diff --git a/microdroid_manager/Android.bp b/microdroid_manager/Android.bp
index 8481edf..cb3b2aa 100644
--- a/microdroid_manager/Android.bp
+++ b/microdroid_manager/Android.bp
@@ -5,7 +5,10 @@
 rust_defaults {
     name: "microdroid_manager_defaults",
     crate_name: "microdroid_manager",
-    defaults: ["avf_build_flags_rust"],
+    defaults: [
+        "avf_build_flags_rust",
+        "secretkeeper_use_latest_hal_aidl_rust",
+    ],
     srcs: ["src/main.rs"],
     edition: "2021",
     prefer_rlib: true,
@@ -43,6 +46,8 @@
         "libprotobuf",
         "librpcbinder_rs",
         "librustutils",
+        "libsecretkeeper_client",
+        "libsecretkeeper_comm_nostd",
         "libscopeguard",
         "libserde",
         "libserde_cbor",
@@ -51,6 +56,7 @@
         "libuuid",
         "libvsock",
         "librand",
+        "libzeroize",
     ],
     init_rc: ["microdroid_manager.rc"],
     multilib: {
diff --git a/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs b/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs
index 9e167a4..c94a937 100644
--- a/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs
+++ b/microdroid_manager/src/main.rs
@@ -105,7 +105,6 @@
             MicrodroidError::PayloadInvalidConfig(msg) => {
                 (ErrorCode::PAYLOAD_INVALID_CONFIG, msg.to_string())
             }
-
             // Connection failure won't be reported to VS; return the default value
             MicrodroidError::FailedToConnectToVirtualizationService(msg) => {
                 (ErrorCode::UNKNOWN, msg.to_string())
@@ -282,7 +281,8 @@
     // To minimize the exposure to untrusted data, derive dice profile as soon as possible.
     info!("DICE derivation for payload");
     let dice_artifacts = dice_derivation(dice, &instance_data, &payload_metadata)?;
-    let vm_secret = VmSecret::new(dice_artifacts).context("Failed to create VM secrets")?;
+    let vm_secret =
+        VmSecret::new(dice_artifacts, service).context("Failed to create VM secrets")?;
 
     if cfg!(dice_changes) {
         // Now that the DICE derivation is done, it's ok to allow payload code to run.
diff --git a/microdroid_manager/src/vm_secret.rs b/microdroid_manager/src/vm_secret.rs
index d84c2e2..df5d318 100644
--- a/microdroid_manager/src/vm_secret.rs
+++ b/microdroid_manager/src/vm_secret.rs
@@ -14,18 +14,28 @@
 
 //! Class for encapsulating & managing represent VM secrets.
 
-use anyhow::Result;
+use anyhow::{anyhow, ensure, Result};
+use android_system_virtualmachineservice::aidl::android::system::virtualmachineservice::IVirtualMachineService::IVirtualMachineService;
+use android_hardware_security_secretkeeper::aidl::android::hardware::security::secretkeeper::ISecretkeeper::ISecretkeeper;
+use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::request::Request;
+use binder::{Strong};
+use coset::CborSerializable;
 use diced_open_dice::{DiceArtifacts, OwnedDiceArtifacts};
 use keystore2_crypto::ZVec;
 use openssl::hkdf::hkdf;
 use openssl::md::Md;
 use openssl::sha;
+use secretkeeper_client::SkSession;
+use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::{Id, ID_SIZE, Secret, SECRET_SIZE};
+use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::response::Response;
+use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::packet::{ResponsePacket, ResponseType};
+use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::request_response_impl::{
+    StoreSecretRequest, GetSecretResponse, GetSecretRequest};
+use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::error::SecretkeeperError;
+use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 
 const ENCRYPTEDSTORE_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "encryptedstore_key";
 
-// Size of the secret stored in Secretkeeper.
-const SK_SECRET_SIZE: usize = 64;
-
 // Generated using hexdump -vn32 -e'14/1 "0x%02X, " 1 "\n"' /dev/urandom
 const SALT_ENCRYPTED_STORE: &[u8] = &[
     0xFC, 0x1D, 0x35, 0x7B, 0x96, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0x17, 0x78, 0x7D, 0x70, 0xED, 0xEA, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0x6F,
@@ -36,6 +46,24 @@
     0x55, 0xF8, 0x08, 0x23, 0x81, 0x5F, 0xF5, 0x16, 0x20, 0x3E, 0xBE, 0xBA, 0xB7, 0xA8, 0x43, 0x92,
 ];
 
