context("Cannot get attestation CDI")
-}
-
-/// Requests the remote attestation of the client VM.
-///
-/// The challenge will be included in the certificate chain in the attestation result,
-/// serving as proof of the freshness of the result.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
-///
-/// * `challenge` must be [valid] for reads of `challenge_size` bytes.
-/// * `res` must be [valid] to write the attestation result.
-/// * The region of memory beginning at `challenge` with `challenge_size` bytes must not
-///  overlap with the region of memory `res` points to.
-///
-/// [valid]: ptr#safety
-#[no_mangle]
-pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmPayload_requestAttestation(
-    challenge: *const u8,
-    challenge_size: usize,
-    res: &mut *mut AttestationResult,
-) -> attestation_status_t {
-    initialize_logging();
-    const MAX_CHALLENGE_SIZE: usize = 64;
-    if challenge_size > MAX_CHALLENGE_SIZE {
-        return attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_INVALID_CHALLENGE;
-    }
-    let challenge = if challenge_size == 0 {
-        &[]
-    } else {
-        // SAFETY: The caller guarantees that `challenge` is valid for reads of
-        // `challenge_size` bytes and `challenge_size` is not zero.
-        unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(challenge, challenge_size) }
-    };
-    let service = unwrap_or_abort(get_vm_payload_service());
-    match service.requestAttestation(challenge) {
-        Ok(attestation_res) => {
-            *res = Box::into_raw(Box::new(attestation_res));
-            attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_OK
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            error!("Remote attestation failed: {e:?}");
-            binder_status_to_attestation_status(e)
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-fn binder_status_to_attestation_status(status: binder::Status) -> attestation_status_t {
-    match status.exception_code() {
-        ExceptionCode::UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION => attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED,
-        _ => attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_ATTESTATION_FAILED,
-    }
-}
-
-/// Converts the return value from `AVmPayload_requestAttestation` to a text string
-/// representing the error code.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_resultToString(
-    status: attestation_status_t,
-) -> *const c_char {
-    let message = match status {
-        attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_OK => {
-            CStr::from_bytes_with_nul(b"The remote attestation completes successfully.\0").unwrap()
-        }
-        attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_INVALID_CHALLENGE => {
-            CStr::from_bytes_with_nul(b"The challenge size is not between 0 and 64.\0").unwrap()
-        }
-        attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_ATTESTATION_FAILED => {
-            CStr::from_bytes_with_nul(b"Failed to attest the VM. Please retry at a later time.\0")
-                .unwrap()
-        }
-        attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED => CStr::from_bytes_with_nul(
-            b"Remote attestation is not supported in the current environment.\0",
-        )
-        .unwrap(),
-    };
-    message.as_ptr()
-}
-
-/// Reads the DER-encoded ECPrivateKey structure specified in [RFC 5915 s3] for the
-/// EC P-256 private key from the provided attestation result.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
-///
-/// * `data` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes, if size > 0.
-/// * The region of memory beginning at `data` with `size` bytes must not overlap with the
-///  region of memory `res` points to.
-///
-/// [valid]: ptr#safety
-/// [RFC 5915 s3]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5915#section-3
-#[no_mangle]
-pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_getPrivateKey(
-    res: &AttestationResult,
-    data: *mut u8,
-    size: usize,
-) -> usize {
-    let private_key = &res.privateKey;
-    if size != 0 {
-        let data = NonNull::new(data).expect("data must not be null when size > 0");
-        // SAFETY: See the requirements on `data` above. The number of bytes copied doesn't exceed
-        // the length of either buffer, and the caller ensures that `private_key` cannot overlap
-        // `data`. We allow data to be null, which is never valid, but only if size == 0
-        // which is checked above.
