diff --git a/gnss/common/utils/default/include/v2_1/GnssTemplate.h b/gnss/common/utils/default/include/v2_1/GnssTemplate.h
index 131af24..48cab99 100644
--- a/gnss/common/utils/default/include/v2_1/GnssTemplate.h
+++ b/gnss/common/utils/default/include/v2_1/GnssTemplate.h
@@ -223,14 +223,8 @@
             this->reportSvStatus(svStatus);
             auto currentLocation = getLocationFromHW();
             notePowerConsumption();
-            if (mGnssFd != -1) {
-                // Only report location if the return from hardware is valid
-                // note that we can not merge these two "if" together, if didn't
-                // get location from hardware, we shouldn't report location, not
-                // report the "default" one.
-                if (currentLocation != nullptr) {
-                    this->reportLocation(*currentLocation);
-                }
+            if (currentLocation != nullptr) {
+                this->reportLocation(*currentLocation);
             } else {
                 if (sGnssCallback_2_1 != nullptr || sGnssCallback_2_0 != nullptr) {
                     const auto location = Utils::getMockLocationV2_0();
diff --git a/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS
index 9310f8e..117692a 100644
--- a/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
-# Telephony team
-amitmahajan@google.com
+# Bug component: 20868
+jminjie@google.com
+sarahchin@google.com
 shuoq@google.com
 jackyu@google.com
-
-# VTS team
-dshi@google.com
diff --git a/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS
index a07c917..4d199ca 100644
--- a/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
+# Bug component: 20868
 include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS
index a07c917..4d199ca 100644
--- a/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
+# Bug component: 20868
 include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS
index a07c917..4d199ca 100644
--- a/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
+# Bug component: 20868
 include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS
index a07c917..4d199ca 100644
--- a/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
+# Bug component: 20868
 include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS
index a07c917..4d199ca 100644
--- a/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
+# Bug component: 20868
 include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/config/1.1/vts/OWNERS b/radio/config/1.1/vts/OWNERS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4109967
--- /dev/null
+++ b/radio/config/1.1/vts/OWNERS
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Bug component: 20868
+include /radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/config/1.2/vts/OWNERS b/radio/config/1.2/vts/OWNERS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4109967
--- /dev/null
+++ b/radio/config/1.2/vts/OWNERS
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Bug component: 20868
+include /radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
index d7abf07..6f2f189 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -64,7 +64,9 @@
  * attestation.
  */
 TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, RsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
     vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
@@ -91,7 +93,9 @@
  * attestation.
  */
 TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
     vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
@@ -117,7 +121,9 @@
  * attestation correctly, if implemented.
  */
 TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, RsaDeviceUniqueAttestation) {
-    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to non-StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
     vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
@@ -174,7 +180,9 @@
  * attestation correctly, if implemented.
  */
 TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestation) {
-    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to non-StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
     vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
@@ -226,7 +234,9 @@
  * local device.
  */
 TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID) {
-    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to non-StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
     auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
@@ -292,7 +302,9 @@
  * don't match the local device.
  */
 TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID) {
-    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to non-StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
     auto attestation_id_tags =
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index f654d88..e41a851 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -1909,7 +1909,9 @@
  * INVALID_ARGUMENT.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaMismatchKeySize) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                       .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)
@@ -2136,7 +2138,9 @@
  * Verifies that keymint rejects HMAC key generation with multiple specified digest algorithms.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacMultipleDigests) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
               GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
@@ -2360,7 +2364,9 @@
  * presented.
  */
 TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, NoUserConfirmation) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
@@ -2450,7 +2456,9 @@
  * for a 1024-bit key.
  */
 TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPssSha512TooSmallKey) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512)
@@ -3269,7 +3277,9 @@
  * Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-521 key pair works correctly.
  */
 TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, Ecdsa521Success) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
                                                .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_521)
@@ -3978,7 +3988,9 @@
  * with a different digest than was used to encrypt.
  */
 TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -5849,7 +5861,9 @@
  * Verifies that the max uses per boot tag works correctly with AES keys.
  */
 TEST_P(MaxOperationsTest, TestLimitAes) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -5876,7 +5890,9 @@
  * Verifies that the max uses per boot tag works correctly with RSA keys.
  */
 TEST_P(MaxOperationsTest, TestLimitRsa) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -5907,7 +5923,9 @@
  * Verifies that the usage count limit tag = 1 works correctly with AES keys.
  */
 TEST_P(UsageCountLimitTest, TestSingleUseAes) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -5951,7 +5969,9 @@
  * Verifies that the usage count limit tag > 1 works correctly with AES keys.
  */
 TEST_P(UsageCountLimitTest, TestLimitedUseAes) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -5996,7 +6016,9 @@
  * Verifies that the usage count limit tag = 1 works correctly with RSA keys.
  */
 TEST_P(UsageCountLimitTest, TestSingleUseRsa) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -6040,7 +6062,9 @@
  * Verifies that the usage count limit tag > 1 works correctly with RSA keys.
  */
 TEST_P(UsageCountLimitTest, TestLimitUseRsa) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -6087,7 +6111,9 @@
  * in hardware.
  */
 TEST_P(UsageCountLimitTest, TestSingleUseKeyAndRollbackResistance) {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not applicable to StrongBox device";
+    }
 
