diff --git a/audio/aidl/default/config/audioPolicy/api/current.txt b/audio/aidl/default/config/audioPolicy/api/current.txt
index ad79a0c..ba867a0 100644
--- a/audio/aidl/default/config/audioPolicy/api/current.txt
+++ b/audio/aidl/default/config/audioPolicy/api/current.txt
@@ -33,14 +33,19 @@
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_INDEX_MASK_8;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_INDEX_MASK_9;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_2POINT0POINT2;
+    enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_2POINT1;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_2POINT1POINT2;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_3POINT0POINT2;
+    enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_3POINT1;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_3POINT1POINT2;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_5POINT1;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_6;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_FRONT_BACK;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_MONO;
+    enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_PENTA;
+    enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_QUAD;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_STEREO;
+    enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_TRI;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_CALL_MONO;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_DNLINK_MONO;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.AudioChannelMask AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_UPLINK_MONO;
diff --git a/audio/aidl/default/config/audioPolicy/audio_policy_configuration.xsd b/audio/aidl/default/config/audioPolicy/audio_policy_configuration.xsd
index 301c969..92d6777 100644
--- a/audio/aidl/default/config/audioPolicy/audio_policy_configuration.xsd
+++ b/audio/aidl/default/config/audioPolicy/audio_policy_configuration.xsd
@@ -533,12 +533,17 @@
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_STEREO_HAPTIC_AB"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_MONO"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_STEREO"/>
+            <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_2POINT1"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_FRONT_BACK"/>
+            <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_TRI"/>
+            <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_3POINT1"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_6"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_2POINT0POINT2"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_2POINT1POINT2"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_3POINT0POINT2"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_3POINT1POINT2"/>
+            <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_QUAD"/>
+            <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_PENTA"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_5POINT1"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_UPLINK_MONO"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_CHANNEL_IN_VOICE_DNLINK_MONO"/>
diff --git a/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/Stream.h b/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/Stream.h
index 65680df..476f1ff 100644
--- a/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/Stream.h
+++ b/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/Stream.h
@@ -155,20 +155,19 @@
 struct DriverInterface {
     using CreateInstance = std::function<DriverInterface*(const StreamContext&)>;
     virtual ~DriverInterface() = default;
-    // This function is called once, on the main thread, before starting the worker thread.
-    virtual ::android::status_t init() = 0;
-    // This function is called from Binder pool thread. It must be done in a thread-safe manner
-    // if this method and other methods in this interface share data.
-    virtual ::android::status_t setConnectedDevices(
-            const std::vector<::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDevice>&
-                    connectedDevices) = 0;
-    // All the functions below are called on the worker thread.
+    // All the methods below are called on the worker thread.
+    virtual ::android::status_t init() = 0;  // This function is only called once.
     virtual ::android::status_t drain(StreamDescriptor::DrainMode mode) = 0;
     virtual ::android::status_t flush() = 0;
     virtual ::android::status_t pause() = 0;
     virtual ::android::status_t transfer(void* buffer, size_t frameCount, size_t* actualFrameCount,
                                          int32_t* latencyMs) = 0;
     virtual ::android::status_t standby() = 0;
+    // The method below is called from a thread of the Binder pool. Access to data shared with other
+    // methods of this interface must be done in a thread-safe manner.
+    virtual ::android::status_t setConnectedDevices(
+            const std::vector<::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDevice>&
+                    connectedDevices) = 0;
 };
 
 class StreamWorkerCommonLogic : public ::android::hardware::audio::common::StreamLogic {
diff --git a/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/StreamStub.h b/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/StreamStub.h
index df0182c..436e610 100644
--- a/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/StreamStub.h
+++ b/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/StreamStub.h
@@ -24,15 +24,16 @@
   public:
     DriverStub(const StreamContext& context, bool isInput);
     ::android::status_t init() override;
-    ::android::status_t setConnectedDevices(
-            const std::vector<::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDevice>& connectedDevices)
-            override;
     ::android::status_t drain(StreamDescriptor::DrainMode) override;
     ::android::status_t flush() override;
     ::android::status_t pause() override;
     ::android::status_t transfer(void* buffer, size_t frameCount, size_t* actualFrameCount,
                                  int32_t* latencyMs) override;
     ::android::status_t standby() override;
+    // Note: called on a different thread.
+    ::android::status_t setConnectedDevices(
+            const std::vector<::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDevice>& connectedDevices)
+            override;
 
   private:
     const size_t mFrameSizeBytes;
diff --git a/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/StreamUsb.h b/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/StreamUsb.h
index 36e64cb..05d889a 100644
--- a/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/StreamUsb.h
+++ b/audio/aidl/default/include/core-impl/StreamUsb.h
@@ -34,15 +34,16 @@
   public:
     DriverUsb(const StreamContext& context, bool isInput);
     ::android::status_t init() override;
-    ::android::status_t setConnectedDevices(
-            const std::vector<::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDevice>& connectedDevices)
-            override;
     ::android::status_t drain(StreamDescriptor::DrainMode) override;
     ::android::status_t flush() override;
     ::android::status_t pause() override;
     ::android::status_t transfer(void* buffer, size_t frameCount, size_t* actualFrameCount,
                                  int32_t* latencyMs) override;
     ::android::status_t standby() override;
+    // Note: called on a different thread.
+    ::android::status_t setConnectedDevices(
+            const std::vector<::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDevice>& connectedDevices)
+            override;
 
   private:
     ::android::status_t exitStandby();
diff --git a/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/Android.bp b/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/Android.bp
index 757f8a8..c6a3963 100644
--- a/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/Android.bp
+++ b/audio/common/all-versions/test/utility/Android.bp
@@ -62,6 +62,5 @@
         "libxml2",
         "liblog",
     ],
-    static_libs: ["libgtest"],
     test_suites: ["general-tests"],
 }
diff --git a/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/Android.bp b/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/Android.bp
index 5d669c2..225c065 100644
--- a/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/Android.bp
+++ b/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/Android.bp
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
     name: "audio_policy_engine_configurable_configuration_V1_0",
     srcs: ["AllSchemas.xsd"],
     package_name: "audio.policy.configurable.V1_0",
+    root_elements: ["ParameterFrameworkConfiguration"],
 }
 
 // Unfortunately, all rules only have a single output, thus
diff --git a/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/api/current.txt b/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/api/current.txt
index c2fb6fc..2b83e60 100644
--- a/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/api/current.txt
+++ b/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/api/current.txt
@@ -470,23 +470,7 @@
 
   public class XmlParser {
     ctor public XmlParser();
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.BitParameterBlock readBitParameterBlock(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.BooleanParameter readBooleanParameter(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.ComponentTypeSetType readComponentTypeSetType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.ComponentTypeSetType readComponentTypeSetType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.ConfigurableDomainType readConfigurableDomainType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.ConfigurableDomains readConfigurableDomains(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.EnumParameterType readEnumParameterType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.FixedPointParameterType readFixedPointParameterType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.FloatingPointParameterType readFloatingPointParameterType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.IntegerParameterType readIntegerParameterType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.LinearAdaptationType readLinearAdaptationType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.LogarithmicAdaptation readLogarithmicAdaptation(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.ParameterFrameworkConfiguration readParameterFrameworkConfiguration(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.StringParameter readStringParameter(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.SubsystemPlugins readSubsystemPlugins(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.SubsystemType readSubsystemType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.SystemClass readSystemClass(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static String readText(org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParser) throws java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static void skip(org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParser) throws java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
   }
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Android.bp b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Android.bp
index 7f66eca..8aa06f8 100644
--- a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -7,11 +7,21 @@
     default_applicable_licenses: ["hardware_interfaces_license"],
 }
 
