diff --git a/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test.cpp b/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test.cpp
index 407ac0c..0e1218e 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test.cpp
@@ -141,18 +141,18 @@
     }
     SetPositionMode(min_interval_msec, low_power_mode);
 
-    auto status = aidl_gnss_hal_->start();
-    EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
-
     if (start_sv_status) {
-        status = aidl_gnss_hal_->startSvStatus();
+        auto status = aidl_gnss_hal_->startSvStatus();
         EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
     }
     if (start_nmea) {
-        status = aidl_gnss_hal_->startNmea();
+        auto status = aidl_gnss_hal_->startNmea();
         EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
     }
 
+    auto status = aidl_gnss_hal_->start();
+    EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+
     /*
      * GnssLocationProvider support of AGPS SUPL & XtraDownloader is not available in VTS,
      * so allow time to demodulate ephemeris over the air.
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp b/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
index f926c40..3696233 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
+++ b/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
@@ -291,10 +291,12 @@
         EXPECT_GT(aidl_gnss_cb_->sv_info_list_cbq_.retrieve(sv_info_lists, kNumSvInfoLists,
                                                             kTimeoutSeconds),
                   0);
-        last_sv_info_list = sv_info_lists.back();
-    } while (last_sv_info_list.size() == 0);
+        if (!sv_info_lists.empty()) {
+            last_sv_info_list = sv_info_lists.back();
+            ALOGD("last_sv_info size = %d", (int)last_sv_info_list.size());
+        }
+    } while (!sv_info_lists.empty() && last_sv_info_list.size() == 0);
 
