diff --git a/audio/aidl/common/include/Utils.h b/audio/aidl/common/include/Utils.h
index dd7975d..bd903d7 100644
--- a/audio/aidl/common/include/Utils.h
+++ b/audio/aidl/common/include/Utils.h
@@ -112,30 +112,6 @@
            device == ::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType::OUT_TELEPHONY_TX;
 }
 
-constexpr bool isUsbInputDeviceType(::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType type) {
-    switch (type) {
-        case ::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType::IN_DOCK:
-        case ::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType::IN_ACCESSORY:
-        case ::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType::IN_DEVICE:
-        case ::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType::IN_HEADSET:
-            return true;
-        default:
-            return false;
-    }
-}
-
-constexpr bool isUsbOutputtDeviceType(::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType type) {
-    switch (type) {
-        case ::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType::OUT_DOCK:
-        case ::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType::OUT_ACCESSORY:
-        case ::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType::OUT_DEVICE:
-        case ::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType::OUT_HEADSET:
-            return true;
-        default:
-            return false;
-    }
-}
-
 constexpr bool isValidAudioMode(::aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioMode mode) {
     return std::find(kValidAudioModes.begin(), kValidAudioModes.end(), mode) !=
            kValidAudioModes.end();
diff --git a/audio/aidl/default/usb/ModuleUsb.cpp b/audio/aidl/default/usb/ModuleUsb.cpp
index ecdbd5c..28116ae 100644
--- a/audio/aidl/default/usb/ModuleUsb.cpp
+++ b/audio/aidl/default/usb/ModuleUsb.cpp
@@ -30,13 +30,13 @@
 #include "alsa_device_profile.h"
 }
 
-using aidl::android::hardware::audio::common::isUsbInputDeviceType;
 using aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioChannelLayout;
 using aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceAddress;
 using aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceDescription;
 using aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioDeviceType;
 using aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioFormatDescription;
 using aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioFormatType;
+using aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioIoFlags;
 using aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioPort;
 using aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioPortConfig;
 using aidl::android::media::audio::common::AudioPortExt;
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
         return ndk::ScopedAStatus::fromExceptionCode(EX_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT);
     }
 
-    const bool isInput = isUsbInputDeviceType(devicePort.device.type.type);
+    const bool isInput = audioPort->flags.getTag() == AudioIoFlags::input;
     alsa_device_profile profile;
     profile_init(&profile, isInput ? PCM_IN : PCM_OUT);
     profile.card = alsaAddress[0];
diff --git a/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/Android.bp b/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/Android.bp
index 5d669c2..225c065 100644
--- a/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/Android.bp
+++ b/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/Android.bp
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
     name: "audio_policy_engine_configurable_configuration_V1_0",
     srcs: ["AllSchemas.xsd"],
     package_name: "audio.policy.configurable.V1_0",
+    root_elements: ["ParameterFrameworkConfiguration"],
 }
 
 // Unfortunately, all rules only have a single output, thus
diff --git a/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/api/current.txt b/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/api/current.txt
index c2fb6fc..2b83e60 100644
--- a/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/api/current.txt
+++ b/audio/policy/1.0/xml/pfw_schemas/api/current.txt
@@ -470,23 +470,7 @@
 
