diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/DefaultConfig.h b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/DefaultConfig.h
index b8a606a..16c33b9 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/DefaultConfig.h
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/DefaultConfig.h
@@ -1039,6 +1039,22 @@
         {
                 .config =
                         {
+                                .prop = toInt(VehicleProperty::CREATE_USER),
+                                .access = VehiclePropertyAccess::READ_WRITE,
+                                .changeMode = VehiclePropertyChangeMode::ON_CHANGE,
+                        },
+        },
+        {
+                .config =
+                        {
+                                .prop = toInt(VehicleProperty::REMOVE_USER),
+                                .access = VehiclePropertyAccess::READ_WRITE,
+                                .changeMode = VehiclePropertyChangeMode::ON_CHANGE,
+                        },
+        },
+        {
+                .config =
+                        {
                                 .prop = toInt(VehicleProperty::USER_IDENTIFICATION_ASSOCIATION),
                                 .access = VehiclePropertyAccess::READ_WRITE,
                                 .changeMode = VehiclePropertyChangeMode::ON_CHANGE,
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/EmulatedUserHal.cpp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/EmulatedUserHal.cpp
index d744a06..f712ea2 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/EmulatedUserHal.cpp
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/EmulatedUserHal.cpp
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
 
 constexpr int INITIAL_USER_INFO = static_cast<int>(VehicleProperty::INITIAL_USER_INFO);
 constexpr int SWITCH_USER = static_cast<int>(VehicleProperty::SWITCH_USER);
+constexpr int CREATE_USER = static_cast<int>(VehicleProperty::CREATE_USER);
+constexpr int REMOVE_USER = static_cast<int>(VehicleProperty::REMOVE_USER);
 constexpr int USER_IDENTIFICATION_ASSOCIATION =
         static_cast<int>(VehicleProperty::USER_IDENTIFICATION_ASSOCIATION);
 
@@ -37,6 +39,8 @@
     switch (prop) {
         case INITIAL_USER_INFO:
         case SWITCH_USER:
+        case CREATE_USER:
+        case REMOVE_USER:
         case USER_IDENTIFICATION_ASSOCIATION:
             return true;
         default:
@@ -53,6 +57,11 @@
             return onSetInitialUserInfoResponse(value);
         case SWITCH_USER:
             return onSetSwitchUserResponse(value);
+        case CREATE_USER:
+            return onSetCreateUserResponse(value);
+        case REMOVE_USER:
+            ALOGI("REMOVE_USER is FYI only, nothing to do...");
+            return {};
         case USER_IDENTIFICATION_ASSOCIATION:
             return onSetUserIdentificationAssociation(value);
         default:
@@ -67,6 +76,8 @@
     switch (prop) {
         case INITIAL_USER_INFO:
         case SWITCH_USER:
+        case CREATE_USER:
+        case REMOVE_USER:
             ALOGE("onGetProperty(): %d is only supported on SET", prop);
             return android::base::Error(static_cast<int>(StatusCode::INVALID_ARG))
                    << "only supported on SET";
@@ -162,6 +173,41 @@
     return updatedValue;
 }
 
+android::base::Result<std::unique_ptr<VehiclePropValue>> EmulatedUserHal::onSetCreateUserResponse(
+        const VehiclePropValue& value) {
+    if (value.value.int32Values.size() == 0) {
+        ALOGE("set(CREATE_USER): no int32values, ignoring it: %s", toString(value).c_str());
+        return android::base::Error(static_cast<int>(StatusCode::INVALID_ARG))
+               << "no int32values on " << toString(value);
+    }
+
+    if (value.areaId != 0) {
+        ALOGD("set(CREATE_USER) called from lshal; storing it: %s", toString(value).c_str());
+        mCreateUserResponseFromCmd.reset(new VehiclePropValue(value));
+        return {};
+    }
+    ALOGD("set(CREATE_USER) called from Android: %s", toString(value).c_str());
+
+    int32_t requestId = value.value.int32Values[0];
+    if (mCreateUserResponseFromCmd != nullptr) {
+        ALOGI("replying CREATE_USER with lshal value:  %s",
+              toString(*mCreateUserResponseFromCmd).c_str());
+        return sendUserHalResponse(std::move(mCreateUserResponseFromCmd), requestId);
+    }
+
+    // Returns default response
+    auto updatedValue = std::unique_ptr<VehiclePropValue>(new VehiclePropValue);
+    updatedValue->prop = CREATE_USER;
+    updatedValue->timestamp = elapsedRealtimeNano();
+    updatedValue->value.int32Values.resize(2);
+    updatedValue->value.int32Values[0] = requestId;
+    updatedValue->value.int32Values[1] = (int32_t)CreateUserStatus::SUCCESS;
+
+    ALOGI("no lshal response; replying with SUCCESS: %s", toString(*updatedValue).c_str());
+
+    return updatedValue;
+}
+
 android::base::Result<std::unique_ptr<VehiclePropValue>>
 EmulatedUserHal::onSetUserIdentificationAssociation(const VehiclePropValue& value) {
     if (value.value.int32Values.size() == 0) {
@@ -247,6 +293,12 @@
     } else {
         dprintf(fd, "%sNo SwitchUser response\n", indent.c_str());
     }
+    if (mCreateUserResponseFromCmd != nullptr) {
+        dprintf(fd, "%sCreateUser response: %s\n", indent.c_str(),
+                toString(*mCreateUserResponseFromCmd).c_str());
+    } else {
+        dprintf(fd, "%sNo CreateUser response\n", indent.c_str());
+    }
     if (mSetUserIdentificationAssociationResponseFromCmd != nullptr) {
         dprintf(fd, "%sSetUserIdentificationAssociation response: %s\n", indent.c_str(),
                 toString(*mSetUserIdentificationAssociationResponseFromCmd).c_str());
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/EmulatedUserHal.h b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/EmulatedUserHal.h
index 3168d75..5243b96 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/EmulatedUserHal.h
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/EmulatedUserHal.h
@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@
             const VehiclePropValue& value);
 
     /**
+     * Used to emulate CREATE_USER - see onSetInitialUserInfoResponse() for usage.
+     */
+    android::base::Result<std::unique_ptr<VehiclePropValue>> onSetCreateUserResponse(
+            const VehiclePropValue& value);
+
+    /**
      * Used to emulate USER_IDENTIFICATION_ASSOCIATION - see onSetInitialUserInfoResponse() for
      * usage.
      */
@@ -116,6 +122,7 @@
 
     std::unique_ptr<VehiclePropValue> mInitialUserResponseFromCmd;
     std::unique_ptr<VehiclePropValue> mSwitchUserResponseFromCmd;
+    std::unique_ptr<VehiclePropValue> mCreateUserResponseFromCmd;
     std::unique_ptr<VehiclePropValue> mSetUserIdentificationAssociationResponseFromCmd;
 };
 
diff --git a/biometrics/fingerprint/2.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBiometricsFingerprintV2_1TargetTest.cpp b/biometrics/fingerprint/2.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBiometricsFingerprintV2_1TargetTest.cpp
index bdbf72d..6093caa 100644
--- a/biometrics/fingerprint/2.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBiometricsFingerprintV2_1TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/biometrics/fingerprint/2.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBiometricsFingerprintV2_1TargetTest.cpp
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
 static const std::chrono::seconds kTimeoutInSeconds = std::chrono::seconds(kTimeout);
 static const uint32_t kGroupId = 99;
 static std::string kTmpDir = "";
-static const uint32_t kIterations = 1000;
+static const uint32_t kIterations = 10;
 
 // Wait for a callback to occur (signaled by the given future) up to the
 // provided timeout. If the future is invalid or the callback does not come
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 463ed84..e9f867f 100644
--- a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -26,4 +26,5 @@
         "general-tests",
         "vts",
     ],
+    disable_framework: true,
 }
diff --git a/camera/device/3.2/ICameraDeviceCallback.hal b/camera/device/3.2/ICameraDeviceCallback.hal
index dec3bd8..607502e 100644
--- a/camera/device/3.2/ICameraDeviceCallback.hal
+++ b/camera/device/3.2/ICameraDeviceCallback.hal
@@ -95,7 +95,8 @@
      * statuses must be STATUS_ERROR, and the result metadata must be an
      * empty buffer. In addition, notify() must be called with a ERROR_REQUEST
      * message. In this case, individual ERROR_RESULT/ERROR_BUFFER messages
-     * must not be sent.
+     * must not be sent. Note that valid partial results are still allowed
+     * as long as the final result metadata fails to be generated.
      *
      * Performance requirements:
      *
diff --git a/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp b/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
index 550a2e0..f6860cf 100644
--- a/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
@@ -575,7 +575,10 @@
  }
  virtual void TearDown() override {}
 
- hidl_vec<hidl_string> getCameraDeviceNames(sp<ICameraProvider> provider);
+ hidl_vec<hidl_string> getCameraDeviceNames(sp<ICameraProvider> provider,
+                                            bool addSecureOnly = false);
+
+ bool isSecureOnly(sp<ICameraProvider> provider, const hidl_string& name);
 
  std::map<hidl_string, hidl_string> getCameraDeviceIdToNameMap(sp<ICameraProvider> provider);
 
@@ -799,6 +802,16 @@
             bool *useHalBufManager /*out*/,
             sp<DeviceCb> *cb /*out*/,
             uint32_t streamConfigCounter = 0);
+    void configureSingleStream(const std::string& name, int32_t deviceVersion,
+            sp<ICameraProvider> provider,
+            const AvailableStream* previewThreshold, uint64_t bufferUsage,
+            RequestTemplate reqTemplate,
+            sp<ICameraDeviceSession>* session /*out*/,
+            V3_2::Stream* previewStream /*out*/,
+            HalStreamConfiguration* halStreamConfig /*out*/,
+            bool* supportsPartialResults /*out*/,
+            uint32_t* partialResultCount /*out*/, bool* useHalBufManager /*out*/,
+            sp<DeviceCb>* cb /*out*/, uint32_t streamConfigCounter = 0);
 
     void verifyLogicalCameraMetadata(const std::string& cameraName,
             const ::android::sp<::android::hardware::camera::device::V3_2::ICameraDevice>& device,
@@ -875,6 +888,9 @@
     static Status getSystemCameraKind(const camera_metadata_t* staticMeta,
                                       SystemCameraKind* systemCameraKind);
 
+    void processCaptureRequestInternal(uint64_t bufferusage, RequestTemplate reqTemplate,
+                                       bool useSecureOnlyCameras);
+
     // Used by switchToOffline where a new result queue is created for offline reqs
     void updateInflightResultQueue(std::shared_ptr<ResultMetadataQueue> resultQueue);
 
@@ -1585,7 +1601,8 @@
     return idToNameMap;
 }
 
-hidl_vec<hidl_string> CameraHidlTest::getCameraDeviceNames(sp<ICameraProvider> provider) {
+hidl_vec<hidl_string> CameraHidlTest::getCameraDeviceNames(sp<ICameraProvider> provider,
+                                                           bool addSecureOnly) {
     std::vector<std::string> cameraDeviceNames;
     Return<void> ret;
     ret = provider->getCameraIdList(
@@ -1634,11 +1651,51 @@
         }
     }
 
-    hidl_vec<hidl_string> retList(cameraDeviceNames.size());
+    std::vector<hidl_string> retList;
     for (size_t i = 0; i < cameraDeviceNames.size(); i++) {
-        retList[i] = cameraDeviceNames[i];
+        bool isSecureOnlyCamera = isSecureOnly(mProvider, cameraDeviceNames[i]);
+        if (addSecureOnly) {
+            if (isSecureOnlyCamera) {
+                retList.emplace_back(cameraDeviceNames[i]);
+            }
+        } else if (!isSecureOnlyCamera) {
+            retList.emplace_back(cameraDeviceNames[i]);
+        }
     }
-    return retList;
+    hidl_vec<hidl_string> finalRetList = std::move(retList);
+    return finalRetList;
+}
+
+bool CameraHidlTest::isSecureOnly(sp<ICameraProvider> provider, const hidl_string& name) {
+    Return<void> ret;
+    ::android::sp<ICameraDevice> device3_x;
+    bool retVal = false;
+    if (getCameraDeviceVersion(mProviderType, name) == CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_1_0) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    ret = provider->getCameraDeviceInterface_V3_x(name, [&](auto status, const auto& device) {
+        ALOGI("getCameraDeviceInterface_V3_x returns status:%d", (int)status);
+        ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, status);
+        ASSERT_NE(device, nullptr);
+        device3_x = device;
+    });
+    if (!ret.isOk()) {
+        ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed to get camera device interface for " << name;
+    }
+    ret = device3_x->getCameraCharacteristics([&](Status s, CameraMetadata metadata) {
+        ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, s);
+        camera_metadata_t* chars = (camera_metadata_t*)metadata.data();
+        SystemCameraKind systemCameraKind = SystemCameraKind::PUBLIC;
+        Status status = getSystemCameraKind(chars, &systemCameraKind);
+        ASSERT_EQ(status, Status::OK);
+        if (systemCameraKind == SystemCameraKind::HIDDEN_SECURE_CAMERA) {
+            retVal = true;
+        }
+    });
+    if (!ret.isOk()) {
+        ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed to get camera characteristics for device " << name;
+    }
+    return retVal;
 }
 
 hidl_vec<hidl_vec<hidl_string>> CameraHidlTest::getConcurrentDeviceCombinations(
@@ -4316,8 +4373,21 @@
 
 // Generate and verify a camera capture request
 TEST_P(CameraHidlTest, processCaptureRequestPreview) {
-    hidl_vec<hidl_string> cameraDeviceNames = getCameraDeviceNames(mProvider);
-    AvailableStream previewThreshold = {kMaxPreviewWidth, kMaxPreviewHeight,
+    processCaptureRequestInternal(GRALLOC1_CONSUMER_USAGE_HWCOMPOSER, RequestTemplate::PREVIEW,
+                                  false /*secureOnlyCameras*/);
+}
+
+// Generate and verify a secure camera capture request
+TEST_P(CameraHidlTest, processSecureCaptureRequest) {
+    processCaptureRequestInternal(GRALLOC1_PRODUCER_USAGE_PROTECTED, RequestTemplate::STILL_CAPTURE,
+                                  true /*secureOnlyCameras*/);
+}
+
+void CameraHidlTest::processCaptureRequestInternal(uint64_t bufferUsage,
+                                                   RequestTemplate reqTemplate,
+                                                   bool useSecureOnlyCameras) {
+    hidl_vec<hidl_string> cameraDeviceNames = getCameraDeviceNames(mProvider, useSecureOnlyCameras);
+    AvailableStream streamThreshold = {kMaxPreviewWidth, kMaxPreviewHeight,
                                         static_cast<int32_t>(PixelFormat::IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED)};
     uint64_t bufferId = 1;
     uint32_t frameNumber = 1;
@@ -4333,17 +4403,17 @@
             return;
         }
 
-        V3_2::Stream previewStream;
+        V3_2::Stream testStream;
         HalStreamConfiguration halStreamConfig;
         sp<ICameraDeviceSession> session;
         sp<DeviceCb> cb;
         bool supportsPartialResults = false;
         bool useHalBufManager = false;
         uint32_t partialResultCount = 0;
-        configurePreviewStream(name, deviceVersion, mProvider, &previewThreshold, &session /*out*/,
-                &previewStream /*out*/, &halStreamConfig /*out*/,
-                &supportsPartialResults /*out*/,
-                &partialResultCount /*out*/, &useHalBufManager /*out*/, &cb /*out*/);
+        configureSingleStream(name, deviceVersion, mProvider, &streamThreshold, bufferUsage,
+                              reqTemplate, &session /*out*/, &testStream /*out*/,
+                              &halStreamConfig /*out*/, &supportsPartialResults /*out*/,
+                              &partialResultCount /*out*/, &useHalBufManager /*out*/, &cb /*out*/);
 
         std::shared_ptr<ResultMetadataQueue> resultQueue;
         auto resultQueueRet =
@@ -4364,7 +4434,6 @@
         InFlightRequest inflightReq = {1, false, supportsPartialResults,
                                        partialResultCount, resultQueue};
 
-        RequestTemplate reqTemplate = RequestTemplate::PREVIEW;
         Return<void> ret;
         ret = session->constructDefaultRequestSettings(reqTemplate,
                                                        [&](auto status, const auto& req) {
@@ -4383,7 +4452,7 @@
                             nullptr,
                             nullptr};
         } else {
-            allocateGraphicBuffer(previewStream.width, previewStream.height,
+            allocateGraphicBuffer(testStream.width, testStream.height,
                     android_convertGralloc1To0Usage(halStreamConfig.streams[0].producerUsage,
                         halStreamConfig.streams[0].consumerUsage),
                     halStreamConfig.streams[0].overrideFormat, &buffer_handle);
@@ -4432,7 +4501,7 @@
 
             ASSERT_FALSE(inflightReq.errorCodeValid);
             ASSERT_NE(inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers.size(), 0u);
-            ASSERT_EQ(previewStream.id, inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers[0].streamId);
+            ASSERT_EQ(testStream.id, inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers[0].streamId);
 
             request.frameNumber++;
             // Empty settings should be supported after the first call
@@ -4470,11 +4539,11 @@
 
             ASSERT_FALSE(inflightReq.errorCodeValid);
             ASSERT_NE(inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers.size(), 0u);
-            ASSERT_EQ(previewStream.id, inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers[0].streamId);
+            ASSERT_EQ(testStream.id, inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers[0].streamId);
         }
 
         if (useHalBufManager) {
-            verifyBuffersReturned(session, deviceVersion, previewStream.id, cb);
+            verifyBuffersReturned(session, deviceVersion, testStream.id, cb);
         }
 
         ret = session->close();
@@ -6278,6 +6347,19 @@
         bool *useHalBufManager /*out*/,
         sp<DeviceCb> *outCb /*out*/,
         uint32_t streamConfigCounter) {
+    configureSingleStream(name, deviceVersion, provider, previewThreshold,
+                          GRALLOC1_CONSUMER_USAGE_HWCOMPOSER, RequestTemplate::PREVIEW, session,
+                          previewStream, halStreamConfig, supportsPartialResults,
+                          partialResultCount, useHalBufManager, outCb, streamConfigCounter);
+}
+// Open a device session and configure a preview stream.
+void CameraHidlTest::configureSingleStream(
+        const std::string& name, int32_t deviceVersion, sp<ICameraProvider> provider,
+        const AvailableStream* previewThreshold, uint64_t bufferUsage, RequestTemplate reqTemplate,
+        sp<ICameraDeviceSession>* session /*out*/, V3_2::Stream* previewStream /*out*/,
+        HalStreamConfiguration* halStreamConfig /*out*/, bool* supportsPartialResults /*out*/,
+        uint32_t* partialResultCount /*out*/, bool* useHalBufManager /*out*/,
+        sp<DeviceCb>* outCb /*out*/, uint32_t streamConfigCounter) {
     ASSERT_NE(nullptr, session);
     ASSERT_NE(nullptr, previewStream);
     ASSERT_NE(nullptr, halStreamConfig);
@@ -6366,11 +6448,14 @@
             dataspaceFlag = static_cast<V3_2::DataspaceFlags>(Dataspace::UNKNOWN);
     }
 
-    V3_2::Stream stream3_2 = {0, StreamType::OUTPUT,
-            static_cast<uint32_t> (outputPreviewStreams[0].width),
-            static_cast<uint32_t> (outputPreviewStreams[0].height),
-            static_cast<PixelFormat> (outputPreviewStreams[0].format),
-            GRALLOC1_CONSUMER_USAGE_HWCOMPOSER, dataspaceFlag, StreamRotation::ROTATION_0};
+    V3_2::Stream stream3_2 = {0,
+                              StreamType::OUTPUT,
+                              static_cast<uint32_t>(outputPreviewStreams[0].width),
+                              static_cast<uint32_t>(outputPreviewStreams[0].height),
+                              static_cast<PixelFormat>(outputPreviewStreams[0].format),
+                              bufferUsage,
+                              dataspaceFlag,
+                              StreamRotation::ROTATION_0};
     ::android::hardware::hidl_vec<V3_2::Stream> streams3_2 = {stream3_2};
     ::android::hardware::camera::device::V3_2::StreamConfiguration config3_2;
     ::android::hardware::camera::device::V3_4::StreamConfiguration config3_4;
@@ -6378,7 +6463,6 @@
     createStreamConfiguration(streams3_2, StreamConfigurationMode::NORMAL_MODE,
                               &config3_2, &config3_4, &config3_5, jpegBufferSize);
     if (session3_5 != nullptr) {
-        RequestTemplate reqTemplate = RequestTemplate::PREVIEW;
         ret = session3_5->constructDefaultRequestSettings(reqTemplate,
                                                        [&config3_5](auto status, const auto& req) {
                                                            ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, status);
@@ -6401,7 +6485,6 @@
                     }
                 });
     } else if (session3_4 != nullptr) {
-        RequestTemplate reqTemplate = RequestTemplate::PREVIEW;
         ret = session3_4->constructDefaultRequestSettings(reqTemplate,
                                                        [&config3_4](auto status, const auto& req) {
                                                            ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, status);
diff --git a/current.txt b/current.txt
index e2d1408..cf515a6 100644
--- a/current.txt
+++ b/current.txt
@@ -588,6 +588,7 @@
 578f640c653726d58f99c84a7e1bb63862e21ef7cbb4f7d95c3cc62de00dca35 android.hardware.automotive.evs@1.0::IEvsDisplay
 f5bc6aa840db933cb9fd36668b06d3e2021cf5384bb70e459f22e2f2f921fba5 android.hardware.automotive.evs@1.0::IEvsEnumerator
 d3a344b7bd4c0d2658ae7209f55a979b8f53f361fd00f4fca29d5baa56d11fd2 android.hardware.automotive.evs@1.0::types
+d123013165a19b6353cdc46a57b2ff4a17179619d36dbd595dfcf15dcd099af6 android.hardware.camera.device@3.2::ICameraDeviceCallback # b/155353799
 2410dd02d67786a732d36e80b0f8ccf55086604ef37f9838e2013ff2c571e404 android.hardware.camera.device@3.5::types
 cd06a7911b9acd4a653bbf7133888878fbcb3f84be177c7a3f1becaae3d8618f android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.2::types
 5cf81b1001296fbb3c5b3d275a859244f61cec5fa858d7be9cca46c5b7dfa733 android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.2::types # b/150331548
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
index 27b633a..00df7c7 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
@@ -414,12 +414,9 @@
 
     mWriter->validateDisplay();
     execute();
-    if (mReader->mCompositionChanges.size() != 0) {
-        GTEST_SUCCEED() << "Composition change requested, skipping test";
-        return;
-    }
-
     ASSERT_EQ(0, mReader->mErrors.size());
+    mReader->mCompositionChanges.clear();
+
     mWriter->presentDisplay();
     execute();
     ASSERT_EQ(0, mReader->mErrors.size());
@@ -427,8 +424,14 @@
     mWriter->selectLayer(layer);
     auto handle2 = allocate();
     ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle2);
+
     mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle2, -1);
     mWriter->setLayerSurfaceDamage(std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, {0, 0, 10, 10}));
+    mWriter->validateDisplay();
+    execute();
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, mReader->mErrors.size());
+    mReader->mCompositionChanges.clear();
+
     mWriter->presentDisplay();
     execute();
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/Android.bp
index 7298c7d..14aef8e 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -18,5 +18,8 @@
             },
         },
     },
-    versions: ["1"],
+    versions: [
+        "1",
+        "2",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/.hash b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/.hash
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..036ce84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/.hash
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+194e04be642728623d65ec8321a3764fdea52ae0
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/Certificate.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/Certificate.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e3002d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/Certificate.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable Certificate {
+  byte[] encodedCertificate;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/CipherSuite.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/CipherSuite.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..447203f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/CipherSuite.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum CipherSuite {
+  CIPHERSUITE_ECDHE_HKDF_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256 = 1,
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/HardwareInformation.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/HardwareInformation.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1296e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/HardwareInformation.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable HardwareInformation {
+  @utf8InCpp String credentialStoreName;
+  @utf8InCpp String credentialStoreAuthorName;
+  int dataChunkSize;
+  boolean isDirectAccess;
+  @utf8InCpp String[] supportedDocTypes;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88104d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+interface IIdentityCredential {
+  byte[] deleteCredential();
+  byte[] createEphemeralKeyPair();
+  void setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(in byte[] publicKey);
+  long createAuthChallenge();
+  void startRetrieval(in android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile[] accessControlProfiles, in android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthToken authToken, in byte[] itemsRequest, in byte[] signingKeyBlob, in byte[] sessionTranscript, in byte[] readerSignature, in int[] requestCounts);
+  void startRetrieveEntryValue(in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize, in int[] accessControlProfileIds);
+  byte[] retrieveEntryValue(in byte[] encryptedContent);
+  void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
+  android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
+  void setRequestedNamespaces(in android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
+  void setVerificationToken(in android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken verificationToken);
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5dafb76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+interface IIdentityCredentialStore {
+  android.hardware.identity.HardwareInformation getHardwareInformation();
+  android.hardware.identity.IWritableIdentityCredential createCredential(in @utf8InCpp String docType, in boolean testCredential);
+  android.hardware.identity.IIdentityCredential getCredential(in android.hardware.identity.CipherSuite cipherSuite, in byte[] credentialData);
+  const int STATUS_OK = 0;
+  const int STATUS_FAILED = 1;
+  const int STATUS_CIPHER_SUITE_NOT_SUPPORTED = 2;
+  const int STATUS_INVALID_DATA = 3;
+  const int STATUS_INVALID_AUTH_TOKEN = 4;
+  const int STATUS_INVALID_ITEMS_REQUEST_MESSAGE = 5;
+  const int STATUS_READER_SIGNATURE_CHECK_FAILED = 6;
+  const int STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7;
+  const int STATUS_USER_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED = 8;
+  const int STATUS_READER_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED = 9;
+  const int STATUS_NO_ACCESS_CONTROL_PROFILES = 10;
+  const int STATUS_NOT_IN_REQUEST_MESSAGE = 11;
+  const int STATUS_SESSION_TRANSCRIPT_MISMATCH = 12;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5ac9d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+interface IWritableIdentityCredential {
+  android.hardware.identity.Certificate[] getAttestationCertificate(in byte[] attestationApplicationId, in byte[] attestationChallenge);
+  void startPersonalization(in int accessControlProfileCount, in int[] entryCounts);
+  android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile addAccessControlProfile(in int id, in android.hardware.identity.Certificate readerCertificate, in boolean userAuthenticationRequired, in long timeoutMillis, in long secureUserId);
+  void beginAddEntry(in int[] accessControlProfileIds, in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize);
+  byte[] addEntryValue(in byte[] content);
+  void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+  void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24ec26a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestDataItem {
+  @utf8InCpp String name;
+  long size;
+  int[] accessControlProfileIds;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af00f3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestNamespace {
+  @utf8InCpp String namespaceName;
+  android.hardware.identity.RequestDataItem[] items;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/SecureAccessControlProfile.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/SecureAccessControlProfile.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfc1ad0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/SecureAccessControlProfile.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable SecureAccessControlProfile {
+  int id;
+  android.hardware.identity.Certificate readerCertificate;
+  boolean userAuthenticationRequired;
+  long timeoutMillis;
+  long secureUserId;
+  byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index 58b90b5..88104d9 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -27,4 +27,6 @@
   byte[] retrieveEntryValue(in byte[] encryptedContent);
   void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
   android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
+  void setRequestedNamespaces(in android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
+  void setVerificationToken(in android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken verificationToken);
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
index 32f283c..c5ac9d6 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -24,4 +24,5 @@
   void beginAddEntry(in int[] accessControlProfileIds, in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize);
   byte[] addEntryValue(in byte[] content);
   void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+  void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24ec26a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestDataItem {
+  @utf8InCpp String name;
+  long size;
+  int[] accessControlProfileIds;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af00f3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestNamespace {
+  @utf8InCpp String namespaceName;
+  android.hardware.identity.RequestDataItem[] items;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index 7d14f03..3b8fbd9 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -17,8 +17,10 @@
 package android.hardware.identity;
 
 import android.hardware.identity.Certificate;
+import android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace;
 import android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile;
 import android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthToken;
+import android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken;
 
