Merge changes from topics "nnapi-reusable-execution-canonical-2", "nnapi-reusable-execution-canonical-burst" into sc-dev
* changes:
Introduce reusable burst to canonical interface -- HAL.
Introduce reusable execution to canonical interface -- HAL.
diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp b/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp
index 2785739..901b7ee 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
"android.hardware.audio-impl_headers",
"android.hardware.audio.common.util@all-versions",
"libaudioclient_headers",
+ "libaudioutils_headers",
"libaudio_system_headers",
"libhardware_headers",
"libmedia_headers",
diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp b/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp
index 6eed3da..d027231 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <HidlUtils.h>
#include <android/log.h>
+#include <audio_utils/Metadata.h>
#include <hardware/audio.h>
#include <util/CoreUtils.h>
#include <utils/Trace.h>
@@ -742,7 +743,11 @@
switch (event) {
case STREAM_EVENT_CBK_TYPE_CODEC_FORMAT_CHANGED: {
hidl_vec<uint8_t> audioMetadata;
- audioMetadata.setToExternal((uint8_t*)param, strlen((char*)param));
+ // void* param is the byte string buffer from byte_string_from_audio_metadata().
+ // As the byte string buffer may have embedded zeroes, we cannot use strlen()
+ // but instead use audio_utils::metadata::dataByteStringLen().
+ audioMetadata.setToExternal((uint8_t*)param, audio_utils::metadata::dataByteStringLen(
+ (const uint8_t*)param));
result = eventCallback->onCodecFormatChanged(audioMetadata);
} break;
default:
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/vts/Android.bp b/biometrics/face/aidl/vts/Android.bp
index c5660b1..99c8c99 100644
--- a/biometrics/face/aidl/vts/Android.bp
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/vts/Android.bp
@@ -14,9 +14,14 @@
"use_libaidlvintf_gtest_helper_static",
],
srcs: ["VtsHalBiometricsFaceTargetTest.cpp"],
+ static_libs: [
+ "android.hardware.biometrics.common-V1-ndk_platform",
+ "android.hardware.biometrics.face-V1-ndk_platform",
+ "android.hardware.common-V2-ndk_platform",
+ "android.hardware.keymaster-V3-ndk_platform",
+ ],
shared_libs: [
"libbinder_ndk",
- "android.hardware.biometrics.face-V1-ndk_platform",
],
test_suites: [
"general-tests",
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 4806fef..768142c 100644
--- a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
"android.hardware.bluetooth@1.0",
"libbluetooth-types",
],
+ test_config: "VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml",
test_suites: [
"general-tests",
"vts",
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09463c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!-- Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+
+ Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+ http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+ Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ limitations under the License.
+-->
+<configuration description="Runs VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.">
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct" />
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct-native" />
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer">
+ </target_preparer>
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.StopServicesSetup">
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.DeviceSetup">
+ <option name="bluetooth" value="off" />
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
+ <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
+ <option name="push" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest->/data/local/tmp/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest" />
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <test class="com.android.tradefed.testtype.GTest" >
+ <option name="native-test-device-path" value="/data/local/tmp" />
+ <option name="module-name" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest" />
+ </test>
+</configuration>
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
index e64d5a9..7f56647 100644
--- a/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -32,5 +32,6 @@
"android.hardware.bluetooth@1.0",
"libbluetooth-types",
],
+ test_config: "VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml",
test_suites: ["general-tests", "vts"],
}
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d64751a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!-- Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+
+ Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+ http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+ Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ limitations under the License.
+-->
+<configuration description="Runs VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.">
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct" />
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct-native" />
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer">
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.DeviceSetup">
+ <option name="bluetooth" value="off" />
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
+ <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
+ <option name="push" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest->/data/local/tmp/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest" />
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <test class="com.android.tradefed.testtype.GTest" >
+ <option name="native-test-device-path" value="/data/local/tmp" />
+ <option name="module-name" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest" />
+ </test>
+</configuration>
diff --git a/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp b/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
index 7bb300e..deb420d 100644
--- a/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
@@ -7155,17 +7155,24 @@
sp<device::V3_5::ICameraDevice>* device3_5 /*out*/,
sp<device::V3_7::ICameraDevice>* device3_7 /*out*/) {
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, device3_5);
- if (deviceVersion == CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_5) {
- auto castResult = device::V3_5::ICameraDevice::castFrom(device);
- ASSERT_TRUE(castResult.isOk());
- *device3_5 = castResult;
- }
-
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, device3_7);
- if (deviceVersion == CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_7) {
- auto castResult = device::V3_7::ICameraDevice::castFrom(device);
- ASSERT_TRUE(castResult.isOk());
- *device3_7 = castResult;
+
+ switch (deviceVersion) {
+ case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_7: {
+ auto castResult = device::V3_7::ICameraDevice::castFrom(device);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(castResult.isOk());
+ *device3_7 = castResult;
+ }
+ [[fallthrough]];
+ case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_5: {
+ auto castResult = device::V3_5::ICameraDevice::castFrom(device);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(castResult.isOk());
+ *device3_5 = castResult;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ // no-op
+ return;
}
}
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
index 608890b..a75ed25 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
index e5e012c..3b8ee21 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
index 8e175f0..0fb21a7 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0-1</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
index bb22974..01cd1f6 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0-1</version>
diff --git a/current.txt b/current.txt
index 270880f..bdbe1b8 100644
--- a/current.txt
+++ b/current.txt
@@ -771,6 +771,7 @@
c2f64133b83ede65c9939ef97ab5bd867b73faf3dba0e7e69f77c3c43d9e487e android.hardware.contexthub@1.0::IContexthubCallback
bda492ec4021d13869de72bd6f8c15c5837b78d6136b8d538efec5320573a5ec android.hardware.gnss@1.0::IGnssMeasurementCallback
6a271e493907e8ba20912e42771bd0d99ae45431a851d5675ef9496d02510a34 android.hardware.gnss@1.1::IGnssMeasurementCallback
+11e9e1a1fd0c9b3d9648750d4b10dc2a839d3a6688904c3fc49500a4e7ca75b0 android.hardware.gnss@2.1::IGnssMeasurementCallback
2c331a9605f3a08d9c1e0a36169ca57758bc43c11a78ef3f3730509885e52c15 android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.4::IComposerClient
3da3ce039247872d95c6bd48621dbfdfa1c2d2a91a90f257862f87ee2bc46300 android.hardware.health@2.1::types
9679f27a42f75781c8993ef163ed92808a1928de186639834841d0b8e326e63d android.hardware.gatekeeper@1.0::IGatekeeper
@@ -780,8 +781,8 @@
dabe23dde7c9e3ad65c61def7392f186d7efe7f4216f9b6f9cf0863745b1a9f4 android.hardware.keymaster@4.1::IKeymasterDevice
cd84ab19c590e0e73dd2307b591a3093ee18147ef95e6d5418644463a6620076 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.2::IDevice
f729ee6a5f136b25d79ea6895d24700fce413df555baaecf2c39e4440d15d043 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.0::types
-a84f8dac7a9b75de1cc2936a9b429b9b62b32a31ea88ca52c29f98f5ddc0fa95 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.2::types
-cd331b92312d16ab89f475c39296abbf539efc4114a8c5c2b136ad99b904ef33 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::types
+38c1a3eb5c3dfa4cc40b7cf4be0e9850440e2c57197fba7407081679b358aa22 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.2::types
+550619f876cadbea1f718edce120f0e1dd4a6f4bd4c28b59d479677dc86b0aec android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::types
c3fec5bd470984402997f78a74b6511efc4063b270f2bd9ee7b78f48b683a1bb android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::IDevice
0fdfad62c2ec33b52e6687004e5a1971c02d10b93ee4d26df5ccff7ce032494a android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::IPreparedModel
e8c86c69c438da8d1549856c1bb3e2d1b8da52722f8235ff49a30f2cce91742c android.hardware.soundtrigger@2.1::ISoundTriggerHwCallback
@@ -797,5 +798,95 @@
2b5afef68e3e2ff1dab63e4f2ee57337ef2635ec812f49080cadfce966d33b52 android.hardware.radio@1.2::IRadio
# HALs released in Android S
-# NOTE: waiting to freeze HALs until later in the release
-# NOTE: new HALs are recommended to be in AIDL
+59fa68432e374c8d3b7ec098a91a1e023a2c728110bb733237c551afa5929725 android.hardware.audio@7.0::IDevice
+2207948ca127b801c94f667c99dfd139f150b50671e1408d3e855d03efbf631d android.hardware.audio@7.0::IDevicesFactory
+1d201e15c553cd44c62864ac8d7039351ddf048a7ee61e380f6efb0904442eb8 android.hardware.audio@7.0::IPrimaryDevice
+38afa920e6d36013b5a800e8c82eefeebd24602de24441e2f8ce5b3bdf62d3af android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStream
+77d84330418abba5a92b0cdc4e27fa7c85c27344eaf7eeef441b8e88829ee475 android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamIn
+40c5c43e923da23497c0e3d5a1c2d699b423a0268e1e971f918e4854e1c39951 android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamOut
+54cbc3c637fe8d4b889ccb5690e5e3069ca8efd9c6607ce1d021a3f47576c67e android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamOutCallback
+8036ae0a68a698a79207218018de5f41aed344723f644112ffc99e20e5e2e9ff android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamOutEventCallback
+84978dbd15d4fa8be6073d0974755f7718ee0cde519ce71449fb734f53cee46b android.hardware.audio@7.0::types
+6a03a9d8cc917da00e8b88f4abc42db2f741e2d50901e8ab6dea32084a238fbd android.hardware.audio.common@7.0::types
+842b4485a00005fb938f674b12445cb592cd1636f56c7cc447966119070811bd android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IAcousticEchoCancelerEffect
+b62a85e5d745dc35b5a60464c6b33a5bb7a2b8b95863a1374aee77ea29cf8f49 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IAutomaticGainControlEffect
+c8d5e30848191713db7cffccc482e4427816f33c98a24734c8769962f79f855b android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IBassBoostEffect
+7d021ecdf5bb6a61eb9ad193585d4986d1a64cb7fb4b52f219d7380145f2c6f1 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IDownmixEffect
+7fee1e7c7bb3d513a524c8963d1f8f7c2ad856f26c745b4ebc286b40d503264a android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEffect
+7596050ccc00234458dcb4e692056ed3c16f3618c11d7b17cb749cfd5713705d android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEffectBufferProviderCallback
+f2e41467bcf1140a11b219c2e8f77981b955c2941befe66e1cc685b7863ae4c9 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEffectsFactory
+af66fb4addbc477f9fea65fb63475203122a9189624ca8d14e757bc7826d60a4 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEnvironmentalReverbEffect
+2878d007ed55e1a4149ddcd29606962c948d8610642276f91dffd5ed32281824 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEqualizerEffect
+0260ef9e2a3e077de366ebebc0c117c7ee13f46a1eabd4abd66cc6245d0bed98 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::ILoudnessEnhancerEffect
+3586bbc3a7cbe30f9aff0a522524eea9b78eea78280f09c35d43dbab48a1193e android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::INoiseSuppressionEffect
+a7d74d7e7e0b1e3b739f233b7776bf01e868856a536f5cdac0f307e9c2850e64 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IPresetReverbEffect
+b4cbc1f2d38787f2ad069a8e4d10c0896287531a2596f0de0283e390b0ecf05d android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IVirtualizerEffect
+2b5681e1ea6a2db0dc1e84edb96d3de2f7daf306046543e7956be76dcb8f20fb android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IVisualizerEffect
+fa1e2d78e66fd662de93cb479ffd55947fe54f51cb53915814b3d3e3036c86a5 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::types
+b525e91d886379c13588f4975bb04d625d46e1f41b4453792c4b2db1e7ff4340 android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint@2.3::IBiometricsFingerprint
+4baf8e0eca4aa896cc9ceb7bb676aaf4fa21372ef8b49eed68eced1221c3dc0d android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::IBluetoothAudioProvider
+d417a9212c8f96e3a06a2f221c8c5756c765355b2b81de2b2a65d4c9eee85401 android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::IBluetoothAudioProvidersFactory
+c17d9e27abd37ae5a8ff8da08fc5c9b13a264670feef6bbbc9d3ab1915216130 android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::types
+6763dd2273b1b47f3ac68af9b66870287eba33fb5b4d66e8fe1d30ae18ce24cb android.hardware.boot@1.2::IBootControl
+1a1dff6e8d25dbc02a69fed3c077dd0782b30331ca3f345848ec52fc67744224 android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::ICameraDevice
+3be6faa3d11ad9c7ec01a1a0a009cf11cb65d701d109dab37613ce9cfb3cdd60 android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::ICameraDeviceSession
+3740ec773b2eb8fa6bd8c6e879eedb56c4e4306b88f1c20fa51103d791d871b1 android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::ICameraInjectionSession
+21f023685571daf46148097d98b89cea353f07e3ed83b2ed5685b23bd136c3ee android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::types
+f655c93132d223369ff6ddc621cb721f82dde6cc85ab9df2cbde6cb24cf2c885 android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.6::types
+98ff825a7d37e5ab983502d13cec1f2e5a9cac9b674b6ff1a52bcf540f4e315e android.hardware.camera.provider@2.7::ICameraProvider
+51fd14005859b16be55872660c34f5d423c77a2abcc5d4bdd5a537c40f32516b android.hardware.camera.provider@2.7::types
+3500d3c4e2d49eeed2f3239330a166beb2db2d5071b84d9c738b048c2d54a3d9 android.hardware.contexthub@1.2::IContexthub
+5ec58b1f9283d47857e3e70fbd39d9a4ff030c12d6fa3113af2b59fa3c77046e android.hardware.contexthub@1.2::IContexthubCallback
+afe69d8a66fcbd87aa1d5c033e91017237d5466110538a57e8287d7efa114538 android.hardware.contexthub@1.2::types
+c38a42661a90a0cef538b1757e29268d3a91867fcadf3c44185c992566da0b81 android.hardware.drm@1.4::ICryptoFactory
+0e96e7699ee74d65432a8712e6b2474b425a3a079c55f4e3122aa65ff2b778a4 android.hardware.drm@1.4::ICryptoPlugin
+4ebbe2b8ff3a6c8729619fe9ce62429f4b561d2e26e32eb54675babddfec9e59 android.hardware.drm@1.4::IDrmFactory
+a71fa24841f1398620f9baf738863dbaf29bde62cd171ac7b4608797ca55e35d android.hardware.drm@1.4::IDrmPlugin
+48127234347525a9d0fad9b7b79be5762d14e51cc87b1a09329a2452e06f3307 android.hardware.drm@1.4::types
+0c0657fad2239c2c7ec363d3b13f2e002d1c267ca89d2cc96d2b1de0475386cb android.hardware.fastboot@1.1::IFastboot
+61e5d73d12d558a3115e5b1e2e740fbe149235c36c607881f053f2f443cafdf5 android.hardware.media.c2@1.2::IComponent
+fcd17fb86c1b5570c8b55d855fd2ab93e4a2c6629d9ba9374372928469aad961 android.hardware.media.c2@1.2::IComponentStore
+8b149e213e77f4be50dcaf68ab55b8220ca62abd9443969e7f46a197b5adddfc android.hardware.media.c2@1.2::types
+3e8866987de4ecb48807c09d4c88ec38365930a22415f1b74edf8b14da17846b android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadio
+715789427a44cc78f9d123b0ceb9e035e4ac2b1049501337c23a512e85b87850 android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadioIndication
+4443f5c5f789d77ab491aad4cf4673d131bba45014d6bb4816888cbac37aa8c1 android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadioResponse
+d06226cd3e916bb866b016b22f35c89c1d9286f62a4aa82a549daf8d52805183 android.hardware.radio@1.6::types
+f22813615be1445ddd817655c054fc69dc9efea56c9035cd0757f3cbed190641 android.hardware.radio.config@1.3::IRadioConfig
+c9ad18729268593d14681d88ffad1c97e707444a45e1b4ed804dab949edbd84f android.hardware.radio.config@1.3::IRadioConfigResponse
+fd43298c43f70130c747a642ee43b0c242ac0cebffb377faa24f2725f0aa6caf android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.1::IOffloadControl
+fe18c9032e4063efca3fff3c377dd69780de1f96e8e2bc3f7d100a5d8bd467b4 android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.1::ITetheringOffloadCallback
+e34b4c7bec5e032c14804707ca924dd6b99ed5ba139da7505fe7d698d0fe178f android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.1::types
+63dfdb433ac73fb2bf4a44d2ade7b7e289e155835206d1939640d6c88d208994 android.hardware.tv.cec@1.1::IHdmiCec
+b9682587677ce9c872e04f0e9fd6c9c78a56ae795c07cbf8c50100e0351d4c44 android.hardware.tv.cec@1.1::IHdmiCecCallback
+4c4243db0fad48931622b07c5ada346ed7b8e49ace30da88fde754c976e430c2 android.hardware.tv.cec@1.1::types
+b8305da72fb09d5c8ae9f89bebdc30a4c1908a62253b705f9cb6df4dc28c9094 android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.1::IFilter
+3e29c02ccc3f0c22414eb05604a0cfe93af4521c49fc4165f0fdcaa3c975dc4f android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.1::IFilterCallback
+0f2deed38165f154f27a01c3e70e6ea770520d67f7dbf3630ee45992f7a644be android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.1::IFrontend
+695213b5c7ccd13cc0227a7aaca652f77b5a5a2352483575f2905d1361562b5d android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.1::IFrontendCallback
+6fd387a7ff5916def0d1c9010aa501b30ef2fe34f161164531c9631f67ff098a android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.1::ITuner
+ea2453fa7563783fa0cd7c09aa86e6cd7ac799a1d0fc439b34c416d1c55062d1 android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.1::types
+bcebdb0b3b59bd144eefc1b17aa96609c1b23bc9a5f7e0d7060dabd7f06ef9c0 android.hardware.usb@1.3::IUsb
+f2a87e56164145160b3b3a097dba2ccc1b0ffc2fb87e8c984adfe59f47b5ecf7 android.hardware.usb.gadget@1.2::IUsbGadget
+c539325b22bce686876f062b16292038555ae2857e8d34aa63a975df18e113b1 android.hardware.usb.gadget@1.2::IUsbGadgetCallback
+95e23dbfcfb38d390f236e5fff77dd518ba272a85551df6ecb4707fe466e60bd android.hardware.usb.gadget@1.2::types
+bb7b8f653452f2044e1db587ceb415edf72201ab9c1d547564c3f75bfab65a83 android.hardware.wifi@1.5::IWifi
+c66c3ea1b375e69d7ad820d67950305a463b5a50908c4fddcbbdbab8bbac3951 android.hardware.wifi@1.5::IWifiApIface
+a1193d37f7e13222bf79ef4b73dbad15b0f0a330d03356d12226dcda20de44a7 android.hardware.wifi@1.5::IWifiChip
+d78f1c169cf7e92ddf49e0b6a2b6d5566730e8085a56aefd9140c76b107bb35d android.hardware.wifi@1.5::IWifiEventCallback
+45ab93378f02a8bc3a658853ce4d3fdc1e9fa2c1d1c545821d490bf0f4d96cec android.hardware.wifi@1.5::IWifiNanIface
+b20261b97359a8b8784700d4278aa00a8666fcd9fc259c3a8386ba34bad5ec83 android.hardware.wifi@1.5::IWifiNanIfaceEventCallback
+b154b9fe8b94cf64392766bfd932c023edf658ba8ecc4b952f8424058120e5bd android.hardware.wifi@1.5::IWifiStaIface
+ee214c95481f61aefc1255987c92be6c3b4519be327467b1692630572060b489 android.hardware.wifi@1.5::types
+c972b342dd527a3952b5d2377bd6483dec48f6b85292ca537a97705381c7ea3c android.hardware.wifi.hostapd@1.3::IHostapd
+6a3152de16dfa71b065c686e84ce8b85317745c0b9dd8f4790009ec6950d96c8 android.hardware.wifi.hostapd@1.3::IHostapdCallback
+6d361bfd0ff1ecb6d2dddb72636ddce4d706453391de401852a6a53effb7b599 android.hardware.wifi.hostapd@1.3::types
+17818b6b1952a75e4364ae82c534b9d2f5c0a9765a56256b16faa5a5cf45d3a8 android.hardware.wifi.supplicant@1.4::ISupplicant
+d29fe62973c49b6fa40eb56c28567e37c4bbec015ff59111edfae446301dc06d android.hardware.wifi.supplicant@1.4::ISupplicantP2pIface
+ea465970e96d9605ee6f6706b3b512726c66d2644738added9128c739f8f8b0c android.hardware.wifi.supplicant@1.4::ISupplicantP2pIfaceCallback
+026b9a46658ee82b154ee624adc30a454f6401230db5eb446ead42e7ef51fc80 android.hardware.wifi.supplicant@1.4::ISupplicantStaIface
+0d5adbc7ca369ca30c64a3e3f021335f991055787bc80ab44bbbbaa056d5515b android.hardware.wifi.supplicant@1.4::ISupplicantStaIfaceCallback
+c8a57364f6ad20842be14f4db284df5304f7521ca8eac6bcc1fa6c5b466fb8a6 android.hardware.wifi.supplicant@1.4::ISupplicantStaNetwork
+2123482b69f3b531c88023aa2a007110e130efbf4ed68ac9ce0bc55d5e82bc8b android.hardware.wifi.supplicant@1.4::ISupplicantStaNetworkCallback
+0821f516e4d428bc15251969f7e19411c94d8f2ccbd99e1fc8168d8e49e38b0f android.hardware.wifi.supplicant@1.4::types
+
+# There should be no more HIDL HALs - please use AIDL instead.
diff --git a/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index e74cca9..7d32ced 100644
--- a/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -306,6 +306,8 @@
if (first != nullptr && second != nullptr) {
EXPECT_NE(first->user_id, second->user_id);
}
+ // the old enrollment should be invalid now
+ verifyPassword(password, enrollRsp.data, 0, verifyRsp, false);
ALOGI("Testing Untrusted Reenroll done");
}
diff --git a/gnss/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGnssV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/gnss/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGnssV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index 237e8ec..699ce9a 100644
--- a/gnss/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGnssV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/gnss/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGnssV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -135,12 +135,29 @@
}
/*
+ * SetPositionMode:
+ * Helper function to set positioning mode and verify output
+ */
+ void SetPositionMode(const int min_interval_msec) {
+ const int kPreferredAccuracy = 0; // Ideally perfect (matches GnssLocationProvider)
+ const int kPreferredTimeMsec = 0; // Ideally immediate
+
+ auto result = gnss_hal_->setPositionMode(
+ IGnss::GnssPositionMode::MS_BASED, IGnss::GnssPositionRecurrence::RECURRENCE_PERIODIC,
+ min_interval_msec, kPreferredAccuracy, kPreferredTimeMsec);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result);
+ }
+
+ /*
* StartAndGetSingleLocation:
* Helper function to get one Location and check fields
*
* returns true if a location was successfully generated
*/
- bool StartAndGetSingleLocation(bool checkAccuracies) {
+ bool StartAndGetSingleLocation(const bool checkAccuracies, const int min_interval_msec) {
+ SetPositionMode(min_interval_msec);
auto result = gnss_hal_->start();
EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk());
@@ -349,37 +366,24 @@
* and checks them for reasonable validity.
*/
TEST_P(GnssHalTest, GetLocation) {
-#define MIN_INTERVAL_MSEC 500
-#define PREFERRED_ACCURACY 0 // Ideally perfect (matches GnssLocationProvider)
-#define PREFERRED_TIME_MSEC 0 // Ideally immediate
+ const int kMinIntervalMsec = 500;
+ const int kLocationTimeoutSubsequentSec = 3;
+ const int kLocationsToCheck = 5;
-#define LOCATION_TIMEOUT_SUBSEQUENT_SEC 3
-#define LOCATIONS_TO_CHECK 5
+ bool checkMoreAccuracies = (info_called_count_ > 0 && last_info_.yearOfHw >= 2017);
- bool checkMoreAccuracies =
- (info_called_count_ > 0 && last_info_.yearOfHw >= 2017);
+ /*
+ * GPS signals initially optional for this test, so don't expect timeout yet.