   public class XmlParser {
     ctor public XmlParser();
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.BitParameterBlock readBitParameterBlock(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.BooleanParameter readBooleanParameter(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.ComponentTypeSetType readComponentTypeSetType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.ComponentTypeSetType readComponentTypeSetType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.ConfigurableDomainType readConfigurableDomainType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.ConfigurableDomains readConfigurableDomains(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.EnumParameterType readEnumParameterType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.FixedPointParameterType readFixedPointParameterType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.FloatingPointParameterType readFloatingPointParameterType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.IntegerParameterType readIntegerParameterType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.LinearAdaptationType readLinearAdaptationType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.LogarithmicAdaptation readLogarithmicAdaptation(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.ParameterFrameworkConfiguration readParameterFrameworkConfiguration(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.StringParameter readStringParameter(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.SubsystemPlugins readSubsystemPlugins(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.SubsystemType readSubsystemType(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static audio.policy.configurable.V1_0.SystemClass readSystemClass(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static String readText(org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParser) throws java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static void skip(org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParser) throws java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
   }
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Android.bp b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Android.bp
index 876a91f..82ad917 100644
--- a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -7,11 +7,21 @@
     default_applicable_licenses: ["hardware_interfaces_license"],
 }
 
+filegroup {
+    name: "face-default.rc",
+    srcs: ["face-default.rc"],
+}
+
+filegroup {
+    name: "face-default.xml",
+    srcs: ["face-default.xml"],
+}
+
 cc_binary {
     name: "android.hardware.biometrics.face-service.example",
     relative_install_path: "hw",
-    init_rc: ["face-default.rc"],
-    vintf_fragments: ["face-default.xml"],
+    init_rc: [":face-default.rc"],
+    vintf_fragments: [":face-default.xml"],
     vendor: true,
     shared_libs: [
         "libbase",
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/Android.bp b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f39a08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package {
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["Android-Apache-2.0"],
+}
+
+apex_key {
+    name: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.key",
+    public_key: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.avbpubkey",
+    private_key: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pem",
+}
+
+android_app_certificate {
+    name: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.certificate",
+    certificate: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face",
+}
+
+apex {
+    name: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face",
+    manifest: "manifest.json",
+    file_contexts: "file_contexts",
+    key: "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.key",
+    certificate: ":com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.certificate",
+    updatable: false,
+
+    vendor: true,
+    use_vndk_as_stable: true,
+
+    binaries: [
+        // hal
+        "android.hardware.biometrics.face-service.example",
+    ],
+    prebuilts: [
+        // init_rc
+        "face-default-apex.rc",
+        // vintf_fragment
+        "face-default-apex.xml",
+        // permission
+        "android.hardware.biometrics.face.prebuilt.xml",
+    ],
+
+    overrides: [
+        "android.hardware.biometrics.face-service.example",
+    ],
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "face-default-apex.rc",
+    src: ":gen-face-default-apex.rc",
+    vendor: true,
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+genrule {
+    name: "gen-face-default-apex.rc",
+    srcs: [":face-default.rc"],
+    out: ["face-default-apex.rc"],
+    cmd: "sed -e 's@/vendor/bin/@/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face/bin/@' $(in) > $(out)",
+}
+
+prebuilt_etc {
+    name: "face-default-apex.xml",
+    src: ":face-default.xml",
+    sub_dir: "vintf",
+    vendor: true,
+    installable: false,
+}
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.avbpubkey b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.avbpubkey
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f358ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.avbpubkey
Binary files differ
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pem b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad8f57d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+ZJpVwCxgxAOagrQtvwdedbmvChAfGA==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pk8 b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pk8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af0ff4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.pk8
Binary files differ
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.x509.pem b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.x509.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dc37ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/com.android.hardware.biometrics.face.x509.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIF7TCCA9UCFCmJBOOYRVUgdy8vKm8OQd0ii2pPMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMIGx
+MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91
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+F5yI52RgPrXK8bNqJOvX6MIc4Y2JoSI2Uz4J2vZ3QhRkPC9oqwk/Enz4GIVJ4Dnm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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/file_contexts b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/file_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f935c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/file_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+(/.*)?                                          u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/etc(/.*)?                                      u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.biometrics\.face-service\.example u:object_r:hal_face_default_exec:s0
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/manifest.json b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/manifest.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d46896
--- /dev/null
+++ b/biometrics/face/aidl/default/apex/manifest.json
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+{
+    "name": "com.android.hardware.biometrics.face",
+    "version": 1
+}
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.0/default/bluetooth_address.cc b/bluetooth/1.0/default/bluetooth_address.cc
index 93a5469..df3e84a 100644
--- a/bluetooth/1.0/default/bluetooth_address.cc
+++ b/bluetooth/1.0/default/bluetooth_address.cc
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
       const uint8_t zero_bdaddr[kBytes] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
       if ((string_to_bytes(address, local_addr)) &&
           (memcmp(local_addr, zero_bdaddr, kBytes) != 0)) {
-        ALOGD("%s: Got Factory BDA %s", __func__, address);
+        ALOGD("%s: Got Factory BDA", __func__);
         return true;
       } else {
         ALOGE("%s: Got Invalid BDA '%s' from %s", __func__, address, property);
@@ -78,12 +78,14 @@
   // No BDADDR found in the file. Look for BDA in a factory property.
   if (property_get(FACTORY_BDADDR_PROPERTY, property, NULL) &&
       string_to_bytes(property, local_addr)) {
+    ALOGD("%s: Using FACTORY_BDADDR_PROPERTY", __func__);
     return true;
   }
 