 @VintfStability
 interface IIdentityCredential {
@@ -70,10 +72,11 @@
 
     /**
      * Creates a challenge value to be used for proving successful user authentication. This
-     * is included in the authToken passed to the startRetrieval() method.
+     * is included in the authToken passed to the startRetrieval() method and the
+     * verificationToken passed to the setVerificationToken() method.
      *
      * This method may only be called once per instance. If called more than once, STATUS_FAILED
-     * will be returned.
+     * will be returned. If user authentication is not needed, this method may not be called.
      *
      * @return challenge, a non-zero number.
      */
@@ -82,6 +85,9 @@
     /**
      * Start an entry retrieval process.
      *
+     * The setRequestedNamespaces() and setVerificationToken() methods will be called before
+     * this method is called.
+     *
      * This method be called after createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(),
      * createAuthChallenge() and before startRetrieveEntry(). This method call is followed by
      * multiple calls of startRetrieveEntryValue(), retrieveEntryValue(), and finally
@@ -93,7 +99,19 @@
      * must be identical for each startRetrieval() invocation. If this is not the case, this call
      * fails with the STATUS_SESSION_TRANSCRIPT_MISMATCH error.
      *
-     * If the provided authToken is not valid this method fails with STATUS_INVALID_AUTH_TOKEN.
+     * If either authToken or verificationToken (as passed with setVerificationToken())
+     * is not valid this method fails with STATUS_INVALID_AUTH_TOKEN. Note that valid tokens
+     * are only passed if they are actually needed and available (this can be detected by
+     * the timestamp being set to zero). For example, if no data items with access control
+     * profiles using user authentication are requested, the tokens are not filled in.
+     * It's also possible that no usable auth token is actually available (it could be the user
+     * never unlocked the device within the timeouts in the access control profiles) and
+     * in this case the tokens aren't filled in either.
+     *
+     * For test credentials (identified by the testCredential boolean in the CredentialData
+     * CBOR created at provisioning time), the |mac| field in both the authToken and
+     * verificationToken should not be checked against the shared HMAC key (see IKeyMasterDevice
+     * for details). This is to enable VTS tests to check for correct behavior.
      *
      * Each of the provided accessControlProfiles is checked in this call. If they are not
      * all valid, the call fails with STATUS_INVALID_DATA.
@@ -142,17 +160,10 @@
      *       ItemsRequestBytes
      *     ]
      *
-     *     SessionTranscript = [
-     *       DeviceEngagementBytes,
-     *       EReaderKeyBytes
-     *     ]
+     *     SessionTranscript = any
      *
-     *     DeviceEngagementBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor DeviceEngagement)
-     *     EReaderKeyBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor EReaderKey.Pub)
      *     ItemsRequestBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor ItemsRequest)
      *
-     *     EReaderKey.Pub = COSE_Key    ; Ephemeral public key provided by reader
-     *
      * The public key corresponding to the key used to made signature, can be found in the
      * 'x5chain' unprotected header element of the COSE_Sign1 structure (as as described
      * in 'draft-ietf-cose-x509-04'). There will be at least one certificate in said element
@@ -166,8 +177,12 @@
      *
      * If the SessionTranscript CBOR is not empty, the X and Y coordinates of the public
      * part of the key-pair previously generated by createEphemeralKeyPair() must appear
-     * somewhere in the bytes of DeviceEngagement structure. Both X and Y should be in
-     * uncompressed form. If this is not satisfied, the call fails with
+     * somewhere in the bytes of the CBOR. Each of these coordinates must appear encoded
+     * with the most significant bits first and use the exact amount of bits indicated by
+     * the key size of the ephemeral keys. For example, if the ephemeral key is using the
+     * P-256 curve then the 32 bytes for the X coordinate encoded with the most significant
+     * bits first must appear somewhere in the CBOR and ditto for the 32 bytes for the Y
+     * coordinate. If this is not satisfied, the call fails with
      * STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND.
      *
      * @param accessControlProfiles
@@ -176,7 +191,8 @@
      *
      * @param authToken
      *   The authentication token that proves the user was authenticated, as required
-     *   by one or more of the provided accessControlProfiles. See above.
+     *   by one or more of the provided accessControlProfiles. This token is only valid
+     *   if the timestamp field is non-zero. See above.
      *
      * @param itemsRequest
      *   If non-empty, contains request data that is signed by the reader. See above.
@@ -274,18 +290,13 @@
      *            "DeviceAuthentication",
      *            SessionTranscript,
      *            DocType,
-     *            DeviceNameSpaceBytes,
+     *            DeviceNameSpacesBytes,
      *        ]
      *
      *        DocType = tstr
      *
-     *        SessionTranscript = [
-     *            DeviceEngagementBytes,
-     *            EReaderKeyBytes
-     *        ]
+     *        SessionTranscript = any
      *
-     *        DeviceEngagementBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor DeviceEngagement)
-     *        EReaderKeyBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor EReaderKey.Pub)
      *        DeviceNameSpacesBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor DeviceNameSpaces)
      *
      *    where
@@ -337,10 +348,32 @@
      *
      *  - subjectPublicKeyInfo: must contain attested public key.
      *
-     * @param out signingKeyBlob contains an encrypted copy of the newly-generated private
-     *     signing key.
+     * @param out signingKeyBlob contains an AES-GCM-ENC(storageKey, R, signingKey, docType)
+     *     where signingKey is an EC private key in uncompressed form. That is, the returned
+     *     blob is an encrypted copy of the newly-generated private signing key.
      *
      * @return an X.509 certificate for the new signing key, signed by the credential key.
      */
     Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
+
+    /**
+     * Sets the namespaces and data items (including their size and access control profiles)
+     * which will be requested. This method must be called before startRetrieval() is called.
+     *
+     * This information is provided to make it possible for a HAL implementation to
+     * incrementally build up cryptographically authenticated data which includes the
+     * DeviceNameSpaces CBOR.
+     *
+     * @param requestNamespaces Namespaces and data items which will be requested.
+     */
+    void setRequestedNamespaces(in RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
+
+   /**
+    * Sets the VerificationToken. This method must be called before startRetrieval() is
+    * called. This token uses the same challenge as returned by createAuthChallenge().
+    *
+    * @param verificationToken
+    *   The verification token. This token is only valid if the timestamp field is non-zero.
+    */
+    void setVerificationToken(in VerificationToken verificationToken);
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
index 07486e6..297fd1d 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -29,9 +29,27 @@
      * Gets the certificate chain for credentialKey which can be used to prove the hardware
      * characteristics to an issuing authority.  Must not be called more than once.
      *
+     * The following non-optional fields for the X.509 certificate shall be set as follows:
+     *
+     *  - version: INTEGER 2 (means v3 certificate).
+     *
+     *  - serialNumber: INTEGER 1 (fixed value: same on all certs).
+     *
+     *  - signature: must be set to ECDSA.
+     *
+     *  - subject: CN shall be set to "Android Identity Credential Key".
+     *
+     *  - issuer: shall be set to "credentialStoreName (credentialStoreAuthorName)" using the
+     *    values returned in HardwareInformation.
+     *
+     *  - validity: should be from current time and expire at the same time as the
+     *    attestation batch certificate used.
+     *
+     *  - subjectPublicKeyInfo: must contain attested public key.
+     *
      * The certificate chain must be generated using Keymaster Attestation
      * (see https://source.android.com/security/keystore/attestation) with the
-     * following additional requirements:
+     * following additional requirements on the data in the attestation extension:
      *
      *  - The attestationVersion field in the attestation extension must be at least 3.
      *
@@ -109,7 +127,8 @@
      *     in Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID. This schema is described in
      *     https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-key-attestation#certificate_schema_attestationid
      *
-     * @param attestationChallenge a challenge set by the issuer to ensure freshness.
+     * @param attestationChallenge a challenge set by the issuer to ensure freshness. If
+     *    this is empty, the call fails with STATUS_INVALID_DATA.
      *
      * @return the X.509 certificate chain for the credentialKey
      */
@@ -120,6 +139,8 @@
      *
      * startPersonalization must not be called more than once.
      *
+     * The setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize() method will be called before this method.
+     *
      * @param accessControlProfileCount specifies the number of access control profiles that will
      *     be provisioned with addAccessControlProfile().
      *
@@ -248,6 +269,7 @@
      *         CredentialKeys = [
      *              bstr,   ; storageKey, a 128-bit AES key
      *              bstr    ; credentialPrivKey, the private key for credentialKey
+     *                      ; in uncompressed form
      *         ]
      *
      * @param out proofOfProvisioningSignature proves to the IA that the credential was imported
@@ -288,4 +310,16 @@
      */
     void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData,
         out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+
+    /**
+     * Sets the expected size of the ProofOfProvisioning returned by finishAddingEntries(). This
+     * method must be called before startPersonalization() is called.
+     *
+     * This information is provided to make it possible for a HAL implementation to
+     * incrementally build up cryptographically authenticated data which includes the
+     * ProofOfProvisioning CBOR.
+     *
+     * @param expectedProofOfProvisioningSize the expected size of ProofOfProvisioning.
+     */
+    void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05bc762
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestDataItem {
+    /**
+     * The data item name being requested, for example "driving_privileges".
+     */
+    @utf8InCpp String name;
+
+    /**
+     * The size of the data item value.
+     *
+     * Data item values are always encoded as CBOR so this is the length of
+     * the CBOR encoding of the value.
+     */
+    long size;
+
+    /**
+     * The access control profile ids this data item is configured with.
+     */
+    int[] accessControlProfileIds;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d61506
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+
+import android.hardware.identity.RequestDataItem;
+
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestNamespace {
+    /**
+     * The name of the namespace that items are being requested from, for
+     * example "org.iso.18013.5.1".
+     */
+    @utf8InCpp String namespaceName;
+
+    /**
+     * The data items requested.
+     */
+    RequestDataItem[] items;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.cpp
index 341fae6..f3c4bbf 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.cpp
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
 
 #include <cppbor.h>
 #include <cppbor_parse.h>
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity {
 
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::keymaster::Timestamp;
+using ::android::base::StringPrintf;
 using ::std::optional;
 
 using namespace ::android::hardware::identity;
@@ -162,6 +164,7 @@
     }
 
     *outChallenge = challenge;
+    authChallenge_ = challenge;
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
@@ -196,15 +199,8 @@
     return false;
 }
 
-Timestamp clockGetTime() {
-    struct timespec time;
-    clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &time);
-    Timestamp ts;
-    ts.milliSeconds = time.tv_sec * 1000 + time.tv_nsec / 1000000;
-    return ts;
-}
-
 bool checkUserAuthentication(const SecureAccessControlProfile& profile,
+                             const VerificationToken& verificationToken,
                              const HardwareAuthToken& authToken, uint64_t authChallenge) {
     if (profile.secureUserId != authToken.userId) {
         LOG(ERROR) << "secureUserId in profile (" << profile.secureUserId
@@ -212,6 +208,15 @@
         return false;
     }
 
+    if (verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds == 0) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "VerificationToken is not set";
+        return false;
+    }
+    if (authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds == 0) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "AuthToken is not set";
+        return false;
+    }
+
     if (profile.timeoutMillis == 0) {
         if (authToken.challenge == 0) {
             LOG(ERROR) << "No challenge in authToken";
@@ -219,25 +224,18 @@
         }
 
         if (authToken.challenge != int64_t(authChallenge)) {
-            LOG(ERROR) << "Challenge in authToken doesn't match the challenge we created";
+            LOG(ERROR) << "Challenge in authToken (" << uint64_t(authToken.challenge) << ") "
+                       << "doesn't match the challenge we created (" << authChallenge << ")";
             return false;
         }
         return true;
     }
 
-    // Note that the Epoch for timestamps in HardwareAuthToken is at the
-    // discretion of the vendor:
+    // Timeout-based user auth follows. The verification token conveys what the
+    // time is right now in the environment which generated the auth token. This
+    // is what makes it possible to do timeout-based checks.
     //
-    //   "[...] since some starting point (generally the most recent device
-    //    boot) which all of the applications within one secure environment
-    //    must agree upon."
-    //
-    // Therefore, if this software implementation is used on a device which isn't
-    // the emulator then the assumption that the epoch is the same as used in
-    // clockGetTime above will not hold. This is OK as this software
-    // implementation should never be used on a real device.
-    //
-    Timestamp now = clockGetTime();
+    const Timestamp now = verificationToken.timestamp;
     if (authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds > now.milliSeconds) {
         LOG(ERROR) << "Timestamp in authToken (" << authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds
                    << ") is in the future (now: " << now.milliSeconds << ")";
@@ -253,6 +251,18 @@
     return true;
 }
 
+ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::setRequestedNamespaces(
+        const vector<RequestNamespace>& requestNamespaces) {
+    requestNamespaces_ = requestNamespaces;
+    return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
+}
+
+ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::setVerificationToken(
+        const VerificationToken& verificationToken) {
+    verificationToken_ = verificationToken;
+    return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
+}
+
 ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieval(
         const vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>& accessControlProfiles,
         const HardwareAuthToken& authToken, const vector<int8_t>& itemsRequestS,
@@ -333,28 +343,6 @@
     //
     // We do this by just searching for the X and Y coordinates.
     if (sessionTranscript.size() > 0) {
-        const cppbor::Array* array = sessionTranscriptItem_->asArray();
-        if (array == nullptr || array->size() != 2) {
-            return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
-                    IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND,
-                    "SessionTranscript is not an array with two items"));
-        }
-        const cppbor::Semantic* taggedEncodedDE = (*array)[0]->asSemantic();
-        if (taggedEncodedDE == nullptr || taggedEncodedDE->value() != 24) {
-            return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
-                    IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND,
-                    "First item in SessionTranscript array is not a "
-                    "semantic with value 24"));
-        }
-        const cppbor::Bstr* encodedDE = (taggedEncodedDE->child())->asBstr();
-        if (encodedDE == nullptr) {
-            return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
-                    IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND,
-                    "Child of semantic in first item in SessionTranscript "
-                    "array is not a bstr"));
-        }
-        const vector<uint8_t>& bytesDE = encodedDE->value();
-
         auto [getXYSuccess, ePubX, ePubY] = support::ecPublicKeyGetXandY(ephemeralPublicKey_);
         if (!getXYSuccess) {
             return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
@@ -362,8 +350,10 @@
                     "Error extracting X and Y from ePub"));
         }
         if (sessionTranscript.size() > 0 &&
-            !(memmem(bytesDE.data(), bytesDE.size(), ePubX.data(), ePubX.size()) != nullptr &&
-              memmem(bytesDE.data(), bytesDE.size(), ePubY.data(), ePubY.size()) != nullptr)) {
+            !(memmem(sessionTranscript.data(), sessionTranscript.size(), ePubX.data(),
+                     ePubX.size()) != nullptr &&
+              memmem(sessionTranscript.data(), sessionTranscript.size(), ePubY.data(),
+                     ePubY.size()) != nullptr)) {
             return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
                     IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND,
                     "Did not find ephemeral public key's X and Y coordinates in "
@@ -451,7 +441,7 @@
                         "Type mismatch in nameSpaces map"));
             }
             string requestedNamespace = nsKey->value();
-            vector<string> requestedKeys;
+            set<string> requestedKeys;
             for (size_t m = 0; m < nsInnerMap->size(); m++) {
                 const auto& [innerMapKeyItem, innerMapValueItem] = (*nsInnerMap)[m];
                 const cppbor::Tstr* nameItem = innerMapKeyItem->asTstr();
@@ -463,23 +453,25 @@
                             IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_ITEMS_REQUEST_MESSAGE,
                             "Type mismatch in value in nameSpaces map"));
                 }
-                requestedKeys.push_back(nameItem->value());
+                requestedKeys.insert(nameItem->value());
             }
             requestedNameSpacesAndNames_[requestedNamespace] = requestedKeys;
         }
     }
 
-    // Finally, validate all the access control profiles in the requestData.
-    bool haveAuthToken = (authToken.mac.size() > 0);
+    // Validate all the access control profiles in the requestData.
+    bool haveAuthToken = (authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds != int64_t(0));
     for (const auto& profile : accessControlProfiles) {
         if (!secureAccessControlProfileCheckMac(profile, storageKey_)) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << "Error checking MAC for profile";
             return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
                     IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
                     "Error checking MAC for profile"));
         }
         int accessControlCheck = IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_OK;
         if (profile.userAuthenticationRequired) {
-            if (!haveAuthToken || !checkUserAuthentication(profile, authToken, authChallenge_)) {
+            if (!haveAuthToken ||
+                !checkUserAuthentication(profile, verificationToken_, authToken, authChallenge_)) {
                 accessControlCheck = IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_USER_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
             }
         } else if (profile.readerCertificate.encodedCertificate.size() > 0) {
@@ -500,10 +492,118 @@
     itemsRequest_ = itemsRequest;
     signingKeyBlob_ = byteStringToUnsigned(signingKeyBlobS);
 
+    // Finally, calculate the size of DeviceNameSpaces. We need to know it ahead of time.
+    expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_ = calcDeviceNameSpacesSize();
+
     numStartRetrievalCalls_ += 1;
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
+size_t cborNumBytesForLength(size_t length) {
+    if (length < 24) {
+        return 0;
+    } else if (length <= 0xff) {
+        return 1;
+    } else if (length <= 0xffff) {
+        return 2;
+    } else if (length <= 0xffffffff) {
+        return 4;
+    }
+    return 8;
+}
+
+size_t cborNumBytesForTstr(const string& value) {
+    return 1 + cborNumBytesForLength(value.size()) + value.size();
+}
+
+size_t IdentityCredential::calcDeviceNameSpacesSize() {
+    /*
+     * This is how DeviceNameSpaces is defined:
+     *
+     *        DeviceNameSpaces = {
+     *            * NameSpace => DeviceSignedItems
+     *        }
+     *        DeviceSignedItems = {
+     *            + DataItemName => DataItemValue
+     *        }
+     *
+     *        Namespace = tstr
+     *        DataItemName = tstr
+     *        DataItemValue = any
+     *
+     * This function will calculate its length using knowledge of how CBOR is
+     * encoded.
+     */
+    size_t ret = 0;
+    size_t numNamespacesWithValues = 0;
+    for (const RequestNamespace& rns : requestNamespaces_) {
+        vector<RequestDataItem> itemsToInclude;
+
+        for (const RequestDataItem& rdi : rns.items) {
+            // If we have a CBOR request message, skip if item isn't in it
+            if (itemsRequest_.size() > 0) {
+                const auto& it = requestedNameSpacesAndNames_.find(rns.namespaceName);
+                if (it == requestedNameSpacesAndNames_.end()) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                const set<string>& dataItemNames = it->second;
+                if (dataItemNames.find(rdi.name) == dataItemNames.end()) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+
+            // Access is granted if at least one of the profiles grants access.
+            //
+            // If an item is configured without any profiles, access is denied.
+            //
+            bool authorized = false;
+            for (auto id : rdi.accessControlProfileIds) {
+                auto it = profileIdToAccessCheckResult_.find(id);
+                if (it != profileIdToAccessCheckResult_.end()) {
+                    int accessControlForProfile = it->second;
+                    if (accessControlForProfile == IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_OK) {
+                        authorized = true;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if (!authorized) {
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            itemsToInclude.push_back(rdi);
+        }
+
+        // If no entries are to be in the namespace, we don't include it...
+        if (itemsToInclude.size() == 0) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        // Key: NameSpace
+        ret += cborNumBytesForTstr(rns.namespaceName);
+
+        // Value: Open the DeviceSignedItems map
+        ret += 1 + cborNumBytesForLength(itemsToInclude.size());
+
+        for (const RequestDataItem& item : itemsToInclude) {
+            // Key: DataItemName
+            ret += cborNumBytesForTstr(item.name);
+
+            // Value: DataItemValue - entryData.size is the length of serialized CBOR so we use
+            // that.
+            ret += item.size;
+        }
+
+        numNamespacesWithValues++;
+    }
+
+    // Now that we now the nunber of namespaces with values, we know how many
+    // bytes the DeviceNamespaces map in the beginning is going to take up.
+    ret += 1 + cborNumBytesForLength(numNamespacesWithValues);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
 ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieveEntryValue(
         const string& nameSpace, const string& name, int32_t entrySize,
         const vector<int32_t>& accessControlProfileIds) {
@@ -562,8 +662,8 @@
                     IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_NOT_IN_REQUEST_MESSAGE,
                     "Name space was not requested in startRetrieval"));
         }
-        const auto& dataItemNames = it->second;
-        if (std::find(dataItemNames.begin(), dataItemNames.end(), name) == dataItemNames.end()) {
+        const set<string>& dataItemNames = it->second;
+        if (dataItemNames.find(name) == dataItemNames.end()) {
             return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
                     IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_NOT_IN_REQUEST_MESSAGE,
                     "Data item name in name space was not requested in startRetrieval"));
@@ -608,7 +708,6 @@
 ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::retrieveEntryValue(const vector<int8_t>& encryptedContentS,
                                                           vector<int8_t>* outContent) {
     auto encryptedContent = byteStringToUnsigned(encryptedContentS);
-
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> content =
             support::decryptAes128Gcm(storageKey_, encryptedContent, entryAdditionalData_);
     if (!content) {
@@ -659,6 +758,17 @@
     }
     vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceNameSpaces = deviceNameSpacesMap_.encode();
 
+    if (encodedDeviceNameSpaces.size() != expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "encodedDeviceNameSpaces is " << encodedDeviceNameSpaces.size() << " bytes, "
+                   << "was expecting " << expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_;
+        return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
+                StringPrintf(
+                        "Unexpected CBOR size %zd for encodedDeviceNameSpaces, was expecting %zd",
+                        encodedDeviceNameSpaces.size(), expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_)
+                        .c_str()));
+    }
+
     // If there's no signing key or no sessionTranscript or no reader ephemeral
     // public key, we return the empty MAC.
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> mac;
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.h b/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.h
index fc29254..40070c0 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/identity/BnIdentityCredential.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.h>
 #include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
 
 #include <map>
@@ -31,16 +32,19 @@
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity {
 