+// TODO(b/291213394): Remove this once policy is generated from dice_chain
+const HYPOTHETICAL_DICE_POLICY: [u8; 43] = [
+    0x83, 0x01, 0x81, 0x83, 0x01, 0x80, 0xA1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x82, 0x83, 0x01, 0x81, 0x01, 0x73, 0x74,
+    0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x5F, 0x64, 0x69, 0x63, 0x65, 0x5F, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x6C, 0x69,
+    0x63, 0x79, 0x83, 0x02, 0x82, 0x03, 0x18, 0x64, 0x19, 0xE9, 0x75,
+];
+// TODO(b/291213394): Differentiate the Id of nPVM based on 'salt'
+const ID_NP_VM: [u8; ID_SIZE] = [
+    0xF1, 0xB2, 0xED, 0x3B, 0xD1, 0xBD, 0xF0, 0x7D, 0xE1, 0xF0, 0x01, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x71, 0xD3, 0x42,
+    0xE5, 0x8A, 0xAF, 0x33, 0x6C, 0x11, 0xDC, 0xC8, 0x6F, 0xAE, 0x12, 0x5C, 0x26, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x86,
+    0xCC, 0x24, 0xFD, 0xBF, 0x91, 0x4A, 0x54, 0x84, 0xF9, 0x01, 0x59, 0x25, 0x70, 0x89, 0x38, 0x8D,
+    0x5E, 0xE6, 0x91, 0xDF, 0x68, 0x60, 0x69, 0x26, 0xBE, 0xFE, 0x79, 0x58, 0xF7, 0xEA, 0x81, 0x7D,
+];
+const SKP_SECRET_NP_VM: [u8; SECRET_SIZE] = [
+    0xA9, 0x89, 0x97, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x97, 0x55, 0x4B, 0x32, 0x35, 0xF0, 0xE8, 0x93, 0xDA, 0xEA, 0x24,
+    0x06, 0xAC, 0x36, 0x8B, 0x3C, 0x95, 0x50, 0x16, 0x67, 0x71, 0x65, 0x26, 0xEB, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0x98,
+];
+
 pub enum VmSecret {
     // V2 secrets are derived from 2 independently secured secrets:
     //      1. Secretkeeper protected secrets (skp secret).
@@ -54,15 +82,47 @@
     V1 { dice: OwnedDiceArtifacts },
 }
 
+fn get_id() -> [u8; ID_SIZE] {
+    if super::is_strict_boot() {
+        todo!("Id for protected VM is not implemented");
+    } else {
+        ID_NP_VM
+    }
+}
+
 impl VmSecret {
-    pub fn new(dice_artifacts: OwnedDiceArtifacts) -> Result<VmSecret> {
-        if is_sk_supported() {
-            // TODO(b/291213394): Change this to real Sk protected secret.
-            let fake_skp_secret = ZVec::new(SK_SECRET_SIZE)?;
-            return Ok(Self::V2 { dice: dice_artifacts, skp_secret: fake_skp_secret });
+    pub fn new(
+        dice_artifacts: OwnedDiceArtifacts,
+        vm_service: &Strong<dyn IVirtualMachineService>,
+    ) -> Result<VmSecret> {
+        ensure!(dice_artifacts.bcc().is_some(), "Dice chain missing");
+
+        if let Some(sk_service) = is_sk_supported(vm_service)? {
+            let id = get_id();
+            let mut skp_secret = Zeroizing::new([0u8; SECRET_SIZE]);
+            if super::is_strict_boot() {
+                if super::is_new_instance() {
+                    *skp_secret = rand::random();
+                    store_secret(sk_service.clone(), id, skp_secret.clone(), &dice_artifacts)?;
+                } else {
+                    // Subsequent run of the pVM -> get the secret stored in Secretkeeper.
+                    *skp_secret = get_secret(sk_service.clone(), id, &dice_artifacts)?;
+                }
+            } else {
+                // TODO(b/291213394): Non protected VM don't need to use Secretkeeper, remove this
+                // once we have sufficient testing on protected VM.
+                store_secret(sk_service.clone(), id, SKP_SECRET_NP_VM.into(), &dice_artifacts)?;
+                *skp_secret = get_secret(sk_service.clone(), id, &dice_artifacts)?;
+            }
+            return Ok(Self::V2 {
+                dice: dice_artifacts,
+                skp_secret: ZVec::try_from(skp_secret.to_vec())?,
+            });
         }
+        //  Use V1 secrets if Secretkeeper is not supported.
         Ok(Self::V1 { dice: dice_artifacts })
     }
+
     pub fn dice(&self) -> &OwnedDiceArtifacts {
         match self {
             Self::V2 { dice, .. } => dice,
@@ -94,13 +154,87 @@
     }
 }
 