   // No factory BDADDR found. Look for a previously stored BDA.
   if (property_get(PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY, property, NULL) &&
       string_to_bytes(property, local_addr)) {
+    ALOGD("%s: Using PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY", __func__);
     return true;
   }
 
diff --git a/bluetooth/aidl/TEST_MAPPING b/bluetooth/aidl/TEST_MAPPING
index 41a508e..18958d2 100644
--- a/bluetooth/aidl/TEST_MAPPING
+++ b/bluetooth/aidl/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -1,24 +1,12 @@
 {
   "presubmit" : [
     {
-      "name" : "VtsHalBluetoothTargetTest",
-      "options": [
-        {
-          // TODO(b/275847929)
-          "exclude-filter": "VtsHalBluetoothTargetTest.PerInstance/BluetoothAidlTest#Vsr_Bluetooth5Requirements/0_android_hardware_bluetooth_IBluetoothHci_default"
-        }
-      ]
+      "name" : "VtsHalBluetoothTargetTest"
     }
   ],
   "hwasan-presubmit" : [
     {
-      "name" : "VtsHalBluetoothTargetTest",
-      "options": [
-        {
-          // TODO(b/275847929)
-          "exclude-filter": "VtsHalBluetoothTargetTest.PerInstance/BluetoothAidlTest#Vsr_Bluetooth5Requirements/0_android_hardware_bluetooth_IBluetoothHci_default"
-        }
-      ]
+      "name" : "VtsHalBluetoothTargetTest"
     }
   ]
 }
diff --git a/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.cpp b/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.cpp
index ac2eabc..18a371d 100644
--- a/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.cpp
+++ b/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.cpp
@@ -174,7 +174,10 @@
   mFdWatcher.WatchFdForNonBlockingReads(mFd,
                                         [this](int) { mH4->OnDataReady(); });
 
-  send(PacketType::COMMAND, reset);
+  ndk::ScopedAStatus result = send(PacketType::COMMAND, reset);
+  if (!result.isOk()) {
+    ALOGE("Error sending reset command");
+  }
   auto status = resetFuture.wait_for(std::chrono::seconds(1));
   mFdWatcher.StopWatchingFileDescriptors();
   if (status == std::future_status::ready) {
@@ -301,30 +304,35 @@
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus BluetoothHci::sendHciCommand(
     const std::vector<uint8_t>& packet) {
-  send(PacketType::COMMAND, packet);
-  return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
+  return send(PacketType::COMMAND, packet);
 }
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus BluetoothHci::sendAclData(
     const std::vector<uint8_t>& packet) {
-  send(PacketType::ACL_DATA, packet);
-  return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
+  return send(PacketType::ACL_DATA, packet);
 }
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus BluetoothHci::sendScoData(
     const std::vector<uint8_t>& packet) {
-  send(PacketType::SCO_DATA, packet);
-  return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
+  return send(PacketType::SCO_DATA, packet);
 }
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus BluetoothHci::sendIsoData(
     const std::vector<uint8_t>& packet) {
-  send(PacketType::ISO_DATA, packet);
-  return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
+  return send(PacketType::ISO_DATA, packet);
 }
 