+ */
+ bool gotLocation = StartAndGetSingleLocation(checkMoreAccuracies, kMinIntervalMsec);
- auto result = gnss_hal_->setPositionMode(
- IGnss::GnssPositionMode::MS_BASED,
- IGnss::GnssPositionRecurrence::RECURRENCE_PERIODIC, MIN_INTERVAL_MSEC,
- PREFERRED_ACCURACY, PREFERRED_TIME_MSEC);
-
- ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk());
- EXPECT_TRUE(result);
-
- /*
- * GPS signals initially optional for this test, so don't expect no timeout
- * yet
- */
- bool gotLocation = StartAndGetSingleLocation(checkMoreAccuracies);
-
- if (gotLocation) {
- for (int i = 1; i < LOCATIONS_TO_CHECK; i++) {
- EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait(LOCATION_TIMEOUT_SUBSEQUENT_SEC));
- EXPECT_EQ(location_called_count_, i + 1);
- CheckLocation(last_location_, checkMoreAccuracies, true);
+ if (gotLocation) {
+ for (int i = 1; i < kLocationsToCheck; i++) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait(kLocationTimeoutSubsequentSec));
+ EXPECT_EQ(location_called_count_, i + 1);
+ CheckLocation(last_location_, checkMoreAccuracies, true);
+ }
}
- }
StopAndClearLocations();
}
@@ -410,7 +414,7 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(resultVoid.isOk());
// Ensure we can get a good location after a bad injection has been deleted
- StartAndGetSingleLocation(false);
+ StartAndGetSingleLocation(false, /* min_interval_sec= */ 1000);
StopAndClearLocations();
}
@@ -430,7 +434,7 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(result);
- StartAndGetSingleLocation(false);
+ StartAndGetSingleLocation(false, /* min_interval_msec= */ 1000);
// Ensure we don't get a location anywhere within 111km (1 degree of lat or lng) of the seed
// location.
diff --git a/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.cpp b/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.cpp
index 52aaa69..6663a19 100644
--- a/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.cpp
@@ -99,7 +99,9 @@
EXPECT_TRUE(result);
}
-bool GnssHalTest::StartAndCheckFirstLocation(bool strict) {
+bool GnssHalTest::StartAndCheckFirstLocation(const bool strict, const int min_interval_msec,
+ const bool low_power_mode) {
+ SetPositionMode(min_interval_msec, low_power_mode);
auto result = gnss_hal_->start();
EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk());
@@ -141,7 +143,9 @@
SetPositionMode(kMinIntervalMsec, kLowPowerMode);
- EXPECT_TRUE(StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ true));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ true,
+ /* min_interval_msec= */ 1000,
+ /* low_power_mode= */ false));
for (int i = 1; i < count; i++) {
EXPECT_TRUE(gnss_cb_->location_cbq_.retrieve(gnss_cb_->last_location_,
diff --git a/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.h b/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.h
index 75c4216..c642028 100644
--- a/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.h
+++ b/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.h
@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@
*
* returns true if a location was successfully generated
*/
- bool StartAndCheckFirstLocation(bool strict);
+ bool StartAndCheckFirstLocation(const bool strict, const int min_interval_msec,
+ const bool low_power_mode);
/*
* CheckLocation:
diff --git a/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp b/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
index e6a51eb..ef64324 100644
--- a/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
+++ b/gnss/1.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
@@ -90,10 +90,8 @@
gnss_cb_->location_cbq_.reset();
// Start of Low Power Mode test
- SetPositionMode(kMinIntervalMsec, kLowPowerMode);
-
// Don't expect true - as without AGPS access
- if (!StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ false)) {
+ if (!StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ false, kMinIntervalMsec, kLowPowerMode)) {
ALOGW("GetLocationLowPower test - no first low power location received.");
}
diff --git a/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.cpp b/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.cpp
index 1cb44c5..5227693 100644
--- a/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.cpp
@@ -97,7 +97,9 @@
EXPECT_TRUE(result);
}
-bool GnssHalTest::StartAndCheckFirstLocation(bool strict) {
+bool GnssHalTest::StartAndCheckFirstLocation(const bool strict, const int min_interval_msec,
+ const bool low_power_mode) {
+ SetPositionMode(min_interval_msec, low_power_mode);
const auto result = gnss_hal_->start();
EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk());
@@ -137,7 +139,9 @@
SetPositionMode(kMinIntervalMsec, kLowPowerMode);
- EXPECT_TRUE(StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ true));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ true,
+ /* min_interval_msec= */ 1000,
+ /* low_power_mode= */ false));
for (int i = 1; i < count; i++) {
EXPECT_TRUE(gnss_cb_->location_cbq_.retrieve(gnss_cb_->last_location_,
diff --git a/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.h b/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.h
index 7fbd735..28a1979 100644
--- a/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.h
+++ b/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test.h
@@ -159,7 +159,8 @@
*
* returns true if a location was successfully generated
*/
- bool StartAndCheckFirstLocation(bool strict);
+ bool StartAndCheckFirstLocation(const bool strict, const int min_interval_msec,
+ const bool low_power_mode);
/*
* CheckLocation:
diff --git a/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp b/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
index 3e0058f..f17336b 100644
--- a/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
+++ b/gnss/2.0/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
@@ -403,7 +403,9 @@
}
TEST_P(GnssHalTest, TestGnssLocationElapsedRealtime) {
- StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ true);
+ StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ true,
+ /* min_interval_msec= */ 1000,
+ /* low_power_mode= */ false);
ASSERT_TRUE((int)gnss_cb_->last_location_.elapsedRealtime.flags <=
(int)(ElapsedRealtimeFlags::HAS_TIMESTAMP_NS |
@@ -419,7 +421,9 @@
// This test only verify that injectBestLocation_2_0 does not crash.
TEST_P(GnssHalTest, TestInjectBestLocation_2_0) {
- StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ true);
+ StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ true,
+ /* min_interval_msec= */ 1000,
+ /* low_power_mode= */ false);
gnss_hal_->injectBestLocation_2_0(gnss_cb_->last_location_);
StopAndClearLocations();
}
@@ -463,7 +467,9 @@
SetPositionMode(kMinIntervalMsec, kLowPowerMode);
// Don't expect true - as without AGPS access
- if (!StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ false)) {
+ if (!StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* strict= */ false,
+ /* min_interval_msec= */ 1000,
+ /* low_power_mode= */ false)) {
ALOGW("GetLocationLowPower test - no first low power location received.");
}
diff --git a/gnss/2.1/IGnssMeasurementCallback.hal b/gnss/2.1/IGnssMeasurementCallback.hal
index 60a5423..beef4fd 100644
--- a/gnss/2.1/IGnssMeasurementCallback.hal
+++ b/gnss/2.1/IGnssMeasurementCallback.hal
@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@
*
* The value does not include the inter-frequency Ionospheric bias.
*
+ * The sign of the value is defined by the following equation:
+ * corrected pseudorange = raw pseudorange - fullInterSignalBias
+ *
* The full ISB of GnssClock.referenceSignalTypeForIsb is defined to be 0.0 nanoseconds.
*/
double fullInterSignalBiasNs;
@@ -127,6 +130,9 @@
* - Satellite inter-code bias (e.g., Differential Code Bias (DCB)) (with respect to the
* code type in GnssClock.referenceSignalTypeForIsb)
*
+ * The sign of the value is defined by the following equation:
+ * corrected pseudorange = raw pseudorange - satelliteInterSignalBias
+ *
* The satellite ISB of GnssClock.referenceSignalTypeForIsb is defined to be 0.0
* nanoseconds.
*/
diff --git a/gnss/2.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp b/gnss/2.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
index deb80e8..fcab8c4 100644
--- a/gnss/2.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
+++ b/gnss/2.1/vts/functional/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@
*/
TEST_P(GnssHalTest, TestGnssSvInfoFields) {
gnss_cb_->location_cbq_.reset();
- StartAndCheckFirstLocation();
+ StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* min_interval_msec= */ 1000, /* low_power_mode= */ false);
int location_called_count = gnss_cb_->location_cbq_.calledCount();
// Tolerate 1 less sv status to handle edge cases in reporting.
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/default/Gnss.cpp b/gnss/aidl/default/Gnss.cpp
index 435afa3..6061eec 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/default/Gnss.cpp
+++ b/gnss/aidl/default/Gnss.cpp
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
#include <log/log.h>
#include "GnssConfiguration.h"
#include "GnssMeasurementInterface.h"
-#include "GnssPowerIndication.h"
#include "GnssPsds.h"
namespace aidl::android::hardware::gnss {
@@ -73,8 +72,11 @@
ndk::ScopedAStatus Gnss::getExtensionGnssPowerIndication(
std::shared_ptr<IGnssPowerIndication>* iGnssPowerIndication) {
ALOGD("Gnss::getExtensionGnssPowerIndication");
+ if (mGnssPowerIndication == nullptr) {
+ mGnssPowerIndication = SharedRefBase::make<GnssPowerIndication>();
+ }
- *iGnssPowerIndication = SharedRefBase::make<GnssPowerIndication>();
+ *iGnssPowerIndication = mGnssPowerIndication;
return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
}
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/default/Gnss.h b/gnss/aidl/default/Gnss.h
index bccc7f2..76ebe4d 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/default/Gnss.h
+++ b/gnss/aidl/default/Gnss.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <aidl/android/hardware/gnss/BnGnssPowerIndication.h>
#include <aidl/android/hardware/gnss/BnGnssPsds.h>
#include "GnssConfiguration.h"
+#include "GnssPowerIndication.h"
namespace aidl::android::hardware::gnss {
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@
std::shared_ptr<IGnssMeasurementInterface>* iGnssMeasurement) override;
std::shared_ptr<GnssConfiguration> mGnssConfiguration;
+ std::shared_ptr<GnssPowerIndication> mGnssPowerIndication;
private:
static std::shared_ptr<IGnssCallback> sGnssCallback;
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/default/GnssHidlHal.cpp b/gnss/aidl/default/GnssHidlHal.cpp
index 9529ec9..263715c 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/default/GnssHidlHal.cpp
+++ b/gnss/aidl/default/GnssHidlHal.cpp
@@ -31,11 +31,19 @@
} else {
mGnssConfigurationAidl = iGnss->mGnssConfiguration;
}
+
+ std::shared_ptr<IGnssPowerIndication> iGnssPowerIndication;
+ status = iGnss->getExtensionGnssPowerIndication(&iGnssPowerIndication);
+ if (!status.isOk()) {
+ ALOGE("Failed to getExtensionGnssPowerIndication.");
+ } else {
+ mGnssPowerIndicationAidl = iGnss->mGnssPowerIndication;
+ }
};
hidl_vec<GnssSvInfo> GnssHidlHal::filterBlocklistedSatellitesV2_1(
hidl_vec<GnssSvInfo> gnssSvInfoList) {
- ALOGD("filterBlocklistSatellitesV2_1 - overridden by GnssHidlHal class");
+ ALOGD("GnssHidlHal::filterBlocklistSatellitesV2_1");
if (mGnssConfigurationAidl == nullptr) {
ALOGE("Handle to AIDL GnssConfiguration is not available.");
return gnssSvInfoList;
@@ -51,4 +59,8 @@
return gnssSvInfoList;
}
+void GnssHidlHal::notePowerConsumption() {
+ mGnssPowerIndicationAidl->notePowerConsumption();
+}
+
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::gnss
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/default/GnssHidlHal.h b/gnss/aidl/default/GnssHidlHal.h
index 93a79a1..5fb4f97 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/default/GnssHidlHal.h
+++ b/gnss/aidl/default/GnssHidlHal.h
@@ -32,9 +32,11 @@
filterBlocklistedSatellitesV2_1(
hidl_vec<::android::hardware::gnss::V2_1::IGnssCallback::GnssSvInfo> gnssSvInfoList)
override;
+ void notePowerConsumption() override;
std::shared_ptr<Gnss> mGnssAidl;
std::shared_ptr<GnssConfiguration> mGnssConfigurationAidl;
+ std::shared_ptr<GnssPowerIndication> mGnssPowerIndicationAidl;
};
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::gnss
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/default/GnssPowerIndication.cpp b/gnss/aidl/default/GnssPowerIndication.cpp
index 429cc8c..4dec1c6 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/default/GnssPowerIndication.cpp
+++ b/gnss/aidl/default/GnssPowerIndication.cpp
@@ -50,13 +50,19 @@
};
GnssPowerStats gnssPowerStats = {
.elapsedRealtime = elapsedRealtime,
- .totalEnergyMilliJoule = 1.59975e+3,
- .singlebandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule = 1.2342e+3,
- .multibandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule = 3.653e+2,
+ .totalEnergyMilliJoule = 1.500e+3 + numLocationReported * 22.0,
+ .singlebandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule = 0.0,
+ .multibandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule = 1.28e+2 + numLocationReported * 4.0,
+ .singlebandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule = 0.0,
+ .multibandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule = 3.65e+2 + numLocationReported * 15.0,
.otherModesEnergyMilliJoule = {1.232e+2, 3.234e+3},
};
sCallback->gnssPowerStatsCb(gnssPowerStats);
return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
}
+void GnssPowerIndication::notePowerConsumption() {
+ numLocationReported++;
+}
+
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::gnss
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/default/GnssPowerIndication.h b/gnss/aidl/default/GnssPowerIndication.h
index e32fd72..93ca0b7 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/default/GnssPowerIndication.h
+++ b/gnss/aidl/default/GnssPowerIndication.h
@@ -26,12 +26,16 @@
const std::shared_ptr<IGnssPowerIndicationCallback>& callback) override;
ndk::ScopedAStatus requestGnssPowerStats() override;
+ void notePowerConsumption();
+
private:
// Guarded by mMutex
static std::shared_ptr<IGnssPowerIndicationCallback> sCallback;
// Synchronization lock for sCallback
mutable std::mutex mMutex;
+
+ int numLocationReported;
};
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::gnss
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp b/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
index ae0551d..0fc2ff8 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
+++ b/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
using android::hardware::gnss::ElapsedRealtime;
using android::hardware::gnss::GnssClock;
using android::hardware::gnss::GnssMeasurement;
+using android::hardware::gnss::GnssPowerStats;
using android::hardware::gnss::IGnss;
using android::hardware::gnss::IGnssConfiguration;
using android::hardware::gnss::IGnssMeasurementCallback;
@@ -168,9 +169,12 @@
* TestGnssPowerIndication
* 1. Gets the GnssPowerIndicationExtension.
* 2. Sets a GnssPowerIndicationCallback.
- * 3.
+ * 3. Requests and verifies the 1st GnssPowerStats is received.
+ * 4. Gets a location.
+ * 5. Requests the 2nd GnssPowerStats, and verifies it has larger values than the 1st one.
*/
TEST_P(GnssHalTest, TestGnssPowerIndication) {
+ // Set up gnssPowerIndication and callback
sp<IGnssPowerIndication> iGnssPowerIndication;
auto status = aidl_gnss_hal_->getExtensionGnssPowerIndication(&iGnssPowerIndication);
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
@@ -186,10 +190,49 @@
EXPECT_EQ(gnssPowerIndicationCallback->capabilities_cbq_.calledCount(), 1);
+ // Request and verify a GnssPowerStats is received
+ gnssPowerIndicationCallback->gnss_power_stats_cbq_.reset();
iGnssPowerIndication->requestGnssPowerStats();
+
EXPECT_TRUE(gnssPowerIndicationCallback->gnss_power_stats_cbq_.retrieve(
gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_gnss_power_stats_, kTimeoutSec));
EXPECT_EQ(gnssPowerIndicationCallback->gnss_power_stats_cbq_.calledCount(), 1);
+ auto powerStats1 = gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_gnss_power_stats_;
+
+ // Get a location and request another GnssPowerStats
+ gnss_cb_->location_cbq_.reset();
+ StartAndCheckFirstLocation(/* min_interval_msec= */ 1000, /* low_power_mode= */ false);
+
+ // Request and verify the 2nd GnssPowerStats has larger values than the 1st one
+ iGnssPowerIndication->requestGnssPowerStats();
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(gnssPowerIndicationCallback->gnss_power_stats_cbq_.retrieve(
+ gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_gnss_power_stats_, kTimeoutSec));
+ EXPECT_EQ(gnssPowerIndicationCallback->gnss_power_stats_cbq_.calledCount(), 2);
+ auto powerStats2 = gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_gnss_power_stats_;
+
+ // Elapsed realtime must increase
+ EXPECT_GT(powerStats2.elapsedRealtime.timestampNs, powerStats1.elapsedRealtime.timestampNs);
+
+ // Total energy must increase
+ EXPECT_GT(powerStats2.totalEnergyMilliJoule, powerStats1.totalEnergyMilliJoule);
+
+ // At least oone of singleband and multiband acquisition energy must increase
+ bool singlebandAcqEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.singlebandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule >
+ powerStats1.singlebandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule;
+ bool multibandAcqEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.multibandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule >
+ powerStats1.multibandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule;
+ EXPECT_TRUE(singlebandAcqEnergyIncreased || multibandAcqEnergyIncreased);
+
+ // At least one of singleband and multiband tracking energy must increase
+ bool singlebandTrackingEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.singlebandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule >
+ powerStats1.singlebandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule;
+ bool multibandTrackingEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.multibandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule >
+ powerStats1.multibandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule;
+ EXPECT_TRUE(singlebandTrackingEnergyIncreased || multibandTrackingEnergyIncreased);
+
+ // Clean up
+ StopAndClearLocations();
}
/*
diff --git a/gnss/common/utils/default/include/v2_1/GnssTemplate.h b/gnss/common/utils/default/include/v2_1/GnssTemplate.h
index a6e8f58..a1d6981 100644
--- a/gnss/common/utils/default/include/v2_1/GnssTemplate.h
+++ b/gnss/common/utils/default/include/v2_1/GnssTemplate.h
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@
mutable std::mutex mMutex;
virtual hidl_vec<V2_1::IGnssCallback::GnssSvInfo> filterBlocklistedSatellitesV2_1(
hidl_vec<V2_1::IGnssCallback::GnssSvInfo> gnssSvInfoList);
+ virtual void notePowerConsumption();
};
template <class T_IGnss>
@@ -219,6 +220,7 @@
auto svStatus = filterBlocklistedSatellitesV2_1(Utils::getMockSvInfoListV2_1());
this->reportSvStatus(svStatus);
auto currentLocation = getLocationFromHW();
+ notePowerConsumption();
if (mGnssFd != -1) {
// Only report location if the return from hardware is valid
// note that we can not merge these two "if" together, if didn't
@@ -245,7 +247,7 @@
template <class T_IGnss>
hidl_vec<V2_1::IGnssCallback::GnssSvInfo> GnssTemplate<T_IGnss>::filterBlocklistedSatellitesV2_1(
hidl_vec<V2_1::IGnssCallback::GnssSvInfo> gnssSvInfoList) {
- ALOGD("filterBlocklistedSatellitesV2_1");
+ ALOGD("GnssTemplate::filterBlocklistedSatellitesV2_1");
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < gnssSvInfoList.size(); i++) {
if (mGnssConfiguration->isBlacklistedV2_1(gnssSvInfoList[i])) {
gnssSvInfoList[i].v2_0.v1_0.svFlag &=
@@ -256,6 +258,11 @@
}
template <class T_IGnss>
+void GnssTemplate<T_IGnss>::notePowerConsumption() {
+ ALOGD("GnssTemplate::notePowerConsumption");
+}
+
+template <class T_IGnss>
Return<bool> GnssTemplate<T_IGnss>::stop() {
ALOGD("stop");
mIsActive = false;
diff --git a/gnss/common/utils/vts/include/v2_1/gnss_hal_test_template.h b/gnss/common/utils/vts/include/v2_1/gnss_hal_test_template.h
index fec3503..03166be 100644
--- a/gnss/common/utils/vts/include/v2_1/gnss_hal_test_template.h
+++ b/gnss/common/utils/vts/include/v2_1/gnss_hal_test_template.h
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@
*
* returns true if a location was successfully generated
*/
- bool StartAndCheckFirstLocation();
+ bool StartAndCheckFirstLocation(const int min_interval_msec, const bool low_power_mode);
/*
* CheckLocation:
@@ -234,7 +234,9 @@
}
template <class T_IGnss>
-bool GnssHalTestTemplate<T_IGnss>::StartAndCheckFirstLocation() {
+bool GnssHalTestTemplate<T_IGnss>::StartAndCheckFirstLocation(const int min_interval_msec,
+ const bool low_power_mode) {
+ SetPositionMode(min_interval_msec, low_power_mode);
const auto result = gnss_hal_->start();
EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk());
@@ -274,9 +276,7 @@
const int kLocationTimeoutSubsequentSec = 2;
const bool kLowPowerMode = false;
- SetPositionMode(kMinIntervalMsec, kLowPowerMode);
-
- EXPECT_TRUE(StartAndCheckFirstLocation());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(StartAndCheckFirstLocation(kMinIntervalMsec, kLowPowerMode));
for (int i = 1; i < count; i++) {
EXPECT_TRUE(gnss_cb_->location_cbq_.retrieve(gnss_cb_->last_location_,
diff --git a/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl b/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
index 8b12169..232e023 100644
--- a/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
+++ b/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
int width;
int height;
int layers;
- android.hardware.graphics.common.PixelFormat format;
- android.hardware.graphics.common.BufferUsage usage;
+ android.hardware.graphics.common.PixelFormat format = android.hardware.graphics.common.PixelFormat.UNSPECIFIED;
+ android.hardware.graphics.common.BufferUsage usage = android.hardware.graphics.common.BufferUsage.CPU_READ_NEVER;
int stride;
}
diff --git a/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl b/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
index e1e3492..078c512 100644
--- a/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
+++ b/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
int width;
int height;
int layers;
- PixelFormat format;
- BufferUsage usage;
+ PixelFormat format = PixelFormat.UNSPECIFIED;
+ BufferUsage usage = BufferUsage.CPU_READ_NEVER;
int stride;
}
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
index 0df2b8d..7d0a83b 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
@@ -73,15 +73,15 @@
IComposerClient::Rect getFrameRect() const { return {0, 0, mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight}; }
- void setDimensions(int32_t displayWidth, int32_t displayHeight) const {
+ void setDimensions(int32_t displayWidth, int32_t displayHeight) {
mDisplayWidth = displayWidth;
mDisplayHeight = displayHeight;
}
private:
const Display mDisplay;
- mutable int32_t mDisplayWidth;
- mutable int32_t mDisplayHeight;
+ int32_t mDisplayWidth;
+ int32_t mDisplayHeight;
};
class GraphicsComposerHidlTest : public ::testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@
const ContentType& contentType, const char* contentTypeStr);
Error setActiveConfigWithConstraints(
- const VtsDisplay& display, Config config,
+ VtsDisplay& display, Config config,
const IComposerClient::VsyncPeriodChangeConstraints& constraints,
VsyncPeriodChangeTimeline* timeline) {
const auto error = mComposerClient->setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display.get(), config,
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
return error;
}
- void setActiveConfig(const VtsDisplay& display, Config config) {
+ void setActiveConfig(VtsDisplay& display, Config config) {
mComposerClient->setActiveConfig(display.get(), config);
const int32_t displayWidth = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
display.get(), config, IComposerClient::Attribute::WIDTH);
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@
}
TEST_P(GraphicsComposerHidlTest, getDisplayVsyncPeriod) {
- for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+ for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
for (Config config : mComposerClient->getDisplayConfigs(display.get())) {
VsyncPeriodNanos expectedVsyncPeriodNanos = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
display.get(), config,
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@
constraints.seamlessRequired = false;
constraints.desiredTimeNanos = systemTime();
- for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+ for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
Config invalidConfigId = GetInvalidConfigId(display.get());
EXPECT_EQ(Error::BAD_CONFIG,
setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display, invalidConfigId, constraints, &timeline));
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@
constraints.seamlessRequired = true;
constraints.desiredTimeNanos = systemTime();
- for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+ for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
forEachTwoConfigs(display.get(), [&](Config config1, Config config2) {
const auto configGroup1 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
display.get(), config1,
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@
}
void GraphicsComposerHidlTest::Test_setActiveConfigWithConstraints(const TestParameters& params) {
- for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+ for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
forEachTwoConfigs(display.get(), [&](Config config1, Config config2) {
setActiveConfig(display, config1);
sendRefreshFrame(display, nullptr);
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index a097895..3224e4b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@
void startRetrieval(in android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile[] accessControlProfiles, in android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthToken authToken, in byte[] itemsRequest, in byte[] signingKeyBlob, in byte[] sessionTranscript, in byte[] readerSignature, in int[] requestCounts);
void startRetrieveEntryValue(in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize, in int[] accessControlProfileIds);
byte[] retrieveEntryValue(in byte[] encryptedContent);
- void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
- android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"}) void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"}) android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
void setRequestedNamespaces(in android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
void setVerificationToken(in android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken verificationToken);
byte[] deleteCredentialWithChallenge(in byte[] challenge);
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
index a713462..19a29ec 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -38,6 +38,6 @@
android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile addAccessControlProfile(in int id, in android.hardware.identity.Certificate readerCertificate, in boolean userAuthenticationRequired, in long timeoutMillis, in long secureUserId);
void beginAddEntry(in int[] accessControlProfileIds, in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize);
byte[] addEntryValue(in byte[] content);
- void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"}) void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index d23f88c..8ae293b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@
*
* @param out deviceNameSpaces the bytes of DeviceNameSpaces.
*/
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"})
void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
/**
@@ -376,6 +377,7 @@
*
* @return an X.509 certificate for the new signing key, signed by the credential key.
*/
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"})
Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
/**
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
index 5f878ee..22bcf61 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@
* "accessControlProfiles" : [ * uint ],
* }
*/
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"})
void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData,
out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index e0d60fc..9e37ed0 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -921,6 +921,23 @@
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
}
+/**
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidKeySize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidKeySize) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ }
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_HIDL_TEST(NewKeyGenerationTest);
typedef KeymasterHidlTest SigningOperationsTest;
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
index db1df2b..4f21cba 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
long challenge;
long userId;
long authenticatorId;
- android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType;
+ android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType = android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType.NONE;
android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
byte[] mac;
}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
index 0633765..b116dac 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -20,6 +20,6 @@
parcelable VerificationToken {
long challenge;
android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
- android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+ android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel = android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel.SOFTWARE;
byte[] mac;
}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
index 58602aa..99b036a 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
* authenticatorType describes the type of authentication that took place, e.g. password or
* fingerprint.
*/
- HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType;
+ HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType = HardwareAuthenticatorType.NONE;
/**
* timestamp indicates when the user authentication took place, in milliseconds since some
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
index f053254..5efd937 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
/**
* SecurityLevel of the secure environment that generated the token.
*/
- SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+ SecurityLevel securityLevel = SecurityLevel.SOFTWARE;
/**
* 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 of the above values, computed as:
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal b/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal
index 03aed86..f5b6ead 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal
@@ -3618,7 +3618,7 @@
* front of dimension i.
* padding[i, 1] specifies the number of elements to be padded after
* the end of dimension i.
- * * 2: An scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
+ * * 2: A scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT16}, the
* pad value must be of {@link OperandType::FLOAT16}.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT32}, the
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal b/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal
index a5dbd5e..a26b858 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal
@@ -3834,7 +3834,7 @@
* front of dimension i.
* padding[i, 1] specifies the number of elements to be padded after
* the end of dimension i.
- * * 2: An scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
+ * * 2: A scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT16}, the
* pad value must be of {@link OperandType::FLOAT16}.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT32}, the
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
index 5a9f4ff..1d9bdd8 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@
package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
@VintfStability
parcelable Operand {
- android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type;
+ android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType.FLOAT32;
int[] dimensions;
float scale;
int zeroPoint;
- android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandLifeTime lifetime;
+ android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandLifeTime lifetime = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandLifeTime.TEMPORARY_VARIABLE;
android.hardware.neuralnetworks.DataLocation location;
@nullable android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandExtraParams extraParams;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
index de93d8b..ebb361b 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
@@ -34,6 +34,6 @@
package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
@VintfStability
parcelable OperandPerformance {
- android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type;
+ android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType.FLOAT32;
android.hardware.neuralnetworks.PerformanceInfo info;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
index 33fcd60..a4a3fbe 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
@VintfStability
parcelable Operation {
- android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperationType type;
+ android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperationType type = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperationType.ADD;
int[] inputs;
int[] outputs;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
index 4d2260f..998e06d 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
* {@link IDevice::OPERAND_TYPE_BASE_MAX} is possible and should be interpreted as an extension
* type according to {@link Model::extensionNameToPrefix}.
*/
- OperandType type;
+ OperandType type = OperandType.FLOAT32;
/**
* Dimensions of the operand.
*
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
/**
* How the operand is used.
*/
- OperandLifeTime lifetime;
+ OperandLifeTime lifetime = OperandLifeTime.TEMPORARY_VARIABLE;
/**
* Where to find the data for this operand.
* If the lifetime is TEMPORARY_VARIABLE, SUBGRAPH_INPUT, SUBGRAPH_OUTPUT, or NO_VALUE:
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
index 7fd86f9..7f53967 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
@@ -25,6 +25,6 @@
*/
@VintfStability
parcelable OperandPerformance {
- OperandType type;
+ OperandType type = OperandType.FLOAT32;
PerformanceInfo info;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
index 0c6032f..366d9a4 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
* {@link IDevice::OPERATION_TYPE_BASE_MAX} is possible and should be interpreted as an
* extension type according to {@link Model::extensionNameToPrefix}.
*/
- OperationType type;
+ OperationType type = OperationType.ADD;
/**
* Describes the table that contains the indexes of the inputs of the operation. The offset is
* the index in the operandIndexes table.
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl
index 3f49154..e7fb90d 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl
@@ -3693,7 +3693,7 @@
* front of dimension i.
* padding[i, 1] specifies the number of elements to be padded after
* the end of dimension i.
- * * 2: An scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
+ * * 2: A scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT16}, the
* pad value must be of {@link OperandType::FLOAT16}.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT32}, the
diff --git a/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp b/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp
index fcdcbbc..a1e50f0 100644
--- a/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp
+++ b/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
::android::hardware::Return<NfcStatus> Nfc::coreInitialized(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& data) {
hidl_vec<uint8_t> copy = data;
- if (mDevice == nullptr) {
+ if (mDevice == nullptr || copy.size() == 0) {
return NfcStatus::FAILED;
}
int ret = mDevice->core_initialized(mDevice, ©[0]);
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index bf30999..fa643fc 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@
void deleteKey(in byte[] keyBlob);
void deleteAllKeys();
void destroyAttestationIds();
- android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult begin(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] params, in android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken authToken);
+ android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult begin(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] params, in @nullable android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken authToken);
void deviceLocked(in boolean passwordOnly, in @nullable android.hardware.security.secureclock.TimeStampToken timestampToken);
void earlyBootEnded();
byte[] convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(in byte[] storageKeyBlob);
- byte[] performOperation(in byte[] request);
+ android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCharacteristics[] getKeyCharacteristics(in byte[] keyBlob, in byte[] appId, in byte[] appData);
const int AUTH_TOKEN_MAC_LENGTH = 32;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index 7591318..e310b44 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@
RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = 1342177480,
INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = 1879048394,
RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST = 536871115,
- BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS = 268435757,
BOOTLOADER_ONLY = 1879048494,
ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = 1879048495,
HARDWARE_TYPE = 268435760,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
index b4bc60c..4e3008f 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
@@ -27,7 +27,19 @@
@VintfStability
@RustDerive(Clone=true, Eq=true, PartialEq=true, Ord=true, PartialOrd=true, Hash=true)
parcelable AttestationKey {
+ /**
+ * Key blob containing a key pair with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY
+ */
byte[] keyBlob;
+
+ /**
+ * Key parameters needed to use the key in keyBlob, notably Tag::APPLICATION_ID and
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA, if they were provided during generation of the key in keyBlob.
+ */
KeyParameter[] attestKeyParams;
+
+ /**
+ * The issuerSubjectName to use in the generated attestation.
+ */
byte[] issuerSubjectName;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
index 2304a58..b5336b9 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
@@ -25,7 +25,10 @@
*/
@VintfStability
parcelable BeginResult {
- /* This is the challenge used in verifyAuthorization. It must be a nonce. */
+ /**
+ * This is the challenge used to verify authorization of an operation.
+ * See IKeyMintOperation.aidl entrypoints updateAad() and update().
+ */
long challenge;
/**
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index 1c503c2..b6af813 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
import android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintOperation;
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCharacteristics;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCreationResult;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyFormat;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyMintHardwareInfo;
@@ -107,7 +108,6 @@
*
* - 168-bit keys.
* - CBC and ECB mode.
-
* - CBC and ECB modes must support unpadded and PKCS7 padding modes. With no padding CBC and
* ECB-mode operations must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the input isn't a
* multiple of the DES block size.
@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@
*
* The IKeyMintDevice must ignore unknown tags.
*
- * The caller must always provide the current date time in the keyParameter CREATION_DATETIME
- * tags.
+ * The caller may provide the current date time in the keyParameter CREATION_DATETIME tag, but
+ * this is optional and informational only.
*
* All authorization tags and their values enforced by an IKeyMintDevice must be cryptographically
* bound to the private/secret key material such that any modification of the portion of the key
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@
* startup, preferably by the bootloader. This bitstring must be cryptographically bound to every
* key managed by the IKeyMintDevice. As above, the recommended mechanism for this cryptographic
* binding is to include the Root of Trust data in the input to the key derivation function used to
- * derive a key that is used to encryp the private/secret key material.
+ * derive a key that is used to encrypt the private/secret key material.
*
* The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by
* Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the lock state of the
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@
* Generates a new cryptographic key, specifying associated parameters, which must be
* cryptographically bound to the key. IKeyMintDevice implementations must disallow any use
* of a key in any way inconsistent with the authorizations specified at generation time. With
- * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure envionment's
+ * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure environment's
* obligation is limited to ensuring that the unenforceable parameters associated with the key
* cannot be modified. In addition, the characteristics returned by generateKey places
* parameters correctly in the tee-enforced and strongbox-enforced lists.
@@ -257,9 +257,6 @@
*
* o Tag::ORIGIN with the value KeyOrigin::GENERATED.
*
- * o Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS with the appropriate value (see KeyBlobUsageRequirements in
- * Tag.aidl).
- *
* o Tag::OS_VERSION, Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL, Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL and Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL with
* appropriate values.
*
@@ -271,15 +268,14 @@
*
* The following parameters are required to generate an RSA key:
*
- * o Tag::Key_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits. If omitted, generateKey
+ * o Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits. If omitted, generateKey
* must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. Required values for TEE IKeyMintDevice
* implementations are 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096. StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations
* must support 2048.
*
* o Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT specifies the RSA public exponent value. If omitted, generateKey
* must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. The values 3 and 65537 must be supported. It is
- * recommended to support all prime values up to 2^64. If provided with a non-prime value,
- * generateKey must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ * recommended to support all prime values up to 2^64.
*
* The following parameters are not necessary to generate a usable RSA key, but generateKey must
* not return an error if they are omitted:
@@ -288,7 +284,7 @@
* except AGREE_KEY must be supported for RSA keys.
*
* o Tag::DIGEST specifies digest algorithms that may be used with the new key. TEE
- * IKeyMintDevice implementatiosn must support all Digest values (see digest.aidl) for RSA
+ * IKeyMintDevice implementations must support all Digest values (see digest.aidl) for RSA
* keys. StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations must support SHA_2_256.
*
* o Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the new
@@ -298,11 +294,9 @@
*
* == ECDSA Keys ==
*
- * Either Tag::KEY_SIZE or Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key. If neither
- * is provided, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. If Tag::KEY_SIZE is
- * provided, the possible values are 224, 256, 384 and 521, and must be mapped to Tag::EC_CURVE
- * values P_224, P_256, P_384 and P_521, respectively. TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations
- * must support all curves. StrongBox implementations must support P_256.
+ * Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key. If it is not provided, generateKey
+ * must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations must support
+ * all curves. StrongBox implementations must support P_256.
*
* == AES Keys ==
*
@@ -312,6 +306,10 @@
* If Tag::BLOCK_MODE is specified with value BlockMode::GCM, then the caller must also provide
* Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH. If omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
*
+ * == 3DES Keys ==
+ *
+ * Only Tag::KEY_SIZE is required to generate an 3DES key, and its value must be 168. If
+ * omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
*
* @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
* provided in params. See above for detailed specifications of which tags are required
@@ -325,6 +323,10 @@
* return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE. If the provided AttestationKey has an empty
* issuer subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
*
+ * If `attestationKey` is null and `keyParams` contains Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE but
+ * the KeyMint implementation does not have factory-provisioned attestation keys, it must
+ * return ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED.
+ *
* @return The result of key creation. See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
*/
KeyCreationResult generateKey(
@@ -348,13 +350,12 @@
*
* o Tag::ORIGIN (returned in keyCharacteristics) must have the value KeyOrigin::IMPORTED.
*
- * @param inKeyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
+ * @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
* provided in params.
*
- * @param inKeyFormat The format of the key material to import. See KeyFormat in
- * keyformat.aidl.
+ * @param keyFormat The format of the key material to import. See KeyFormat in keyformat.aidl.
*
- * @param inKeyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
+ * @param keyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
*
* @param attestationKey, if provided, specifies the key that must be used to sign the
* attestation certificate. If `keyParams` does not contain a Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE
@@ -364,6 +365,10 @@
* return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE. If the provided AttestationKey has an empty
* issuer subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
*
+ * If `attestationKey` is null and `keyParams` contains Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE but
+ * the KeyMint implementation does not have factory-provisioned attestation keys, it must
+ * return ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED.
+ *
* @return The result of key creation. See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
*/
KeyCreationResult importKey(in KeyParameter[] keyParams, in KeyFormat keyFormat,
@@ -373,9 +378,8 @@
* Securely imports a key, or key pair, returning a key blob and a description of the imported
* key.
*
- * @param inWrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import.
- * TODO(seleneh) Decide if we want the wrapped key in DER-encoded ASN.1 format or CBOR
- * format or both. And specify the standarized format.
+ * @param wrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import, as ASN.1 DER-encoded data
+ * corresponding to the following schema.
*
* KeyDescription ::= SEQUENCE(
* keyFormat INTEGER, # Values from KeyFormat enum.
@@ -393,20 +397,20 @@
*
* Where:
*
- * o keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext
+ * - keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext
* key material.
- * o keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or
+ * - keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or
* importKey). If the secure import is successful, these characteristics must be
* associated with the key exactly as if the key material had been insecurely imported
- * with the IKeyMintDevice::importKey. See attestKey() for documentation of the
- * AuthorizationList schema.
- * o encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted
+ * with the IKeyMintDevice::importKey. See KeyCreationResult.aidl for documentation of
+ * the AuthorizationList schema.
+ * - encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted
* with the wrapping key specified by wrappingKeyBlob.
- * o keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above.
- * o encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and
+ * - keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above.
+ * - encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and
* encrypted with encryptedEphemeralKey in AES-GCM mode, with the DER-encoded
* representation of keyDescription provided as additional authenticated data.
- * o tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey.
+ * - tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey.
*
* So, importWrappedKey does the following:
*
@@ -435,7 +439,7 @@
*
* @param passwordSid specifies the password secure ID (SID) of the user that owns the key being
* installed. If the authorization list in wrappedKeyData contains a
- * Tag::USER_SECURE_IDwith a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD bit
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID with a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD bit
* set, the constructed key must be bound to the SID value provided by this argument. If
* the wrappedKeyData does not contain such a tag and value, this argument must be
* ignored.
@@ -478,9 +482,9 @@
* patch level and OS version. This requirement is relaxed for 4.0::IKeymasterDevice and
* IKeyMintDevice, and the OS version in the boot image footer is no longer used.
*
- * @param inKeyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+ * @param keyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey().
*
- * @param inUpgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the
+ * @param upgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the
* upgrade, including Tag::APPLICATION_ID and Tag::APPLICATION_DATA.
*
* @return A new key blob that references the same key as keyBlobToUpgrade, but is in the new
@@ -494,7 +498,9 @@
* render the key permanently unusable. Keys without Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or
* may not be rendered unusable.
*
- * @param inKeyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+ * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+ *
+ * @return error See the ErrorCode enum.
*/
void deleteKey(in byte[] keyBlob);
@@ -503,8 +509,6 @@
* this function is called all keys with Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE in their hardware-enforced
* authorization lists must be rendered permanently unusable. Keys without
* Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or may not be rendered unusable.
- *
- * @return error See the ErrorCode enum.
*/
void deleteAllKeys();
@@ -523,28 +527,27 @@
/**
* Begins a cryptographic operation using the specified key. If all is well, begin() must
- * return ErrorCode::OK and create an operation handle which must be passed to subsequent calls
- * to update(), finish() or abort().
+ * return ErrorCode::OK and create an IKeyMintOperation handle which will be used to perform
+ * the cryptographic operation.
*
- * It is critical that each call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to finish() or
- * abort(), to allow the IKeyMintDevice implementation to clean up any internal operation
- * state. The caller's failure to do this may leak internal state space or other internal
- * resources and may eventually cause begin() to return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it
- * runs out of space for operations. Any result other than ErrorCode::OK from begin(), update()
- * or finish() implicitly aborts the operation, in which case abort() need not be called (and
- * must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE if called). IKeyMintDevice implementations
- * must support 32 concurrent operations.
+ * It is critical that each successful call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to
+ * finish() or abort() on the resulting IKeyMintOperation, to allow the IKeyMintDevice
+ * implementation to clean up any internal operation state. The caller's failure to do this may
+ * leak internal state space or other internal resources and may eventually cause begin() to
+ * return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it runs out of space for operations. Any result
+ * other than ErrorCode::OK from begin() will not return an IKeyMintOperation (in which case
+ * calling finish() or abort() is neither possible nor necessary). IKeyMintDevice
+ * implementations must support 32 concurrent operations.
*
* If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were specified during key generation or
* import, calls to begin must include those tags with the originally-specified values in the
- * inParams argument to this method. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
+ * params argument to this method. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
*
* == Authorization Enforcement ==
*
* The following key authorization parameters must be enforced by the IKeyMintDevice secure
* environment if the tags were returned in the "hardwareEnforced" list in the
- * KeyCharacteristics. Public key operations, meaning KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and
- * KeyPurpose::VERIFY must be allowed to succeed even if authorization requirements are not met.
+ * KeyCharacteristics.
*
* -- All Key Types --
*
@@ -573,9 +576,9 @@
*
* o Tag::USER_SECURE_ID must be enforced by this method if and only if the key also has
* Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT (if it does not have Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT, the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID
- * requirement must be enforced by update() and finish()). If the key has both, then this
- * method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument. For the auth
- * token to be valid, all of the following have to be true:
+ * requirement must be enforced by updateAad(), update() and finish()). If the key has both,
+ * then this method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument. For
+ * the auth token to be valid, all of the following have to be true:
*
* o The HMAC field must validate correctly.
*
@@ -602,32 +605,30 @@
*
* -- RSA Keys --
*
- * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams. If unspecified or
+ * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in params. If unspecified or
* specified more than once, the begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
*
- * RSA signing and verification operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption
- * operations with OAEP padding mode. For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one
- * digest in inParams. If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return
+ * RSA signing operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption operations with
+ * OAEP padding mode. For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one digest in params.
+ * If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return
* ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST.
*
* Private key operations (KeyPurpose::DECRYPT and KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of
* digest and padding, which means that the key authorizations need to contain the specified
* values. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST or
- * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING, as appropriate. Public key operations (KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT
- * and KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are permitted with unauthorized digest or padding modes.
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, as appropriate.
*
* With the exception of PaddingMode::NONE, all RSA padding modes are applicable only to certain
* purposes. Specifically, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN and PaddingMode::RSA_PSS only
- * support signing and verification, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and
- * PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only support encryption and decryption. begin() must return
- * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE if the specified mode does not support the specified
- * purpose.
+ * support signing, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only
+ * support encryption and decryption. begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE
+ * if the specified mode does not support the specified purpose.
*
* There are some important interactions between padding modes and digests:
*
- * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed. If signing or
- * verifying, Digest::NONE is specified for the digest. No digest is necessary for unpadded
- * encryption or decryption.
+ * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed. If signing,
+ * Digest::NONE is specified for the digest. No digest is necessary for unpadded encryption
+ * or decryption.
*
* o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN padding requires a digest. The digest may be Digest::NONE,
* in which case the KeyMint implementation cannot build a proper PKCS#1 v1.5 signature
@@ -639,37 +640,37 @@
*
* o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_1_5_ENCRYPT padding does not require a digest.
*
- * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE. If
- * Digest::NONE is specified, the begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. In
- * addition, the size of the RSA key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size
- * of the digest, where D is the size of the digest, in bytes. Otherwise begin() must
- * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The salt size must be D.
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which must match one of the padding values
+ * in the key authorizations, and which may not be Digest::NONE. begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST if this is not the case. In addition, the size of the RSA
+ * key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size of the digest, where D is the
+ * size of the digest, in bytes. Otherwise begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The salt size must be D.
*
- * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE. If
- * Digest::NONE is specified, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The OAEP
- * mask generation function must be MGF1 and the MGF1 digest must be SHA1, regardless of the
- * OAEP digest specified.
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which must match one of the padding values
+ * in the key authorizations, and which may not be Digest::NONE. begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST if this is not the case. RSA_OAEP padding also requires an
+ * MGF1 digest, specified with Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, which must match one of the MGF1
+ * padding values in the key authorizations and which may not be Digest::NONE. begin() must
+ * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST if this is not the case. The OAEP mask generation
+ * function must be MGF1.
*
* -- EC Keys --
*
- * EC key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams. If unspecified or
- * specified more than once, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
- *
* Private key operations (KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of digest and padding, which
* means that the key authorizations must contain the specified values. If not, begin() must
- * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. Public key operations (KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are
- * permitted with unauthorized digest or padding.
+ * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
*
* -- AES Keys --
*
* AES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding mode
- * (Tag::PADDING) in inParams. If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
+ * (Tag::PADDING) in params. If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
* begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or
* ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE. The specified modes must be authorized by the key,
* otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or
* ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
*
- * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, inParams must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified
+ * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, params must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified
* value must be a multiple of 8 that is not greater than 128 or less than the value of
* Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations. For MAC lengths greater than 128 or
* non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH. For values less
@@ -682,48 +683,66 @@
*
* If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, BlockMode::CTR, or BlockMode::GCM, an initialization
* vector or nonce is required. In most cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the
- * IKeyMintDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via
- * Tag::NONCE in outParams. CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes. GCM nonces are 12 bytes. If the key
+ * IKeyMintDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via Tag::NONCE
+ * in outParams. CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes. GCM nonces are 12 bytes. If the key
* authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an IV/nonce with
- * Tag::NONCE in inParams. If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
+ * Tag::NONCE in params, which must be of the correct size (if not, return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE). If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
* begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED. If a nonce is not provided when
- * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice msut generate a random IV/nonce.
+ * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice must generate a random IV/nonce.
+ *
+ * -- 3DES Keys --
+ *
+ * 3DES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding
+ * mode (Tag::PADDING) in params. If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
+ * begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or
+ * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE. The specified modes must be authorized by the key,
+ * otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
+ *
+ * If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, an initialization vector or nonce is required. In most
+ * cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the IKeyMintDevice implementation must
+ * generate a random IV or nonce and return it via Tag::NONCE in outParams. CBC IVs are 8
+ * bytes. If the key authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an
+ * IV/nonce with Tag::NONCE in params, which must be of the correct size (if not, return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE). If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
+ * begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED. If a nonce is not provided when
+ * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice must generate a random IV/nonce.
+ *
*
* -- HMAC keys --
*
- * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in inParams. The specified value must be a
+ * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in params. The specified value must be a
* multiple of 8 that is not greater than the digest length or less than the value of
* Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations. For MAC lengths greater than the digest
* length or non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH. For
* values less than the key's minimum length, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH.
*
- * @param inPurpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
- * KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, KeyPurpose::SIGN, KeyPurpose::VERIFY, or KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY.
- * Note that for AEAD modes, encryption and decryption imply signing and verification,
- * respectively, but must be specified as KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT.
+ * @param purpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT,
+ * KeyPurpose::SIGN, KeyPurpose::VERIFY, or KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY. Note that for AEAD
+ * modes, encryption and decryption imply signing and verification, respectively, but
+ * must be specified as KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT.
*
- * @param inKeyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(). The key
+ * @param keyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(). The key
* must have a purpose compatible with purpose and all of its usage requirements must be
* satisfied, or begin() must return an appropriate error code (see above).
*
- * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation. If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or
+ * @param params Additional parameters for the operation. If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or
* Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were provided during generation, they must be provided here, or
* the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB. For operations that require
- * a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, inParams may
+ * a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, params may
* contain a tag Tag::NONCE. If Tag::NONCE is provided for a key without
* Tag:CALLER_NONCE, ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED must be returned.
*
- * @param inAuthToken Authentication token. Callers that provide no token must set all numeric
- * fields to zero and the MAC must be an empty vector. TODO: make this field nullable.
- * b/173483024.
+ * @param authToken Authentication token.
*
* @return BeginResult as output, which contains the challenge, KeyParameters which haves
* additional data from the operation initialization, notably to return the IV or nonce
* from operations that generate an IV or nonce, and IKeyMintOperation object pointer
- * which is used to perform update(), finish() or abort() operations.
+ * which is used to perform updateAad(), update(), finish() or abort() operations.
*/
BeginResult begin(in KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in KeyParameter[] params,
- in HardwareAuthToken authToken);
+ in @nullable HardwareAuthToken authToken);
/**
* Called by client to notify the IKeyMintDevice that the device is now locked, and keys with
@@ -737,7 +756,7 @@
* Note that the IKeyMintDevice UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics are slightly different from
* the UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics enforced by keystore. Keystore handles device locking
* on a per-user basis. Because auth tokens do not contain an Android user ID, it's not
- * possible to replicate the keystore enformcement logic in IKeyMintDevice. So from the
+ * possible to replicate the keystore enforcement logic in IKeyMintDevice. So from the
* IKeyMintDevice perspective, any user unlock unlocks all UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED keys.
* Keystore will continue enforcing the per-user device locking.
*
@@ -763,7 +782,7 @@
*/
void earlyBootEnded();
- /*
+ /**
* Called by the client to get a wrapped per-boot ephemeral key from a wrapped storage key.
* Clients will then use the returned per-boot ephemeral key in place of the wrapped storage
* key. Whenever the hardware is presented with a per-boot ephemeral key for an operation, it
@@ -785,16 +804,24 @@
byte[] convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(in byte[] storageKeyBlob);
/**
- * Called by the client to perform a KeyMint operation.
+ * Returns parameters associated with the provided key. This should match the
+ * KeyCharacteristics present in the KeyCreationResult returned by generateKey(),
+ * importKey(), or importWrappedKey().
*
- * This method is added primarily as a placeholder. Details will be fleshed before the KeyMint
- * V1 interface is frozen. Until then, implementations must return ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED.
+ * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey, importKey or importWrappedKey.
*
- * @param request is an encrypted buffer containing a description of the operation the client
- * wishes to perform. Structure, content and encryption are TBD.
+ * @param appId An opaque byte string identifying the client. This value must match the
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_ID data provided during key generation/import. Without the correct
+ * value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to obtain the
+ * key material.
*
- * @return an encrypted buffer containing the result of the operation. Structure, content and
- * encryption are TBD.
+ * @param appData An opaque byte string provided by the application. This value must match the
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA data provided during key generation/import. Without the
+ * correct value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to
+ * obtain the key material.
+ *
+ * @return Characteristics of the generated key. See KeyCreationResult for details.
*/
- byte[] performOperation(in byte[] request);
+ KeyCharacteristics[] getKeyCharacteristics(
+ in byte[] keyBlob, in byte[] appId, in byte[] appData);
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
index d2a993f..aa7b492 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@
* update() is called. If updateAad() is called after update(), it must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG.
*
- * If operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
+ * If the operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
* If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and
- * the operation handle must be invalidated. Any future use of the handle, with this method,
- * finish, or abort, must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
+ * the operation handle must be invalidated. Any future use of this object must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
* == Authorization Enforcement ==
*
@@ -58,9 +58,10 @@
*
* o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
*
- * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle
+ * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the value returned from
+ * IKeyMintDevice::begin(), given by the challenge field of the BeginResult structure.
*
- * If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
+ * If any of these conditions are not met, updateAad() must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
*
* The caller must provide the auth token on every call to updateAad(), update() and finish().
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@
*
* @param input Additional Authentication Data to be processed.
*
- * @param authToken Authentication token. Can be nullable if not provided.
+ * @param authToken Authentication token, if provided.
*
* @param timeStampToken timestamp token, certifies the freshness of an auth token in case
* the security domain of this KeyMint instance has a different clock than the
@@ -93,18 +94,9 @@
* If operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
- * To provide more flexibility for buffer handling, implementations of this method have the
- * option of consuming less data than was provided. The caller is responsible for looping to
- * feed the rest of the data in subsequent calls. The amount of input consumed must be returned
- * in the inputConsumed parameter. Implementations must always consume at least one byte,
- * unless the operation cannot accept any more; if more than zero bytes are provided and zero
- * bytes are consumed, callers must consider this an error and abort the operation.
- * TODO(seleneh) update the code to always consume alll the input data. b/168665179.
- *
- * Implementations may also choose how much data to return, as a result of the update. This is
- * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing and verification
- * return no data until finish. It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather
- * than buffer it.
+ * Implementations may choose how much data to return as a result of the update. This is
+ * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing returns no data
+ * until finish. It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather than buffer it.
*
* If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and
* the operation handle must be invalidated. Any future use of the handle, with this method,
@@ -112,8 +104,8 @@
*
* == Authorization Enforcement ==
*
- * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in begin(). The one exception is the
- * case where the key has:
+ * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in IKeyMintDevice::begin(). The one
+ * exception is the case where the key has:
*
* o One or more Tag::USER_SECURE_IDs, and
*
@@ -130,7 +122,8 @@
*
* o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
*
- * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle
+ * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the challenge value contained in the
+ * BeginResult returned from IKeyMintDevice::begin().
*
* If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
@@ -139,22 +132,20 @@
*
* -- RSA keys --
*
- * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
- * block to be signed or verified in a single update. It may not consume only a portion of the
- * block in these cases. However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple
- * updates, and update() must accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more
- * data to sign than can be used (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ * For signing operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire block to be
+ * signed in a single update. It may not consume only a portion of the block in these cases.
+ * However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates, and update() must
+ * accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign than can be used
+ * (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
*
* -- ECDSA keys --
*
- * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
- * block to be signed or verified in a single update. This method may not consume only a
- * portion of the block. However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates
- * and update() must accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign
- * than can be used, the data is silently truncated. (This differs from the handling of excess
- * data provided in similar RSA operations. The reason for this is compatibility with legacy
- * clients.)
+ * For signing operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire block to be
+ * signed in a single update. This method may not consume only a portion of the block.
+ * However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates and update() must
+ * accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign than can be used,
+ * the data is silently truncated. (This differs from the handling of excess data provided in
+ * similar RSA operations. The reason for this is compatibility with legacy clients.)
*
* -- AES keys --
*
@@ -182,7 +173,7 @@
in @nullable TimeStampToken timeStampToken);
/**
- * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates operation.
+ * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates the operation.
*
* This method is the last one called in an operation, so all processed data must be returned.
*
@@ -190,8 +181,7 @@
* Any future use of the operation, with finish(), update(), or abort(), must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
- * Signing operations return the signature as the output. Verification operations accept the
- * signature in the signature parameter, and return no output.
+ * Signing operations return the signature as the output.
*
* == Authorization enforcement ==
*
@@ -230,44 +220,35 @@
* Some additional requirements, depending on the padding mode:
*
* o PaddingMode::NONE. For unpadded signing and encryption operations, if the provided data is
- * shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before
- * signing/encryption. If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger,
- * finish() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. For verification and decryption
- * operations, the data must be exactly as long as the key. Otherwise, return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ * shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before signing/encryption.
+ * If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger, finish() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. For decryption operations, the data must be exactly as long
+ * as the key. Otherwise, return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
*
* o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS. For PSS-padded signature operations, the PSS salt length must match
- * the size of the PSS digest selected. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams
+ * the size of the PSS digest selected. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in params
* on begin() must be used as the PSS digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask
* generation function and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
*
- * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams on begin is
- * used as the OAEP digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask generation function and
- * and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
- *
* -- ECDSA keys --
*
- * If the data provided for unpadded signing or verification is too long, truncate it.
+ * If the data provided for undigested signing is too long, truncate it.
*
* -- AES keys --
*
* Some additional conditions, depending on block mode:
*
* o BlockMode::ECB or BlockMode::CBC. If padding is PaddingMode::NONE and the data length is
- * not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the
- * PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a multiple
- * of the block length.
+ * not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the
+ * PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a
+ * multiple of the block length.
*
* o BlockMode::GCM. During encryption, after processing all plaintext, compute the tag
* (Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes) and append it to the returned ciphertext. During decryption,
* process the last Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes as the tag. If tag verification fails, finish()
* must return ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED.
*
- * TODO: update() will need to be refactored into 2 function. b/168665179.
- *
- * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation.
- *
* @param input Data to be processed, per the parameters established in the call to begin().
* finish() must consume all provided data or return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
*
@@ -281,11 +262,9 @@
* token.
*
* @param confirmationToken is the confirmation token required by keys with
- * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.
+ * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.
*
* @return The output data, if any.
- *
- * @return outParams Any output parameters generated by finish().
*/
byte[] finish(in @nullable byte[] input, in @nullable byte[] signature,
in @nullable HardwareAuthToken authToken,
@@ -293,13 +272,10 @@
in @nullable byte[] confirmationToken);
/**
- * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with begin(), freeing all internal resources. If an
- * operation was finalized, calling update, finish, or abort yields
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. An operation is finalized if finish or abort was
- * called on it, or if update returned an ErrorCode.
- *
- * @param operationHandle The operation handle returned by begin(). This handle must be
- * invalid when abort() returns.
+ * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with IKeyMintDevice::begin(), freeing all internal
+ * resources. If an operation was finalized, calling updateAad, update, finish, or abort yields
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. An operation is finalized if finish or abort was called
+ * on it, or if updateAad or update returned an ErrorCode.
*
* @return error See the ErrorCode enum in ErrorCode.aidl.
*/
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index b6285d9..04d91d0 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
* While a proper BCC, as described above, reflects the complete boot sequence from boot ROM to the
* secure area image of the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent, it's also possible to use a "degenerate"
* BCC which consists only of a single, self-signed certificate containing the public key of a
- * hardware-bound key pair. This is an appopriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
+ * hardware-bound key pair. This is an appropriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
* everything necessary to produce a proper BCC, but can derive a unique key pair in the secure
* area. In this degenerate case, DK_pub is the same as KM_pub.
*
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
index c2e21b6..f93dbba 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
* There are a few variations in what is contained in `certificateChain`, depending on whether
* the caller requested attestation, whether they provided an attestation key (via the
* `attestationKey` parameter of `generateKey()`, `importKey()` or `importWrappedKey()`), and in
- * the non-attestaion case, whether the key can self-sign.
+ * the non-attestation case, whether the key can self-sign.
*
* 1. Asymmetric key attestation with factory key. If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is provided
* and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generate/import call is null, the returned
@@ -66,10 +66,11 @@
* provisioned attestation key, and the full certificate chain for that factory-provisioned
* attestation key. Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID must also be provided when the
* ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is provided, otherwise ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING will be
- * returned.
+ * returned. KeyMint implementations are not required to support factory-provisioned
+ * attestation keys.
*
* 2. Asymmetric key attestation with caller-provided key. If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is
- * provided and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generat/import call is non-null and
+ * provided and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generate/import call is non-null and
* contains the key blob of a key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the returned certificate
* chain must contain only an attestation certificate signed with the specified key. The
* caller must know the certificate chain for the provided key. Tag::
@@ -90,6 +91,110 @@
* 5. Symmetric key. If the generated/imported key is symmetric, the certificate chain must
* return empty, any Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE or Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID inputs,
* if provided, are ignored.
+ *
+ * In all cases except the symmetric key, the contents of certificate chain must be DER-encoded
+ * X.509 certificates ordered such that each certificate is signed by the subsequent one, up to
+ * the root which must be self-signed (or contain a fake signature in the case of case 4 above).
+ * The first certificate in the chain signs the public key info of the newly-generated or
+ * newly-imported key pair. In the attestation cases (1 and 2 above), the first certificate
+ * must also satisfy some other requirements:
+ *
+ * o It must have the serial number provided in Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, or default to 1 if the
+ * tag is not provided.
+ *
+ * o It must have the subject provided in Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, or default to CN="Android
+ * Keystore Key", if the tag is not provided.
+ *
+ * o It must contain the notBefore and notAfter date-times specified in
+ * Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE and Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, respectively.
+ *
+ * o It must contain a Key Usage extension with:
+ *
+ * - the digitalSignature bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ * - the dataEncipherment bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::DECRYPT,
+ * - the keyEncipherment bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY,
+ * - the keyAgreement bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY, and
+ * - the keyCertSignBit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY.
+ *
+ * o it must contain a KeyDescription attestation extension with OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17.
+ *
+ * The KeyDescription content is defined by the following ASN.1 schema, which is mostly a
+ * straightforward translation of the KeyMint tag/value parameter lists to ASN.1.
+ *
+ * KeyDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * attestationVersion INTEGER, # Value 100
+ * attestationSecurityLevel SecurityLevel, # See below
+ * keyMintVersion INTEGER, # Value 100
+ * keymintSecurityLevel SecurityLevel, # See below
+ * attestationChallenge OCTET_STRING, # Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE from attestParams
+ * uniqueId OCTET_STRING, # Empty unless key has Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID
+ * softwareEnforced AuthorizationList, # See below
+ * hardwareEnforced AuthorizationList, # See below
+ * }
+ *
+ * SecurityLevel ::= ENUMERATED {
+ * Software (0),
+ * TrustedEnvironment (1),
+ * StrongBox (2),
+ * }
+ *
+ * RootOfTrust ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * verifiedBootKey OCTET_STRING,
+ * deviceLocked BOOLEAN,
+ * verifiedBootState VerifiedBootState,
+ * # verifiedBootHash must contain 32-byte value that represents the state of all binaries
+ * # or other components validated by verified boot. Updating any verified binary or
+ * # component must cause this value to change.
+ * verifiedBootHash OCTET_STRING,
+ * }
+ *
+ * VerifiedBootState ::= ENUMERATED {
+ * Verified (0),
+ * SelfSigned (1),
+ * Unverified (2),
+ * Failed (3),
+ * }
+ *
+ * AuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * purpose [1] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * algorithm [2] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * keySize [3] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * blockMode [4] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * digest [5] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * padding [6] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * callerNonce [7] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * minMacLength [8] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * ecCurve [10] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * rsaPublicExponent [200] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * rollbackResistance [303] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * activeDateTime [400] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * originationExpireDateTime [401] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * usageExpireDateTime [402] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * userSecureId [502] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * noAuthRequired [503] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * userAuthType [504] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * authTimeout [505] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * allowWhileOnBody [506] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * trustedUserPresenceReq [507] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * trustedConfirmationReq [508] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * unlockedDeviceReq [509] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * creationDateTime [701] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * origin [702] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * rootOfTrust [704] EXPLICIT RootOfTrust OPTIONAL,
+ * osVersion [705] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * osPatchLevel [706] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationApplicationId [709] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdBrand [710] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdDevice [711] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdProduct [712] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdSerial [713] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdImei [714] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdMeid [715] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdManufacturer [716] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdModel [717] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * vendorPatchLevel [718] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * bootPatchLevel [719] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * }
*/
Certificate[] certificateChain;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
index f896125..5840c6b 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
* The origin of a key (or pair), i.e. where it was generated. Note that ORIGIN can be found in
* either the hardware-enforced or software-enforced list for a key, indicating whether the key is
* hardware or software-based. Specifically, a key with GENERATED in the hardware-enforced list
- * must be guaranteed never to have existed outide the secure hardware.
+ * must be guaranteed never to have existed outside the secure hardware.
* @hide
*/
@VintfStability
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
index c874fc3..e141e55 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
@VintfStability
@Backing(type="int")
enum KeyPurpose {
- /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+ /* Usable with RSA, 3DES and AES keys. */
ENCRYPT = 0,
- /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+ /* Usable with RSA, 3DES and AES keys. */
DECRYPT = 1,
/* Usable with RSA, EC and HMAC keys. */
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
VERIFY = 3,
/* 4 is reserved */
+
/* Usable with wrapping keys. */
WRAP_KEY = 5,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index cde1fc0..8fbc91a 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
import android.hardware.security.keymint.TagType;
// TODO(seleneh) : note aidl currently does not support double nested enum definitions such as
-// ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType:BYTES | 704. So we are forced to write definations as
+// ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType:BYTES | 704. So we are forced to write definitions as
// ROOT_OF_TRUST = (9 << 28) for now. Will need to flip this back later when aidl support is added.
/**
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
ALGORITHM = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 2,
/**
- * Tag::KEY_SIZE pecifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
+ * Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
* key's algorithm. For example, for RSA keys, Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size of the public
* modulus. For AES keys it specifies the length of the secret key material. For 3DES keys it
* specifies the length of the key material, not counting parity bits (though parity bits must
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@
* is only relevant to AES and 3DES keys. Possible values are defined by the BlockMode enum.
*
* This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. For AES and 3DES operations the caller
- * must specify a Tag::BLOCK_MODE in the additionalParams argument of begin(). If the mode is
- * missing or the specified mode is not in the modes specified for the key during
- * generation/import, the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
+ * must specify a Tag::BLOCK_MODE in the params argument of begin(). If the mode is missing or
+ * the specified mode is not in the modes specified for the key during generation/import, the
+ * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
@@ -89,9 +89,9 @@
* values are defined by the Digest enum.
*
* This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. For signing and verification operations,
- * the caller must specify a digest in the additionalParams argument of begin(). If the digest
- * is missing or the specified digest is not in the digests associated with the key, the
- * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
+ * the caller must specify a digest in the params argument of begin(). If the digest is missing
+ * or the specified digest is not in the digests associated with the key, the operation must
+ * fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
* This value is the minimum MAC length, in bits. It must be a multiple of 8 bits. For HMAC
* keys, the value must be least 64 and no more than 512. For GCM keys, the value must be at
* least 96 and no more than 128. If the provided value violates these requirements,
- * generateKey() or importKey() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ * generateKey() or importKey() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
@@ -154,9 +154,8 @@
// Tag 9 reserved
/**
- * Tag::EC_CURVE specifies the elliptic curve. EC key generation requests may have
- * Tag:EC_CURVE, Tag::KEY_SIZE, or both. If both are provided and the size and curve do not
- * match, IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ * Tag::EC_CURVE specifies the elliptic curve. Possible values are defined in the EcCurve
+ * enumeration.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
@@ -188,37 +187,19 @@
INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 202,
/**
- * Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST specifies the MGF1 digest algorithms that may be used with
- * RSA encryption/decryption with OAEP padding. If the key characteristics supports OAEP
- * and this tag is absent then SHA1 digest is selected by default for MGF1.
+ * Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST specifies the MGF1 digest algorithms that may be used with RSA
+ * encryption/decryption with OAEP padding. Possible values are defined by the Digest enum.
*
- * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. If this tag is present in the key
- * characteristics with one or more values from @4.0::Digest, then for RSA cipher
- * operations with OAEP Padding, the caller must specify a digest in the additionalParams
- * argument of begin operation. If this tag is missing or the specified digest is not in
- * the digests associated with the key then begin operation must fail with
- * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST.
+ * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. RSA cipher operations with OAEP padding
+ * must specify an MGF1 digest in the params argument of begin(). If this tag is missing or the
+ * specified digest is not in the MGF1 digests associated with the key then begin operation must
+ * fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 203,
- /**
- * TODO(seleneh) this tag needs to be deleted from all codes.
- *
- * Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS specifies the necessary system environment conditions for the
- * generated key to be used. Possible values are defined by the KeyBlobUsageRequirements enum.
- *
- * This tag is specified by the caller during key generation or import to require that the key
- * is usable in the specified condition. If the caller specifies Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS
- * with value KeyBlobUsageRequirements::STANDALONE the IKeyMintDevice must return a key blob
- * that can be used without file system support. This is critical for devices with encrypted
- * disks, where the file system may not be available until after a KeyMint key is used to
- * decrypt the disk.
- *
- * Must be hardware-enforced.
- */
- BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 301,
+ // Tag 301 reserved
/**
* Tag::BOOTLOADER_ONLY specifies only the bootloader can use the key.
@@ -241,7 +222,7 @@
* ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE. IKeyMintDevice implementations are not
* required to support rollback resistance.
*
- * Must be hardwared-enforced.
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 303,
@@ -251,7 +232,7 @@
/**
* Keys tagged with EARLY_BOOT_ONLY may only be used during early boot, until
* IKeyMintDevice::earlyBootEnded() is called. Early boot keys may be created after
- * early boot. Early boot keys may not be imprted at all, if Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY is
+ * early boot. Early boot keys may not be imported at all, if Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY is
* provided to IKeyMintDevice::importKey, the import must fail with
* ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
*/
@@ -307,7 +288,7 @@
* with ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED. This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a
* table of use counters for keys with this tag. Because memory is often limited, this table
* may have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint may fail operations that attempt to use keys with
- * this tag when the table is full. The table must acommodate at least 8 in-use keys and
+ * this tag when the table is full. The table must accommodate at least 8 in-use keys and
* aggressively reuse table slots when key minimum-usage intervals expire. If an operation
* fails because the table is full, KeyMint returns ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
*
@@ -327,7 +308,7 @@
* device is restarted. This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a table of use
* counters for keys with this tag. Because KeyMint memory is often limited, this table can
* have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint can fail operations that attempt to use keys with
- * this tag when the table is full. The table needs to acommodate at least 8 keys. If an
+ * this tag when the table is full. The table needs to accommodate at least 8 keys. If an
* operation fails because the table is full, IKeyMintDevice must
* ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
*
@@ -386,14 +367,14 @@
* key, and may only be used if the difference between the current time when begin() is called
* and the timestamp in the HardwareAuthToken is less than the value in Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT * 1000
* (the multiplier is because Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is in seconds, but the HardwareAuthToken
- * timestamp is in milliseconds). Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+ * timestamp is in milliseconds). Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
*
* If Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is not present, then the key is an "auth-per-operation" key. In this
* case, begin() must not require a HardwareAuthToken with appropriate contents. Instead,
* update() and finish() must receive a HardwareAuthToken with Tag::USER_SECURE_ID value in
* userId or authenticatorId fields, and the current operation's operation handle in the
- * challenge field. Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+ * challenge field. Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
*
* This tag is repeatable. If repeated, and any one of the values matches the HardwareAuthToken
@@ -434,7 +415,7 @@
/**
* Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT specifies the time in seconds for which the key is authorized for use,
* after user authentication. If
- * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is present and this tag is not, then the key requies authentication for
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is present and this tag is not, then the key requires authentication for
* every usage (see begin() for the details of the authentication-per-operation flow).
*
* The value is a 32-bit integer specifying the time in seconds after a successful
@@ -504,7 +485,7 @@
* Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED is only applicable to keys with KeyPurpose SIGN, and
* specifies that this key must not be usable unless the user provides confirmation of the data
* to be signed. Confirmation is proven to keyMint via an approval token. See
- * CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, as well as the ConfirmatinUI HAL.
+ * CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, as well as the ConfirmationUI HAL.
*
* If an attempt to use a key with this tag does not have a cryptographically valid
* CONFIRMATION_TOKEN provided to finish() or if the data provided to update()/finish() does not
@@ -526,7 +507,7 @@
* Tag::APPLICATION_ID. When provided to generateKey or importKey, this tag specifies data
* that is necessary during all uses of the key. In particular, calls to exportKey() and
* getKeyCharacteristics() must provide the same value to the clientId parameter, and calls to
- * begin must provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set. If
+ * begin() must provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set. If
* the correct data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
*
* The content of this tag must be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
@@ -550,7 +531,7 @@
* provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set. If the correct
* data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
*
- * The content of this tag msut be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
+ * The content of this tag must be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
* possible for an adversary who has access to all of the secure world secrets but does not have
* access to the tag content to decrypt the key without brute-forcing the tag content, which
* applications can prevent by specifying sufficiently high-entropy content.
@@ -561,10 +542,9 @@
/**
* Tag::CREATION_DATETIME specifies the date and time the key was created, in milliseconds since
- * January 1, 1970. This tag is optional and informational only.
+ * January 1, 1970. This tag is optional and informational only, and not enforced by anything.
*
- * Tag::CREATED is informational only, and not enforced by anything. Must be in the
- * software-enforced list, if provided.
+ * Must be in the software-enforced list, if provided.
*/
CREATION_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 701,
@@ -650,10 +630,11 @@
* Tag::CREATION_DATETIME by 2592000000, dropping any remainder. T changes every 30 days
* (2592000000 = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000).
*
- * C is the value of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID that is provided to attestKey().
+ * C is the value of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID that is provided to attested key
+ * generation/import operations.
*
- * R is 1 if Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION was provided to attestKey or 0 if the tag was not
- * provided.
+ * R is 1 if Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION was provided to attested key generation/import or 0
+ * if the tag was not provided.
*
* HBK is a unique hardware-bound secret known to the secure environment and never revealed
* by it. The secret must contain at least 128 bits of entropy and be unique to the
@@ -668,9 +649,9 @@
UNIQUE_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 707,
/**
- * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attestKey() method,
- * which must place the value in the KeyDescription SEQUENCE of the attestation extension. See
- * attestKey().
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attested key
+ * generation/import methods, which must place the value in the KeyDescription SEQUENCE of the
+ * attestation extension.
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
@@ -678,7 +659,7 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID identifies the set of applications which may use a key, used
- * only with attestKey().
+ * only with attested key generation/import operations.
*
* The content of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID is a DER-encoded ASN.1 structure, with the
* following schema:
@@ -704,8 +685,8 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND provides the device's brand name, as returned by Build.BRAND in
- * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
- * device's identifiers.
+ * Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -717,8 +698,8 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE provides the device's device name, as returned by Build.DEVICE in
- * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
- * device's identifiers.
+ * Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -730,8 +711,8 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT provides the device's product name, as returned by Build.PRODUCT
- * in Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
- * device's identifiers.
+ * in Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -754,8 +735,9 @@
ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 713,
/**
- * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
- * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attested key
+ * generation/import operations. This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+ * device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -766,8 +748,9 @@
ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 714,
/**
- * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
- * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attested key
+ * generation/import operations. This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+ * device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -779,8 +762,8 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER provides the device's manufacturer name, as returned by
- * Build.MANUFACTURER in Android, to attstKey(). This field must be set only when requesting
- * attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ * Build.MANUFACTURER in Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must
+ * be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -792,8 +775,8 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL provides the device's model name, as returned by Build.MODEL in
- * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
- * device's identifiers.
+ * Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -839,20 +822,20 @@
* the value would be 20180605. If the day is not known, 00 may be substituted.
*
* During each boot, the bootloader must provide the patch level of the boot image to the secure
- * envirionment (mechanism is implementation-defined).
+ * environment (mechanism is implementation-defined).
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
BOOT_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 719,
/**
- * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attestKey(). It indicates that
- * attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather than a batch key. When a
- * device-unique key is used, only the attestation certificate is returned; no additional
- * chained certificates are provided. It's up to the caller to recognize the device-unique
- * signing key. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices may support device-unique
- * attestations. SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
+ * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attested key generation/import
+ * operations. It indicates that attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather
+ * than a batch key. When a device-unique key is used, only the attestation certificate is
+ * returned; no additional chained certificates are provided. It's up to the caller to
+ * recognize the device-unique signing key. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices may
+ * support device-unique attestations. SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must
+ * return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
* SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices need not support DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, and
* return ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS if they do not support it.
*
@@ -935,33 +918,34 @@
CONFIRMATION_TOKEN = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1005,
/**
- * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL specifies the serial number to be assigned to the
- * attestation certificate to be generated for the given key. This parameter should only
- * be passed to keyMint in the attestation parameters during generateKey() and importKey().
+ * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL specifies the serial number to be assigned to the attestation
+ * certificate to be generated for the given key. This parameter should only be passed to
+ * keyMint in the attestation parameters during generateKey() and importKey(). If not provided,
+ * the serial shall default to 1.
*/
CERTIFICATE_SERIAL = (8 << 28) /* TagType:BIGNUM */ | 1006,
/**
- * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT the certificate subject. The value is a DER encoded X509 NAME.
- * This value is used when generating a self signed certificates. This tag may be specified
+ * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT the certificate subject. The value is a DER encoded X509 NAME.
+ * This value is used when generating a self signed certificates. This tag may be specified
* during generateKey and importKey. If not provided the subject name shall default to
- * <TODO default subject here>.
+ * CN="Android Keystore Key".
*/
CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1007,
/**
* Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE the beginning of the validity of the certificate in UNIX epoch
- * time in seconds. This value is used when generating attestation or self signed certificates.
- * ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_BEFORE must be returned if this tag is not provided if this tag is
- * not provided to generateKey or importKey.
+ * time in seconds. This value is used when generating attestation or self signed certificates.
+ * ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_BEFORE must be returned if this tag is not provided if this tag is not
+ * provided to generateKey or importKey.
*/
CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 1008,
/**
- * Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER the end of the validity of the certificate in UNIX epoch
- * time in seconds. This value is used when generating attestation or self signed certificates.
- * ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_AFTER must be returned if this tag is not provided to generateKey
- * or importKey.
+ * Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER the end of the validity of the certificate in UNIX epoch time in
+ * seconds. This value is used when generating attestation or self signed certificates.
+ * ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_AFTER must be returned if this tag is not provided to generateKey or
+ * importKey.
*/
CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 1009,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
index daa3e18..881354d 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
@@ -35,10 +35,16 @@
using AttestKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.AllRsaSizes
+ *
+ * This test creates self signed RSA attestation keys of various sizes, and verify they can be
+ * used to sign other RSA and EC keys.
+ */
TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllRsaSizes) {
for (auto size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
/*
- * Create attestaton key.
+ * Create attestation key.
*/
AttestationKey attest_key;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
@@ -50,11 +56,12 @@
{} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
&attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+ ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain)) << "Failed on size " << size;
/*
- * Use attestation key to sign RSA key
+ * Use attestation key to sign RSA signing key
*/
attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
@@ -81,20 +88,55 @@
EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
// Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
- if (attest_key_cert_chain.size() > 0) {
- attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
- }
+ attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+ EXPECT_EQ(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 2);
/*
- * Use attestation key to sign EC key
+ * Use attestation key to sign RSA decryption key
*/
+ attested_key_characteristics.resize(0);
+ attested_key_cert_chain.resize(0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo2")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar2")
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+
+ hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo2", "bar2", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+ attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+ EXPECT_EQ(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 2);
+
+ /*
+ * Use attestation key to sign EC key. Specify a CREATION_DATETIME for this one.
+ */
+ attested_key_characteristics.resize(0);
+ attested_key_cert_chain.resize(0);
+ uint64_t timestamp = 1619621648000;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AttestationChallenge("foo")
.AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, timestamp)
.SetDefaultValidity(),
attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
&attested_key_cert_chain));
@@ -104,6 +146,12 @@
hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ // The client-specified CREATION_DATETIME should be in sw_enforced.
+ // Its presence will also trigger verify_attestation_record() to check that it
+ // is in the attestation extension with a matching value.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, timestamp))
+ << "expected CREATION_TIMESTAMP in sw_enforced:" << sw_enforced
+ << " not in hw_enforced:" << hw_enforced;
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
@@ -111,9 +159,7 @@
EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
// Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
- if (attest_key_cert_chain.size() > 0) {
- attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
- }
+ attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
// Bail early if anything failed.
@@ -121,10 +167,378 @@
}
}
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.RsaAttestedAttestKeys
+ *
+ * This test creates an RSA attestation key signed by factory keys, and varifies it can be
+ * used to sign other RSA and EC keys.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, RsaAttestedAttestKeys) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 66;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ /*
+ * Create attestation key.
+ */
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+ &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ EXPECT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(attest_key_cert_chain[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attest_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attest_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id, //
+ sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ attest_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ /*
+ * Use attestation key to sign RSA key
+ */
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = subject_der;
+ vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+
+ auto subject2 = "cert subject";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der2(make_name_from_str(subject2));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int2 = 987;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob2(build_serial_blob(serial_int2));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob2)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der2)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced2 = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced2 = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced2, hw_enforced2, SecLevel(),
+ attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+ attested_key_cert_chain.insert(attested_key_cert_chain.end(), attest_key_cert_chain.begin(),
+ attest_key_cert_chain.end());
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+ EXPECT_GT(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 2);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(attested_key_cert_chain[0], serial_int2, subject2, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.RsaAttestKeyChaining
+ *
+ * This test creates a chain of multiple RSA attest keys, each used to sign the next attest key,
+ * with the last attest key signed by the factory chain.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, RsaAttestKeyChaining) {
+ const int chain_size = 6;
+ vector<vector<uint8_t>> key_blob_list(chain_size);
+ vector<vector<Certificate>> cert_chain_list(chain_size);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ string sub = "attest key chaining ";
+ char index = '1' + i;
+ string subject = sub + index;
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 7000 + i;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ optional<AttestationKey> attest_key_opt;
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str(sub + (char)(index - 1));
+ attest_key.keyBlob = key_blob_list[i - 1];
+ attest_key_opt = attest_key;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ /*
+ * The first key is attestated with factory chain, but all the rest of the keys are
+ * not supposed to be returned in attestation certificate chains.
+ */
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+ // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+ cert_chain_list[i].insert(cert_chain_list[i].end(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].begin(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].end());
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+ EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), i + 1);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_list[i][0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_list[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.EcAttestKeyChaining
+ *
+ * This test creates a chain of multiple Ec attest keys, each used to sign the next attest key,
+ * with the last attest key signed by the factory chain.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, EcAttestKeyChaining) {
+ const int chain_size = 6;
+ vector<vector<uint8_t>> key_blob_list(chain_size);
+ vector<vector<Certificate>> cert_chain_list(chain_size);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ string sub = "Ec attest key chaining ";
+ char index = '1' + i;
+ string subject = sub + index;
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 800000 + i;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ optional<AttestationKey> attest_key_opt;
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str(sub + (char)(index - 1));
+ attest_key.keyBlob = key_blob_list[i - 1];
+ attest_key_opt = attest_key;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(224)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ /*
+ * The first key is attestated with factory chain, but all the rest of the keys are
+ * not supposed to be returned in attestation certificate chains.
+ */
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+ // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+ cert_chain_list[i].insert(cert_chain_list[i].end(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].begin(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].end());
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+ EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), i + 1);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_list[i][0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_list[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.AlternateAttestKeyChaining
+ *
+ * This test creates a chain of multiple attest keys, in the order Ec - RSA - Ec - RSA ....
+ * Each attest key is used to sign the next attest key, with the last attest key signed by
+ * the factory chain. This is to verify different algorithms of attest keys can
+ * cross sign each other and be chained together.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AlternateAttestKeyChaining) {
+ const int chain_size = 6;
+ vector<vector<uint8_t>> key_blob_list(chain_size);
+ vector<vector<Certificate>> cert_chain_list(chain_size);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ string sub = "Alt attest key chaining ";
+ char index = '1' + i;
+ string subject = sub + index;
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 90000000 + i;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ optional<AttestationKey> attest_key_opt;
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str(sub + (char)(index - 1));
+ attest_key.keyBlob = key_blob_list[i - 1];
+ attest_key_opt = attest_key;
+ }
+
+ if ((i & 0x1) == 1) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(224)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &cert_chain_list[i]));
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &cert_chain_list[i]));
+ }
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ /*
+ * The first key is attestated with factory chain, but all the rest of the keys are
+ * not supposed to be returned in attestation certificate chains.
+ */
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+ // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+ cert_chain_list[i].insert(cert_chain_list[i].end(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].begin(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].end());
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+ EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), i + 1);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_list[i][0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_list[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, MissingChallenge) {
+ for (auto size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+ /*
+ * Create attestation key.
+ */
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(size, 65537)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+ &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain)) << "Failed on size " << size;
+
+ /*
+ * Use attestation key to sign RSA / ECDSA key but forget to provide a challenge
+ */
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+ vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+ }
+}
+
TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllEcCurves) {
for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
/*
- * Create attestaton key.
+ * Create attestation key.
*/
AttestationKey attest_key;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
@@ -136,6 +550,7 @@
{} /* attestation siging key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
&attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+ ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain)) << "Failed on curve " << curve;
@@ -208,7 +623,7 @@
}
TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AttestWithNonAttestKey) {
- // Create non-attestaton key.
+ // Create non-attestation key.
AttestationKey non_attest_key;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> non_attest_key_characteristics;
vector<Certificate> non_attest_key_cert_chain;
@@ -219,6 +634,7 @@
{} /* attestation siging key */, &non_attest_key.keyBlob,
&non_attest_key_characteristics, &non_attest_key_cert_chain));
+ ASSERT_GT(non_attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
EXPECT_EQ(non_attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(non_attest_key_cert_chain));
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
index 7009c6e..6f0ee4e 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -70,13 +70,12 @@
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AttestationChallenge("challenge")
.AttestationApplicationId("foo")
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics);
- ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG);
+ ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
}
/*
@@ -102,7 +101,7 @@
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics);
- ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG);
+ ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
}
/*
@@ -124,7 +123,6 @@
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AttestationChallenge("challenge")
.AttestationApplicationId("foo")
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index 64ef066..4789204 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -119,7 +119,6 @@
// Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter the key
// lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.
auto kTagsToFilter = {
- Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS, //
Tag::CREATION_DATETIME, //
Tag::EC_CURVE,
Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,
@@ -168,9 +167,11 @@
securityLevel_ = info.securityLevel;
name_.assign(info.keyMintName.begin(), info.keyMintName.end());
author_.assign(info.keyMintAuthorName.begin(), info.keyMintAuthorName.end());
+ timestamp_token_required_ = info.timestampTokenRequired;
os_version_ = getOsVersion();
os_patch_level_ = getOsPatchlevel();
+ vendor_patch_level_ = getVendorPatchlevel();
}
void KeyMintAidlTestBase::SetUp() {
@@ -273,7 +274,8 @@
ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc,
string masking_key,
- const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params) {
+ const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params,
+ int64_t password_sid, int64_t biometric_sid) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(wrapping_key_desc, KeyFormat::PKCS8, wrapping_key));
key_characteristics_.clear();
@@ -282,8 +284,7 @@
Status result = keymint_->importWrappedKey(
vector<uint8_t>(wrapped_key.begin(), wrapped_key.end()), key_blob_,
vector<uint8_t>(masking_key.begin(), masking_key.end()),
- unwrapping_params.vector_data(), 0 /* passwordSid */, 0 /* biometricSid */,
- &creationResult);
+ unwrapping_params.vector_data(), password_sid, biometric_sid, &creationResult);
if (result.isOk()) {
EXPECT_PRED2(KeyCharacteristicsBasicallyValid, SecLevel(),
@@ -332,6 +333,11 @@
return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
}
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::DestroyAttestationIds() {
+ Status result = keymint_->destroyAttestationIds();
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckedDeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob) {
ErrorCode result = DeleteKey(key_blob, keep_key_blob);
EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::OK || result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED) << result << endl;
@@ -348,7 +354,7 @@
SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
Status result;
BeginResult out;
- result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(), &out);
+ result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), std::nullopt, &out);
if (result.isOk()) {
*out_params = out.params;
@@ -366,7 +372,7 @@
Status result;
BeginResult out;
- result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(), &out);
+ result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), std::nullopt, &out);
if (result.isOk()) {
*out_params = out.params;
@@ -654,6 +660,18 @@
return ciphertext;
}
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding, uint8_t mac_length_bits) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, mac_length_bits);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
string KeyMintAidlTestBase::DecryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
const string& ciphertext,
const AuthorizationSet& params) {
@@ -744,6 +762,15 @@
return {224, 384, 521};
case Algorithm::AES:
return {192};
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ return {56};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ return {56};
default:
return {};
}
@@ -751,6 +778,68 @@
return {};
}
+vector<BlockMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidBlockModes(Algorithm algorithm) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ return {
+ BlockMode::CBC,
+ BlockMode::CTR,
+ BlockMode::ECB,
+ BlockMode::GCM,
+ };
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ return {
+ BlockMode::CBC,
+ BlockMode::ECB,
+ };
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+}
+
+vector<PaddingMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm,
+ BlockMode blockMode) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ switch (blockMode) {
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ return {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ return {PaddingMode::NONE};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ };
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ switch (blockMode) {
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ return {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ };
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+}
+
+vector<PaddingMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm,
+ BlockMode blockMode) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ switch (blockMode) {
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ return {PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ };
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+}
+
vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidCurves() {
if (securityLevel_ == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
return {EcCurve::P_256};
@@ -942,7 +1031,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return false;
- EXPECT_GE(att_attestation_version, 3U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(att_attestation_version, 100U);
vector<uint8_t> appId(app_id.begin(), app_id.end());
// check challenge and app id only if we expects a non-fake certificate
@@ -953,7 +1042,7 @@
expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, appId);
}
- EXPECT_GE(att_keymaster_version, 4U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(att_keymaster_version, 100U);
EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymaster_security_level);
EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_attestation_security_level);
@@ -1142,7 +1231,10 @@
string cert_issuer = x509NameToStr(X509_get_issuer_name(key_cert.get()));
string signer_subj = x509NameToStr(X509_get_subject_name(signing_cert.get()));
if (cert_issuer != signer_subj) {
- return AssertionFailure() << "Cert " << i << " has wrong issuer.\n" << cert_data.str();
+ return AssertionFailure() << "Cert " << i << " has wrong issuer.\n"
+ << " Signer subject is " << signer_subj
+ << " Issuer subject is " << cert_issuer << endl
+ << cert_data.str();
}
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index 75a4418..cb38938 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
IKeyMintDevice& keyMint() { return *keymint_; }
uint32_t os_version() { return os_version_; }
uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }
+ uint32_t vendor_patch_level() { return vendor_patch_level_; }
ErrorCode GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result);
@@ -94,13 +95,22 @@
ErrorCode ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc, string masking_key,
- const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params);
+ const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params, int64_t password_sid,
+ int64_t biometric_sid);
+ ErrorCode ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc, string masking_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params) {
+ return ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, masking_key,
+ unwrapping_params, 0 /* password_sid */, 0 /* biometric_sid */);
+ }
ErrorCode DeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false);
ErrorCode DeleteKey(bool keep_key_blob = false);
ErrorCode DeleteAllKeys();
+ ErrorCode DestroyAttestationIds();
+
void CheckedDeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false);
void CheckedDeleteKey();
@@ -165,6 +175,8 @@
const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in);
string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
uint8_t mac_length_bits, const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
+ uint8_t mac_length_bits);
string DecryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& ciphertext,
const AuthorizationSet& params);
@@ -230,6 +242,10 @@
vector<uint32_t> ValidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
vector<uint32_t> InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
+ vector<BlockMode> ValidBlockModes(Algorithm algorithm);
+ vector<PaddingMode> ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm, BlockMode blockMode);
+ vector<PaddingMode> InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm, BlockMode blockMode);
+
vector<EcCurve> ValidCurves();
vector<EcCurve> InvalidCurves();
@@ -262,6 +278,8 @@
std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> keymint_;
uint32_t os_version_;
uint32_t os_patch_level_;
+ uint32_t vendor_patch_level_;
+ bool timestamp_token_required_;
SecurityLevel securityLevel_;
string name_;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index aa008f8..cd7d603 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
namespace {
+bool check_patchLevels = false;
+
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
bool contains(const vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag,
ValueT expected_value) {
@@ -113,109 +115,296 @@
return b;
}
-string rsa_key =
- hex2str("30820275020100300d06092a864886f70d01010105000482025f3082025b"
- "02010002818100c6095409047d8634812d5a218176e45c41d60a75b13901"
- "f234226cffe776521c5a77b9e389417b71c0b6a44d13afe4e4a2805d46c9"
- "da2935adb1ff0c1f24ea06e62b20d776430a4d435157233c6f916783c30e"
- "310fcbd89b85c2d56771169785ac12bca244abda72bfb19fc44d27c81e1d"
- "92de284f4061edfd99280745ea6d2502030100010281801be0f04d9cae37"
- "18691f035338308e91564b55899ffb5084d2460e6630257e05b3ceab0297"
- "2dfabcd6ce5f6ee2589eb67911ed0fac16e43a444b8c861e544a05933657"
- "72f8baf6b22fc9e3c5f1024b063ac080a7b2234cf8aee8f6c47bbf4fd3ac"
- "e7240290bef16c0b3f7f3cdd64ce3ab5912cf6e32f39ab188358afcccd80"
- "81024100e4b49ef50f765d3b24dde01aceaaf130f2c76670a91a61ae08af"
- "497b4a82be6dee8fcdd5e3f7ba1cfb1f0c926b88f88c92bfab137fba2285"
- "227b83c342ff7c55024100ddabb5839c4c7f6bf3d4183231f005b31aa58a"
- "ffdda5c79e4cce217f6bc930dbe563d480706c24e9ebfcab28a6cdefd324"
- "b77e1bf7251b709092c24ff501fd91024023d4340eda3445d8cd26c14411"
- "da6fdca63c1ccd4b80a98ad52b78cc8ad8beb2842c1d280405bc2f6c1bea"
- "214a1d742ab996b35b63a82a5e470fa88dbf823cdd02401b7b57449ad30d"
- "1518249a5f56bb98294d4b6ac12ffc86940497a5a5837a6cf946262b4945"
- "26d328c11e1126380fde04c24f916dec250892db09a6d77cdba351024077"
- "62cd8f4d050da56bd591adb515d24d7ccd32cca0d05f866d583514bd7324"
- "d5f33645e8ed8b4a1cb3cc4a1d67987399f2a09f5b3fb68c88d5e5d90ac3"
- "3492d6");
+string rsa_key = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "30820275" // SEQUENCE length 0x275 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "300d" // SEQUENCE length 0x0d (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0609" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 9 (algorithm)
+ "2a864886f70d010101" // 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (rsaEncryption)
+ "0500" // NULL (parameters)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "0482025f" // OCTET STRING length 0x25f (privateKey) holding...
+ // RFC 8017 A.1.2
+ "3082025b" // SEQUENCE length 0x25b (RSAPrivateKey) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 value (modulus) ...
+ "00c6095409047d8634812d5a218176e4"
+ "5c41d60a75b13901f234226cffe77652"
+ "1c5a77b9e389417b71c0b6a44d13afe4"
+ "e4a2805d46c9da2935adb1ff0c1f24ea"
+ "06e62b20d776430a4d435157233c6f91"
+ "6783c30e310fcbd89b85c2d567711697"
+ "85ac12bca244abda72bfb19fc44d27c8"
+ "1e1d92de284f4061edfd99280745ea6d"
+ "25"
+ "0203010001" // INTEGER length 3 value 0x10001 (publicExponent)
+ "028180" // INTEGER length 0x80 (privateExponent) value...
+ "1be0f04d9cae3718691f035338308e91"
+ "564b55899ffb5084d2460e6630257e05"
+ "b3ceab02972dfabcd6ce5f6ee2589eb6"
+ "7911ed0fac16e43a444b8c861e544a05"
+ "93365772f8baf6b22fc9e3c5f1024b06"
+ "3ac080a7b2234cf8aee8f6c47bbf4fd3"
+ "ace7240290bef16c0b3f7f3cdd64ce3a"
+ "b5912cf6e32f39ab188358afcccd8081"
+ "0241" // INTEGER length 0x41 (prime1)
+ "00e4b49ef50f765d3b24dde01aceaaf1"
+ "30f2c76670a91a61ae08af497b4a82be"
+ "6dee8fcdd5e3f7ba1cfb1f0c926b88f8"
+ "8c92bfab137fba2285227b83c342ff7c"
+ "55"
+ "0241" // INTEGER length 0x41 (prime2)
+ "00ddabb5839c4c7f6bf3d4183231f005"
+ "b31aa58affdda5c79e4cce217f6bc930"
+ "dbe563d480706c24e9ebfcab28a6cdef"
+ "d324b77e1bf7251b709092c24ff501fd"
+ "91"
+ "0240" // INTEGER length 0x40 (exponent1)
+ "23d4340eda3445d8cd26c14411da6fdc"
+ "a63c1ccd4b80a98ad52b78cc8ad8beb2"
+ "842c1d280405bc2f6c1bea214a1d742a"
+ "b996b35b63a82a5e470fa88dbf823cdd"
+ "0240" // INTEGER length 0x40 (exponent2)
+ "1b7b57449ad30d1518249a5f56bb9829"
+ "4d4b6ac12ffc86940497a5a5837a6cf9"
+ "46262b494526d328c11e1126380fde04"
+ "c24f916dec250892db09a6d77cdba351"
+ "0240" // INTEGER length 0x40 (coefficient)
+ "7762cd8f4d050da56bd591adb515d24d"
+ "7ccd32cca0d05f866d583514bd7324d5"
+ "f33645e8ed8b4a1cb3cc4a1d67987399"
+ "f2a09f5b3fb68c88d5e5d90ac33492d6"
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
/*
* DER-encoded PKCS#8 format RSA key. Generated using:
*
* openssl genrsa 2048 | openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -nocrypt -outform der | hexdump -e '30/1 "%02X" "\n"'
*/
-string rsa_2048_key =
- hex2str("308204BD020100300D06092A864886F70D0101010500048204A7308204A3"
- "0201000282010100BEBC342B56D443B1299F9A6A7056E80A897E318476A5"
- "A18029E63B2ED739A61791D339F58DC763D9D14911F2EDEC383DEE11F631"
- "9B44510E7A3ECD9B79B97382E49500ACF8117DC89CAF0E621F77756554A2"
- "FD4664BFE7AB8B59AB48340DBFA27B93B5A81F6ECDEB02D0759307128DF3"
- "E3BAD4055C8B840216DFAA5700670E6C5126F0962FCB70FF308F25049164"
- "CCF76CC2DA66A7DD9A81A714C2809D69186133D29D84568E892B6FFBF319"
- "9BDB14383EE224407F190358F111A949552ABA6714227D1BD7F6B20DD0CB"
- "88F9467B719339F33BFF35B3870B3F62204E4286B0948EA348B524544B5F"
- "9838F29EE643B079EEF8A713B220D7806924CDF7295070C5020301000102"
- "82010069F377F35F2F584EF075353CCD1CA99738DB3DBC7C7FF35F9366CE"
- "176DFD1B135AB10030344ABF5FBECF1D4659FDEF1C0FC430834BE1BE3911"
- "951377BB3D563A2EA9CA8F4AD9C48A8CE6FD516A735C662686C7B4B3C09A"
- "7B8354133E6F93F790D59EAEB92E84C9A4339302CCE28FDF04CCCAFA7DE3"
- "F3A827D4F6F7D38E68B0EC6AB706645BF074A4E4090D06FB163124365FD5"
- "EE7A20D350E9958CC30D91326E1B292E9EF5DB408EC42DAF737D20149704"
- "D0A678A0FB5B5446863B099228A352D604BA8091A164D01D5AB05397C71E"
- "AD20BE2A08FC528FE442817809C787FEE4AB97F97B9130D022153EDC6EB6"
- "CBE7B0F8E3473F2E901209B5DB10F93604DB0102818100E83C0998214941"
- "EA4F9293F1B77E2E99E6CF305FAF358238E126124FEAF2EB9724B2EA7B78"
- "E6032343821A80E55D1D88FB12D220C3F41A56142FEC85796D1917F1E8C7"
- "74F142B67D3D6E7B7E6B4383E94DB5929089DBB346D5BDAB40CC2D96EE04"
- "09475E175C63BF78CFD744136740838127EA723FF3FE7FA368C1311B4A4E"
- "0502818100D240FCC0F5D7715CDE21CB2DC86EA146132EA3B06F61FF2AF5"
- "4BF38473F59DADCCE32B5F4CC32DD0BA6F509347B4B5B1B58C39F95E4798"
- "CCBB43E83D0119ACF532F359CA743C85199F0286610E200997D731291717"
- "9AC9B67558773212EC961E8BCE7A3CC809BC5486A96E4B0E6AF394D94E06"
- "6A0900B7B70E82A44FB30053C102818100AD15DA1CBD6A492B66851BA8C3"
- "16D38AB700E2CFDDD926A658003513C54BAA152B30021D667D20078F500F"
- "8AD3E7F3945D74A891ED1A28EAD0FEEAEC8C14A8E834CF46A13D1378C99D"
- "18940823CFDD27EC5810D59339E0C34198AC638E09C87CBB1B634A9864AE"
- "9F4D5EB2D53514F67B4CAEC048C8AB849A02E397618F3271350281801FA2"
- "C1A5331880A92D8F3E281C617108BF38244F16E352E69ED417C7153F9EC3"
- "18F211839C643DCF8B4DD67CE2AC312E95178D5D952F06B1BF779F491692"
- "4B70F582A23F11304E02A5E7565AE22A35E74FECC8B6FDC93F92A1A37703"
- "E4CF0E63783BD02EB716A7ECBBFA606B10B74D01579522E7EF84D91FC522"
- "292108D902C1028180796FE3825F9DCC85DF22D58690065D93898ACD65C0"
- "87BEA8DA3A63BF4549B795E2CD0E3BE08CDEBD9FCF1720D9CDC5070D74F4"
- "0DED8E1102C52152A31B6165F83A6722AECFCC35A493D7634664B888A08D"
- "3EB034F12EA28BFEE346E205D334827F778B16ED40872BD29FCB36536B6E"
- "93FFB06778696B4A9D81BB0A9423E63DE5");
+string rsa_2048_key = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "308204BD" // SEQUENCE length 0x4bd (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "300D" // SEQUENCE length 0x0d (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0609" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 9 (algorithm)
+ "2A864886F70D010101" // 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (rsaEncryption)
+ "0500" // NULL (parameters)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "048204A7" // OCTET STRING length 0x25f (privateKey) holding...
+ // RFC 8017 A.1.2
+ "308204A3" // SEQUENCE length 0x4a3 (RSAPrivateKey) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "02820101" // INTEGER length 0x101 value (modulus) ...
+ "00BEBC342B56D443B1299F9A6A7056E8"
+ "0A897E318476A5A18029E63B2ED739A6"
+ "1791D339F58DC763D9D14911F2EDEC38"
+ "3DEE11F6319B44510E7A3ECD9B79B973"
+ "82E49500ACF8117DC89CAF0E621F7775"
+ "6554A2FD4664BFE7AB8B59AB48340DBF"
+ "A27B93B5A81F6ECDEB02D0759307128D"
+ "F3E3BAD4055C8B840216DFAA5700670E"
+ "6C5126F0962FCB70FF308F25049164CC"
+ "F76CC2DA66A7DD9A81A714C2809D6918"
+ "6133D29D84568E892B6FFBF3199BDB14"
+ "383EE224407F190358F111A949552ABA"
+ "6714227D1BD7F6B20DD0CB88F9467B71"
+ "9339F33BFF35B3870B3F62204E4286B0"
+ "948EA348B524544B5F9838F29EE643B0"
+ "79EEF8A713B220D7806924CDF7295070"
+ "C5"
+ "0203010001" // INTEGER length 3 value 0x10001 (publicExponent)
+ "02820100" // INTEGER length 0x100 (privateExponent) value...
+ "69F377F35F2F584EF075353CCD1CA997"
+ "38DB3DBC7C7FF35F9366CE176DFD1B13"
+ "5AB10030344ABF5FBECF1D4659FDEF1C"
+ "0FC430834BE1BE3911951377BB3D563A"
+ "2EA9CA8F4AD9C48A8CE6FD516A735C66"
+ "2686C7B4B3C09A7B8354133E6F93F790"
+ "D59EAEB92E84C9A4339302CCE28FDF04"
+ "CCCAFA7DE3F3A827D4F6F7D38E68B0EC"
+ "6AB706645BF074A4E4090D06FB163124"
+ "365FD5EE7A20D350E9958CC30D91326E"
+ "1B292E9EF5DB408EC42DAF737D201497"
+ "04D0A678A0FB5B5446863B099228A352"
+ "D604BA8091A164D01D5AB05397C71EAD"
+ "20BE2A08FC528FE442817809C787FEE4"
+ "AB97F97B9130D022153EDC6EB6CBE7B0"
+ "F8E3473F2E901209B5DB10F93604DB01"
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime1)
+ "00E83C0998214941EA4F9293F1B77E2E"
+ "99E6CF305FAF358238E126124FEAF2EB"
+ "9724B2EA7B78E6032343821A80E55D1D"
+ "88FB12D220C3F41A56142FEC85796D19"
+ "17F1E8C774F142B67D3D6E7B7E6B4383"
+ "E94DB5929089DBB346D5BDAB40CC2D96"
+ "EE0409475E175C63BF78CFD744136740"
+ "838127EA723FF3FE7FA368C1311B4A4E"
+ "05"
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime2)
+ "00D240FCC0F5D7715CDE21CB2DC86EA1"
+ "46132EA3B06F61FF2AF54BF38473F59D"
+ "ADCCE32B5F4CC32DD0BA6F509347B4B5"
+ "B1B58C39F95E4798CCBB43E83D0119AC"
+ "F532F359CA743C85199F0286610E2009"
+ "97D7312917179AC9B67558773212EC96"
+ "1E8BCE7A3CC809BC5486A96E4B0E6AF3"
+ "94D94E066A0900B7B70E82A44FB30053"
+ "C1"
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (exponent1)
+ "00AD15DA1CBD6A492B66851BA8C316D3"
+ "8AB700E2CFDDD926A658003513C54BAA"
+ "152B30021D667D20078F500F8AD3E7F3"
+ "945D74A891ED1A28EAD0FEEAEC8C14A8"
+ "E834CF46A13D1378C99D18940823CFDD"
+ "27EC5810D59339E0C34198AC638E09C8"
+ "7CBB1B634A9864AE9F4D5EB2D53514F6"
+ "7B4CAEC048C8AB849A02E397618F3271"
+ "35"
+ "028180" // INTEGER length 0x80 (exponent2)
+ "1FA2C1A5331880A92D8F3E281C617108"
+ "BF38244F16E352E69ED417C7153F9EC3"
+ "18F211839C643DCF8B4DD67CE2AC312E"
+ "95178D5D952F06B1BF779F4916924B70"
+ "F582A23F11304E02A5E7565AE22A35E7"
+ "4FECC8B6FDC93F92A1A37703E4CF0E63"
+ "783BD02EB716A7ECBBFA606B10B74D01"
+ "579522E7EF84D91FC522292108D902C1"
+ "028180" // INTEGER length 0x80 (coefficient)
+ "796FE3825F9DCC85DF22D58690065D93"
+ "898ACD65C087BEA8DA3A63BF4549B795"
+ "E2CD0E3BE08CDEBD9FCF1720D9CDC507"
+ "0D74F40DED8E1102C52152A31B6165F8"
+ "3A6722AECFCC35A493D7634664B888A0"
+ "8D3EB034F12EA28BFEE346E205D33482"
+ "7F778B16ED40872BD29FCB36536B6E93"
+ "FFB06778696B4A9D81BB0A9423E63DE5"
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
-string ec_256_key =
- hex2str("308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
- "6b0201010420737c2ecd7b8d1940bf2930aa9b4ed3ff941eed09366bc032"
- "99986481f3a4d859a14403420004bf85d7720d07c25461683bc648b4778a"
- "9a14dd8a024e3bdd8c7ddd9ab2b528bbc7aa1b51f14ebbbb0bd0ce21bcc4"
- "1c6eb00083cf3376d11fd44949e0b2183bfe");
+string ec_256_key = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "308187" // SEQUENCE length 0x87 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+ "3013" // SEQUENCE length 0x13 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0607" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+ "2a8648ce3d0201" // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+ "0608" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8 (param)
+ "2a8648ce3d030107" // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "046d" // OCTET STRING length 0x6d (privateKey) holding...