-    ALOGD("last_sv_info size = %d", (int)last_sv_info_list.size());
     bool nonZeroCn0Found = false;
     for (auto sv_info : last_sv_info_list) {
         EXPECT_TRUE(sv_info.basebandCN0DbHz >= 0.0 && sv_info.basebandCN0DbHz <= 65.0);
diff --git a/security/keymint/RKP_README.md b/security/keymint/RKP_README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89a2598
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/RKP_README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+# Remote Provisioning HAL
+
+## Objective
+
+Design a HAL to support over-the-air provisioning of certificates for asymmetric
+keys. The HAL must interact effectively with Keystore (and other daemons) and
+protect device privacy and security.
+
+Note that this API is designed for KeyMint, but with the intention that it
+should be usable for other HALs that require certificate provisioning.
+Throughout this document we'll refer to the Keystore and KeyMint (formerly
+called Keymaster) components, but only for concreteness and convenience; those
+labels could be replaced with the names of any system and secure area
+components, respectively, that need certificates provisioned.
+
+## Key design decisions
+
+### General approach
+
+To more securely and reliably get keys and certificates to Android devices, we
+need to create a system where no party outside of the device's secure components
+is responsible for managing private keys. The strategy we've chosen is to
+deliver certificates over the air, using an asymmetric key pair created
+on-device in the factory as a root of trust to create an authenticated, secure
+channel. In this document we refer to this device-unique asymmetric key pair as
+Device Key (DK), its public half DK\_pub, its private half DK\_priv and a Device
+Key Certificate containing DK\_pub is denoted DKC.
+
+In order for the provisioning service to use DK (or a key authenticated by DK),
+it must know whether a given DK\_pub is known and trusted. To prove trust, we
+ask device OEMs to use one of two mechanisms:
+
+1.  (Preferred, recommended) The device OEM extracts DK\_pub from each device it
+    manufactures and uploads the public keys to a backend server.
+
+1.  The device OEM signs the DK\_pub to produce DKC and stores it on the device.
+    This has the advantage that they don't need to upload a DK\_pub for every
+    device immediately, but the disadvantage that they have to manage their
+    private signing keys, which means they have to have HSMs, configure and
+    secure them correctly, etc. Some backend providers may also require that the
+    OEM passes a factory security audit, and additionally promises to upload the
+    keys eventually as well.
+
+Note that in the full elaboration of this plan, DK\_pub is not the key used to
+establish a secure channel. Instead, DK\_pub is just the first public key in a
+chain of public keys which ends with the KeyMint public key, KM\_pub. All keys
+in the chain are device-unique and are joined in a certificate chain called the
+_Boot Certificate Chain_ (BCC), because in phases 2 and 3 of the remote
+provisioning project it is a chain of certificates corresponding to boot phases.
+We speak of the BCC even for phase 1, though in phase 1 it contains only a
+single self-signed DKC. This is described in more depth in the Phases section
+below.
+
+The BCC is authenticated by DK\_pub. To authenticate DK\_pub, we may have
+additional DKCs, from the SoC vendor, the device OEM, or both. Those are not
+part of the BCC but included as optional fields in the certificate request
+structure.
+
+The format of the the DK and BCC is specified within [Open Profile for DICE]
+(https://pigweed.googlesource.com/open-dice/+/HEAD/docs/specification.md).  To
+map phrases within this document to their equivalent terminology in the DICE
+specification, read the terms as follows: the DK corresponds to the UDS-derived
+key pair, DKC corresponds to the UDS certificate, and the BCC entries between
+DK\_pub and KM\_pub correspond to a chain of CDI certificates.
+
+Note: In addition to allowing 32 byte hash values for fields in the BCC payload,
+this spec additionally constrains some of the choices allowed in open-DICE.
+Specifically, these include which entries are required and which are optional in
+the BCC payload, and which algorithms are acceptable for use.
+
+### Phases
+
+RKP will be deployed in three phases, in terms of managing the root of trust
+binding between the device and the backend. To briefly describe them:
+
+* Phase 1: In phase 1 there is only one entry in the BCC; DK_pub and KM_pub are
+  the same key and the certificate is self-signed.
+* Phase 2: This is identical to phase 1, except it leverages the hardware root
+  of trust process described by DICE. Instead of trust being rooted in the TEE,
+  it is now rooted in the ROM by key material blown into fuses which are only
+  accessible to the ROM code.
+* Phase 3: This is identical to Phase 2, except the SoC vendor also does the
+  public key extraction or certification in their facilities, along with the OEM
+  doing it in the factory. This tightens up the "supply chain" and aims to make
+  key upload management more secure.
+
+### Privacy considerations
+
+Because DK and the DKCs are unique, immutable, unspoofable hardware-bound
+identifiers for the device, we must limit access to them to the absolute minimum
+possible. We do this in two ways:
+
+1.  We require KeyMint (which knows the BCC and either knows or at least has the
+ability to use KM\_priv) to refuse to ever divulge the BCC or additional
+signatures in plaintext. Instead, KeyMint requires the caller to provide an
+_Endpoint Encryption Key_ (EEK), with which it will encrypt the data before
+returning it. When provisioning production keys, the EEK must be signed by an
