diff --git a/radio/1.6/types.hal b/radio/1.6/types.hal
index d843fd8..1b697a9 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/types.hal
+++ b/radio/1.6/types.hal
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@
     * the estimated maximum sustainable link bandwidth (as would be measured
     * at the Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP). If the DL Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate is known,
     * this value shall not exceed the DL-AMBR for the Internet PDN connection.
-    * This must be filled with -1 if network is not connected.
+    * This must be filled with 0 if network is not connected.
     */
    uint32_t downlinkCapacityKbps;
 
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@
     * estimated maximum sustainable link bandwidth (as would be measured at the
     * Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP). If the UL Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate is known,
     * this value shall not exceed the UL-AMBR for the Internet PDN connection.
-    * This must be filled with -1 if network is not connected.
+    * This must be filled with 0 if network is not connected.
     */
    uint32_t uplinkCapacityKbps;
 
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@
     * This bandwidth estimate shall be the estimated maximum sustainable link bandwidth
     * (as would be measured at the Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP). This is valid only
     * in if device is connected to both primary and secodary in dual connected
-    * mode. This must be filled with -1 if secondary is not connected or if
+    * mode. This must be filled with 0 if secondary is not connected or if
     * modem does not support this feature.
     */
    uint32_t secondaryDownlinkCapacityKbps;
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@
     * This bandwidth estimate shall be the estimated
     * maximum sustainable link bandwidth (as would be measured at the Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP).
     * This is valid only in if device is connected to both primary and secodary in dual connected
-    * mode.This must be filled with -1 if secondary is not connected or if modem
+    * mode.This must be filled with 0 if secondary is not connected or if modem
     * does not support this feature.
     */
    uint32_t secondaryUplinkCapacityKbps;
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 65b0dd0..2bc6af3 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
     defaults: ["VtsHalTargetTestDefaults"],
     srcs: [
         "radio_hidl_hal_api.cpp",
+        "radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp",
         "radio_hidl_hal_test.cpp",
         "radio_response.cpp",
         "radio_indication.cpp",
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4222441
--- /dev/null
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <regex>
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h>
+
+/*
+ * Test IRadio.getAvailableNetworks() for the response returned.
+ */
+TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, getAvailableNetworks) {
+    LOG(DEBUG) << "getAvailableNetworks";
+    serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
+
+    radio_v1_6->getAvailableNetworks(serial);
+    EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
+    EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.serial);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.type == RadioResponseType::SOLICITED ||
+                radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.type == RadioResponseType::SOLICITED_ACK_EXP);
+
+    if (cardStatus.base.base.base.cardState == CardState::ABSENT) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+                radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.error,
+                {::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::NONE,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::CANCELLED,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::DEVICE_IN_USE,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::MODEM_ERR,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED},
+                CHECK_GENERAL_ERROR));
+    } else if (radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.error ==
+               ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::NONE) {
+        static const std::regex kOperatorNumericRe("^[0-9]{5,6}$");
+        for (OperatorInfo info : radioRsp_v1_6->networkInfos) {
+            if (info.operatorNumeric != nullptr) {
+                ASSERT_TRUE(
+                        std::regex_match(std::string(info.operatorNumeric), kOperatorNumericRe));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    LOG(DEBUG) << "getAvailableNetworks finished";
+}
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h
index 950d82a..3185f98 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 
   public:
     hidl_vec<RadioBandMode> radioBandModes;
+    hidl_vec<OperatorInfo> networkInfos;
 
     ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioResponseInfo rspInfo_v1_0;
     ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo rspInfo;
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp
index 942964b..6e7b86f 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp
@@ -274,8 +274,11 @@
 }
 