+ "306b" // SEQUENCE length 0x6b (ECPrivateKey)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 1 (version)
+ "0420" // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (privateKey)
+ "737c2ecd7b8d1940bf2930aa9b4ed3ff"
+ "941eed09366bc03299986481f3a4d859"
+ "a144" // TAG [1] len 0x44 (publicKey) {
+ "03420004bf85d7720d07c25461683bc6"
+ "48b4778a9a14dd8a024e3bdd8c7ddd9a"
+ "b2b528bbc7aa1b51f14ebbbb0bd0ce21"
+ "bcc41c6eb00083cf3376d11fd44949e0"
+ "b2183bfe"
+ // } end SEQUENCE (ECPrivateKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
-string ec_521_key =
- hex2str("3081EE020100301006072A8648CE3D020106052B810400230481D63081D3"
- "02010104420011458C586DB5DAA92AFAB03F4FE46AA9D9C3CE9A9B7A006A"
- "8384BEC4C78E8E9D18D7D08B5BCFA0E53C75B064AD51C449BAE0258D54B9"
- "4B1E885DED08ED4FB25CE9A1818903818600040149EC11C6DF0FA122C6A9"
- "AFD9754A4FA9513A627CA329E349535A5629875A8ADFBE27DCB932C05198"
- "6377108D054C28C6F39B6F2C9AF81802F9F326B842FF2E5F3C00AB7635CF"
- "B36157FC0882D574A10D839C1A0C049DC5E0D775E2EE50671A208431BB45"
- "E78E70BEFE930DB34818EE4D5C26259F5C6B8E28A652950F9F88D7B4B2C9"
- "D9");
+string ec_521_key = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "3081EE" // SEQUENCE length 0xee (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+ "3010" // SEQUENCE length 0x10 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0607" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+ "2A8648CE3D0201" // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+ "0605" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 5 (param)
+ "2B81040023" // 1.3.132.0.35 (secp521r1)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "0481D6" // OCTET STRING length 0xd6 (privateKey) holding...
+ "3081D3" // SEQUENCE length 0xd3 (ECPrivateKey)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 1 (version)
+ "0442" // OCTET STRING length 0x42 (privateKey)
+ "0011458C586DB5DAA92AFAB03F4FE46A"
+ "A9D9C3CE9A9B7A006A8384BEC4C78E8E"
+ "9D18D7D08B5BCFA0E53C75B064AD51C4"
+ "49BAE0258D54B94B1E885DED08ED4FB2"
+ "5CE9"
+ "A18189" // TAG [1] len 0x89 (publicKey) {
+ "03818600040149EC11C6DF0FA122C6A9"
+ "AFD9754A4FA9513A627CA329E349535A"
+ "5629875A8ADFBE27DCB932C051986377"
+ "108D054C28C6F39B6F2C9AF81802F9F3"
+ "26B842FF2E5F3C00AB7635CFB36157FC"
+ "0882D574A10D839C1A0C049DC5E0D775"
+ "E2EE50671A208431BB45E78E70BEFE93"
+ "0DB34818EE4D5C26259F5C6B8E28A652"
+ "950F9F88D7B4B2C9D9"
+ // } end SEQUENCE (ECPrivateKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
-string ec_256_key_rfc5915 =
- hex2str("308193020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107047930"
- "770201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
- "8e8d21c9fa750c1da00a06082a8648ce3d030107a14403420004e2cc561e"
- "e701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c9"
- "05464666f98dad4f01573ba81078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
+string ec_256_key_rfc5915 = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "308193" // SEQUENCE length 0x93 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+ "3013" // SEQUENCE length 0x13 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0607" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+ "2a8648ce3d0201" // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+ "0608" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8 (param)
+ "2a8648ce3d030107" // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "0479" // OCTET STRING length 0x79 (privateKey) holding...
+ // RFC 5915 s3
+ "3077" // SEQUENCE length 0x77 (ECPrivateKey)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 1 (version)
+ "0420" // OCTET STRING length 0x42 (privateKey)
+ "782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8"
+ "158cfa9c67b818b38e8d21c9fa750c1d"
+ "a00a" // TAG [0] length 0xa (parameters)
+ "0608" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8
+ "2a8648ce3d030107" // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+ // } end TAG [0]
+ "a144" // TAG [1] length 0x44 (publicKey) {
+ "0342" // BIT STRING length 0x42
+ "00" // no pad bits
+ "04e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c9"
+ "19d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf"
+ "8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba810"
+ "78b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c55068"
+ "2f"
+ // } end SEQUENCE (ECPrivateKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
-string ec_256_key_sec1 =
- hex2str("308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
- "6b0201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
- "8e8d21c9fa750c1da14403420004e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919"
- "d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba8"
- "1078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
+string ec_256_key_sec1 = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "308187" // SEQUENCE length 0x87 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+ "3013" // SEQUENCE length 0x13 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0607" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+ "2a8648ce3d0201" // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+ "0608" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8 (param)
+ "2a8648ce3d030107" // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "046d" // OCTET STRING length 0x6d (privateKey) holding...
+ // SEC1-v2 C.4
+ "306b" // SEQUENCE length 0x6b (ECPrivateKey)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (version)
+ "0420" // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (privateKey)
+ "782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8"
+ "158cfa9c67b818b38e8d21c9fa750c1d"
+ "a144" // TAG [1] length 0x44 (publicKey) {
+ "0342" // BIT STRING length 0x42
+ "00" // no pad bits
+ "04e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c9"
+ "19d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf"
+ "8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba810"
+ "78b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c55068"
+ "2f"
+ // } end TAG [1] (publicKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
struct RSA_Delete {
void operator()(RSA* p) { RSA_free(p); }
@@ -291,37 +480,375 @@
class NewKeyGenerationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
protected:
void CheckBaseParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
- // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
-
- AuthorizationSet auths;
- for (auto& entry : keyCharacteristics) {
- auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
- }
-
- EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+ AuthorizationSet auths = CheckCommonParams(keyCharacteristics);
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
- // Verify that App data and ROT are NOT included.
- EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
- EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
-
// Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+ }
+
+ void CheckSymmetricParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
+ AuthorizationSet auths = CheckCommonParams(keyCharacteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
+ }
+
+ AuthorizationSet CheckCommonParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
+ // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
+ AuthorizationSet auths;
+ for (auto& entry : keyCharacteristics) {
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+
+ // Verify that App data, ROT and auth timeout are NOT included.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301U));
- auto os_ver = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
- ASSERT_TRUE(os_ver);
- EXPECT_EQ(*os_ver, os_version());
+ // None of the tests specify CREATION_DATETIME so check that the KeyMint implementation
+ // never adds it.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME));
+ // Check OS details match the original hardware info.
+ auto os_ver = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(os_ver);
+ EXPECT_EQ(*os_ver, os_version());
auto os_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL);
- ASSERT_TRUE(os_pl);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(os_pl);
EXPECT_EQ(*os_pl, os_patch_level());
+
+ if (check_patchLevels) {
+ // Should include vendor and boot patchlevels.
+ auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(vendor_pl);
+ EXPECT_EQ(*vendor_pl, vendor_patch_level());
+ auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(boot_pl);
+ }
+
+ return auths;
}
};
/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.Aes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required AES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Aes) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidSize) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ // No key size specified
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid padding on AES keys gives a failure
+ * somewhere along the way.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidPadding) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder);
+ if (result == ErrorCode::OK) {
+ // Key creation was OK but has generated a key that cannot be used.
+ auto params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(block_mode).Padding(padding_mode);
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ params.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+ auto result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE ||
+ result == ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB)
+ << "unexpected result: " << result;
+ } else {
+ // The KeyMint implementation detected that the generated key
+ // is unusable.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, result);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesGcmMissingMinMac
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesGcmMissingMinMac) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ BlockMode block_mode = BlockMode::GCM;
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ // No MIN_MAC_LENGTH provided.
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesGcmMinMacOutOfRange
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid min MAC size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesGcmMinMacOutOfRange) {
+ for (size_t min_mac_len : {88, 136}) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ BlockMode block_mode = BlockMode::GCM;
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_len)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required 3DES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDes) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesWithAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required 3DES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ *
+ * Request attestation, which doesn't help for symmetric keys (as there is no public key to
+ * put in a certificate) but which isn't an error.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesWithAttestation) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for 3-DES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesInvalidSize) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Omitting the key size fails.
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-default-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.Rsa
*
* Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys
@@ -355,8 +882,8 @@
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithAttestation
*
- * Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys
- * have correct characteristics.
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes with attestation, and that the
+ * resulting keys have correct characteristics.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithAttestation) {
auto challenge = "hello";
@@ -807,6 +1334,20 @@
}
/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaMissingParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that omitting optional tags works.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaMissingParams) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().RsaKey(key_size, 65537).SetDefaultValidity()));
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.Ecdsa
*
* Verifies that keymint can generate all required EC key sizes, and that the resulting keys
@@ -1147,7 +1688,7 @@
}
/*
- * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaInvalidCurves
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAllValidCurves
*
* Verifies that keymint does not support any curve designated as unsupported.
*/
@@ -1298,6 +1839,16 @@
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ // STRONGBOX devices must not support keys larger than 512 bits.
+ size_t key_size = 520;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(key_size)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)))
+ << "HMAC key size " << key_size << " unexpectedly valid";
+ }
}
/*
@@ -1331,6 +1882,15 @@
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
+
+ // Minimum MAC length must be no more than 512 bits.
+ size_t min_mac_length = 520;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_length)))
+ << "HMAC min mac length " << min_mac_length << " invalid.";
}
/*
@@ -1681,6 +2241,38 @@
}
/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaNonUniqueParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that an operation with multiple padding modes is rejected.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNonUniqueParams) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+}
+
+/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaUnsupportedPadding
*
* Verifies that RSA operations fail with the correct error (but key gen succeeds) when used
@@ -1697,6 +2289,20 @@
ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256 /* supported digest */)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP) /* padding mode for encryption only */
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
}
/*
@@ -1720,7 +2326,7 @@
}
/*
- * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoPadding
*
* Verifies that RSA operations fail when no padding mode is specified. PaddingMode::NONE is
* supported in some cases (as validated in other tests), but a mode must be specified.
@@ -1899,6 +2505,23 @@
}
/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaIncompatibleDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that using an EC key requires compatible digest.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaIncompatibleDigest) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+}
+
+/*
* SigningOperationsTest.AesEcbSign
*
* Verifies that attempts to use AES keys to sign fail in the correct way.
@@ -1959,6 +2582,26 @@
}
/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256InvalidMacLength
+ *
+ * Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC whose length is
+ * not a multiple of 8.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacSha256InvalidMacLength) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160)));
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 161),
+ &output_params));
+}
+
+/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256TooSmallMacLength
*
* Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC smaller than the
@@ -2075,7 +2718,7 @@
}
/*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests
*
* Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
*/
@@ -2171,7 +2814,7 @@
}
/*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaAllDigestsAndCurves
*
* Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
*/
@@ -2377,6 +3020,48 @@
}
/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.RsaSuccessWithoutParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an RSA key pair without specifying parameters
+ * works correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaSuccessWithoutParams) {
+ uint32_t key_size;
+ string key;
+
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ key_size = 2048;
+ key = rsa_2048_key;
+ } else {
+ key_size = 1024;
+ key = rsa_key;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SigningKey()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, key));
+
+ // Key size and public exponent are determined from the imported key material.
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U);
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(1024 / 8, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
* ImportKeyTest.RsaKeySizeMismatch
*
* Verifies that importing an RSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
@@ -2571,7 +3256,113 @@
}
/*
- * ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
+ * ImportKeyTest.AesFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an invalid AES key fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, AesFailure) {
+ string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ uint32_t bitlen = key.size() * 8;
+ for (uint32_t key_size : {bitlen - 1, bitlen + 1, bitlen - 8, bitlen + 8}) {
+ // Explicit key size doesn't match that of the provided key.
+ auto result = ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH ||
+ result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE)
+ << "unexpected result: " << result;
+ }
+
+ // Explicit key size matches that of the provided key, but it's not a valid size.
+ string long_key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(long_key.size() * 8)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, long_key));
+ string short_key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(short_key.size() * 8)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, short_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.TripleDesSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using a 3DES key works.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, TripleDesSuccess) {
+ string key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 168U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.TripleDesFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an invalid 3DES key fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, TripleDesFailure) {
+ string key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+ uint32_t bitlen = key.size() * 8;
+ for (uint32_t key_size : {bitlen - 1, bitlen + 1, bitlen - 8, bitlen + 8}) {
+ // Explicit key size doesn't match that of the provided key.
+ auto result = ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH ||
+ result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE)
+ << "unexpected result: " << result;
+ }
+ // Explicit key size matches that of the provided key, but it's not a valid size.
+ string long_key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(long_key.size() * 8)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, long_key));
+ string short_key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(short_key.size() * 8)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, short_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.HmacKeySuccess
*
* Verifies that importing and using an HMAC key works.
*/
@@ -2597,57 +3388,230 @@
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ImportKeyTest);
auto wrapped_key = hex2str(
- "3082017902010004820100934bf94e2aa28a3f83c9f79297250262fbe3276b5a1c91159bbfa3ef8957aac8"
- "4b59b30b455a79c2973480823d8b3863c3deef4a8e243590268d80e18751a0e130f67ce6a1ace9f79b95e0"
- "97474febc981195b1d13a69086c0863f66a7b7fdb48792227b1ac5e2489febdf087ab5486483033a6f001c"
- "a5d1ec1e27f5c30f4cec2642074a39ae68aee552e196627a8e3d867e67a8c01b11e75f13cca0a97ab668b5"
- "0cda07a8ecb7cd8e3dd7009c9636534f6f239cffe1fc8daa466f78b676c7119efb96bce4e69ca2a25d0b34"
- "ed9c3ff999b801597d5220e307eaa5bee507fb94d1fa69f9e519b2de315bac92c36f2ea1fa1df4478c0dde"
- "deae8c70e0233cd098040cd796b02c370f1fa4cc0124f1302e0201033029a1083106020100020101a20302"
- "0120a30402020100a4053103020101a6053103020140bf83770205000420ccd540855f833a5e1480bfd2d3"
- "6faf3aeee15df5beabe2691bc82dde2a7aa910041064c9f689c60ff6223ab6e6999e0eb6e5");
+ // IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+ "30820179" // SEQUENCE length 0x179 (SecureKeyWrapper) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "04820100" // OCTET STRING length 0x100 (encryptedTransportKey)
+ "934bf94e2aa28a3f83c9f79297250262"
+ "fbe3276b5a1c91159bbfa3ef8957aac8"
+ "4b59b30b455a79c2973480823d8b3863"
+ "c3deef4a8e243590268d80e18751a0e1"
+ "30f67ce6a1ace9f79b95e097474febc9"
+ "81195b1d13a69086c0863f66a7b7fdb4"
+ "8792227b1ac5e2489febdf087ab54864"
+ "83033a6f001ca5d1ec1e27f5c30f4cec"
+ "2642074a39ae68aee552e196627a8e3d"
+ "867e67a8c01b11e75f13cca0a97ab668"
+ "b50cda07a8ecb7cd8e3dd7009c963653"
+ "4f6f239cffe1fc8daa466f78b676c711"
+ "9efb96bce4e69ca2a25d0b34ed9c3ff9"
+ "99b801597d5220e307eaa5bee507fb94"
+ "d1fa69f9e519b2de315bac92c36f2ea1"
+ "fa1df4478c0ddedeae8c70e0233cd098"
+ "040c" // OCTET STRING length 0x0c (initializationVector)
+ "d796b02c370f1fa4cc0124f1"
+ "302e" // SEQUENCE length 0x2e (KeyDescription) {
+ "020103" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x03 (keyFormat = RAW)
+ "3029" // SEQUENCE length 0x29 (AuthorizationList) {
+ "a108" // [1] context-specific constructed tag=1 length 0x08 { (purpose)
+ "3106" // SET length 0x06
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (Encrypt)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (Decrypt)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [1]
+ "a203" // [2] context-specific constructed tag=2 length 0x02 { (algorithm)
+ "020120" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x20 (AES)
+ // } end [2]
+ "a304" // [3] context-specific constructed tag=3 length 0x04 { (keySize)
+ "02020100" // INTEGER length 2 value 0x100
+ // } end [3]
+ "a405" // [4] context-specific constructed tag=4 length 0x05 { (blockMode)
+ "3103" // SET length 0x03 {
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (ECB)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [4]
+ "a605" // [6] context-specific constructed tag=6 length 0x05 { (padding)
+ "3103" // SET length 0x03 {
+ "020140" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x40 (PKCS7)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [5]
+ "bf837702" // [503] context-specific constructed tag=503=0x1F7 length 0x02 {
+ // (noAuthRequired)
+ "0500" // NULL
+ // } end [503]
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AuthorizationList)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (KeyDescription)
+ "0420" // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (encryptedKey)
+ "ccd540855f833a5e1480bfd2d36faf3a"
+ "eee15df5beabe2691bc82dde2a7aa910"
+ "0410" // OCTET STRING length 0x10 (tag)
+ "64c9f689c60ff6223ab6e6999e0eb6e5"
+ // } SEQUENCE (SecureKeyWrapper)
+);
auto wrapped_key_masked = hex2str(
- "3082017902010004820100aad93ed5924f283b4bb5526fbe7a1412f9d9749ec30db9062b29e574a8546f33"
- "c88732452f5b8e6a391ee76c39ed1712c61d8df6213dec1cffbc17a8c6d04c7b30893d8daa9b2015213e21"
- "946821553207f8f9931c4caba23ed3bee28b36947e47f10e0a5c3dc51c988a628daad3e5e1f4005e79c2d5"
- "a96c284b4b8d7e4948f331e5b85dd5a236f85579f3ea1d1b848487470bdb0ab4f81a12bee42c99fe0df4be"
- "e3759453e69ad1d68a809ce06b949f7694a990429b2fe81e066ff43e56a21602db70757922a4bcc23ab89f"
- "1e35da77586775f423e519c2ea394caf48a28d0c8020f1dcf6b3a68ec246f615ae96dae9a079b1f6eb9590"
- "33c1af5c125fd94168040c6d9721d08589581ab49204a3302e0201033029a1083106020100020101a20302"
- "0120a30402020100a4053103020101a6053103020140bf83770205000420a61c6e247e25b3e6e69aa78eb0"
- "3c2d4ac20d1f99a9a024a76f35c8e2cab9b68d04102560c70109ae67c030f00b98b512a670");
+ // IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+ "30820179" // SEQUENCE length 0x179 (SecureKeyWrapper) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "04820100" // OCTET STRING length 0x100 (encryptedTransportKey)
+ "aad93ed5924f283b4bb5526fbe7a1412"
+ "f9d9749ec30db9062b29e574a8546f33"
+ "c88732452f5b8e6a391ee76c39ed1712"
+ "c61d8df6213dec1cffbc17a8c6d04c7b"
+ "30893d8daa9b2015213e219468215532"
+ "07f8f9931c4caba23ed3bee28b36947e"
+ "47f10e0a5c3dc51c988a628daad3e5e1"
+ "f4005e79c2d5a96c284b4b8d7e4948f3"
+ "31e5b85dd5a236f85579f3ea1d1b8484"
+ "87470bdb0ab4f81a12bee42c99fe0df4"
+ "bee3759453e69ad1d68a809ce06b949f"
+ "7694a990429b2fe81e066ff43e56a216"
+ "02db70757922a4bcc23ab89f1e35da77"
+ "586775f423e519c2ea394caf48a28d0c"
+ "8020f1dcf6b3a68ec246f615ae96dae9"
+ "a079b1f6eb959033c1af5c125fd94168"
+ "040c" // OCTET STRING length 0x0c (initializationVector)
+ "6d9721d08589581ab49204a3"
+ "302e" // SEQUENCE length 0x2e (KeyDescription) {
+ "020103" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x03 (keyFormat = RAW)
+ "3029" // SEQUENCE length 0x29 (AuthorizationList) {
+ "a108" // [1] context-specific constructed tag=1 length 0x08 { (purpose)
+ "3106" // SET length 0x06
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (Encrypt)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (Decrypt)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [1]
+ "a203" // [2] context-specific constructed tag=2 length 0x02 { (algorithm)
+ "020120" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x20 (AES)
+ // } end [2]
+ "a304" // [3] context-specific constructed tag=3 length 0x04 { (keySize)
+ "02020100" // INTEGER length 2 value 0x100
+ // } end [3]
+ "a405" // [4] context-specific constructed tag=4 length 0x05 { (blockMode
+ "3103" // SET length 0x03 {
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (ECB)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [4]
+ "a605" // [6] context-specific constructed tag=6 length 0x05 { (padding)
+ "3103" // SET length 0x03 {
+ "020140" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x40 (PKCS7)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [5]
+ "bf837702" // [503] context-specific constructed tag=503=0x1F7 length 0x02 {
+ // (noAuthRequired)
+ "0500" // NULL
+ // } end [503]
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AuthorizationList)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (KeyDescription)
+ "0420" // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (encryptedKey)
+ "a61c6e247e25b3e6e69aa78eb03c2d4a"
+ "c20d1f99a9a024a76f35c8e2cab9b68d"
+ "0410" // OCTET STRING length 0x10 (tag)
+ "2560c70109ae67c030f00b98b512a670"
+ // } SEQUENCE (SecureKeyWrapper)
+);
auto wrapping_key = hex2str(
- "308204be020100300d06092a864886f70d0101010500048204a8308204a40201000282010100aec367931d"
- "8900ce56b0067f7d70e1fc653f3f34d194c1fed50018fb43db937b06e673a837313d56b1c725150a3fef86"
- "acbddc41bb759c2854eae32d35841efb5c18d82bc90a1cb5c1d55adf245b02911f0b7cda88c421ff0ebafe"
- "7c0d23be312d7bd5921ffaea1347c157406fef718f682643e4e5d33c6703d61c0cf7ac0bf4645c11f5c137"
- "4c3886427411c449796792e0bef75dec858a2123c36753e02a95a96d7c454b504de385a642e0dfc3e60ac3"
- "a7ee4991d0d48b0172a95f9536f02ba13cecccb92b727db5c27e5b2f5cec09600b286af5cf14c42024c61d"
- "dfe71c2a8d7458f185234cb00e01d282f10f8fc6721d2aed3f4833cca2bd8fa62821dd5502030100010282"
- "0100431447b6251908112b1ee76f99f3711a52b6630960046c2de70de188d833f8b8b91e4d785caeeeaf4f"
- "0f74414e2cda40641f7fe24f14c67a88959bdb27766df9e710b630a03adc683b5d2c43080e52bee71e9eae"
- "b6de297a5fea1072070d181c822bccff087d63c940ba8a45f670feb29fb4484d1c95e6d2579ba02aae0a00"
- "900c3ebf490e3d2cd7ee8d0e20c536e4dc5a5097272888cddd7e91f228b1c4d7474c55b8fcd618c4a957bb"
- "ddd5ad7407cc312d8d98a5caf7e08f4a0d6b45bb41c652659d5a5ba05b663737a8696281865ba20fbdd7f8"
- "51e6c56e8cbe0ddbbf24dc03b2d2cb4c3d540fb0af52e034a2d06698b128e5f101e3b51a34f8d8b4f86181"
- "02818100de392e18d682c829266cc3454e1d6166242f32d9a1d10577753e904ea7d08bff841be5bac82a16"
- "4c5970007047b8c517db8f8f84e37bd5988561bdf503d4dc2bdb38f885434ae42c355f725c9a60f91f0788"
- "e1f1a97223b524b5357fdf72e2f696bab7d78e32bf92ba8e1864eab1229e91346130748a6e3c124f9149d7"
- "1c743502818100c95387c0f9d35f137b57d0d65c397c5e21cc251e47008ed62a542409c8b6b6ac7f8967b3"
- "863ca645fcce49582a9aa17349db6c4a95affdae0dae612e1afac99ed39a2d934c880440aed8832f984316"
- "3a47f27f392199dc1202f9a0f9bd08308007cb1e4e7f58309366a7de25f7c3c9b880677c068e1be936e812"
- "88815252a8a102818057ff8ca1895080b2cae486ef0adfd791fb0235c0b8b36cd6c136e52e4085f4ea5a06"
- "3212a4f105a3764743e53281988aba073f6e0027298e1c4378556e0efca0e14ece1af76ad0b030f27af6f0"
- "ab35fb73a060d8b1a0e142fa2647e93b32e36d8282ae0a4de50ab7afe85500a16f43a64719d6e2b9439823"
- "719cd08bcd03178102818100ba73b0bb28e3f81e9bd1c568713b101241acc607976c4ddccc90e65b6556ca"
- "31516058f92b6e09f3b160ff0e374ec40d78ae4d4979fde6ac06a1a400c61dd31254186af30b22c10582a8"
- "a43e34fe949c5f3b9755bae7baa7b7b7a6bd03b38cef55c86885fc6c1978b9cee7ef33da507c9df6b9277c"
- "ff1e6aaa5d57aca528466102818100c931617c77829dfb1270502be9195c8f2830885f57dba869536811e6"
- "864236d0c4736a0008a145af36b8357a7c3d139966d04c4e00934ea1aede3bb6b8ec841dc95e3f579751e2"
- "bfdfe27ae778983f959356210723287b0affcc9f727044d48c373f1babde0724fa17a4fd4da0902c7c9b9b"
- "f27ba61be6ad02dfddda8f4e6822");
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "308204be" // SEQUENCE length 0x4be (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "300d" // SEQUENCE length 0x0d (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0609" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 0x09 (algorithm)
+ "2a864886f70d010101" // 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 encryption scheme)
+ "0500" // NULL (parameters)
+ // } SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "048204a8" // OCTET STRING len 0x4a8 (privateKey), which contains...