+approved authority whose public key is embedded in KeyMint. When certifying test
+keys, KeyMint will accept any EEK without checking the signature, but will
+encrypt and return a test BCC, rather than the real one.  The result is that
+only an entity in possession of an Trusted EEK (TEEK) private key can discover
+the plaintext of the production BCC.
+1.  Having thus limited access to the public keys to the trusted party only, we
+need to prevent the entity from abusing this unique device identifier.  The
+approach and mechanisms for doing that are beyond the scope of this document
+(they must be addressed in the server design), but generally involve taking care
+to ensure that we do not create any links between user IDs, IP addresses or
+issued certificates and the device pubkey.
+
+Although the details of the mechanisms for preventing the entity from abusing
+the BCC are, as stated, beyond the scope of this document, there is a subtle
+design decision here made specifically to enable abuse prevention. Specifically
+the `CertificateRequest` message sent to the server is (in
+[CDDL](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8610)):
+
+```
+cddl
+CertificateRequest = [
+    DeviceInfo,
+    challenge : bstr,
+    ProtectedData,
+    MacedKeysToSign
+]
+```
+
+The public keys to be attested by the server are in `MacedKeysToSign`, which is
+a COSE\_Mac0 structure, MACed with a key that is found in `ProtectedData`. The
+MAC key is signed by DK\_pub.
+
+This structure allows the backend component that has access to EEK\_priv to
+decrypt `ProtectedData`, validate that the request is from an authorized device,
+check that the request is fresh and verify and extract the MAC key. That backend
+component never sees any data related to the keys to be signed, but can provide
+the MAC key to another backend component that can verify `MacedKeysToSign` and
+proceed to generate the certificates.
+
+In this way, we can partition the provisioning server into one component that
+knows the device identity, as represented by DK\_pub, but never sees the keys to
+be certified or certificates generated, and another component that sees the keys
+to be certified and certificates generated but does not know the device
+identity.
+
+### Key and cryptographic message formatting
+
+For simplicity of generation and parsing, compactness of wire representation,
+and flexibility and standardization, we've settled on using the CBOR Object
+Signing and Encryption (COSE) standard, defined in [RFC
+8152](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8152). COSE provides compact and reasonably
+simple, yet easily-extensible, wire formats for:
+
+*   Keys,
+*   MACed messages,
+*   Signed messages, and
+*   Encrypted messages
+
+COSE enables easy layering of these message formats, such as using a COSE\_Sign
+structure to contain a COSE\_Key with a public key in it. We call this a
+"certificate".
+
+Due to the complexity of the standard, we'll spell out the COSE structures
+completely in this document and in the HAL and other documentation, so that
+although implementors will need to understand CBOR and the CBOR Data Definition
+Language ([CDDL, defined in RFC 8610](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8610)),
+they shouldn't need to understand COSE.
+
+Note, however, that the certificate chains returned from the provisioning server
+are standard X.509 certificates.
+
+### Algorithm choices
+
+This document uses:
+
+*   ECDSA P-256 for attestation signing keys;
+*   Remote provisioning protocol signing keys:
+  *  Ed25519 / P-256
+*   ECDH keys:
+  *  X25519 / P-256
+*   AES-GCM for all encryption;
+*   SHA-256 for all message digesting;
+*   HMAC-SHA-256 for all MACing; and
+*   HKDF-SHA-256 for all key derivation.
+
+We believe that Curve25519 offers the best tradeoff in terms of security,
+efficiency and global trustworthiness, and that it is now sufficiently
+widely-used and widely-implemented to make it a practical choice.
+
+However, since Secure Elements (SE) do not currently offer support for curve
+25519, we are allowing implementations to instead make use of EC P-256 for
+signing and ECDH. To put it simply, the device unique key pair will be a P-256
+key pair for ECDSA instead of Ed25519, and the ProtectedData COSE\_Encrypt
+message will have its payload encrypted with P-256 ECDH key exchange instead of
+X25519.
+
+The CDDL in the rest of the document will use the '/' operator to show areas
+where either curve 25519 or P-256 may be used. Since there is no easy way to
+bind choices across different CDDL groups, it is important that the implementor
+stays consistent in which type is chosen. E.g. taking ES256 as the choice for
+algorithm implies the implementor should also choose the P256 public key group
+further down in the COSE structure.
+
+### Testability
+
+It's critical that the remote provisioning implementation be testable, to
+minimize the probability that broken devices are sold to end users. To support
+testing, the remote provisioning HAL methods take a `testMode` argument. Keys
+created in test mode are tagged to indicate this. The provisioning server will
+check for the test mode tag and issue test certificates that do not chain back
+to a trusted public key. In test mode, any EEK will be accepted, enabling
+testing tools to use EEKs for which they have the private key so they can
+validate the content of certificate requests. The BCC included in the
+`CertificateRequest` must contain freshly-generated keys, not the real BCC keys.
+
+Keystore (or similar) will need to be able to handle both testMode keys and
+production keys and keep them distinct, generating test certificate requests
+when asked with a test EEK and production certificate requests when asked with a