-        unsafe {
-            ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(
-                private_key.as_ptr(),
-                data.as_ptr(),
-                std::cmp::min(private_key.len(), size),
-            )
-        };
-    }
-    private_key.len()
-}
-
-/// Signs the given message using ECDSA P-256, the message is first hashed with SHA-256 and
-/// then it is signed with the attested EC P-256 private key in the attestation result.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
-///
-/// * `message` must be [valid] for reads of `message_size` bytes.
-/// * `data` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes, if size > 0.
-/// * The region of memory beginning at `data` with `size` bytes must not overlap with the
-///  region of memory `res` or `message` point to.
-///
-///
-/// [valid]: ptr#safety
-#[no_mangle]
-pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_sign(
-    res: &AttestationResult,
-    message: *const u8,
-    message_size: usize,
-    data: *mut u8,
-    size: usize,
-) -> usize {
-    if message_size == 0 {
-        panic!("Message to be signed must not be empty.")
-    }
-    // SAFETY: See the requirements on `message` above.
-    let message = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(message, message_size) };
-    let signature = unwrap_or_abort(try_ecdsa_sign(message, &res.privateKey));
-    if size != 0 {
-        let data = NonNull::new(data).expect("data must not be null when size > 0");
-        // SAFETY: See the requirements on `data` above. The number of bytes copied doesn't exceed
-        // the length of either buffer, and the caller ensures that `signature` cannot overlap
-        // `data`. We allow data to be null, which is never valid, but only if size == 0
-        // which is checked above.
-        unsafe {
-            ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(
-                signature.as_ptr(),
-                data.as_ptr(),
-                std::cmp::min(signature.len(), size),
-            )
-        };
-    }
-    signature.len()
-}
-
-fn try_ecdsa_sign(message: &[u8], der_encoded_ec_private_key: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let private_key = EcKey::private_key_from_der(der_encoded_ec_private_key)?;
-    let digest = sha256(message);
-    let sig = EcdsaSig::sign(&digest, &private_key)?;
-    Ok(sig.to_der()?)
-}
-
-/// Gets the number of certificates in the certificate chain.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_getCertificateCount(res: &AttestationResult) -> usize {
-    res.certificateChain.len()
-}
-
-/// Retrieves the certificate at the given `index` from the certificate chain in the provided
-/// attestation result.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
-///
-/// * `data` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes, if size > 0.
-/// * `index` must be within the range of [0, number of certificates). The number of certificates
-///   can be obtained with `AVmAttestationResult_getCertificateCount`.
-/// * The region of memory beginning at `data` with `size` bytes must not overlap with the
-///  region of memory `res` points to.
-///
-/// [valid]: ptr#safety
-#[no_mangle]
-pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_getCertificateAt(
-    res: &AttestationResult,
-    index: usize,
-    data: *mut u8,
-    size: usize,
-) -> usize {
-    let certificate =
-        &res.certificateChain.get(index).expect("The index is out of bounds.").encodedCertificate;
-    if size != 0 {
-        let data = NonNull::new(data).expect("data must not be null when size > 0");
-        // SAFETY: See the requirements on `data` above. The number of bytes copied doesn't exceed
-        // the length of either buffer, and the caller ensures that `certificate` cannot overlap
-        // `data`. We allow data to be null, which is never valid, but only if size == 0
-        // which is checked above.
-        unsafe {
-            ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(
-                certificate.as_ptr(),
-                data.as_ptr(),
-                std::cmp::min(certificate.len(), size),
-            )
-        };
-    }
-    certificate.len()
-}
-
-/// Frees all the data owned by given attestation result and result itself.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
-///
-/// * `res` must point to a valid `AttestationResult` and has not been freed before.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_free(res: *mut AttestationResult) {
-    if !res.is_null() {
-        // SAFETY: The result is only freed once is ensured by the caller.