     auto error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                      .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
@@ -6096,38 +6122,39 @@
                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
                                      .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE)
                                      .SetDefaultValidity());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE || error == ErrorCode::OK);
-
-    if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
-        // Rollback resistance is supported by KeyMint, verify it is enforced in hardware.
-        AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(SecLevelAuthorizations());
-        ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
-        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey());
-
-        // The KeyMint should also enforce single use key in hardware when it supports rollback
-        // resistance.
-        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                     .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
-                                                     .NoDigestOrPadding()
-                                                     .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1)
-                                                     .SetDefaultValidity()));
-
-        // Check the usage count limit tag appears in the hardware authorizations.
-        AuthorizationSet hardware_auths = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics_);
-        EXPECT_TRUE(hardware_auths.Contains(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1U))
-                << "key usage count limit " << 1U << " missing";
-
-        string message = "1234567890123456";
-        auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().NoDigestOrPadding();
-
-        // First usage of RSA key should work.
-        SignMessage(message, params);
-
-        // Usage count limit tag is enforced by hardware. After using the key, the key blob
-        // must be invalidated from secure storage (such as RPMB partition).
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, params));
+    if (error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Rollback resistance not supported";
     }
+
+    // Rollback resistance is supported by KeyMint, verify it is enforced in hardware.
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
+    AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(SecLevelAuthorizations());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey());
+
+    // The KeyMint should also enforce single use key in hardware when it supports rollback
+    // resistance.
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
+                                                 .NoDigestOrPadding()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1)
+                                                 .SetDefaultValidity()));
+
+    // Check the usage count limit tag appears in the hardware authorizations.
+    AuthorizationSet hardware_auths = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(hardware_auths.Contains(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1U))
+            << "key usage count limit " << 1U << " missing";
+
+    string message = "1234567890123456";
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().NoDigestOrPadding();
+
+    // First usage of RSA key should work.
+    SignMessage(message, params);
+
+    // Usage count limit tag is enforced by hardware. After using the key, the key blob
+    // must be invalidated from secure storage (such as RPMB partition).
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, params));
 }
 
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UsageCountLimitTest);
@@ -6204,24 +6231,25 @@
                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
                                      .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE)
                                      .SetDefaultValidity());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE || error == ErrorCode::OK);
+    if (error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Rollback resistance not supported";
+    }
 
     // Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
-    if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
-        AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(SecLevelAuthorizations());
-        ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
+    AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(SecLevelAuthorizations());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
 
-        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey(true /* keep key blob */));
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey(true /* keep key blob */));
 
-        string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
-        AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
-                  Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
-                        AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
-                        &begin_out_params));
-        AbortIfNeeded();
-        key_blob_ = AidlBuf();
-    }
+    string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+    AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+                    AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+                    &begin_out_params));
+    AbortIfNeeded();
+    key_blob_ = AidlBuf();
 }
 
 /**
@@ -6238,21 +6266,22 @@
                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
                                      .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE)
                                      .SetDefaultValidity());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE || error == ErrorCode::OK);
+    if (error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Rollback resistance not supported";
+    }
 
     // Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
-    if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
-        AuthorizationSet enforced(SecLevelAuthorizations());
-        ASSERT_TRUE(enforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
+    AuthorizationSet enforced(SecLevelAuthorizations());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(enforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
 
-        // Delete the key we don't care about the result at this point.
-        DeleteKey();
+    // Delete the key we don't care about the result at this point.
+    DeleteKey();
 
-        // Now create an invalid key blob and delete it.
-        key_blob_ = AidlBuf("just some garbage data which is not a valid key blob");
+    // Now create an invalid key blob and delete it.
+    key_blob_ = AidlBuf("just some garbage data which is not a valid key blob");
 
-        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey());
-    }
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey());
 }
 
 /**
@@ -6267,7 +6296,10 @@
  * credentials stored in Keystore/Keymint.
  */
 TEST_P(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteAllKeys) {
-    if (!arm_deleteAllKeys) return;
+    if (!arm_deleteAllKeys) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Option --arm_deleteAllKeys not set";
+        return;
+    }
     auto error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                      .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
@@ -6275,25 +6307,26 @@
                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
                                      .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE)
                                      .SetDefaultValidity());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE || error == ErrorCode::OK);
+    if (error == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Rollback resistance not supported";
+    }
 
     // Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
-    if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
-        AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(SecLevelAuthorizations());
-        ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
+    AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(SecLevelAuthorizations());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE));
 
-        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteAllKeys());
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteAllKeys());
 
-        string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
-        AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
+    string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+    AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
 
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
-                  Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
-                        AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
-                        &begin_out_params));
-        AbortIfNeeded();
-        key_blob_ = AidlBuf();
-    }
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+                    AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
+                    &begin_out_params));
+    AbortIfNeeded();
+    key_blob_ = AidlBuf();
 }
 
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyDeletionTest);
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/OWNERS b/vibrator/aidl/OWNERS
index 4bd5614..e3d7e6b 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/OWNERS
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/OWNERS
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
+include platform/frameworks/base:/services/core/java/com/android/server/vibrator/OWNERS
 chasewu@google.com
 leungv@google.com
-lsandrade@google.com
-michaelwr@google.com
diff --git a/weaver/1.0/vts/functional/OWNERS b/weaver/1.0/vts/functional/OWNERS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec8c304
--- /dev/null
+++ b/weaver/1.0/vts/functional/OWNERS
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# Bug component: 186411
+chengyouho@google.com
+frankwoo@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS
index cf81c79..287152d 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
+# Bug component: 33618
 arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS
index cf81c79..294fc82 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-arabawy@google.com
-etancohen@google.com
+# Bug component: 33618
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS
index cf81c79..294fc82 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-arabawy@google.com
-etancohen@google.com
+# Bug component: 33618
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS
index cf81c79..294fc82 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-arabawy@google.com
-etancohen@google.com
+# Bug component: 33618
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS