diff --git a/audio/aidl/android/hardware/audio/core/IModule.aidl b/audio/aidl/android/hardware/audio/core/IModule.aidl
index 2d4d283..3c5f7f6 100644
--- a/audio/aidl/android/hardware/audio/core/IModule.aidl
+++ b/audio/aidl/android/hardware/audio/core/IModule.aidl
@@ -928,7 +928,10 @@
      * using 'connectExternalDevice' method. 'disconnectExternalDevice' method will be called
      * soon after this method with the same 'portId'.
      *
-     * @param portId The ID of the audio port that is about to disconnect
+     * Note: This method is called after the external device is disconnected. The system does
+     * not try to predict the disconnection event.
+     *
+     * @param portId The ID of the audio port corresponding to the disconnected device
      * @throws EX_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT In the following cases:
      *                             - If the port can not be found by the ID.
      *                             - If this is not a connected device port.
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
index 3d7ecb6..d210304 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@
         <version>1</version>
         <interface>
             <name>ISecretkeeper</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
             <instance>nonsecure</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
diff --git a/graphics/composer/aidl/vts/VtsHalGraphicsComposer3_TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/aidl/vts/VtsHalGraphicsComposer3_TargetTest.cpp
index 18d36e4..323e358 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/aidl/vts/VtsHalGraphicsComposer3_TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/aidl/vts/VtsHalGraphicsComposer3_TargetTest.cpp
@@ -1554,6 +1554,7 @@
 }
 
 TEST_P(GraphicsComposerAidlCommandTest, SetDisplayBrightness) {
+    EXPECT_TRUE(mComposerClient->setPowerMode(getPrimaryDisplayId(), PowerMode::ON).isOk());
     const auto& [status, capabilities] =
             mComposerClient->getDisplayCapabilities(getPrimaryDisplayId());
     ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
diff --git a/security/rkp/README.md b/security/rkp/README.md
index 2180d0f..2d00b83 100644
--- a/security/rkp/README.md
+++ b/security/rkp/README.md
@@ -210,10 +210,10 @@
    describes an RKP VM. If there are further certificates without the RKP VM
    marker, then the chain does not describe an RKP VM.
 
-   Implementations must include the first RPK VM marker as early as possible
+   Implementations must include the first RKP VM marker as early as possible
    after the point of divergence between TEE and non-TEE components in the DICE
    chain, prior to loading the Android Bootloader (ABL).
 2. "widevine" or "keymint": If there are no certificates with the RKP VM
    marker then it describes a TEE component.
 3. None: Any component described by a DICE chain that does not match the above
-   two categories.
\ No newline at end of file
+   two categories.
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
index a1de93e..68b966c 100644
--- a/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@
         for (auto& key : keysToSign_) {
             bytevec privateKeyBlob;
             auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &key, &privateKeyBlob);
-            ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+            ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
 
             vector<uint8_t> payload_value;
             check_maced_pubkey(key, testMode, &payload_value);
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@
         auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
                 testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
                 &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
 
         auto result = verifyProductionProtectedData(
                 deviceInfo, cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_, eekId_,
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
             testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
             &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
 
     auto firstBcc = verifyProductionProtectedData(
             deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_,
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
     status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
             testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
             &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
 
     auto secondBcc = verifyProductionProtectedData(
             deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_,
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@
         auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
                 testMode, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
                 &keysToSignMac);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
 
         auto result = verifyProductionProtectedData(
                 deviceInfo, cborKeysToSign_, keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_, eekId_,
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
             testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
             &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
-    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
     EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
 }
 
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
             testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, getProdEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve),
             challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
-    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
     EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
 }
 
@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@
         auto challenge = randomBytes(size);
         auto status =
                 provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2({} /* keysToSign */, challenge, &csr);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
 
         auto result = verifyProductionCsr(cppbor::Array(), csr, provisionable_.get(), challenge);
         ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.message();
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@
         SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "challenge[" << size << "]");
         auto challenge = randomBytes(size);
         auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2(keysToSign_, challenge, &csr);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
 
         auto result = verifyProductionCsr(cborKeysToSign_, csr, provisionable_.get(), challenge);
         ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.message();
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@
 
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2(
             /* keysToSign */ {}, randomBytes(MAX_CHALLENGE_SIZE + 1), &csr);
-    EXPECT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    EXPECT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
     EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_FAILED);
 }
 
@@ -773,13 +773,13 @@
     bytevec csr;
 
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2(keysToSign_, challenge_, &csr);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
 
     auto firstCsr = verifyProductionCsr(cborKeysToSign_, csr, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
     ASSERT_TRUE(firstCsr) << firstCsr.message();
 
     status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2(keysToSign_, challenge_, &csr);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
 
     auto secondCsr = verifyProductionCsr(cborKeysToSign_, csr, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secondCsr) << secondCsr.message();
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@
     bytevec csr;
 
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2(keysToSign_, challenge_, &csr);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
 
     auto result = verifyProductionCsr(cborKeysToSign_, csr, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
     ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.message();
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@
     bytevec csr;
     auto status =
             provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2({keyWithCorruptMac}, challenge_, &csr);
-    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
     EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
 }
 
@@ -829,7 +829,7 @@
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
             false /* testMode */, {} /* keysToSign */, {} /* EEK chain */, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
             &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
-    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
     EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_REMOVED);
 }
 
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@
     auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
             true /* testMode */, {} /* keysToSign */, {} /* EEK chain */, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
             &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
-    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getDescription();
     EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_REMOVED);
 }
 
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@
     bytevec csr;
     irpcStatus =
             provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2({} /* keysToSign */, challenge_, &csr);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(irpcStatus.isOk()) << irpcStatus.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_TRUE(irpcStatus.isOk()) << irpcStatus.getDescription();
 
     auto result = verifyProductionCsr(cppbor::Array(), csr, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
     ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.message();
diff --git a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.secretkeeper/current/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretId.aidl b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.secretkeeper/current/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretId.aidl
index 87d0233..9887066 100644
--- a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.secretkeeper/current/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretId.aidl
+++ b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.secretkeeper/current/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretId.aidl
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@
 /* @hide */
 @VintfStability
 parcelable SecretId {
-  byte[] id;
+  byte[64] id;
 }
diff --git a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/ISecretkeeper.aidl b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/ISecretkeeper.aidl
index 49c3446..b07dba8 100644
--- a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/ISecretkeeper.aidl
+++ b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/ISecretkeeper.aidl
@@ -39,9 +39,14 @@
 
     /**
      * Retrieve the instance of the `IAuthGraphKeyExchange` HAL that should be used for shared
-     * session key establishment.  These keys are used to perform encryption of messages as
+     * session key establishment. These keys are used to perform encryption of messages as
      * described in SecretManagement.cddl, allowing the client and Secretkeeper to have a
-     * cryptographically secure channel.
+     * cryptographically secure channel. In the key exchange protocol the client acts as P1
+     * (source) and Secretkeeper as P2 (sink). The interface returned here can be used to invoke
+     * methods on the sink.
+     *
+     * The client's identity is its DICE chain; Secretkeeper's identity is a
+     * per-boot key pair.
      */
     IAuthGraphKeyExchange getAuthGraphKe();
 
@@ -56,8 +61,8 @@
      * ProtectedRequestPacket & ProtectedResponsePacket using symmetric keys agreed between
      * the client & service. This cryptographic protection is required because the messages are
      * ferried via Android, which is allowed to be outside the TCB of clients (for example protected
-     * Virtual Machines). For this, service (& client) must implement a key exchange protocol, which
-     * is critical for establishing the secure channel.
+     * Virtual Machines). For this, service (& client) must implement the AuthGraph key exchange
+     * protocol to establish a secure channel between them.
      *
      * If an encrypted response cannot be generated, then a service-specific Binder error using one
      * of the ERROR_ codes above will be returned.
diff --git a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretId.aidl b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretId.aidl
index bd982e7..b17917f 100644
--- a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretId.aidl
+++ b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretId.aidl
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@
     /**
      * 64-byte identifier for a secret.
      */
-    byte[] id;
+    byte[64] id;
 }
diff --git a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretManagement.cddl b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretManagement.cddl
index 3d08078..6a824c9 100644
--- a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretManagement.cddl
+++ b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/android/hardware/security/secretkeeper/SecretManagement.cddl
@@ -3,10 +3,11 @@
 ; The input parameter to the `processSecretManagementRequest` operation in
 ; `ISecretkeeper.aidl` is always an encrypted request message, CBOR-encoded as a
 ; COSE_Encrypt0 object.  The encryption uses the first of the keys agreed using
-; the associated AuthGraph instance, referred to as `KeySourceToSink`.
-ProtectedRequestPacket = CryptoPayload<RequestPacket, KeySourceToSink>
+; the associated AuthGraph instance, referred to as `KeySourceToSink`. Additionally,
+; an external aad is used - RequestSeqNum.
+ProtectedRequestPacket = CryptoPayload<RequestPacket, KeySourceToSink, RequestSeqNum>
 
-CryptoPayload<Payload, Key> = [ ; COSE_Encrypt0 (untagged), [RFC 9052 s5.2]
+CryptoPayload<Payload, Key, SeqNum> = [ ; COSE_Encrypt0 (untagged), [RFC 9052 s5.2]
     protected: bstr .cbor {
         1 : 3,                  ; Algorithm: AES-GCM mode w/ 256-bit key, 128-bit tag
         4 : bstr                ; key identifier set to session ID produced
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@
     },
     ciphertext : bstr           ; AES-GCM-256(Key, bstr .cbor Payload)
                                 ; AAD for the encryption is CBOR-serialized
-                                ; Enc_structure (RFC 9052 s5.3) with empty external_aad.
+                                ; Enc_structure (RFC 9052 s5.3) with SeqNum as the external_aad.
 ]
 
 ; Once decrypted, the request packet is an encoded CBOR array holding:
@@ -58,10 +59,18 @@
 SecretId = bstr .size 64        ; Unique identifier of the secret.
 Secret = bstr .size 32          ; The secret value.
 
+; A monotonically incrementing number is associated with each RequestPacket to prevent replay
+; of messages within a session. This starts with 0 and is incremented (by 1) for each request
+; in a session. Secretkeeper implementation must maintain an expected RequestSeqNum for each
+; session (increasing it by 1 for each SecretManagement request received). This will be used in
+; in decryption (external_aad).
+RequestSeqNum = bstr .cbor uint     ; Encoded in accordance with Core Deterministic Encoding
+                                    ; Requirements [RFC 8949 s4.2.1]
+
 ; The return value from a successful `processSecretManagementRequest` operation is a
 ; response message encrypted with the second of the keys agreed using the associated
 ; AuthGraph instance, referred to as `KeySinkToSource`.
-ProtectedResponsePacket = CryptoPayload<ResponsePacket, KeySinkToSource>
+ProtectedResponsePacket = CryptoPayload<ResponsePacket, KeySinkToSource, ResponseSeqNum>
 
 ; Once decrypted, the inner response message is encoded as a CBOR array holding:
 ; - An initial integer return code value.
@@ -82,7 +91,7 @@
     ; Requested Entry not found.
     ErrorCode_EntryNotFound: 3,
     ; Error happened while serialization or deserialization.
-    SerializationError: 4,
+    ErrorCode_SerializationError: 4,
     ; Indicates that Dice Policy matching did not succeed & hence access not granted.
     ErrorCode_DicePolicyError: 5,
 )
@@ -95,8 +104,13 @@
     GetSecretResult,
 )
 
-GetVersionResult = (version : uint)
+GetVersionResult = (1)
 
 StoreSecretResult = ()
 
 GetSecretResult = (secret : Secret)
+
+; Analogous to RequestSeqNum, Secretkeeper must maintain ResponseSeqNum for each session.
+; This will be input to the encryption (ProtectedResponsePacket) as external_aad.
+ResponseSeqNum = bstr .cbor uint    ; Encoded in accordance with Core Deterministic Encoding
+                                    ; Requirements [RFC 8949 s4.2.1]
diff --git a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/vts/Android.bp b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/vts/Android.bp
index 7fc7a70..7de9d6a 100644
--- a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/vts/Android.bp
+++ b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/vts/Android.bp
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
     ],
     test_config: "AndroidTest.xml",
     rustlibs: [
+        "libsecretkeeper_client",
         "libsecretkeeper_comm_nostd",
         "libsecretkeeper_core_nostd",
         "android.hardware.security.secretkeeper-V1-rust",
diff --git a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/vts/rustfmt.toml b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/vts/rustfmt.toml
new file mode 120000
index 0000000..ed2086b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/vts/rustfmt.toml
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+../../../../../../build/soong/scripts/rustfmt.toml
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/vts/secretkeeper_test_client.rs b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/vts/secretkeeper_test_client.rs
index 6a70d02..c457d24 100644
--- a/security/secretkeeper/aidl/vts/secretkeeper_test_client.rs
+++ b/security/secretkeeper/aidl/vts/secretkeeper_test_client.rs
@@ -24,18 +24,19 @@
 use binder::StatusCode;
 use coset::{CborSerializable, CoseEncrypt0};
 use log::{info, warn};
+use secretkeeper_client::SkSession;
 use secretkeeper_core::cipher;
 use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::error::SecretkeeperError;
 use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::request::Request;
 use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::request_response_impl::{
     GetVersionRequest, GetVersionResponse, GetSecretRequest, GetSecretResponse, StoreSecretRequest,
     StoreSecretResponse };
-use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::{Id, Secret};
+use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::{Id, Secret, SeqNum};
 use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::response::Response;
 use secretkeeper_comm::data_types::packet::{ResponsePacket, ResponseType};
 
 const SECRETKEEPER_SERVICE: &str = "android.hardware.security.secretkeeper.ISecretkeeper";
-const SECRETKEEPER_INSTANCES: [&'static str; 2] = ["nonsecure", "default"];
+const SECRETKEEPER_INSTANCES: [&'static str; 2] = ["default", "nonsecure"];
 const CURRENT_VERSION: u64 = 1;
 
 // TODO(b/291238565): This will change once libdice_policy switches to Explicit-key DiceCertChain
@@ -75,9 +76,16 @@
     // Initialize logging (which is OK to call multiple times).
     logger::init(logger::Config::default().with_min_level(log::Level::Debug));
 
+    // Determine which instances are available.
+    let available = binder::get_declared_instances(SECRETKEEPER_SERVICE).unwrap_or_default();
+
     // TODO: replace this with a parameterized set of tests that run for each available instance of
     // ISecretkeeper (rather than having a fixed set of instance names to look for).
     for instance in &SECRETKEEPER_INSTANCES {
+        if available.iter().find(|s| s == instance).is_none() {
+            // Skip undeclared instances.
+            continue;
+        }
         let name = format!("{SECRETKEEPER_SERVICE}/{instance}");
         match binder::get_interface(&name) {
             Ok(sk) => {
@@ -88,10 +96,14 @@
                 info!("No /{instance} instance of ISecretkeeper present");
             }
             Err(e) => {
-                panic!("unexpected error while fetching connection to Secretkeeper {:?}", e);
+                panic!(
+                    "unexpected error while fetching connection to Secretkeeper {:?}",
+                    e
+                );
             }
         }
     }
+    info!("no Secretkeeper instances in {SECRETKEEPER_INSTANCES:?} are declared and present");
     None
 }
 
@@ -112,8 +124,7 @@
 struct SkClient {
     sk: binder::Strong<dyn ISecretkeeper>,
     name: String,
-    aes_keys: [key::AesKey; 2],
-    session_id: Vec<u8>,
+    session: SkSession,
 }
 
 impl Drop for SkClient {
@@ -126,27 +137,58 @@
 impl SkClient {
     fn new() -> Option<Self> {
         let (sk, name) = get_connection()?;
-        let (aes_keys, session_id) = authgraph_key_exchange(sk.clone());
-        Some(Self { sk, name, aes_keys, session_id })
+        Some(Self {
+            sk: sk.clone(),
+            name,
+            session: SkSession::new(sk).unwrap(),
+        })
     }
 
-    /// Wrapper around `ISecretkeeper::processSecretManagementRequest` that handles
+    /// This method is wrapper that use `SkSession::secret_management_request` which handles
     /// encryption and decryption.
-    fn secret_management_request(&self, req_data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    fn secret_management_request(&mut self, req_data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+        self.session.secret_management_request(req_data).unwrap()
+    }
+
+    /// Unlike the method [`secret_management_request`], this method directly uses
+    /// `cipher::encrypt_message` & `cipher::decrypt_message`, allowing finer control of request
+    /// & response aad.
+    fn secret_management_request_custom_aad(
+        &self,
+        req_data: &[u8],
+        req_aad: &[u8],
+        expected_res_aad: &[u8],
+    ) -> Vec<u8> {
         let aes_gcm = boring::BoringAes;
         let rng = boring::BoringRng;
-        let request_bytes =
-            cipher::encrypt_message(&aes_gcm, &rng, &self.aes_keys[0], &self.session_id, &req_data)
-                .unwrap();
+        let request_bytes = cipher::encrypt_message(
+            &aes_gcm,
+            &rng,
+            self.session.encryption_key(),
+            self.session.session_id(),
+            &req_data,
+            req_aad,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
 