-        let res = unsafe { Box::from_raw(res) };
-        drop(res)
-    }
-}
-
-/// Gets the path to the APK contents.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn AVmPayload_getApkContentsPath() -> *const c_char {
-    VM_APK_CONTENTS_PATH_C.as_ptr()
-}
-
-/// Gets the path to the VM's encrypted storage.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn AVmPayload_getEncryptedStoragePath() -> *const c_char {
-    if Path::new(ENCRYPTEDSTORE_MOUNTPOINT).exists() {
-        VM_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE_PATH_C.as_ptr()
-    } else {
-        ptr::null()
-    }
-}
diff --git a/vm_payload/src/lib.rs b/vm_payload/src/lib.rs
index 9e10895..7978059 100644
--- a/vm_payload/src/lib.rs
+++ b/vm_payload/src/lib.rs
@@ -12,14 +12,498 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-//! Library for payload to communicate with the Microdroid Manager.
+//! This module handles the interaction with virtual machine payload service.
 
-mod api;
-
-pub use api::{
-    AVmAttestationResult_free, AVmAttestationResult_getCertificateAt,
-    AVmAttestationResult_getCertificateCount, AVmAttestationResult_getPrivateKey,
-    AVmAttestationResult_resultToString, AVmAttestationResult_sign,
-    AVmPayload_getDiceAttestationCdi, AVmPayload_getDiceAttestationChain,
-    AVmPayload_getVmInstanceSecret, AVmPayload_notifyPayloadReady, AVmPayload_requestAttestation,
+use android_system_virtualization_payload::aidl::android::system::virtualization::payload:: IVmPayloadService::{
+    IVmPayloadService, ENCRYPTEDSTORE_MOUNTPOINT, VM_APK_CONTENTS_PATH,
+    VM_PAYLOAD_SERVICE_SOCKET_NAME, AttestationResult::AttestationResult,
 };
+use anyhow::{bail, ensure, Context, Result};
+use binder::{
+    unstable_api::{new_spibinder, AIBinder},
+    Strong, ExceptionCode,
+};
+use lazy_static::lazy_static;
+use log::{error, info, LevelFilter};
+use rpcbinder::{RpcServer, RpcSession};
+use openssl::{ec::EcKey, sha::sha256, ecdsa::EcdsaSig};
+use std::convert::Infallible;
+use std::ffi::{CString, CStr};
+use std::fmt::Debug;
+use std::os::raw::{c_char, c_void};
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::ptr::{self, NonNull};
+use std::sync::{
+    atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
+    Mutex,
+};
+use vm_payload_status_bindgen::attestation_status_t;
+
+lazy_static! {
+    static ref VM_APK_CONTENTS_PATH_C: CString =
+        CString::new(VM_APK_CONTENTS_PATH).expect("CString::new failed");
+    static ref PAYLOAD_CONNECTION: Mutex<Option<Strong<dyn IVmPayloadService>>> = Mutex::default();
+    static ref VM_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE_PATH_C: CString =
+        CString::new(ENCRYPTEDSTORE_MOUNTPOINT).expect("CString::new failed");
+}
+
+static ALREADY_NOTIFIED: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
+
+/// Return a connection to the payload service in Microdroid Manager. Uses the existing connection
+/// if there is one, otherwise attempts to create a new one.
+fn get_vm_payload_service() -> Result<Strong<dyn IVmPayloadService>> {
+    let mut connection = PAYLOAD_CONNECTION.lock().unwrap();
+    if let Some(strong) = &*connection {
+        Ok(strong.clone())
+    } else {
+        let new_connection: Strong<dyn IVmPayloadService> = RpcSession::new()
+            .setup_unix_domain_client(VM_PAYLOAD_SERVICE_SOCKET_NAME)
+            .context(format!("Failed to connect to service: {}", VM_PAYLOAD_SERVICE_SOCKET_NAME))?;
+        *connection = Some(new_connection.clone());
+        Ok(new_connection)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Make sure our logging goes to logcat. It is harmless to call this more than once.