 Return<void> RadioResponse_v1_6::getAvailableNetworksResponse(
-        const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioResponseInfo& /*info*/,
-        const ::android::hardware::hidl_vec<OperatorInfo>& /*networkInfos*/) {
+        const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioResponseInfo& info,
+        const ::android::hardware::hidl_vec<OperatorInfo>& networkInfos) {
+    rspInfo_v1_0 = info;
+    this->networkInfos = networkInfos;
+    parent_v1_6.notify(info.serial);
     return Void();
 }
 
diff --git a/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal b/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal
index 15eefed..f6aee31 100644
--- a/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal
+++ b/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
      *        - Requesting android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadio.setDataThrottling()
      *        - Providing android.hardware.radio@1.6::SlicingConfig through
      *          android.hardware.radio@1.6::getSlicingConfig()
+     *        - Providing android.hardware.radio@1.6::PhysicalChannelConfig through
+     *          android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadioIndication.currentPhysicalChannelConfigs_1_6()
      *
      * Valid errors returned:
      *   RadioError:NONE
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
index 1187717..230534c 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
         "libkeymint",
         "liblog",
         "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
-        "libremote_provisioner",
         "libutils",
     ],
     srcs: [
@@ -51,28 +50,3 @@
     vendor: true,
     src: "android.hardware.hardware_keystore.xml",
 }
-
-cc_library {
-    name: "libremote_provisioner",
-    vendor_available: true,
-    static_libs: [
-        "libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
-    ],
-    shared_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
-        "libbinder_ndk",
-        "libcppbor_external",
-        "libcppcose_rkp",
-        "libcrypto",
-        "libkeymaster_portable",
-        "libkeymint",
-        "liblog",
-        "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
-    ],
-    export_include_dirs: [
-        ".",
-    ],
-    srcs: [
-        "RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp",
-    ],
-}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index e21efb7..0000000
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h"
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <variant>
-
-#include <cppbor.h>
-#include <cppbor_parse.h>
-
-#include <KeyMintUtils.h>
-#include <keymaster/cppcose/cppcose.h>
-#include <keymaster/keymaster_configuration.h>
-#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint {
-
-using ::std::string;
-using ::std::tuple;
-using ::std::unique_ptr;
-using ::std::variant;
-using ::std::vector;
-using bytevec = ::std::vector<uint8_t>;
-
-using namespace cppcose;
-using namespace keymaster;
-
-namespace {
-
-constexpr auto STATUS_FAILED = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_FAILED;
-
-struct AStatusDeleter {
-    void operator()(AStatus* p) { AStatus_delete(p); }
-};
-
-// TODO(swillden): Remove the dependency on AStatus stuff.  The COSE lib should use something like
-// StatusOr, but it shouldn't depend on AStatus.
-class Status {
-  public:
-    Status() {}
-    Status(int32_t errCode, const std::string& errMsg)
-        : status_(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(errCode, errMsg.c_str())) {}
-    explicit Status(const std::string& errMsg)
-        : status_(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(STATUS_FAILED, errMsg.c_str())) {}
-    Status(AStatus* status) : status_(status) {}
-    Status(Status&&) = default;
-    Status(const Status&) = delete;
-
-    operator ::ndk::ScopedAStatus() && { return ndk::ScopedAStatus(status_.release()); }
-
-    bool isOk() { return !status_; }
-
-    // Don't call getMessage() unless isOk() returns false;
-    const char* getMessage() const { return AStatus_getMessage(status_.get()); }
-
-  private:
-    std::unique_ptr<AStatus, AStatusDeleter> status_;
-};
-
-template <typename T>
-class StatusOr {
-  public:
-    StatusOr(AStatus* status) : status_(status) {}
-    StatusOr(Status status) : status_(std::move(status)) {}
-    StatusOr(T val) : value_(std::move(val)) {}
-
-    bool isOk() { return status_.isOk(); }
-
-    T* operator->() & {
-        assert(isOk());
-        return &value_.value();
-    }
-    T& operator*() & {
-        assert(isOk());
-        return value_.value();
-    }
-    T&& operator*() && {
-        assert(isOk());
-        return std::move(value_).value();
-    }
-
-    const char* getMessage() const {
-        assert(!isOk());
-        return status_.getMessage();
-    }
-
-    Status moveError() {
-        assert(!isOk());