-        let response_bytes = self.sk.processSecretManagementRequest(&request_bytes).unwrap();
+        // Binder call!
+        let response_bytes = self
+            .sk
+            .processSecretManagementRequest(&request_bytes)
+            .unwrap();
 
         let response_encrypt0 = CoseEncrypt0::from_slice(&response_bytes).unwrap();
-        cipher::decrypt_message(&aes_gcm, &self.aes_keys[1], &response_encrypt0).unwrap()
+        cipher::decrypt_message(
+            &aes_gcm,
+            self.session.decryption_key(),
+            &response_encrypt0,
+            expected_res_aad,
+        )
+        .unwrap()
     }
 
     /// Helper method to store a secret.
-    fn store(&self, id: &Id, secret: &Secret) {
+    fn store(&mut self, id: &Id, secret: &Secret) {
         let store_request = StoreSecretRequest {
             id: id.clone(),
             secret: secret.clone(),
@@ -157,14 +199,20 @@
         let store_response = self.secret_management_request(&store_request);
         let store_response = ResponsePacket::from_slice(&store_response).unwrap();
 
-        assert_eq!(store_response.response_type().unwrap(), ResponseType::Success);
+        assert_eq!(
+            store_response.response_type().unwrap(),
+            ResponseType::Success
+        );
         // Really just checking that the response is indeed StoreSecretResponse
         let _ = StoreSecretResponse::deserialize_from_packet(store_response).unwrap();
     }
 
     /// Helper method to get a secret.
-    fn get(&self, id: &Id) -> Option<Secret> {
-        let get_request = GetSecretRequest { id: id.clone(), updated_sealing_policy: None };
+    fn get(&mut self, id: &Id) -> Option<Secret> {
+        let get_request = GetSecretRequest {
+            id: id.clone(),
+            updated_sealing_policy: None,
+        };
         let get_request = get_request.serialize_to_packet().to_vec().unwrap();
 
         let get_response = self.secret_management_request(&get_request);
@@ -183,7 +231,10 @@
 
     /// Helper method to delete secrets.
     fn delete(&self, ids: &[&Id]) {
-        let ids: Vec<SecretId> = ids.iter().map(|id| SecretId { id: id.0.to_vec() }).collect();
+        let ids: Vec<SecretId> = ids
+            .iter()
+            .map(|id| SecretId { id: id.0 })
+            .collect();
         self.sk.deleteIds(&ids).unwrap();
     }
 
@@ -251,7 +302,7 @@
 
 #[test]
 fn secret_management_get_version() {
-    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+    let mut sk_client = setup_client!();
 
     let request = GetVersionRequest {};
     let request_packet = request.serialize_to_packet();
@@ -260,7 +311,10 @@
     let response_bytes = sk_client.secret_management_request(&request_bytes);
 
     let response_packet = ResponsePacket::from_slice(&response_bytes).unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(response_packet.response_type().unwrap(), ResponseType::Success);
+    assert_eq!(
+        response_packet.response_type().unwrap(),
+        ResponseType::Success
+    );
     let get_version_response =
         *GetVersionResponse::deserialize_from_packet(response_packet).unwrap();
     assert_eq!(get_version_response.version, CURRENT_VERSION);
@@ -268,7 +322,7 @@
 
 #[test]
 fn secret_management_malformed_request() {
-    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+    let mut sk_client = setup_client!();
 
     let request = GetVersionRequest {};
     let request_packet = request.serialize_to_packet();
@@ -280,14 +334,17 @@
     let response_bytes = sk_client.secret_management_request(&request_bytes);
 
     let response_packet = ResponsePacket::from_slice(&response_bytes).unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(response_packet.response_type().unwrap(), ResponseType::Error);
+    assert_eq!(
+        response_packet.response_type().unwrap(),
+        ResponseType::Error
+    );
     let err = *SecretkeeperError::deserialize_from_packet(response_packet).unwrap();
     assert_eq!(err, SecretkeeperError::RequestMalformed);
 }
 
 #[test]
 fn secret_management_store_get_secret_found() {
-    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+    let mut sk_client = setup_client!();
 
     sk_client.store(&ID_EXAMPLE, &SECRET_EXAMPLE);
 
@@ -297,7 +354,7 @@
 
 #[test]
 fn secret_management_store_get_secret_not_found() {
-    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+    let mut sk_client = setup_client!();
 