+filegroup {
+    name: "face-default.rc",
+    srcs: ["face-default.rc"],
+}
+
+filegroup {
+    name: "face-default.xml",
+    srcs: ["face-default.xml"],
+}
+
 cc_binary {
     name: "android.hardware.biometrics.face-service.example",
     relative_install_path: "hw",
-    init_rc: ["face-default.rc"],
-    vintf_fragments: ["face-default.xml"],
+    init_rc: [":face-default.rc"],
+    vintf_fragments: [":face-default.xml"],
     vendor: true,
     shared_libs: [
         "libbase",
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/Android.bp b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f39a08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package {
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["Android-Apache-2.0"],
+}
+
+apex_key {
+    name: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.key",
+    public_key: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.avbpubkey",
+    private_key: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pem",
+}
+
+android_app_certificate {
+    name: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.certificate",
+    certificate: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face",
+}
+
+apex {
+    name: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face",
+    manifest: "manifest.json",
+    file_contexts: "file_contexts",
+    key: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.key",
+    certificate: ":com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.certificate",
+    updatable: false,
+
+    vendor: true,
+    use_vndk_as_stable: true,
+
+    binaries: [
+        // hal
+        "android.hardware.biometrics.face-service.example",
+    ],
+    prebuilts: [
+        // init_rc
+        "face-default-apex.rc",
+        // vintf_fragment
+        "face-default-apex.xml",
+        // permission
+        "android.hardware.biometrics.face.prebuilt.xml",
+    ],
+
+    overrides: [
+        "android.hardware.biometrics.face-service.example",
+    ],
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "face-default-apex.rc",
+    src: ":gen-face-default-apex.rc",
+    vendor: true,
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+genrule {
+    name: "gen-face-default-apex.rc",
+    srcs: [":face-default.rc"],
+    out: ["face-default-apex.rc"],
+    cmd: "sed -e 's@/vendor/bin/@/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face/bin/@' $(in) > $(out)",
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "face-default-apex.xml",
+    src: ":face-default.xml",
+    sub_dir: "vintf",
+    vendor: true,
+    installable: false,
+}
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.avbpubkey b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.avbpubkey
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f358ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.avbpubkey
Binary files differ
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pem b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad8f57d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pk8 b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pk8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af0ff4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pk8
Binary files differ
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.x509.pem b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.x509.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dc37ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.x509.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIF7TCCA9UCFCmJBOOYRVUgdy8vKm8OQd0ii2pPMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMIGx
+MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91
+bnRhaW4gVmlldzEQMA4GA1UECgwHQW5kcm9pZDEQMA4GA1UECwwHQW5kcm9pZDEi
+MCAGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYTYW5kcm9pZEBhbmRyb2lkLmNvbTEtMCsGA1UEAwwkY29t
+LmFuZHJvaWQuaGFyZHdhcmUuYmlvbWV0cmljcy5mYWNlMCAXDTIzMDUyNTA2NDIw
+MFoYDzQ3NjEwNDIwMDY0MjAwWjCBsTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAgMCkNh
+bGlmb3JuaWExFjAUBgNVBAcMDU1vdW50YWluIFZpZXcxEDAOBgNVBAoMB0FuZHJv
+aWQxEDAOBgNVBAsMB0FuZHJvaWQxIjAgBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWE2FuZHJvaWRAYW5k
+cm9pZC5jb20xLTArBgNVBAMMJGNvbS5hbmRyb2lkLmhhcmR3YXJlLmJpb21ldHJp
+Y3MuZmFjZTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIPADCCAgoCggIBAPadnCNPEvKN
+HxACZt3C+tE2rga6gZ1pxfvlwGo1UY9yAxcQjL22SW93OA6R3de5uvQUbHh7b9g5
+AbNYcRnxOMiuUK2XSGWGDscxuGpQVCph4G1rXCOtbTmz1Zb42vQLCCQHHyxzI7ZE
+9Y6+rzw4p3jtEyBSiiErk13GFZTzwcDzqsQs12vDn9ovSTTn5Nyy6Csz7+O2t4SN
+qU4S/uLE6b/TiXj7196r58DcGvJgKbzbbnv/DUHGfaESrVWYLk3xoX3X8VJvP7jI
+M9XoZBbbgFLgAP5DFEvf5QWS9tR092z0YXOGr+mLHtkJM7Or9nKOohm6aFfHbuvu
+pSWyR4FWnaFANQ8wLH+fH485fiO6juJdTuRWeQpZddv0/IgguZ2Plu7z6NHCf5+L
+KYFjQ5y716wOufIqHhRLqYnpsAG2AFaMuPKzsy2KMifqoyB4KYR24EA1MCT7vwqu
+Hurp+SJrmNdkFVXbhGVUfMKf4nRZ37b9Miie0ju0OxJ9C3zY5uR5BMnqEjqq/rCX
+pQh5o1y+bWacOQVp0iQWJHfy8KkjhhQ1Pd1VeoVk9l2DsAJWm6unwMvGHviRcvzg
+BejDOVcE0x4xDj+TwAu2X2+w2hbUSY9W6lmkX4nGHlbLz211bIBFq42PzAMpRnYq
+jLxml4VpO4UnhyRp7Ipps99s7/iMFOn7AgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggIB
+AG/5t56hKYKORne0bwJpMSCWZNT6JcYjf6fEmNrvG3/gz9BCuj4osZjJHD2OSUJl
+F5yI52RgPrXK8bNqJOvX6MIc4Y2JoSI2Uz4J2vZ3QhRkPC9oqwk/Enz4GIVJ4Dnm
+/kgpBbN2SN0TjnmEooptly5tWb3IPTjqLZpaPIW1ntQeCAbgrYVHiMsvNe1BuBrn
+RNi1xqw3QGp2ZV/RfJ3MH6d49TswEL1gwiUeg3hw5eG7IDfLB/2IJBrff7kmPTQ6
+n+il4uXuXMmX70xSvJXwP/NinomJsORZ4Npbmp7xV/QJp9cNoxNAo3DJ4OHRAnA+
+L7E1KZ3+nSRxGcVlqBekmG6wH9U39NN+dh758aGdJOWqA+B+1PAGxkvFCNqLgTpm
+xNl62YiRRo4FiIAkntvs+JneMEphv/T5i824t2xFZD2lBuW8r54nWj5cpx8AU9W2
+rulR0jx7BnVdj6czn1/pPCIah8Os9pZM8q1CbF8vXD+QLAF0/NjPNomTEGd/M+V+
+sfn1OhLGF/E1kWyNeOmkvX26txQdY8k6jUdsAc5vmQqgwxdorjI38ynpYQnFwq2g
+eO4l62sx8icsSh2TRklWy8BwZpaCyO/WVv/FcjIUexYhmZ0EHpmQk/RAlD1f9wFy
+CciNa/Dm94AwJgZk9LcXye3BSvb1sKF6C7eYrW0eI95V
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/file_contexts b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/file_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f935c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/file_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+(/.*)?                                          u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/etc(/.*)?                                      u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.biometrics\.face-service\.example u:object_r:hal_face_default_exec:s0
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/manifest.json b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/manifest.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d46896
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/manifest.json
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+{
+    "name": "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face",
+    "version": 1
+}
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/aidl/TEST_MAPPING b/bluetooth/audio/aidl/TEST_MAPPING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c853f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/aidl/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "presubmit": [
+    {
+      "name": "VtsHalBluetoothAudioTargetTest"
+    }
+  ],
+  "kernel-presubmit": [
+    {
+      "name": "VtsHalBluetoothAudioTargetTest"
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/Android.bp b/bluetooth/audio/utils/Android.bp
index 914d2b2..2cba61e 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/Android.bp
@@ -93,4 +93,5 @@
     srcs: ["le_audio_codec_capabilities/le_audio_codec_capabilities.xsd"],
     package_name: "aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting",
     api_dir: "le_audio_codec_capabilities/schema",
+    root_elements: ["leAudioOffloadSetting"],
 }
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/le_audio_codec_capabilities/schema/current.txt b/bluetooth/audio/utils/le_audio_codec_capabilities/schema/current.txt
index 886350e..3cef417 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/le_audio_codec_capabilities/schema/current.txt
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/le_audio_codec_capabilities/schema/current.txt
@@ -96,15 +96,7 @@
 