-        return std::move(status_);
-    }
-
-    T moveValue() { return std::move(value_).value(); }
-
-  private:
-    Status status_;
-    std::optional<T> value_;
-};
-
-}  // namespace
-
-RemotelyProvisionedComponent::RemotelyProvisionedComponent(
-        std::shared_ptr<keymint::AndroidKeyMintDevice> keymint) {
-    impl_ = keymint->getKeymasterImpl();
-}
-
-RemotelyProvisionedComponent::~RemotelyProvisionedComponent() {}
-
-ScopedAStatus RemotelyProvisionedComponent::getHardwareInfo(RpcHardwareInfo* info) {
-    info->versionNumber = 1;
-    info->rpcAuthorName = "Google";
-    info->supportedEekCurve = RpcHardwareInfo::CURVE_25519;
-    return ScopedAStatus::ok();
-}
-
-ScopedAStatus RemotelyProvisionedComponent::generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(bool testMode,
-                                                                     MacedPublicKey* macedPublicKey,
-                                                                     bytevec* privateKeyHandle) {
-    GenerateRkpKeyRequest request(impl_->message_version());
-    request.test_mode = testMode;
-    GenerateRkpKeyResponse response(impl_->message_version());
-    impl_->GenerateRkpKey(request, &response);
-    if (response.error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
-        return Status(-static_cast<int32_t>(response.error), "Failure in key generation.");
-    }
-
-    macedPublicKey->macedKey = km_utils::kmBlob2vector(response.maced_public_key);
-    *privateKeyHandle = km_utils::kmBlob2vector(response.key_blob);
-    return ScopedAStatus::ok();
-}
-
-ScopedAStatus RemotelyProvisionedComponent::generateCertificateRequest(
-        bool testMode, const vector<MacedPublicKey>& keysToSign,
-        const bytevec& endpointEncCertChain, const bytevec& challenge, DeviceInfo* deviceInfo,
-        ProtectedData* protectedData, bytevec* keysToSignMac) {
-    GenerateCsrRequest request(impl_->message_version());
-    request.test_mode = testMode;
-    request.num_keys = keysToSign.size();
-    request.keys_to_sign_array = new KeymasterBlob[keysToSign.size()];
-    for (int i = 0; i < keysToSign.size(); i++) {
-        request.SetKeyToSign(i, keysToSign[i].macedKey.data(), keysToSign[i].macedKey.size());
-    }
-    request.SetEndpointEncCertChain(endpointEncCertChain.data(), endpointEncCertChain.size());
-    request.SetChallenge(challenge.data(), challenge.size());
-    GenerateCsrResponse response(impl_->message_version());
-    impl_->GenerateCsr(request, &response);
-
-    if (response.error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
-        return Status(-static_cast<int32_t>(response.error), "Failure in CSR Generation.");
-    }
-    deviceInfo->deviceInfo = km_utils::kmBlob2vector(response.device_info_blob);
-    protectedData->protectedData = km_utils::kmBlob2vector(response.protected_data_blob);
-    *keysToSignMac = km_utils::kmBlob2vector(response.keys_to_sign_mac);
-    return ScopedAStatus::ok();
-}
-
-}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h b/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h
deleted file mode 100644
index ff54d04..0000000
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#pragma once
-
-#include <AndroidKeyMintDevice.h>
-#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
-#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
-#include <cppbor.h>
-#include <keymaster/UniquePtr.h>
-#include <keymaster/android_keymaster.h>
-
-namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint {
-
-using ::ndk::ScopedAStatus;
-
-class RemotelyProvisionedComponent : public BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
-  public:
-    explicit RemotelyProvisionedComponent(std::shared_ptr<keymint::AndroidKeyMintDevice> keymint);
-    virtual ~RemotelyProvisionedComponent();
-
-    ScopedAStatus getHardwareInfo(RpcHardwareInfo* info) override;
-
-    ScopedAStatus generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(bool testMode, MacedPublicKey* macedPublicKey,
-                                           std::vector<uint8_t>* privateKeyHandle) override;
-
-    ScopedAStatus generateCertificateRequest(bool testMode,
-                                             const std::vector<MacedPublicKey>& keysToSign,
-                                             const std::vector<uint8_t>& endpointEncCertChain,
-                                             const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
-                                             DeviceInfo* deviceInfo, ProtectedData* protectedData,
-                                             std::vector<uint8_t>* keysToSignMac) override;
-
-  private:
-    std::shared_ptr<::keymaster::AndroidKeymaster> impl_;
-};
-
-}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
index bcebbaf..8092e34 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
@@ -21,14 +21,13 @@
 #include <android/binder_process.h>
 