+ // RFC 8017 A.1.2
+ "308204a4" // SEQUENCE len 0x4a4 (RSAPrivateKey) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "02820101" // INTEGER length 0x0101 (modulus) value...
+ "00aec367931d8900ce56b0067f7d70e1" // 0x10
+ "fc653f3f34d194c1fed50018fb43db93" // 0x20
+ "7b06e673a837313d56b1c725150a3fef" // 0x30
+ "86acbddc41bb759c2854eae32d35841e" // 0x40
+ "fb5c18d82bc90a1cb5c1d55adf245b02" // 0x50
+ "911f0b7cda88c421ff0ebafe7c0d23be" // 0x60
+ "312d7bd5921ffaea1347c157406fef71" // 0x70
+ "8f682643e4e5d33c6703d61c0cf7ac0b" // 0x80
+ "f4645c11f5c1374c3886427411c44979" // 0x90
+ "6792e0bef75dec858a2123c36753e02a" // 0xa0
+ "95a96d7c454b504de385a642e0dfc3e6" // 0xb0
+ "0ac3a7ee4991d0d48b0172a95f9536f0" // 0xc0
+ "2ba13cecccb92b727db5c27e5b2f5cec" // 0xd0
+ "09600b286af5cf14c42024c61ddfe71c" // 0xe0
+ "2a8d7458f185234cb00e01d282f10f8f" // 0xf0
+ "c6721d2aed3f4833cca2bd8fa62821dd" // 0x100
+ "55" // 0x101
+ "0203010001" // INTEGER length 3 value 0x10001 (publicExponent)
+ "02820100" // INTEGER length 0x100 (privateExponent) value...
+ "431447b6251908112b1ee76f99f3711a" // 0x10
+ "52b6630960046c2de70de188d833f8b8" // 0x20
+ "b91e4d785caeeeaf4f0f74414e2cda40" // 0x30
+ "641f7fe24f14c67a88959bdb27766df9" // 0x40
+ "e710b630a03adc683b5d2c43080e52be" // 0x50
+ "e71e9eaeb6de297a5fea1072070d181c" // 0x60
+ "822bccff087d63c940ba8a45f670feb2" // 0x70
+ "9fb4484d1c95e6d2579ba02aae0a0090" // 0x80
+ "0c3ebf490e3d2cd7ee8d0e20c536e4dc" // 0x90
+ "5a5097272888cddd7e91f228b1c4d747" // 0xa0
+ "4c55b8fcd618c4a957bbddd5ad7407cc" // 0xb0
+ "312d8d98a5caf7e08f4a0d6b45bb41c6" // 0xc0
+ "52659d5a5ba05b663737a8696281865b" // 0xd0
+ "a20fbdd7f851e6c56e8cbe0ddbbf24dc" // 0xe0
+ "03b2d2cb4c3d540fb0af52e034a2d066" // 0xf0
+ "98b128e5f101e3b51a34f8d8b4f86181" // 0x100
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime1) value...
+ "00de392e18d682c829266cc3454e1d61" // 0x10
+ "66242f32d9a1d10577753e904ea7d08b" // 0x20
+ "ff841be5bac82a164c5970007047b8c5" // 0x30
+ "17db8f8f84e37bd5988561bdf503d4dc" // 0x40
+ "2bdb38f885434ae42c355f725c9a60f9" // 0x50
+ "1f0788e1f1a97223b524b5357fdf72e2" // 0x60
+ "f696bab7d78e32bf92ba8e1864eab122" // 0x70
+ "9e91346130748a6e3c124f9149d71c74" // 0x80
+ "35"
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime2) value...
+ "00c95387c0f9d35f137b57d0d65c397c" // 0x10
+ "5e21cc251e47008ed62a542409c8b6b6" // 0x20
+ "ac7f8967b3863ca645fcce49582a9aa1" // 0x30
+ "7349db6c4a95affdae0dae612e1afac9" // 0x40
+ "9ed39a2d934c880440aed8832f984316" // 0x50
+ "3a47f27f392199dc1202f9a0f9bd0830" // 0x60
+ "8007cb1e4e7f58309366a7de25f7c3c9" // 0x70
+ "b880677c068e1be936e81288815252a8" // 0x80
+ "a1"
+ "028180" // INTEGER length 0x80 (exponent1) value...
+ "57ff8ca1895080b2cae486ef0adfd791" // 0x10
+ "fb0235c0b8b36cd6c136e52e4085f4ea" // 0x20
+ "5a063212a4f105a3764743e53281988a" // 0x30
+ "ba073f6e0027298e1c4378556e0efca0" // 0x40
+ "e14ece1af76ad0b030f27af6f0ab35fb" // 0x50
+ "73a060d8b1a0e142fa2647e93b32e36d" // 0x60
+ "8282ae0a4de50ab7afe85500a16f43a6" // 0x70
+ "4719d6e2b9439823719cd08bcd031781" // 0x80
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (exponent2) value...
+ "00ba73b0bb28e3f81e9bd1c568713b10" // 0x10
+ "1241acc607976c4ddccc90e65b6556ca" // 0x20
+ "31516058f92b6e09f3b160ff0e374ec4" // 0x30
+ "0d78ae4d4979fde6ac06a1a400c61dd3" // 0x40
+ "1254186af30b22c10582a8a43e34fe94" // 0x50
+ "9c5f3b9755bae7baa7b7b7a6bd03b38c" // 0x60
+ "ef55c86885fc6c1978b9cee7ef33da50" // 0x70
+ "7c9df6b9277cff1e6aaa5d57aca52846" // 0x80
+ "61"
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (coefficient) value...
+ "00c931617c77829dfb1270502be9195c" // 0x10
+ "8f2830885f57dba869536811e6864236" // 0x20
+ "d0c4736a0008a145af36b8357a7c3d13" // 0x30
+ "9966d04c4e00934ea1aede3bb6b8ec84" // 0x40
+ "1dc95e3f579751e2bfdfe27ae778983f" // 0x50
+ "959356210723287b0affcc9f727044d4" // 0x60
+ "8c373f1babde0724fa17a4fd4da0902c" // 0x70
+ "7c9b9bf27ba61be6ad02dfddda8f4e68" // 0x80
+ "22"
+ // } SEQUENCE
+ // } SEQUENCE ()
+);
string zero_masking_key =
hex2str("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000");
@@ -2676,6 +3640,36 @@
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
+/*
+ * ImportWrappedKeyTest.SuccessSidsIgnored
+ *
+ * Verifies that password_sid and biometric_sid are ignored on import if the authorizations don't
+ * include Tag:USER_SECURE_ID.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, SuccessSidsIgnored) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+ int64_t password_sid = 42;
+ int64_t biometric_sid = 24;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP),
+ password_sid, biometric_sid));
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, SuccessMasked) {
auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
@@ -2722,6 +3716,36 @@
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
}
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongPaddingMode) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongDigest) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ImportWrappedKeyTest);
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase EncryptionOperationsTest;
@@ -2732,22 +3756,26 @@
* Verifies that raw RSA encryption works.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingSuccess) {
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
- .SetDefaultValidity()));
+ for (uint64_t exponent : {3, 65537}) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, exponent)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
- string message = string(2048 / 8, 'a');
- auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
- string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
- EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
+ string message = string(2048 / 8, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
- string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
- EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
- // Unpadded RSA is deterministic
- EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+ // Unpadded RSA is deterministic
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
}
/*
@@ -2874,14 +3902,31 @@
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.SetDefaultValidity()));
- string message = "Hello World!";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP).Digest(Digest::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
+ * with a padding value that is only suitable for signing/verifying.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepInvalidPadding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS).Digest(Digest::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest
*
* Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to decrypt
* with a different digest than was used to encrypt.
@@ -3080,7 +4125,7 @@
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1TooLarge
*
- * Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption fails in the correct way when the mssage is too large.
+ * Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption fails in the correct way when the message is too large.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1TooLarge) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
@@ -3165,7 +4210,49 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbUnknownTag
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES ECB operations ignore unknown tags.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbUnknownTag) {
+ int32_t unknown_tag_value = ((7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 150);
+ Tag unknown_tag = static_cast<Tag>(unknown_tag_value);
+ KeyParameter unknown_param;
+ unknown_param.tag = unknown_tag;
+
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(unknown_param),
+ &key_blob_, &key_characteristics));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ // Unknown tags should not be returned in key characteristics.
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_EQ(hw_enforced.find(unknown_tag), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(sw_enforced.find(unknown_tag), -1);
+
+ // Encrypt without mentioning the unknown parameter.
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
+
+ // Decrypt including the unknown parameter.
+ auto decrypt_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(unknown_param);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, decrypt_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongMode
*
* Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized mode is specified.
*/
@@ -3175,11 +4262,8 @@
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
-
ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
- // Two-block message.
- string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
@@ -3187,6 +4271,55 @@
}
/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized padding is specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesWrongPadding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(
+ ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesInvalidParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an duplicate parameters are specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesInvalidParams) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ auto result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE ||
+ result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE);
+
+ result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE ||
+ result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+}
+
+/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongPurpose
*
* Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized purpose is
@@ -3227,25 +4360,30 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
*
* Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when provided an input that is not a
* multiple of the block size and no padding is specified.
*/
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .AesEncryptionKey(128)
- .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
- // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
- string message(16 * 2 - 1, 'a');
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
+ for (BlockMode blockMode : {BlockMode::ECB, BlockMode::CBC}) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, blockMode)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
+ string message(16 * 2 - 1, 'a');
- auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
- string ciphertext;
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &ciphertext));
- EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(blockMode).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &out_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &ciphertext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
}
/*
@@ -3565,7 +4703,7 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCbcRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
*/
@@ -3805,6 +4943,31 @@
}
/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmDifferentAutoNonces
+ *
+ * Verifies that encrypting the same data with KeyMint generated nonces produces different outputs.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmDifferentAutoNonces) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string aad = "foobar";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128);
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128);
+ string ciphertext3 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128);
+
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext3);
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext2, ciphertext3);
+}
+
+/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmTooShortTag
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when a too-short tag length is specified.
@@ -4032,6 +5195,9 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(message, &ciphertext));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG, UpdateAad("foo"));
+ // The failure should have already cancelled the operation.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE, Abort());
+
op_ = {};
}
@@ -4231,11 +5397,8 @@
.BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
- for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
- auto inParams =
- AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
- }
+ auto inParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
}
/*
@@ -4401,6 +5564,25 @@
}
/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesInvalidCallerIv
+ *
+ * Validates that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size IV.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesInvalidCallerIv) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("abcdefg"));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCallerIv
*
* Validates that 3DES keys can allow caller-specified IVs, and use them correctly.
@@ -4438,7 +5620,7 @@
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited.
*
- * Verifies that 3DES keys without TAG_CALLER_NONCE do not allow caller-specified IVS.
+ * Verifies that 3DES keys without TAG_CALLER_NONCE do not allow caller-specified IVs.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
@@ -4486,25 +5668,29 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
*
* Verifies that unpadded CBC operations reject inputs that are not a multiple of block size.
*/
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
- .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
- // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
- string message = "123456789012345";
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
+ for (BlockMode blockMode : {BlockMode::ECB, BlockMode::CBC}) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(blockMode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
+ string message = "123456789012345";
- auto begin_params =
- AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
- AuthorizationSet output_params;
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &output_params));
- string ciphertext;
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, "", &ciphertext));
+ auto begin_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(blockMode).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &output_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, "", &ciphertext));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
}
/*
@@ -4912,6 +6098,19 @@
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UsageCountLimitTest);
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase GetHardwareInfoTest;
+
+TEST_P(GetHardwareInfoTest, GetHardwareInfo) {
+ // Retrieving hardware info should give the same result each time.
+ KeyMintHardwareInfo info;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint().getHardwareInfo(&info).isOk());
+ KeyMintHardwareInfo info2;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint().getHardwareInfo(&info2).isOk());
+ EXPECT_EQ(info, info2);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(GetHardwareInfoTest);
+
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase AddEntropyTest;
/*
@@ -4943,6 +6142,16 @@
EXPECT_TRUE(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024, 'a'))).isOk());
}
+/*
+ * AddEntropyTest.AddTooLargeEntropy
+ *
+ * Verifies that the addRngEntropy method rejects more than 2KiB of data.
+ */
+TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddTooLargeEntropy) {
+ ErrorCode rc = GetReturnErrorCode(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024 + 1, 'a'))));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, rc);
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AddEntropyTest);
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase KeyDeletionTest;
@@ -5054,6 +6263,28 @@
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyDeletionTest);
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase KeyUpgradeTest;
+
+/**
+ * KeyUpgradeTest.UpgradeInvalidKey
+ *
+ * This test checks that the HAL excepts invalid key blobs..
+ */
+TEST_P(KeyUpgradeTest, UpgradeInvalidKey) {
+ AidlBuf key_blob = AidlBuf("just some garbage data which is not a valid key blob");
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> new_blob;
+ Status result = keymint_->upgradeKey(key_blob,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
+ .vector_data(),
+ &new_blob);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB, GetReturnErrorCode(result));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyUpgradeTest);
+
using UpgradeKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
/*
@@ -5122,7 +6353,7 @@
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase TransportLimitTest;
/*
- * TransportLimitTest.FinishInput
+ * TransportLimitTest.LargeFinishInput
*
* Verifies that passing input data to finish succeeds as expected.
*/
@@ -5277,6 +6508,17 @@
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyAgreementTest);
+using DestroyAttestationIdsTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
+
+// This is a problematic test, as it can render the device under test permanently unusable.
+// Re-enable and run at your own risk.
+TEST_P(DestroyAttestationIdsTest, DISABLED_DestroyTest) {
+ auto result = DestroyAttestationIds();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::OK || result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(DestroyAttestationIdsTest);
+
using EarlyBootKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
TEST_P(EarlyBootKeyTest, CreateEarlyBootKeys) {
@@ -5289,7 +6531,7 @@
CheckedDeleteKey(&ecdsaKeyData.blob);
}
-// This is a more comprenhensive test, but it can only be run on a machine which is still in early
+// This is a more comprehensive test, but it can only be run on a machine which is still in early
// boot stage, which no proper Android device is by the time we can run VTS. To use this,
// un-disable it and modify vold to remove the call to earlyBootEnded(). Running the test will end
// early boot, so you'll have to reboot between runs.
@@ -5357,7 +6599,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, UseEcdsaKey(ecdsaKeyData.blob));
ErrorCode rc = GetReturnErrorCode(
- keyMint().deviceLocked(false /* passwordOnly */, {} /* verificationToken */));
+ keyMint().deviceLocked(false /* passwordOnly */, {} /* timestampToken */));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, rc);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED, UseAesKey(aesKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED, UseHmacKey(hmacKeyData.blob));
@@ -5372,16 +6614,6 @@
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UnlockedDeviceRequiredTest);
-using PerformOperationTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
-
-TEST_P(PerformOperationTest, RequireUnimplemented) {
- vector<uint8_t> response;
- auto result = keymint_->performOperation({} /* request */, &response);
- ASSERT_EQ(GetReturnErrorCode(result), ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
-}
-
-INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(PerformOperationTest);
-
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
@@ -5406,6 +6638,10 @@
} else {
std::cout << "NOT dumping attestations" << std::endl;
}
+ // TODO(drysdale): Remove this flag when available KeyMint devices comply with spec
+ if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--check_patchLevels") {
+ aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test::check_patchLevels = true;
+ }
}
}
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp
index 6c795f5..54b6fdc 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp
@@ -228,8 +228,7 @@
AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
Status result;
BeginResult out;
- result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob_, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(),
- &out);
+ result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob_, in_params.vector_data(), std::nullopt, &out);
if (result.isOk()) {
*out_params = out.params;
op_ = out.operation;
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
index 53d5b96..e1ead21 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
+++ b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
@@ -38,5 +38,6 @@
uint32_t getOsVersion();
uint32_t getOsPatchlevel();
+uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel();
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
index e73d602..2dbdfa8 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
@@ -31,10 +31,11 @@
constexpr size_t kPlatformVersionMatchCount = kSubminorVersionMatch + 1;
constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.build.version.security_patch";
-constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-[0-9]{2}$";
+constexpr char kVendorPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.vendor.build.security_patch";
+constexpr char kPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-[0-9]{2}$";
constexpr size_t kYearMatch = 1;
constexpr size_t kMonthMatch = 2;
-constexpr size_t kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount = kMonthMatch + 1;
+constexpr size_t kPatchlevelMatchCount = kMonthMatch + 1;
uint32_t match_to_uint32(const char* expression, const regmatch_t& match) {
if (match.rm_so == -1) return 0;
@@ -80,15 +81,14 @@
return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
}
-uint32_t getOsPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str) {
+uint32_t getPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str) {
regex_t regex;
- if (regcomp(®ex, kPlatformPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
+ if (regcomp(®ex, kPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
return 0;
}
- regmatch_t matches[kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount];
- int not_match =
- regexec(®ex, patchlevel_str, kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
+ regmatch_t matches[kPatchlevelMatchCount];
+ int not_match = regexec(®ex, patchlevel_str, kPatchlevelMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
regfree(®ex);
if (not_match) {
return 0;
@@ -105,7 +105,12 @@
uint32_t getOsPatchlevel() {
std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformPatchlevelProp);
- return getOsPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+ return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+}
+
+uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel() {
+ std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kVendorPatchlevelProp);
+ return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
}
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl b/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
index 71b4278..2fbd29a 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
*
* where:
*
- * ``ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL'' is a sting constant defined in ISecureClock.aidl.
+ * ``ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL'' is a string constant defined in ISecureClock.aidl.
*
* ``H'' is the shared HMAC key (see computeSharedHmac() in ISharedSecret).
*
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
index 2e27475..67f6bae 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
@@ -53,12 +53,15 @@
return failure();
}
- auto status = mCas->setSessionPrivateData(sessionId, hidlPvtData);
- if (status != android::hardware::cas::V1_0::Status::OK) {
- ALOGW("[vts] Failed to set session private data");
- mCas->closeSession(sessionId);
- return failure();
+ if (hidlPvtData.size() > 0) {
+ auto status = mCas->setSessionPrivateData(sessionId, hidlPvtData);
+ if (status != android::hardware::cas::V1_0::Status::OK) {
+ ALOGW("[vts] Failed to set session private data");
+ mCas->closeSession(sessionId);
+ return failure();
+ }
}
+
return success();
}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index 4c92665..b39abe3 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -56,9 +56,6 @@
}
void TunerFilterHidlTest::testTimeFilter(TimeFilterConfig filterConf) {
- if (!timeFilter.support) {
- return;
- }
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
DemuxCapabilities caps;
@@ -161,27 +158,36 @@
void TunerRecordHidlTest::recordSingleFilterTest(FilterConfig filterConf,
FrontendConfig frontendConf, DvrConfig dvrConf) {
- uint32_t feId;
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+ mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+
+ DvrConfig dvrSourceConfig;
+ if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ uint32_t feId;
+ mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+ if (mLnbId) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setLnb(*mLnbId));
+ }
+ if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
+ mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[record.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
+ }
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+ mFrontendTests.setDvrTests(mDvrTests);
+ } else {
+ dvrSourceConfig = dvrMap[record.dvrSourceId];
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrSourceConfig.type, dvrSourceConfig.bufferSize));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrPlayback(dvrSourceConfig.settings));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrPlaybackMQDescriptor());
+ }
+
uint32_t filterId;
sp<IFilter> filter;
-
- mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
- ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
- if (mLnbId) {
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setLnb(*mLnbId));
- }
- if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
- mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[record.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
- }
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
- mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
- mFrontendTests.setDvrTests(mDvrTests);
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrConf.type, dvrConf.bufferSize));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrRecord(dvrConf.settings));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrRecordMQDescriptor());
@@ -195,17 +201,39 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.attachFilterToDvr(filter));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.startDvrRecord());
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.startFilter(filterId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+ if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+ } else {
+ // Start DVR Source
+ mDvrTests.startPlaybackInputThread(dvrSourceConfig.playbackInputFile,
+ dvrSourceConfig.settings.playback());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.startDvrPlayback());
+ }
+
mDvrTests.testRecordOutput();
mDvrTests.stopRecordThread();
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+ if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+ } else {
+ mDvrTests.stopPlaybackThread();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.stopDvrPlayback());
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.stopFilter(filterId));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.stopDvrRecord());
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.detachFilterToDvr(filter));
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(filterId));
mDvrTests.closeDvrRecord();
+
+ if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+ } else {
+ mDvrTests.closeDvrPlayback();
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
}
void TunerRecordHidlTest::recordSingleFilterTestWithLnb(FilterConfig filterConf,
@@ -236,23 +264,34 @@
void TunerRecordHidlTest::attachSingleFilterToRecordDvrTest(FilterConfig filterConf,
FrontendConfig frontendConf,
DvrConfig dvrConf) {
- uint32_t feId;
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+ mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+
+ DvrConfig dvrSourceConfig;
+ if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ uint32_t feId;
+ mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+ } else {
+ dvrSourceConfig = dvrMap[record.dvrSourceId];
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrSourceConfig.type, dvrSourceConfig.bufferSize));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrPlayback(dvrSourceConfig.settings));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrPlaybackMQDescriptor());
+ }
+
uint32_t filterId;
sp<IFilter> filter;
-
- mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
- ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
- mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrConf.type, dvrConf.bufferSize));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrRecord(dvrConf.settings));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrRecordMQDescriptor());
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux(filterConf.type, filterConf.bufferSize));
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.getNewlyOpenedFilterId(filterId));
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.configFilter(filterConf.settings, filterId));
@@ -268,30 +307,43 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(filterId));
mDvrTests.closeDvrRecord();
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+
+ if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+ }
}
void TunerDescramblerHidlTest::scrambledBroadcastTest(set<struct FilterConfig> mediaFilterConfs,
FrontendConfig frontendConf,
DescramblerConfig descConfig) {
- uint32_t feId;
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+
+ DvrConfig dvrSourceConfig;
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ uint32_t feId;
+ mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+ if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
+ mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
+ }
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+ mFrontendTests.setDemux(demux);
+ } else {
+ dvrSourceConfig = dvrMap[descrambling.dvrSourceId];
+ mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrSourceConfig.type, dvrSourceConfig.bufferSize));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrPlayback(dvrSourceConfig.settings));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrPlaybackMQDescriptor());
+ }
+
set<uint32_t> filterIds;
uint32_t filterId;
set<struct FilterConfig>::iterator config;
set<uint32_t>::iterator id;
-
- mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
- if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
- mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
- }
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
- mFrontendTests.setDemux(demux);
for (config = mediaFilterConfs.begin(); config != mediaFilterConfs.end(); config++) {
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux((*config).type, (*config).bufferSize));
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.getNewlyOpenedFilterId(filterId));
@@ -314,10 +366,26 @@
for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.startFilter(*id));
}
- // tune test
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ // tune test
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+ } else {
+ // Start DVR Source
+ mDvrTests.startPlaybackInputThread(dvrSourceConfig.playbackInputFile,
+ dvrSourceConfig.settings.playback());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.startDvrPlayback());
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(filterDataOutputTest());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+ } else {
+ mDvrTests.stopPlaybackThread();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.stopDvrPlayback());
+ }
+
for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.stopFilter(*id));
}
@@ -328,27 +396,45 @@
for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(*id));
}
+
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+ } else {
+ mDvrTests.closeDvrPlayback();
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
}
TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, TuneFrontend) {
description("Tune one Frontend with specific setting and check Lock event");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
mFrontendTests.tuneTest(frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, AutoScanFrontend) {
description("Run an auto frontend scan with specific setting and check lock scanMessage");
+ if (!scan.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
mFrontendTests.scanTest(frontendMap[scan.frontendId], FrontendScanType::SCAN_AUTO);
}
TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, BlindScanFrontend) {
description("Run an blind frontend scan with specific setting and check lock scanMessage");
+ if (!scan.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
mFrontendTests.scanTest(frontendMap[scan.frontendId], FrontendScanType::SCAN_BLIND);
}
TEST_P(TunerLnbHidlTest, SendDiseqcMessageToLnb) {
description("Open and configure an Lnb with specific settings then send a diseqc msg to it.");
+ if (!lnbLive.support) {
+ return;
+ }
if (lnbMap[lnbLive.lnbId].name.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
vector<uint32_t> ids;
ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.getLnbIds(ids));
@@ -370,6 +456,9 @@
TEST_P(TunerDemuxHidlTest, openDemux) {
description("Open and close a Demux.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
uint32_t feId;
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
@@ -385,6 +474,9 @@
TEST_P(TunerDemuxHidlTest, getAvSyncTime) {
description("Get the A/V sync time from a PCR filter.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
if (live.pcrFilterId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
return;
}
@@ -423,6 +515,9 @@
TEST_P(TunerFilterHidlTest, StartFilterInDemux) {
description("Open and start a filter in Demux.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
// TODO use paramterized tests
configSingleFilterInDemuxTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
@@ -457,22 +552,34 @@
TEST_P(TunerFilterHidlTest, testTimeFilter) {
description("Open a timer filter in Demux and set time stamp.");
+ if (!timeFilter.support) {
+ return;
+ }
// TODO use paramterized tests
testTimeFilter(timeFilterMap[timeFilter.timeFilterId]);
}
TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowVideoFilterTest) {
description("Test Video Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowAudioFilterTest) {
description("Test Audio Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterMap[live.audioFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowSectionFilterTest) {
description("Test Section Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
if (live.sectionFilterId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
return;
}
@@ -481,6 +588,9 @@
TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, IonBufferTest) {
description("Test the av filter data bufferring.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
@@ -501,6 +611,22 @@
playbackSingleFilterTest(filterMap[playback.sectionFilterId], dvrMap[playback.dvrId]);
}
+TEST_P(TunerPlaybackHidlTest, PlaybackDataFlowWithTsAudioFilterTest) {
+ description("Feed ts data from playback and configure Ts audio filter to get output");
+ if (!playback.support) {
+ return;
+ }
+ playbackSingleFilterTest(filterMap[playback.audioFilterId], dvrMap[playback.dvrId]);
+}
+
+TEST_P(TunerPlaybackHidlTest, PlaybackDataFlowWithTsVideoFilterTest) {
+ description("Feed ts data from playback and configure Ts video filter to get output");
+ if (!playback.support) {
+ return;
+ }
+ playbackSingleFilterTest(filterMap[playback.videoFilterId], dvrMap[playback.dvrId]);
+}
+
TEST_P(TunerRecordHidlTest, AttachFiltersToRecordTest) {
description("Attach a single filter to the record dvr test.");
// TODO use paramterized tests
@@ -522,7 +648,7 @@
TEST_P(TunerRecordHidlTest, LnbRecordDataFlowWithTsRecordFilterTest) {
description("Feed ts data from Fe with Lnb to recording and test with ts record filter");
- if (lnbRecord.support) {
+ if (!lnbRecord.support) {
return;
}
recordSingleFilterTestWithLnb(filterMap[lnbRecord.recordFilterId],
@@ -532,27 +658,34 @@
TEST_P(TunerDescramblerHidlTest, CreateDescrambler) {
description("Create Descrambler");
- if (descrambling.support) {
+ if (!descrambling.support) {
return;
}
- uint32_t feId;
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
- mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].type, feId);
- ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ uint32_t feId;
+ mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].type, feId);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mDescramblerTests.openDescrambler(demuxId));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDescramblerTests.closeDescrambler());
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+ }
}
TEST_P(TunerDescramblerHidlTest, ScrambledBroadcastDataFlowMediaFiltersTest) {
description("Test ts audio filter in scrambled broadcast use case");
- if (descrambling.support) {
+ if (!descrambling.support) {
return;
}
set<FilterConfig> filterConfs;
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
index a1597c7..2cea181 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
@@ -150,10 +150,32 @@
};
inline bool validateConnections() {
- bool feIsValid = frontendMap.find(live.frontendId) != frontendMap.end() &&
- frontendMap.find(scan.frontendId) != frontendMap.end();
- feIsValid &= record.support ? frontendMap.find(record.frontendId) != frontendMap.end() : true;
- feIsValid &= descrambling.support
+ if ((!live.hasFrontendConnection || !scan.hasFrontendConnection) && !playback.support) {
+ ALOGW("[vts config] VTS must support either a DVR source or a Frontend source.");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (record.support && !record.hasFrontendConnection &&
+ record.dvrSourceId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
+ ALOGW("[vts config] Record must support either a DVR source or a Frontend source.");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (descrambling.support && !descrambling.hasFrontendConnection &&
+ descrambling.dvrSourceId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
+ ALOGW("[vts config] Descrambling must support either a DVR source or a Frontend source.");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ bool feIsValid = live.hasFrontendConnection
+ ? frontendMap.find(live.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
+ : true;
+ feIsValid &= scan.hasFrontendConnection ? frontendMap.find(scan.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
+ : true;
+ feIsValid &= record.support && record.hasFrontendConnection
+ ? frontendMap.find(record.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
+ : true;
+ feIsValid &= (descrambling.support && descrambling.hasFrontendConnection)
? frontendMap.find(descrambling.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
: true;
feIsValid &= lnbLive.support ? frontendMap.find(lnbLive.frontendId) != frontendMap.end() : true;
@@ -165,18 +187,28 @@
return false;
}
- bool dvrIsValid = frontendMap[live.frontendId].isSoftwareFe
+ bool dvrIsValid = (live.hasFrontendConnection && frontendMap[live.frontendId].isSoftwareFe)
? dvrMap.find(live.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end()
: true;
dvrIsValid &= playback.support ? dvrMap.find(playback.dvrId) != dvrMap.end() : true;
if (record.support) {
- if (frontendMap[record.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
- dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+ if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ if (frontendMap[record.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
+ dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+ }
+ } else {
+ dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSourceId) != dvrMap.end();
}
dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrRecordId) != dvrMap.end();
}
- if (descrambling.support && frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
- dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+ if (descrambling.support) {
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ if (frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
+ dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+ }
+ } else {
+ dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(descrambling.dvrSourceId) != dvrMap.end();
+ }
}
if (!dvrIsValid) {
@@ -184,8 +216,10 @@
return false;
}
- bool filterIsValid = filterMap.find(live.audioFilterId) != filterMap.end() &&
- filterMap.find(live.videoFilterId) != filterMap.end();
+ bool filterIsValid = (live.hasFrontendConnection)
+ ? filterMap.find(live.audioFilterId) != filterMap.end() &&
+ filterMap.find(live.videoFilterId) != filterMap.end()
+ : true;
filterIsValid &= playback.support
? (filterMap.find(playback.audioFilterId) != filterMap.end() &&
filterMap.find(playback.videoFilterId) != filterMap.end())
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Demux.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Demux.cpp
index db25c2e..15b8e6c 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Demux.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Demux.cpp
@@ -392,6 +392,10 @@
mIsRecording = isRecording;
}
+bool Demux::isRecording() {
+ return mIsRecording;
+}
+
bool Demux::attachRecordFilter(uint64_t filterId) {
if (mFilters[filterId] == nullptr || mDvrRecord == nullptr ||
!mFilters[filterId]->isRecordFilter()) {
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Demux.h b/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Demux.h
index 5212eae..ce46f9c 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Demux.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Demux.h
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
void updateMediaFilterOutput(uint64_t filterId, vector<uint8_t> data, uint64_t pts);
uint16_t getFilterTpid(uint64_t filterId);
void setIsRecording(bool isRecording);
+ bool isRecording();
void startFrontendInputLoop();
/**
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Dvr.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Dvr.cpp
index 93bb6a8..c487d98 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Dvr.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.1/default/Dvr.cpp
@@ -218,19 +218,26 @@
continue;
}
+ // If the both dvr playback and dvr record are created, the playback will be treated as
+ // the source of the record. isVirtualFrontend set to true would direct the dvr playback
+ // input to the demux record filters or live broadcast filters.