-void BluetoothHci::send(PacketType type, const std::vector<uint8_t>& v) {
+ndk::ScopedAStatus BluetoothHci::send(PacketType type,
+    const std::vector<uint8_t>& v) {
+  if (mH4 == nullptr) {
+    return ndk::ScopedAStatus::fromExceptionCode(EX_ILLEGAL_STATE);
+  }
+  if (v.empty()) {
+    ALOGE("Packet is empty, no data was found to be sent");
+    return ndk::ScopedAStatus::fromExceptionCode(EX_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT);
+  }
   mH4->Send(type, v);
+  return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::bluetooth::impl
diff --git a/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.h b/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.h
index 85aafc8..477cc5c 100644
--- a/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.h
+++ b/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.h
@@ -66,8 +66,9 @@
   ::android::hardware::bluetooth::async::AsyncFdWatcher mFdWatcher;
 
   int getFdFromDevPath();
-  void send(::android::hardware::bluetooth::hci::PacketType type,
-            const std::vector<uint8_t>& packet);
+  [[nodiscard]] ndk::ScopedAStatus send(
+      ::android::hardware::bluetooth::hci::PacketType type,
+      const std::vector<uint8_t>& packet);
   std::unique_ptr<NetBluetoothMgmt> management_{};
 
   // Send a reset command and discard all packets until a reset is received.
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/aidl/TEST_MAPPING b/bluetooth/audio/aidl/TEST_MAPPING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c853f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/aidl/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "presubmit": [
+    {
+      "name": "VtsHalBluetoothAudioTargetTest"
+    }
+  ],
+  "kernel-presubmit": [
+    {
+      "name": "VtsHalBluetoothAudioTargetTest"
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/Android.bp b/bluetooth/audio/utils/Android.bp
index 914d2b2..2cba61e 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/Android.bp
@@ -93,4 +93,5 @@
     srcs: ["le_audio_codec_capabilities/le_audio_codec_capabilities.xsd"],
     package_name: "aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting",
     api_dir: "le_audio_codec_capabilities/schema",
+    root_elements: ["leAudioOffloadSetting"],
 }
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/le_audio_codec_capabilities/schema/current.txt b/bluetooth/audio/utils/le_audio_codec_capabilities/schema/current.txt
index 886350e..3cef417 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/le_audio_codec_capabilities/schema/current.txt
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/le_audio_codec_capabilities/schema/current.txt
@@ -96,15 +96,7 @@
 
   public class XmlParser {
     ctor public XmlParser();
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.CodecConfiguration readCodecConfiguration(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.CodecConfigurationList readCodecConfigurationList(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.Configuration readConfiguration(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.ConfigurationList readConfigurationList(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.LeAudioOffloadSetting readLeAudioOffloadSetting(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.Scenario readScenario(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.ScenarioList readScenarioList(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.StrategyConfiguration readStrategyConfiguration(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
-    method public static aidl.android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.setting.StrategyConfigurationList readStrategyConfigurationList(java.io.InputStream) throws javax.xml.datatype.DatatypeConfigurationException, java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static String readText(org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParser) throws java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
     method public static void skip(org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParser) throws java.io.IOException, org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException;
   }
diff --git a/bluetooth/hci/h4_protocol.cc b/bluetooth/hci/h4_protocol.cc
index 51a624f..5f6d86e 100644
--- a/bluetooth/hci/h4_protocol.cc
+++ b/bluetooth/hci/h4_protocol.cc
@@ -105,15 +105,12 @@
       buffer_offset += 1;
     } else {
       bool packet_ready = hci_packetizer_.OnDataReady(
-          hci_packet_type_, input_buffer, buffer_offset);
+          hci_packet_type_, input_buffer, &buffer_offset);
       if (packet_ready) {
-        // Call packet callback and move offset.
-        buffer_offset += OnPacketReady(hci_packetizer_.GetPacket());
+        // Call packet callback.
+        OnPacketReady(hci_packetizer_.GetPacket());
         // Get ready for the next type byte.
         hci_packet_type_ = PacketType::UNKNOWN;
-      } else {
-        // The data was consumed, but there wasn't a packet.
-        buffer_offset = input_buffer.size();
       }
     }
   }
diff --git a/bluetooth/hci/hci_packetizer.cc b/bluetooth/hci/hci_packetizer.cc
index 5b6c443..4135920 100644
--- a/bluetooth/hci/hci_packetizer.cc
+++ b/bluetooth/hci/hci_packetizer.cc
@@ -51,9 +51,10 @@
 