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthToken;
+using ::aidl::android::hardware::keymaster::VerificationToken;
 using ::std::map;
+using ::std::set;
 using ::std::string;
 using ::std::vector;
 
-using MapStringToVectorOfStrings = map<string, vector<string>>;
-
 class IdentityCredential : public BnIdentityCredential {
   public:
     IdentityCredential(const vector<uint8_t>& credentialData)
-        : credentialData_(credentialData), numStartRetrievalCalls_(0), authChallenge_(0) {}
+        : credentialData_(credentialData),
+          numStartRetrievalCalls_(0),
+          authChallenge_(0),
+          expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_(0) {}
 
     // Parses and decrypts credentialData_, return a status code from
     // IIdentityCredentialStore. Must be called right after construction.
@@ -51,6 +55,9 @@
     ndk::ScopedAStatus createEphemeralKeyPair(vector<int8_t>* outKeyPair) override;
     ndk::ScopedAStatus setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(const vector<int8_t>& publicKey) override;
     ndk::ScopedAStatus createAuthChallenge(int64_t* outChallenge) override;
+    ndk::ScopedAStatus setRequestedNamespaces(
+            const vector<RequestNamespace>& requestNamespaces) override;
+    ndk::ScopedAStatus setVerificationToken(const VerificationToken& verificationToken) override;
     ndk::ScopedAStatus startRetrieval(
             const vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>& accessControlProfiles,
             const HardwareAuthToken& authToken, const vector<int8_t>& itemsRequest,
@@ -86,6 +93,12 @@
     // Set by createAuthChallenge()
     uint64_t authChallenge_;
 
+    // Set by setRequestedNamespaces()
+    vector<RequestNamespace> requestNamespaces_;
+
+    // Set by setVerificationToken().
+    VerificationToken verificationToken_;
+
     // Set at startRetrieval() time.
     map<int32_t, int> profileIdToAccessCheckResult_;
     vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob_;
@@ -93,16 +106,21 @@
     std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item> sessionTranscriptItem_;
     vector<uint8_t> itemsRequest_;
     vector<int32_t> requestCountsRemaining_;
-    MapStringToVectorOfStrings requestedNameSpacesAndNames_;
+    map<string, set<string>> requestedNameSpacesAndNames_;
     cppbor::Map deviceNameSpacesMap_;
     cppbor::Map currentNameSpaceDeviceNameSpacesMap_;
 
+    // Calculated at startRetrieval() time.
+    size_t expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_;
+
     // Set at startRetrieveEntryValue() time.
     string currentNameSpace_;
     string currentName_;
     size_t entryRemainingBytes_;
     vector<uint8_t> entryValue_;
     vector<uint8_t> entryAdditionalData_;
+
+    size_t calcDeviceNameSpacesSize();
 };
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
index 52cd496..c218866 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
 
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
 
 #include <cppbor/cppbor.h>
 #include <cppbor/cppbor_parse.h>
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
 
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity {
 
+using ::android::base::StringPrintf;
 using ::std::optional;
 using namespace ::android::hardware::identity;
 
@@ -63,6 +65,10 @@
                 IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED,
                 "Error attestation certificate previously generated"));
     }
+    if (attestationChallenge.empty()) {
+        return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA, "Challenge can not be empty"));
+    }
 
     vector<uint8_t> challenge(attestationChallenge.begin(), attestationChallenge.end());
     vector<uint8_t> appId(attestationApplicationId.begin(), attestationApplicationId.end());
@@ -105,6 +111,12 @@
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
+ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(
+        int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) {
+    expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_ = expectedProofOfProvisioningSize;
+    return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
+}
+
 ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::startPersonalization(
         int32_t accessControlProfileCount, const vector<int32_t>& entryCounts) {
     if (startPersonalizationCalled_) {
@@ -157,6 +169,13 @@
                 "userAuthenticationRequired is false but timeout is non-zero"));
     }
 
+    // If |userAuthenticationRequired| is true, then |secureUserId| must be non-zero.
+    if (userAuthenticationRequired && secureUserId == 0) {
+        return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
+                "userAuthenticationRequired is true but secureUserId is zero"));
+    }
+
     profile.id = id;
     profile.readerCertificate = readerCertificate;
     profile.userAuthenticationRequired = userAuthenticationRequired;
@@ -255,7 +274,7 @@
 }
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::addEntryValue(const vector<int8_t>& contentS,
-                                                             vector<int8_t>* outEncryptedContent) {
+                                                             vector<int8_t>* outEncryptedContentS) {
     auto content = byteStringToUnsigned(contentS);
     size_t contentSize = content.size();
 
@@ -311,7 +330,7 @@
         signedDataCurrentNamespace_.add(std::move(entryMap));
     }
 
-    *outEncryptedContent = byteStringToSigned(encryptedContent.value());
+    *outEncryptedContentS = byteStringToSigned(encryptedContent.value());
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
@@ -384,6 +403,16 @@
             .add(testCredential_);
     vector<uint8_t> encodedCbor = popArray.encode();
 
+    if (encodedCbor.size() != expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "CBOR for proofOfProvisioning is " << encodedCbor.size() << " bytes, "
+                   << "was expecting " << expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_;
+        return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
+                StringPrintf("Unexpected CBOR size %zd for proofOfProvisioning, was expecting %zd",
+                             encodedCbor.size(), expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_)
+                        .c_str()));
+    }
+
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> signature = support::coseSignEcDsa(credentialPrivKey_,
                                                                  encodedCbor,  // payload
                                                                  {},           // additionalData
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.h b/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.h
index cb91f7b..05104d7 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.h
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
                                                  const vector<int8_t>& attestationChallenge,
                                                  vector<Certificate>* outCertificateChain) override;
 
+    ndk::ScopedAStatus setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(
+            int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) override;
+
     ndk::ScopedAStatus startPersonalization(int32_t accessControlProfileCount,
                                             const vector<int32_t>& entryCounts) override;
 
@@ -62,7 +65,7 @@
             vector<int8_t>* outCredentialData,
             vector<int8_t>* outProofOfProvisioningSignature) override;
 
-    // private:
+  private:
     string docType_;
     bool testCredential_;
 
@@ -82,6 +85,7 @@
     cppbor::Array signedDataAccessControlProfiles_;
     cppbor::Map signedDataNamespaces_;
     cppbor::Array signedDataCurrentNamespace_;
+    size_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_;
 
     // This field is initialized in addAccessControlProfile
     set<int32_t> accessControlProfileIds_;
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/service.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/service.cpp
index f05c615..bf95df5 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/service.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/service.cpp
@@ -22,9 +22,14 @@
 
 #include "IdentityCredentialStore.h"
 
+using ::android::base::InitLogging;
+using ::android::base::StderrLogger;
+
 using aidl::android::hardware::identity::IdentityCredentialStore;
 
