diff --git a/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp b/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
index 550a2e0..f6860cf 100644
--- a/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/camera/provider/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalCameraProviderV2_4TargetTest.cpp
@@ -575,7 +575,10 @@
  }
  virtual void TearDown() override {}
 
- hidl_vec<hidl_string> getCameraDeviceNames(sp<ICameraProvider> provider);
+ hidl_vec<hidl_string> getCameraDeviceNames(sp<ICameraProvider> provider,
+                                            bool addSecureOnly = false);
+
+ bool isSecureOnly(sp<ICameraProvider> provider, const hidl_string& name);
 
  std::map<hidl_string, hidl_string> getCameraDeviceIdToNameMap(sp<ICameraProvider> provider);
 
@@ -799,6 +802,16 @@
             bool *useHalBufManager /*out*/,
             sp<DeviceCb> *cb /*out*/,
             uint32_t streamConfigCounter = 0);
+    void configureSingleStream(const std::string& name, int32_t deviceVersion,
+            sp<ICameraProvider> provider,
+            const AvailableStream* previewThreshold, uint64_t bufferUsage,
+            RequestTemplate reqTemplate,
+            sp<ICameraDeviceSession>* session /*out*/,
+            V3_2::Stream* previewStream /*out*/,
+            HalStreamConfiguration* halStreamConfig /*out*/,
+            bool* supportsPartialResults /*out*/,
+            uint32_t* partialResultCount /*out*/, bool* useHalBufManager /*out*/,
+            sp<DeviceCb>* cb /*out*/, uint32_t streamConfigCounter = 0);
 
     void verifyLogicalCameraMetadata(const std::string& cameraName,
             const ::android::sp<::android::hardware::camera::device::V3_2::ICameraDevice>& device,
@@ -875,6 +888,9 @@
     static Status getSystemCameraKind(const camera_metadata_t* staticMeta,
                                       SystemCameraKind* systemCameraKind);
 
+    void processCaptureRequestInternal(uint64_t bufferusage, RequestTemplate reqTemplate,
+                                       bool useSecureOnlyCameras);
+
     // Used by switchToOffline where a new result queue is created for offline reqs
     void updateInflightResultQueue(std::shared_ptr<ResultMetadataQueue> resultQueue);
 
@@ -1585,7 +1601,8 @@
     return idToNameMap;
 }
 
-hidl_vec<hidl_string> CameraHidlTest::getCameraDeviceNames(sp<ICameraProvider> provider) {
+hidl_vec<hidl_string> CameraHidlTest::getCameraDeviceNames(sp<ICameraProvider> provider,
+                                                           bool addSecureOnly) {
     std::vector<std::string> cameraDeviceNames;
     Return<void> ret;
     ret = provider->getCameraIdList(
@@ -1634,11 +1651,51 @@
         }
     }
 
-    hidl_vec<hidl_string> retList(cameraDeviceNames.size());
+    std::vector<hidl_string> retList;
     for (size_t i = 0; i < cameraDeviceNames.size(); i++) {
-        retList[i] = cameraDeviceNames[i];
+        bool isSecureOnlyCamera = isSecureOnly(mProvider, cameraDeviceNames[i]);
+        if (addSecureOnly) {
+            if (isSecureOnlyCamera) {
+                retList.emplace_back(cameraDeviceNames[i]);
+            }
+        } else if (!isSecureOnlyCamera) {
+            retList.emplace_back(cameraDeviceNames[i]);
+        }
     }
-    return retList;
+    hidl_vec<hidl_string> finalRetList = std::move(retList);
+    return finalRetList;
+}
+
+bool CameraHidlTest::isSecureOnly(sp<ICameraProvider> provider, const hidl_string& name) {
+    Return<void> ret;
+    ::android::sp<ICameraDevice> device3_x;
+    bool retVal = false;
+    if (getCameraDeviceVersion(mProviderType, name) == CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_1_0) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    ret = provider->getCameraDeviceInterface_V3_x(name, [&](auto status, const auto& device) {
+        ALOGI("getCameraDeviceInterface_V3_x returns status:%d", (int)status);
+        ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, status);
+        ASSERT_NE(device, nullptr);
+        device3_x = device;
+    });
+    if (!ret.isOk()) {
+        ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed to get camera device interface for " << name;
+    }
+    ret = device3_x->getCameraCharacteristics([&](Status s, CameraMetadata metadata) {
+        ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, s);
+        camera_metadata_t* chars = (camera_metadata_t*)metadata.data();
+        SystemCameraKind systemCameraKind = SystemCameraKind::PUBLIC;
+        Status status = getSystemCameraKind(chars, &systemCameraKind);
+        ASSERT_EQ(status, Status::OK);
+        if (systemCameraKind == SystemCameraKind::HIDDEN_SECURE_CAMERA) {
+            retVal = true;
+        }
+    });
+    if (!ret.isOk()) {
+        ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed to get camera characteristics for device " << name;
+    }
+    return retVal;
 }
 
 hidl_vec<hidl_vec<hidl_string>> CameraHidlTest::getConcurrentDeviceCombinations(
@@ -4316,8 +4373,21 @@
 
 // Generate and verify a camera capture request
 TEST_P(CameraHidlTest, processCaptureRequestPreview) {
-    hidl_vec<hidl_string> cameraDeviceNames = getCameraDeviceNames(mProvider);
-    AvailableStream previewThreshold = {kMaxPreviewWidth, kMaxPreviewHeight,
+    processCaptureRequestInternal(GRALLOC1_CONSUMER_USAGE_HWCOMPOSER, RequestTemplate::PREVIEW,
+                                  false /*secureOnlyCameras*/);
+}
+
+// Generate and verify a secure camera capture request
+TEST_P(CameraHidlTest, processSecureCaptureRequest) {
+    processCaptureRequestInternal(GRALLOC1_PRODUCER_USAGE_PROTECTED, RequestTemplate::STILL_CAPTURE,
+                                  true /*secureOnlyCameras*/);
+}
+
+void CameraHidlTest::processCaptureRequestInternal(uint64_t bufferUsage,
+                                                   RequestTemplate reqTemplate,
+                                                   bool useSecureOnlyCameras) {
+    hidl_vec<hidl_string> cameraDeviceNames = getCameraDeviceNames(mProvider, useSecureOnlyCameras);
+    AvailableStream streamThreshold = {kMaxPreviewWidth, kMaxPreviewHeight,
                                         static_cast<int32_t>(PixelFormat::IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED)};
     uint64_t bufferId = 1;
     uint32_t frameNumber = 1;
@@ -4333,17 +4403,17 @@
             return;
         }
 
-        V3_2::Stream previewStream;
+        V3_2::Stream testStream;
         HalStreamConfiguration halStreamConfig;
         sp<ICameraDeviceSession> session;
         sp<DeviceCb> cb;
         bool supportsPartialResults = false;
         bool useHalBufManager = false;
         uint32_t partialResultCount = 0;
-        configurePreviewStream(name, deviceVersion, mProvider, &previewThreshold, &session /*out*/,
-                &previewStream /*out*/, &halStreamConfig /*out*/,
-                &supportsPartialResults /*out*/,
-                &partialResultCount /*out*/, &useHalBufManager /*out*/, &cb /*out*/);
+        configureSingleStream(name, deviceVersion, mProvider, &streamThreshold, bufferUsage,
+                              reqTemplate, &session /*out*/, &testStream /*out*/,
+                              &halStreamConfig /*out*/, &supportsPartialResults /*out*/,
+                              &partialResultCount /*out*/, &useHalBufManager /*out*/, &cb /*out*/);
 
         std::shared_ptr<ResultMetadataQueue> resultQueue;
         auto resultQueueRet =
@@ -4364,7 +4434,6 @@
         InFlightRequest inflightReq = {1, false, supportsPartialResults,
                                        partialResultCount, resultQueue};
 
-        RequestTemplate reqTemplate = RequestTemplate::PREVIEW;
         Return<void> ret;
         ret = session->constructDefaultRequestSettings(reqTemplate,
                                                        [&](auto status, const auto& req) {
@@ -4383,7 +4452,7 @@
                             nullptr,
                             nullptr};
         } else {
-            allocateGraphicBuffer(previewStream.width, previewStream.height,
+            allocateGraphicBuffer(testStream.width, testStream.height,
                     android_convertGralloc1To0Usage(halStreamConfig.streams[0].producerUsage,
                         halStreamConfig.streams[0].consumerUsage),
                     halStreamConfig.streams[0].overrideFormat, &buffer_handle);
@@ -4432,7 +4501,7 @@
 
             ASSERT_FALSE(inflightReq.errorCodeValid);
             ASSERT_NE(inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers.size(), 0u);
-            ASSERT_EQ(previewStream.id, inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers[0].streamId);
+            ASSERT_EQ(testStream.id, inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers[0].streamId);
 
             request.frameNumber++;
             // Empty settings should be supported after the first call
@@ -4470,11 +4539,11 @@
 
             ASSERT_FALSE(inflightReq.errorCodeValid);
             ASSERT_NE(inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers.size(), 0u);
-            ASSERT_EQ(previewStream.id, inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers[0].streamId);
+            ASSERT_EQ(testStream.id, inflightReq.resultOutputBuffers[0].streamId);
         }
 
         if (useHalBufManager) {
-            verifyBuffersReturned(session, deviceVersion, previewStream.id, cb);
+            verifyBuffersReturned(session, deviceVersion, testStream.id, cb);
         }
 
         ret = session->close();
@@ -6278,6 +6347,19 @@
         bool *useHalBufManager /*out*/,
         sp<DeviceCb> *outCb /*out*/,
         uint32_t streamConfigCounter) {
+    configureSingleStream(name, deviceVersion, provider, previewThreshold,
+                          GRALLOC1_CONSUMER_USAGE_HWCOMPOSER, RequestTemplate::PREVIEW, session,
+                          previewStream, halStreamConfig, supportsPartialResults,
+                          partialResultCount, useHalBufManager, outCb, streamConfigCounter);
+}
+// Open a device session and configure a preview stream.
+void CameraHidlTest::configureSingleStream(
+        const std::string& name, int32_t deviceVersion, sp<ICameraProvider> provider,
+        const AvailableStream* previewThreshold, uint64_t bufferUsage, RequestTemplate reqTemplate,
+        sp<ICameraDeviceSession>* session /*out*/, V3_2::Stream* previewStream /*out*/,
+        HalStreamConfiguration* halStreamConfig /*out*/, bool* supportsPartialResults /*out*/,
+        uint32_t* partialResultCount /*out*/, bool* useHalBufManager /*out*/,
+        sp<DeviceCb>* outCb /*out*/, uint32_t streamConfigCounter) {
     ASSERT_NE(nullptr, session);
     ASSERT_NE(nullptr, previewStream);
     ASSERT_NE(nullptr, halStreamConfig);
@@ -6366,11 +6448,14 @@
             dataspaceFlag = static_cast<V3_2::DataspaceFlags>(Dataspace::UNKNOWN);
     }
 