 #include <AndroidKeyMintDevice.h>
+#include <AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice.h>
 #include <AndroidSecureClock.h>
 #include <AndroidSharedSecret.h>
 #include <keymaster/soft_keymaster_logger.h>
 
-#include "RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h"
-
 using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::AndroidKeyMintDevice;
-using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::RemotelyProvisionedComponent;
+using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice;
 using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel;
 using aidl::android::hardware::security::secureclock::AndroidSecureClock;
 using aidl::android::hardware::security::sharedsecret::AndroidSharedSecret;
@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@
     // Add Shared Secret Service
     addService<AndroidSharedSecret>(keyMint);
     // Add Remotely Provisioned Component Service
-    addService<RemotelyProvisionedComponent>(keyMint);
+    addService<AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice>(keyMint);
     ABinderProcess_joinThreadPool();
     return EXIT_FAILURE;  // should not reach
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
index d969dfe..d5c45e2 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
     ],
     srcs: [
         "AttestKeyTest.cpp",
+        "DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp",
         "KeyMintTest.cpp",
     ],
     shared_libs: [
@@ -106,7 +107,6 @@
         "libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
         "libkeymint_vts_test_utils",
         "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
-        "libremote_provisioner",
     ],
     test_suites: [
         "general-tests",
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7009c6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "keymint_1_attest_key_test"
+
+#include <cutils/log.h>
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
+#include <keymint_support/key_param_output.h>
+#include <keymint_support/openssl_utils.h>
+
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
+namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test {
+
+class DeviceUniqueAttestationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
+  protected:
+    void CheckUniqueAttestationResults(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+                                       const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics,
+                                       const AuthorizationSet& hw_enforced, int key_size) {
+        ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+
+        if (KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations) {
+            std::cout << bin2hex(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate) << std::endl;
+        }
+
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size)) << "Key size missing";
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+                                              SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+    }
+};
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.RsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented
+ *
+ * Verifies that non strongbox implementations do not implement Rsa device unique
+ * attestation.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, RsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented) {
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    // Check RSA implementation
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                      .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented
+ *
+ * Verifies that non strongbox implementations do not implement Ecdsa device unique
+ * attestation.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented) {
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    // Check Ecdsa implementation
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.RsaDeviceUniqueAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that strongbox implementations of Rsa implements device unique
+ * attestation correctly, if implemented.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, RsaDeviceUniqueAttestation) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    int key_size = 2048;
+
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                      .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+    // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+    if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                           .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                           .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                           .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+
+    CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced, key_size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that strongbox implementations of Rsa implements device unique
+ * attestation correctly, if implemented.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestation) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    int key_size = 256;
+
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+    // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+    if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                           .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                           .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+                                           .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+
+    CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced, key_size);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest);
+
+}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index 0dcc961..59cb57b 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -883,16 +883,20 @@
     if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return false;
 
     EXPECT_GE(att_attestation_version, 3U);
+    vector<uint8_t> appId(app_id.begin(), app_id.end());
 
-    expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
-                                   vector<uint8_t>(app_id.begin(), app_id.end()));
+    // check challenge and app id only if we expects a non-fake certificate
+    if (challenge.length() > 0) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
+        EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));
+
+        expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, appId);
+    }
 
     EXPECT_GE(att_keymaster_version, 4U);
     EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymaster_security_level);
     EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_attestation_security_level);
 
-    EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
-    EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));
 
     char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {};
     // TODO(b/136282179): When running under VTS-on-GSI the TEE-backed
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index 2d28845..09cdab1 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -359,10 +359,10 @@
  * have correct characteristics.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithAttestation) {
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
-        auto challenge = "hello";
-        auto app_id = "foo";
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
 