+production EEK. Likewise, the interface used to instruct Keystore to create keys
+will need to be able to specify whether test or production keys are desired.
+
+## Design
+
+### Certificate provisioning flow
+
+TODO(jbires): Replace this with a `.png` containing a sequence diagram.  The
+provisioning flow looks something like this:
+
+Provisioner -> Keystore: Prepare N keys
+Keystore -> KeyMint: generateKeyPair
+KeyMint -> KeyMint: Generate  key pair
+KeyMint --> Keystore: key\_blob,pubkey
+Keystore -> Keystore: Store key\_blob,pubkey
+Provisioner -> Server: Get TEEK
+Server --> Provisioner: TEEK
+Provisioner -> Keystore: genCertReq(N, TEEK)
+Keystore -> KeyMint: genCertReq(pubkeys, TEEK)
+KeyMint -> KeyMint: Sign pubkeys & encrypt BCC
+KeyMint --> Keystore: signature, encrypted BCC
+Keystore -> Keystore: Construct cert\_request
+Keystore --> Provisioner: cert\_request
+Provisioner --> Server: cert\_request
+Server -> Server: Validate cert\_request
+Server -> Server: Generate certificates
+Server --> Provisioner: certificates
+Provisioner -> Keystore: certificates
+Keystore -> Keystore: Store certificates
+
+The actors in the above diagram are:
+
+*   **Server** is the backend certificate provisioning server. It has access to
+    the uploaded device public keys and is responsible for providing encryption
+    keys, decrypting and validating requests, and generating certificates in
+    response to requests.
+*   **Provisioner** is an application that is responsible for communicating with
+    the server and all of the system components that require key certificates
+    from the server. It also implements the policy that defines how many key
+    pairs each client should keep in their pool.
+*   **Keystore** is the [Android keystore
+    daemon](https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore) (or, more
+    generally, whatever system component manages communications with a
+    particular secure aread component).
+*   **KeyMint** is the secure area component that manages cryptographic keys and
+    performs attestations (or perhaps some other secure area component).
+
+### `BCC`
+
+The _Boot Certificate Chain_ (BCC) is the chain of certificates that contains
+DK\_pub as well as other often device-unique certificates. The BCC is
+represented as a COSE\_Key containing DK\_pub followed by an array of
+COSE\_Sign1 "certificates" containing public keys and optional additional
+information, ordered from root to leaf, with each certificate signing the next.
+The first certificate in the array is signed by DK\_pub, the last certificate
+has the KeyMint (or whatever) signing key's public key, KM\_pub. In phase 1
+there is only one entry; DK\_pub and KM\_pub are the same key and the
+certificate is self-signed.
+
+Each COSE\_Sign1 certificate is a CBOR Web Token (CWT) as described in [RFC
+8392](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8392) with additional fields as described
+in the Open Profile for DICE. Of these additional fields, only the
+_subjectPublicKey_ and _keyUsage_ fields are expected to be present for the
+KM\_pub entry (that is, the last entry) in a BCC, but all fields required by the
+Open Profile for DICE are expected for other entries (each of which corresponds
+to a particular firmware component or boot stage). The CWT fields _iss_ and
+_sub_ identify the issuer and subject of the certificate and are consistent
+along the BCC entries; the issuer of a given entry matches the subject of the
+previous entry.
+
+The BCC is designed to be constructed using the Open Profile for DICE. In this
+case the DK key pair is derived from the UDS as described by that profile and
+all BCC entries before the leaf are CBOR CDI certificates chained from DK\_pub.
+The KM key pair is not part of the derived DICE chain. It is generated (not
+derived) by the KeyMint module, certified by the last key in the DICE chain, and
+added as the leaf BCC entry. The key usage field in this leaf certificate must
+indicate the key is not used to sign certificates. If a UDS certificate is
+available on the device it should appear in the certificate request as the leaf
+of a DKCertChain in AdditionalDKSignatures (see
+[CertificateRequest](#certificaterequest)).
+
+The Open Profile for DICE allows for an arbitrary configuration descriptor. For
+BCC entries, this configuration descriptor is a CBOR map with the following
+optional fields. If no fields are relevant, an empty map should be encoded.
+Additional implementation-specific fields may be added using key values not in
+the range \[-70000, -70999\] (these are reserved for future additions here).
+
+```
+| Name              | Key    | Value type | Meaning                           |
+| ----------------- | ------ | ---------- | ----------------------------------|
+| Component name    | -70002 | tstr       | Name of firmware component / boot |
+:                   :        :            : stage                             :
+| Component version | -70003 | int        | Version of firmware component /   |
+:                   :        :            : boot stage                        :
+| Resettable        | -70004 | null       | If present, key changes on factory|
+:                   :        :            : reset                             :
+```
+
+Please see
+[ProtectedData.aidl](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:hardware/interfaces/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl)
+for a full CDDL definition of the BCC.
+
+### `CertificateRequest`
+
+The full CBOR message that will be sent to the server to request certificates
+is:
+
+```cddl
+CertificateRequest = [
+    DeviceInfo,
+    challenge : bstr,       // Provided by the server
+    ProtectedData,          // See ProtectedData.aidl
+    MacedKeysToSign         // See IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+]