-    V3_2::Stream stream3_2 = {0, StreamType::OUTPUT,
-            static_cast<uint32_t> (outputPreviewStreams[0].width),
-            static_cast<uint32_t> (outputPreviewStreams[0].height),
-            static_cast<PixelFormat> (outputPreviewStreams[0].format),
-            GRALLOC1_CONSUMER_USAGE_HWCOMPOSER, dataspaceFlag, StreamRotation::ROTATION_0};
+    V3_2::Stream stream3_2 = {0,
+                              StreamType::OUTPUT,
+                              static_cast<uint32_t>(outputPreviewStreams[0].width),
+                              static_cast<uint32_t>(outputPreviewStreams[0].height),
+                              static_cast<PixelFormat>(outputPreviewStreams[0].format),
+                              bufferUsage,
+                              dataspaceFlag,
+                              StreamRotation::ROTATION_0};
     ::android::hardware::hidl_vec<V3_2::Stream> streams3_2 = {stream3_2};
     ::android::hardware::camera::device::V3_2::StreamConfiguration config3_2;
     ::android::hardware::camera::device::V3_4::StreamConfiguration config3_4;
@@ -6378,7 +6463,6 @@
     createStreamConfiguration(streams3_2, StreamConfigurationMode::NORMAL_MODE,
                               &config3_2, &config3_4, &config3_5, jpegBufferSize);
     if (session3_5 != nullptr) {
-        RequestTemplate reqTemplate = RequestTemplate::PREVIEW;
         ret = session3_5->constructDefaultRequestSettings(reqTemplate,
                                                        [&config3_5](auto status, const auto& req) {
                                                            ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, status);
@@ -6401,7 +6485,6 @@
                     }
                 });
     } else if (session3_4 != nullptr) {
-        RequestTemplate reqTemplate = RequestTemplate::PREVIEW;
         ret = session3_4->constructDefaultRequestSettings(reqTemplate,
                                                        [&config3_4](auto status, const auto& req) {
                                                            ASSERT_EQ(Status::OK, status);
diff --git a/identity/aidl/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/Android.bp
index 7298c7d..14aef8e 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -18,5 +18,8 @@
             },
         },
     },
-    versions: ["1"],
+    versions: [
+        "1",
+        "2",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/.hash b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/.hash
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..036ce84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/.hash
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+194e04be642728623d65ec8321a3764fdea52ae0
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/Certificate.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/Certificate.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e3002d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/Certificate.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable Certificate {
+  byte[] encodedCertificate;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/CipherSuite.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/CipherSuite.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..447203f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/CipherSuite.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum CipherSuite {
+  CIPHERSUITE_ECDHE_HKDF_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256 = 1,
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/HardwareInformation.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/HardwareInformation.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1296e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/HardwareInformation.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable HardwareInformation {
+  @utf8InCpp String credentialStoreName;
+  @utf8InCpp String credentialStoreAuthorName;
+  int dataChunkSize;
+  boolean isDirectAccess;
+  @utf8InCpp String[] supportedDocTypes;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88104d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+interface IIdentityCredential {
+  byte[] deleteCredential();
+  byte[] createEphemeralKeyPair();
+  void setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(in byte[] publicKey);
+  long createAuthChallenge();
+  void startRetrieval(in android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile[] accessControlProfiles, in android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthToken authToken, in byte[] itemsRequest, in byte[] signingKeyBlob, in byte[] sessionTranscript, in byte[] readerSignature, in int[] requestCounts);
+  void startRetrieveEntryValue(in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize, in int[] accessControlProfileIds);
+  byte[] retrieveEntryValue(in byte[] encryptedContent);
+  void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
+  android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
+  void setRequestedNamespaces(in android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
+  void setVerificationToken(in android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken verificationToken);
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5dafb76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+interface IIdentityCredentialStore {
+  android.hardware.identity.HardwareInformation getHardwareInformation();
+  android.hardware.identity.IWritableIdentityCredential createCredential(in @utf8InCpp String docType, in boolean testCredential);
+  android.hardware.identity.IIdentityCredential getCredential(in android.hardware.identity.CipherSuite cipherSuite, in byte[] credentialData);
+  const int STATUS_OK = 0;
+  const int STATUS_FAILED = 1;
+  const int STATUS_CIPHER_SUITE_NOT_SUPPORTED = 2;
+  const int STATUS_INVALID_DATA = 3;
+  const int STATUS_INVALID_AUTH_TOKEN = 4;
+  const int STATUS_INVALID_ITEMS_REQUEST_MESSAGE = 5;
+  const int STATUS_READER_SIGNATURE_CHECK_FAILED = 6;
+  const int STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7;
+  const int STATUS_USER_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED = 8;
+  const int STATUS_READER_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED = 9;
+  const int STATUS_NO_ACCESS_CONTROL_PROFILES = 10;
+  const int STATUS_NOT_IN_REQUEST_MESSAGE = 11;
+  const int STATUS_SESSION_TRANSCRIPT_MISMATCH = 12;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5ac9d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+interface IWritableIdentityCredential {
+  android.hardware.identity.Certificate[] getAttestationCertificate(in byte[] attestationApplicationId, in byte[] attestationChallenge);
+  void startPersonalization(in int accessControlProfileCount, in int[] entryCounts);
+  android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile addAccessControlProfile(in int id, in android.hardware.identity.Certificate readerCertificate, in boolean userAuthenticationRequired, in long timeoutMillis, in long secureUserId);
+  void beginAddEntry(in int[] accessControlProfileIds, in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize);
+  byte[] addEntryValue(in byte[] content);
+  void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+  void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24ec26a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestDataItem {
+  @utf8InCpp String name;
+  long size;
+  int[] accessControlProfileIds;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af00f3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestNamespace {
+  @utf8InCpp String namespaceName;
+  android.hardware.identity.RequestDataItem[] items;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/SecureAccessControlProfile.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/SecureAccessControlProfile.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfc1ad0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/2/android/hardware/identity/SecureAccessControlProfile.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable SecureAccessControlProfile {
+  int id;
+  android.hardware.identity.Certificate readerCertificate;
+  boolean userAuthenticationRequired;
+  long timeoutMillis;
+  long secureUserId;
+  byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index 58b90b5..88104d9 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -27,4 +27,6 @@
   byte[] retrieveEntryValue(in byte[] encryptedContent);
   void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
   android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
+  void setRequestedNamespaces(in android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
+  void setVerificationToken(in android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken verificationToken);
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
index 32f283c..c5ac9d6 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -24,4 +24,5 @@
   void beginAddEntry(in int[] accessControlProfileIds, in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize);
   byte[] addEntryValue(in byte[] content);
   void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+  void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24ec26a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestDataItem {
+  @utf8InCpp String name;
+  long size;
+  int[] accessControlProfileIds;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af00f3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestNamespace {
+  @utf8InCpp String namespaceName;
+  android.hardware.identity.RequestDataItem[] items;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index 7d14f03..d7f47e8 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -17,8 +17,10 @@
 package android.hardware.identity;
 
 import android.hardware.identity.Certificate;
+import android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace;
 import android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile;
 import android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthToken;
+import android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken;
 
 @VintfStability
 interface IIdentityCredential {
@@ -70,10 +72,11 @@
 
     /**
      * Creates a challenge value to be used for proving successful user authentication. This
-     * is included in the authToken passed to the startRetrieval() method.
+     * is included in the authToken passed to the startRetrieval() method and the
+     * verificationToken passed to the setVerificationToken() method.
      *
      * This method may only be called once per instance. If called more than once, STATUS_FAILED
-     * will be returned.
+     * will be returned. If user authentication is not needed, this method may not be called.
      *
      * @return challenge, a non-zero number.
      */
@@ -82,6 +85,9 @@
     /**
      * Start an entry retrieval process.
      *
+     * The setRequestedNamespaces() and setVerificationToken() methods will be called before
+     * this method is called.
+     *
      * This method be called after createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(),
      * createAuthChallenge() and before startRetrieveEntry(). This method call is followed by
      * multiple calls of startRetrieveEntryValue(), retrieveEntryValue(), and finally
@@ -93,7 +99,19 @@
      * must be identical for each startRetrieval() invocation. If this is not the case, this call
      * fails with the STATUS_SESSION_TRANSCRIPT_MISMATCH error.
      *
-     * If the provided authToken is not valid this method fails with STATUS_INVALID_AUTH_TOKEN.
+     * If either authToken or verificationToken (as passed with setVerificationToken())
+     * is not valid this method fails with STATUS_INVALID_AUTH_TOKEN. Note that valid tokens
+     * are only passed if they are actually needed and available (this can be detected by
+     * the timestamp being set to zero). For example, if no data items with access control
+     * profiles using user authentication are requested, the tokens are not filled in.
+     * It's also possible that no usable auth token is actually available (it could be the user
+     * never unlocked the device within the timeouts in the access control profiles) and
+     * in this case the tokens aren't filled in either.
+     *
+     * For test credentials (identified by the testCredential boolean in the CredentialData
+     * CBOR created at provisioning time), the |mac| field in both the authToken and
+     * verificationToken should not be checked against the shared HMAC key (see IKeyMasterDevice
+     * for details). This is to enable VTS tests to check for correct behavior.
      *
      * Each of the provided accessControlProfiles is checked in this call. If they are not
      * all valid, the call fails with STATUS_INVALID_DATA.
@@ -176,7 +194,8 @@
      *
      * @param authToken
      *   The authentication token that proves the user was authenticated, as required
-     *   by one or more of the provided accessControlProfiles. See above.
+     *   by one or more of the provided accessControlProfiles. This token is only valid
+     *   if the timestamp field is non-zero. See above.
      *
      * @param itemsRequest
      *   If non-empty, contains request data that is signed by the reader. See above.
@@ -274,7 +293,7 @@
      *            "DeviceAuthentication",
      *            SessionTranscript,
      *            DocType,
-     *            DeviceNameSpaceBytes,
+     *            DeviceNameSpacesBytes,
      *        ]
      *
      *        DocType = tstr
@@ -343,4 +362,25 @@
      * @return an X.509 certificate for the new signing key, signed by the credential key.
      */
     Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
+
+    /**
+     * Sets the namespaces and data items (including their size and access control profiles)
+     * which will be requested. This method must be called before startRetrieval() is called.
+     *
+     * This information is provided to make it possible for a HAL implementation to
+     * incrementally build up cryptographically authenticated data which includes the
+     * DeviceNameSpaces CBOR.
+     *
+     * @param requestNamespaces Namespaces and data items which will be requested.
+     */
+    void setRequestedNamespaces(in RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
+
+   /**
+    * Sets the VerificationToken. This method must be called before startRetrieval() is
+    * called. This token uses the same challenge as returned by createAuthChallenge().
+    *
+    * @param verificationToken
+    *   The verification token. This token is only valid if the timestamp field is non-zero.
+    */
+    void setVerificationToken(in VerificationToken verificationToken);
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
index 07486e6..b7ad283 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -120,6 +120,8 @@
      *
      * startPersonalization must not be called more than once.
      *
+     * The setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize() method will be called before this method.
+     *
      * @param accessControlProfileCount specifies the number of access control profiles that will
      *     be provisioned with addAccessControlProfile().
      *
@@ -288,4 +290,16 @@
      */
     void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData,
         out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+
+    /**
+     * Sets the expected size of the ProofOfProvisioning returned by finishAddingEntries(). This
+     * method must be called before startPersonalization() is called.
+     *
+     * This information is provided to make it possible for a HAL implementation to
+     * incrementally build up cryptographically authenticated data which includes the
+     * ProofOfProvisioning CBOR.
+     *
+     * @param expectedProofOfProvisioningSize the expected size of ProofOfProvisioning.
+     */
+    void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05bc762
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestDataItem.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestDataItem {
+    /**
+     * The data item name being requested, for example "driving_privileges".
+     */
+    @utf8InCpp String name;
+
+    /**
+     * The size of the data item value.
+     *
+     * Data item values are always encoded as CBOR so this is the length of
+     * the CBOR encoding of the value.
+     */
+    long size;
+
+    /**
+     * The access control profile ids this data item is configured with.
+     */
+    int[] accessControlProfileIds;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d61506
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/RequestNamespace.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.identity;
+
+import android.hardware.identity.RequestDataItem;
+
+@VintfStability
+parcelable RequestNamespace {
+    /**
+     * The name of the namespace that items are being requested from, for
+     * example "org.iso.18013.5.1".
+     */
+    @utf8InCpp String namespaceName;
+
+    /**
+     * The data items requested.
+     */
+    RequestDataItem[] items;
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.cpp
index 341fae6..8a00d22 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.cpp
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
 
 #include <cppbor.h>
 #include <cppbor_parse.h>
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity {
 
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::keymaster::Timestamp;
+using ::android::base::StringPrintf;
 using ::std::optional;
 
 using namespace ::android::hardware::identity;
@@ -196,15 +198,8 @@
     return false;
 }
 
-Timestamp clockGetTime() {
-    struct timespec time;
-    clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &time);
-    Timestamp ts;
-    ts.milliSeconds = time.tv_sec * 1000 + time.tv_nsec / 1000000;
-    return ts;
-}
-
 bool checkUserAuthentication(const SecureAccessControlProfile& profile,
+                             const VerificationToken& verificationToken,
                              const HardwareAuthToken& authToken, uint64_t authChallenge) {
     if (profile.secureUserId != authToken.userId) {
         LOG(ERROR) << "secureUserId in profile (" << profile.secureUserId
@@ -212,6 +207,15 @@
         return false;
     }
 