-// Does the hardware support Secretkeeper.
-fn is_sk_supported() -> bool {
-    if cfg!(llpvm_changes) {
-        return false;
+fn store_secret(
+    secretkeeper: binder::Strong<dyn ISecretkeeper>,
+    id: [u8; ID_SIZE],
+    secret: Zeroizing<[u8; SECRET_SIZE]>,
+    _dice_chain: &OwnedDiceArtifacts,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    // Start a new secretkeeper session!
+    let session = SkSession::new(secretkeeper).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
+    let store_request = StoreSecretRequest {
+        id: Id(id),
+        secret: Secret(*secret),
+        // TODO(b/291233371): Construct policy out of dice_chain.
+        sealing_policy: HYPOTHETICAL_DICE_POLICY.to_vec(),
     };
-    // TODO(b/292209416): This value should be extracted from device tree.
-    // Note: this does not affect the security of pVM. pvmfw & microdroid_manager continue to block
-    // upgraded images. Setting this true is equivalent to including constant salt in vm secrets.
-    true
+    log::info!("Secretkeeper operation: {:?}", store_request);
+
+    let store_request = store_request.serialize_to_packet().to_vec().map_err(anyhow_err)?;
+    let store_response = session.secret_management_request(&store_request).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
+    let store_response = ResponsePacket::from_slice(&store_response).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
+    let response_type = store_response.response_type().map_err(anyhow_err)?;
+    ensure!(
+        response_type == ResponseType::Success,
+        "Secretkeeper store failed with error: {:?}",
+        *SecretkeeperError::deserialize_from_packet(store_response).map_err(anyhow_err)?
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn get_secret(
+    secretkeeper: binder::Strong<dyn ISecretkeeper>,
+    id: [u8; ID_SIZE],
+    _dice_chain: &OwnedDiceArtifacts,
+) -> Result<[u8; SECRET_SIZE]> {
+    // Start a new secretkeeper session!
+    let session = SkSession::new(secretkeeper).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
+    let get_request = GetSecretRequest {
+        id: Id(id),
+        // TODO(b/291233371): Construct policy out of dice_chain.
+        updated_sealing_policy: None,
+    };
+    log::info!("Secretkeeper operation: {:?}", get_request);
+
+    let get_request = get_request.serialize_to_packet().to_vec().map_err(anyhow_err)?;
+    let get_response = session.secret_management_request(&get_request).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
+    let get_response = ResponsePacket::from_slice(&get_response).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
+    let response_type = get_response.response_type().map_err(anyhow_err)?;
+    ensure!(
+        response_type == ResponseType::Success,
+        "Secretkeeper get failed with error: {:?}",
+        *SecretkeeperError::deserialize_from_packet(get_response).map_err(anyhow_err)?
+    );
+    let get_response =