   public class XmlParser {
     ctor public XmlParser();
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.CodecConfiguration readCodecConfiguration(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.CodecConfigurationList readCodecConfigurationList(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.Configuration readConfiguration(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.ConfigurationList readConfigurationList(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.LeAudioOffloadSetting readLeAudioOffloadSetting(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.Scenario readScenario(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.ScenarioList readScenarioList(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.StrategyConfiguration readStrategyConfiguration(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.StrategyConfigurationList readStrategyConfigurationList(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static String readText(org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParser) throws java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static void skip(org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParser) throws java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
   }
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
index 9b9506d..e23f2ae 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@
             <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true" updatable-via-apex="true">
         <name>android.hardware.biometrics.face</name>
         <version>2</version>
         <interface>
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true" updatable-via-apex="true">
         <name>android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint</name>
         <version>2</version>
         <interface>
@@ -150,14 +150,6 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
-        <name>android.hardware.bluetooth</name>
-        <version>1.0-1</version>
-        <interface>
-            <name>IBluetoothHci</name>
-            <instance>default</instance>
-        </interface>
-    </hal>
     <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.bluetooth</name>
         <interface>
@@ -637,14 +629,6 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
-        <name>android.hardware.soundtrigger</name>
-        <version>2.3</version>
-        <interface>
-            <name>ISoundTriggerHw</name>
-            <instance>default</instance>
-        </interface>
-    </hal>
     <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
          <name>android.hardware.soundtrigger3</name>
          <version>1</version>
@@ -653,22 +637,6 @@
              <instance>default</instance>
          </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
-        <name>android.hardware.tetheroffload.config</name>
-        <version>1.0</version>
-        <interface>
-            <name>IOffloadConfig</name>
-            <instance>default</instance>
-        </interface>
-    </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
-        <name>android.hardware.tetheroffload.control</name>
-        <version>1.1</version>
-        <interface>
-            <name>IOffloadControl</name>
-            <instance>default</instance>
-        </interface>
-    </hal>
     <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.tetheroffload</name>
         <version>1</version>
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/TEST_MAPPING b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/TEST_MAPPING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aedac5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "presubmit": [
+    {
+      "name": "VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest"
+    }
+  ],
+  "kernel-presubmit": [
+    {
+      "name": "VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+
diff --git a/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp
index 2c06353..b329de2 100644
--- a/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp
@@ -1371,6 +1371,28 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(buffer->info().usage, *value);
 }
 
+TEST_P(GraphicsMapperStableCTests, GetUsage64) {
+    BufferDescriptorInfo info{
+            .name = {"VTS_TEMP"},
+            .width = 64,
+            .height = 64,
+            .layerCount = 1,
+            .format = PixelFormat::RGBA_8888,
+            .usage = BufferUsage::FRONT_BUFFER | BufferUsage::GPU_RENDER_TARGET |
+                     BufferUsage::COMPOSER_OVERLAY | BufferUsage::GPU_TEXTURE,
+            .reservedSize = 0,
+    };
+    if (!isSupported(info)) {
+        GTEST_SKIP();
+    }
+    auto buffer = allocate(info);
+    auto bufferHandle = buffer->import();
+    auto value = getStandardMetadata<StandardMetadataType::USAGE>(*bufferHandle);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(value.has_value());
+    using T = std::underlying_type_t<BufferUsage>;
+    EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<T>(buffer->info().usage), static_cast<T>(*value));
+}
+
 TEST_P(GraphicsMapperStableCTests, GetAllocationSize) {
     auto buffer = allocateGeneric();
     auto bufferHandle = buffer->import();
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/Util.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/Util.cpp
index 4f5c121..ad9281c 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/Util.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/Util.cpp
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
     ndkMacedPublicKey.macedKey = macedPublicKey.macedKey;
 
     vector<uint8_t> publicKeyBits;
-    check_maced_pubkey(ndkMacedPublicKey, /*testMode=*/true, &publicKeyBits);
+    check_maced_pubkey(ndkMacedPublicKey, /*testMode=*/false, &publicKeyBits);
 
     ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::EVP_PKEY_Ptr publicKey;
     p256_pub_key(publicKeyBits, &publicKey);
diff --git a/identity/support/Android.bp b/identity/support/Android.bp
index 3096fe5..d62d055 100644
--- a/identity/support/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/support/Android.bp
@@ -22,15 +22,8 @@
     default_applicable_licenses: ["hardware_interfaces_license"],
 }
 
-cc_library {
-    name: "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
-    vendor_available: true,
-    srcs: [
-        "src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp",
-    ],
-    export_include_dirs: [
-        "include",
-    ],
+cc_defaults {
+    name: "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-deps",
     shared_libs: [
         "android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
         "libcrypto",
@@ -47,19 +40,36 @@
     ],
 }
 
+cc_library {
+    name: "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
+    vendor_available: true,
+    defaults: [
+        "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-deps",
+    ],
+    srcs: [
+        "src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp",
+    ],
+    export_include_dirs: [
+        "include",
+    ],
+}
+
 cc_test {
     name: "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-test",
     srcs: [
         "tests/IdentityCredentialSupportTest.cpp",
     ],
+    defaults: [
+        "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-deps",
+    ],
     shared_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
         "libcrypto",
         "libbase",
         "libhidlbase",
         "libhardware",
     ],
     static_libs: [
+        "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
         "libcppbor_external",
         "libgmock",
     ],
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp
index 6b5e8bf..912b59b 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp
@@ -60,13 +60,9 @@
         ASSERT_TRUE(attest_rec) << "Failed to get attestation record.";
 
         // Parse root of trust.
-        HidlBuf verified_boot_key;
-        keymaster_verified_boot_t verified_boot_state;
-        bool device_locked;
-        HidlBuf verified_boot_hash;
-        auto result =
-                parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &verified_boot_key,
-                                    &verified_boot_state, &device_locked, &verified_boot_hash);
+        auto result = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &attestedVbKey_,
+                                          &attestedVbState_, &attestedBootloaderState_,
+                                          &attestedVbmetaDigest_);
         ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK) << "Failed to parse root of trust.";
     }
 