+
+DeviceInfo = [
+    VerifiedDeviceInfo,     // See DeviceInfo.aidl
+    UnverifiedDeviceInfo
+]
+
+// Unverified info is anything provided by the HLOS. Subject to change out of
+// step with the HAL.
+UnverifiedDeviceInfo = {
+    ? "fingerprint" : tstr,
+}
+
+```
+
+It will be the responsibility of Keystore and the Provisioner to construct the
+`CertificateRequest`. The HAL provides a method to generate the elements that
+need to be constructed on the secure side, which are the tag field of
+`MacedKeysToSign`, `VerifiedDeviceInfo`, and the ciphertext field of
+`ProtectedData`.
+
+### HAL
+
+The remote provisioning HAL provides a simple interface that can be implemented
+by multiple secure components that require remote provisioning. It would be
+slightly simpler to extend the KeyMint API, but that approach would only serve
+the needs of KeyMint, this is more general.
+
+NOTE the data structures defined in this HAL may look a little bloated and
+complex. This is because the COSE data structures are fully spelled-out; we
+could make it much more compact by not re-specifying the standardized elements
+and instead just referencing the standard, but it seems better to fully specify
+them. If the apparent complexity seems daunting, consider what the same would
+look like if traditional ASN.1 DER-based structures from X.509 and related
+standards were used and also fully elaborated.
+
+Please see the related HAL documentation directly in the source code at the
+following links:
+
+*   [IRemotelyProvisionedComponent
+    HAL](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:hardware/interfaces/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl)
+*   [ProtectedData](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:hardware/interfaces/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl)
+*   [MacedPublicKey](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:hardware/interfaces/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/MacedPublicKey.aidl)
+*   [RpcHardwareInfo](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:hardware/interfaces/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl)
+*   [DeviceInfo](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:hardware/interfaces/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl)
+
diff --git a/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 274cfa7..d53179a 100644
--- a/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -26,7 +26,10 @@
 cc_test {
     name: "VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest",
     cflags: ["-DLOG_TAG=\"sensors_hidl_hal_test\""],
-    defaults: ["VtsHalTargetTestDefaults"],
+    defaults: [
+        "VtsHalSensorsDefaults",
+        "VtsHalTargetTestDefaults",
+    ],
     tidy_timeout_srcs: [
         "VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp",
     ],
@@ -34,9 +37,12 @@
         "SensorsHidlEnvironmentV1_0.cpp",
         "VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp",
     ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "libbinder_ndk",
+        "libvndksupport",
+    ],
     static_libs: [
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0",
-        "VtsHalSensorsTargetTestUtils",
     ],
     test_suites: [
         "general-tests",
diff --git a/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index c4ec866..62eaf6b 100644
--- a/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -26,7 +26,10 @@
 cc_test {
     name: "VtsHalSensorsV2_0TargetTest",
     cflags: ["-DLOG_TAG=\"sensors_hidl_hal_test\""],
-    defaults: ["VtsHalTargetTestDefaults"],
+    defaults: [
+        "VtsHalSensorsDefaults",
+        "VtsHalTargetTestDefaults",
+    ],
     tidy_timeout_srcs: [
         "VtsHalSensorsV2_0TargetTest.cpp",
     ],
@@ -36,13 +39,15 @@
     header_libs: [
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.X-shared-utils",
     ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "libbinder_ndk",
+    ],
     static_libs: [
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0-convert",
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.1",
         "libfmq",
-        "VtsHalSensorsTargetTestUtils",
         "VtsHalSensorsV2_0TargetTest-lib",
     ],
     test_suites: [
diff --git a/sensors/2.1/vts/functional/Android.bp b/sensors/2.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 3659e11..61cfd14 100644
--- a/sensors/2.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/sensors/2.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -28,7 +28,10 @@
     cflags: [
         "-DLOG_TAG=\"sensors_hidl_hal_test\"",
     ],
-    defaults: ["VtsHalTargetTestDefaults"],
+    defaults: [
+        "VtsHalSensorsDefaults",
+        "VtsHalTargetTestDefaults",
+    ],
     srcs: [
         "VtsHalSensorsV2_1TargetTest.cpp",
     ],
@@ -41,7 +44,6 @@
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.1",
         "libfmq",
-        "VtsHalSensorsTargetTestUtils",
         "VtsHalSensorsV2_1TargetTest-lib",
     ],
     test_suites: [
diff --git a/sensors/aidl/vts/Android.bp b/sensors/aidl/vts/Android.bp
index b5a5f15..f3972ec 100644
--- a/sensors/aidl/vts/Android.bp
+++ b/sensors/aidl/vts/Android.bp
@@ -24,8 +24,9 @@
 cc_test {
     name: "VtsAidlHalSensorsTargetTest",
     defaults: [
-        "VtsHalTargetTestDefaults",
         "use_libaidlvintf_gtest_helper_static",
+        "VtsHalSensorsDefaults",
+        "VtsHalTargetTestDefaults",
     ],
     srcs: [
         "VtsAidlHalSensorsTargetTest.cpp",
diff --git a/sensors/common/vts/utils/Android.bp b/sensors/common/vts/utils/Android.bp
index 44bed6e..08b6afa 100644
--- a/sensors/common/vts/utils/Android.bp
+++ b/sensors/common/vts/utils/Android.bp
@@ -23,6 +23,23 @@
     default_applicable_licenses: ["hardware_interfaces_license"],
 }
 