+        *GetSecretResponse::deserialize_from_packet(get_response).map_err(anyhow_err)?;
+    Ok(get_response.secret.0)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+fn anyhow_err<E: core::fmt::Debug>(err: E) -> anyhow::Error {
+    anyhow!("{:?}", err)
+}
+
+// Get the secretkeeper connection if supported. Host can be consulted whether the device supports
+// secretkeeper but that should be used with caution for protected VM.
+fn is_sk_supported(
+    host: &Strong<dyn IVirtualMachineService>,
+) -> Result<Option<Strong<dyn ISecretkeeper>>> {
+    let sk = if cfg!(llpvm_changes) {
+        if super::is_strict_boot() {
+            // TODO: For protected VM check for Secretkeeper authentication data in device tree.
+            None
+        } else {
+            // For non-protected VM, believe what host claims.
+            host.getSecretkeeper()
+                // TODO rename this error!
+                .map_err(|e| {
+                    super::MicrodroidError::FailedToConnectToVirtualizationService(e.to_string())
+                })?
+        }
+    } else {
+        // LLPVM flag is disabled
+        None
+    };
+    Ok(sk)
 }
diff --git a/virtualizationmanager/Android.bp b/virtualizationmanager/Android.bp
index 33897b2..88e9c70 100644
--- a/virtualizationmanager/Android.bp
+++ b/virtualizationmanager/Android.bp
@@ -5,7 +5,11 @@
 rust_defaults {
     name: "virtualizationmanager_defaults",
     crate_name: "virtualizationmanager",
-    defaults: ["avf_build_flags_rust"],
+    defaults: [
+        "avf_build_flags_rust",
+        "secretkeeper_use_latest_hal_aidl_rust",
+        "authgraph_use_latest_hal_aidl_rust",
+    ],
     edition: "2021",
     // Only build on targets which crosvm builds on.
     enabled: false,
diff --git a/virtualizationmanager/src/aidl.rs b/virtualizationmanager/src/aidl.rs
index 7f98fe8..7b30f48 100644
--- a/virtualizationmanager/src/aidl.rs
+++ b/virtualizationmanager/src/aidl.rs
@@ -52,6 +52,14 @@
 use android_system_virtualmachineservice::aidl::android::system::virtualmachineservice::IVirtualMachineService::{
         BnVirtualMachineService, IVirtualMachineService,
 };
+use android_hardware_security_secretkeeper::aidl::android::hardware::security::secretkeeper::ISecretkeeper::{BnSecretkeeper, ISecretkeeper};
+use android_hardware_security_secretkeeper::aidl::android::hardware::security::secretkeeper::SecretId::SecretId;
+use android_hardware_security_authgraph::aidl::android::hardware::security::authgraph::{
+    Arc::Arc as AuthgraphArc, IAuthGraphKeyExchange::IAuthGraphKeyExchange,
+    IAuthGraphKeyExchange::BnAuthGraphKeyExchange, Identity::Identity, KeInitResult::KeInitResult,
+    Key::Key, PubKey::PubKey, SessionIdSignature::SessionIdSignature, SessionInfo::SessionInfo,
+    SessionInitiationInfo::SessionInitiationInfo,
+};
 use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
 use apkverify::{HashAlgorithm, V4Signature};
 use avflog::LogResult;
@@ -102,6 +110,10 @@
 