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AuthTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AuthTest.cpp
index 78c88f4..290e8fc 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AuthTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AuthTest.cpp
@@ -93,17 +93,21 @@
     void TearDown() {
         if (gk_ == nullptr) return;
         gk_->deleteUser(uid_);
+        if (alt_uid_ != 0) {
+            gk_->deleteUser(alt_uid_);
+        }
     }
 
     bool GatekeeperAvailable() { return (gk_ != nullptr) || (hidl_gk_ != nullptr); }
 
-    std::optional<GatekeeperEnrollResponse> doEnroll(const std::vector<uint8_t>& newPwd,
+    std::optional<GatekeeperEnrollResponse> doEnroll(uint32_t uid,
+                                                     const std::vector<uint8_t>& newPwd,
                                                      const std::vector<uint8_t>& curHandle = {},
                                                      const std::vector<uint8_t>& curPwd = {}) {
         if (gk_ != nullptr) {
             while (true) {
                 GatekeeperEnrollResponse rsp;
-                Status status = gk_->enroll(uid_, curHandle, curPwd, newPwd, &rsp);
+                Status status = gk_->enroll(uid, curHandle, curPwd, newPwd, &rsp);
                 if (!status.isOk() && status.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC &&
                     status.getServiceSpecificError() == IGatekeeper::ERROR_RETRY_TIMEOUT) {
                     sleep(1);
@@ -120,7 +124,7 @@
             while (true) {
                 HidlGatekeeperResponse rsp;
                 auto status = hidl_gk_->enroll(
-                        uid_, curHandle, curPwd, newPwd,
+                        uid, curHandle, curPwd, newPwd,
                         [&rsp](const HidlGatekeeperResponse& cbRsp) { rsp = cbRsp; });
                 if (!status.isOk()) {
                     GTEST_LOG_(ERROR) << "doEnroll(HIDL) failed";
@@ -155,20 +159,23 @@
         }
     }
 
-    std::optional<GatekeeperEnrollResponse> doEnroll(const string& newPwd,
+    std::optional<GatekeeperEnrollResponse> doEnroll(uint32_t uid, const string& newPwd,
                                                      const std::vector<uint8_t>& curHandle = {},
                                                      const string& curPwd = {}) {
-        return doEnroll(std::vector<uint8_t>(newPwd.begin(), newPwd.end()), curHandle,
+        return doEnroll(uid, std::vector<uint8_t>(newPwd.begin(), newPwd.end()), curHandle,
                         std::vector<uint8_t>(curPwd.begin(), curPwd.end()));
     }
+    std::optional<GatekeeperEnrollResponse> doEnroll(const string& newPwd) {
+        return doEnroll(uid_, newPwd);
+    }
 
-    std::optional<HardwareAuthToken> doVerify(uint64_t challenge,
+    std::optional<HardwareAuthToken> doVerify(uint32_t uid, uint64_t challenge,
                                               const std::vector<uint8_t>& handle,
                                               const std::vector<uint8_t>& pwd) {
         if (gk_ != nullptr) {
             while (true) {
                 GatekeeperVerifyResponse rsp;
-                Status status = gk_->verify(uid_, challenge, handle, pwd, &rsp);
+                Status status = gk_->verify(uid, challenge, handle, pwd, &rsp);
                 if (!status.isOk() && status.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC &&
                     status.getServiceSpecificError() == IGatekeeper::ERROR_RETRY_TIMEOUT) {
                     sleep(1);
@@ -185,7 +192,7 @@
             while (true) {
                 HidlGatekeeperResponse rsp;
                 auto status = hidl_gk_->verify(
-                        uid_, challenge, handle, pwd,
+                        uid, challenge, handle, pwd,
                         [&rsp](const HidlGatekeeperResponse& cbRsp) { rsp = cbRsp; });
                 if (!status.isOk()) {
                     GTEST_LOG_(ERROR) << "doVerify(HIDL) failed";
@@ -220,10 +227,15 @@
             return std::nullopt;
         }
     }
+    std::optional<HardwareAuthToken> doVerify(uint32_t uid, uint64_t challenge,
+                                              const std::vector<uint8_t>& handle,
+                                              const string& pwd) {
+        return doVerify(uid, challenge, handle, std::vector<uint8_t>(pwd.begin(), pwd.end()));
+    }
     std::optional<HardwareAuthToken> doVerify(uint64_t challenge,
                                               const std::vector<uint8_t>& handle,
                                               const string& pwd) {
-        return doVerify(challenge, handle, std::vector<uint8_t>(pwd.begin(), pwd.end()));
+        return doVerify(uid_, challenge, handle, pwd);
     }
 
     // Variants of the base class methods but with authentication information included.
@@ -268,6 +280,13 @@
         return plaintext;
     }
 
+    string SignMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
+                       const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params,
+                       const HardwareAuthToken& hat) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE("SignMessage");
+        return ProcessMessage(key_blob, KeyPurpose::SIGN, message, in_params, out_params, hat);
+    }
+
   protected:
     std::shared_ptr<IGatekeeper> gk_;
     sp<IHidlGatekeeper> hidl_gk_;
@@ -275,6 +294,8 @@
     string password_;
     uint32_t uid_;
     int64_t sid_;
+    uint32_t alt_uid_;
+    int64_t alt_sid_;
     std::vector<uint8_t> handle_;
 };
 