+// Prefer to use these defaults to pull in VtsHalSensorsTargetTestUtils + its
+// dependencies
+cc_defaults {
+    name: "VtsHalSensorsDefaults",
+    shared_libs: [
+        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator-V1-ndk",
+        "android.hardware.graphics.common-V3-ndk",
+        "libbinder_ndk",
+        "libutils",
+        "libvndksupport",
+    ],
+    static_libs: [
+        "libaidlcommonsupport",
+        "VtsHalSensorsTargetTestUtils",
+    ],
+}
+
 cc_library_static {
     name: "VtsHalSensorsTargetTestUtils",
     defaults: ["VtsHalTargetTestDefaults"],
@@ -36,13 +53,19 @@
     local_include_dirs: [
         "include/sensors-vts-utils",
     ],
+    // Targets that depend on us need to also include these
     shared_libs: [
+        "android.hardware.graphics.allocator-V1-ndk",
+        "android.hardware.graphics.common-V3-ndk",
+        "libbinder_ndk",
         "libutils",
+        "libvndksupport",
     ],
     static_libs: [
         "android.hardware.sensors@1.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.0",
         "android.hardware.sensors@2.1",
+        "libaidlcommonsupport",
     ],
     whole_static_libs: [
         "android.hardware.graphics.allocator@2.0",
diff --git a/sensors/common/vts/utils/GrallocWrapper.cpp b/sensors/common/vts/utils/GrallocWrapper.cpp
index 47d1f42..e6e0888 100644
--- a/sensors/common/vts/utils/GrallocWrapper.cpp
+++ b/sensors/common/vts/utils/GrallocWrapper.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
 