+ bool isRecording = mDemux->isRecording();
+ bool isVirtualFrontend = isRecording;
+
if (mDvrSettings.playback().dataFormat == DataFormat::ES) {
- if (!processEsDataOnPlayback(false /*isVirtualFrontend*/, false /*isRecording*/)) {
+ if (!processEsDataOnPlayback(isVirtualFrontend, isRecording)) {
ALOGE("[Dvr] playback es data failed to be filtered. Ending thread");
break;
}
maySendPlaybackStatusCallback();
continue;
}
+
// Our current implementation filter the data and write it into the filter FMQ immediately
// after the DATA_READY from the VTS/framework
// This is for the non-ES data source, real playback use case handling.
- if (!readPlaybackFMQ(false /*isVirtualFrontend*/, false /*isRecording*/) ||
- !startFilterDispatcher(false /*isVirtualFrontend*/, false /*isRecording*/)) {
+ if (!readPlaybackFMQ(isVirtualFrontend, isRecording) ||
+ !startFilterDispatcher(isVirtualFrontend, isRecording)) {
ALOGE("[Dvr] playback data failed to be filtered. Ending thread");
break;
}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.cpp
index 1080861..e70c320 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.cpp
@@ -22,10 +22,6 @@
return filterDataOutputTestBase(mFilterTests);
}
-AssertionResult TunerRecordHidlTest::filterDataOutputTest() {
- return filterDataOutputTestBase(mFilterTests);
-}
-
void TunerFilterHidlTest::configSingleFilterInDemuxTest(FilterConfig1_1 filterConf,
FrontendConfig1_1 frontendConf) {
uint32_t feId;
@@ -70,6 +66,9 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+ if (frontendConf.config1_0.isSoftwareFe) {
+ mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[live.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
+ }
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
mFrontendTests.setDemux(demux);
@@ -103,6 +102,9 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+ if (frontendConf.config1_0.isSoftwareFe) {
+ mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[live.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
+ }
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
mFrontendTests.setDemux(demux);
@@ -129,21 +131,33 @@
void TunerRecordHidlTest::recordSingleFilterTest(FilterConfig1_1 filterConf,
FrontendConfig1_1 frontendConf,
DvrConfig dvrConf) {
- uint32_t feId;
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+ mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+
+ DvrConfig dvrSourceConfig;
+ if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ uint32_t feId;
+ mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.config1_0.type, feId);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+ if (frontendConf.config1_0.isSoftwareFe) {
+ mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[record.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
+ }
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+ mFrontendTests.setDvrTests(mDvrTests);
+ } else {
+ dvrSourceConfig = dvrMap[record.dvrSourceId];
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrSourceConfig.type, dvrSourceConfig.bufferSize));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrPlayback(dvrSourceConfig.settings));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrPlaybackMQDescriptor());
+ }
+
uint64_t filterId;
sp<IFilter> filter;
-
- mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.config1_0.type, feId);
- ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
- mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
- mFrontendTests.setDvrTests(mDvrTests);
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrConf.type, dvrConf.bufferSize));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrRecord(dvrConf.settings));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrRecordMQDescriptor());
@@ -158,22 +172,46 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.attachFilterToDvr(filter));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.startDvrRecord());
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.startFilter(filterId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+ if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+ } else {
+ // Start DVR Source
+ mDvrTests.startPlaybackInputThread(dvrSourceConfig.playbackInputFile,
+ dvrSourceConfig.settings.playback());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.startDvrPlayback());
+ }
+
mDvrTests.testRecordOutput();
- ASSERT_TRUE(filterDataOutputTest());
mDvrTests.stopRecordThread();
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+ if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+ } else {
+ mDvrTests.stopPlaybackThread();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.stopDvrPlayback());
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.stopFilter(filterId));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.stopDvrRecord());
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.detachFilterToDvr(filter));
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(filterId));
mDvrTests.closeDvrRecord();
+
+ if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+ } else {
+ mDvrTests.closeDvrPlayback();
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
}
TEST_P(TunerFilterHidlTest, StartFilterInDemux) {
description("Open and start a filter in Demux.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
// TODO use parameterized tests
configSingleFilterInDemuxTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
@@ -181,6 +219,9 @@
TEST_P(TunerFilterHidlTest, ConfigIpFilterInDemuxWithCid) {
description("Open and configure an ip filter in Demux.");
// TODO use parameterized tests
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
if (live.ipFilterId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
return;
}
@@ -189,6 +230,9 @@
TEST_P(TunerFilterHidlTest, ReconfigFilterToReceiveStartId) {
description("Recofigure and restart a filter to test start id.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
// TODO use parameterized tests
reconfigSingleFilterInDemuxTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], filterMap[live.videoFilterId],
frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
@@ -205,16 +249,25 @@
TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, TuneFrontendWithFrontendSettingsExt1_1) {
description("Tune one Frontend with v1_1 extended setting and check Lock event");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
mFrontendTests.tuneTest(frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, BlindScanFrontendWithEndFrequency) {
description("Run an blind frontend scan with v1_1 extended setting and check lock scanMessage");
+ if (!scan.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
mFrontendTests.scanTest(frontendMap[scan.frontendId], FrontendScanType::SCAN_BLIND);
}
TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, MediaFilterWithSharedMemoryHandle) {
description("Test the Media Filter with shared memory handle");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
mediaFilterUsingSharedMemoryTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
@@ -225,6 +278,9 @@
TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, LinkToCiCam) {
description("Test Frontend link to CiCam");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
if (!frontendMap[live.frontendId].canConnectToCiCam) {
return;
}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.h b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.h
index 863f649..007e3d5 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.h
@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@
void recordSingleFilterTest(FilterConfig1_1 filterConf, FrontendConfig1_1 frontendConf,
DvrConfig dvrConf);
- AssertionResult filterDataOutputTest();
sp<ITuner> mService;
FrontendTests mFrontendTests;
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TestConfigurations.h b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TestConfigurations.h
index 390bd4c..2b5ad46 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TestConfigurations.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TestConfigurations.h
@@ -148,6 +148,11 @@
};
inline bool validateConnections() {
+ if (record.support && !record.hasFrontendConnection &&
+ record.dvrSourceId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
+ ALOGW("[vts config] Record must support either a DVR source or a Frontend source.");
+ return false;
+ }
bool feIsValid = frontendMap.find(live.frontendId) != frontendMap.end() &&
frontendMap.find(scan.frontendId) != frontendMap.end();
feIsValid &= record.support ? frontendMap.find(record.frontendId) != frontendMap.end() : true;
@@ -160,9 +165,14 @@
bool dvrIsValid = frontendMap[live.frontendId].config1_0.isSoftwareFe
? dvrMap.find(live.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end()
: true;
+
if (record.support) {
- if (frontendMap[record.frontendId].config1_0.isSoftwareFe) {
- dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+ if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ if (frontendMap[record.frontendId].config1_0.isSoftwareFe) {
+ dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+ }
+ } else {
+ dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSourceId) != dvrMap.end();
}
dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrRecordId) != dvrMap.end();
}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReaderV1_0.h b/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReaderV1_0.h
index cff4af1..0688219 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReaderV1_0.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReaderV1_0.h
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@
};
struct LiveBroadcastHardwareConnections {
+ bool hasFrontendConnection;
string frontendId;
string dvrSoftwareFeId;
string audioFilterId;
@@ -134,6 +135,7 @@
};
struct ScanHardwareConnections {
+ bool hasFrontendConnection;
string frontendId;
};
@@ -149,19 +151,23 @@
struct DvrRecordHardwareConnections {
bool support;
+ bool hasFrontendConnection;
string frontendId;
string dvrRecordId;
string dvrSoftwareFeId;
string recordFilterId;
+ string dvrSourceId;
};
struct DescramblingHardwareConnections {
bool support;
+ bool hasFrontendConnection;
string frontendId;
string dvrSoftwareFeId;
string audioFilterId;
string videoFilterId;
string descramblerId;
+ string dvrSourceId;
/* list string of extra filters; */
};
@@ -402,7 +408,14 @@
}
static void connectLiveBroadcast(LiveBroadcastHardwareConnections& live) {
- auto liveConfig = *getDataFlowConfiguration().getFirstClearLiveBroadcast();
+ auto dataFlow = getDataFlowConfiguration();
+ if (dataFlow.hasClearLiveBroadcast()) {
+ live.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+ } else {
+ live.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+ return;
+ }
+ auto liveConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstClearLiveBroadcast();
live.frontendId = liveConfig.getFrontendConnection();
live.audioFilterId = liveConfig.getAudioFilterConnection();
@@ -428,8 +441,15 @@
}
static void connectScan(ScanHardwareConnections& scan) {
- auto scanConfig = getDataFlowConfiguration().getFirstScan();
- scan.frontendId = scanConfig->getFrontendConnection();
+ auto dataFlow = getDataFlowConfiguration();
+ if (dataFlow.hasScan()) {
+ scan.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+ } else {
+ scan.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+ return;
+ }
+ auto scanConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstScan();
+ scan.frontendId = scanConfig.getFrontendConnection();
}
static void connectDvrPlayback(DvrPlaybackHardwareConnections& playback) {
@@ -437,6 +457,7 @@
if (dataFlow.hasDvrPlayback()) {
playback.support = true;
} else {
+ playback.support = false;
return;
}
auto playbackConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstDvrPlayback();
@@ -455,15 +476,23 @@
if (dataFlow.hasDvrRecord()) {
record.support = true;
} else {
+ record.support = false;
return;
}
auto recordConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstDvrRecord();
- record.frontendId = recordConfig.getFrontendConnection();
record.recordFilterId = recordConfig.getRecordFilterConnection();
record.dvrRecordId = recordConfig.getDvrRecordConnection();
if (recordConfig.hasDvrSoftwareFeConnection()) {
record.dvrSoftwareFeId = recordConfig.getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
}
+ if (recordConfig.getHasFrontendConnection()) {
+ record.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+ record.dvrSourceId = emptyHardwareId;
+ record.frontendId = recordConfig.getFrontendConnection();
+ } else {
+ record.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+ record.dvrSourceId = recordConfig.getDvrSourceConnection();
+ }
}
static void connectDescrambling(DescramblingHardwareConnections& descrambling) {
@@ -471,16 +500,24 @@
if (dataFlow.hasDescrambling()) {
descrambling.support = true;
} else {
+ descrambling.support = false;
return;
}
auto descConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstDescrambling();
- descrambling.frontendId = descConfig.getFrontendConnection();
descrambling.descramblerId = descConfig.getDescramblerConnection();
descrambling.audioFilterId = descConfig.getAudioFilterConnection();
descrambling.videoFilterId = descConfig.getVideoFilterConnection();
if (descConfig.hasDvrSoftwareFeConnection()) {
descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId = descConfig.getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
}
+ if (descConfig.getHasFrontendConnection()) {
+ descrambling.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+ descrambling.dvrSourceId = emptyHardwareId;
+ descrambling.frontendId = descConfig.getFrontendConnection();
+ } else {
+ descrambling.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+ descrambling.dvrSourceId = descConfig.getDvrSourceConnection();
+ }
}
static void connectLnbLive(LnbLiveHardwareConnections& lnbLive) {
@@ -488,6 +525,7 @@
if (dataFlow.hasLnbLive()) {
lnbLive.support = true;
} else {
+ lnbLive.support = false;
return;
}
auto lnbLiveConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstLnbLive();
@@ -507,6 +545,7 @@
if (dataFlow.hasLnbRecord()) {
lnbRecord.support = true;
} else {
+ lnbRecord.support = false;
return;
}
auto lnbRecordConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstLnbRecord();
@@ -526,6 +565,7 @@
if (dataFlow.hasTimeFilter()) {
timeFilter.support = true;
} else {
+ timeFilter.support = false;
return;
}
auto timeFilterConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstTimeFilter();
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt b/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
index a9602e7..ef73315 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
@@ -54,12 +54,16 @@
method @Nullable public String getAudioFilterConnection();
method @Nullable public String getDescramblerConnection();
method @Nullable public String getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
+ method @Nullable public String getDvrSourceConnection();
method @Nullable public String getFrontendConnection();
+ method @Nullable public boolean getHasFrontendConnection();
method @Nullable public String getVideoFilterConnection();
method public void setAudioFilterConnection(@Nullable String);
method public void setDescramblerConnection(@Nullable String);
method public void setDvrSoftwareFeConnection(@Nullable String);
+ method public void setDvrSourceConnection(@Nullable String);
method public void setFrontendConnection(@Nullable String);
+ method public void setHasFrontendConnection(@Nullable boolean);
method public void setVideoFilterConnection(@Nullable String);
}
@@ -79,11 +83,15 @@
ctor public DataFlowConfiguration.DvrRecord();
method @Nullable public String getDvrRecordConnection();
method @Nullable public String getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
+ method @Nullable public String getDvrSourceConnection();
method @Nullable public String getFrontendConnection();
+ method @Nullable public boolean getHasFrontendConnection();
method @Nullable public String getRecordFilterConnection();
method public void setDvrRecordConnection(@Nullable String);
method public void setDvrSoftwareFeConnection(@Nullable String);
+ method public void setDvrSourceConnection(@Nullable String);
method public void setFrontendConnection(@Nullable String);
+ method public void setHasFrontendConnection(@Nullable boolean);
method public void setRecordFilterConnection(@Nullable String);
}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config_1_0.xml b/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config_1_0.xml
index 570171e..2624076 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config_1_0.xml
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config_1_0.xml
@@ -196,7 +196,8 @@
sectionFilterConnection="FILTER_TS_SECTION_0"
dvrSoftwareFeConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_0"/>
<scan frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"/>
- <descrambling frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
+ <descrambling hasFrontendConnection="true"
+ frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
descramblerConnection="DESCRAMBLER_0"
audioFilterConnection="FILTER_AUDIO_DEFAULT"
videoFilterConnection="FILTER_VIDEO_DEFAULT"
@@ -205,7 +206,8 @@
audioFilterConnection="FILTER_AUDIO_DEFAULT"
videoFilterConnection="FILTER_VIDEO_DEFAULT"
sectionFilterConnection="FILTER_TS_SECTION_0"/>
- <dvrRecord frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
+ <dvrRecord hasFrontendConnection="true"
+ frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
recordFilterConnection="FILTER_TS_RECORD_0"
dvrRecordConnection="DVR_RECORD_0"
dvrSoftwareFeConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_0"/>
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config_1_1.xml b/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config_1_1.xml
index 191e51c..8c99207 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config_1_1.xml
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config_1_1.xml
@@ -145,14 +145,15 @@
audioFilterConnection="FILTER_AUDIO_DEFAULT"
videoFilterConnection="FILTER_VIDEO_DEFAULT"
ipFilterConnection="FILTER_IP_IP_0"
- dvrSoftwareFeConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_0"/>
+ dvrSoftwareFeConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_1"/>
<scan frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"/>
- <dvrPlayback dvrConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_0"
+ <dvrPlayback dvrConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_1"
audioFilterConnection="FILTER_AUDIO_DEFAULT"
videoFilterConnection="FILTER_VIDEO_DEFAULT"/>
- <dvrRecord frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
+ <dvrRecord hasFrontendConnection="true"
+ frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
recordFilterConnection="FILTER_TS_RECORD_0"
dvrRecordConnection="DVR_RECORD_0"
- dvrSoftwareFeConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_0"/>
+ dvrSoftwareFeConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_1"/>
</dataFlowConfiguration>
</TunerConfiguration>
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd b/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
index 3303657..5216837 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
@@ -587,7 +587,9 @@
<!-- DATA FLOW CONFIGURATION SESSION -->
<xs:complexType name="dataFlowConfiguration">
<xs:sequence>
- <xs:element name="clearLiveBroadcast" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1">
+ <!-- clearLiveBroadcast is only optional when there is no physical frontend. In this
+ case, the dvrPlayback config is required. -->
+ <xs:element name="clearLiveBroadcast" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="audioFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
@@ -600,20 +602,27 @@
<xs:attribute name="dvrSoftwareFeConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
- <xs:element name="scan" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1">
+ <!-- scan is only optional when there is no physical frontend. In this case, the
+ dvrPlayback config is required. -->
+ <xs:element name="scan" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="descrambling" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
<xs:complexType>
+ <!-- If there is a software or hardware frontend connection or not. If false,
+ dvrSourceConnection config is required when testing dvrRecord. -->
+ <xs:attribute name="hasFrontendConnection" type="xs:boolean" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="descramblerConnection" type="descramblerId" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="audioFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="videoFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
<!-- TODO: b/182519645 allow the users to insert extra filters -->
- <!-- DVR is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
+ <!-- This DVR is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
<xs:attribute name="dvrSoftwareFeConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
+ <!-- This Dvr is only required when there's no frontend(sw or hw) connection -->
+ <xs:attribute name="dvrSourceConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="dvrPlayback" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
@@ -627,10 +636,15 @@
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="dvrRecord" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
<xs:complexType>
- <xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
+ <!-- If there is a software or hardware frontend connection or not. If false,
+ dvrSourceConnection config is required when testing dvrRecord. -->
+ <xs:attribute name="hasFrontendConnection" type="xs:boolean" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="dvrRecordConnection" type="dvrId" use="required"/>
- <!-- DVR is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
+ <!-- This Dvr is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
<xs:attribute name="dvrSoftwareFeConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
+ <!-- This Dvr is only required when there's no frontend(sw or hw) connection -->
+ <xs:attribute name="dvrSourceConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="recordFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl b/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
index 3be58a1..679c82c 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
@@ -35,6 +35,6 @@
@VintfStability
parcelable CompositeEffect {
int delayMs;
- android.hardware.vibrator.CompositePrimitive primitive;
+ android.hardware.vibrator.CompositePrimitive primitive = android.hardware.vibrator.CompositePrimitive.NOOP;
float scale;
}
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl b/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
index 406a899..5a990c0 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
parcelable CompositeEffect {
/* Period of silence preceding primitive. */
int delayMs;
- CompositePrimitive primitive;
+ CompositePrimitive primitive = CompositePrimitive.NOOP;
/*
* 0.0 (inclusive) - 1.0 (inclusive),
* where 0.0 is minimum "feelable" amplitude.
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
index 4d03ebf..713ec75 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
@@ -276,7 +276,9 @@
if (!status.isOk())
continue;
- std::chrono::milliseconds timeout{lengthMs * 2};
+ //TODO(b/187207798): revert back to conservative timeout values once
+ //latencies have been fixed
+ std::chrono::milliseconds timeout{lengthMs * 8};
EXPECT_EQ(completionFuture.wait_for(timeout), std::future_status::ready);
}
}
@@ -588,7 +590,9 @@
EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_NONE, vibrator->compose(composite, callback).exceptionCode())
<< toString(primitive);
- EXPECT_EQ(completionFuture.wait_for(duration * 2), std::future_status::ready)
+ //TODO(b/187207798): revert back to conservative timeout values once
+ //latencies have been fixed
+ EXPECT_EQ(completionFuture.wait_for(duration * 4), std::future_status::ready)
<< toString(primitive);
end = high_resolution_clock::now();
@@ -739,7 +743,9 @@
sp<CompletionCallback> callback =
new CompletionCallback([&completionPromise] { completionPromise.set_value(); });
uint32_t durationMs = 2100; // Sum of 2 active and 1 braking below
- std::chrono::milliseconds timeout{durationMs * 2};
+ //TODO(b/187207798): revert back to conservative timeout values once
+ //latencies have been fixed
+ std::chrono::milliseconds timeout{durationMs * 4};
ActivePwle active = composeValidActivePwle(vibrator, capabilities);