@@ -347,6 +368,116 @@
     }
 }
 
+// Test use of a key that requires user-authentication within recent history, but where
+// the `TimestampToken` provided to the device is unrelated to the in-progress operation.
+TEST_P(AuthTest, TimeoutAuthenticationIncorrectTimestampToken) {
+    if (!GatekeeperAvailable()) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "No Gatekeeper available";
+    }
+    if (!timestamp_token_required_) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Test only applies to devices with no secure clock";
+    }
+    if (clock_ == nullptr) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Device requires timestamps and no ISecureClock available";
+    }
+
+    // Create an AES key that requires authentication within the last 3 seconds.
+    const uint32_t timeout_secs = 3;
+    auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                           .AesEncryptionKey(256)
+                           .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+                           .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)
+                           .Authorization(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, sid_)
+                           .Authorization(TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD)
+                           .Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, timeout_secs);
+    vector<uint8_t> keyblob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    vector<Certificate> cert_chain;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(builder, std::nullopt, &keyblob, &key_characteristics, &cert_chain));
+
+    // Verify to get a HAT, arbitrary challenge.
+    const uint64_t challenge = 42;
+    const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken> hat = doVerify(challenge, handle_, password_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(hat.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(hat->userId, sid_);
+
+    // KeyMint implementation has no clock, so only detects timeout via timestamp token provided
+    // on update()/finish().  However, for this test we ensure that that the timestamp token has a
+    // *different* challenge value.
+    const string message = "Hello World!";
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+    AuthorizationSet out_params;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, keyblob, params, &out_params, hat));
+
+    secureclock::TimeStampToken time_token;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GetReturnErrorCode(clock_->generateTimeStamp(challenge_ + 1, &time_token)));
+    string output;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED,
+              Finish(message, {} /* signature */, &output, hat, time_token));
+}
+
+// Test use of a key with multiple USER_SECURE_ID values.  For variety, use an EC signing key
+// generated with attestation.
+TEST_P(AuthTest, TimeoutAuthenticationMultiSid) {
+    if (!GatekeeperAvailable()) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "No Gatekeeper available";
+    }
+    if (timestamp_token_required_ && clock_ == nullptr) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Device requires timestamps and no ISecureClock available";
+    }
+
+    // Enroll a password for a second user.
+    alt_uid_ = 20001;
+    const string alt_password = "correcthorsebatterystaple2";
+    std::optional<GatekeeperEnrollResponse> rsp = doEnroll(alt_uid_, alt_password);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(rsp.has_value());
+    alt_sid_ = rsp->secureUserId;
+    const std::vector<uint8_t> alt_handle = rsp->data;
+
+    // Create an attested EC key that requires authentication within the last 3 seconds from either
+    // secure ID. Also allow any authenticator type.
+    const uint32_t timeout_secs = 3;
+    auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                           .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                           .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                           .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                           .SetDefaultValidity()
+                           .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                           .AttestationApplicationId("app_id")
+                           .Authorization(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, alt_sid_)
+                           .Authorization(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, sid_)
+                           .Authorization(TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, HardwareAuthenticatorType::ANY)
+                           .Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, timeout_secs);
+    vector<uint8_t> keyblob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    vector<Certificate> cert_chain;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(builder, std::nullopt, &keyblob, &key_characteristics, &cert_chain));
+
+    // Verify first user to get a HAT that should work.
+    const uint64_t challenge = 42;
+    const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken> hat = doVerify(uid_, challenge, handle_, password_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(hat.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(hat->userId, sid_);
+
+    const string message = "Hello World!";
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
+    AuthorizationSet out_params;
+    const string signature = SignMessage(keyblob, message, params, &out_params, hat.value());
+
+    // Verify second user to get a HAT that should work.
+    const uint64_t alt_challenge = 43;
+    const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken> alt_hat =
+            doVerify(alt_uid_, alt_challenge, alt_handle, alt_password);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(alt_hat.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(alt_hat->userId, alt_sid_);
+
+    const string alt_signature =
+            SignMessage(keyblob, message, params, &out_params, alt_hat.value());
+}
+
 // Test use of a key that requires an auth token for each action on the operation, with
 // a per-operation challenge value included.
 TEST_P(AuthTest, AuthPerOperation) {
@@ -407,6 +538,93 @@
               Finish(message, {} /* signature */, &ciphertext, hat.value()));
 }
 
+// Test use of a key that requires an auth token for each action on the operation, with
+// a per-operation challenge value included, with multiple secure IDs allowed.
+TEST_P(AuthTest, AuthPerOperationMultiSid) {
+    if (!GatekeeperAvailable()) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "No Gatekeeper available";
+    }
+
+    // Enroll a password for a second user.
+    alt_uid_ = 20001;
+    const string alt_password = "correcthorsebatterystaple2";
+    std::optional<GatekeeperEnrollResponse> rsp = doEnroll(alt_uid_, alt_password);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(rsp.has_value());
+    alt_sid_ = rsp->secureUserId;
+    const std::vector<uint8_t> alt_handle = rsp->data;
+
+    // Create an AES key that requires authentication per-action.
+    auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                           .AesEncryptionKey(256)
+                           .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+                           .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)
+                           .Authorization(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, sid_)
+                           .Authorization(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, alt_sid_)
+                           .Authorization(TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, HardwareAuthenticatorType::ANY);
+    vector<uint8_t> keyblob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    vector<Certificate> cert_chain;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(builder, std::nullopt, &keyblob, &key_characteristics, &cert_chain));
+
+    // Get a HAT for first user with the challenge from an in-progress operation.
+    const string message = "Hello World!";
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+    AuthorizationSet out_params;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, keyblob, params, &out_params));
+    const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken> hat = doVerify(uid_, challenge_, handle_, password_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(hat.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(hat->userId, sid_);
+    string ciphertext;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(message, {} /* signature */, &ciphertext, hat.value()));
+
+    // Get a HAT for second user with the challenge from an in-progress operation.
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, keyblob, params, &out_params));
+    const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken> alt_hat =
+            doVerify(alt_uid_, challenge_, alt_handle, alt_password);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(alt_hat.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(alt_hat->userId, alt_sid_);
+    string alt_ciphertext;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(message, {} /* signature */, &ciphertext, alt_hat.value()));
+}
+
+// Test use of a key that requires an auth token for each action on the operation, but
+// which gets passed a HAT of the wrong type
+TEST_P(AuthTest, AuthPerOperationWrongAuthType) {
+    if (!GatekeeperAvailable()) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "No Gatekeeper available";
+    }
+
+    // Create an AES key that requires authentication per-action, but with no valid authenticator
+    // types.
+    auto builder =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .AesEncryptionKey(256)
+                    .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+                    .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, sid_)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, HardwareAuthenticatorType::FINGERPRINT);
+    vector<uint8_t> keyblob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    vector<Certificate> cert_chain;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(builder, std::nullopt, &keyblob, &key_characteristics, &cert_chain));
+
+    // Get a HAT with the challenge from an in-progress operation.
+    const string message = "Hello World!";
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+    AuthorizationSet out_params;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, keyblob, params, &out_params));
+    const std::optional<HardwareAuthToken> hat = doVerify(challenge_, handle_, password_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(hat.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(hat->userId, sid_);
+
+    // Should fail because auth type doesn't (can't) match.
+    string ciphertext;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED,
+              Finish(message, {} /* signature */, &ciphertext, hat.value()));
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AuthTest);
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index e51bb6e..b55e609 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -1606,7 +1606,8 @@
     auto res = property_get("ro.vendor.qti.soc_model", buffer.data(), nullptr);
     if (res <= 0) return false;
 
-    const string allowed_soc_models[] = {"SM8450", "SM8475", "SM8550", "SXR2230P"};
+    const string allowed_soc_models[] = {"SM8450", "SM8475", "SM8550", "SXR2230P",
+                                         "SM4450", "SM7450", "SM6450"};
 
     for (const string model : allowed_soc_models) {
         if (model.compare(buffer.data()) == 0) {
diff --git a/security/rkp/README.md b/security/rkp/README.md
index a966141..f8e1d5e 100644
--- a/security/rkp/README.md
+++ b/security/rkp/README.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 ## Objective
 
 Design a HAL to support over-the-air provisioning of certificates for asymmetric
-keys. The HAL must interact effectively with Keystore (and other daemons) and
+keys. The HAL must interact effectively with Keystore (and other services) and
 protect device privacy and security.
 
 Note that this API was originally designed for KeyMint, with the intention that
@@ -20,125 +20,52 @@
 To more securely and reliably get keys and certificates to Android devices, we
 need to create a system where no party outside of the device's secure components
 is responsible for managing private keys. The strategy we've chosen is to
-deliver certificates over the air, using an asymmetric key pair created
-on-device in the factory as a root of trust to create an authenticated, secure
-channel. In this document we refer to this device-unique asymmetric key pair as
-Device Key (DK), its public half DK\_pub, its private half DK\_priv and a Device
-Key Certificate containing DK\_pub is denoted DKC.
+deliver certificates over the air, using an asymmetric key pair derived from a
+unique device secret (UDS) as a root of trust for authenticated requests from
+the secure components. We refer to the public half of this asymmetric key pair
+as UDS\_pub.
 
-In order for the provisioning service to use DK (or a key authenticated by DK),
-it must know whether a given DK\_pub is known and trusted. To prove trust, we
-ask device OEMs to use one of two mechanisms:
+In order for the provisioning service to trust UDS\_pub we ask device OEMs to
+use one of two mechanisms:
 
-1.  (Preferred, recommended) The device OEM extracts DK\_pub from each device it
-    manufactures and uploads the public keys to a backend server.
+1.  (Preferred, recommended) The device OEM extracts the UDS\_pub from each
+    device they manufacture and uploads the public keys to a backend server.
 