+fn initialize_logging() {
+    android_logger::init_once(
+        android_logger::Config::default().with_tag("vm_payload").with_max_level(LevelFilter::Info),
+    );
+}
+
+/// In many cases clients can't do anything useful if API calls fail, and the failure
+/// generally indicates that the VM is exiting or otherwise doomed. So rather than
+/// returning a non-actionable error indication we just log the problem and abort
+/// the process.
+fn unwrap_or_abort<T, E: Debug>(result: Result<T, E>) -> T {
+    result.unwrap_or_else(|e| {
+        let msg = format!("{:?}", e);
+        error!("{msg}");
+        panic!("{msg}")
+    })
+}
+
+/// Notifies the host that the payload is ready.
+/// Panics on failure.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn AVmPayload_notifyPayloadReady() {
+    initialize_logging();
+
+    if !ALREADY_NOTIFIED.swap(true, Ordering::Relaxed) {
+        unwrap_or_abort(try_notify_payload_ready());
+
+        info!("Notified host payload ready successfully");
+    }
+}
+
+/// Notifies the host that the payload is ready.
+/// Returns a `Result` containing error information if failed.
+fn try_notify_payload_ready() -> Result<()> {
+    get_vm_payload_service()?.notifyPayloadReady().context("Cannot notify payload ready")
+}
+
+/// Runs a binder RPC server, serving the supplied binder service implementation on the given vsock
+/// port.
+///
+/// If and when the server is ready for connections (it is listening on the port), `on_ready` is
+/// called to allow appropriate action to be taken - e.g. to notify clients that they may now
+/// attempt to connect.
+///
+/// The current thread joins the binder thread pool to handle incoming messages.
+/// This function never returns.
+///
+/// Panics on error (including unexpected server exit).
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// If present, the `on_ready` callback must be a valid function pointer, which will be called at
+/// most once, while this function is executing, with the `param` parameter.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmPayload_runVsockRpcServer(
+    service: *mut AIBinder,
+    port: u32,
+    on_ready: Option<unsafe extern "C" fn(param: *mut c_void)>,
+    param: *mut c_void,
+) -> Infallible {
+    initialize_logging();
+
+    // SAFETY: try_run_vsock_server has the same requirements as this function
+    unwrap_or_abort(unsafe { try_run_vsock_server(service, port, on_ready, param) })
+}
+
+/// # Safety: Same as `AVmPayload_runVsockRpcServer`.
+unsafe fn try_run_vsock_server(
+    service: *mut AIBinder,
+    port: u32,
+    on_ready: Option<unsafe extern "C" fn(param: *mut c_void)>,
+    param: *mut c_void,
+) -> Result<Infallible> {
+    // SAFETY: AIBinder returned has correct reference count, and the ownership can
+    // safely be taken by new_spibinder.
+    let service = unsafe { new_spibinder(service) };
+    if let Some(service) = service {
+        match RpcServer::new_vsock(service, libc::VMADDR_CID_HOST, port) {
+            Ok(server) => {
+                if let Some(on_ready) = on_ready {
+                    // SAFETY: We're calling the callback with the parameter specified within the
+                    // allowed lifetime.
+                    unsafe { on_ready(param) };
+                }
+                server.join();
+                bail!("RpcServer unexpectedly terminated");
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                bail!("Failed to start RpcServer: {:?}", err);
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        bail!("Failed to convert the given service from AIBinder to SpIBinder.");
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get a secret that is uniquely bound to this VM instance.
+/// Panics on failure.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
+///
+/// * `identifier` must be [valid] for reads of `identifier_size` bytes.
+/// * `secret` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes.
+///
+/// [valid]: ptr#safety
+#[no_mangle]
+pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmPayload_getVmInstanceSecret(
+    identifier: *const u8,
+    identifier_size: usize,
+    secret: *mut u8,
+    size: usize,
+) {
+    initialize_logging();
+
+    // SAFETY: See the requirements on `identifier` above.