+    if (verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds == 0) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "VerificationToken is not set";
+        return false;
+    }
+    if (authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds == 0) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "AuthToken is not set";
+        return false;
+    }
+
     if (profile.timeoutMillis == 0) {
         if (authToken.challenge == 0) {
             LOG(ERROR) << "No challenge in authToken";
@@ -225,19 +229,11 @@
         return true;
     }
 
-    // Note that the Epoch for timestamps in HardwareAuthToken is at the
-    // discretion of the vendor:
+    // Timeout-based user auth follows. The verification token conveys what the
+    // time is right now in the environment which generated the auth token. This
+    // is what makes it possible to do timeout-based checks.
     //
-    //   "[...] since some starting point (generally the most recent device
-    //    boot) which all of the applications within one secure environment
-    //    must agree upon."
-    //
-    // Therefore, if this software implementation is used on a device which isn't
-    // the emulator then the assumption that the epoch is the same as used in
-    // clockGetTime above will not hold. This is OK as this software
-    // implementation should never be used on a real device.
-    //
-    Timestamp now = clockGetTime();
+    const Timestamp now = verificationToken.timestamp;
     if (authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds > now.milliSeconds) {
         LOG(ERROR) << "Timestamp in authToken (" << authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds
                    << ") is in the future (now: " << now.milliSeconds << ")";
@@ -253,6 +249,18 @@
     return true;
 }
 
+ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::setRequestedNamespaces(
+        const vector<RequestNamespace>& requestNamespaces) {
+    requestNamespaces_ = requestNamespaces;
+    return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
+}
+
+ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::setVerificationToken(
+        const VerificationToken& verificationToken) {
+    verificationToken_ = verificationToken;
+    return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
+}
+
 ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieval(
         const vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>& accessControlProfiles,
         const HardwareAuthToken& authToken, const vector<int8_t>& itemsRequestS,
@@ -451,7 +459,7 @@
                         "Type mismatch in nameSpaces map"));
             }
             string requestedNamespace = nsKey->value();
-            vector<string> requestedKeys;
+            set<string> requestedKeys;
             for (size_t m = 0; m < nsInnerMap->size(); m++) {
                 const auto& [innerMapKeyItem, innerMapValueItem] = (*nsInnerMap)[m];
                 const cppbor::Tstr* nameItem = innerMapKeyItem->asTstr();
@@ -463,13 +471,13 @@
                             IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_ITEMS_REQUEST_MESSAGE,
                             "Type mismatch in value in nameSpaces map"));
                 }
-                requestedKeys.push_back(nameItem->value());
+                requestedKeys.insert(nameItem->value());
             }
             requestedNameSpacesAndNames_[requestedNamespace] = requestedKeys;
         }
     }
 
-    // Finally, validate all the access control profiles in the requestData.
+    // Validate all the access control profiles in the requestData.
     bool haveAuthToken = (authToken.mac.size() > 0);
     for (const auto& profile : accessControlProfiles) {
         if (!secureAccessControlProfileCheckMac(profile, storageKey_)) {
@@ -479,7 +487,8 @@
         }
         int accessControlCheck = IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_OK;
         if (profile.userAuthenticationRequired) {
-            if (!haveAuthToken || !checkUserAuthentication(profile, authToken, authChallenge_)) {
+            if (!haveAuthToken ||
+                !checkUserAuthentication(profile, verificationToken_, authToken, authChallenge_)) {
                 accessControlCheck = IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_USER_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
             }
         } else if (profile.readerCertificate.encodedCertificate.size() > 0) {
@@ -500,10 +509,118 @@
     itemsRequest_ = itemsRequest;
     signingKeyBlob_ = byteStringToUnsigned(signingKeyBlobS);
 
+    // Finally, calculate the size of DeviceNameSpaces. We need to know it ahead of time.
+    expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_ = calcDeviceNameSpacesSize();
+
     numStartRetrievalCalls_ += 1;
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
+size_t cborNumBytesForLength(size_t length) {
+    if (length < 24) {
+        return 0;
+    } else if (length <= 0xff) {
+        return 1;
+    } else if (length <= 0xffff) {
+        return 2;
+    } else if (length <= 0xffffffff) {
+        return 4;
+    }
+    return 8;
+}
+
+size_t cborNumBytesForTstr(const string& value) {
+    return 1 + cborNumBytesForLength(value.size()) + value.size();
+}
+
+size_t IdentityCredential::calcDeviceNameSpacesSize() {
+    /*
+     * This is how DeviceNameSpaces is defined:
+     *
+     *        DeviceNameSpaces = {
+     *            * NameSpace => DeviceSignedItems
+     *        }
+     *        DeviceSignedItems = {
+     *            + DataItemName => DataItemValue
+     *        }
+     *
+     *        Namespace = tstr
+     *        DataItemName = tstr
+     *        DataItemValue = any
+     *
+     * This function will calculate its length using knowledge of how CBOR is
+     * encoded.
+     */
+    size_t ret = 0;
+    size_t numNamespacesWithValues = 0;
+    for (const RequestNamespace& rns : requestNamespaces_) {
+        vector<RequestDataItem> itemsToInclude;
+
+        for (const RequestDataItem& rdi : rns.items) {
+            // If we have a CBOR request message, skip if item isn't in it
+            if (itemsRequest_.size() > 0) {
+                const auto& it = requestedNameSpacesAndNames_.find(rns.namespaceName);
+                if (it == requestedNameSpacesAndNames_.end()) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                const set<string>& dataItemNames = it->second;
+                if (dataItemNames.find(rdi.name) == dataItemNames.end()) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+
+            // Access is granted if at least one of the profiles grants access.
+            //
+            // If an item is configured without any profiles, access is denied.
+            //
+            bool authorized = false;
+            for (auto id : rdi.accessControlProfileIds) {
+                auto it = profileIdToAccessCheckResult_.find(id);
+                if (it != profileIdToAccessCheckResult_.end()) {
+                    int accessControlForProfile = it->second;
+                    if (accessControlForProfile == IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_OK) {
+                        authorized = true;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if (!authorized) {
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            itemsToInclude.push_back(rdi);
+        }
+
+        // If no entries are to be in the namespace, we don't include it...
+        if (itemsToInclude.size() == 0) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        // Key: NameSpace
+        ret += cborNumBytesForTstr(rns.namespaceName);
+
+        // Value: Open the DeviceSignedItems map
+        ret += 1 + cborNumBytesForLength(itemsToInclude.size());
+
+        for (const RequestDataItem& item : itemsToInclude) {
+            // Key: DataItemName
+            ret += cborNumBytesForTstr(item.name);
+
+            // Value: DataItemValue - entryData.size is the length of serialized CBOR so we use
+            // that.
+            ret += item.size;
+        }
+
+        numNamespacesWithValues++;
+    }
+
+    // Now that we now the nunber of namespaces with values, we know how many
+    // bytes the DeviceNamespaces map in the beginning is going to take up.
+    ret += 1 + cborNumBytesForLength(numNamespacesWithValues);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
 ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieveEntryValue(
         const string& nameSpace, const string& name, int32_t entrySize,
         const vector<int32_t>& accessControlProfileIds) {
@@ -562,8 +679,8 @@
                     IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_NOT_IN_REQUEST_MESSAGE,
                     "Name space was not requested in startRetrieval"));
         }
-        const auto& dataItemNames = it->second;
-        if (std::find(dataItemNames.begin(), dataItemNames.end(), name) == dataItemNames.end()) {
+        const set<string>& dataItemNames = it->second;
+        if (dataItemNames.find(name) == dataItemNames.end()) {
             return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
                     IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_NOT_IN_REQUEST_MESSAGE,
                     "Data item name in name space was not requested in startRetrieval"));
@@ -608,7 +725,6 @@
 ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::retrieveEntryValue(const vector<int8_t>& encryptedContentS,
                                                           vector<int8_t>* outContent) {
     auto encryptedContent = byteStringToUnsigned(encryptedContentS);
-
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> content =
             support::decryptAes128Gcm(storageKey_, encryptedContent, entryAdditionalData_);
     if (!content) {
@@ -659,6 +775,17 @@
     }
     vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceNameSpaces = deviceNameSpacesMap_.encode();
 
+    if (encodedDeviceNameSpaces.size() != expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "encodedDeviceNameSpaces is " << encodedDeviceNameSpaces.size() << " bytes, "
+                   << "was expecting " << expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_;
+        return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
+                StringPrintf(
+                        "Unexpected CBOR size %zd for encodedDeviceNameSpaces, was expecting %zd",
+                        encodedDeviceNameSpaces.size(), expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_)
+                        .c_str()));
+    }
+
     // If there's no signing key or no sessionTranscript or no reader ephemeral
     // public key, we return the empty MAC.
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> mac;
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.h b/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.h
index fc29254..40070c0 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/IdentityCredential.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/identity/BnIdentityCredential.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.h>
 #include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
 
 #include <map>
@@ -31,16 +32,19 @@
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity {
 
 using ::aidl::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthToken;
+using ::aidl::android::hardware::keymaster::VerificationToken;
 using ::std::map;
+using ::std::set;
 using ::std::string;
 using ::std::vector;
 
-using MapStringToVectorOfStrings = map<string, vector<string>>;
-
 class IdentityCredential : public BnIdentityCredential {
   public:
     IdentityCredential(const vector<uint8_t>& credentialData)
-        : credentialData_(credentialData), numStartRetrievalCalls_(0), authChallenge_(0) {}
+        : credentialData_(credentialData),
+          numStartRetrievalCalls_(0),
+          authChallenge_(0),
+          expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_(0) {}
 
     // Parses and decrypts credentialData_, return a status code from
     // IIdentityCredentialStore. Must be called right after construction.
@@ -51,6 +55,9 @@
     ndk::ScopedAStatus createEphemeralKeyPair(vector<int8_t>* outKeyPair) override;
     ndk::ScopedAStatus setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(const vector<int8_t>& publicKey) override;
     ndk::ScopedAStatus createAuthChallenge(int64_t* outChallenge) override;
+    ndk::ScopedAStatus setRequestedNamespaces(
+            const vector<RequestNamespace>& requestNamespaces) override;
+    ndk::ScopedAStatus setVerificationToken(const VerificationToken& verificationToken) override;
     ndk::ScopedAStatus startRetrieval(
             const vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>& accessControlProfiles,
             const HardwareAuthToken& authToken, const vector<int8_t>& itemsRequest,
@@ -86,6 +93,12 @@
     // Set by createAuthChallenge()
     uint64_t authChallenge_;
 
+    // Set by setRequestedNamespaces()
+    vector<RequestNamespace> requestNamespaces_;
+
+    // Set by setVerificationToken().
+    VerificationToken verificationToken_;
+
     // Set at startRetrieval() time.
     map<int32_t, int> profileIdToAccessCheckResult_;
     vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob_;
@@ -93,16 +106,21 @@
     std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item> sessionTranscriptItem_;
     vector<uint8_t> itemsRequest_;
     vector<int32_t> requestCountsRemaining_;
-    MapStringToVectorOfStrings requestedNameSpacesAndNames_;
+    map<string, set<string>> requestedNameSpacesAndNames_;
     cppbor::Map deviceNameSpacesMap_;
     cppbor::Map currentNameSpaceDeviceNameSpacesMap_;
 
+    // Calculated at startRetrieval() time.
+    size_t expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_;
+
     // Set at startRetrieveEntryValue() time.
     string currentNameSpace_;
     string currentName_;
     size_t entryRemainingBytes_;
     vector<uint8_t> entryValue_;
     vector<uint8_t> entryAdditionalData_;
+
+    size_t calcDeviceNameSpacesSize();
 };
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
index 52cd496..7732c33 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
 
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
 
 #include <cppbor/cppbor.h>
 #include <cppbor/cppbor_parse.h>
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
 
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity {
 
+using ::android::base::StringPrintf;
 using ::std::optional;
 using namespace ::android::hardware::identity;
 