-1.  The device OEM signs the DK\_pub to produce DKC and stores it on the device.
-    This has the advantage that they don't need to upload a DK\_pub for every
-    device immediately, but the disadvantage that they have to manage their
-    private signing keys, which means they have to have HSMs, configure and
-    secure them correctly, etc. Some backend providers may also require that the
-    OEM passes a factory security audit, and additionally promises to upload the
-    keys eventually as well.
+1.  The device OEM signs the UDS\_pub and stores the certificates on the device
+    rather than uploading a UDS\_pub for every device immediately. However,
+    there are many disadvantages and costs associated with this option as the
+    OEM will need to pass a security audit of their factory's physical security,
+    CA and HSM configuration, and incident response processes before the OEM's
+    public key is registered with the provisioning server.
 
-Note that in the full elaboration of this plan, DK\_pub is not the key used to
-establish a secure channel. Instead, DK\_pub is just the first public key in a
-chain of public keys which ends with the KeyMint public key, KM\_pub. All keys
-in the chain are device-unique and are joined in a certificate chain called the
-_Boot Certificate Chain_ (BCC), because in phases 2 and 3 of the remote
-provisioning project it is a chain of certificates corresponding to boot phases.
-We speak of the BCC even for phase 1, though in phase 1 it contains only a
-single self-signed DKC. This is described in more depth in the Phases section
-below.
-
-The BCC is authenticated by DK\_pub. To authenticate DK\_pub, we may have
-additional DKCs, from the SoC vendor, the device OEM, or both. Those are not
-part of the BCC but included as optional fields in the certificate request
-structure.
-
-The format of the the DK and BCC is specified within [Open Profile for DICE]
-(https://pigweed.googlesource.com/open-dice/+/HEAD/docs/specification.md).  To
-map phrases within this document to their equivalent terminology in the DICE
-specification, read the terms as follows: the DK corresponds to the UDS-derived
-key pair, DKC corresponds to the UDS certificate, and the BCC entries between
-DK\_pub and KM\_pub correspond to a chain of CDI certificates.
-
-Note: In addition to allowing 32 byte hash values for fields in the BCC payload,
-this spec additionally constrains some of the choices allowed in open-DICE.
-Specifically, these include which entries are required and which are optional in
-the BCC payload, and which algorithms are acceptable for use.
+Note that in the full elaboration of this plan, UDS\_pub is not the key used to
+sign certificate requests. Instead, UDS\_pub is just the first public key in a
+chain of public keys that end the KeyMint public key. All keys in the chain are
+transitively derived from the UDS and joined in a certificate chain following
+the specification of the [Android Profile for DICE](#android-profile-for-dice).
 
 ### Phases
 
-RKP will be deployed in three phases, in terms of managing the root of trust
+RKP will be deployed with phased management of the root of trust
 binding between the device and the backend. To briefly describe them:
 
-* Phase 1: In phase 1 there is only one entry in the BCC; DK_pub and KM_pub are
-  the same key and the certificate is self-signed.
-* Phase 2: This is identical to phase 1, except it leverages the hardware root
-  of trust process described by DICE. Instead of trust being rooted in the TEE,
-  it is now rooted in the ROM by key material blown into fuses which are only
-  accessible to the ROM code.
-* Phase 3: This is identical to Phase 2, except the SoC vendor also does the
-  public key extraction or certification in their facilities, along with the OEM
-  doing it in the factory. This tightens up the "supply chain" and aims to make
-  key upload management more secure.
+* Degenerate DICE (Phase 1): A TEE root of trust key pair is used to sign
+  certificate requests; a single self-signed certificate signifies this phase.
+* DICE (Phase 2): A hardware root of trust key pair is only accessible to ROM
+  code; the boot process follows the [Android Profile for
+  DICE](#android-profile-for-dice).
+* SoC vendor certified DICE (Phase 3): This is identical to Phase 2, except the
+  SoC vendor also does the UDS\_pub extraction or certification in their
+  facilities, along with the OEM doing it in the factory. This tightens up the
+  "supply chain" and aims to make key upload management more secure.
 
 ### Privacy considerations
 
-Because DK and the DKCs are unique, immutable, unspoofable hardware-bound
-identifiers for the device, we must limit access to them to the absolute minimum
-possible. We do this in two ways:
-
-1.  We require KeyMint (which knows the BCC and either knows or at least has the
-ability to use KM\_priv) to refuse to ever divulge the BCC or additional
-signatures in plaintext. Instead, KeyMint requires the caller to provide an
-_Endpoint Encryption Key_ (EEK), with which it will encrypt the data before
-returning it. When provisioning production keys, the EEK must be signed by an
-approved authority whose public key is embedded in KeyMint. When certifying test
-keys, KeyMint will accept any EEK without checking the signature, but will
-encrypt and return a test BCC, rather than the real one.  The result is that
-only an entity in possession of an Trusted EEK (TEEK) private key can discover
-the plaintext of the production BCC.
-1.  Having thus limited access to the public keys to the trusted party only, we
-need to prevent the entity from abusing this unique device identifier.  The
-approach and mechanisms for doing that are beyond the scope of this document
-(they must be addressed in the server design), but generally involve taking care
-to ensure that we do not create any links between user IDs, IP addresses or
-issued certificates and the device pubkey.
-
-Although the details of the mechanisms for preventing the entity from abusing
-the BCC are, as stated, beyond the scope of this document, there is a subtle
-design decision here made specifically to enable abuse prevention. Specifically
-the `CertificateRequest` message sent to the server is (in
-[CDDL](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8610)):
-
-```
-cddl
-CertificateRequest = [
-    DeviceInfo,
-    challenge : bstr,
-    ProtectedData,
-    MacedKeysToSign
-]
-```
-
-The public keys to be attested by the server are in `MacedKeysToSign`, which is
-a COSE\_Mac0 structure, MACed with a key that is found in `ProtectedData`. The
-MAC key is signed by DK\_pub.
-
-This structure allows the backend component that has access to EEK\_priv to
-decrypt `ProtectedData`, validate that the request is from an authorized device,
-check that the request is fresh and verify and extract the MAC key. That backend
-component never sees any data related to the keys to be signed, but can provide
-the MAC key to another backend component that can verify `MacedKeysToSign` and
-proceed to generate the certificates.
-
-In this way, we can partition the provisioning server into one component that
-knows the device identity, as represented by DK\_pub, but never sees the keys to
-be certified or certificates generated, and another component that sees the keys
-to be certified and certificates generated but does not know the device
-identity.
+Because the UDS, CDIs and derived values are unique, immutable, unspoofable
+hardware-bound identifiers for the device, we must limit access to them. We
+require that the values are never exposed in public APIs and are only available
+to the minimum set of system components that require access to them to function
+correctly.
 
 ### Key and cryptographic message formatting
 
@@ -195,24 +122,6 @@
 choice for algorithm implies the implementor should also choose the P256 public
 key group further down in the COSE structure.
 