 #include "GrallocWrapper.h"
 
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/graphics/allocator/IAllocator.h>
+#include <aidlcommonsupport/NativeHandle.h>
+#include <android/binder_manager.h>
 #include <android/hardware/graphics/allocator/2.0/IAllocator.h>
 #include <android/hardware/graphics/allocator/3.0/IAllocator.h>
 #include <android/hardware/graphics/allocator/4.0/IAllocator.h>
@@ -27,8 +30,10 @@
 #include <utils/Log.h>
 
 #include <cinttypes>
+#include <memory>
 #include <type_traits>
 
+using IAllocatorAidl = ::aidl::android::hardware::graphics::allocator::IAllocator;
 using IAllocator2 = ::android::hardware::graphics::allocator::V2_0::IAllocator;
 using IAllocator3 = ::android::hardware::graphics::allocator::V3_0::IAllocator;
 using IAllocator4 = ::android::hardware::graphics::allocator::V4_0::IAllocator;
@@ -41,6 +46,9 @@
 using Error3 = ::android::hardware::graphics::mapper::V3_0::Error;
 using Error4 = ::android::hardware::graphics::mapper::V4_0::Error;
 
+using ::aidl::android::hardware::common::NativeHandle;
+using ::aidl::android::hardware::graphics::allocator::AllocationResult;
+
 using ::android::hardware::graphics::common::V1_0::BufferUsage;
 using ::android::hardware::graphics::common::V1_0::PixelFormat;
 
@@ -97,10 +105,11 @@
 
 // Since all the type and function names are the same for the things we use across the major HAL
 // versions, we use template magic to avoid repeating ourselves.
-template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT>
+template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT,
+          template <typename> typename AllocatorWrapperT = sp>
 class GrallocHalWrapper : public IGrallocHalWrapper {
   public:
-    GrallocHalWrapper(const sp<AllocatorT>& allocator, const sp<MapperT>& mapper)
+    GrallocHalWrapper(const AllocatorWrapperT<AllocatorT>& allocator, const sp<MapperT>& mapper)
         : mAllocator(allocator), mMapper(mapper) {
         if (mapper->isRemote()) {
             ALOGE("Mapper is in passthrough mode");
@@ -116,7 +125,7 @@
   private:
     static constexpr uint64_t kBufferUsage =
             static_cast<uint64_t>(BufferUsage::SENSOR_DIRECT_DATA | BufferUsage::CPU_READ_OFTEN);
-    sp<AllocatorT> mAllocator;
+    AllocatorWrapperT<AllocatorT> mAllocator;
     sp<MapperT> mMapper;
 
     // v2.0 and v3.0 use vec<uint32_t> for BufferDescriptor, but v4.0 uses vec<uint8_t>, so use
@@ -128,8 +137,34 @@
     native_handle_t* importBuffer(const hidl_handle& rawHandle);
 };
 
-template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT>
-native_handle_t* GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::allocate(uint32_t size) {
+template <>
+native_handle_t* GrallocHalWrapper<IAllocatorAidl, IMapper4, std::shared_ptr>::allocate(
+        uint32_t size) {
+    constexpr uint32_t kBufferCount = 1;
+    BufferDescriptorT descriptor = getDescriptor(size);
+    native_handle_t* bufferHandle = nullptr;
+
+    AllocationResult result;
+    auto status = mAllocator->allocate(descriptor, kBufferCount, &result);
+    if (!status.isOk()) {
+        status_t error = status.getExceptionCode();
+        ALOGE("Failed to allocate buffer: %" PRId32, static_cast<int32_t>(error));
+    } else if (result.buffers.size() != kBufferCount) {
+        ALOGE("Invalid buffer array size (got %zu, expected %" PRIu32 ")", result.buffers.size(),
+              kBufferCount);
+    } else {
+        // Convert from AIDL NativeHandle to native_handle_t to hidl_handle
+        hidl_handle hidlHandle;
+        hidlHandle.setTo(dupFromAidl(result.buffers[0]), /*shouldOwn*/ true);
+        bufferHandle = importBuffer(hidlHandle);
+    }
+
+    return bufferHandle;
+}
+
+template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT, template <typename> typename AllocatorWrapperT>
+native_handle_t* GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT, AllocatorWrapperT>::allocate(
+        uint32_t size) {
     constexpr uint32_t kBufferCount = 1;
     BufferDescriptorT descriptor = getDescriptor(size);
     native_handle_t* bufferHandle = nullptr;
@@ -149,17 +184,18 @@
     return bufferHandle;
 }
 