@@ -105,6 +107,12 @@
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
+ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(
+        int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) {
+    expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_ = expectedProofOfProvisioningSize;
+    return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
+}
+
 ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::startPersonalization(
         int32_t accessControlProfileCount, const vector<int32_t>& entryCounts) {
     if (startPersonalizationCalled_) {
@@ -255,7 +263,7 @@
 }
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::addEntryValue(const vector<int8_t>& contentS,
-                                                             vector<int8_t>* outEncryptedContent) {
+                                                             vector<int8_t>* outEncryptedContentS) {
     auto content = byteStringToUnsigned(contentS);
     size_t contentSize = content.size();
 
@@ -311,7 +319,7 @@
         signedDataCurrentNamespace_.add(std::move(entryMap));
     }
 
-    *outEncryptedContent = byteStringToSigned(encryptedContent.value());
+    *outEncryptedContentS = byteStringToSigned(encryptedContent.value());
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
@@ -384,6 +392,16 @@
             .add(testCredential_);
     vector<uint8_t> encodedCbor = popArray.encode();
 
+    if (encodedCbor.size() != expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "CBOR for proofOfProvisioning is " << encodedCbor.size() << " bytes, "
+                   << "was expecting " << expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_;
+        return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
+                StringPrintf("Unexpected CBOR size %zd for proofOfProvisioning, was expecting %zd",
+                             encodedCbor.size(), expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_)
+                        .c_str()));
+    }
+
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> signature = support::coseSignEcDsa(credentialPrivKey_,
                                                                  encodedCbor,  // payload
                                                                  {},           // additionalData
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.h b/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.h
index cb91f7b..05104d7 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/WritableIdentityCredential.h
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
                                                  const vector<int8_t>& attestationChallenge,
                                                  vector<Certificate>* outCertificateChain) override;
 
+    ndk::ScopedAStatus setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(
+            int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) override;
+
     ndk::ScopedAStatus startPersonalization(int32_t accessControlProfileCount,
                                             const vector<int32_t>& entryCounts) override;
 
@@ -62,7 +65,7 @@
             vector<int8_t>* outCredentialData,
             vector<int8_t>* outProofOfProvisioningSignature) override;
 
-    // private:
+  private:
     string docType_;
     bool testCredential_;
 
@@ -82,6 +85,7 @@
     cppbor::Array signedDataAccessControlProfiles_;
     cppbor::Map signedDataNamespaces_;
     cppbor::Array signedDataCurrentNamespace_;
+    size_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_;
 
     // This field is initialized in addAccessControlProfile
     set<int32_t> accessControlProfileIds_;
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/service.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/service.cpp
index f05c615..bf95df5 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/service.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/service.cpp
@@ -22,9 +22,14 @@
 
 #include "IdentityCredentialStore.h"
 
+using ::android::base::InitLogging;
+using ::android::base::StderrLogger;
+
 using aidl::android::hardware::identity::IdentityCredentialStore;
 
-int main() {
+int main(int /*argc*/, char* argv[]) {
+    InitLogging(argv, StderrLogger);
+
     ABinderProcess_setThreadPoolMaxThreadCount(0);
     std::shared_ptr<IdentityCredentialStore> store =
             ndk::SharedRefBase::make<IdentityCredentialStore>();
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
index e4780bf..5b075c6 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
@@ -8,10 +8,16 @@
         "VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest.cpp",
         "VtsIWritableIdentityCredentialTests.cpp",
         "VtsIdentityTestUtils.cpp",
+        "VtsAttestationTests.cpp",
+        "VtsAttestationParserSupport.cpp",
     ],
     shared_libs: [
+        "android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
         "libbinder",
         "libcrypto",
+        "libkeymaster_portable",
+        "libsoft_attestation_cert",
+        "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
     ],
     static_libs: [
         "libcppbor",
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71fe733
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019, The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "VtsAttestationParserSupport.h"
+
+#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
+#include <map>
+
+namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils {
+
+using std::endl;
+using std::map;
+using std::optional;
+using std::string;
+using std::vector;
+
+using ::android::sp;
+using ::android::String16;
+using ::android::binder::Status;
+
+using ::keymaster::ASN1_OBJECT_Ptr;
+using ::keymaster::AuthorizationSet;
+using ::keymaster::EVP_PKEY_Ptr;
+using ::keymaster::kAttestionRecordOid;
+using ::keymaster::TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID;
+using ::keymaster::TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY;
+using ::keymaster::TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID;
+using ::keymaster::TypedTag;
+using ::keymaster::X509_Ptr;
+
+using support::certificateChainSplit;
+
+optional<keymaster_cert_chain_t> AttestationCertificateParser::certificateChainToKeymasterChain(
+        const vector<Certificate>& certificates) {
+    if (certificates.size() <= 0) {
+        return {};
+    }
+
+    keymaster_cert_chain_t kCert;
+    kCert.entry_count = certificates.size();
+    kCert.entries = (keymaster_blob_t*)malloc(sizeof(keymaster_blob_t) * kCert.entry_count);
+
+    int index = 0;
+    for (const auto& c : certificates) {
+        kCert.entries[index].data_length = c.encodedCertificate.size();
+        uint8_t* data = (uint8_t*)malloc(c.encodedCertificate.size());
+
+        memcpy(data, c.encodedCertificate.data(), c.encodedCertificate.size());
+        kCert.entries[index].data = (const uint8_t*)data;
+        index++;
+    }
+
+    return kCert;
+}
+
+bool AttestationCertificateParser::parse() {
+    optional<keymaster_cert_chain_t> cert_chain = certificateChainToKeymasterChain(origCertChain_);
+    if (!cert_chain) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if (cert_chain.value().entry_count < 3) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if (!verifyChain(cert_chain.value())) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if (!verifyAttestationRecord(cert_chain.value().entries[0])) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    keymaster_free_cert_chain(&cert_chain.value());
+    return true;
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING* AttestationCertificateParser::getAttestationRecord(X509* certificate) {
+    ASN1_OBJECT_Ptr oid(OBJ_txt2obj(kAttestionRecordOid, 1));
+    if (!oid.get()) return nullptr;
+
+    int location = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(certificate, oid.get(), -1);
+    if (location == -1) return nullptr;
+
+    X509_EXTENSION* attest_rec_ext = X509_get_ext(certificate, location);
+    if (!attest_rec_ext) return nullptr;
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(attest_rec_ext);
+    return attest_rec;
+}
+
+X509* AttestationCertificateParser::parseCertBlob(const keymaster_blob_t& blob) {
+    const uint8_t* p = blob.data;
+    return d2i_X509(nullptr, &p, blob.data_length);
+}
+
+bool AttestationCertificateParser::verifyAttestationRecord(
+        const keymaster_blob_t& attestation_cert) {
+    X509_Ptr cert(parseCertBlob(attestation_cert));
+    if (!cert.get()) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = getAttestationRecord(cert.get());
+    if (!attest_rec) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    keymaster_blob_t att_unique_id = {};
+    keymaster_blob_t att_challenge;
+    keymaster_error_t ret = parse_attestation_record(
+            attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &att_attestation_version_,
+            &att_attestation_security_level_, &att_keymaster_version_,
+            &att_keymaster_security_level_, &att_challenge, &att_sw_enforced_, &att_hw_enforced_,
+            &att_unique_id);
+    if (ret) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    att_challenge_.assign(att_challenge.data, att_challenge.data + att_challenge.data_length);
+    return true;
+}
+
+uint32_t AttestationCertificateParser::getKeymasterVersion() {
+    return att_keymaster_version_;
+}
+
+uint32_t AttestationCertificateParser::getAttestationVersion() {
+    return att_attestation_version_;
+}
+
+vector<uint8_t> AttestationCertificateParser::getAttestationChallenge() {
+    return att_challenge_;
+}
+
+keymaster_security_level_t AttestationCertificateParser::getKeymasterSecurityLevel() {
+    return att_keymaster_security_level_;
+}
+
+keymaster_security_level_t AttestationCertificateParser::getAttestationSecurityLevel() {
+    return att_attestation_security_level_;
+}
+
+// Verify the Attestation certificates are correctly chained.
+bool AttestationCertificateParser::verifyChain(const keymaster_cert_chain_t& chain) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < chain.entry_count - 1; ++i) {
+        keymaster_blob_t& key_cert_blob = chain.entries[i];
+        keymaster_blob_t& signing_cert_blob = chain.entries[i + 1];
+
+        X509_Ptr key_cert(parseCertBlob(key_cert_blob));
+        X509_Ptr signing_cert(parseCertBlob(signing_cert_blob));
+        if (!key_cert.get() || !signing_cert.get()) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
+        if (!signing_pubkey.get()) return false;
+
+        if (X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get()) != 1) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        if (i + 1 == chain.entry_count - 1) {
+            // Last entry is self-signed.
+            if (X509_verify(signing_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get()) != 1) {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    return true;
+}
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.h b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c7e1b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationParserSupport.h
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019, The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef VTS_ATTESTATION_PARSER_SUPPORT_H
+#define VTS_ATTESTATION_PARSER_SUPPORT_H
+
+//#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
+#include <android/hardware/keymaster/4.0/types.h>
+#include <hardware/keymaster_defs.h>
+#include <keymaster/android_keymaster_utils.h>
+#include <keymaster/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keymaster/contexts/pure_soft_keymaster_context.h>
+#include <keymaster/contexts/soft_attestation_cert.h>
+#include <keymaster/keymaster_tags.h>
+#include <keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_utils.h>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils {
+
+using ::std::optional;
+using ::std::string;
+using ::std::vector;
+
+using ::keymaster::AuthorizationSet;
+using ::keymaster::TypedTag;
+
+class AttestationCertificateParser {
+  public:
+    AttestationCertificateParser(const vector<Certificate>& certChain)
+        : origCertChain_(certChain) {}
+
+    bool parse();
+
+    uint32_t getKeymasterVersion();
+    uint32_t getAttestationVersion();
+    vector<uint8_t> getAttestationChallenge();
+    keymaster_security_level_t getKeymasterSecurityLevel();
+    keymaster_security_level_t getAttestationSecurityLevel();
+
+    template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
+    bool getSwEnforcedBool(TypedTag<KM_BOOL, Tag> tag) {
+        if (att_sw_enforced_.GetTagValue(tag)) {
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
+    bool getHwEnforcedBool(TypedTag<KM_BOOL, Tag> tag) {
+        if (att_hw_enforced_.GetTagValue(tag)) {
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> getHwEnforcedBlob(TypedTag<KM_BYTES, Tag> tag) {
+        keymaster_blob_t blob;
+        if (att_hw_enforced_.GetTagValue(tag, &blob)) {
+            return {};
+        }
+
+        vector<uint8_t> ret(blob.data, blob.data + blob.data_length);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> getSwEnforcedBlob(TypedTag<KM_BYTES, Tag> tag) {
+        keymaster_blob_t blob;
+        if (!att_sw_enforced_.GetTagValue(tag, &blob)) {
+            return {};
+        }
+
+        vector<uint8_t> ret(blob.data, blob.data + blob.data_length);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+  private:
+    // Helper functions.
+    bool verifyChain(const keymaster_cert_chain_t& chain);
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* getAttestationRecord(X509* certificate);
+
+    X509* parseCertBlob(const keymaster_blob_t& blob);
+
+    bool verifyAttestationRecord(const keymaster_blob_t& attestation_cert);
+
+    optional<keymaster_cert_chain_t> certificateChainToKeymasterChain(
+            const vector<Certificate>& certificates);
+
+    // Private variables.
+    vector<Certificate> origCertChain_;
+    AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced_;
+    AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced_;
+    uint32_t att_attestation_version_;
+    uint32_t att_keymaster_version_;
+    keymaster_security_level_t att_attestation_security_level_;
+    keymaster_security_level_t att_keymaster_security_level_;
+    vector<uint8_t> att_challenge_;
+};
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils
+
+#endif  // VTS_ATTESTATION_PARSER_SUPPORT_H
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00b5893
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsAttestationTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "VtsAttestationTests"
+
+#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
+#include <aidl/Vintf.h>
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.h>
+#include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
+#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
+#include <binder/ProcessState.h>
+#include <cppbor.h>
+#include <cppbor_parse.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <future>
+#include <map>
+
+#include "VtsAttestationParserSupport.h"
+#include "VtsIdentityTestUtils.h"
+
+namespace android::hardware::identity {
+
+using std::endl;
+using std::map;
+using std::optional;
+using std::string;
+using std::vector;
+
+using ::android::sp;
+using ::android::String16;
+using ::android::binder::Status;
+
+using test_utils::AttestationCertificateParser;
+using test_utils::setupWritableCredential;
+using test_utils::validateAttestationCertificate;
+
+// This file verifies the Identity Credential VTS Attestation Certificate
+// generated.
+class VtsAttestationTests : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
+  public:
+    virtual void SetUp() override {
+        credentialStore_ = android::waitForDeclaredService<IIdentityCredentialStore>(
+                String16(GetParam().c_str()));
+        ASSERT_NE(credentialStore_, nullptr);
+    }
+
+    sp<IIdentityCredentialStore> credentialStore_;
+};
+
+TEST_P(VtsAttestationTests, verifyAttestationWithEmptyChallengeEmptyId) {
+    Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge;
+    vector<Certificate> attestationCertificate;
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId = {};
+    result = writableCredential->getAttestationCertificate(
+            attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge, &attestationCertificate);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
+                               << endl;
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate, attestationChallenge,
+                                               attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
+}
+
+TEST_P(VtsAttestationTests, verifyAttestationWithEmptyChallengeNonemptyId) {
+    Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge;
+    vector<Certificate> attestationCertificate;
+    string applicationId = "Attestation Verification";
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId = {applicationId.begin(), applicationId.end()};
+
+    result = writableCredential->getAttestationCertificate(
+            attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge, &attestationCertificate);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
+                               << endl;
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate, attestationChallenge,
+                                               attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
+}
+
+TEST_P(VtsAttestationTests, verifyAttestationWithNonemptyChallengeEmptyId) {
+    Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+
+    string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge";
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge(challenge.begin(), challenge.end());
+    vector<Certificate> attestationCertificate;
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId = {};
+
+    result = writableCredential->getAttestationCertificate(
+            attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge, &attestationCertificate);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
+                               << endl;
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate, attestationChallenge,
+                                               attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
+}
+
+TEST_P(VtsAttestationTests, verifyAttestationWithNonemptyChallengeNonemptyId) {
+    Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+
+    string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge1NotSoRandomChallenge1NotSoRandomChallenge1";
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge(challenge.begin(), challenge.end());
+    vector<Certificate> attestationCertificate;
+    string applicationId = "Attestation Verification";
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId = {applicationId.begin(), applicationId.end()};
+
+    result = writableCredential->getAttestationCertificate(
+            attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge, &attestationCertificate);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
+                               << endl;
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate, attestationChallenge,
+                                               attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
+}
+
+TEST_P(VtsAttestationTests, verifyAttestationWithVeryShortChallengeAndId) {
+    Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+
+    string challenge = "c";
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge(challenge.begin(), challenge.end());
+    vector<Certificate> attestationCertificate;
+    string applicationId = "i";
+    vector<uint8_t> attestationApplicationId = {applicationId.begin(), applicationId.end()};
+
+    result = writableCredential->getAttestationCertificate(
+            attestationApplicationId, attestationChallenge, &attestationCertificate);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
+                               << endl;
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate, attestationChallenge,
+                                               attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
+        Identity, VtsAttestationTests,
+        testing::ValuesIn(android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IIdentityCredentialStore::descriptor)),
+        android::PrintInstanceNameToString);
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::identity
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest.cpp
index 8a4e8a7..464ab0c 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest.cpp
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
  * limitations under the License.
  */
-#define LOG_TAG "VtsHalIdentityTargetTest"
+#define LOG_TAG "VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest"
 