     // Store a secret (corresponding to an id).
     sk_client.store(&ID_EXAMPLE, &SECRET_EXAMPLE);
@@ -308,7 +365,7 @@
 
 #[test]
 fn secretkeeper_store_delete_ids() {
-    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+    let mut sk_client = setup_client!();
 
     sk_client.store(&ID_EXAMPLE, &SECRET_EXAMPLE);
     sk_client.store(&ID_EXAMPLE_2, &SECRET_EXAMPLE);
@@ -325,7 +382,7 @@
 
 #[test]
 fn secretkeeper_store_delete_multiple_ids() {
-    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+    let mut sk_client = setup_client!();
 
     sk_client.store(&ID_EXAMPLE, &SECRET_EXAMPLE);
     sk_client.store(&ID_EXAMPLE_2, &SECRET_EXAMPLE);
@@ -337,7 +394,7 @@
 
 #[test]
 fn secretkeeper_store_delete_duplicate_ids() {
-    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+    let mut sk_client = setup_client!();
 
     sk_client.store(&ID_EXAMPLE, &SECRET_EXAMPLE);
     sk_client.store(&ID_EXAMPLE_2, &SECRET_EXAMPLE);
@@ -350,7 +407,7 @@
 
 #[test]
 fn secretkeeper_store_delete_nonexistent() {
-    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+    let mut sk_client = setup_client!();
 
     sk_client.store(&ID_EXAMPLE, &SECRET_EXAMPLE);
     sk_client.store(&ID_EXAMPLE_2, &SECRET_EXAMPLE);
@@ -363,7 +420,7 @@
 
 #[test]
 fn secretkeeper_store_delete_all() {
-    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+    let mut sk_client = setup_client!();
 