-int main() {
+int main(int /*argc*/, char* argv[]) {
+    InitLogging(argv, StderrLogger);
+
     ABinderProcess_setThreadPoolMaxThreadCount(0);
     std::shared_ptr<IdentityCredentialStore> store =
             ndk::SharedRefBase::make<IdentityCredentialStore>();
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
index e4780bf..58473dc 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
@@ -8,10 +8,19 @@
         "VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest.cpp",
         "VtsIWritableIdentityCredentialTests.cpp",
         "VtsIdentityTestUtils.cpp",
+        "VtsAttestationTests.cpp",
+        "VtsAttestationParserSupport.cpp",
+        "UserAuthTests.cpp",
+        "ReaderAuthTests.cpp",
     ],
     shared_libs: [
+        "android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
         "libbinder",
         "libcrypto",
+        "libkeymaster_portable",
+        "libsoft_attestation_cert",
+        "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
+        "android.hardware.keymaster-ndk_platform",
     ],
     static_libs: [
         "libcppbor",
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/ReaderAuthTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/ReaderAuthTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..680ba5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/ReaderAuthTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,596 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "ReaderAuthTests"
+
+#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
+#include <aidl/Vintf.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.h>
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
+#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
+#include <binder/ProcessState.h>
+#include <cppbor.h>
+#include <cppbor_parse.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <future>
+#include <map>
+#include <utility>
+
+#include "VtsIdentityTestUtils.h"
+
+namespace android::hardware::identity {
+
+using std::endl;
+using std::make_pair;
+using std::map;
+using std::optional;
+using std::pair;
+using std::string;
+using std::tie;
+using std::vector;
+
+using ::android::sp;
+using ::android::String16;
+using ::android::binder::Status;
+
+using ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthToken;
+using ::android::hardware::keymaster::VerificationToken;
+
+class ReaderAuthTests : public testing::TestWithParam<string> {
+  public:
+    virtual void SetUp() override {
+        credentialStore_ = android::waitForDeclaredService<IIdentityCredentialStore>(
+                String16(GetParam().c_str()));
+        ASSERT_NE(credentialStore_, nullptr);
+    }
+
+    void provisionData();
+    void retrieveData(const vector<uint8_t>& readerPrivateKey,
+                      const vector<vector<uint8_t>>& readerCertChain, bool expectSuccess,
+                      bool leaveOutAccessibleToAllFromRequestMessage);
+
+    // Set by provisionData
+    vector<uint8_t> readerPublicKey_;
+    vector<uint8_t> readerPrivateKey_;
+    vector<uint8_t> intermediateAPublicKey_;
+    vector<uint8_t> intermediateAPrivateKey_;
+    vector<uint8_t> intermediateBPublicKey_;
+    vector<uint8_t> intermediateBPrivateKey_;
+    vector<uint8_t> intermediateCPublicKey_;
+    vector<uint8_t> intermediateCPrivateKey_;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> cert_A_SelfSigned_;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> cert_B_SelfSigned_;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> cert_B_SignedBy_C_;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> cert_C_SelfSigned_;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> cert_reader_SelfSigned_;
+    vector<uint8_t> cert_reader_SignedBy_A_;
+    vector<uint8_t> cert_reader_SignedBy_B_;
+
+    SecureAccessControlProfile sacp0_;
+    SecureAccessControlProfile sacp1_;
+    SecureAccessControlProfile sacp2_;
+    SecureAccessControlProfile sacp3_;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> encContentAccessibleByA_;
+    vector<uint8_t> encContentAccessibleByAorB_;
+    vector<uint8_t> encContentAccessibleByB_;
+    vector<uint8_t> encContentAccessibleByC_;
+    vector<uint8_t> encContentAccessibleByAll_;
+    vector<uint8_t> encContentAccessibleByNone_;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> credentialData_;
+
+    // Set by retrieveData()
+    bool canGetAccessibleByA_;
+    bool canGetAccessibleByAorB_;
+    bool canGetAccessibleByB_;
+    bool canGetAccessibleByC_;
+    bool canGetAccessibleByAll_;
+    bool canGetAccessibleByNone_;
+
+    sp<IIdentityCredentialStore> credentialStore_;
+};
+
+pair<vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderKey() {
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> keyPKCS8 = support::createEcKeyPair();
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> publicKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(keyPKCS8.value());
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> privateKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(keyPKCS8.value());
+    return make_pair(publicKey.value(), privateKey.value());
+}
+
+vector<uint8_t> generateReaderCert(const vector<uint8_t>& publicKey,
+                                   const vector<uint8_t>& signingKey) {
+    time_t validityNotBefore = 0;
+    time_t validityNotAfter = 0xffffffff;
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> cert =
+            support::ecPublicKeyGenerateCertificate(publicKey, signingKey, "24601", "Issuer",
+                                                    "Subject", validityNotBefore, validityNotAfter);
+    return cert.value();
+}
+
+void ReaderAuthTests::provisionData() {
+    // Keys and certificates for intermediates.
+    tie(intermediateAPublicKey_, intermediateAPrivateKey_) = generateReaderKey();
+    tie(intermediateBPublicKey_, intermediateBPrivateKey_) = generateReaderKey();
+    tie(intermediateCPublicKey_, intermediateCPrivateKey_) = generateReaderKey();
+
+    cert_A_SelfSigned_ = generateReaderCert(intermediateAPublicKey_, intermediateAPrivateKey_);
+
+    cert_B_SelfSigned_ = generateReaderCert(intermediateBPublicKey_, intermediateBPrivateKey_);
+
+    cert_B_SignedBy_C_ = generateReaderCert(intermediateBPublicKey_, intermediateCPrivateKey_);
+
+    cert_C_SelfSigned_ = generateReaderCert(intermediateCPublicKey_, intermediateCPrivateKey_);
+
+    // Key and self-signed certificate reader
+    tie(readerPublicKey_, readerPrivateKey_) = generateReaderKey();
+    cert_reader_SelfSigned_ = generateReaderCert(readerPublicKey_, readerPrivateKey_);
+
+    // Certificate for reader signed by intermediates
+    cert_reader_SignedBy_A_ = generateReaderCert(readerPublicKey_, intermediateAPrivateKey_);
+    cert_reader_SignedBy_B_ = generateReaderCert(readerPublicKey_, intermediateBPrivateKey_);
+
+    string docType = "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl";
+    bool testCredential = true;
+    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> wc;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->createCredential(docType, testCredential, &wc).isOk());
+
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId = {};
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge = {1};
+    vector<Certificate> certChain;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->getAttestationCertificate(attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge,
+                                              &certChain)
+                        .isOk());
+
+    size_t proofOfProvisioningSize =
+            465 + cert_A_SelfSigned_.size() + cert_B_SelfSigned_.size() + cert_C_SelfSigned_.size();
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(proofOfProvisioningSize).isOk());
+
+    // Not in v1 HAL, may fail
+    wc->startPersonalization(4 /* numAccessControlProfiles */,
+                             {6} /* numDataElementsPerNamespace */);
+
+    // AIDL expects certificates wrapped in the Certificate type...
+    Certificate cert_A;
+    Certificate cert_B;
+    Certificate cert_C;
+    cert_A.encodedCertificate = cert_A_SelfSigned_;
+    cert_B.encodedCertificate = cert_B_SelfSigned_;
+    cert_C.encodedCertificate = cert_C_SelfSigned_;
+
+    // Access control profile 0: accessible by A
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addAccessControlProfile(0, cert_A, false, 0, 0, &sacp0_).isOk());
+
+    // Access control profile 1: accessible by B
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addAccessControlProfile(1, cert_B, false, 0, 0, &sacp1_).isOk());
+
+    // Access control profile 2: accessible by C
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addAccessControlProfile(2, cert_C, false, 0, 0, &sacp2_).isOk());
+
+    // Access control profile 3: open access
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addAccessControlProfile(3, {}, false, 0, 0, &sacp3_).isOk());
+
+    // Data Element: "Accessible by A"
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({0}, "ns", "Accessible by A", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encContentAccessibleByA_).isOk());
+
+    // Data Element: "Accessible by A or B"
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({0, 1}, "ns", "Accessible by A or B", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encContentAccessibleByAorB_).isOk());
+
+    // Data Element: "Accessible by B"
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({1}, "ns", "Accessible by B", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encContentAccessibleByB_).isOk());
+
+    // Data Element: "Accessible by C"
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({2}, "ns", "Accessible by C", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encContentAccessibleByC_).isOk());
+
+    // Data Element: "Accessible by All"
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({3}, "ns", "Accessible by All", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encContentAccessibleByAll_).isOk());
+
+    // Data Element: "Accessible by None"
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({}, "ns", "Accessible by None", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encContentAccessibleByNone_).isOk());
+
+    vector<uint8_t> proofOfProvisioningSignature;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->finishAddingEntries(&credentialData_, &proofOfProvisioningSignature).isOk());
+}
+
+RequestDataItem buildRequestDataItem(const string& name, size_t size,
+                                     vector<int32_t> accessControlProfileIds) {
+    RequestDataItem item;
+    item.name = name;
+    item.size = size;
+    item.accessControlProfileIds = accessControlProfileIds;
+    return item;
+}
+
+void ReaderAuthTests::retrieveData(const vector<uint8_t>& readerPrivateKey,
+                                   const vector<vector<uint8_t>>& readerCertChain,
+                                   bool expectSuccess,
+                                   bool leaveOutAccessibleToAllFromRequestMessage) {
+    canGetAccessibleByA_ = false;
+    canGetAccessibleByAorB_ = false;
+    canGetAccessibleByB_ = false;
+    canGetAccessibleByC_ = false;
+    canGetAccessibleByAll_ = false;
+    canGetAccessibleByNone_ = false;
+
+    sp<IIdentityCredential> c;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_
+                        ->getCredential(
+                                CipherSuite::CIPHERSUITE_ECDHE_HKDF_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256,
+                                credentialData_, &c)
+                        .isOk());
+
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerEKeyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerEPublicKey =
+            support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(readerEKeyPair.value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(c->setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(readerEPublicKey.value()).isOk());
+
+    vector<uint8_t> eKeyPair;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(c->createEphemeralKeyPair(&eKeyPair).isOk());
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> ePublicKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(eKeyPair);
+
+    // Calculate requestData field and sign it with the reader key.
+    auto [getXYSuccess, ephX, ephY] = support::ecPublicKeyGetXandY(ePublicKey.value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(getXYSuccess);
+    cppbor::Map deviceEngagement = cppbor::Map().add("ephX", ephX).add("ephY", ephY);
+    vector<uint8_t> deviceEngagementBytes = deviceEngagement.encode();
+    vector<uint8_t> eReaderPubBytes = cppbor::Tstr("ignored").encode();
+    cppbor::Array sessionTranscript = cppbor::Array()
+                                              .add(cppbor::Semantic(24, deviceEngagementBytes))
+                                              .add(cppbor::Semantic(24, eReaderPubBytes));
+    vector<uint8_t> sessionTranscriptBytes = sessionTranscript.encode();
+
+    vector<uint8_t> itemsRequestBytes;
+    if (leaveOutAccessibleToAllFromRequestMessage) {
+        itemsRequestBytes =
+                cppbor::Map("nameSpaces",
+                            cppbor::Map().add("ns", cppbor::Map()
+                                                            .add("Accessible by A", false)
+                                                            .add("Accessible by A or B", false)
+                                                            .add("Accessible by B", false)
+                                                            .add("Accessible by C", false)
+                                                            .add("Accessible by None", false)))
+                        .encode();
+    } else {
+        itemsRequestBytes =
+                cppbor::Map("nameSpaces",
+                            cppbor::Map().add("ns", cppbor::Map()
+                                                            .add("Accessible by A", false)
+                                                            .add("Accessible by A or B", false)
+                                                            .add("Accessible by B", false)
+                                                            .add("Accessible by C", false)
+                                                            .add("Accessible by All", false)
+                                                            .add("Accessible by None", false)))
+                        .encode();
+    }
+    vector<uint8_t> dataToSign = cppbor::Array()
+                                         .add("ReaderAuthentication")
+                                         .add(sessionTranscript.clone())
+                                         .add(cppbor::Semantic(24, itemsRequestBytes))
+                                         .encode();
+
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerSignature =
+            support::coseSignEcDsa(readerPrivateKey,  // private key for reader
+                                   {},                // content
+                                   dataToSign,        // detached content
+                                   support::certificateChainJoin(readerCertChain));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(readerSignature);
+
+    // Generate the key that will be used to sign AuthenticatedData.
+    vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob;
+    Certificate signingKeyCertificate;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(c->generateSigningKeyPair(&signingKeyBlob, &signingKeyCertificate).isOk());
+
+    RequestNamespace rns;
+    rns.namespaceName = "ns";
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by A", 1, {0}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by A or B", 1, {0, 1}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by B", 1, {1}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by C", 1, {2}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by All", 1, {3}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by None", 1, {}));
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    c->setRequestedNamespaces({rns}).isOk();
+
+    // It doesn't matter since no user auth is needed in this particular test,
+    // but for good measure, clear out the tokens we pass to the HAL.
+    HardwareAuthToken authToken;
+    VerificationToken verificationToken;
+    authToken.challenge = 0;
+    authToken.userId = 0;
+    authToken.authenticatorId = 0;
+    authToken.authenticatorType = ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType::NONE;
+    authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+    authToken.mac.clear();
+    verificationToken.challenge = 0;
+    verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+    verificationToken.securityLevel = ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
+    verificationToken.mac.clear();
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    c->setVerificationToken(verificationToken);
+
+    Status status = c->startRetrieval(
+            {sacp0_, sacp1_, sacp2_, sacp3_}, authToken, itemsRequestBytes, signingKeyBlob,
+            sessionTranscriptBytes, readerSignature.value(), {6 /* numDataElementsPerNamespace */});
+    if (expectSuccess) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+    } else {
+        ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+        return;
+    }
+
+    vector<uint8_t> decrypted;
+
+    status = c->startRetrieveEntryValue("ns", "Accessible by A", 1, {0});
+    if (status.isOk()) {
+        canGetAccessibleByA_ = true;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(c->retrieveEntryValue(encContentAccessibleByA_, &decrypted).isOk());
+    }
+
+    status = c->startRetrieveEntryValue("ns", "Accessible by A or B", 1, {0, 1});
+    if (status.isOk()) {
+        canGetAccessibleByAorB_ = true;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(c->retrieveEntryValue(encContentAccessibleByAorB_, &decrypted).isOk());
+    }
+
+    status = c->startRetrieveEntryValue("ns", "Accessible by B", 1, {1});
+    if (status.isOk()) {
+        canGetAccessibleByB_ = true;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(c->retrieveEntryValue(encContentAccessibleByB_, &decrypted).isOk());
+    }
+
+    status = c->startRetrieveEntryValue("ns", "Accessible by C", 1, {2});
+    if (status.isOk()) {
+        canGetAccessibleByC_ = true;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(c->retrieveEntryValue(encContentAccessibleByC_, &decrypted).isOk());
+    }
+
+    status = c->startRetrieveEntryValue("ns", "Accessible by All", 1, {3});
+    if (status.isOk()) {
+        canGetAccessibleByAll_ = true;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(c->retrieveEntryValue(encContentAccessibleByAll_, &decrypted).isOk());
+    }
+
+    status = c->startRetrieveEntryValue("ns", "Accessible by None", 1, {});
+    if (status.isOk()) {
+        canGetAccessibleByNone_ = true;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(c->retrieveEntryValue(encContentAccessibleByNone_, &decrypted).isOk());
+    }
+
+    vector<uint8_t> mac;
+    vector<uint8_t> deviceNameSpaces;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(c->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpaces).isOk());
+}
+
+TEST_P(ReaderAuthTests, presentingChain_Reader) {
+    provisionData();
+    retrieveData(readerPrivateKey_, {cert_reader_SelfSigned_}, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 false /* leaveOutAccessibleToAllFromRequestMessage */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByA_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByAorB_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByB_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByC_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+TEST_P(ReaderAuthTests, presentingChain_Reader_A) {
+    provisionData();
+    retrieveData(readerPrivateKey_, {cert_reader_SignedBy_A_, cert_A_SelfSigned_},
+                 true /* expectSuccess */, false /* leaveOutAccessibleToAllFromRequestMessage */);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByA_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAorB_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByB_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByC_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+TEST_P(ReaderAuthTests, presentingChain_Reader_B) {
+    provisionData();
+    retrieveData(readerPrivateKey_, {cert_reader_SignedBy_B_, cert_B_SelfSigned_},
+                 true /* expectSuccess */, false /* leaveOutAccessibleToAllFromRequestMessage */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByA_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAorB_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByB_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByC_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+// This test proves that for the purpose of determining inclusion of an ACP certificate
+// in a presented reader chain, certificate equality is done by comparing public keys,
+// not bitwise comparison of the certificates.
+//
+// Specifically for this test, the ACP is configured with cert_B_SelfSigned_ and the
+// reader is presenting cert_B_SignedBy_C_. Both certificates have the same public
+// key - intermediateBPublicKey_ - but they are signed by different keys.
+//
+TEST_P(ReaderAuthTests, presentingChain_Reader_B_C) {
+    provisionData();
+    retrieveData(readerPrivateKey_,
+                 {cert_reader_SignedBy_B_, cert_B_SignedBy_C_, cert_C_SelfSigned_},
+                 true /* expectSuccess */, false /* leaveOutAccessibleToAllFromRequestMessage */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByA_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAorB_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByB_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByC_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+// This test presents a reader chain where the chain is invalid because
+// the 2nd certificate in the chain isn't signed by the 3rd one.
+//
+TEST_P(ReaderAuthTests, presentingInvalidChain) {
+    provisionData();
+    retrieveData(readerPrivateKey_,
+                 {cert_reader_SignedBy_B_, cert_B_SelfSigned_, cert_C_SelfSigned_},
+                 false /* expectSuccess */, false /* leaveOutAccessibleToAllFromRequestMessage */);
+}
+
+// This tests presents a valid reader chain but where requestMessage isn't
+// signed by the private key corresponding to the public key in the top-level
+// certificate.
+//
+TEST_P(ReaderAuthTests, presentingMessageSignedNotByTopLevel) {
+    provisionData();
+    retrieveData(intermediateBPrivateKey_,
+                 {cert_reader_SignedBy_B_, cert_B_SignedBy_C_, cert_C_SelfSigned_},
+                 false /* expectSuccess */, false /* leaveOutAccessibleToAllFromRequestMessage */);
+}
+
+// This test leaves out "Accessible by All" data element from the signed request
+// message (the CBOR from the reader) while still including this data element at
+// the API level. The call on the API level for said element will fail with
+// STATUS_NOT_IN_REQUEST_MESSAGE but this doesn't prevent the other elements
+// from being returned (if authorized, of course).
+//
+// This test verifies that.
+//
+TEST_P(ReaderAuthTests, limitedMessage) {
+    provisionData();
+    retrieveData(readerPrivateKey_, {cert_reader_SelfSigned_}, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* leaveOutAccessibleToAllFromRequestMessage */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByA_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByAorB_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByB_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByC_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+TEST_P(ReaderAuthTests, ephemeralKeyNotInSessionTranscript) {
+    provisionData();
+
+    sp<IIdentityCredential> c;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_
+                        ->getCredential(
+                                CipherSuite::CIPHERSUITE_ECDHE_HKDF_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256,
+                                credentialData_, &c)
+                        .isOk());
+
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerEKeyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerEPublicKey =
+            support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(readerEKeyPair.value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(c->setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(readerEPublicKey.value()).isOk());
+
+    vector<uint8_t> eKeyPair;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(c->createEphemeralKeyPair(&eKeyPair).isOk());
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> ePublicKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(eKeyPair);
+
+    // Calculate requestData field and sign it with the reader key.
+    auto [getXYSuccess, ephX, ephY] = support::ecPublicKeyGetXandY(ePublicKey.value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(getXYSuccess);
+    // Instead of include the X and Y coordinates (|ephX| and |ephY|), add NUL bytes instead.
+    vector<uint8_t> nulls(32);
+    cppbor::Map deviceEngagement = cppbor::Map().add("ephX", nulls).add("ephY", nulls);
+    vector<uint8_t> deviceEngagementBytes = deviceEngagement.encode();
+    vector<uint8_t> eReaderPubBytes = cppbor::Tstr("ignored").encode();
+    cppbor::Array sessionTranscript = cppbor::Array()
+                                              .add(cppbor::Semantic(24, deviceEngagementBytes))
+                                              .add(cppbor::Semantic(24, eReaderPubBytes));
+    vector<uint8_t> sessionTranscriptBytes = sessionTranscript.encode();
+
+    vector<uint8_t> itemsRequestBytes;
+    itemsRequestBytes =
+            cppbor::Map("nameSpaces",
+                        cppbor::Map().add("ns", cppbor::Map()
+                                                        .add("Accessible by A", false)
+                                                        .add("Accessible by A or B", false)
+                                                        .add("Accessible by B", false)
+                                                        .add("Accessible by C", false)
+                                                        .add("Accessible by None", false)))
+                    .encode();
+    vector<uint8_t> dataToSign = cppbor::Array()
+                                         .add("ReaderAuthentication")
+                                         .add(sessionTranscript.clone())
+                                         .add(cppbor::Semantic(24, itemsRequestBytes))
+                                         .encode();
+
+    vector<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertChain = {cert_reader_SelfSigned_};
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerSignature =
+            support::coseSignEcDsa(readerPrivateKey_,  // private key for reader
+                                   {},                 // content
+                                   dataToSign,         // detached content
+                                   support::certificateChainJoin(readerCertChain));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(readerSignature);
+
+    // Generate the key that will be used to sign AuthenticatedData.
+    vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob;
+    Certificate signingKeyCertificate;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(c->generateSigningKeyPair(&signingKeyBlob, &signingKeyCertificate).isOk());
+
+    RequestNamespace rns;
+    rns.namespaceName = "ns";
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by A", 1, {0}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by A or B", 1, {0, 1}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by B", 1, {1}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by C", 1, {2}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by All", 1, {3}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by None", 1, {}));
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    c->setRequestedNamespaces({rns}).isOk();
+
+    // It doesn't matter since no user auth is needed in this particular test,
+    // but for good measure, clear out the tokens we pass to the HAL.
+    HardwareAuthToken authToken;
+    VerificationToken verificationToken;
+    authToken.challenge = 0;
+    authToken.userId = 0;
+    authToken.authenticatorId = 0;
+    authToken.authenticatorType = ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType::NONE;
+    authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+    authToken.mac.clear();
+    verificationToken.challenge = 0;
+    verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+    verificationToken.securityLevel =
+            ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT;
+    verificationToken.mac.clear();
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    c->setVerificationToken(verificationToken);
+
+    // Finally check that STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND is returned.
+    // This proves that the TA checked for X and Y coordinatets and didn't find
+    // them.
+    Status status = c->startRetrieval(
+            {sacp0_, sacp1_, sacp2_, sacp3_}, authToken, itemsRequestBytes, signingKeyBlob,
+            sessionTranscriptBytes, readerSignature.value(), {6 /* numDataElementsPerNamespace */});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+    ASSERT_EQ(binder::Status::EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, status.exceptionCode());
+    ASSERT_EQ(IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND,
+              status.serviceSpecificErrorCode());
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
+        Identity, ReaderAuthTests,
+        testing::ValuesIn(android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IIdentityCredentialStore::descriptor)),
+        android::PrintInstanceNameToString);
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::identity
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/UserAuthTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/UserAuthTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b4c8f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/UserAuthTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "UserAuthTests"
+
+#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
+#include <aidl/Vintf.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.h>
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
+#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
+#include <binder/ProcessState.h>
+#include <cppbor.h>
+#include <cppbor_parse.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <future>
+#include <map>
+#include <utility>
+
+#include "VtsIdentityTestUtils.h"
+
+namespace android::hardware::identity {
+
+using std::endl;
+using std::make_pair;
+using std::map;
+using std::optional;
+using std::pair;
+using std::string;
+using std::tie;
+using std::vector;
+
+using ::android::sp;
+using ::android::String16;
+using ::android::binder::Status;
+
+using ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthToken;
+using ::android::hardware::keymaster::VerificationToken;
+
+class UserAuthTests : public testing::TestWithParam<string> {
+  public:
+    virtual void SetUp() override {
+        credentialStore_ = android::waitForDeclaredService<IIdentityCredentialStore>(
+                String16(GetParam().c_str()));
+        ASSERT_NE(credentialStore_, nullptr);
+    }
+
+    void provisionData();
+    void setupRetrieveData();
+    pair<HardwareAuthToken, VerificationToken> mintTokens(uint64_t challengeForAuthToken,
+                                                          int64_t ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds);
+    void retrieveData(HardwareAuthToken authToken, VerificationToken verificationToken,
+                      bool expectSuccess, bool useSessionTranscript);
+
+    // Set by provisionData
+    SecureAccessControlProfile sacp0_;
+    SecureAccessControlProfile sacp1_;
+    SecureAccessControlProfile sacp2_;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> encContentUserAuthPerSession_;
+    vector<uint8_t> encContentUserAuthTimeout_;
+    vector<uint8_t> encContentAccessibleByAll_;
+    vector<uint8_t> encContentAccessibleByNone_;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> credentialData_;
+
+    // Set by setupRetrieveData().
+    int64_t authChallenge_;
+    cppbor::Map sessionTranscript_;
+    sp<IIdentityCredential> credential_;
+
+    // Set by retrieveData()
+    bool canGetUserAuthPerSession_;
+    bool canGetUserAuthTimeout_;
+    bool canGetAccessibleByAll_;
+    bool canGetAccessibleByNone_;
+
+    sp<IIdentityCredentialStore> credentialStore_;
+};
+
+void UserAuthTests::provisionData() {
+    string docType = "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl";
+    bool testCredential = true;
+    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> wc;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->createCredential(docType, testCredential, &wc).isOk());
+
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId = {};
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge = {1};
+    vector<Certificate> certChain;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->getAttestationCertificate(attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge,
+                                              &certChain)
+                        .isOk());
+
+    size_t proofOfProvisioningSize = 381;
+    // Not in v1 HAL, may fail
+    wc->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(proofOfProvisioningSize);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->startPersonalization(3 /* numAccessControlProfiles */,
+                                         {4} /* numDataElementsPerNamespace */)
+                        .isOk());
+
+    // Access control profile 0: user auth every session (timeout = 0)
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addAccessControlProfile(0, {}, true, 0, 65 /* secureUserId */, &sacp0_).isOk());
+
+    // Access control profile 1: user auth, 60 seconds timeout
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+            wc->addAccessControlProfile(1, {}, true, 60000, 65 /* secureUserId */, &sacp1_).isOk());
+
+    // Access control profile 2: open access
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addAccessControlProfile(2, {}, false, 0, 0, &sacp2_).isOk());
+
+    // Data Element: "UserAuth Per Session"
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({0}, "ns", "UserAuth Per Session", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encContentUserAuthPerSession_).isOk());
+
+    // Data Element: "UserAuth Timeout"
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({1}, "ns", "UserAuth Timeout", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encContentUserAuthTimeout_).isOk());
+
+    // Data Element: "Accessible by All"
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({2}, "ns", "Accessible by All", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encContentAccessibleByAll_).isOk());
+
+    // Data Element: "Accessible by None"
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({}, "ns", "Accessible by None", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encContentAccessibleByNone_).isOk());
+
+    vector<uint8_t> proofOfProvisioningSignature;
+    Status status = wc->finishAddingEntries(&credentialData_, &proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.exceptionCode() << ": " << status.exceptionMessage();
+}
+
+// From ReaderAuthTest.cpp - TODO: consolidate with VtsIdentityTestUtils.h
+pair<vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderKey();
+vector<uint8_t> generateReaderCert(const vector<uint8_t>& publicKey,
+                                   const vector<uint8_t>& signingKey);
+RequestDataItem buildRequestDataItem(const string& name, size_t size,
+                                     vector<int32_t> accessControlProfileIds);
+
+cppbor::Map calcSessionTranscript(const vector<uint8_t>& ePublicKey) {
+    auto [getXYSuccess, ephX, ephY] = support::ecPublicKeyGetXandY(ePublicKey);
+    cppbor::Map deviceEngagement = cppbor::Map().add("ephX", ephX).add("ephY", ephY);
+    vector<uint8_t> deviceEngagementBytes = deviceEngagement.encode();
+    vector<uint8_t> eReaderPubBytes = cppbor::Tstr("ignored").encode();
+    // Let SessionTranscript be a map here (it's an array in EndToEndTest) just
+    // to check that the implementation can deal with either.
+    cppbor::Map sessionTranscript;
+    sessionTranscript.add(42, cppbor::Semantic(24, deviceEngagementBytes));
+    sessionTranscript.add(43, cppbor::Semantic(24, eReaderPubBytes));
+    return sessionTranscript;
+}
+
+void UserAuthTests::setupRetrieveData() {
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_
+                        ->getCredential(
+                                CipherSuite::CIPHERSUITE_ECDHE_HKDF_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256,
+                                credentialData_, &credential_)
+                        .isOk());
+
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerEKeyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerEPublicKey =
+            support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(readerEKeyPair.value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credential_->setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(readerEPublicKey.value()).isOk());
+
+    vector<uint8_t> eKeyPair;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credential_->createEphemeralKeyPair(&eKeyPair).isOk());
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> ePublicKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(eKeyPair);
+    sessionTranscript_ = calcSessionTranscript(ePublicKey.value());
+
+    Status status = credential_->createAuthChallenge(&authChallenge_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.exceptionCode() << ": " << status.exceptionMessage();
+}
+
+void UserAuthTests::retrieveData(HardwareAuthToken authToken, VerificationToken verificationToken,
+                                 bool expectSuccess, bool useSessionTranscript) {
+    canGetUserAuthPerSession_ = false;
+    canGetUserAuthTimeout_ = false;
+    canGetAccessibleByAll_ = false;
+    canGetAccessibleByNone_ = false;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> itemsRequestBytes;
+    vector<uint8_t> sessionTranscriptBytes;
+    if (useSessionTranscript) {
+        sessionTranscriptBytes = sessionTranscript_.encode();
+
+        itemsRequestBytes =
+                cppbor::Map("nameSpaces",
+                            cppbor::Map().add("ns", cppbor::Map()
+                                                            .add("UserAuth Per Session", false)
+                                                            .add("UserAuth Timeout", false)
+                                                            .add("Accessible by All", false)
+                                                            .add("Accessible by None", false)))
+                        .encode();
+        vector<uint8_t> dataToSign = cppbor::Array()
+                                             .add("ReaderAuthentication")
+                                             .add(sessionTranscript_.clone())
+                                             .add(cppbor::Semantic(24, itemsRequestBytes))
+                                             .encode();
+    }
+
+    // Generate the key that will be used to sign AuthenticatedData.
+    vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob;
+    Certificate signingKeyCertificate;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+            credential_->generateSigningKeyPair(&signingKeyBlob, &signingKeyCertificate).isOk());
+
+    RequestNamespace rns;
+    rns.namespaceName = "ns";
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("UserAuth Per Session", 1, {0}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("UserAuth Timeout", 1, {1}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by All", 1, {2}));
+    rns.items.push_back(buildRequestDataItem("Accessible by None", 1, {}));
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    credential_->setRequestedNamespaces({rns}).isOk();
+
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    credential_->setVerificationToken(verificationToken);
+
+    Status status = credential_->startRetrieval({sacp0_, sacp1_, sacp2_}, authToken,
+                                                itemsRequestBytes, signingKeyBlob,
+                                                sessionTranscriptBytes, {} /* readerSignature */,
+                                                {4 /* numDataElementsPerNamespace */});
+    if (expectSuccess) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+    } else {
+        ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+        return;
+    }
+
+    vector<uint8_t> decrypted;
+
+    status = credential_->startRetrieveEntryValue("ns", "UserAuth Per Session", 1, {0});
+    if (status.isOk()) {
+        canGetUserAuthPerSession_ = true;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(
+                credential_->retrieveEntryValue(encContentUserAuthPerSession_, &decrypted).isOk());
+    }
+
+    status = credential_->startRetrieveEntryValue("ns", "UserAuth Timeout", 1, {1});
+    if (status.isOk()) {
+        canGetUserAuthTimeout_ = true;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(credential_->retrieveEntryValue(encContentUserAuthTimeout_, &decrypted).isOk());
+    }
+
+    status = credential_->startRetrieveEntryValue("ns", "Accessible by All", 1, {2});
+    if (status.isOk()) {
+        canGetAccessibleByAll_ = true;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(credential_->retrieveEntryValue(encContentAccessibleByAll_, &decrypted).isOk());
+    }
+
+    status = credential_->startRetrieveEntryValue("ns", "Accessible by None", 1, {});
+    if (status.isOk()) {
+        canGetAccessibleByNone_ = true;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(
+                credential_->retrieveEntryValue(encContentAccessibleByNone_, &decrypted).isOk());
+    }
+
+    vector<uint8_t> mac;
+    vector<uint8_t> deviceNameSpaces;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credential_->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpaces).isOk());
+}
+
+pair<HardwareAuthToken, VerificationToken> UserAuthTests::mintTokens(
+        uint64_t challengeForAuthToken, int64_t ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds) {
+    HardwareAuthToken authToken;
+    VerificationToken verificationToken;
+
+    uint64_t epochMilliseconds = 1000ULL * 1000ULL * 1000ULL * 1000ULL;
+
+    authToken.challenge = challengeForAuthToken;
+    authToken.userId = 65;
+    authToken.authenticatorId = 0;
+    authToken.authenticatorType = ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType::NONE;
+    authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = epochMilliseconds - ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds;
+    authToken.mac.clear();
+    verificationToken.challenge = authChallenge_;
+    verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = epochMilliseconds;
+    verificationToken.securityLevel =
+            ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT;
+    verificationToken.mac.clear();
+    return make_pair(authToken, verificationToken);
+}
+
+TEST_P(UserAuthTests, GoodChallenge) {
+    provisionData();
+    setupRetrieveData();
+    auto [authToken, verificationToken] = mintTokens(authChallenge_,  // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                     0);              // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* useSessionTranscript */);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetUserAuthPerSession_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetUserAuthTimeout_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+TEST_P(UserAuthTests, OtherChallenge) {
+    provisionData();
+    setupRetrieveData();
+    uint64_t otherChallenge = authChallenge_ ^ 0x12345678;
+    auto [authToken, verificationToken] = mintTokens(otherChallenge,  // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                     0);              // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* useSessionTranscript */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthPerSession_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetUserAuthTimeout_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+TEST_P(UserAuthTests, NoChallenge) {
+    provisionData();
+    setupRetrieveData();
+    auto [authToken, verificationToken] = mintTokens(0,   // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                     0);  // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* useSessionTranscript */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthPerSession_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetUserAuthTimeout_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+TEST_P(UserAuthTests, AuthTokenAgeZero) {
+    provisionData();
+    setupRetrieveData();
+    auto [authToken, verificationToken] = mintTokens(0,   // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                     0);  // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* useSessionTranscript */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthPerSession_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetUserAuthTimeout_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+TEST_P(UserAuthTests, AuthTokenFromTheFuture) {
+    provisionData();
+    setupRetrieveData();
+    auto [authToken, verificationToken] = mintTokens(0,           // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                     -1 * 1000);  // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* useSessionTranscript */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthPerSession_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthTimeout_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+TEST_P(UserAuthTests, AuthTokenInsideTimeout) {
+    provisionData();
+    setupRetrieveData();
+    auto [authToken, verificationToken] = mintTokens(0,           // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                     30 * 1000);  // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* useSessionTranscript */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthPerSession_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetUserAuthTimeout_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+TEST_P(UserAuthTests, AuthTokenOutsideTimeout) {
+    provisionData();
+    setupRetrieveData();
+    auto [authToken, verificationToken] = mintTokens(0,           // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                     61 * 1000);  // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* useSessionTranscript */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthPerSession_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthTimeout_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+// The API works even when there's no SessionTranscript / itemsRequest.
+// Verify that.
+TEST_P(UserAuthTests, NoSessionTranscript) {
+    provisionData();
+    setupRetrieveData();
+    auto [authToken, verificationToken] = mintTokens(0,          // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                     1 * 1000);  // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 false /* useSessionTranscript */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthPerSession_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetUserAuthTimeout_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+// This test verifies that it's possible to do multiple requests as long
+// as the sessionTranscript doesn't change.
+//
+TEST_P(UserAuthTests, MultipleRequestsSameSessionTranscript) {
+    provisionData();
+    setupRetrieveData();
+
+    // First we try with a stale authToken
+    //
+    auto [authToken, verificationToken] = mintTokens(0,           // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                     61 * 1000);  // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* useSessionTranscript */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthPerSession_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthTimeout_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+
+    // Then we get a new authToken and try again.
+    tie(authToken, verificationToken) = mintTokens(0,          // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                   5 * 1000);  // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* useSessionTranscript */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthPerSession_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetUserAuthTimeout_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+}
+
+// Like MultipleRequestsSameSessionTranscript but we change the sessionTranscript
+// between the two calls. This test verifies that change is detected and the
+// second request fails.
+//
+TEST_P(UserAuthTests, MultipleRequestsSessionTranscriptChanges) {
+    provisionData();
+    setupRetrieveData();
+
+    // First we try with a stale authToken
+    //
+    auto [authToken, verificationToken] = mintTokens(0,           // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                     61 * 1000);  // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, true /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* useSessionTranscript */);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthPerSession_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetUserAuthTimeout_);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(canGetAccessibleByAll_);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(canGetAccessibleByNone_);
+
+    // Then we get a new authToken and try again.
+    tie(authToken, verificationToken) = mintTokens(0,          // challengeForAuthToken
+                                                   5 * 1000);  // ageOfAuthTokenMilliSeconds
+
+    // Change sessionTranscript...
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> eKeyPairNew = support::createEcKeyPair();
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> ePublicKeyNew = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(eKeyPairNew.value());
+    sessionTranscript_ = calcSessionTranscript(ePublicKeyNew.value());
+
+    // ... and expect failure.
+    retrieveData(authToken, verificationToken, false /* expectSuccess */,
+                 true /* useSessionTranscript */);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
+        Identity, UserAuthTests,
+        testing::ValuesIn(android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IIdentityCredentialStore::descriptor)),
+        android::PrintInstanceNameToString);
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::identity
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71fe733
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019, The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "VtsAttestationParserSupport.h"
+
+#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
+#include <map>
+
+namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils {
+
+using std::endl;
+using std::map;
+using std::optional;
+using std::string;
+using std::vector;
+
+using ::android::sp;
+using ::android::String16;
+using ::android::binder::Status;
+
+using ::keymaster::ASN1_OBJECT_Ptr;
+using ::keymaster::AuthorizationSet;
+using ::keymaster::EVP_PKEY_Ptr;
+using ::keymaster::kAttestionRecordOid;
+using ::keymaster::TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID;
+using ::keymaster::TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY;
+using ::keymaster::TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID;
+using ::keymaster::TypedTag;
+using ::keymaster::X509_Ptr;
+
+using support::certificateChainSplit;
+
+optional<keymaster_cert_chain_t> AttestationCertificateParser::certificateChainToKeymasterChain(
+        const vector<Certificate>& certificates) {
+    if (certificates.size() <= 0) {
+        return {};
+    }
+
+    keymaster_cert_chain_t kCert;
+    kCert.entry_count = certificates.size();
+    kCert.entries = (keymaster_blob_t*)malloc(sizeof(keymaster_blob_t) * kCert.entry_count);
+
+    int index = 0;
+    for (const auto& c : certificates) {
+        kCert.entries[index].data_length = c.encodedCertificate.size();
+        uint8_t* data = (uint8_t*)malloc(c.encodedCertificate.size());
+
+        memcpy(data, c.encodedCertificate.data(), c.encodedCertificate.size());
+        kCert.entries[index].data = (const uint8_t*)data;
+        index++;
+    }
+
+    return kCert;
+}
+
+bool AttestationCertificateParser::parse() {
+    optional<keymaster_cert_chain_t> cert_chain = certificateChainToKeymasterChain(origCertChain_);
+    if (!cert_chain) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if (cert_chain.value().entry_count < 3) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if (!verifyChain(cert_chain.value())) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if (!verifyAttestationRecord(cert_chain.value().entries[0])) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    keymaster_free_cert_chain(&cert_chain.value());
+    return true;
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING* AttestationCertificateParser::getAttestationRecord(X509* certificate) {
+    ASN1_OBJECT_Ptr oid(OBJ_txt2obj(kAttestionRecordOid, 1));
+    if (!oid.get()) return nullptr;
+
+    int location = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(certificate, oid.get(), -1);
+    if (location == -1) return nullptr;
+
+    X509_EXTENSION* attest_rec_ext = X509_get_ext(certificate, location);
+    if (!attest_rec_ext) return nullptr;
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(attest_rec_ext);
+    return attest_rec;
+}
+
+X509* AttestationCertificateParser::parseCertBlob(const keymaster_blob_t& blob) {
+    const uint8_t* p = blob.data;
+    return d2i_X509(nullptr, &p, blob.data_length);
+}
+
+bool AttestationCertificateParser::verifyAttestationRecord(
+        const keymaster_blob_t& attestation_cert) {
+    X509_Ptr cert(parseCertBlob(attestation_cert));
+    if (!cert.get()) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = getAttestationRecord(cert.get());
+    if (!attest_rec) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    keymaster_blob_t att_unique_id = {};
+    keymaster_blob_t att_challenge;
+    keymaster_error_t ret = parse_attestation_record(
+            attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &att_attestation_version_,
+            &att_attestation_security_level_, &att_keymaster_version_,
+            &att_keymaster_security_level_, &att_challenge, &att_sw_enforced_, &att_hw_enforced_,
+            &att_unique_id);
+    if (ret) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    att_challenge_.assign(att_challenge.data, att_challenge.data + att_challenge.data_length);
+    return true;
+}
+
+uint32_t AttestationCertificateParser::getKeymasterVersion() {
+    return att_keymaster_version_;
+}
+
+uint32_t AttestationCertificateParser::getAttestationVersion() {
+    return att_attestation_version_;
+}
+
+vector<uint8_t> AttestationCertificateParser::getAttestationChallenge() {
+    return att_challenge_;
+}
+
+keymaster_security_level_t AttestationCertificateParser::getKeymasterSecurityLevel() {
+    return att_keymaster_security_level_;
+}
+
+keymaster_security_level_t AttestationCertificateParser::getAttestationSecurityLevel() {
+    return att_attestation_security_level_;
+}
+
+// Verify the Attestation certificates are correctly chained.
+bool AttestationCertificateParser::verifyChain(const keymaster_cert_chain_t& chain) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < chain.entry_count - 1; ++i) {
+        keymaster_blob_t& key_cert_blob = chain.entries[i];
+        keymaster_blob_t& signing_cert_blob = chain.entries[i + 1];
+
+        X509_Ptr key_cert(parseCertBlob(key_cert_blob));
+        X509_Ptr signing_cert(parseCertBlob(signing_cert_blob));
+        if (!key_cert.get() || !signing_cert.get()) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
+        if (!signing_pubkey.get()) return false;
+
+        if (X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get()) != 1) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        if (i + 1 == chain.entry_count - 1) {
+            // Last entry is self-signed.
+            if (X509_verify(signing_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get()) != 1) {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    return true;
+}
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.h b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c7e1b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.h
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019, The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef VTS_ATTESTATION_PARSER_SUPPORT_H
+#define VTS_ATTESTATION_PARSER_SUPPORT_H
+
+//#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymaster/4.0/types.h>
+#include <hardware/keymaster_defs.h>
+#include <keymaster/android_keymaster_utils.h>
+#include <keymaster/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keymaster/contexts/pure_soft_keymaster_context.h>
+#include <keymaster/contexts/soft_attestation_cert.h>
+#include <keymaster/keymaster_tags.h>
+#include <keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_utils.h>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils {
+
+using ::std::optional;
+using ::std::string;
+using ::std::vector;
+
+using ::keymaster::AuthorizationSet;
+using ::keymaster::TypedTag;
+
+class AttestationCertificateParser {
+  public:
+    AttestationCertificateParser(const vector<Certificate>& certChain)
+        : origCertChain_(certChain) {}
+
+    bool parse();
+
+    uint32_t getKeymasterVersion();
+    uint32_t getAttestationVersion();
+    vector<uint8_t> getAttestationChallenge();
+    keymaster_security_level_t getKeymasterSecurityLevel();
+    keymaster_security_level_t getAttestationSecurityLevel();
+
+    template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
+    bool getSwEnforcedBool(TypedTag<KM_BOOL, Tag> tag) {
+        if (att_sw_enforced_.GetTagValue(tag)) {
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
+    bool getHwEnforcedBool(TypedTag<KM_BOOL, Tag> tag) {
+        if (att_hw_enforced_.GetTagValue(tag)) {
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> getHwEnforcedBlob(TypedTag<KM_BYTES, Tag> tag) {
+        keymaster_blob_t blob;
+        if (att_hw_enforced_.GetTagValue(tag, &blob)) {
+            return {};
+        }
+
+        vector<uint8_t> ret(blob.data, blob.data + blob.data_length);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> getSwEnforcedBlob(TypedTag<KM_BYTES, Tag> tag) {
+        keymaster_blob_t blob;
+        if (!att_sw_enforced_.GetTagValue(tag, &blob)) {
+            return {};
+        }
+
+        vector<uint8_t> ret(blob.data, blob.data + blob.data_length);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+  private:
+    // Helper functions.
+    bool verifyChain(const keymaster_cert_chain_t& chain);
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* getAttestationRecord(X509* certificate);
+
+    X509* parseCertBlob(const keymaster_blob_t& blob);
+
+    bool verifyAttestationRecord(const keymaster_blob_t& attestation_cert);
+
+    optional<keymaster_cert_chain_t> certificateChainToKeymasterChain(
+            const vector<Certificate>& certificates);
+
+    // Private variables.
+    vector<Certificate> origCertChain_;
+    AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced_;
+    AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced_;
+    uint32_t att_attestation_version_;
+    uint32_t att_keymaster_version_;
+    keymaster_security_level_t att_attestation_security_level_;
+    keymaster_security_level_t att_keymaster_security_level_;
+    vector<uint8_t> att_challenge_;
+};
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils
+
+#endif  // VTS_ATTESTATION_PARSER_SUPPORT_H
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7cdfc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "VtsAttestationTests"
+
+#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
+#include <aidl/Vintf.h>
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
+#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
+#include <binder/ProcessState.h>
+#include <cppbor.h>
+#include <cppbor_parse.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <future>
+#include <map>
+
+#include "VtsAttestationParserSupport.h"
+#include "VtsIdentityTestUtils.h"
+
+namespace android::hardware::identity {
+
+using std::endl;
+using std::map;
+using std::optional;
+using std::string;
+using std::vector;
+
+using ::android::sp;
+using ::android::String16;
+using ::android::binder::Status;
+
+using test_utils::AttestationCertificateParser;
+using test_utils::setupWritableCredential;
+using test_utils::validateAttestationCertificate;
+
+// This file verifies the Identity Credential VTS Attestation Certificate
+// generated.
+class VtsAttestationTests : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
+  public:
+    virtual void SetUp() override {
+        credentialStore_ = android::waitForDeclaredService<IIdentityCredentialStore>(
+                String16(GetParam().c_str()));
+        ASSERT_NE(credentialStore_, nullptr);
+    }
+
+    sp<IIdentityCredentialStore> credentialStore_;
+};
+
+TEST_P(VtsAttestationTests, verifyAttestationWithNonemptyChallengeEmptyId) {
+    Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+
+    string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge";
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge(challenge.begin(), challenge.end());
+    vector<Certificate> attestationCertificate;
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId = {};
+
+    result = writableCredential->getAttestationCertificate(
+            attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge, &attestationCertificate);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
+                               << endl;
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate, attestationChallenge,
+                                               attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
+}
+
+TEST_P(VtsAttestationTests, verifyAttestationWithNonemptyChallengeNonemptyId) {
+    Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+
+    string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge1NotSoRandomChallenge1NotSoRandomChallenge1";
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge(challenge.begin(), challenge.end());
+    vector<Certificate> attestationCertificate;
+    string applicationId = "Attestation Verification";
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId = {applicationId.begin(), applicationId.end()};
+
+    result = writableCredential->getAttestationCertificate(
+            attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge, &attestationCertificate);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
+                               << endl;
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate, attestationChallenge,
+                                               attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
+}
+
+TEST_P(VtsAttestationTests, verifyAttestationWithVeryShortChallengeAndId) {
+    Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+
+    string challenge = "c";
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge(challenge.begin(), challenge.end());
+    vector<Certificate> attestationCertificate;
+    string applicationId = "i";
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId = {applicationId.begin(), applicationId.end()};
+
+    result = writableCredential->getAttestationCertificate(
+            attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge, &attestationCertificate);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
+                               << endl;
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate, attestationChallenge,
+                                               attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
+        Identity, VtsAttestationTests,
+        testing::ValuesIn(android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IIdentityCredentialStore::descriptor)),
+        android::PrintInstanceNameToString);
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::identity
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest.cpp
index 8a4e8a7..a0c4416 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest.cpp
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
  * limitations under the License.
  */
-#define LOG_TAG "VtsHalIdentityTargetTest"
+#define LOG_TAG "VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest"
 