+    let identifier = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(identifier, identifier_size) };
+    let vm_secret = unwrap_or_abort(try_get_vm_instance_secret(identifier, size));
+
+    // SAFETY: See the requirements on `secret` above; `vm_secret` is known to have length `size`,
+    // and cannot overlap `secret` because we just allocated it.
+    unsafe {
+        ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(vm_secret.as_ptr(), secret, size);
+    }
+}
+
+fn try_get_vm_instance_secret(identifier: &[u8], size: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let vm_secret = get_vm_payload_service()?
+        .getVmInstanceSecret(identifier, i32::try_from(size)?)
+        .context("Cannot get VM instance secret")?;
+    ensure!(
+        vm_secret.len() == size,
+        "Returned secret has {} bytes, expected {}",
+        vm_secret.len(),
+        size
+    );
+    Ok(vm_secret)
+}
+
+/// Get the VM's attestation chain.
+/// Panics on failure.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
+///
+/// * `data` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes, if size > 0.
+///
+/// [valid]: ptr#safety
+#[no_mangle]
+pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmPayload_getDiceAttestationChain(data: *mut u8, size: usize) -> usize {
+    initialize_logging();
+
+    let chain = unwrap_or_abort(try_get_dice_attestation_chain());
+    if size != 0 {
+        // SAFETY: See the requirements on `data` above. The number of bytes copied doesn't exceed
+        // the length of either buffer, and `chain` cannot overlap `data` because we just allocated
+        // it. We allow data to be null, which is never valid, but only if size == 0 which is
+        // checked above.
+        unsafe { ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(chain.as_ptr(), data, std::cmp::min(chain.len(), size)) };
+    }
+    chain.len()
+}
+
+fn try_get_dice_attestation_chain() -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    get_vm_payload_service()?.getDiceAttestationChain().context("Cannot get attestation chain")
+}
+
+/// Get the VM's attestation CDI.
+/// Panics on failure.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
+///
+/// * `data` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes, if size > 0.
+///
+/// [valid]: ptr#safety
+#[no_mangle]
+pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmPayload_getDiceAttestationCdi(data: *mut u8, size: usize) -> usize {
+    initialize_logging();
+
+    let cdi = unwrap_or_abort(try_get_dice_attestation_cdi());
+    if size != 0 {
+        // SAFETY: See the requirements on `data` above. The number of bytes copied doesn't exceed
+        // the length of either buffer, and `cdi` cannot overlap `data` because we just allocated
+        // it. We allow data to be null, which is never valid, but only if size == 0 which is
+        // checked above.
+        unsafe { ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(cdi.as_ptr(), data, std::cmp::min(cdi.len(), size)) };
+    }
+    cdi.len()
+}
+
+fn try_get_dice_attestation_cdi() -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    get_vm_payload_service()?.getDiceAttestationCdi().context("Cannot get attestation CDI")
+}
+
+/// Requests the remote attestation of the client VM.
+///
+/// The challenge will be included in the certificate chain in the attestation result,
+/// serving as proof of the freshness of the result.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
+///
+/// * `challenge` must be [valid] for reads of `challenge_size` bytes.
+/// * `res` must be [valid] to write the attestation result.
+/// * The region of memory beginning at `challenge` with `challenge_size` bytes must not
+///  overlap with the region of memory `res` points to.
+///
+/// [valid]: ptr#safety
+#[no_mangle]
+pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmPayload_requestAttestation(
+    challenge: *const u8,
+    challenge_size: usize,
+    res: &mut *mut AttestationResult,
+) -> attestation_status_t {
+    initialize_logging();
+    const MAX_CHALLENGE_SIZE: usize = 64;
+    if challenge_size > MAX_CHALLENGE_SIZE {
+        return attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_INVALID_CHALLENGE;
+    }
+    let challenge = if challenge_size == 0 {
+        &[]
+    } else {
+        // SAFETY: The caller guarantees that `challenge` is valid for reads of
+        // `challenge_size` bytes and `challenge_size` is not zero.