 const MICRODROID_OS_NAME: &str = "microdroid";
 
+// TODO(b/291213394): Use 'default' instance for secretkeeper instead of 'nonsecure'
+const SECRETKEEPER_IDENTIFIER: &str =
+    "android.hardware.security.secretkeeper.ISecretkeeper/nonsecure";
+
 const UNFORMATTED_STORAGE_MAGIC: &str = "UNFORMATTED-STORAGE";
 
 /// Roughly estimated sufficient size for storing vendor public key into DTBO.
@@ -1370,6 +1382,20 @@
         }
     }
 
+    fn getSecretkeeper(&self) -> binder::Result<Option<Strong<dyn ISecretkeeper>>> {
+        let sk = match binder::get_interface(SECRETKEEPER_IDENTIFIER) {
+            Ok(sk) => {
+                Some(BnSecretkeeper::new_binder(SecretkeeperProxy(sk), BinderFeatures::default()))
+            }
+            Err(StatusCode::NAME_NOT_FOUND) => None,
+            Err(e) => {
+                error!("unexpected error while fetching connection to Secretkeeper {:?}", e);
+                return Err(e.into());
+            }
+        };
+        Ok(sk)
+    }
+
     fn requestAttestation(&self, csr: &[u8]) -> binder::Result<Vec<Certificate>> {
         GLOBAL_SERVICE.requestAttestation(csr, get_calling_uid() as i32)
     }
@@ -1554,3 +1580,67 @@
         Ok(())
     }
 }
+
+struct SecretkeeperProxy(Strong<dyn ISecretkeeper>);
+
+impl Interface for SecretkeeperProxy {}
+
+impl ISecretkeeper for SecretkeeperProxy {
+    fn processSecretManagementRequest(&self, req: &[u8]) -> binder::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        // Pass the request to the channel, and read the response.
+        self.0.processSecretManagementRequest(req)
+    }
+
+    fn getAuthGraphKe(&self) -> binder::Result<Strong<dyn IAuthGraphKeyExchange>> {
+        let ag = AuthGraphKeyExchangeProxy(self.0.getAuthGraphKe()?);
+        Ok(BnAuthGraphKeyExchange::new_binder(ag, BinderFeatures::default()))
+    }
+
+    fn deleteIds(&self, ids: &[SecretId]) -> binder::Result<()> {
+        self.0.deleteIds(ids)
+    }
+
+    fn deleteAll(&self) -> binder::Result<()> {
+        self.0.deleteAll()
+    }
+}
+
+struct AuthGraphKeyExchangeProxy(Strong<dyn IAuthGraphKeyExchange>);
+
+impl Interface for AuthGraphKeyExchangeProxy {}
+
+impl IAuthGraphKeyExchange for AuthGraphKeyExchangeProxy {
+    fn create(&self) -> binder::Result<SessionInitiationInfo> {
+        self.0.create()
+    }
+
+    fn init(
+        &self,
+        peer_pub_key: &PubKey,
+        peer_id: &Identity,
+        peer_nonce: &[u8],
+        peer_version: i32,
+    ) -> binder::Result<KeInitResult> {
+        self.0.init(peer_pub_key, peer_id, peer_nonce, peer_version)
+    }
+
+    fn finish(
+        &self,
+        peer_pub_key: &PubKey,
+        peer_id: &Identity,
+        peer_signature: &SessionIdSignature,
+        peer_nonce: &[u8],
+        peer_version: i32,
+        own_key: &Key,
+    ) -> binder::Result<SessionInfo> {
+        self.0.finish(peer_pub_key, peer_id, peer_signature, peer_nonce, peer_version, own_key)
+    }
+
+    fn authenticationComplete(
+        &self,
+        peer_signature: &SessionIdSignature,
+        shared_keys: &[AuthgraphArc; 2],
+    ) -> binder::Result<[AuthgraphArc; 2]> {
+        self.0.authenticationComplete(peer_signature, shared_keys)
+    }
+}
diff --git a/virtualizationservice/aidl/Android.bp b/virtualizationservice/aidl/Android.bp
index c69fe8f..8ca375a 100644
--- a/virtualizationservice/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/virtualizationservice/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -57,7 +57,10 @@
 aidl_interface {
     name: "android.system.virtualmachineservice",
     srcs: ["android/system/virtualmachineservice/**/*.aidl"],
-    imports: ["android.system.virtualizationcommon"],
+    imports: [
+        "android.hardware.security.secretkeeper-V1",
+        "android.system.virtualizationcommon",
+    ],
     unstable: true,
     backend: {
         java: {
diff --git a/virtualizationservice/aidl/android/system/virtualmachineservice/IVirtualMachineService.aidl b/virtualizationservice/aidl/android/system/virtualmachineservice/IVirtualMachineService.aidl
index 3c60478..cf91302 100644
--- a/virtualizationservice/aidl/android/system/virtualmachineservice/IVirtualMachineService.aidl
+++ b/virtualizationservice/aidl/android/system/virtualmachineservice/IVirtualMachineService.aidl
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
  */
 package android.system.virtualmachineservice;
 
+import android.hardware.security.secretkeeper.ISecretkeeper;
 import android.system.virtualizationcommon.Certificate;
 import android.system.virtualizationcommon.ErrorCode;
 
@@ -54,4 +55,11 @@
      *         key's certificate chain. The attestation key is provided in the CSR.
      */
     Certificate[] requestAttestation(in byte[] csr);
+
+    /**
+     * Request connection to Secretkeeper. This is used by pVM to store Anti-Rollback protected
+     * secrets. Note that the return value is nullable to reflect that Secretkeeper HAL may not be
+     * present.
+     */
+    @nullable ISecretkeeper getSecretkeeper();
 }