 #include <aidl/Gtest.h>
 #include <aidl/Vintf.h>
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
 using ::android::binder::Status;
 
 using ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthToken;
+using ::android::hardware::keymaster::VerificationToken;
+
+using test_utils::validateAttestationCertificate;
 
 class IdentityAidl : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
   public:
@@ -68,13 +71,13 @@
     // part of the request data.
     vector<uint8_t> readerKey;
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate =
-            test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("1234", readerKey);
+            test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("1234", &readerKey);
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate);
 
     // Make the portrait image really big (just shy of 256 KiB) to ensure that
     // the chunking code gets exercised.
     vector<uint8_t> portraitImage;
-    test_utils::SetImageData(portraitImage);
+    test_utils::setImageData(portraitImage);
 
     // Access control profiles:
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {// Profile 0 (reader authentication)
@@ -82,7 +85,20 @@
                                                           // Profile 1 (no authentication)
                                                           {1, {}, false, 0}};
 
+    // It doesn't matter since no user auth is needed in this particular test,
+    // but for good measure, clear out the tokens we pass to the HAL.
     HardwareAuthToken authToken;
+    VerificationToken verificationToken;
+    authToken.challenge = 0;
+    authToken.userId = 0;
+    authToken.authenticatorId = 0;
+    authToken.authenticatorType = ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType::NONE;
+    authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+    authToken.mac.clear();
+    verificationToken.challenge = 0;
+    verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+    verificationToken.securityLevel = ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
+    verificationToken.mac.clear();
 
     // Here's the actual test data:
     const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries = {
@@ -100,24 +116,28 @@
 
     string cborPretty;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "attestationChallenge";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
     ASSERT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
             << attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
-    ASSERT_EQ(binder::Status::EX_NONE, attData.result.exceptionCode());
-    ASSERT_EQ(IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_OK, attData.result.serviceSpecificErrorCode());
 
-    // TODO: set it to something random and check it's in the cert chain
-    ASSERT_GE(attData.attestationCertificate.size(), 2);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(validateAttestationCertificate(attData.attestationCertificate,
+                                               attData.attestationChallenge,
+                                               attData.attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
 
+    // This is kinda of a hack but we need to give the size of
+    // ProofOfProvisioning that we'll expect to receive.
+    const int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize = 262861 - 326 + readerCertificate.value().size();
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
     ASSERT_TRUE(
             writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), testEntriesEntryCounts)
                     .isOk());
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     // Uses TestEntryData* pointer as key and values are the encrypted blobs. This
@@ -125,7 +145,7 @@
     map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
 
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries) {
-        ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                          encryptedBlobs, true));
     }
 
@@ -268,6 +288,11 @@
     Certificate signingKeyCertificate;
     ASSERT_TRUE(credential->generateSigningKeyPair(&signingKeyBlob, &signingKeyCertificate).isOk());
 
+    vector<RequestNamespace> requestedNamespaces = test_utils::buildRequestNamespaces(testEntries);
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    credential->setRequestedNamespaces(requestedNamespaces).isOk();
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    credential->setVerificationToken(verificationToken);
     ASSERT_TRUE(credential
                         ->startRetrieval(secureProfiles.value(), authToken, itemsRequestBytes,
                                          signingKeyBlob, sessionTranscriptBytes,
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIWritableIdentityCredentialTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIWritableIdentityCredentialTests.cpp
index b68fbb5..8b0c050 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIWritableIdentityCredentialTests.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIWritableIdentityCredentialTests.cpp
@@ -56,8 +56,12 @@
 
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyAttestationWithEmptyChallenge) {
     Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge;
     vector<Certificate> attestationCertificate;
@@ -68,13 +72,18 @@
     EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
-    EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::ValidateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::validateAttestationCertificate(
+            attestationCertificate, attestationChallenge, attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
 }
 
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyAttestationSuccessWithChallenge) {
     Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge1NotSoRandomChallenge1NotSoRandomChallenge1";
     vector<uint8_t> attestationChallenge(challenge.begin(), challenge.end());
@@ -87,17 +96,24 @@
     EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
-    EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::ValidateAttestationCertificate(attestationCertificate));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::validateAttestationCertificate(
+            attestationCertificate, attestationChallenge, attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
 }
 
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyAttestationDoubleCallFails) {
     Status result;
+
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge1";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::ValidateAttestationCertificate(attData.attestationCertificate));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::validateAttestationCertificate(
+            attData.attestationCertificate, attData.attestationChallenge,
+            attData.attestationApplicationId, hwInfo));
 
     string challenge2 = "NotSoRandomChallenge2";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData2(writableCredential, challenge2, {});
@@ -110,7 +126,7 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyStartPersonalization) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     // First call should go through
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {2, 4};
@@ -131,7 +147,7 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyStartPersonalizationMin) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     // Verify minimal number of profile count and entry count
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1, 1};
@@ -143,7 +159,7 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyStartPersonalizationZero) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {0};
     writableCredential->startPersonalization(0, entryCounts);
@@ -154,7 +170,7 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyStartPersonalizationOne) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     // Verify minimal number of profile count and entry count
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1};
@@ -166,7 +182,7 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyStartPersonalizationLarge) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     // Verify set a large number of profile count and entry count is ok
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {3000};
@@ -178,7 +194,7 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyProfileNumberMismatchShouldFail) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     // Enter mismatched entry and profile numbers
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {5, 6};
@@ -186,7 +202,7 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("12345");
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("12345");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {// Profile 0 (reader authentication)
@@ -196,7 +212,7 @@
                                                           {4, {}, false, 0}};
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     vector<uint8_t> credentialData;
@@ -205,7 +221,7 @@
             writableCredential->finishAddingEntries(&credentialData, &proofOfProvisioningSignature);
 
     // finishAddingEntries should fail because the number of addAccessControlProfile mismatched with
-    // startPersonalization, and begintest_utils::AddEntry was not called.
+    // startPersonalization, and begintest_utils::addEntry was not called.
     EXPECT_FALSE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                 << endl;
     EXPECT_EQ(binder::Status::EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, result.exceptionCode());
@@ -215,7 +231,7 @@
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyDuplicateProfileId) {
     Status result;
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {3, 6};
     writableCredential->startPersonalization(3, entryCounts);
@@ -272,25 +288,28 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
 
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge1";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
     EXPECT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
             << attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
 
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456");
+    ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
+
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1u};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
+    size_t expectedPoPSize = 186 + readerCertificate1.value().size();
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedPoPSize);
+    result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
     ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456");
-    ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
-
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {{1, readerCertificate1.value(), true, 1}};
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries1 = {
@@ -299,7 +318,7 @@
 
     map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries1) {
-        ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                          encryptedBlobs, true));
     }
 
@@ -356,17 +375,17 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
 
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
     EXPECT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
             << attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
 
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456");
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
 
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate2 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("1256");
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate2 = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("1256");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate2);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {
@@ -374,19 +393,23 @@
             {2, readerCertificate2.value(), true, 2},
     };
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1u, 3u, 1u, 1u, 2u};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), entryCounts);
+    size_t expectedPoPSize =
+            525021 + readerCertificate1.value().size() + readerCertificate2.value().size();
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedPoPSize);
+    result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), entryCounts);
     ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     vector<uint8_t> portraitImage1;
-    test_utils::SetImageData(portraitImage1);
+    test_utils::setImageData(portraitImage1);
 
     vector<uint8_t> portraitImage2;
-    test_utils::SetImageData(portraitImage2);
+    test_utils::setImageData(portraitImage2);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries1 = {
             {"Name Space 1", "Last name", string("Turing"), vector<int32_t>{1, 2}},
@@ -404,7 +427,7 @@
 
     map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries1) {
-        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                          encryptedBlobs, true));
     }
 
@@ -511,31 +534,36 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
 
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
     ASSERT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
             << attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
 
-    const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {2u, 2u};
-    writableCredential->startPersonalization(3, entryCounts);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
-                               << endl;
-
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456");
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
 
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate2 =
-            test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456987987987987987987");
+            test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456987987987987987987");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate2);
 
+    const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {2u, 2u};
+    size_t expectedPoPSize =
+            377 + readerCertificate1.value().size() + readerCertificate2.value().size();
+    ;
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedPoPSize);
+    writableCredential->startPersonalization(3, entryCounts);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
+                               << endl;
+
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {{0, readerCertificate1.value(), false, 0},
                                                           {1, readerCertificate2.value(), true, 1},
                                                           {2, {}, false, 0}};
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries1 = {
@@ -548,7 +576,7 @@
 
     map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries1) {
-        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                          encryptedBlobs, true));
     }
 