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
@@ -470,6 +470,163 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaEncryptionWithAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint attestation for RSA encryption keys with challenge and
+ * app id is also successful.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaEncryptionWithAttestation) {
+    auto key_size = 2048;
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .RsaEncryptionKey(key_size, 65537)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                 .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                 .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                         &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+    ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+    AuthorizationSet auths;
+    for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+        auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+    }
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+
+    // Verify that App data and ROT are NOT included.
+    EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
+
+    // Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
+    EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
+
+    EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301U));
+
+    auto os_ver = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(os_ver);
+    EXPECT_EQ(*os_ver, os_version());
+
+    AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+            << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+    ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+
+    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+    AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id,  //
+                                          sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                          cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithSelfSign
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA key generation is successful, and returns
+ * self signed certificate if no challenge is provided.  And signing etc
+ * works as expected.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithSelfSign) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                             &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithAttestationMissAppId
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA checks for missing app ID.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithAttestationMissAppId) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                  .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                          &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithAttestationAppIdIgnored
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA ignores app id if challenge is missing.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithAttestationAppIdIgnored) {
+    auto key_size = 2048;
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                 .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                         &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+    ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+    CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+    AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+            << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+    ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+}
+
+/*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.LimitedUsageRsa
  *
  * Verifies that KeyMint can generate all required RSA key sizes with limited usage, and that the
@@ -516,10 +673,10 @@
  * resulting keys have correct characteristics and attestation.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, LimitedUsageRsaWithAttestation) {
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
-        auto challenge = "hello";
-        auto app_id = "foo";
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
 
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
@@ -628,6 +785,188 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that for all Ecdsa key sizes, if challenge and app id is provided,
+ * an attestation will be generated.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestation) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                     .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                     .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                             &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id,  //
+                                              sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaSelfSignAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that if no challenge is provided to an Ecdsa key generation, then
+ * the key will generate a self signed attestation.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaSelfSignAttestation) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                             &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationRequireAppId
+ *
+ * Verifies that if attestation challenge is provided to Ecdsa key generation, then
+ * app id must also be provided or else it will fail.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationRequireAppId) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                          &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaIgnoreAppId
+ *
+ * Verifies that if no challenge is provided to the Ecdsa key generation, then
+ * any appid will be ignored, and keymint will generate a self sign certificate.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaIgnoreAppId) {
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                     .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                             &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AttestationApplicationIDLengthProperlyEncoded
+ *
+ * Verifies that the Attestation Application ID software enforced tag has a proper length encoding.
+ * Some implementations break strict encoding rules by encoding a length between 127 and 256 in one
+ * byte. Proper DER encoding specifies that for lengths greater than 127, one byte should be used
+ * to specify how many following bytes will be used to encode the length.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AttestationApplicationIDLengthProperlyEncoded) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto key_size = 256;
+    std::vector<uint32_t> app_id_lengths{143, 258};
+
+    for (uint32_t length : app_id_lengths) {
+        const string app_id(length, 'a');
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                     .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                     .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                             &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id,  //
+                                              sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.LimitedUsageEcdsa
  *
  * Verifies that KeyMint can generate all required EC key sizes with limited usage, and that the
@@ -789,6 +1128,41 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacNoAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that for Hmac key generation, no attestation will be generated even if challenge
+ * and app id are provided.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacNoAttestation) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        constexpr size_t key_size = 128;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .HmacKey(key_size)
+                                                     .Digest(digest)
+                                                     .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                     .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128),
+                                             &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.LimitedUsageHmac
  *
  * Verifies that KeyMint supports all required digests with limited usage Hmac, and that the
@@ -922,6 +1296,47 @@
                                   .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
 }
 
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesNoAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that attestation parameters to AES keys are ignored and generateKey
+ * will succeed.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesNoAttestation) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+                                                 .EcbMode()
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)
+                                                 .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                 .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)));
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesNoAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting parameters to 3DES keys are ignored and generate key
+ * will be successful.  No attestation should be generated.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesNoAttestation) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+                                                 .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                 .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                 .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)));
+    ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(NewKeyGenerationTest);
 
 typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase SigningOperationsTest;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
index 6443015..a2071c2 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 #define LOG_TAG "VtsRemotelyProvisionableComponentTests"
 
-#include <RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
+#include <AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
 #include <android/binder_manager.h>
diff --git a/tetheroffload/control/1.1/Android.bp b/tetheroffload/control/1.1/Android.bp
index e87ff5c..7871c2c 100644
--- a/tetheroffload/control/1.1/Android.bp
+++ b/tetheroffload/control/1.1/Android.bp
@@ -21,5 +21,9 @@
         "android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.0",
         "android.hidl.base@1.0",
     ],
+    apex_available: [
+        "//apex_available:platform", // Used by InProcessTethering
+        "com.android.tethering",
+    ],
     gen_java: true,
 }