+        unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(challenge, challenge_size) }
+    };
+    let service = unwrap_or_abort(get_vm_payload_service());
+    match service.requestAttestation(challenge) {
+        Ok(attestation_res) => {
+            *res = Box::into_raw(Box::new(attestation_res));
+            attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_OK
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            error!("Remote attestation failed: {e:?}");
+            binder_status_to_attestation_status(e)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn binder_status_to_attestation_status(status: binder::Status) -> attestation_status_t {
+    match status.exception_code() {
+        ExceptionCode::UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION => attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED,
+        _ => attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_ATTESTATION_FAILED,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Converts the return value from `AVmPayload_requestAttestation` to a text string
+/// representing the error code.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_resultToString(
+    status: attestation_status_t,
+) -> *const c_char {
+    let message = match status {
+        attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_OK => {
+            CStr::from_bytes_with_nul(b"The remote attestation completes successfully.\0").unwrap()
+        }
+        attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_INVALID_CHALLENGE => {
+            CStr::from_bytes_with_nul(b"The challenge size is not between 0 and 64.\0").unwrap()
+        }
+        attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_ATTESTATION_FAILED => {
+            CStr::from_bytes_with_nul(b"Failed to attest the VM. Please retry at a later time.\0")
+                .unwrap()
+        }
+        attestation_status_t::ATTESTATION_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED => CStr::from_bytes_with_nul(
+            b"Remote attestation is not supported in the current environment.\0",
+        )
+        .unwrap(),
+    };
+    message.as_ptr()
+}
+
+/// Reads the DER-encoded ECPrivateKey structure specified in [RFC 5915 s3] for the
+/// EC P-256 private key from the provided attestation result.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
+///
+/// * `data` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes, if size > 0.
+/// * The region of memory beginning at `data` with `size` bytes must not overlap with the
+///  region of memory `res` points to.
+///
+/// [valid]: ptr#safety
+/// [RFC 5915 s3]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5915#section-3
+#[no_mangle]
+pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_getPrivateKey(
+    res: &AttestationResult,
+    data: *mut u8,
+    size: usize,
+) -> usize {
+    let private_key = &res.privateKey;
+    if size != 0 {
+        let data = NonNull::new(data).expect("data must not be null when size > 0");
+        // SAFETY: See the requirements on `data` above. The number of bytes copied doesn't exceed
+        // the length of either buffer, and the caller ensures that `private_key` cannot overlap
+        // `data`. We allow data to be null, which is never valid, but only if size == 0
+        // which is checked above.
+        unsafe {
+            ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(
+                private_key.as_ptr(),
+                data.as_ptr(),
+                std::cmp::min(private_key.len(), size),
+            )
+        };
+    }
+    private_key.len()
+}
+
+/// Signs the given message using ECDSA P-256, the message is first hashed with SHA-256 and
+/// then it is signed with the attested EC P-256 private key in the attestation result.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
+///
+/// * `message` must be [valid] for reads of `message_size` bytes.
+/// * `data` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes, if size > 0.
+/// * The region of memory beginning at `data` with `size` bytes must not overlap with the
+///  region of memory `res` or `message` point to.
+///
+///
+/// [valid]: ptr#safety
+#[no_mangle]
+pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_sign(
+    res: &AttestationResult,
+    message: *const u8,
+    message_size: usize,
+    data: *mut u8,
+    size: usize,
+) -> usize {
+    if message_size == 0 {
+        panic!("Message to be signed must not be empty.")
+    }
+    // SAFETY: See the requirements on `message` above.
+    let message = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(message, message_size) };
+    let signature = unwrap_or_abort(try_ecdsa_sign(message, &res.privateKey));
+    if size != 0 {
+        let data = NonNull::new(data).expect("data must not be null when size > 0");
+        // SAFETY: See the requirements on `data` above. The number of bytes copied doesn't exceed
+        // the length of either buffer, and the caller ensures that `signature` cannot overlap
+        // `data`. We allow data to be null, which is never valid, but only if size == 0
+        // which is checked above.