@@ -568,7 +596,7 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
 
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     string challenge = "NotSoRandomChallenge";
     test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge, {});
@@ -584,11 +612,11 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                << endl;
 
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456");
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
 
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate2 =
-            test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456987987987987987987");
+            test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("123456987987987987987987");
     ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate2);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {{0, readerCertificate1.value(), false, 0},
@@ -596,7 +624,7 @@
                                                           {2, {}, false, 0}};
 
     optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
-            test_utils::AddAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
     ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
 
     const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries1 = {
@@ -607,13 +635,13 @@
 
     map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries1) {
-        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                          encryptedBlobs, true));
     }
     const test_utils::TestEntryData testEntry2 = {"Image", "Portrait image", string("asdfs"),
                                                   vector<int32_t>{0, 1}};
 
-    EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, testEntry2, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+    EXPECT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, testEntry2, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                      encryptedBlobs, true));
 
     // We expect this to fail because the namespace is out of order, all "Name Space"
@@ -625,7 +653,7 @@
     };
 
     for (const auto& entry : testEntries3) {
-        EXPECT_FALSE(test_utils::AddEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+        EXPECT_FALSE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
                                           encryptedBlobs, false));
     }
 
@@ -634,7 +662,7 @@
     result =
             writableCredential->finishAddingEntries(&credentialData, &proofOfProvisioningSignature);
 
-    // should fail because test_utils::AddEntry should have failed earlier.
+    // should fail because test_utils::addEntry should have failed earlier.
     EXPECT_FALSE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
                                 << endl;
     EXPECT_EQ(binder::Status::EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, result.exceptionCode());
@@ -643,7 +671,7 @@
 
 TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyAccessControlProfileIdOutOfRange) {
     sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::SetupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_));
 
     const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1};
     Status result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.cpp
index 3aeebc6..aaebcbe 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.cpp
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 #include <aidl/Gtest.h>
 #include <map>
 
+#include "VtsAttestationParserSupport.h"
+
 namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils {
 
 using std::endl;
@@ -31,7 +33,7 @@
 using ::android::String16;
 using ::android::binder::Status;
 
-bool SetupWritableCredential(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
+bool setupWritableCredential(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
                              sp<IIdentityCredentialStore>& credentialStore) {
     if (credentialStore == nullptr) {
         return false;
@@ -48,13 +50,13 @@
     }
 }
 
-optional<vector<uint8_t>> GenerateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal) {
+optional<vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal) {
     vector<uint8_t> privKey;
-    return GenerateReaderCertificate(serialDecimal, privKey);
+    return generateReaderCertificate(serialDecimal, &privKey);
 }
 
-optional<vector<uint8_t>> GenerateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal,
-                                                    vector<uint8_t>& readerPrivateKey) {
+optional<vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal,
+                                                    vector<uint8_t>* outReaderPrivateKey) {
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerKeyPKCS8 = support::createEcKeyPair();
     if (!readerKeyPKCS8) {
         return {};
@@ -67,7 +69,11 @@
         return {};
     }
 
-    readerPrivateKey = readerKey.value();
+    if (outReaderPrivateKey == nullptr) {
+        return {};
+    }
+
+    *outReaderPrivateKey = readerKey.value();
 
     string issuer = "Android Open Source Project";
     string subject = "Android IdentityCredential VTS Test";
@@ -79,7 +85,7 @@
                                                    validityNotBefore, validityNotAfter);
 }
 
-optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> AddAccessControlProfiles(
+optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> addAccessControlProfiles(
         sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
         const vector<TestProfile>& testProfiles) {
     Status result;
@@ -120,7 +126,7 @@
 
 // Most test expects this function to pass. So we will print out additional
 // value if failed so more debug data can be provided.
-bool AddEntry(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential, const TestEntryData& entry,
+bool addEntry(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential, const TestEntryData& entry,
               int dataChunkSize, map<const TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>>& encryptedBlobs,
               bool expectSuccess) {
     Status result;
@@ -164,16 +170,92 @@
     return true;
 }
 
-bool ValidateAttestationCertificate(vector<Certificate>& inputCertificates) {
-    return (inputCertificates.size() >= 2);
-    // TODO: add parsing of the certificate and make sure it is genuine.
-}
-
-void SetImageData(vector<uint8_t>& image) {
+void setImageData(vector<uint8_t>& image) {
     image.resize(256 * 1024 - 10);
     for (size_t n = 0; n < image.size(); n++) {
         image[n] = (uint8_t)n;
     }
 }
 
+bool validateAttestationCertificate(const vector<Certificate>& inputCertificates,
+                                    const vector<uint8_t>& expectedChallenge,
+                                    const vector<uint8_t>& expectedAppId,
+                                    const HardwareInformation& hwInfo) {
+    AttestationCertificateParser certParser_(inputCertificates);
+    bool ret = certParser_.parse();
+    EXPECT_TRUE(ret);
+    if (!ret) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // As per the IC HAL, the version of the Identity
+    // Credential HAL is 1.0 - and this is encoded as major*10 + minor. This field is used by
+    // Keymaster which is known to report integers less than or equal to 4 (for KM up to 4.0)
+    // and integers greater or equal than 41 (for KM starting with 4.1).
+    //
+    // Since we won't get to version 4.0 of the IC HAL for a while, let's also check that a KM
+    // version isn't errornously returned.
+    EXPECT_LE(10, certParser_.getKeymasterVersion());
+    EXPECT_GT(40, certParser_.getKeymasterVersion());
+    EXPECT_LE(3, certParser_.getAttestationVersion());
+
+    // Verify the app id matches to whatever we set it to be.
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> appId =
+            certParser_.getSwEnforcedBlob(::keymaster::TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID);
+    if (appId) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(expectedAppId.size(), appId.value().size());
+        EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(expectedAppId.data(), appId.value().data(), expectedAppId.size()));
+    } else {
+        // app id not found
+        EXPECT_EQ(0, expectedAppId.size());
+    }
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(certParser_.getHwEnforcedBool(::keymaster::TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(certParser_.getHwEnforcedBool(::keymaster::TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID));
+
+    // Verify the challenge always matches in size and data of what is passed
+    // in.
+    vector<uint8_t> attChallenge = certParser_.getAttestationChallenge();
+    EXPECT_EQ(expectedChallenge.size(), attChallenge.size());
+    EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(expectedChallenge.data(), attChallenge.data(), expectedChallenge.size()));
+
+    // Ensure the attestation conveys that it's implemented in secure hardware (with carve-out
+    // for the reference implementation which cannot be implemented in secure hardware).
+    if (hwInfo.credentialStoreName == "Identity Credential Reference Implementation" &&
+        hwInfo.credentialStoreAuthorName == "Google") {
+        EXPECT_LE(KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_SOFTWARE, certParser_.getKeymasterSecurityLevel());
+        EXPECT_LE(KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_SOFTWARE, certParser_.getAttestationSecurityLevel());
+
+    } else {
+        // Actual devices should use TrustedEnvironment or StrongBox.
+        EXPECT_LE(KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, certParser_.getKeymasterSecurityLevel());
+        EXPECT_LE(KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, certParser_.getAttestationSecurityLevel());
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+
+vector<RequestNamespace> buildRequestNamespaces(const vector<TestEntryData> entries) {
+    vector<RequestNamespace> ret;
+    RequestNamespace curNs;
+    for (const TestEntryData& testEntry : entries) {
+        if (testEntry.nameSpace != curNs.namespaceName) {
+            if (curNs.namespaceName.size() > 0) {
+                ret.push_back(curNs);
+            }
+            curNs.namespaceName = testEntry.nameSpace;
+            curNs.items.clear();
+        }
+
+        RequestDataItem item;
+        item.name = testEntry.name;
+        item.size = testEntry.valueCbor.size();
+        item.accessControlProfileIds = testEntry.profileIds;
+        curNs.items.push_back(item);
+    }
+    if (curNs.namespaceName.size() > 0) {
+        ret.push_back(curNs);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
 }  // namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.h b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.h
index 043ccd6..673b736 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/VtsIdentityTestUtils.h
@@ -93,25 +93,30 @@
     uint64_t timeoutMillis;
 };
 
-bool SetupWritableCredential(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
+bool setupWritableCredential(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
                              sp<IIdentityCredentialStore>& credentialStore);
 
-optional<vector<uint8_t>> GenerateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal);
+optional<vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal);
 
-optional<vector<uint8_t>> GenerateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal,
-                                                    vector<uint8_t>& readerPrivateKey);
+optional<vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal,
+                                                    vector<uint8_t>* outReaderPrivateKey);
 
-optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> AddAccessControlProfiles(
+optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> addAccessControlProfiles(
         sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
         const vector<TestProfile>& testProfiles);
 
-bool AddEntry(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential, const TestEntryData& entry,
+bool addEntry(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential, const TestEntryData& entry,
               int dataChunkSize, map<const TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>>& encryptedBlobs,
               bool expectSuccess);
 
-bool ValidateAttestationCertificate(vector<Certificate>& inputCertificates);
+void setImageData(vector<uint8_t>& image);
 
-void SetImageData(vector<uint8_t>& image);
+bool validateAttestationCertificate(const vector<Certificate>& inputCertificates,
+                                    const vector<uint8_t>& expectedChallenge,
+                                    const vector<uint8_t>& expectedAppId,
+                                    const HardwareInformation& hwInfo);
+
+vector<RequestNamespace> buildRequestNamespaces(const vector<TestEntryData> entries);
 
 }  // namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils
 
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h b/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h
index 61645f8..f585d62 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #define HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMASTER_40_SUPPORT_KEYMASTER_UTILS_H_
 
 #include <android/hardware/keymaster/4.0/types.h>
+#include <optional>
+#include <vector>
 
 namespace android {
 namespace hardware {
@@ -52,6 +54,15 @@
 HardwareAuthToken hidlVec2AuthToken(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& buffer);
 hidl_vec<uint8_t> authToken2HidlVec(const HardwareAuthToken& token);
 
+// Serializes and deserializes a verification token. This format is private and
+// not stable between releases and should not be persisted to disk.
+//
+// Currently doesn't support the |parametersVerified| field, will fail if set.
+//
+std::optional<VerificationToken> deserializeVerificationToken(
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& serializedToken);
+std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> serializeVerificationToken(const VerificationToken& token);
+
 uint32_t getOsVersion();
 uint32_t getOsPatchlevel();
 
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/keymaster_utils.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/support/keymaster_utils.cpp
index 850a776..366cd0e 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/keymaster_utils.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/keymaster_utils.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #include <regex.h>
 
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
 #include <android-base/properties.h>
 #include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
 #include <keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h>
@@ -110,6 +111,80 @@
     return token;
 }
 