     if sk_client.name != "nonsecure" {
         // Don't run deleteAll() on a secure device, as it might affect
@@ -389,3 +446,107 @@
     // (Try to) Get the secret that was never stored
     assert_eq!(sk_client.get(&ID_NOT_STORED), None);
 }
+
+// This test checks that Secretkeeper uses the expected [`RequestSeqNum`] as aad while
+// decrypting requests and the responses are encrypted with correct [`ResponseSeqNum`] for the
+// first few messages.
+#[test]
+fn secret_management_replay_protection_seq_num() {
+    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+    // Construct encoded request packets for the test
+    let (req_1, req_2, req_3) = construct_secret_management_requests();
+
+    // Lets now construct the seq_numbers(in request & expected in response)
+    let mut seq_a = SeqNum::new();
+    let [seq_0, seq_1, seq_2] = std::array::from_fn(|_| seq_a.get_then_increment().unwrap());
+
+    // Check first request/response is successful
+    let res = ResponsePacket::from_slice(
+        &sk_client.secret_management_request_custom_aad(&req_1, &seq_0, &seq_0),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(res.response_type().unwrap(), ResponseType::Success);
+
+    // Check 2nd request/response is successful
+    let res = ResponsePacket::from_slice(
+        &sk_client.secret_management_request_custom_aad(&req_2, &seq_1, &seq_1),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(res.response_type().unwrap(), ResponseType::Success);
+
+    // Check 3rd request/response is successful
+    let res = ResponsePacket::from_slice(
+        &sk_client.secret_management_request_custom_aad(&req_3, &seq_2, &seq_2),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(res.response_type().unwrap(), ResponseType::Success);
+}
+
+// This test checks that Secretkeeper uses fresh [`RequestSeqNum`] & [`ResponseSeqNum`]
+// for new sessions.
+#[test]
+fn secret_management_replay_protection_seq_num_per_session() {
+    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+
+    // Construct encoded request packets for the test
+    let (req_1, _, _) = construct_secret_management_requests();
+
+    // Lets now construct the seq_number (in request & expected in response)
+    let mut seq_a = SeqNum::new();
+    let seq_0 = seq_a.get_then_increment().unwrap();
+    // Check first request/response is successful
+    let res = ResponsePacket::from_slice(
+        &sk_client.secret_management_request_custom_aad(&req_1, &seq_0, &seq_0),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(res.response_type().unwrap(), ResponseType::Success);
+
+    // Start another session
+    let sk_client_diff = setup_client!();
+    // Check first request/response is with seq_0 is successful
+    let res = ResponsePacket::from_slice(
+        &sk_client_diff.secret_management_request_custom_aad(&req_1, &seq_0, &seq_0),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(res.response_type().unwrap(), ResponseType::Success);
+}
+
+// This test checks that Secretkeeper rejects requests with out of order [`RequestSeqNum`]
+#[test]
+// TODO(b/317416663): This test fails, when HAL is not present in the device. Refactor to fix this.
+#[ignore]
+#[should_panic]
+fn secret_management_replay_protection_out_of_seq_req_not_accepted() {
+    let sk_client = setup_client!();
+
+    // Construct encoded request packets for the test
+    let (req_1, req_2, _) = construct_secret_management_requests();
+
+    // Lets now construct the seq_numbers(in request & expected in response)
+    let mut seq_a = SeqNum::new();
+    let [seq_0, seq_1, seq_2] = std::array::from_fn(|_| seq_a.get_then_increment().unwrap());
+
+    // Assume First request/response is successful
+    sk_client.secret_management_request_custom_aad(&req_1, &seq_0, &seq_0);
+
+    // Check 2nd request/response with skipped seq_num in request is a binder error
+    // This should panic!
+    sk_client.secret_management_request_custom_aad(&req_2, /*Skipping seq_1*/ &seq_2, &seq_1);
+}
+
+fn construct_secret_management_requests() -> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) {
+    let version_request = GetVersionRequest {};
+    let version_request = version_request.serialize_to_packet().to_vec().unwrap();
+    let store_request = StoreSecretRequest {
+        id: ID_EXAMPLE,
+        secret: SECRET_EXAMPLE,
+        sealing_policy: HYPOTHETICAL_DICE_POLICY.to_vec(),
+    };
+    let store_request = store_request.serialize_to_packet().to_vec().unwrap();
+    let get_request = GetSecretRequest {
+        id: ID_EXAMPLE,
+        updated_sealing_policy: None,
+    };
+    let get_request = get_request.serialize_to_packet().to_vec().unwrap();
+    (version_request, store_request, get_request)
+}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.cpp
index fccd2ed..3d60e89 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TargetTest.cpp
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+    mFrontendTests.setDemux(demux);
     mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux(filterConf.config1_0.type,
                                                filterConf.config1_0.bufferSize));
diff --git a/tv/tuner/aidl/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerTargetTest.cpp b/tv/tuner/aidl/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerTargetTest.cpp
index 3664b6c..766814f 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/aidl/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/aidl/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerTargetTest.cpp
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+    mFrontendTests.setDemux(demux);
     mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux(filterConf.type, filterConf.bufferSize));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.getNewlyOpenedFilterId_64bit(filterId));
@@ -1197,6 +1198,10 @@
     vector<ScanHardwareConnections> scan_configs = generateScanConfigurations();
     for (auto& configuration : scan_configs) {
         scan = configuration;
+        // Skip test if the frontend implementation doesn't support blind scan
+        if (!frontendMap[scan.frontendId].supportBlindScan) {
+            continue;
+        }
         mFrontendTests.scanTest(frontendMap[scan.frontendId], FrontendScanType::SCAN_BLIND);
     }
 }
@@ -1221,6 +1226,10 @@
     vector<ScanHardwareConnections> scan_configs = generateScanConfigurations();
     for (auto& configuration : scan_configs) {
         scan = configuration;
+        // Skip test if the frontend implementation doesn't support blind scan
+        if (!frontendMap[scan.frontendId].supportBlindScan) {
+            continue;
+        }
         mFrontendTests.scanTest(frontendMap[scan.frontendId], FrontendScanType::SCAN_BLIND);
     }
 }
diff --git a/tv/tuner/aidl/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerTestConfigurations.h b/tv/tuner/aidl/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerTestConfigurations.h
index 516cb62..5c13ed0 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/aidl/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerTestConfigurations.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/aidl/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerTestConfigurations.h
@@ -612,6 +612,7 @@
     frontendMap[defaultFeId].isSoftwareFe = true;
     frontendMap[defaultFeId].canConnectToCiCam = true;
     frontendMap[defaultFeId].ciCamId = 0;
+    frontendMap[defaultFeId].supportBlindScan = true;
     FrontendDvbtSettings dvbt;
     dvbt.transmissionMode = FrontendDvbtTransmissionMode::MODE_8K_E;
     frontendMap[defaultFeId].settings.set<FrontendSettings::Tag::dvbt>(dvbt);
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigAidlReaderV1_0.h b/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigAidlReaderV1_0.h
index 9517520..5ffb38f 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigAidlReaderV1_0.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigAidlReaderV1_0.h
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
     FrontendSettings settings;
     vector<FrontendStatusType> tuneStatusTypes;
     vector<FrontendStatus> expectTuneStatuses;
+    bool supportBlindScan;
 };
 