-### Testability
-
-It's critical that the remote provisioning implementation be testable, to
-minimize the probability that broken devices are sold to end users. To support
-testing, the remote provisioning HAL methods take a `testMode` argument. Keys
-created in test mode are tagged to indicate this. The provisioning server will
-check for the test mode tag and issue test certificates that do not chain back
-to a trusted public key. In test mode, any EEK will be accepted, enabling
-testing tools to use EEKs for which they have the private key so they can
-validate the content of certificate requests. The BCC included in the
-`CertificateRequest` must contain freshly-generated keys, not the real BCC keys.
-
-Keystore (or similar) will need to be able to handle both testMode keys and
-production keys and keep them distinct, generating test certificate requests
-when asked with a test EEK and production certificate requests when asked with a
-production EEK. Likewise, the interface used to instruct Keystore to create keys
-will need to be able to specify whether test or production keys are desired.
-
 ## Design
 
 ### Certificate provisioning flow
@@ -220,25 +129,20 @@
 TODO(jbires): Replace this with a `.png` containing a sequence diagram.  The
 provisioning flow looks something like this:
 
-Provisioner -> Keystore: Prepare N keys
-Keystore -> KeyMint: generateKeyPair
-KeyMint -> KeyMint: Generate  key pair
-KeyMint --> Keystore: key\_blob,pubkey
-Keystore -> Keystore: Store key\_blob,pubkey
-Provisioner -> Server: Get TEEK
-Server --> Provisioner: TEEK
-Provisioner -> Keystore: genCertReq(N, TEEK)
-Keystore -> KeyMint: genCertReq(pubkeys, TEEK)
-KeyMint -> KeyMint: Sign pubkeys & encrypt BCC
-KeyMint --> Keystore: signature, encrypted BCC
-Keystore -> Keystore: Construct cert\_request
-Keystore --> Provisioner: cert\_request
-Provisioner --> Server: cert\_request
-Server -> Server: Validate cert\_request
+rkpd -> KeyMint: generateKeyPair
+KeyMint -> KeyMint: Generate key pair
+KeyMint --> rkpd: key\_blob,pubkey
+rkpd -> rkpd: Store key\_blob,pubkey
+rkpd -> Server: Get challenge
+Server --> rkpd: challenge
+rkpd -> KeyMint: genCertReq(pubkeys, challenge)
+KeyMint -> KeyMint: Sign CSR
+KeyMint --> rkpd: signed CSR
+rkpd --> Server: CSR
+Server -> Server: Validate CSR
 Server -> Server: Generate certificates
-Server --> Provisioner: certificates
-Provisioner -> Keystore: certificates
-Keystore -> Keystore: Store certificates
+Server --> rkpd: certificates
+rkpd -> rkpd: Store certificates
 
 The actors in the above diagram are:
 
@@ -246,10 +150,12 @@
     the uploaded device public keys and is responsible for providing encryption
     keys, decrypting and validating requests, and generating certificates in
     response to requests.
-*   **Provisioner** is an application that is responsible for communicating with
-    the server and all of the system components that require key certificates
-    from the server. It also implements the policy that defines how many key
-    pairs each client should keep in their pool.
+*   **rkpd** is, optionally, a modular system component that is responsible for
+    communicating with the server and all of the system components that require
+    key certificates from the server. It also implements the policy that defines
+    how many key pairs each client should keep in their pool. When a system
+    ships with rkpd as a modular component, it may be updated independently from
+    the rest of the system.
 *   **Keystore** is the [Android keystore
     daemon](https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore) (or, more
     generally, whatever system component manages communications with a
@@ -257,51 +163,37 @@
 *   **KeyMint** is the secure area component that manages cryptographic keys and
     performs attestations (or perhaps some other secure area component).
 
-### `BCC`
+### Android Profile for DICE
 
-The _Boot Certificate Chain_ (BCC) is the chain of certificates that contains
-DK\_pub as well as other often device-unique certificates. The BCC is
-represented as a COSE\_Key containing DK\_pub followed by an array of
-COSE\_Sign1 "certificates" containing public keys and optional additional
-information, ordered from root to leaf, with each certificate signing the next.
-The first certificate in the array is signed by DK\_pub, the last certificate
-has the KeyMint (or whatever) signing key's public key, KM\_pub. In phase 1
-there is only one entry; DK\_pub and KM\_pub are the same key and the
-certificate is self-signed.
+The Android Profile for DICE is based on the [Open Profile for
+DICE](https://pigweed.googlesource.com/open-dice/+/refs/heads/main/docs/specification.md),
+with additional constraints for details that the Open Profile for DICE leaves
+intentionally underspecified. This section describes the differences from the
+Open Profile for DICE.
 
-Each COSE\_Sign1 certificate is a CBOR Web Token (CWT) as described in [RFC
-8392](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8392) with additional fields as described
-in the Open Profile for DICE. Of these additional fields, only the
-_subjectPublicKey_ and _keyUsage_ fields are expected to be present for the
-KM\_pub entry (that is, the last entry) in a BCC, but all fields required by the
-Open Profile for DICE are expected for other entries (each of which corresponds
-to a particular firmware component or boot stage). The CWT fields _iss_ and
-_sub_ identify the issuer and subject of the certificate and are consistent
-along the BCC entries; the issuer of a given entry matches the subject of the
-previous entry.
+#### Algorithms
 
-The BCC is designed to be constructed using the Open Profile for DICE. In this
-case the DK key pair is derived from the UDS as described by that profile and
-all BCC entries before the leaf are CBOR CDI certificates chained from DK\_pub.
-The KM key pair is not part of the derived DICE chain. It is generated (not
-derived) by the KeyMint module, certified by the last key in the DICE chain, and
-added as the leaf BCC entry. The key usage field in this leaf certificate must
-indicate the key is not used to sign certificates. If a UDS certificate is
-available on the device it should appear in the certificate request as the leaf
-of a DKCertChain in AdditionalDKSignatures (see
-[CertificateRequest](#certificaterequest)).
+The choice of algorithm must remain consistent with a given certificate e.g. if
+SHA-256 is used for the code hash then the authority hash, config hash, etc.
+must also use SHA-256.
+
+* UDS and CDI key pairs:
+  * Ed25519 / P-256 / P-384
+* Hash algorithms (digests can be encoded with their natural size and do not
+  need to be the 64-bytes specified by the Open Profile for DICE):
+  * SHA-256 / SHA-384 / SHA-512
+* HKDF with a supported message digest for all key derivation
 
 #### Mode
 
-The Open Profile for DICE specifies four possible modes with the most important
-mode being `normal`. A certificate must only set the mode to `normal` when all
-of the following conditions are met when loading and verifying the software
-component that is being described by the certificate:
+A certificate must only set the mode to `normal` when all of the following
+conditions are met when loading and verifying the software component that is
+being described by the certificate:
 
-*   verified boot with anti-rollback protection is enabled
-*   only the verified boot authorities for production images are enabled
-*   debug ports, fuses or other debug facilities are disabled
-*   device booted software from the normal primary source e.g. internal flash
+* verified boot with anti-rollback protection is enabled
+* only the verified boot authorities for production images are enabled
+* debug ports, fuses, or other debug facilities are disabled
+* device booted software from the normal primary source e.g. internal flash
 
 The mode should never be `not configured`.
 