 bool HciPacketizer::OnDataReady(PacketType packet_type,
                                 const std::vector<uint8_t>& buffer,
-                                size_t offset) {
+                                size_t* offset) {
   bool packet_completed = false;
-  size_t bytes_available = buffer.size() - offset;
+  size_t bytes_available = buffer.size() - *offset;
+
   switch (state_) {
     case HCI_HEADER: {
       size_t header_size =
@@ -62,18 +63,20 @@
         bytes_remaining_ = header_size;
         packet_.clear();
       }
+
       size_t bytes_to_copy = std::min(bytes_remaining_, bytes_available);
-      packet_.insert(packet_.end(), buffer.begin() + offset,
-                     buffer.begin() + offset + bytes_to_copy);
+      packet_.insert(packet_.end(), buffer.begin() + *offset,
+                     buffer.begin() + *offset + bytes_to_copy);
       bytes_remaining_ -= bytes_to_copy;
       bytes_available -= bytes_to_copy;
+      *offset += bytes_to_copy;
+
       if (bytes_remaining_ == 0) {
         bytes_remaining_ = HciGetPacketLengthForType(packet_type, packet_);
         if (bytes_remaining_ > 0) {
           state_ = HCI_PAYLOAD;
           if (bytes_available > 0) {
-            packet_completed =
-                OnDataReady(packet_type, buffer, offset + bytes_to_copy);
+            packet_completed = OnDataReady(packet_type, buffer, offset);
           }
         } else {
           packet_completed = true;
@@ -84,9 +87,10 @@
 
     case HCI_PAYLOAD: {
       size_t bytes_to_copy = std::min(bytes_remaining_, bytes_available);
-      packet_.insert(packet_.end(), buffer.begin() + offset,
-                     buffer.begin() + offset + bytes_to_copy);
+      packet_.insert(packet_.end(), buffer.begin() + *offset,
+                     buffer.begin() + *offset + bytes_to_copy);
       bytes_remaining_ -= bytes_to_copy;
+      *offset += bytes_to_copy;
       if (bytes_remaining_ == 0) {
         state_ = HCI_HEADER;
         packet_completed = true;
@@ -94,6 +98,7 @@
       break;
     }
   }
+
   return packet_completed;
 }
 
diff --git a/bluetooth/hci/hci_packetizer.h b/bluetooth/hci/hci_packetizer.h
index ba3e841..0d9319f 100644
--- a/bluetooth/hci/hci_packetizer.h
+++ b/bluetooth/hci/hci_packetizer.h
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
  public:
   HciPacketizer() = default;
   bool OnDataReady(PacketType packet_type, const std::vector<uint8_t>& data,
-                   size_t offset);
+                   size_t* offset);
   const std::vector<uint8_t>& GetPacket() const;
 
  protected:
diff --git a/bluetooth/hci/test/h4_protocol_unittest.cc b/bluetooth/hci/test/h4_protocol_unittest.cc
index d3fab61..f0c49b5 100644
--- a/bluetooth/hci/test/h4_protocol_unittest.cc
+++ b/bluetooth/hci/test/h4_protocol_unittest.cc
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
 #include <vector>
 
 #include "async_fd_watcher.h"
-#include "log/log.h"
 
 using android::hardware::bluetooth::async::AsyncFdWatcher;
 using namespace android::hardware::bluetooth::hci;
@@ -49,6 +48,7 @@
 static char event_data[100] = "The edges of a surface are lines.";
 static char iso_data[100] =
     "A plane angle is the inclination to one another of two lines in a ...";
+static char short_payload[10] = "12345";
 
 // 5 seconds.  Just don't hang.
 static constexpr size_t kTimeoutMs = 5000;
@@ -225,6 +225,49 @@
     CallDataReady();
   }
 
+  void WriteAndExpectManyAclDataPacketsDifferentOffsetsShort() {
+    std::promise<void> last_packet_promise;
+    size_t kNumPackets = 30;
+    // h4 type[1] + handle[2] + size[2]
+    char preamble[5] = {static_cast<uint8_t>(PacketType::ACL_DATA), 19, 92, 0,
+                        0};
+    int length = strlen(short_payload);
+    preamble[3] = length & 0xFF;
+    preamble[4] = 0;
+
+    EXPECT_CALL(acl_cb_, Call(PacketMatches(preamble + 1, kAclHeaderSize,
+                                            short_payload)))
+        .Times(kNumPackets);
+    ExpectInboundEvent(event_data, &last_packet_promise);
+
+    char all_packets[kNumPackets * 10];
+    size_t total_bytes = 0;
+
+    for (size_t packet = 0; packet < kNumPackets; packet++) {
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(preamble); i++) {
+        all_packets[total_bytes++] = preamble[i];
+      }
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+        all_packets[total_bytes++] = short_payload[i];
+      }
+    }
+
+    size_t written_bytes = 0;
+    size_t partial_size = 1;
+    while (written_bytes < total_bytes) {
+      size_t to_write = std::min(partial_size, total_bytes - written_bytes);
+      TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(
+          write(chip_uart_fd_, all_packets + written_bytes, to_write));
+      written_bytes += to_write;
+      CallDataReady();
+      partial_size++;
+      partial_size = partial_size % 5 + 1;
+    }
+    WriteInboundEvent(event_data);
+    CallDataReady();
+    WaitForTimeout(&last_packet_promise);
+  }
+
   testing::MockFunction<void(const std::vector<uint8_t>&)> cmd_cb_;
   testing::MockFunction<void(const std::vector<uint8_t>&)> event_cb_;
   testing::MockFunction<void(const std::vector<uint8_t>&)> acl_cb_;
@@ -276,6 +319,10 @@
   WriteAndExpectManyInboundAclDataPackets(sco_data);
 }
 
+TEST_F(H4ProtocolTest, TestMultipleWritesPacketsShortWrites) {
+  WriteAndExpectManyAclDataPacketsDifferentOffsetsShort();
+}
+
 TEST_F(H4ProtocolTest, TestDisconnect) {
   EXPECT_CALL(disconnect_cb_, Call());
   close(chip_uart_fd_);
@@ -332,10 +379,8 @@
 
   void TearDown() override { fd_watcher_.StopWatchingFileDescriptors(); }
 
-  void CallDataReady() override {
-    // The Async test can't call data ready.
-    FAIL();
-  }
+  // Calling CallDataReady() has no effect in the AsyncTest
+  void CallDataReady() override {}
 
   void SendAndReadUartOutbound(PacketType type, char* data) {
     ALOGD("%s sending", __func__);
@@ -434,6 +479,10 @@
   WriteAndExpectManyInboundAclDataPackets(sco_data);
 }
 