 #include <aidl/Gtest.h>
 #include <aidl/Vintf.h>
@@ -27,15 +27,18 @@
 #include <gtest/gtest.h>
 #include <future>
 #include <map>
+#include <tuple>
 
 #include "VtsIdentityTestUtils.h"
 
 namespace android::hardware::identity {
 
 using std::endl;
+using std::make_tuple;
 using std::map;
 using std::optional;
 using std::string;
+using std::tuple;
 using std::vector;
 
 using ::android::sp;
@@ -43,6 +46,9 @@
 using ::android::binder::Status;
 
 using ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthToken;
+using ::android::hardware::keymaster::VerificationToken;
+
+using test_utils::validateAttestationCertificate;
 
 class IdentityAidl : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
   public:
@@ -63,18 +69,73 @@
     ASSERT_GE(info.dataChunkSize, 256);
 }
 
+tuple<bool, string, vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>> extractFromTestCredentialData(
+        const vector<uint8_t>& credentialData) {
+    string docType;
+    vector<uint8_t> storageKey;
+    vector<uint8_t> credentialPrivKey;
+
+    auto [item, _, message] = cppbor::parse(credentialData);
+    if (item == nullptr) {
+        return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey);
+    }
+
+    const cppbor::Array* arrayItem = item->asArray();
+    if (arrayItem == nullptr || arrayItem->size() != 3) {
+        return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey);
+    }
+
+    const cppbor::Tstr* docTypeItem = (*arrayItem)[0]->asTstr();
+    const cppbor::Bool* testCredentialItem =
+            ((*arrayItem)[1]->asSimple() != nullptr ? ((*arrayItem)[1]->asSimple()->asBool())
+                                                    : nullptr);
+    const cppbor::Bstr* encryptedCredentialKeysItem = (*arrayItem)[2]->asBstr();
+    if (docTypeItem == nullptr || testCredentialItem == nullptr ||
+        encryptedCredentialKeysItem == nullptr) {
+        return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey);
+    }
+
+    docType = docTypeItem->value();
+
+    vector<uint8_t> hardwareBoundKey = support::getTestHardwareBoundKey();
+    const vector<uint8_t>& encryptedCredentialKeys = encryptedCredentialKeysItem->value();
+    const vector<uint8_t> docTypeVec(docType.begin(), docType.end());
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> decryptedCredentialKeys =
+            support::decryptAes128Gcm(hardwareBoundKey, encryptedCredentialKeys, docTypeVec);
+    if (!decryptedCredentialKeys) {
+        return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey);
+    }
+
+    auto [dckItem, dckPos, dckMessage] = cppbor::parse(decryptedCredentialKeys.value());
+    if (dckItem == nullptr) {
+        return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey);
+    }
+    const cppbor::Array* dckArrayItem = dckItem->asArray();
+    if (dckArrayItem == nullptr || dckArrayItem->size() != 2) {
+        return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey);
+    }
+    const cppbor::Bstr* storageKeyItem = (*dckArrayItem)[0]->asBstr();
+    const cppbor::Bstr* credentialPrivKeyItem = (*dckArrayItem)[1]->asBstr();
+    if (storageKeyItem == nullptr || credentialPrivKeyItem == nullptr) {
+        return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey);
+    }
+    storageKey = storageKeyItem->value();
+    credentialPrivKey = credentialPrivKeyItem->value();
+    return make_tuple(true, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey);
+}
+
 TEST_P(IdentityAidl, createAndRetrieveCredential) {
     // First, generate a key-pair for the reader since its public key will be
     // part of the request data.
     vector<uint8_t> readerKey;
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate =
-            test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("1234", readerKey);
+            test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("1234", &readerKey);
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate);
 
     // Make the portrait image really big (just shy of 256 KiB) to ensure that
     // the chunking code gets exercised.
     vector<uint8_t> portraitImage;
-    test_utils::SetImageData(portraitImage);
+    test_utils::setImageData(portraitImage);
 
     // Access control profiles:
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {// Profile 0 (reader authentication)
@@ -82,7 +143,20 @@
                                                           // Profile 1 (no authentication)
                                                           {1, {}, false, 0}};
 
+    // It doesn't matter since no user auth is needed in this particular test,
+    // but for good measure, clear out the tokens we pass to the HAL.
     HardwareAuthToken authToken;
+    VerificationToken verificationToken;
+    authToken.challenge = 0;
+    authToken.userId = 0;
+    authToken.authenticatorId = 0;
+    authToken.authenticatorType = ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType::NONE;
+    authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+    authToken.mac.clear();
+    verificationToken.challenge = 0;
+    verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+    verificationToken.securityLevel = ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
+    verificationToken.mac.clear();
 
     // Here's the actual test data:
     const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries = {
@@ -100,24 +174,28 @@
 
     string cborPretty;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "attestationChallenge";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
     ASSERT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
             << attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
-    ASSERT_EQ(binder::Status::EX_NONE, attData.result.exceptionCode());
-    ASSERT_EQ(IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_OK, attData.result.serviceSpecificErrorCode());
 
-    // TODO: set it to something random and check it's in the cert chain
-    ASSERT_GE(attData.attestationCertificate.size(), 2);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateAttestationCertificate(attData.attestationCertificate,
+                                               attData.attestationChallenge,
+                                               attData.attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
 
+    // This is kinda of a hack but we need to give the size of
+    // ProofOfProvisioning that we'll expect to receive.
+    const int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize = 262861 - 326 + readerCertificate.value().size();
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
     ASSERT_TRUE(
             writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), testEntriesEntryCounts)
                     .isOk());
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     // Uses TestEntryData* pointer as key and values are the encrypted blobs. This
@@ -125,7 +203,7 @@
     map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
 
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries) {
-        ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                          encryptedBlobs, true));
     }
 
@@ -135,6 +213,7 @@
             writableCredential->finishAddingEntries(&credentialData, &proofOfProvisioningSignature)
                     .isOk());
 
+    // Validate the proofOfProvisioning which was returned
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> proofOfProvisioning =
             support::coseSignGetPayload(proofOfProvisioningSignature);
     ASSERT_TRUE(proofOfProvisioning);
@@ -195,6 +274,22 @@
                                                  credentialPubKey.value()));
     writableCredential = nullptr;
 
+    // Extract doctype, storage key, and credentialPrivKey from credentialData... this works
+    // only because we asked for a test-credential meaning that the HBK is all zeroes.
+    auto [exSuccess, exDocType, exStorageKey, exCredentialPrivKey] =
+            extractFromTestCredentialData(credentialData);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(exSuccess);
+    ASSERT_EQ(exDocType, "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl");
+    // ... check that the public key derived from the private key matches what was
+    // in the certificate.
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> exCredentialKeyPair =
+            support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(exCredentialPrivKey);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(exCredentialKeyPair);
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> exCredentialPubKey =
+            support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(exCredentialKeyPair.value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(exCredentialPubKey);
+    ASSERT_EQ(exCredentialPubKey.value(), credentialPubKey.value());
+
     // Now that the credential has been provisioned, read it back and check the
     // correct data is returned.
     sp<IIdentityCredential> credential;
@@ -267,7 +362,30 @@
     vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob;
     Certificate signingKeyCertificate;
     ASSERT_TRUE(credential->generateSigningKeyPair(&signingKeyBlob, &signingKeyCertificate).isOk());
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> signingPubKey =
+            support::certificateChainGetTopMostKey(signingKeyCertificate.encodedCertificate);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(signingPubKey);
 
+    // Since we're using a test-credential we know storageKey meaning we can get the
+    // private key. Do this, derive the public key from it, and check this matches what
+    // is in the certificate...
+    const vector<uint8_t> exDocTypeVec(exDocType.begin(), exDocType.end());
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> exSigningPrivKey =
+            support::decryptAes128Gcm(exStorageKey, signingKeyBlob, exDocTypeVec);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(exSigningPrivKey);
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> exSigningKeyPair =
+            support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(exSigningPrivKey.value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(exSigningKeyPair);
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> exSigningPubKey =
+            support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(exSigningKeyPair.value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(exSigningPubKey);
+    ASSERT_EQ(exSigningPubKey.value(), signingPubKey.value());
+
+    vector<RequestNamespace> requestedNamespaces = test_utils::buildRequestNamespaces(testEntries);
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    credential->setRequestedNamespaces(requestedNamespaces).isOk();
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    credential->setVerificationToken(verificationToken);
     ASSERT_TRUE(credential
                         ->startRetrieval(secureProfiles.value(), authToken, itemsRequestBytes,
                                          signingKeyBlob, sessionTranscriptBytes,
@@ -291,6 +409,9 @@
             content.insert(content.end(), chunk.begin(), chunk.end());
         }
         EXPECT_EQ(content, entry.valueCbor);
+
+        // TODO: also use |exStorageKey| to decrypt data and check it's the same as whatt
+        // the HAL returns...
     }
 
     vector<uint8_t> mac;
@@ -321,15 +442,12 @@
     deviceAuthentication.add(docType);
     deviceAuthentication.add(cppbor::Semantic(24, deviceNameSpacesBytes));
     vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication = deviceAuthentication.encode();
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> signingPublicKey =
-            support::certificateChainGetTopMostKey(signingKeyCertificate.encodedCertificate);
-    EXPECT_TRUE(signingPublicKey);
 
     // Derive the key used for MACing.
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerEphemeralPrivateKey =
             support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(readerEphemeralKeyPair.value());
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> sharedSecret =
-            support::ecdh(signingPublicKey.value(), readerEphemeralPrivateKey.value());
+            support::ecdh(signingPubKey.value(), readerEphemeralPrivateKey.value());
     ASSERT_TRUE(sharedSecret);
     vector<uint8_t> salt = {0x00};
     vector<uint8_t> info = {};
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIWritableIdentityCredentialTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIWritableIdentityCredentialTests.cpp
index b68fbb5..b572b0f 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIWritableIdentityCredentialTests.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIWritableIdentityCredentialTests.cpp
@@ -56,8 +56,12 @@
 
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyAttestationWithEmptyChallenge) {
     Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge;
     vector<Certificate> attestationCertificate;
@@ -65,16 +69,20 @@
     result = writableCredential->getAttestationCertificate(
             attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge, &attestationCertificate);
 
-    EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
-                               << endl;
-
-    EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::ValidateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
+                                << endl;
+    EXPECT_EQ(binder::Status::EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, result.exceptionCode());
+    EXPECT_EQ(IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA, result.serviceSpecificErrorCode());
 }
 
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyAttestationSuccessWithChallenge) {
     Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge1NotSoRandomChallenge1NotSoRandomChallenge1";
     vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge(challenge.begin(), challenge.end());
@@ -87,17 +95,24 @@
     EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
-    EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::ValidateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::validateAttestationCertificate(
+            attestationCertificate, attestationChallenge, attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
 }
 
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyAttestationDoubleCallFails) {
     Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge1";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::ValidateAttestationCertificate(attData.attestationCertificate));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::validateAttestationCertificate(
+            attData.attestationCertificate, attData.attestationChallenge,
+            attData.attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
 
     string challenge2 = "NotSoRandomChallenge2";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData2(writableCredential, challenge2, {});
@@ -110,10 +125,11 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyStartPersonalization) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     // First call should go through
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {2, 4};
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(123456);
     result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(5, entryCounts);
     ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
@@ -131,22 +147,12 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyStartPersonalizationMin) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     // Verify minimal number of profile count and entry count
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1, 1};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
-    EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
-                               << endl;
-}
-
-TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyStartPersonalizationZero) {
-    Status result;
-    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
-
-    const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {0};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(0, entryCounts);
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(123456);
+    result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
     EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 }
@@ -154,11 +160,12 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyStartPersonalizationOne) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     // Verify minimal number of profile count and entry count
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(123456);
+    result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
     EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 }
@@ -166,11 +173,12 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyStartPersonalizationLarge) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     // Verify set a large number of profile count and entry count is ok
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {3000};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(3500, entryCounts);
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(123456);
+    result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(25, entryCounts);
     EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 }
@@ -178,15 +186,16 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyProfileNumberMismatchShouldFail) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     // Enter mismatched entry and profile numbers
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {5, 6};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(5, entryCounts);
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(123456);
+    result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(5, entryCounts);
     ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("12345");
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("12345");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {// Profile 0 (reader authentication)
@@ -196,7 +205,7 @@
                                                           {4, {}, false, 0}};
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     vector<uint8_t> credentialData;
@@ -205,7 +214,7 @@
             writableCredential->finishAddingEntries(&credentialData, &proofOfProvisioningSignature);
 
     // finishAddingEntries should fail because the number of addAccessControlProfile mismatched with
-    // startPersonalization, and begintest_utils::AddEntry was not called.
+    // startPersonalization, and begintest_utils::addEntry was not called.
     EXPECT_FALSE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                 << endl;
     EXPECT_EQ(binder::Status::EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, result.exceptionCode());
@@ -215,10 +224,11 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyDuplicateProfileId) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {3, 6};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(3, entryCounts);
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(123456);
+    result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(3, entryCounts);
     ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
@@ -235,9 +245,10 @@
         SecureAccessControlProfile profile;
         Certificate cert;
         cert.encodedCertificate = testProfile.readerCertificate;
+        int64_t secureUserId = testProfile.userAuthenticationRequired ? 66 : 0;
         result = writableCredential->addAccessControlProfile(
                 testProfile.id, cert, testProfile.userAuthenticationRequired,
-                testProfile.timeoutMillis, 0, &profile);
+                testProfile.timeoutMillis, secureUserId, &profile);
 
         if (expectOk) {
             expectOk = false;
@@ -272,25 +283,28 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
 
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge1";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
     EXPECT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
             << attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
 
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456");
+    ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
+
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1u};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
+    size_t expectedPoPSize = 186 + readerCertificate1.value().size();
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedPoPSize);
+    result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
     ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456");
-    ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
-
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {{1, readerCertificate1.value(), true, 1}};
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries1 = {
@@ -299,7 +313,7 @@
 
     map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries1) {
-        ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                          encryptedBlobs, true));
     }
 
@@ -356,17 +370,17 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
 
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
     EXPECT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
             << attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
 
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456");
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
 
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate2 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("1256");
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate2 = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("1256");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate2);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {
@@ -374,19 +388,23 @@
             {2, readerCertificate2.value(), true, 2},
     };
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1u, 3u, 1u, 1u, 2u};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), entryCounts);
+    size_t expectedPoPSize =
+            525021 + readerCertificate1.value().size() + readerCertificate2.value().size();
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedPoPSize);
+    result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), entryCounts);
     ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     vector<uint8_t> portraitImage1;
-    test_utils::SetImageData(portraitImage1);
+    test_utils::setImageData(portraitImage1);
 
     vector<uint8_t> portraitImage2;
-    test_utils::SetImageData(portraitImage2);
+    test_utils::setImageData(portraitImage2);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries1 = {
             {"Name Space 1", "Last name", string("Turing"), vector<int32_t>{1, 2}},
@@ -404,7 +422,7 @@
 
     map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries1) {
-        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                          encryptedBlobs, true));
     }
 
@@ -511,31 +529,36 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
 
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
     ASSERT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
             << attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
 
-    const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {2u, 2u};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(3, entryCounts);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
-                               << endl;
-
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456");
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
 
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate2 =
-            test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456987987987987987987");
+            test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456987987987987987987");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate2);
 
+    const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {2u, 2u};
+    size_t expectedPoPSize =
+            377 + readerCertificate1.value().size() + readerCertificate2.value().size();
+    ;
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedPoPSize);
+    result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(3, entryCounts);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
+                               << endl;
+
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {{0, readerCertificate1.value(), false, 0},
                                                           {1, readerCertificate2.value(), true, 1},
                                                           {2, {}, false, 0}};
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries1 = {
@@ -548,7 +571,7 @@
 
     map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries1) {
-        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                          encryptedBlobs, true));
     }
 
@@ -568,7 +591,7 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
 
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
@@ -580,15 +603,16 @@
     // before "Image" and 2 after image, which is not correct.  All of same name
     // space should occur together.  Let's see if this fails.
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {2u, 1u, 2u};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(3, entryCounts);
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(123456);
+    result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(3, entryCounts);
     ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456");
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
 
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate2 =
-            test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456987987987987987987");
+            test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456987987987987987987");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate2);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {{0, readerCertificate1.value(), false, 0},
@@ -596,7 +620,7 @@
                                                           {2, {}, false, 0}};
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries1 = {
@@ -607,13 +631,13 @@
 
     map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries1) {
-        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                          encryptedBlobs, true));
     }
     const test_utils::TestEntryData testEntry2 = {"Image", "Portrait image", string("asdfs"),
                                                   vector<int32_t>{0, 1}};
 
-    EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, testEntry2, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+    EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, testEntry2, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                      encryptedBlobs, true));
 
     // We expect this to fail because the namespace is out of order, all "Name Space"
@@ -625,7 +649,7 @@
     };
 
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries3) {
-        EXPECT_FALSE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        EXPECT_FALSE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                           encryptedBlobs, false));
     }
 
@@ -634,7 +658,7 @@
     result =
             writableCredential->finishAddingEntries(&credentialData, &proofOfProvisioningSignature);
 
-    // should fail because test_utils::AddEntry should have failed earlier.
+    // should fail because test_utils::addEntry should have failed earlier.
     EXPECT_FALSE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                 << endl;
     EXPECT_EQ(binder::Status::EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, result.exceptionCode());
@@ -643,9 +667,10 @@
 
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyAccessControlProfileIdOutOfRange) {
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1};
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(123456);
     Status result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
     ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.cpp
index 3aeebc6..b6ed80f 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.cpp
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 #include <aidl/Gtest.h>
 #include <map>
 
+#include "VtsAttestationParserSupport.h"
+
 namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils {
 
 using std::endl;
@@ -31,7 +33,7 @@
 using ::android::String16;
 using ::android::binder::Status;
 
-bool SetupWritableCredential(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
+bool setupWritableCredential(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
                              sp<IIdentityCredentialStore>& credentialStore) {
     if (credentialStore == nullptr) {
         return false;
@@ -48,13 +50,13 @@
     }
 }
 
-optional<vector<uint8_t>> GenerateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal) {
+optional<vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal) {
     vector<uint8_t> privKey;
-    return GenerateReaderCertificate(serialDecimal, privKey);
+    return generateReaderCertificate(serialDecimal, &privKey);
 }
 
-optional<vector<uint8_t>> GenerateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal,
-                                                    vector<uint8_t>& readerPrivateKey) {
+optional<vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal,
+                                                    vector<uint8_t>* outReaderPrivateKey) {
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerKeyPKCS8 = support::createEcKeyPair();
     if (!readerKeyPKCS8) {
         return {};
@@ -67,7 +69,11 @@
         return {};
     }
 
-    readerPrivateKey = readerKey.value();
+    if (outReaderPrivateKey == nullptr) {
+        return {};
+    }
+
+    *outReaderPrivateKey = readerKey.value();
 
     string issuer = "Android Open Source Project";
     string subject = "Android IdentityCredential VTS Test";
@@ -79,7 +85,7 @@
                                                    validityNotBefore, validityNotAfter);
 }
 
-optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> AddAccessControlProfiles(
+optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> addAccessControlProfiles(
         sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
         const vector<TestProfile>& testProfiles) {
     Status result;
@@ -90,9 +96,10 @@
         SecureAccessControlProfile profile;
         Certificate cert;
         cert.encodedCertificate = testProfile.readerCertificate;
+        int64_t secureUserId = testProfile.userAuthenticationRequired ? 66 : 0;
         result = writableCredential->addAccessControlProfile(
                 testProfile.id, cert, testProfile.userAuthenticationRequired,
-                testProfile.timeoutMillis, 0, &profile);
+                testProfile.timeoutMillis, secureUserId, &profile);
 
         // Don't use assert so all errors can be outputed.  Then return
         // instead of exit even on errors so caller can decide.
@@ -120,7 +127,7 @@
 
 // Most test expects this function to pass. So we will print out additional
 // value if failed so more debug data can be provided.
-bool AddEntry(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential, const TestEntryData& entry,
+bool addEntry(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential, const TestEntryData& entry,
               int dataChunkSize, map<const TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>>& encryptedBlobs,
               bool expectSuccess) {
     Status result;
@@ -164,16 +171,92 @@
     return true;
 }
 
-bool ValidateAttestationCertificate(vector<Certificate>& inputCertificates) {
-    return (inputCertificates.size() >= 2);
-    // TODO: add parsing of the certificate and make sure it is genuine.
-}
-
-void SetImageData(vector<uint8_t>& image) {
+void setImageData(vector<uint8_t>& image) {
     image.resize(256 * 1024 - 10);
     for (size_t n = 0; n < image.size(); n++) {
         image[n] = (uint8_t)n;
     }
 }
 
+bool validateAttestationCertificate(const vector<Certificate>& inputCertificates,
+                                    const vector<uint8_t>& expectedChallenge,
+                                    const vector<uint8_t>& expectedAppId,
+                                    const HardwareInformation& hwInfo) {
+    AttestationCertificateParser certParser_(inputCertificates);
+    bool ret = certParser_.parse();
+    EXPECT_TRUE(ret);
+    if (!ret) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // As per the IC HAL, the version of the Identity
+    // Credential HAL is 1.0 - and this is encoded as major*10 + minor. This field is used by
+    // Keymaster which is known to report integers less than or equal to 4 (for KM up to 4.0)
+    // and integers greater or equal than 41 (for KM starting with 4.1).
+    //
+    // Since we won't get to version 4.0 of the IC HAL for a while, let's also check that a KM
+    // version isn't errornously returned.
+    EXPECT_LE(10, certParser_.getKeymasterVersion());
+    EXPECT_GT(40, certParser_.getKeymasterVersion());
+    EXPECT_LE(3, certParser_.getAttestationVersion());
+
+    // Verify the app id matches to whatever we set it to be.
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> appId =
+            certParser_.getSwEnforcedBlob(::keymaster::TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID);
+    if (appId) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(expectedAppId.size(), appId.value().size());
+        EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(expectedAppId.data(), appId.value().data(), expectedAppId.size()));
+    } else {
+        // app id not found
+        EXPECT_EQ(0, expectedAppId.size());
+    }
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(certParser_.getHwEnforcedBool(::keymaster::TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(certParser_.getHwEnforcedBool(::keymaster::TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID));
+
+    // Verify the challenge always matches in size and data of what is passed
+    // in.
+    vector<uint8_t> attChallenge = certParser_.getAttestationChallenge();
+    EXPECT_EQ(expectedChallenge.size(), attChallenge.size());
+    EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(expectedChallenge.data(), attChallenge.data(), expectedChallenge.size()));
+
+    // Ensure the attestation conveys that it's implemented in secure hardware (with carve-out
+    // for the reference implementation which cannot be implemented in secure hardware).
+    if (hwInfo.credentialStoreName == "Identity Credential Reference Implementation" &&
+        hwInfo.credentialStoreAuthorName == "Google") {
+        EXPECT_LE(KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_SOFTWARE, certParser_.getKeymasterSecurityLevel());
+        EXPECT_LE(KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_SOFTWARE, certParser_.getAttestationSecurityLevel());
+
+    } else {
+        // Actual devices should use TrustedEnvironment or StrongBox.
+        EXPECT_LE(KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, certParser_.getKeymasterSecurityLevel());
+        EXPECT_LE(KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, certParser_.getAttestationSecurityLevel());
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+
+vector<RequestNamespace> buildRequestNamespaces(const vector<TestEntryData> entries) {
+    vector<RequestNamespace> ret;
+    RequestNamespace curNs;
+    for (const TestEntryData& testEntry : entries) {
+        if (testEntry.nameSpace != curNs.namespaceName) {
+            if (curNs.namespaceName.size() > 0) {
+                ret.push_back(curNs);
+            }
+            curNs.namespaceName = testEntry.nameSpace;
+            curNs.items.clear();
+        }
+
+        RequestDataItem item;
+        item.name = testEntry.name;
+        item.size = testEntry.valueCbor.size();
+        item.accessControlProfileIds = testEntry.profileIds;
+        curNs.items.push_back(item);
+    }
+    if (curNs.namespaceName.size() > 0) {
+        ret.push_back(curNs);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
 }  // namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.h b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.h
index 043ccd6..673b736 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.h
@@ -93,25 +93,30 @@
     uint64_t timeoutMillis;
 };
 
-bool SetupWritableCredential(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
+bool setupWritableCredential(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
                              sp<IIdentityCredentialStore>& credentialStore);
 
-optional<vector<uint8_t>> GenerateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal);
+optional<vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal);
 
-optional<vector<uint8_t>> GenerateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal,
-                                                    vector<uint8_t>& readerPrivateKey);
+optional<vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal,
+                                                    vector<uint8_t>* outReaderPrivateKey);
 
-optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> AddAccessControlProfiles(
+optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> addAccessControlProfiles(
         sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
         const vector<TestProfile>& testProfiles);
 
-bool AddEntry(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential, const TestEntryData& entry,
+bool addEntry(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential, const TestEntryData& entry,
               int dataChunkSize, map<const TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>>& encryptedBlobs,
               bool expectSuccess);
 
-bool ValidateAttestationCertificate(vector<Certificate>& inputCertificates);
+void setImageData(vector<uint8_t>& image);
 
-void SetImageData(vector<uint8_t>& image);
+bool validateAttestationCertificate(const vector<Certificate>& inputCertificates,
+                                    const vector<uint8_t>& expectedChallenge,
+                                    const vector<uint8_t>& expectedAppId,
+                                    const HardwareInformation& hwInfo);
+
+vector<RequestNamespace> buildRequestNamespaces(const vector<TestEntryData> entries);
 
 }  // namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils
 
diff --git a/identity/support/include/android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h b/identity/support/include/android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h
index 507e914..0f27a72 100644
--- a/identity/support/include/android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h
+++ b/identity/support/include/android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h
@@ -134,6 +134,11 @@
 //
 optional<vector<uint8_t>> ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(const vector<uint8_t>& keyPair);
 
+// Creates a PKCS#8 encoded key-pair from a private key (which must be uncompressed,
+// e.g. 32 bytes). The public key is derived from the given private key..
+//
+optional<vector<uint8_t>> ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(const vector<uint8_t>& privateKey);
+
 // For an EC key |keyPair| encoded in PKCS#8 format, creates a PKCS#12 structure
 // with the key-pair (not using a password to encrypt the data). The public key
 // in the created structure is included as a certificate, using the given fields
diff --git a/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp b/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp
index dc49ddc..e9d5d6c 100644
--- a/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp
+++ b/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp
@@ -1047,6 +1047,42 @@
     return privateKey;
 }
 
+optional<vector<uint8_t>> ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(const vector<uint8_t>& privateKey) {
+    auto bn = BIGNUM_Ptr(BN_bin2bn(privateKey.data(), privateKey.size(), nullptr));
+    if (bn.get() == nullptr) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Error creating BIGNUM";
+        return {};
+    }
+
+    auto ecKey = EC_KEY_Ptr(EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1));
+    if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(ecKey.get(), bn.get()) != 1) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Error setting private key from BIGNUM";
+        return {};
+    }
+
+    auto pkey = EVP_PKEY_Ptr(EVP_PKEY_new());
+    if (pkey.get() == nullptr) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Memory allocation failed";
+        return {};
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey.get(), ecKey.get()) != 1) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting private key";
+        return {};
+    }
+
+    int size = i2d_PrivateKey(pkey.get(), nullptr);
+    if (size == 0) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Error generating public key encoding";
+        return {};
+    }
+    vector<uint8_t> keyPair;
+    keyPair.resize(size);
+    unsigned char* p = keyPair.data();
+    i2d_PrivateKey(pkey.get(), &p);
+    return keyPair;
+}
+
 optional<vector<uint8_t>> ecKeyPairGetPkcs12(const vector<uint8_t>& keyPair, const string& name,
                                              const string& serialDecimal, const string& issuer,
                                              const string& subject, time_t validityNotBefore,
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h b/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h
index 61645f8..f585d62 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #define HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMASTER_40_SUPPORT_KEYMASTER_UTILS_H_
 
 #include <android/hardware/keymaster/4.0/types.h>
+#include <optional>
+#include <vector>
 
 namespace android {
 namespace hardware {
@@ -52,6 +54,15 @@
 HardwareAuthToken hidlVec2AuthToken(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& buffer);
 hidl_vec<uint8_t> authToken2HidlVec(const HardwareAuthToken& token);
 
+// Serializes and deserializes a verification token. This format is private and
+// not stable between releases and should not be persisted to disk.
+//
+// Currently doesn't support the |parametersVerified| field, will fail if set.
+//
+std::optional<VerificationToken> deserializeVerificationToken(
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& serializedToken);
+std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> serializeVerificationToken(const VerificationToken& token);
+
 uint32_t getOsVersion();
 uint32_t getOsPatchlevel();
 
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/keymaster_utils.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/support/keymaster_utils.cpp
index 850a776..366cd0e 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/keymaster_utils.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/keymaster_utils.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #include <regex.h>
 
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
 #include <android-base/properties.h>
 #include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
 #include <keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h>
@@ -110,6 +111,80 @@
     return token;
 }
 
+void appendUint64(std::vector<uint8_t>& vec, uint64_t value) {
+    for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint64_t); n++) {
+        uint8_t byte = (value >> (n * 8)) & 0xff;
+        vec.push_back(byte);
+    }
+}
+
+uint64_t extractUint64(const std::vector<uint8_t>& data, size_t offset) {
+    uint64_t value = 0;
+    for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint64_t); n++) {
+        uint8_t byte = data[offset + n];
+        value |= byte << (n * 8);
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+
+void appendUint32(std::vector<uint8_t>& vec, uint32_t value) {
+    for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint32_t); n++) {
+        uint8_t byte = (value >> (n * 8)) & 0xff;
+        vec.push_back(byte);
+    }
+}
+
+uint32_t extractUint32(const std::vector<uint8_t>& data, size_t offset) {
+    uint32_t value = 0;
+    for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint32_t); n++) {
+        uint8_t byte = data[offset + n];
+        value |= byte << (n * 8);
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+
+std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> serializeVerificationToken(const VerificationToken& token) {
+    if (token.parametersVerified.size() > 0) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Serializing verification tokens with parametersVerified is not supported";
+        return {};
+    }
+    if (!(token.mac.size() == 0 || token.mac.size() == 32)) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected MAC size " << token.mac.size() << ", expected 0 or 32";
+        return {};
+    }
+    std::vector<uint8_t> serializedToken;
+    appendUint64(serializedToken, token.challenge);
+    appendUint64(serializedToken, token.timestamp);
+    appendUint32(serializedToken, uint32_t(token.securityLevel));
+    appendUint32(serializedToken, token.mac.size());
+    serializedToken.insert(serializedToken.end(), token.mac.begin(), token.mac.end());
+    return serializedToken;
+}
+
+std::optional<VerificationToken> deserializeVerificationToken(
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& serializedToken) {
+    if (serializedToken.size() < 24) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected serialized VerificationToken size " << serializedToken.size()
+                   << ", expected at least 24 bytes";
+        return {};
+    }
+    VerificationToken token;
+    token.challenge = extractUint64(serializedToken, 0);
+    token.timestamp = extractUint64(serializedToken, 8);
+    token.securityLevel = SecurityLevel(extractUint32(serializedToken, 16));
+    size_t macSize = extractUint32(serializedToken, 20);
+    size_t expectedSerializedSize = 24 + macSize;
+    if (serializedToken.size() != expectedSerializedSize) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected serialized VerificationToken size " << serializedToken.size()
+                   << ", expected " << expectedSerializedSize;
+        return {};
+    }
+    if (macSize > 0) {
+        token.mac = std::vector<uint8_t>(serializedToken.begin() + 24, serializedToken.end());
+    }
+    return token;
+}
+
 namespace {
 
 constexpr char kPlatformVersionProp[] = "ro.build.version.release";
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index 6cbe4da..aa2de2a 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -438,10 +438,10 @@
             EXPECT_TRUE(device_locked);
         }
 
-        // Check that the expected result from VBMeta matches the build type. Only a user build
-        // should have AVB reporting the device is locked.
-        EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.build.type", property_value, ""), 0);
-        if (!strcmp(property_value, "user")) {
+        // Check that the device is locked if not debuggable, e.g., user build
+        // images in CTS. For VTS, debuggable images are used to allow adb root
+        // and the device is unlocked.
+        if (!property_get_bool("ro.debuggable", false)) {
             EXPECT_TRUE(device_locked);
         } else {
             EXPECT_FALSE(device_locked);
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp b/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp
index 3011da6..56a3ca9 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -15,5 +15,8 @@
             },
         },
     },
-    versions: ["1"],
+    versions: [
+        "1",
+        "2",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/.hash b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/.hash
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d5974e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/.hash
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+91ab0be1887410935f564e3938ff12c5f5f8c59d
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db1df2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable HardwareAuthToken {
+  long challenge;
+  long userId;
+  long authenticatorId;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
+  byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..924567f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum HardwareAuthenticatorType {
+  NONE = 0,
+  PASSWORD = 1,
+  FINGERPRINT = 2,
+  ANY = -1,
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..127c1bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum SecurityLevel {
+  SOFTWARE = 0,
+  TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
+  STRONGBOX = 2,
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/Timestamp.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/Timestamp.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45fa1ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/Timestamp.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable Timestamp {
+  long milliSeconds;
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0633765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable VerificationToken {
+  long challenge;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+  byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..127c1bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum SecurityLevel {
+  SOFTWARE = 0,
+  TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
+  STRONGBOX = 2,
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0633765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable VerificationToken {
+  long challenge;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+  byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f129783
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+
+/**
+ * Device security levels.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum SecurityLevel {
+    SOFTWARE = 0,
+    TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
+    /**
+     * STRONGBOX specifies that the secure hardware satisfies the requirements specified in CDD
+     * 9.11.2.
+     */
+    STRONGBOX = 2,
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eff9ca6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+
+import android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel;
+import android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp;
+import android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType;
+
+/**
+ * VerificationToken instances are used for secure environments to authenticate one another.
+ *
+ * This version of the parcelable currently don't use the parametersVerified field since it's not
+ * needed for time-based verification. This can be added in a later version, if needed.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+parcelable VerificationToken {
+    /**
+     * The operation handle, used to ensure freshness.
+     */
+    long challenge;
+
+    /**
+     * The current time of the secure environment that generates the VerificationToken.  This can be
+     * checked against auth tokens generated by the same secure environment, which avoids needing to
+     * synchronize clocks.
+     */
+    Timestamp timestamp;
+
+    /**
+     * SecurityLevel of the secure environment that generated the token.
+     */
+    SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+
+    /**
+     * 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 of the above values, computed as:
+     *
+     *    HMAC(H,
+     *         "Auth Verification" || challenge || timestamp || securityLevel || parametersVerified)
+     *
+     * where:
+     *
+     *   ``HMAC'' is the shared HMAC key (see computeSharedHmac() in IKeymaster).
+     *
+     *   ``||'' represents concatenation
+     *
+     * The representation of challenge and timestamp is as 64-bit unsigned integers in big-endian
+     * order.  securityLevel is represented as a 32-bit unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+     *
+     * If parametersVerified is non-empty, the representation of parametersVerified is an ASN.1 DER
+     * encoded representation of the values.  The ASN.1 schema used is the AuthorizationList schema
+     * from the Keystore attestation documentation.  If parametersVerified is empty, it is simply
+     * omitted from the HMAC computation.
+     */
+    byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_hal_sap_target_test.xml b/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_hal_sap_target_test.xml
index 876e1fb..d7d4477 100644
--- a/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_hal_sap_target_test.xml
+++ b/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_hal_sap_target_test.xml
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
     <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.MultiSimPreparer" />
     <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer" />
 
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.StopServicesSetup"/>
+
     <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
         <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
         <option name="push" value="VtsHalSapV1_0TargetTest->/data/local/tmp/VtsHalSapV1_0TargetTest" />
diff --git a/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 31424ab..c77733b 100644
--- a/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -23,11 +23,6 @@
         "VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp",
     ],
     static_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@2.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@3.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.1",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@3.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0",
         "VtsHalSensorsTargetTestUtils",
     ],
diff --git a/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 598ad15..83ebc6b 100644
--- a/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -25,11 +25,6 @@
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.X-shared-utils",
     ],
     static_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@2.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@3.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.1",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@3.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0-convert",
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.0",
diff --git a/sensors/2.1/vts/functional/Android.bp b/sensors/2.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 3f01a3e..d257993 100644
--- a/sensors/2.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/sensors/2.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -27,11 +27,6 @@
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.X-shared-utils",
     ],
     static_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@2.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@3.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.1",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@3.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0-convert",
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.0",
diff --git a/sensors/common/vts/2_X/Android.bp b/sensors/common/vts/2_X/Android.bp
index 8cdb5d1..e5eceb5 100644
--- a/sensors/common/vts/2_X/Android.bp
+++ b/sensors/common/vts/2_X/Android.bp
@@ -29,11 +29,6 @@
         "libbinder",
     ],
     static_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@2.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@3.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.1",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@3.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0-convert",
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.0",
diff --git a/sensors/common/vts/utils/Android.bp b/sensors/common/vts/utils/Android.bp
index ca4346a..baaed6c 100644
--- a/sensors/common/vts/utils/Android.bp
+++ b/sensors/common/vts/utils/Android.bp
@@ -31,13 +31,17 @@
         "libutils",
     ],
     static_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@2.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@3.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.0",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.1",
-        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@3.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.1",
     ],
+    whole_static_libs: [
+        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@2.0",
+        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@3.0",
+        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@4.0",
+        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.0",
+        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@2.1",
+        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@3.0",
+        "android.hardware.graphics.mapper@4.0",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/sensors/common/vts/utils/GrallocWrapper.cpp b/sensors/common/vts/utils/GrallocWrapper.cpp
index e63faa2..47d1f42 100644
--- a/sensors/common/vts/utils/GrallocWrapper.cpp
+++ b/sensors/common/vts/utils/GrallocWrapper.cpp
@@ -18,9 +18,11 @@
 
 #include <android/hardware/graphics/allocator/2.0/IAllocator.h>
 #include <android/hardware/graphics/allocator/3.0/IAllocator.h>
+#include <android/hardware/graphics/allocator/4.0/IAllocator.h>
 #include <android/hardware/graphics/mapper/2.0/IMapper.h>
 #include <android/hardware/graphics/mapper/2.1/IMapper.h>
 #include <android/hardware/graphics/mapper/3.0/IMapper.h>
+#include <android/hardware/graphics/mapper/4.0/IMapper.h>
 
 #include <utils/Log.h>
 
@@ -29,19 +31,19 @@
 
 using IAllocator2 = ::android::hardware::graphics::allocator::V2_0::IAllocator;
 using IAllocator3 = ::android::hardware::graphics::allocator::V3_0::IAllocator;
+using IAllocator4 = ::android::hardware::graphics::allocator::V4_0::IAllocator;
 using IMapper2 = ::android::hardware::graphics::mapper::V2_0::IMapper;
 using IMapper2_1 = ::android::hardware::graphics::mapper::V2_1::IMapper;
 using IMapper3 = ::android::hardware::graphics::mapper::V3_0::IMapper;
+using IMapper4 = ::android::hardware::graphics::mapper::V4_0::IMapper;
 
 using Error2 = ::android::hardware::graphics::mapper::V2_0::Error;
 using Error3 = ::android::hardware::graphics::mapper::V3_0::Error;
+using Error4 = ::android::hardware::graphics::mapper::V4_0::Error;
 
 using ::android::hardware::graphics::common::V1_0::BufferUsage;
 using ::android::hardware::graphics::common::V1_0::PixelFormat;
 
-// This is a typedef to the same underlying type across v2.0 and v3.0
-using ::android::hardware::graphics::mapper::V2_0::BufferDescriptor;
-
 using ::android::hardware::hidl_handle;
 using ::android::hardware::hidl_string;
 using ::android::hardware::hidl_vec;
@@ -58,7 +60,6 @@
     virtual ~IGrallocHalWrapper() = default;
 
     // IAllocator
-    virtual std::string dumpDebugInfo() = 0;
     virtual native_handle_t* allocate(uint32_t size) = 0;
     virtual void freeBuffer(native_handle_t* bufferHandle) = 0;
 
@@ -75,6 +76,24 @@
 bool failed(Error3 error) {
     return (error != Error3::NONE);
 }
+bool failed(Error4 error) {
+    return (error != Error4::NONE);
+}
+
+template <typename>
+struct FirstArg;
+
+// Template specialization for pointer to a non-static member function, which exposes
+// the type of the first argument given to said function
+template <typename ReturnType, typename ClassT, typename Arg1, typename... OtherArgs>
+struct FirstArg<ReturnType (ClassT::*)(Arg1, OtherArgs...)> {
+    using type = Arg1;
+};
+
+// Alias to FirstArg which also removes any reference type and const associated
+template <typename T>
+using BaseTypeOfFirstArg = typename std::remove_const<
+        typename std::remove_reference<typename FirstArg<T>::type>::type>::type;
 
 // Since all the type and function names are the same for the things we use across the major HAL
 // versions, we use template magic to avoid repeating ourselves.
@@ -88,7 +107,6 @@
         }
     }
 
-    virtual std::string dumpDebugInfo() override;
     virtual native_handle_t* allocate(uint32_t size) override;
     virtual void freeBuffer(native_handle_t* bufferHandle) override;
 
@@ -101,21 +119,19 @@
     sp<AllocatorT> mAllocator;
     sp<MapperT> mMapper;
 
-    BufferDescriptor getDescriptor(uint32_t size);
+    // v2.0 and v3.0 use vec<uint32_t> for BufferDescriptor, but v4.0 uses vec<uint8_t>, so use
+    // some template magic to deduce the right type based off of the first argument to allocate(),
+    // which is always the version-specific BufferDescriptor type
+    typedef BaseTypeOfFirstArg<decltype(&AllocatorT::allocate)> BufferDescriptorT;
+
+    BufferDescriptorT getDescriptor(uint32_t size);
     native_handle_t* importBuffer(const hidl_handle& rawHandle);
 };
 
 template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT>
-std::string GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::dumpDebugInfo() {
-    std::string debugInfo;
-    mAllocator->dumpDebugInfo([&](const hidl_string& tmpDebugInfo) { debugInfo = tmpDebugInfo; });
-    return debugInfo;
-}
-
-template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT>
 native_handle_t* GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::allocate(uint32_t size) {
     constexpr uint32_t kBufferCount = 1;
-    BufferDescriptor descriptor = getDescriptor(size);
+    BufferDescriptorT descriptor = getDescriptor(size);
     native_handle_t* bufferHandle = nullptr;
 
     auto callback = [&](auto error, uint32_t /*stride*/, const hidl_vec<hidl_handle>& buffers) {
@@ -142,7 +158,8 @@
 }
 
 template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT>
-BufferDescriptor GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::getDescriptor(uint32_t size) {
+typename GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::BufferDescriptorT
+GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::getDescriptor(uint32_t size) {
     typename MapperT::BufferDescriptorInfo descriptorInfo = {
             .width = size,
             .height = 1,
@@ -151,8 +168,8 @@
             .usage = kBufferUsage,
     };
 
-    BufferDescriptor descriptor;
-    auto callback = [&](auto error, const BufferDescriptor& tmpDescriptor) {
+    BufferDescriptorT descriptor;
+    auto callback = [&](auto error, const BufferDescriptorT& tmpDescriptor) {
         if (failed(error)) {
             ALOGE("Failed to create descriptor: %" PRId32, static_cast<int32_t>(error));
         } else {
@@ -189,7 +206,7 @@
 
     void* data = nullptr;
     mMapper->lock(bufferHandle, kBufferUsage, accessRegion, acquireFenceHandle,
-                  [&](auto error, void* tmpData, ...) {  // V3_0 passes extra args we don't use
+                  [&](auto error, void* tmpData, ...) {  // V3/4 pass extra args we don't use
                       if (failed(error)) {
                           ALOGE("Failed to lock buffer %p: %" PRId32, bufferHandle,
                                 static_cast<int32_t>(error));
@@ -214,28 +231,40 @@
 }  // anonymous namespace
 