@@ -310,11 +202,11 @@
 
 #### Configuration descriptor
 
-The Open Profile for DICE allows for an arbitrary configuration descriptor. For
-BCC entries, this configuration descriptor is a CBOR map with the following
-optional fields. If no fields are relevant, an empty map should be encoded.
-Additional implementation-specific fields may be added using key values not in
-the range \[-70000, -70999\] (these are reserved for future additions here).
+The configuration descriptor is a CBOR map with the following optional fields.
+If no fields are relevant, an empty map should be encoded. The key value range
+\[-70000, -70999\] is reserved for the Android Profile for DICE.
+Implementation-specific fields may be added using key values outside of the
+reserved range.
 
 ```
 | Name              | Key    | Value type | Meaning                           |
@@ -332,42 +224,6 @@
 :                   :        :            : version                           :
 ```
 
-Please see
-[ProtectedData.aidl](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:hardware/interfaces/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl)
-for a full CDDL definition of the BCC.
-
-### `CertificateRequest`
-
-The full CBOR message that will be sent to the server to request certificates
-is:
-
-```cddl
-CertificateRequest = [
-    DeviceInfo,
-    challenge : bstr,       // Provided by the server
-    ProtectedData,          // See ProtectedData.aidl
-    MacedKeysToSign         // See IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
-]
-
-DeviceInfo = [
-    VerifiedDeviceInfo,     // See DeviceInfo.aidl
-    UnverifiedDeviceInfo
-]
-
-// Unverified info is anything provided by the HLOS. Subject to change out of
-// step with the HAL.
-UnverifiedDeviceInfo = {
-    ? "fingerprint" : tstr,
-}
-
-```
-
-It will be the responsibility of Keystore and the Provisioner to construct the
-`CertificateRequest`. The HAL provides a method to generate the elements that
-need to be constructed on the secure side, which are the tag field of
-`MacedKeysToSign`, `VerifiedDeviceInfo`, and the ciphertext field of
-`ProtectedData`.
-
 ### HAL
 
 The remote provisioning HAL provides a simple interface that can be implemented
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/FrontendTests.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/FrontendTests.cpp
index 9f0f30d..0a645fc 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/FrontendTests.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/FrontendTests.cpp
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@
                 break;
             }
             case FrontendStatusTypeExt1_1::UEC: {
-                ASSERT_TRUE(realStatuses[i].uec() == expectStatuses[i].uec());
+                ASSERT_TRUE(realStatuses[i].uec() >= 0 );
                 break;
             }
             case FrontendStatusTypeExt1_1::T2_SYSTEM_ID: {
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TestConfigurations.h b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TestConfigurations.h
index 669fa11..dcdc673 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TestConfigurations.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_1TestConfigurations.h
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
     types.push_back(FrontendStatusTypeExt1_1::IS_MISO);
     vector<FrontendStatusExt1_1> statuses;
     FrontendStatusExt1_1 status;
-    status.uec(4);
+    status.uec(0);
     statuses.push_back(status);
     status.isMiso(true);
     statuses.push_back(status);
diff --git a/usb/OWNERS b/usb/OWNERS
index 2b1d34d..3611b4d 100644
--- a/usb/OWNERS
+++ b/usb/OWNERS
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 # Bug component: 175220
 
+aprasath@google.com
+kumarashishg@google.com
+sarup@google.com
+anothermark@google.com
 albertccwang@google.com
 badhri@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.6/vts/functional/wifi_rtt_controller_hidl_test.cpp b/wifi/1.6/vts/functional/wifi_rtt_controller_hidl_test.cpp
index 5b5e623..0572ac6 100644
--- a/wifi/1.6/vts/functional/wifi_rtt_controller_hidl_test.cpp
+++ b/wifi/1.6/vts/functional/wifi_rtt_controller_hidl_test.cpp
@@ -78,6 +78,13 @@
 
     virtual void TearDown() override { stopWifi(GetInstanceName()); }
 
+    RttCapabilities getRttCapabilities() {
+        std::pair<WifiStatus, RttCapabilities> status_and_caps;
+        status_and_caps = HIDL_INVOKE(wifi_rtt_controller_, getCapabilities_1_6);
+        EXPECT_EQ(WifiStatusCode::SUCCESS, status_and_caps.first.code);
+        return status_and_caps.second;
+    }
+
     // A simple test implementation of WifiRttControllerEventCallback.
     class WifiRttControllerEventCallback
         : public ::testing::VtsHalHidlTargetCallbackBase<WifiRttControllerHidlTest>,
@@ -151,12 +158,9 @@
  * This test case tests the two sided ranging - 802.11mc FTM protocol.
  */
 TEST_P(WifiRttControllerHidlTest, Request2SidedRangeMeasurement) {
-    std::pair<WifiStatus, RttCapabilities> status_and_caps;
-
     // Get the Capabilities
-    status_and_caps = HIDL_INVOKE(wifi_rtt_controller_, getCapabilities_1_6);
-    EXPECT_EQ(WifiStatusCode::SUCCESS, status_and_caps.first.code);
-    if (!status_and_caps.second.rttFtmSupported) {
+    RttCapabilities capabilities = getRttCapabilities();
+    if (!capabilities.rttFtmSupported) {
         GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping two sided RTT since driver/fw doesn't support";
     }
     std::vector<RttConfig> configs;
@@ -196,19 +200,16 @@
  * rangeRequest_1_6
  */
 TEST_P(WifiRttControllerHidlTest, RangeRequest_1_6) {
-    std::pair<WifiStatus, RttCapabilities> status_and_caps;
-
     // Get the Capabilities
-    status_and_caps = HIDL_INVOKE(wifi_rtt_controller_, getCapabilities_1_6);
-    EXPECT_EQ(WifiStatusCode::SUCCESS, status_and_caps.first.code);
-    if (!status_and_caps.second.rttOneSidedSupported) {
+    RttCapabilities capabilities = getRttCapabilities();
+    if (!capabilities.rttOneSidedSupported) {
         GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping one sided RTT since driver/fw doesn't support";
     }
     // Get the highest support preamble
     int preamble = 1;
-    status_and_caps.second.preambleSupport >>= 1;
-    while (status_and_caps.second.preambleSupport != 0) {
-        status_and_caps.second.preambleSupport >>= 1;
+    capabilities.preambleSupport >>= 1;
+    while (capabilities.preambleSupport != 0) {
+        capabilities.preambleSupport >>= 1;
         preamble <<= 1;
     }
     std::vector<RttConfig> configs;
@@ -259,9 +260,14 @@
  * getResponderInfo_1_6
  */
 TEST_P(WifiRttControllerHidlTest, GetResponderInfo_1_6) {
-    std::pair<WifiStatus, RttResponder> status_and_info;
+    // Get the capabilities
+    RttCapabilities capabilities = getRttCapabilities();
+    if (!capabilities.responderSupported) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping because responder is not supported";
+    }
 
     // Invoke the call
+    std::pair<WifiStatus, RttResponder> status_and_info;
     status_and_info = HIDL_INVOKE(wifi_rtt_controller_, getResponderInfo_1_6);
     EXPECT_EQ(WifiStatusCode::SUCCESS, status_and_info.first.code);
 }
@@ -270,6 +276,12 @@
  * enableResponder_1_6
  */
 TEST_P(WifiRttControllerHidlTest, EnableResponder_1_6) {
+    // Get the capabilities
+    RttCapabilities capabilities = getRttCapabilities();
+    if (!capabilities.responderSupported) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping because responder is not supported";
+    }
+
     std::pair<WifiStatus, RttResponder> status_and_info;
     int cmdId = 55;
     WifiChannelInfo channelInfo;