+TEST_F(H4ProtocolAsyncTest, TestMultipleWritesPacketsShortWrites) {
+  WriteAndExpectManyAclDataPacketsDifferentOffsetsShort();
+}
+
 TEST_F(H4ProtocolAsyncTest, TestDisconnect) {
   std::promise<void> promise;
   EXPECT_CALL(disconnect_cb_, Call()).WillOnce(Notify(&promise));
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp b/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp
index 93b5380..b3ca293 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp
@@ -82,3 +82,15 @@
         "kernel_config_u_6.1",
     ],
 }
+
+vintf_compatibility_matrix {
+    name: "framework_compatibility_matrix.9.xml",
+    stem: "compatibility_matrix.9.xml",
+    srcs: [
+        "compatibility_matrix.9.xml",
+    ],
+    kernel_configs: [
+        "kernel_config_v_5.15",
+        "kernel_config_v_6.1",
+    ],
+}
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk b/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk
index 6e4c419..a82a421 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@
     framework_compatibility_matrix.6.xml \
     framework_compatibility_matrix.7.xml \
     framework_compatibility_matrix.8.xml \
+    framework_compatibility_matrix.9.xml \
     framework_compatibility_matrix.device.xml \
 
 my_framework_matrix_deps += \
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
index 188746d..a4f56b6 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-<!-- WARNING: This file is unused in the Android 14 branch. -->
 <compatibility-matrix version="1.0" type="framework" level="9">
     <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.audio</name>
@@ -115,7 +114,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true" updatable-via-apex="true">
         <name>android.hardware.biometrics.face</name>
         <version>3</version>
         <interface>
@@ -493,16 +492,6 @@
         </interface>
     </hal>
     <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
-        <name>android.hardware.radio.satellite</name>
-        <version>1</version>
-        <interface>
-            <name>IRadioSatellite</name>
-            <instance>slot1</instance>
-            <instance>slot2</instance>
-            <instance>slot3</instance>
-        </interface>
-    </hal>
-    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.radio.ims.media</name>
         <version>1</version>
         <interface>
@@ -510,14 +499,6 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
-        <name>android.hardware.renderscript</name>
-        <version>1.0</version>
-        <interface>
-            <name>IDevice</name>
-            <instance>default</instance>
-        </interface>
-    </hal>
     <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.rebootescrow</name>
         <version>1</version>
diff --git a/drm/1.3/vts/OWNERS b/drm/1.3/vts/OWNERS
index 3a0672e..744827c 100644
--- a/drm/1.3/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/drm/1.3/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
+# Bug component: 49079
 conglin@google.com
-edwinwong@google.com
 fredgc@google.com
-jtinker@google.com
 juce@google.com
+kelzhan@google.com
 kylealexander@google.com
+mattfedd@google.com
 rfrias@google.com
 robertshih@google.com
 sigquit@google.com
+vickymin@google.com
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/OWNERS b/gnss/aidl/OWNERS
index b7b4a2e..e5b585e 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/OWNERS
+++ b/gnss/aidl/OWNERS
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+# Bug component: 393449
+
 gomo@google.com
 smalkos@google.com
 wyattriley@google.com
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/TEST_MAPPING b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/TEST_MAPPING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aedac5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "presubmit": [
+    {
+      "name": "VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest"
+    }
+  ],
+  "kernel-presubmit": [
+    {
+      "name": "VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+
diff --git a/graphics/mapper/4.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsMapperV4_0TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/mapper/4.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsMapperV4_0TargetTest.cpp
index e4a84e1..03d9041 100644
--- a/graphics/mapper/4.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsMapperV4_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/mapper/4.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsMapperV4_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@
 
     const native_handle_t* clonedBufferHandle;
     ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(clonedBufferHandle = mGralloc->allocate(mDummyDescriptorInfo, false));
-    error = mGralloc->getMapper()->freeBuffer(invalidHandle);
+    error = mGralloc->getMapper()->freeBuffer(const_cast<native_handle_t*>(clonedBufferHandle));
     EXPECT_EQ(Error::BAD_BUFFER, error)
             << "freeBuffer with un-imported handle did not fail with BAD_BUFFER";
 
diff --git a/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp
index 2c06353..b329de2 100644
--- a/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/mapper/stable-c/vts/VtsHalGraphicsMapperStableC_TargetTest.cpp
@@ -1371,6 +1371,28 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(buffer->info().usage, *value);
 }
 