 GrallocWrapper::GrallocWrapper() {
-    sp<IAllocator3> allocator3 = IAllocator3::getService();
-    sp<IMapper3> mapper3 = IMapper3::getService();
+    sp<IAllocator4> allocator4 = IAllocator4::getService();
+    sp<IMapper4> mapper4 = IMapper4::getService();
 
-    if (allocator3 != nullptr && mapper3 != nullptr) {
+    if (allocator4 != nullptr && mapper4 != nullptr) {
+        ALOGD("Using IAllocator/IMapper v4.0");
         mGrallocHal = std::unique_ptr<IGrallocHalWrapper>(
-                new GrallocHalWrapper<IAllocator3, IMapper3>(allocator3, mapper3));
+                new GrallocHalWrapper<IAllocator4, IMapper4>(allocator4, mapper4));
     } else {
-        ALOGD("Graphics HALs 3.0 not found (allocator %d mapper %d), falling back to 2.x",
-              (allocator3 != nullptr), (mapper3 != nullptr));
+        ALOGD("Graphics HALs 4.0 not found (allocator %d mapper %d), falling back to 3.0",
+              (allocator4 != nullptr), (mapper4 != nullptr));
 
-        sp<IAllocator2> allocator2 = IAllocator2::getService();
-        sp<IMapper2> mapper2 = IMapper2_1::getService();
-        if (mapper2 == nullptr) {
-            mapper2 = IMapper2::getService();
-        }
+        sp<IAllocator3> allocator3 = IAllocator3::getService();
+        sp<IMapper3> mapper3 = IMapper3::getService();
 
-        if (allocator2 != nullptr && mapper2 != nullptr) {
+        if (allocator3 != nullptr && mapper3 != nullptr) {
             mGrallocHal = std::unique_ptr<IGrallocHalWrapper>(
-                    new GrallocHalWrapper<IAllocator2, IMapper2>(allocator2, mapper2));
+                    new GrallocHalWrapper<IAllocator3, IMapper3>(allocator3, mapper3));
         } else {
-            ALOGE("Couldn't open 2.x/3.0 graphics HALs (2.x allocator %d mapper %d)",
-                  (allocator2 != nullptr), (mapper2 != nullptr));
+            ALOGD("Graphics HALs 3.0 not found (allocator %d mapper %d), falling back to 2.x",
+                  (allocator3 != nullptr), (mapper3 != nullptr));
+
+            sp<IAllocator2> allocator2 = IAllocator2::getService();
+            sp<IMapper2> mapper2 = IMapper2_1::getService();
+            if (mapper2 == nullptr) {
+                mapper2 = IMapper2::getService();
+            }
+
+            if (allocator2 != nullptr && mapper2 != nullptr) {
+                mGrallocHal = std::unique_ptr<IGrallocHalWrapper>(
+                        new GrallocHalWrapper<IAllocator2, IMapper2>(allocator2, mapper2));
+            } else {
+                ALOGE("Couldn't open graphics HALs (2.x allocator %d mapper %d)",
+                      (allocator2 != nullptr), (mapper2 != nullptr));
+            }
         }
     }
 }
@@ -248,10 +277,6 @@
     mAllocatedBuffers.clear();
 }
 
-std::string GrallocWrapper::dumpDebugInfo() {
-    return mGrallocHal->dumpDebugInfo();
-}
-
 std::pair<native_handle_t*, void*> GrallocWrapper::allocate(uint32_t size) {
     native_handle_t* bufferHandle = mGrallocHal->allocate(size);
     void* buffer = nullptr;
diff --git a/sensors/common/vts/utils/include/sensors-vts-utils/GrallocWrapper.h b/sensors/common/vts/utils/include/sensors-vts-utils/GrallocWrapper.h
index 41e6334..ebbcb2c 100644
--- a/sensors/common/vts/utils/include/sensors-vts-utils/GrallocWrapper.h
+++ b/sensors/common/vts/utils/include/sensors-vts-utils/GrallocWrapper.h
@@ -37,8 +37,6 @@
     // returns false, other methods are not safe to call.
     bool isInitialized() const { return (mGrallocHal != nullptr); };
 
-    std::string dumpDebugInfo();
-
     // Allocates a gralloc buffer suitable for direct channel sensors usage with the given size.
     // The buffer should be freed using freeBuffer when it's not needed anymore; otherwise it'll
     // be freed when this object is destroyed.
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Demux.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Demux.cpp
index da56041..b74f6ec 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Demux.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Demux.cpp
@@ -124,12 +124,12 @@
     }
 
     if (!mPcrFilterIds.empty()) {
-        ALOGE("[Demux] No PCR filter opened.");
         // Return the lowest pcr filter id in the default implementation as the av sync id
         _hidl_cb(Result::SUCCESS, *mPcrFilterIds.begin());
         return Void();
     }
 
+    ALOGE("[Demux] No PCR filter opened.");
     _hidl_cb(Result::INVALID_STATE, avSyncHwId);
     return Void();
 }
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Frontend.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Frontend.cpp
index 996b6ef..61bbbf8 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Frontend.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Frontend.cpp
@@ -254,7 +254,9 @@
 
 Return<Result> Frontend::setLnb(uint32_t /* lnb */) {
     ALOGV("%s", __FUNCTION__);
-
+    if (!supportsSatellite()) {
+        return Result::INVALID_STATE;
+    }
     return Result::SUCCESS;
 }
 
@@ -270,6 +272,10 @@
     return FRONTEND_STREAM_FILE;
 }
 
+bool Frontend::supportsSatellite() {
+    return mType == FrontendType::DVBS || mType == FrontendType::ISDBS ||
+           mType == FrontendType::ISDBS3;
+}
 }  // namespace implementation
 }  // namespace V1_0
 }  // namespace tuner
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Frontend.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Frontend.h
index 65537d7..c0d1613 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Frontend.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Frontend.h
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
 
   private:
     virtual ~Frontend();
+    bool supportsSatellite();
     sp<IFrontendCallback> mCallback;
     sp<Tuner> mTunerService;
     FrontendType mType = FrontendType::UNDEFINED;
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Tuner.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Tuner.cpp
index 821d83f..ae8070c 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Tuner.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/Tuner.cpp
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@
 
     DemuxCapabilities caps;
 
+    // IP filter can be an MMTP filter's data source.
+    caps.linkCaps = {0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00};
     _hidl_cb(Result::SUCCESS, caps);
     return Void();
 }
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index b152a29..1765915 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -23,8 +23,13 @@
         "DemuxTests.cpp",
         "FilterTests.cpp",
         "DvrTests.cpp",
+        "DescramblerTests.cpp",
+        "LnbTests.cpp",
     ],
     static_libs: [
+        "android.hardware.cas@1.0",
+        "android.hardware.cas@1.1",
+        "android.hardware.cas@1.2",
         "android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.0",
         "android.hidl.allocator@1.0",
         "android.hidl.memory@1.0",
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DemuxTests.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DemuxTests.cpp
index 6c32534..37a47d7 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DemuxTests.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DemuxTests.cpp
@@ -33,6 +33,19 @@
     return AssertionResult(status.isOk());
 }
 
+AssertionResult DemuxTests::getDemuxCaps(DemuxCapabilities& demuxCaps) {
+    if (!mDemux) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Test with openDemux first.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    Result status;
+    mService->getDemuxCaps([&](Result result, DemuxCapabilities caps) {
+        status = result;
+        demuxCaps = caps;
+    });
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
 AssertionResult DemuxTests::closeDemux() {
     EXPECT_TRUE(mDemux) << "Test with openDemux first.";
     auto status = mDemux->close();
@@ -40,23 +53,23 @@
     return AssertionResult(status.isOk());
 }
 
-void DemuxTests::getAvSyncId(sp<IFilter> filter, uint32_t& avSyncHwId) {
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemux) << "Demux is not opened yet.";
+AssertionResult DemuxTests::getAvSyncId(sp<IFilter> filter, uint32_t& avSyncHwId) {
+    EXPECT_TRUE(mDemux) << "Demux is not opened yet.";
     Result status;
     mDemux->getAvSyncHwId(filter, [&](Result result, uint32_t id) {
         status = result;
         avSyncHwId = id;
     });
-    ASSERT_TRUE(status == Result::SUCCESS) << "Fail to get avSyncHwId.";
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
 }
 
-void DemuxTests::getAvSyncTime(uint32_t avSyncId) {
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemux) << "Demux is not opened yet.";
+AssertionResult DemuxTests::getAvSyncTime(uint32_t avSyncId) {
+    EXPECT_TRUE(mDemux) << "Demux is not opened yet.";
     Result status;
     uint64_t syncTime;
     mDemux->getAvSyncTime(avSyncId, [&](Result result, uint64_t time) {
         status = result;
         syncTime = time;
     });
-    ASSERT_TRUE(status == Result::SUCCESS) << "Fail to get avSyncTime.";
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
 }
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DemuxTests.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DemuxTests.h
index 0443c67..b249ea8 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DemuxTests.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DemuxTests.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 using android::sp;
 using android::hardware::Return;
 using android::hardware::Void;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxCapabilities;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::IDemux;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::IFilter;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::ITuner;
@@ -43,8 +44,9 @@
 
     AssertionResult openDemux(sp<IDemux>& demux, uint32_t& demuxId);
     AssertionResult setDemuxFrontendDataSource(uint32_t frontendId);
-    void getAvSyncId(sp<IFilter> filter, uint32_t& avSyncHwId);
-    void getAvSyncTime(uint32_t avSyncId);
+    AssertionResult getAvSyncId(sp<IFilter> filter, uint32_t& avSyncHwId);
+    AssertionResult getAvSyncTime(uint32_t avSyncId);
+    AssertionResult getDemuxCaps(DemuxCapabilities& demuxCaps);
     AssertionResult closeDemux();
 
   protected:
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7440bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "DescramblerTests.h"
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::createCasPlugin(int32_t caSystemId) {
+    auto status = mMediaCasService->isSystemIdSupported(caSystemId);
+    if (!status.isOk() || !status) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Failed to check isSystemIdSupported.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    mCasListener = new MediaCasListener();
+    auto pluginStatus = mMediaCasService->createPluginExt(caSystemId, mCasListener);
+    if (!pluginStatus.isOk()) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Failed to createPluginExt.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    mCas = ICas::castFrom(pluginStatus);
+    if (mCas == nullptr) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Failed to get ICas.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::openCasSession(TunerKeyToken& sessionId,
+                                                 vector<uint8_t> hidlPvtData) {
+    Status sessionStatus;
+    SessionIntent intent = SessionIntent::LIVE;
+    ScramblingMode mode = ScramblingMode::RESERVED;
+    auto returnVoid =
+            mCas->openSession_1_2(intent, mode, [&](Status status, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& id) {
+                sessionStatus = status;
+                sessionId = id;
+            });
+    if (!returnVoid.isOk() || (sessionStatus != Status::OK)) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Failed to open cas session.");
+        mCas->closeSession(sessionId);
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    auto status = mCas->setSessionPrivateData(sessionId, hidlPvtData);
+    if (status != android::hardware::cas::V1_0::Status::OK) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Failed to set session private data");
+        mCas->closeSession(sessionId);
+        return failure();
+    }
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::getKeyToken(int32_t caSystemId, string provisonStr,
+                                              hidl_vec<uint8_t> hidlPvtData, TunerKeyToken& token) {
+    if (createCasPlugin(caSystemId) != success()) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] createCasPlugin failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    if (provisonStr.size() > 0) {
+        auto returnStatus = mCas->provision(hidl_string(provisonStr));
+        if (returnStatus != android::hardware::cas::V1_0::Status::OK) {
+            ALOGW("[vts] provision failed.");
+            return failure();
+        }
+    }
+
+    return openCasSession(token, hidlPvtData);
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::openDescrambler(uint32_t demuxId) {
+    Result status;
+    mService->openDescrambler([&](Result result, const sp<IDescrambler>& descrambler) {
+        mDescrambler = descrambler;
+        status = result;
+    });
+    if (status != Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] openDescrambler failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    status = mDescrambler->setDemuxSource(demuxId);
+    if (status != Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] setDemuxSource failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::setKeyToken(TunerKeyToken token) {
+    Result status;
+    if (mDescrambler) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Descrambler is not opened yet.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    status = mDescrambler->setKeyToken(token);
+    if (status == Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] setKeyToken failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::addPid(DemuxPid pid, sp<IFilter> optionalSourceFilter) {
+    Result status;
+    if (mDescrambler) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Descrambler is not opened yet.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    status = mDescrambler->addPid(pid, optionalSourceFilter);
+    if (status == Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] addPid failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::removePid(DemuxPid pid, sp<IFilter> optionalSourceFilter) {
+    Result status;
+    if (mDescrambler) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Descrambler is not opened yet.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    status = mDescrambler->removePid(pid, optionalSourceFilter);
+    if (status == Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] removePid failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::closeDescrambler() {
+    Result status;
+    if (mDescrambler) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Descrambler is not opened yet.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    status = mDescrambler->close();
+    mDescrambler = nullptr;
+    if (status == Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] close Descrambler failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::getDemuxPidFromFilterSettings(DemuxFilterType type,
+                                                                DemuxFilterSettings settings,
+                                                                DemuxPid& pid) {
+    switch (type.mainType) {
+        case DemuxFilterMainType::TS:
+            if (type.subType.tsFilterType() == DemuxTsFilterType::AUDIO ||
+                type.subType.tsFilterType() == DemuxTsFilterType::VIDEO) {
+                pid.tPid(settings.ts().tpid);
+            } else {
+                ALOGW("[vts] Not a media ts filter!");
+                return failure();
+            }
+            break;
+        case DemuxFilterMainType::MMTP:
+            if (type.subType.mmtpFilterType() == DemuxMmtpFilterType::AUDIO ||
+                type.subType.mmtpFilterType() == DemuxMmtpFilterType::VIDEO) {
+                pid.mmtpPid(settings.mmtp().mmtpPid);
+            } else {
+                ALOGW("[vts] Not a media mmtp filter!");
+                return failure();
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            ALOGW("[vts] Not a media filter!");
+            return failure();
+    }
+    return success();
+}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16d480d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.h
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android/hardware/cas/1.0/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/cas/1.2/ICas.h>
+#include <android/hardware/cas/1.2/ICasListener.h>
+#include <android/hardware/cas/1.2/IMediaCasService.h>
+#include <android/hardware/cas/1.2/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/IDescrambler.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/IDvr.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/IDvrCallback.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/ITuner.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/types.h>
+#include <fmq/MessageQueue.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <hidl/HidlSupport.h>
+#include <hidl/Status.h>
+#include <utils/Condition.h>
+#include <utils/Mutex.h>
+#include <fstream>
+#include <iostream>
+#include <map>
+
+using android::Condition;
+using android::Mutex;
+using android::sp;
+using android::hardware::EventFlag;
+using android::hardware::hidl_handle;
+using android::hardware::hidl_string;
+using android::hardware::hidl_vec;
+using android::hardware::kSynchronizedReadWrite;
+using android::hardware::MessageQueue;
+using android::hardware::MQDescriptorSync;
+using android::hardware::Return;
+using android::hardware::Void;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::ICas;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::ICasListener;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::IMediaCasService;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::ScramblingMode;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::SessionIntent;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::Status;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::StatusEvent;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterMainType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterSettings;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterStatus;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxMmtpFilterType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxPid;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxTsFilterType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::IDescrambler;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::IFilter;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::ITuner;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::Result;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::TunerKeyToken;
+
+using ::testing::AssertionResult;
+
+using namespace std;
+
+class MediaCasListener : public ICasListener {
+  public:
+    virtual Return<void> onEvent(int32_t /*event*/, int32_t /*arg*/,
+                                 const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& /*data*/) override {
+        return Void();
+    }
+
+    virtual Return<void> onSessionEvent(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& /*sessionId*/, int32_t /*event*/,
+                                        int32_t /*arg*/,
+                                        const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& /*data*/) override {
+        return Void();
+    }
+
+    virtual Return<void> onStatusUpdate(StatusEvent /*event*/, int32_t /*arg*/) override {
+        return Void();
+    }
+};
+
+class DescramblerTests {
+  public:
+    void setService(sp<ITuner> tuner) { mService = tuner; }
+    void setCasService(sp<IMediaCasService> casService) { mMediaCasService = casService; }
+
+    AssertionResult setKeyToken(TunerKeyToken token);
+    AssertionResult openDescrambler(uint32_t demuxId);
+    AssertionResult addPid(DemuxPid pid, sp<IFilter> optionalSourceFilter);
+    AssertionResult removePid(DemuxPid pid, sp<IFilter> optionalSourceFilter);
+    AssertionResult closeDescrambler();
+    AssertionResult getKeyToken(int32_t caSystemId, string provisonStr,
+                                hidl_vec<uint8_t> hidlPvtData, TunerKeyToken& token);
+    AssertionResult getDemuxPidFromFilterSettings(DemuxFilterType type,
+                                                  DemuxFilterSettings settings, DemuxPid& pid);
+
+  protected:
+    static AssertionResult failure() { return ::testing::AssertionFailure(); }
+
+    static AssertionResult success() { return ::testing::AssertionSuccess(); }
+
+    sp<ITuner> mService;
+    sp<ICas> mCas;
+    sp<IMediaCasService> mMediaCasService;
+    sp<MediaCasListener> mCasListener;
+    sp<IDescrambler> mDescrambler;
+
+  private:
+    AssertionResult openCasSession(TunerKeyToken& sessionId, vector<uint8_t> hidlPvtData);
+    AssertionResult createCasPlugin(int32_t caSystemId);
+};
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FilterTests.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FilterTests.cpp
index 4639e59..ca8bd19 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FilterTests.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FilterTests.cpp
@@ -197,6 +197,26 @@
     return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
 }
 
+AssertionResult FilterTests::setFilterDataSource(uint32_t sourceFilterId, uint32_t sinkFilterId) {
+    if (!mFilters[sourceFilterId] || !mFilters[sinkFilterId]) {
+        ALOGE("[vts] setFilterDataSource filter not opened.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    auto status = mFilters[sinkFilterId]->setDataSource(mFilters[sourceFilterId]);
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
+AssertionResult FilterTests::setFilterDataSourceToDemux(uint32_t filterId) {
+    if (!mFilters[filterId]) {
+        ALOGE("[vts] setFilterDataSourceToDemux filter not opened.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    auto status = mFilters[filterId]->setDataSource(NULL);
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
 AssertionResult FilterTests::startFilter(uint32_t filterId) {
     EXPECT_TRUE(mFilters[filterId]) << "Test with getNewlyOpenedFilterId first.";
     Result status = mFilters[filterId]->start();
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FilterTests.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FilterTests.h
index 71efce4..2aa1b90 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FilterTests.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FilterTests.h
@@ -154,6 +154,8 @@
     AssertionResult getNewlyOpenedFilterId(uint32_t& filterId);
     AssertionResult configFilter(DemuxFilterSettings setting, uint32_t filterId);
     AssertionResult getFilterMQDescriptor(uint32_t filterId);
+    AssertionResult setFilterDataSource(uint32_t sourceFilterId, uint32_t sinkFilterId);
+    AssertionResult setFilterDataSourceToDemux(uint32_t filterId);
     AssertionResult startFilter(uint32_t filterId);
     AssertionResult stopFilter(uint32_t filterId);
     AssertionResult closeFilter(uint32_t filterId);
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FrontendTests.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FrontendTests.cpp
index d54a959..d094510 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FrontendTests.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FrontendTests.cpp
@@ -371,6 +371,14 @@
     return AssertionResult(true);
 }
 
+AssertionResult FrontendTests::setLnb(uint32_t lnbId) {
+    if (!mFrontendCallback) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] open and set frontend callback first.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    return AssertionResult(mFrontend->setLnb(lnbId) == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
 AssertionResult FrontendTests::stopTuneFrontend() {
     EXPECT_TRUE(mFrontend) << "Test with openFrontendById first.";
     Result status;
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FrontendTests.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FrontendTests.h
index 2bdc8fd..b8b9f47 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FrontendTests.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/FrontendTests.h
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
     AssertionResult scanFrontend(FrontendConfig config, FrontendScanType type);
     AssertionResult stopScanFrontend();
     AssertionResult tuneFrontend(FrontendConfig config);
+    AssertionResult setLnb(uint32_t lnbId);
     void verifyFrontendStatus(vector<FrontendStatusType> statusTypes,
                               vector<FrontendStatus> expectStatuses);
     AssertionResult stopTuneFrontend();
@@ -119,6 +120,9 @@
     void scanTest(FrontendConfig frontend, FrontendScanType type);
 
   protected:
+    static AssertionResult failure() { return ::testing::AssertionFailure(); }
+    static AssertionResult success() { return ::testing::AssertionSuccess(); }
+
     sp<IFrontend> mFrontend;
     FrontendInfo mFrontendInfo;
     sp<FrontendCallback> mFrontendCallback;
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/LnbTests.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/LnbTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9080f59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/LnbTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "LnbTests.h"
+
+Return<void> LnbCallback::onEvent(LnbEventType lnbEventType) {
+    android::Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mMsgLock);
+    ALOGD("[vts] lnb event received. Type: %d", lnbEventType);
+    mEventReceived = true;
+    mMsgCondition.signal();
+    return Void();
+}
+
+Return<void> LnbCallback::onDiseqcMessage(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& diseqcMessage) {
+    string msg(diseqcMessage.begin(), diseqcMessage.end());
+    ALOGD("[vts] onDiseqcMessage %s", msg.c_str());
+    return Void();
+}
+
+AssertionResult LnbTests::getLnbIds(vector<uint32_t>& ids) {
+    Result status;
+    mService->getLnbIds([&](Result result, const hidl_vec<uint32_t>& lnbIds) {
+        status = result;
+        ids = lnbIds;
+    });
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
+AssertionResult LnbTests::openLnbById(uint32_t lnbId) {
+    Result status;
+    mService->openLnbById(lnbId, [&](Result result, const sp<ILnb>& lnb) {
+        mLnb = lnb;
+        status = result;
+    });
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
+AssertionResult LnbTests::openLnbByName(string lnbName) {
+    Result status;
+    mService->openLnbByName(lnbName, [&](Result result, uint32_t /*lnbId*/, const sp<ILnb>& lnb) {
+        mLnb = lnb;
+        status = result;
+    });
+
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
+AssertionResult LnbTests::setLnbCallback() {
+    if (!mLnb) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Open Lnb first");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    mLnbCallback = new LnbCallback();
+    auto callbackStatus = mLnb->setCallback(mLnbCallback);
+    return AssertionResult(callbackStatus.isOk());
+}
+
+AssertionResult LnbTests::setVoltage(LnbVoltage voltage) {
+    if (!mLnb) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Open Lnb first");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    Result status = mLnb->setVoltage(voltage);
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
+AssertionResult LnbTests::setTone(LnbTone tone) {
+    if (!mLnb) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Open Lnb first");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    Result status = mLnb->setTone(tone);
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
+AssertionResult LnbTests::setSatellitePosition(LnbPosition position) {
+    if (!mLnb) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Open Lnb first");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    Result status = mLnb->setSatellitePosition(position);
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
+AssertionResult LnbTests::sendDiseqcMessage(vector<uint8_t> diseqcMsg) {
+    if (!mLnb) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Open Lnb first");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    Result status = mLnb->sendDiseqcMessage(diseqcMsg);
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
+
+AssertionResult LnbTests::closeLnb() {
+    if (!mLnb) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Open Lnb first");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    Result status = mLnb->close();
+    mLnb = nullptr;
+    mLnbCallback = nullptr;
+    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
+}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/LnbTests.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/LnbTests.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fdbe2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/LnbTests.h
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/ILnb.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/ITuner.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/types.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <hidl/HidlSupport.h>
+#include <hidl/HidlTransportSupport.h>
+#include <hidl/ServiceManagement.h>
+#include <hidl/Status.h>
+#include <hidlmemory/FrameworkUtils.h>
+#include <utils/Condition.h>
+#include <utils/Mutex.h>
+#include <map>
+
+using android::Condition;
+using android::Mutex;
+using android::sp;
+using android::hardware::hidl_vec;
+using android::hardware::Return;
+using android::hardware::Void;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::ILnb;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::ILnbCallback;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::ITuner;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::LnbEventType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::LnbPosition;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::LnbTone;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::LnbVoltage;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::Result;
+
+using ::testing::AssertionResult;
+
+using namespace std;
+
+class LnbCallback : public ILnbCallback {
+  public:
+    virtual Return<void> onEvent(LnbEventType lnbEventType) override;
+    virtual Return<void> onDiseqcMessage(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& diseqcMessage) override;
+
+  private:
+    bool mEventReceived = false;
+    android::Mutex mMsgLock;
+    android::Condition mMsgCondition;
+};
+
+class LnbTests {
+  public:
+    void setService(sp<ITuner> tuner) { mService = tuner; }
+
+    AssertionResult getLnbIds(vector<uint32_t>& ids);
+    AssertionResult openLnbById(uint32_t lnbId);
+    AssertionResult openLnbByName(string lnbName);
+    AssertionResult setLnbCallback();
+    AssertionResult setVoltage(LnbVoltage voltage);
+    AssertionResult setTone(LnbTone tone);
+    AssertionResult setSatellitePosition(LnbPosition position);
+    AssertionResult sendDiseqcMessage(vector<uint8_t> diseqcMsg);
+    AssertionResult closeLnb();
+
+  protected:
+    static AssertionResult failure() { return ::testing::AssertionFailure(); }
+
+    static AssertionResult success() { return ::testing::AssertionSuccess(); }
+
+    sp<ITuner> mService;
+    sp<ILnb> mLnb;
+    sp<LnbCallback> mLnbCallback;
+    hidl_vec<uint32_t> mLnbIds;
+};
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index 9ac42da..732090e 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -18,53 +18,17 @@
 
 namespace {
 
-AssertionResult TunerHidlTest::createDescrambler(uint32_t demuxId) {
-    Result status;
-    mService->openDescrambler([&](Result result, const sp<IDescrambler>& descrambler) {
-        mDescrambler = descrambler;
-        status = result;
-    });
-    if (status != Result::SUCCESS) {
-        return failure();
-    }
-
-    status = mDescrambler->setDemuxSource(demuxId);
-    if (status != Result::SUCCESS) {
-        return failure();
-    }
-
-    // Test if demux source can be set more than once.
-    status = mDescrambler->setDemuxSource(demuxId);
-    return AssertionResult(status == Result::INVALID_STATE);
-}
-
-AssertionResult TunerHidlTest::closeDescrambler() {
-    Result status;
-    EXPECT_TRUE(mDescrambler);
-
-    status = mDescrambler->close();
-    mDescrambler = nullptr;
-    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
-}
-
 AssertionResult TunerBroadcastHidlTest::filterDataOutputTest(vector<string> /*goldenOutputFiles*/) {
-    // Data Verify Module
-    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>>::iterator it;
-    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>> filterCallbacks = mFilterTests.getFilterCallbacks();
-    for (it = filterCallbacks.begin(); it != filterCallbacks.end(); it++) {
-        it->second->testFilterDataOutput();
-    }
-    return success();
+    return filterDataOutputTestBase(mFilterTests);
 }
 