-template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT>
-void GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::freeBuffer(native_handle_t* bufferHandle) {
+template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT, template <typename> typename AllocatorWrapperT>
+void GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT, AllocatorWrapperT>::freeBuffer(
+        native_handle_t* bufferHandle) {
     auto error = mMapper->freeBuffer(bufferHandle);
     if (!error.isOk() || failed(error)) {
         ALOGE("Failed to free buffer %p", bufferHandle);
     }
 }
 
-template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT>
-typename GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::BufferDescriptorT
-GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::getDescriptor(uint32_t size) {
+template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT, template <typename> typename AllocatorWrapperT>
+typename GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT, AllocatorWrapperT>::BufferDescriptorT
+GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT, AllocatorWrapperT>::getDescriptor(uint32_t size) {
     typename MapperT::BufferDescriptorInfo descriptorInfo = {
             .width = size,
             .height = 1,
@@ -181,8 +217,8 @@
     return descriptor;
 }
 
-template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT>
-native_handle_t* GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::importBuffer(
+template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT, template <typename> typename AllocatorWrapperT>
+native_handle_t* GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT, AllocatorWrapperT>::importBuffer(
         const hidl_handle& rawHandle) {
     native_handle_t* bufferHandle = nullptr;
 
@@ -198,8 +234,9 @@
     return bufferHandle;
 }
 
-template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT>
-void* GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::lock(native_handle_t* bufferHandle) {
+template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT, template <typename> typename AllocatorWrapperT>
+void* GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT, AllocatorWrapperT>::lock(
+        native_handle_t* bufferHandle) {
     // Per the HAL, all-zeros Rect means the entire buffer
     typename MapperT::Rect accessRegion = {};
     hidl_handle acquireFenceHandle;  // No fence needed, already safe to lock
@@ -218,8 +255,9 @@
     return data;
 }
 
-template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT>
-void GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT>::unlock(native_handle_t* bufferHandle) {
+template <typename AllocatorT, typename MapperT, template <typename> typename AllocatorWrapperT>
+void GrallocHalWrapper<AllocatorT, MapperT, AllocatorWrapperT>::unlock(
+        native_handle_t* bufferHandle) {
     mMapper->unlock(bufferHandle, [&](auto error, const hidl_handle& /*releaseFence*/) {
         if (failed(error)) {
             ALOGE("Failed to unlock buffer %p: %" PRId32, bufferHandle,
@@ -234,8 +272,22 @@
     sp<IAllocator4> allocator4 = IAllocator4::getService();
     sp<IMapper4> mapper4 = IMapper4::getService();
 
-    if (allocator4 != nullptr && mapper4 != nullptr) {
-        ALOGD("Using IAllocator/IMapper v4.0");
+    const auto kAllocatorSvc = std::string(IAllocatorAidl::descriptor) + "/default";
+    std::shared_ptr<IAllocatorAidl> allocatorAidl;
+    if (AServiceManager_isDeclared(kAllocatorSvc.c_str())) {
+        allocatorAidl = IAllocatorAidl::fromBinder(
+                ndk::SpAIBinder(AServiceManager_checkService(kAllocatorSvc.c_str())));
+    }
+
+    // As of T, AIDL Allocator is supported only with HIDL Mapper4
+    // (ref: VtsHalGraphicsAllocatorAidl_TargetTest.cpp)
+    if (allocatorAidl != nullptr && mapper4 != nullptr) {
+        ALOGD("Using AIDL IAllocator + HIDL IMapper v4.0");
+        mGrallocHal = std::unique_ptr<IGrallocHalWrapper>(
+                new GrallocHalWrapper<IAllocatorAidl, IMapper4, std::shared_ptr>(allocatorAidl,
+                                                                                 mapper4));
+    } else if (allocator4 != nullptr && mapper4 != nullptr) {
+        ALOGD("AIDL IAllocator not found, using HIDL IAllocator/IMapper v4.0");
         mGrallocHal = std::unique_ptr<IGrallocHalWrapper>(
                 new GrallocHalWrapper<IAllocator4, IMapper4>(allocator4, mapper4));
     } else {