+        unsafe {
+            ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(
+                signature.as_ptr(),
+                data.as_ptr(),
+                std::cmp::min(signature.len(), size),
+            )
+        };
+    }
+    signature.len()
+}
+
+fn try_ecdsa_sign(message: &[u8], der_encoded_ec_private_key: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let private_key = EcKey::private_key_from_der(der_encoded_ec_private_key)?;
+    let digest = sha256(message);
+    let sig = EcdsaSig::sign(&digest, &private_key)?;
+    Ok(sig.to_der()?)
+}
+
+/// Gets the number of certificates in the certificate chain.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_getCertificateCount(res: &AttestationResult) -> usize {
+    res.certificateChain.len()
+}
+
+/// Retrieves the certificate at the given `index` from the certificate chain in the provided
+/// attestation result.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
+///
+/// * `data` must be [valid] for writes of `size` bytes, if size > 0.
+/// * `index` must be within the range of [0, number of certificates). The number of certificates
+///   can be obtained with `AVmAttestationResult_getCertificateCount`.
+/// * The region of memory beginning at `data` with `size` bytes must not overlap with the
+///  region of memory `res` points to.
+///
+/// [valid]: ptr#safety
+#[no_mangle]
+pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_getCertificateAt(
+    res: &AttestationResult,
+    index: usize,
+    data: *mut u8,
+    size: usize,
+) -> usize {
+    let certificate =
+        &res.certificateChain.get(index).expect("The index is out of bounds.").encodedCertificate;
+    if size != 0 {
+        let data = NonNull::new(data).expect("data must not be null when size > 0");
+        // SAFETY: See the requirements on `data` above. The number of bytes copied doesn't exceed
+        // the length of either buffer, and the caller ensures that `certificate` cannot overlap
+        // `data`. We allow data to be null, which is never valid, but only if size == 0
+        // which is checked above.
+        unsafe {
+            ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(
+                certificate.as_ptr(),
+                data.as_ptr(),
+                std::cmp::min(certificate.len(), size),
+            )
+        };
+    }
+    certificate.len()
+}
+
+/// Frees all the data owned by given attestation result and result itself.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Behavior is undefined if any of the following conditions are violated:
+///
+/// * `res` must point to a valid `AttestationResult` and has not been freed before.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub unsafe extern "C" fn AVmAttestationResult_free(res: *mut AttestationResult) {
+    if !res.is_null() {
+        // SAFETY: The result is only freed once is ensured by the caller.
+        let res = unsafe { Box::from_raw(res) };
+        drop(res)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Gets the path to the APK contents.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn AVmPayload_getApkContentsPath() -> *const c_char {
+    VM_APK_CONTENTS_PATH_C.as_ptr()
+}
+
+/// Gets the path to the VM's encrypted storage.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn AVmPayload_getEncryptedStoragePath() -> *const c_char {
+    if Path::new(ENCRYPTEDSTORE_MOUNTPOINT).exists() {
+        VM_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE_PATH_C.as_ptr()
+    } else {
+        ptr::null()
+    }
+}
diff --git a/vmbase/example/tests/test.rs b/vmbase/example/tests/test.rs
index 17ff947..2df5a80 100644
--- a/vmbase/example/tests/test.rs
+++ b/vmbase/example/tests/test.rs
@@ -42,7 +42,9 @@
 #[test]
 fn test_run_example_vm() -> Result<(), Error> {
     android_logger::init_once(
-        android_logger::Config::default().with_tag("vmbase").with_min_level(log::Level::Debug),
+        android_logger::Config::default()
+            .with_tag("vmbase")
+            .with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug),
     );
 
     // Redirect panic messages to logcat.