 AssertionResult TunerPlaybackHidlTest::filterDataOutputTest(vector<string> /*goldenOutputFiles*/) {
-    // Data Verify Module
-    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>>::iterator it;
-    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>> filterCallbacks = mFilterTests.getFilterCallbacks();
-    for (it = filterCallbacks.begin(); it != filterCallbacks.end(); it++) {
-        it->second->testFilterDataOutput();
-    }
-    return success();
+    return filterDataOutputTestBase(mFilterTests);
+}
+
+AssertionResult TunerDescramblerHidlTest::filterDataOutputTest(
+        vector<string> /*goldenOutputFiles*/) {
+    return filterDataOutputTestBase(mFilterTests);
 }
 
 void TunerFilterHidlTest::configSingleFilterInDemuxTest(FilterConfig filterConf,
@@ -108,6 +72,9 @@
     }
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+    if (mLnbId) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setLnb(*mLnbId));
+    }
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
     mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
@@ -126,6 +93,26 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
 }
 
+void TunerBroadcastHidlTest::broadcastSingleFilterTestWithLnb(FilterConfig filterConf,
+                                                              FrontendConfig frontendConf,
+                                                              LnbConfig lnbConf) {
+    vector<uint32_t> ids;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.getLnbIds(ids));
+    if (!lnbConf.usingLnb) {
+        return;
+    }
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ids.size() > 0);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.openLnbById(ids[0]));
+    *mLnbId = ids[0];
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setLnbCallback());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setVoltage(lnbConf.voltage));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setTone(lnbConf.tone));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setSatellitePosition(lnbConf.position));
+    broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterConf, frontendConf);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.closeLnb());
+    mLnbId = nullptr;
+}
+
 void TunerPlaybackHidlTest::playbackSingleFilterTest(FilterConfig filterConf, DvrConfig dvrConf) {
     uint32_t demuxId;
     sp<IDemux> demux;
@@ -165,6 +152,9 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+    if (mLnbId) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setLnb(*mLnbId));
+    }
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
     mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
@@ -195,6 +185,26 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
 }
 
+void TunerRecordHidlTest::recordSingleFilterTestWithLnb(FilterConfig filterConf,
+                                                        FrontendConfig frontendConf,
+                                                        DvrConfig dvrConf, LnbConfig lnbConf) {
+    vector<uint32_t> ids;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.getLnbIds(ids));
+    if (!lnbConf.usingLnb) {
+        return;
+    }
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ids.size() > 0);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.openLnbById(ids[0]));
+    *mLnbId = ids[0];
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setLnbCallback());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setVoltage(lnbConf.voltage));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setTone(lnbConf.tone));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setSatellitePosition(lnbConf.position));
+    recordSingleFilterTest(filterConf, frontendConf, dvrConf);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.closeLnb());
+    mLnbId = nullptr;
+}
+
 void TunerRecordHidlTest::attachSingleFilterToRecordDvrTest(FilterConfig filterConf,
                                                             FrontendConfig frontendConf,
                                                             DvrConfig dvrConf) {
@@ -233,6 +243,69 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
 }
 
+void TunerDescramblerHidlTest::scrambledBroadcastTest(set<struct FilterConfig> mediaFilterConfs,
+                                                      FrontendConfig frontendConf,
+                                                      DescramblerConfig descConfig) {
+    uint32_t feId;
+    uint32_t demuxId;
+    sp<IDemux> demux;
+    set<uint32_t> filterIds;
+    uint32_t filterId;
+    set<struct FilterConfig>::iterator config;
+    set<uint32_t>::iterator id;
+
+    mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
+    if (feId == INVALID_ID) {
+        // TODO broadcast test on Cuttlefish needs licensed ts input,
+        // these tests are runnable on vendor device with real frontend module
+        // or with manual ts installing and use DVBT frontend.
+        return;
+    }
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+    mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
+    for (config = mediaFilterConfs.begin(); config != mediaFilterConfs.end(); config++) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux((*config).type, (*config).bufferSize));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.getNewlyOpenedFilterId(filterId));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.configFilter((*config).settings, filterId));
+        filterIds.insert(filterId);
+    }
+    mDescramblerTests.openDescrambler(demuxId);
+    TunerKeyToken token;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDescramblerTests.getKeyToken(descConfig.casSystemId, descConfig.provisionStr,
+                                              descConfig.hidlPvtData, token));
+    mDescramblerTests.setKeyToken(token);
+    vector<DemuxPid> pids;
+    DemuxPid pid;
+    for (config = mediaFilterConfs.begin(); config != mediaFilterConfs.end(); config++) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDescramblerTests.getDemuxPidFromFilterSettings((*config).type,
+                                                                    (*config).settings, pid));
+        pids.push_back(pid);
+        mDescramblerTests.addPid(pid, nullptr);
+    }
+    for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.startFilter(*id));
+    }
+    // tune test
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(filterDataOutputTest(goldenOutputFiles));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend());
+    for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.stopFilter(*id));
+    }
+    for (auto pid : pids) {
+        mDescramblerTests.removePid(pid, nullptr);
+    }
+    mDescramblerTests.closeDescrambler();
+    for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(*id));
+    }
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+}
+
 TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, TuneFrontend) {
     description("Tune one Frontend with specific setting and check Lock event");
     mFrontendTests.tuneTest(frontendArray[DVBT]);
@@ -248,6 +321,34 @@
     mFrontendTests.scanTest(frontendScanArray[SCAN_DVBT], FrontendScanType::SCAN_BLIND);
 }
 
+TEST_P(TunerLnbHidlTest, OpenLnbByName) {
+    description("Open and configure an Lnb with name then send a diseqc msg to it.");
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.openLnbByName(lnbArray[LNB_EXTERNAL].name));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setLnbCallback());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setVoltage(lnbArray[LNB_EXTERNAL].voltage));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setTone(lnbArray[LNB_EXTERNAL].tone));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setSatellitePosition(lnbArray[LNB_EXTERNAL].position));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.sendDiseqcMessage(diseqcMsgArray[DISEQC_POWER_ON]));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.closeLnb());
+}
+
+TEST_P(TunerLnbHidlTest, SendDiseqcMessageToLnb) {
+    description("Open and configure an Lnb with specific settings then send a diseqc msg to it.");
+    vector<uint32_t> ids;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.getLnbIds(ids));
+    if (!lnbArray[LNB0].usingLnb) {
+        return;
+    }
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ids.size() > 0);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.openLnbById(ids[0]));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setLnbCallback());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setVoltage(lnbArray[LNB0].voltage));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setTone(lnbArray[LNB0].tone));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.setSatellitePosition(lnbArray[LNB0].position));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.sendDiseqcMessage(diseqcMsgArray[DISEQC_POWER_ON]));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.closeLnb());
+}
+
 TEST_P(TunerDemuxHidlTest, openDemux) {
     description("Open and close a Demux.");
     uint32_t feId;
@@ -304,23 +405,58 @@
     configSingleFilterInDemuxTest(filterArray[TS_VIDEO0], frontendArray[DVBT]);
 }
 
+TEST_P(TunerFilterHidlTest, SetFilterLinkage) {
+    description("Pick up all the possible linkages from the demux caps and set them up.");
+    DemuxCapabilities caps;
+    uint32_t demuxId;
+    sp<IDemux> demux;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.getDemuxCaps(caps));
+    mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
+    for (int i = 0; i < caps.linkCaps.size(); i++) {
+        uint32_t bitMask = 1;
+        for (int j = 0; j < FILTER_MAIN_TYPE_BIT_COUNT; j++) {
+            if (caps.linkCaps[i] & (bitMask << j)) {
+                uint32_t sourceFilterId;
+                uint32_t sinkFilterId;
+                ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux(filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][i],
+                                                           FMQ_SIZE_16M));
+                ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.getNewlyOpenedFilterId(sourceFilterId));
+                ASSERT_TRUE(
+                        mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux(filterLinkageTypes[SINK][j], FMQ_SIZE_16M));
+                ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.getNewlyOpenedFilterId(sinkFilterId));
+                ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.setFilterDataSource(sourceFilterId, sinkFilterId));
+                ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.setFilterDataSourceToDemux(sinkFilterId));
+                ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(sinkFilterId));
+                ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(sourceFilterId));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
+}
+
 TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowVideoFilterTest) {
     description("Test Video Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
-    broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterArray[TS_VIDEO1], frontendArray[DVBS]);
+    broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterArray[TS_VIDEO1], frontendArray[DVBT]);
 }
 
 TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowAudioFilterTest) {
     description("Test Audio Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
-    broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterArray[TS_AUDIO0], frontendArray[DVBS]);
+    broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterArray[TS_AUDIO0], frontendArray[DVBT]);
 }
 
 TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowSectionFilterTest) {
     description("Test Section Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
-    broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterArray[TS_SECTION0], frontendArray[DVBS]);
+    broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterArray[TS_SECTION0], frontendArray[DVBT]);
 }
 
 TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, IonBufferTest) {
     description("Test the av filter data bufferring.");
+    broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterArray[TS_VIDEO0], frontendArray[DVBT]);
+}
+
+TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, LnbBroadcastDataFlowVideoFilterTest) {
+    description("Test Video Filter functionality in Broadcast with Lnb use case.");
     broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterArray[TS_VIDEO0], frontendArray[DVBS]);
 }
 
@@ -341,7 +477,12 @@
     recordSingleFilterTest(filterArray[TS_RECORD0], frontendArray[DVBT], dvrArray[DVR_RECORD0]);
 }
 
-TEST_P(TunerHidlTest, CreateDescrambler) {
+TEST_P(TunerRecordHidlTest, LnbRecordDataFlowWithTsRecordFilterTest) {
+    description("Feed ts data from Fe with Lnb to recording and test with ts record filter");
+    recordSingleFilterTest(filterArray[TS_RECORD0], frontendArray[DVBS], dvrArray[DVR_RECORD0]);
+}
+
+TEST_P(TunerDescramblerHidlTest, CreateDescrambler) {
     description("Create Descrambler");
     uint32_t feId;
     uint32_t demuxId;
@@ -352,18 +493,31 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(createDescrambler(demuxId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(closeDescrambler());
+    mDescramblerTests.openDescrambler(demuxId);
+    mDescramblerTests.closeDescrambler();
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
 }
 
+TEST_P(TunerDescramblerHidlTest, ScrambledBroadcastDataFlowMediaFiltersTest) {
+    description("Test ts audio filter in scrambled broadcast use case");
+    set<FilterConfig> filterConfs;
+    filterConfs.insert(filterArray[TS_AUDIO0]);
+    filterConfs.insert(filterArray[TS_VIDEO1]);
+    scrambledBroadcastTest(filterConfs, frontendArray[DVBT], descramblerArray[DESC_0]);
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
         PerInstance, TunerFrontendHidlTest,
         testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(ITuner::descriptor)),
         android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
 
 INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
+        PerInstance, TunerLnbHidlTest,
+        testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(ITuner::descriptor)),
+        android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
+
+INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
         PerInstance, TunerDemuxHidlTest,
         testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(ITuner::descriptor)),
         android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
@@ -389,7 +543,7 @@
         android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
 
 INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
-        PerInstance, TunerHidlTest,
+        PerInstance, TunerDescramblerHidlTest,
         testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(ITuner::descriptor)),
         android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
 }  // namespace
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.h
index 6dddc38..d71222b 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.h
@@ -14,19 +14,15 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
-#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/IDescrambler.h>
-
 #include "DemuxTests.h"
+#include "DescramblerTests.h"
 #include "DvrTests.h"
 #include "FrontendTests.h"
+#include "LnbTests.h"
 
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DataFormat;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::IDescrambler;
 
-static AssertionResult failure() {
-    return ::testing::AssertionFailure();
-}
-
 static AssertionResult success() {
     return ::testing::AssertionSuccess();
 }
@@ -36,8 +32,20 @@
 void initConfiguration() {
     initFrontendConfig();
     initFrontendScanConfig();
+    initLnbConfig();
     initFilterConfig();
     initDvrConfig();
+    initDescramblerConfig();
+}
+
+AssertionResult filterDataOutputTestBase(FilterTests tests) {
+    // Data Verify Module
+    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>>::iterator it;
+    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>> filterCallbacks = tests.getFilterCallbacks();
+    for (it = filterCallbacks.begin(); it != filterCallbacks.end(); it++) {
+        it->second->testFilterDataOutput();
+    }
+    return success();
 }
 
 class TunerFrontendHidlTest : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
@@ -59,6 +67,25 @@
     FrontendTests mFrontendTests;
 };
 
+class TunerLnbHidlTest : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
+  public:
+    virtual void SetUp() override {
+        mService = ITuner::getService(GetParam());
+        ASSERT_NE(mService, nullptr);
+        initConfiguration();
+
+        mLnbTests.setService(mService);
+    }
+
+  protected:
+    static void description(const std::string& description) {
+        RecordProperty("description", description);
+    }
+
+    sp<ITuner> mService;
+    LnbTests mLnbTests;
+};
+
 class TunerDemuxHidlTest : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
   public:
     virtual void SetUp() override {
@@ -117,6 +144,7 @@
         mFrontendTests.setService(mService);
         mDemuxTests.setService(mService);
         mFilterTests.setService(mService);
+        mLnbTests.setService(mService);
     }
 
   protected:
@@ -128,10 +156,16 @@
     FrontendTests mFrontendTests;
     DemuxTests mDemuxTests;
     FilterTests mFilterTests;
+    LnbTests mLnbTests;
 
     AssertionResult filterDataOutputTest(vector<string> goldenOutputFiles);
 
     void broadcastSingleFilterTest(FilterConfig filterConf, FrontendConfig frontendConf);
+    void broadcastSingleFilterTestWithLnb(FilterConfig filterConf, FrontendConfig frontendConf,
+                                          LnbConfig lnbConf);
+
+  private:
+    uint32_t* mLnbId = nullptr;
 };
 
 class TunerPlaybackHidlTest : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
@@ -174,6 +208,7 @@
         mDemuxTests.setService(mService);
         mFilterTests.setService(mService);
         mDvrTests.setService(mService);
+        mLnbTests.setService(mService);
     }
 
   protected:
@@ -185,23 +220,33 @@
                                            DvrConfig dvrConf);
     void recordSingleFilterTest(FilterConfig filterConf, FrontendConfig frontendConf,
                                 DvrConfig dvrConf);
+    void recordSingleFilterTestWithLnb(FilterConfig filterConf, FrontendConfig frontendConf,
+                                       DvrConfig dvrConf, LnbConfig lnbConf);
 
     sp<ITuner> mService;
     FrontendTests mFrontendTests;
     DemuxTests mDemuxTests;
     FilterTests mFilterTests;
     DvrTests mDvrTests;
+    LnbTests mLnbTests;
+
+  private:
+    uint32_t* mLnbId = nullptr;
 };
 
-class TunerHidlTest : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
+class TunerDescramblerHidlTest : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
   public:
     virtual void SetUp() override {
         mService = ITuner::getService(GetParam());
+        mCasService = IMediaCasService::getService();
         ASSERT_NE(mService, nullptr);
+        ASSERT_NE(mCasService, nullptr);
         initConfiguration();
 
         mFrontendTests.setService(mService);
         mDemuxTests.setService(mService);
+        mDescramblerTests.setService(mService);
+        mDescramblerTests.setCasService(mCasService);
     }
 
   protected:
@@ -209,13 +254,15 @@
         RecordProperty("description", description);
     }
 
+    void scrambledBroadcastTest(set<struct FilterConfig> mediaFilterConfs,
+                                FrontendConfig frontendConf, DescramblerConfig descConfig);
+    AssertionResult filterDataOutputTest(vector<string> /*goldenOutputFiles*/);
+
     sp<ITuner> mService;
+    sp<IMediaCasService> mCasService;
     FrontendTests mFrontendTests;
     DemuxTests mDemuxTests;
-
-    sp<IDescrambler> mDescrambler;
-
-    AssertionResult createDescrambler(uint32_t demuxId);
-    AssertionResult closeDescrambler();
+    FilterTests mFilterTests;
+    DescramblerTests mDescramblerTests;
 };
 }  // namespace
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
index 287f673..1d47636 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
@@ -22,11 +22,15 @@
 #include <hidlmemory/FrameworkUtils.h>
 
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DataFormat;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxAlpFilterType;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterEvent;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterMainType;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterSettings;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxIpFilterType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxMmtpFilterType;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxRecordScIndexType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxTlvFilterType;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxTpid;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxTsFilterType;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DvrSettings;
@@ -43,6 +47,9 @@
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendStatus;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendStatusType;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::LnbPosition;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::LnbTone;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::LnbVoltage;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::PlaybackSettings;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::RecordSettings;
 
@@ -52,6 +59,20 @@
 const uint32_t FMQ_SIZE_4M = 0x400000;
 const uint32_t FMQ_SIZE_16M = 0x1000000;
 
+#define CLEAR_KEY_SYSTEM_ID 0xF6D8
+#define FILTER_MAIN_TYPE_BIT_COUNT 32
+#define PROVISION_STR                                      \
+    "{                                                   " \
+    "  \"id\": 21140844,                                 " \
+    "  \"name\": \"Test Title\",                         " \
+    "  \"lowercase_organization_name\": \"Android\",     " \
+    "  \"asset_key\": {                                  " \
+    "  \"encryption_key\": \"nezAr3CHFrmBR9R8Tedotw==\"  " \
+    "  },                                                " \
+    "  \"cas_type\": 1,                                  " \
+    "  \"track_types\": [ ]                              " \
+    "}                                                   "
+
 typedef enum {
     TS_VIDEO0,
     TS_VIDEO1,
@@ -65,12 +86,29 @@
 } Filter;
 
 typedef enum {
+    SOURCE,
+    SINK,
+    LINKAGE_DIR,
+} Linkage;
+
+typedef enum {
     DVBT,
     DVBS,
     FRONTEND_MAX,
 } Frontend;
 
 typedef enum {
+    LNB0,
+    LNB_EXTERNAL,
+    LNB_MAX,
+} Lnb;
+
+typedef enum {
+    DISEQC_POWER_ON,
+    DISEQC_MAX,
+} Diseqc;
+
+typedef enum {
     SCAN_DVBT,
     SCAN_MAX,
 } FrontendScan;
@@ -81,10 +119,17 @@
     DVR_MAX,
 } Dvr;
 
+typedef enum {
+    DESC_0,
+    DESC_MAX,
+} Descrambler;
+
 struct FilterConfig {
     uint32_t bufferSize;
     DemuxFilterType type;
     DemuxFilterSettings settings;
+
+    bool operator<(const FilterConfig& /*c*/) const { return false; }
 };
 
 struct FrontendConfig {
@@ -94,6 +139,14 @@
     vector<FrontendStatus> expectTuneStatuses;
 };
 
+struct LnbConfig {
+    bool usingLnb;
+    string name;
+    LnbVoltage voltage;
+    LnbTone tone;
+    LnbPosition position;
+};
+
 struct ChannelConfig {
     int32_t frontendId;
     int32_t channelId;
@@ -109,11 +162,21 @@
     string playbackInputFile;
 };
 
+struct DescramblerConfig {
+    uint32_t casSystemId;
+    string provisionStr;
+    vector<uint8_t> hidlPvtData;
+};
+
 static FrontendConfig frontendArray[FILTER_MAX];
 static FrontendConfig frontendScanArray[SCAN_MAX];
+static LnbConfig lnbArray[LNB_MAX];
+static vector<uint8_t> diseqcMsgArray[DISEQC_MAX];
 static ChannelConfig channelArray[FRONTEND_MAX];
 static FilterConfig filterArray[FILTER_MAX];
+static DemuxFilterType filterLinkageTypes[LINKAGE_DIR][FILTER_MAIN_TYPE_BIT_COUNT];
 static DvrConfig dvrArray[DVR_MAX];
+static DescramblerConfig descramblerArray[DESC_MAX];
 static vector<string> goldenOutputFiles;
 
 /** Configuration array for the frontend tune test */
@@ -159,6 +222,24 @@
     });
 };
 
+/** Configuration array for the Lnb test */
+inline void initLnbConfig() {
+    lnbArray[LNB0].usingLnb = true;
+    lnbArray[LNB0].voltage = LnbVoltage::VOLTAGE_12V;
+    lnbArray[LNB0].tone = LnbTone::NONE;
+    lnbArray[LNB0].position = LnbPosition::UNDEFINED;
+    lnbArray[LNB_EXTERNAL].usingLnb = true;
+    lnbArray[LNB_EXTERNAL].name = "default_lnb_external";
+    lnbArray[LNB_EXTERNAL].voltage = LnbVoltage::VOLTAGE_5V;
+    lnbArray[LNB_EXTERNAL].tone = LnbTone::NONE;
+    lnbArray[LNB_EXTERNAL].position = LnbPosition::UNDEFINED;
+};
+
+/** Diseqc messages array for the Lnb test */
+inline void initDiseqcMsg() {
+    diseqcMsgArray[DISEQC_POWER_ON] = {0xE, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x3};
+};
+
 /** Configuration array for the filter test */
 inline void initFilterConfig() {
     // TS VIDEO filter setting for default implementation testing
@@ -214,6 +295,27 @@
     filterArray[TS_RECORD0].settings.ts().filterSettings.record({
             .scIndexType = DemuxRecordScIndexType::NONE,
     });
+
+    // TS Linkage filter setting
+    filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][0].mainType = DemuxFilterMainType::TS;
+    filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][0].subType.tsFilterType(DemuxTsFilterType::TS);
+    filterLinkageTypes[SINK][0] = filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][0];
+    // MMTP Linkage filter setting
+    filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][1].mainType = DemuxFilterMainType::MMTP;
+    filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][1].subType.mmtpFilterType(DemuxMmtpFilterType::AUDIO);
+    filterLinkageTypes[SINK][1] = filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][1];
+    // IP Linkage filter setting
+    filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][2].mainType = DemuxFilterMainType::IP;
+    filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][2].subType.ipFilterType(DemuxIpFilterType::IP);
+    filterLinkageTypes[SINK][2] = filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][2];
+    // TLV Linkage filter setting
+    filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][3].mainType = DemuxFilterMainType::TLV;
+    filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][3].subType.tlvFilterType(DemuxTlvFilterType::TLV);
+    filterLinkageTypes[SINK][3] = filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][3];
+    // ALP Linkage PTP filter setting
+    filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][4].mainType = DemuxFilterMainType::ALP;
+    filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][4].subType.alpFilterType(DemuxAlpFilterType::PTP);
+    filterLinkageTypes[SINK][4] = filterLinkageTypes[SOURCE][4];
 };
 
 /** Configuration array for the dvr test */
@@ -240,3 +342,10 @@
     dvrArray[DVR_PLAYBACK0].bufferSize = FMQ_SIZE_4M;
     dvrArray[DVR_PLAYBACK0].settings.playback(playbackSettings);
 };
+
+/** Configuration array for the descrambler test */
+inline void initDescramblerConfig() {
+    descramblerArray[DESC_0].casSystemId = CLEAR_KEY_SYSTEM_ID;
+    descramblerArray[DESC_0].provisionStr = PROVISION_STR;
+    descramblerArray[DESC_0].hidlPvtData.resize(256);
+};