 struct FilterConfig {
@@ -354,6 +355,11 @@
                 } else {
                     hasHwFe = true;
                 }
+                if (feConfig.hasSupportBlindScan()) {
+                    frontendMap[id].supportBlindScan = feConfig.getSupportBlindScan();
+                } else {
+                    frontendMap[id].supportBlindScan = true;
+                }
                 // TODO: b/182519645 complete the tune status config
                 frontendMap[id].tuneStatusTypes = types;
                 frontendMap[id].expectTuneStatuses = statuses;
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt b/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
index dbd3486..ff2df90 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@
     method @Nullable public android.media.tuner.testing.configuration.V1_0.IsdbsFrontendSettings getIsdbsFrontendSettings_optional();
     method @Nullable public android.media.tuner.testing.configuration.V1_0.IsdbtFrontendSettings getIsdbtFrontendSettings_optional();
     method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getRemoveOutputPid();
+    method @Nullable public boolean getSupportBlindScan();
     method @Nullable public android.media.tuner.testing.configuration.V1_0.FrontendTypeEnum getType();
     method public void setAtscFrontendSettings_optional(@Nullable android.media.tuner.testing.configuration.V1_0.AtscFrontendSettings);
     method public void setConnectToCicamId(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
@@ -381,6 +382,7 @@
     method public void setIsdbsFrontendSettings_optional(@Nullable android.media.tuner.testing.configuration.V1_0.IsdbsFrontendSettings);
     method public void setIsdbtFrontendSettings_optional(@Nullable android.media.tuner.testing.configuration.V1_0.IsdbtFrontendSettings);
     method public void setRemoveOutputPid(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+    method public void setSupportBlindScan(@Nullable boolean);
     method public void setType(@Nullable android.media.tuner.testing.configuration.V1_0.FrontendTypeEnum);
   }
 
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd b/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
index c51ac51..eafaca9 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@
         <xs:attribute name="connectToCicamId" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="optional"/>
         <xs:attribute name="removeOutputPid" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="optional"/>
         <xs:attribute name="endFrequency" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="optional"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="supportBlindScan" type="xs:boolean" use="optional"/>
     </xs:complexType>
 
     <!-- FILTER SESSION -->
diff --git a/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs b/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs
index d749147..d1c3c67 100644
--- a/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs
+++ b/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs
@@ -61,6 +61,20 @@
             callbacks.as_binder().unlink_to_death(death_recipient)?;
             token.cancel();
             handle.await.unwrap();
+            let packet: UciControlPacket = DeviceResetCmdBuilder {
+                reset_config: ResetConfig::UwbsReset,
+            }
+            .build()
+            .into();
+            // DeviceResetCmd need to be send to reset the device to stop all running
+            // activities on UWBS.
+            let packet_vec: Vec<UciControlPacketHal> = packet.into();
+            for hal_packet in packet_vec.into_iter() {
+                serial
+                    .write(&hal_packet.to_vec())
+                    .map(|written| written as i32)
+                    .map_err(|_| binder::StatusCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR)?;
+            }
             consume_device_reset_rsp_and_ntf(
                 &mut serial
                     .try_clone()
@@ -238,21 +252,7 @@
 
         let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
 
-        if let State::Opened { ref mut serial, .. } = *state {
-            let packet: UciControlPacket = DeviceResetCmdBuilder {
-                reset_config: ResetConfig::UwbsReset,
-            }
-            .build()
-            .into();
-            // DeviceResetCmd need to be send to reset the device to stop all running
-            // activities on UWBS.
-            let packet_vec: Vec<UciControlPacketHal> = packet.into();
-            for hal_packet in packet_vec.into_iter() {
-                serial
-                    .write(&hal_packet.to_vec())
-                    .map(|written| written as i32)
-                    .map_err(|_| binder::StatusCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR)?;
-            }
+        if let State::Opened { .. } = *state {
             state.close().await
         } else {
             Err(binder::ExceptionCode::ILLEGAL_STATE.into())