+void appendUint64(std::vector<uint8_t>& vec, uint64_t value) {
+    for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint64_t); n++) {
+        uint8_t byte = (value >> (n * 8)) & 0xff;
+        vec.push_back(byte);
+    }
+}
+
+uint64_t extractUint64(const std::vector<uint8_t>& data, size_t offset) {
+    uint64_t value = 0;
+    for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint64_t); n++) {
+        uint8_t byte = data[offset + n];
+        value |= byte << (n * 8);
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+
+void appendUint32(std::vector<uint8_t>& vec, uint32_t value) {
+    for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint32_t); n++) {
+        uint8_t byte = (value >> (n * 8)) & 0xff;
+        vec.push_back(byte);
+    }
+}
+
+uint32_t extractUint32(const std::vector<uint8_t>& data, size_t offset) {
+    uint32_t value = 0;
+    for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint32_t); n++) {
+        uint8_t byte = data[offset + n];
+        value |= byte << (n * 8);
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+
+std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> serializeVerificationToken(const VerificationToken& token) {
+    if (token.parametersVerified.size() > 0) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Serializing verification tokens with parametersVerified is not supported";
+        return {};
+    }
+    if (!(token.mac.size() == 0 || token.mac.size() == 32)) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected MAC size " << token.mac.size() << ", expected 0 or 32";
+        return {};
+    }
+    std::vector<uint8_t> serializedToken;
+    appendUint64(serializedToken, token.challenge);
+    appendUint64(serializedToken, token.timestamp);
+    appendUint32(serializedToken, uint32_t(token.securityLevel));
+    appendUint32(serializedToken, token.mac.size());
+    serializedToken.insert(serializedToken.end(), token.mac.begin(), token.mac.end());
+    return serializedToken;
+}
+
+std::optional<VerificationToken> deserializeVerificationToken(
+        const std::vector<uint8_t>& serializedToken) {
+    if (serializedToken.size() < 24) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected serialized VerificationToken size " << serializedToken.size()
+                   << ", expected at least 24 bytes";
+        return {};
+    }
+    VerificationToken token;
+    token.challenge = extractUint64(serializedToken, 0);
+    token.timestamp = extractUint64(serializedToken, 8);
+    token.securityLevel = SecurityLevel(extractUint32(serializedToken, 16));
+    size_t macSize = extractUint32(serializedToken, 20);
+    size_t expectedSerializedSize = 24 + macSize;
+    if (serializedToken.size() != expectedSerializedSize) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected serialized VerificationToken size " << serializedToken.size()
+                   << ", expected " << expectedSerializedSize;
+        return {};
+    }
+    if (macSize > 0) {
+        token.mac = std::vector<uint8_t>(serializedToken.begin() + 24, serializedToken.end());
+    }
+    return token;
+}
+
 namespace {
 
 constexpr char kPlatformVersionProp[] = "ro.build.version.release";
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp b/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp
index 3011da6..56a3ca9 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -15,5 +15,8 @@
             },
         },
     },
-    versions: ["1"],
+    versions: [
+        "1",
+        "2",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/.hash b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/.hash
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d5974e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/.hash
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+91ab0be1887410935f564e3938ff12c5f5f8c59d
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db1df2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable HardwareAuthToken {
+  long challenge;
+  long userId;
+  long authenticatorId;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
+  byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..924567f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthenticatorType.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum HardwareAuthenticatorType {
+  NONE = 0,
+  PASSWORD = 1,
+  FINGERPRINT = 2,
+  ANY = -1,
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..127c1bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum SecurityLevel {
+  SOFTWARE = 0,
+  TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
+  STRONGBOX = 2,
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/Timestamp.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/Timestamp.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45fa1ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/Timestamp.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable Timestamp {
+  long milliSeconds;
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0633765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/2/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable VerificationToken {
+  long challenge;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+  byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..127c1bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
+enum SecurityLevel {
+  SOFTWARE = 0,
+  TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
+  STRONGBOX = 2,
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0633765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
+// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
+// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
+// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
+// breakage is intended.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+@VintfStability
+parcelable VerificationToken {
+  long challenge;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+  byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f129783
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/SecurityLevel.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+
+/**
+ * Device security levels.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@Backing(type="int")
+enum SecurityLevel {
+    SOFTWARE = 0,
+    TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
+    /**
+     * STRONGBOX specifies that the secure hardware satisfies the requirements specified in CDD
+     * 9.11.2.
+     */
+    STRONGBOX = 2,
+}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eff9ca6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.keymaster;
+
+import android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel;
+import android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp;
+import android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType;
+
+/**
+ * VerificationToken instances are used for secure environments to authenticate one another.
+ *
+ * This version of the parcelable currently don't use the parametersVerified field since it's not
+ * needed for time-based verification. This can be added in a later version, if needed.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+parcelable VerificationToken {
+    /**
+     * The operation handle, used to ensure freshness.
+     */
+    long challenge;
+
+    /**
+     * The current time of the secure environment that generates the VerificationToken.  This can be
+     * checked against auth tokens generated by the same secure environment, which avoids needing to
+     * synchronize clocks.
+     */
+    Timestamp timestamp;
+
+    /**
+     * SecurityLevel of the secure environment that generated the token.
+     */
+    SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+
+    /**
+     * 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 of the above values, computed as:
+     *
+     *    HMAC(H,
+     *         "Auth Verification" || challenge || timestamp || securityLevel || parametersVerified)
+     *
+     * where:
+     *
+     *   ``HMAC'' is the shared HMAC key (see computeSharedHmac() in IKeymaster).
+     *
+     *   ``||'' represents concatenation
+     *
+     * The representation of challenge and timestamp is as 64-bit unsigned integers in big-endian
+     * order.  securityLevel is represented as a 32-bit unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+     *
+     * If parametersVerified is non-empty, the representation of parametersVerified is an ASN.1 DER
+     * encoded representation of the values.  The ASN.1 schema used is the AuthorizationList schema
+     * from the Keystore attestation documentation.  If parametersVerified is empty, it is simply
+     * omitted from the HMAC computation.
+     */
+    byte[] mac;
+}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index b152a29..8c08873 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -23,8 +23,12 @@
         "DemuxTests.cpp",
         "FilterTests.cpp",
         "DvrTests.cpp",
+        "DescramblerTests.cpp",
     ],
     static_libs: [
+        "android.hardware.cas@1.0",
+        "android.hardware.cas@1.1",
+        "android.hardware.cas@1.2",
         "android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.0",
         "android.hidl.allocator@1.0",
         "android.hidl.memory@1.0",
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7440bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "DescramblerTests.h"
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::createCasPlugin(int32_t caSystemId) {
+    auto status = mMediaCasService->isSystemIdSupported(caSystemId);
+    if (!status.isOk() || !status) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Failed to check isSystemIdSupported.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    mCasListener = new MediaCasListener();
+    auto pluginStatus = mMediaCasService->createPluginExt(caSystemId, mCasListener);
+    if (!pluginStatus.isOk()) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Failed to createPluginExt.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    mCas = ICas::castFrom(pluginStatus);
+    if (mCas == nullptr) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Failed to get ICas.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::openCasSession(TunerKeyToken& sessionId,
+                                                 vector<uint8_t> hidlPvtData) {
+    Status sessionStatus;
+    SessionIntent intent = SessionIntent::LIVE;
+    ScramblingMode mode = ScramblingMode::RESERVED;
+    auto returnVoid =
+            mCas->openSession_1_2(intent, mode, [&](Status status, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& id) {
+                sessionStatus = status;
+                sessionId = id;
+            });
+    if (!returnVoid.isOk() || (sessionStatus != Status::OK)) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Failed to open cas session.");
+        mCas->closeSession(sessionId);
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    auto status = mCas->setSessionPrivateData(sessionId, hidlPvtData);
+    if (status != android::hardware::cas::V1_0::Status::OK) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Failed to set session private data");
+        mCas->closeSession(sessionId);
+        return failure();
+    }
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::getKeyToken(int32_t caSystemId, string provisonStr,
+                                              hidl_vec<uint8_t> hidlPvtData, TunerKeyToken& token) {
+    if (createCasPlugin(caSystemId) != success()) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] createCasPlugin failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    if (provisonStr.size() > 0) {
+        auto returnStatus = mCas->provision(hidl_string(provisonStr));
+        if (returnStatus != android::hardware::cas::V1_0::Status::OK) {
+            ALOGW("[vts] provision failed.");
+            return failure();
+        }
+    }
+
+    return openCasSession(token, hidlPvtData);
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::openDescrambler(uint32_t demuxId) {
+    Result status;
+    mService->openDescrambler([&](Result result, const sp<IDescrambler>& descrambler) {
+        mDescrambler = descrambler;
+        status = result;
+    });
+    if (status != Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] openDescrambler failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    status = mDescrambler->setDemuxSource(demuxId);
+    if (status != Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] setDemuxSource failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::setKeyToken(TunerKeyToken token) {
+    Result status;
+    if (mDescrambler) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Descrambler is not opened yet.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    status = mDescrambler->setKeyToken(token);
+    if (status == Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] setKeyToken failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::addPid(DemuxPid pid, sp<IFilter> optionalSourceFilter) {
+    Result status;
+    if (mDescrambler) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Descrambler is not opened yet.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    status = mDescrambler->addPid(pid, optionalSourceFilter);
+    if (status == Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] addPid failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::removePid(DemuxPid pid, sp<IFilter> optionalSourceFilter) {
+    Result status;
+    if (mDescrambler) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Descrambler is not opened yet.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    status = mDescrambler->removePid(pid, optionalSourceFilter);
+    if (status == Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] removePid failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::closeDescrambler() {
+    Result status;
+    if (mDescrambler) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] Descrambler is not opened yet.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    status = mDescrambler->close();
+    mDescrambler = nullptr;
+    if (status == Result::SUCCESS) {
+        ALOGW("[vts] close Descrambler failed.");
+        return failure();
+    }
+
+    return success();
+}
+
+AssertionResult DescramblerTests::getDemuxPidFromFilterSettings(DemuxFilterType type,
+                                                                DemuxFilterSettings settings,
+                                                                DemuxPid& pid) {
+    switch (type.mainType) {
+        case DemuxFilterMainType::TS:
+            if (type.subType.tsFilterType() == DemuxTsFilterType::AUDIO ||
+                type.subType.tsFilterType() == DemuxTsFilterType::VIDEO) {
+                pid.tPid(settings.ts().tpid);
+            } else {
+                ALOGW("[vts] Not a media ts filter!");
+                return failure();
+            }
+            break;
+        case DemuxFilterMainType::MMTP:
+            if (type.subType.mmtpFilterType() == DemuxMmtpFilterType::AUDIO ||
+                type.subType.mmtpFilterType() == DemuxMmtpFilterType::VIDEO) {
+                pid.mmtpPid(settings.mmtp().mmtpPid);
+            } else {
+                ALOGW("[vts] Not a media mmtp filter!");
+                return failure();
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            ALOGW("[vts] Not a media filter!");
+            return failure();
+    }
+    return success();
+}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31f4663
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.h
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <VtsHalHidlTargetTestBase.h>
+#include <VtsHalHidlTargetTestEnvBase.h>
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android/hardware/cas/1.0/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/cas/1.2/ICas.h>
+#include <android/hardware/cas/1.2/ICasListener.h>
+#include <android/hardware/cas/1.2/IMediaCasService.h>
+#include <android/hardware/cas/1.2/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/IDescrambler.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/IDvr.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/IDvrCallback.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/ITuner.h>
+#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/types.h>
+#include <fmq/MessageQueue.h>
+#include <hidl/Status.h>
+#include <utils/Condition.h>
+#include <utils/Mutex.h>
+#include <fstream>
+#include <iostream>
+#include <map>
+
+using android::Condition;
+using android::Mutex;
+using android::sp;
+using android::hardware::EventFlag;
+using android::hardware::hidl_handle;
+using android::hardware::hidl_string;
+using android::hardware::hidl_vec;
+using android::hardware::kSynchronizedReadWrite;
+using android::hardware::MessageQueue;
+using android::hardware::MQDescriptorSync;
+using android::hardware::Return;
+using android::hardware::Void;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::ICas;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::ICasListener;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::IMediaCasService;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::ScramblingMode;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::SessionIntent;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::Status;
+using android::hardware::cas::V1_2::StatusEvent;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterMainType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterSettings;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterStatus;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxFilterType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxMmtpFilterType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxPid;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DemuxTsFilterType;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::IDescrambler;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::IFilter;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::ITuner;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::Result;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::TunerKeyToken;
+
+using ::testing::AssertionResult;
+
+class MediaCasListener : public ICasListener {
+  public:
+    virtual Return<void> onEvent(int32_t /*event*/, int32_t /*arg*/,
+                                 const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& /*data*/) override {
+        return Void();
+    }
+
+    virtual Return<void> onSessionEvent(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& /*sessionId*/, int32_t /*event*/,
+                                        int32_t /*arg*/,
+                                        const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& /*data*/) override {
+        return Void();
+    }
+
+    virtual Return<void> onStatusUpdate(StatusEvent /*event*/, int32_t /*arg*/) override {
+        return Void();
+    }
+};
+
+class DescramblerTests {
+  public:
+    void setService(sp<ITuner> tuner) { mService = tuner; }
+    void setCasService(sp<IMediaCasService> casService) { mMediaCasService = casService; }
+
+    AssertionResult setKeyToken(TunerKeyToken token);
+    AssertionResult openDescrambler(uint32_t demuxId);
+    AssertionResult addPid(DemuxPid pid, sp<IFilter> optionalSourceFilter);
+    AssertionResult removePid(DemuxPid pid, sp<IFilter> optionalSourceFilter);
+    AssertionResult closeDescrambler();
+    AssertionResult getKeyToken(int32_t caSystemId, string provisonStr,
+                                hidl_vec<uint8_t> hidlPvtData, TunerKeyToken& token);
+    AssertionResult getDemuxPidFromFilterSettings(DemuxFilterType type,
+                                                  DemuxFilterSettings settings, DemuxPid& pid);
+
+  protected:
+    static AssertionResult failure() { return ::testing::AssertionFailure(); }
+
+    static AssertionResult success() { return ::testing::AssertionSuccess(); }
+
+    sp<ITuner> mService;
+    sp<ICas> mCas;
+    sp<IMediaCasService> mMediaCasService;
+    sp<MediaCasListener> mCasListener;
+    sp<IDescrambler> mDescrambler;
+
+  private:
+    AssertionResult openCasSession(TunerKeyToken& sessionId, vector<uint8_t> hidlPvtData);
+    AssertionResult createCasPlugin(int32_t caSystemId);
+};
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index 9ac42da..a365282 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -18,53 +18,17 @@
 
 namespace {
 
-AssertionResult TunerHidlTest::createDescrambler(uint32_t demuxId) {
-    Result status;
-    mService->openDescrambler([&](Result result, const sp<IDescrambler>& descrambler) {
-        mDescrambler = descrambler;
-        status = result;
-    });
-    if (status != Result::SUCCESS) {
-        return failure();
-    }
-
-    status = mDescrambler->setDemuxSource(demuxId);
-    if (status != Result::SUCCESS) {
-        return failure();
-    }
-
-    // Test if demux source can be set more than once.
-    status = mDescrambler->setDemuxSource(demuxId);
-    return AssertionResult(status == Result::INVALID_STATE);
-}
-
-AssertionResult TunerHidlTest::closeDescrambler() {
-    Result status;
-    EXPECT_TRUE(mDescrambler);
-
-    status = mDescrambler->close();
-    mDescrambler = nullptr;
-    return AssertionResult(status == Result::SUCCESS);
-}
-
 AssertionResult TunerBroadcastHidlTest::filterDataOutputTest(vector<string> /*goldenOutputFiles*/) {
-    // Data Verify Module
-    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>>::iterator it;
-    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>> filterCallbacks = mFilterTests.getFilterCallbacks();
-    for (it = filterCallbacks.begin(); it != filterCallbacks.end(); it++) {
-        it->second->testFilterDataOutput();
-    }
-    return success();
+    return filterDataOutputTestBase(mFilterTests);
 }
 
 AssertionResult TunerPlaybackHidlTest::filterDataOutputTest(vector<string> /*goldenOutputFiles*/) {
-    // Data Verify Module
-    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>>::iterator it;
-    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>> filterCallbacks = mFilterTests.getFilterCallbacks();
-    for (it = filterCallbacks.begin(); it != filterCallbacks.end(); it++) {
-        it->second->testFilterDataOutput();
-    }
-    return success();
+    return filterDataOutputTestBase(mFilterTests);
+}
+
+AssertionResult TunerDescramblerHidlTest::filterDataOutputTest(
+        vector<string> /*goldenOutputFiles*/) {
+    return filterDataOutputTestBase(mFilterTests);
 }
 
 void TunerFilterHidlTest::configSingleFilterInDemuxTest(FilterConfig filterConf,
@@ -233,6 +197,69 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
 }
 
+void TunerDescramblerHidlTest::scrambledBroadcastTest(set<struct FilterConfig> mediaFilterConfs,
+                                                      FrontendConfig frontendConf,
+                                                      DescramblerConfig descConfig) {
+    uint32_t feId;
+    uint32_t demuxId;
+    sp<IDemux> demux;
+    set<uint32_t> filterIds;
+    uint32_t filterId;
+    set<struct FilterConfig>::iterator config;
+    set<uint32_t>::iterator id;
+
+    mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
+    if (feId == INVALID_ID) {
+        // TODO broadcast test on Cuttlefish needs licensed ts input,
+        // these tests are runnable on vendor device with real frontend module
+        // or with manual ts installing and use DVBT frontend.
+        return;
+    }
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+    mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
+    for (config = mediaFilterConfs.begin(); config != mediaFilterConfs.end(); config++) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux((*config).type, (*config).bufferSize));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.getNewlyOpenedFilterId(filterId));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.configFilter((*config).settings, filterId));
+        filterIds.insert(filterId);
+    }
+    mDescramblerTests.openDescrambler(demuxId);
+    TunerKeyToken token;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDescramblerTests.getKeyToken(descConfig.casSystemId, descConfig.provisionStr,
+                                              descConfig.hidlPvtData, token));
+    mDescramblerTests.setKeyToken(token);
+    vector<DemuxPid> pids;
+    DemuxPid pid;
+    for (config = mediaFilterConfs.begin(); config != mediaFilterConfs.end(); config++) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDescramblerTests.getDemuxPidFromFilterSettings((*config).type,
+                                                                    (*config).settings, pid));
+        pids.push_back(pid);
+        mDescramblerTests.addPid(pid, nullptr);
+    }
+    for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.startFilter(*id));
+    }
+    // tune test
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(filterDataOutputTest(goldenOutputFiles));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend());
+    for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.stopFilter(*id));
+    }
+    for (auto pid : pids) {
+        mDescramblerTests.removePid(pid, nullptr);
+    }
+    mDescramblerTests.closeDescrambler();
+    for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(*id));
+    }
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+}
+
 TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, TuneFrontend) {
     description("Tune one Frontend with specific setting and check Lock event");
     mFrontendTests.tuneTest(frontendArray[DVBT]);
@@ -341,7 +368,7 @@
     recordSingleFilterTest(filterArray[TS_RECORD0], frontendArray[DVBT], dvrArray[DVR_RECORD0]);
 }
 
-TEST_P(TunerHidlTest, CreateDescrambler) {
+TEST_P(TunerDescramblerHidlTest, CreateDescrambler) {
     description("Create Descrambler");
     uint32_t feId;
     uint32_t demuxId;
@@ -352,13 +379,21 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(createDescrambler(demuxId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(closeDescrambler());
+    mDescramblerTests.openDescrambler(demuxId);
+    mDescramblerTests.closeDescrambler();
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
 }
 
-INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
+TEST_P(TunerDescramblerHidlTest, ScrambledBroadcastDataFlowMediaFiltersTest) {
+    description("Test ts audio filter in scrambled broadcast use case");
+    set<FilterConfig> filterConfs;
+    filterConfs.insert(filterArray[TS_AUDIO0]);
+    filterConfs.insert(filterArray[TS_VIDEO1]);
+    scrambledBroadcastTest(filterConfs, frontendArray[DVBT], descramblerArray[DESC_0]);
+}
+
+/*INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
         PerInstance, TunerFrontendHidlTest,
         testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(ITuner::descriptor)),
         android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
@@ -386,10 +421,10 @@
 INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
         PerInstance, TunerRecordHidlTest,
         testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(ITuner::descriptor)),
-        android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
+        android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);*/
 
 INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
-        PerInstance, TunerHidlTest,
+        PerInstance, TunerDescramblerHidlTest,
         testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(ITuner::descriptor)),
         android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
 }  // namespace
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.h
index 6dddc38..2bdb537 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.h
@@ -14,19 +14,14 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
-#include <android/hardware/tv/tuner/1.0/IDescrambler.h>
-
 #include "DemuxTests.h"
+#include "DescramblerTests.h"
 #include "DvrTests.h"
 #include "FrontendTests.h"
 
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::DataFormat;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::IDescrambler;
 
-static AssertionResult failure() {
-    return ::testing::AssertionFailure();
-}
-
 static AssertionResult success() {
     return ::testing::AssertionSuccess();
 }
@@ -38,6 +33,17 @@
     initFrontendScanConfig();
     initFilterConfig();
     initDvrConfig();
+    initDescramblerConfig();
+}
+
+AssertionResult filterDataOutputTestBase(FilterTests tests) {
+    // Data Verify Module
+    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>>::iterator it;
+    std::map<uint32_t, sp<FilterCallback>> filterCallbacks = tests.getFilterCallbacks();
+    for (it = filterCallbacks.begin(); it != filterCallbacks.end(); it++) {
+        it->second->testFilterDataOutput();
+    }
+    return success();
 }
 
 class TunerFrontendHidlTest : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
@@ -193,15 +199,19 @@
     DvrTests mDvrTests;
 };
 
-class TunerHidlTest : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
+class TunerDescramblerHidlTest : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
   public:
     virtual void SetUp() override {
         mService = ITuner::getService(GetParam());
+        mCasService = IMediaCasService::getService();
         ASSERT_NE(mService, nullptr);
+        ASSERT_NE(mCasService, nullptr);
         initConfiguration();
 
         mFrontendTests.setService(mService);
         mDemuxTests.setService(mService);
+        mDescramblerTests.setService(mService);
+        mDescramblerTests.setCasService(mCasService);
     }
 
   protected:
@@ -209,13 +219,15 @@
         RecordProperty("description", description);
     }
 
+    void scrambledBroadcastTest(set<struct FilterConfig> mediaFilterConfs,
+                                FrontendConfig frontendConf, DescramblerConfig descConfig);
+    AssertionResult filterDataOutputTest(vector<string> /*goldenOutputFiles*/);
+
     sp<ITuner> mService;
+    sp<IMediaCasService> mCasService;
     FrontendTests mFrontendTests;
     DemuxTests mDemuxTests;
-
-    sp<IDescrambler> mDescrambler;
-
-    AssertionResult createDescrambler(uint32_t demuxId);
-    AssertionResult closeDescrambler();
+    FilterTests mFilterTests;
+    DescramblerTests mDescramblerTests;
 };
 }  // namespace
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
index 287f673..f2dd197 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
@@ -52,6 +52,19 @@
 const uint32_t FMQ_SIZE_4M = 0x400000;
 const uint32_t FMQ_SIZE_16M = 0x1000000;
 
+#define CLEAR_KEY_SYSTEM_ID 0xF6D8
+#define PROVISION_STR                                      \
+    "{                                                   " \
+    "  \"id\": 21140844,                                 " \
+    "  \"name\": \"Test Title\",                         " \
+    "  \"lowercase_organization_name\": \"Android\",     " \
+    "  \"asset_key\": {                                  " \
+    "  \"encryption_key\": \"nezAr3CHFrmBR9R8Tedotw==\"  " \
+    "  },                                                " \
+    "  \"cas_type\": 1,                                  " \
+    "  \"track_types\": [ ]                              " \
+    "}                                                   "
+
 typedef enum {
     TS_VIDEO0,
     TS_VIDEO1,
@@ -81,10 +94,17 @@
     DVR_MAX,
 } Dvr;
 
+typedef enum {
+    DESC_0,
+    DESC_MAX,
+} Descrambler;
+
 struct FilterConfig {
     uint32_t bufferSize;
     DemuxFilterType type;
     DemuxFilterSettings settings;
+
+    bool operator<(const FilterConfig& /*c*/) const { return false; }
 };
 
 struct FrontendConfig {
@@ -109,11 +129,18 @@
     string playbackInputFile;
 };
 
+struct DescramblerConfig {
+    uint32_t casSystemId;
+    string provisionStr;
+    vector<uint8_t> hidlPvtData;
+};
+
 static FrontendConfig frontendArray[FILTER_MAX];
 static FrontendConfig frontendScanArray[SCAN_MAX];
 static ChannelConfig channelArray[FRONTEND_MAX];
 static FilterConfig filterArray[FILTER_MAX];
 static DvrConfig dvrArray[DVR_MAX];
+static DescramblerConfig descramblerArray[DESC_MAX];
 static vector<string> goldenOutputFiles;
 
 /** Configuration array for the frontend tune test */
@@ -240,3 +267,10 @@
     dvrArray[DVR_PLAYBACK0].bufferSize = FMQ_SIZE_4M;
     dvrArray[DVR_PLAYBACK0].settings.playback(playbackSettings);
 };
+
+/** Configuration array for the descrambler test */
+inline void initDescramblerConfig() {
+    descramblerArray[DESC_0].casSystemId = CLEAR_KEY_SYSTEM_ID;
+    descramblerArray[DESC_0].provisionStr = PROVISION_STR;
+    descramblerArray[DESC_0].hidlPvtData.resize(256);
+};