+TEST_P(GraphicsMapperStableCTests, GetUsage64) {
+    BufferDescriptorInfo info{
+            .name = {"VTS_TEMP"},
+            .width = 64,
+            .height = 64,
+            .layerCount = 1,
+            .format = PixelFormat::RGBA_8888,
+            .usage = BufferUsage::FRONT_BUFFER | BufferUsage::GPU_RENDER_TARGET |
+                     BufferUsage::COMPOSER_OVERLAY | BufferUsage::GPU_TEXTURE,
+            .reservedSize = 0,
+    };
+    if (!isSupported(info)) {
+        GTEST_SKIP();
+    }
+    auto buffer = allocate(info);
+    auto bufferHandle = buffer->import();
+    auto value = getStandardMetadata<StandardMetadataType::USAGE>(*bufferHandle);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(value.has_value());
+    using T = std::underlying_type_t<BufferUsage>;
+    EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<T>(buffer->info().usage), static_cast<T>(*value));
+}
+
 TEST_P(GraphicsMapperStableCTests, GetAllocationSize) {
     auto buffer = allocateGeneric();
     auto bufferHandle = buffer->import();
diff --git a/health/storage/aidl/vts/functional/OWNERS b/health/storage/aidl/vts/functional/OWNERS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a15ed7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/health/storage/aidl/vts/functional/OWNERS
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Bug component: 30545
+file:platform/hardware/interfaces:/health/aidl/OWNERS
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/identity/support/Android.bp b/identity/support/Android.bp
index 3096fe5..d62d055 100644
--- a/identity/support/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/support/Android.bp
@@ -22,15 +22,8 @@
     default_applicable_licenses: ["hardware_interfaces_license"],
 }
 
-cc_library {
-    name: "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
-    vendor_available: true,
-    srcs: [
-        "src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp",
-    ],
-    export_include_dirs: [
-        "include",
-    ],
+cc_defaults {
+    name: "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-deps",
     shared_libs: [
         "android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
         "libcrypto",
@@ -47,19 +40,36 @@
     ],
 }
 
+cc_library {
+    name: "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
+    vendor_available: true,
+    defaults: [
+        "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-deps",
+    ],
+    srcs: [
+        "src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp",
+    ],
+    export_include_dirs: [
+        "include",
+    ],
+}
+
 cc_test {
     name: "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-test",
     srcs: [
         "tests/IdentityCredentialSupportTest.cpp",
     ],
+    defaults: [
+        "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-deps",
+    ],
     shared_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
         "libcrypto",
         "libbase",
         "libhidlbase",
         "libhardware",
     ],
     static_libs: [
+        "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
         "libcppbor_external",
         "libgmock",
     ],
diff --git a/keymaster/3.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/keymaster/3.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index 554afe7..65b3dfa 100644
--- a/keymaster/3.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/3.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -2617,10 +2617,11 @@
     EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr /* alloc new */, &p, exported.size()));
     RSA_Ptr rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey.get()));
 
-    size_t modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    const BIGNUM* n = RSA_get0_n(rsa.get());
+    size_t modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(n);
     ASSERT_EQ(1024U / 8, modulus_len);
     std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> modulus_buf(new uint8_t[modulus_len]);
-    BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, modulus_buf.get());
+    BN_bn2bin(n, modulus_buf.get());
 
     // The modulus is too big to encrypt.
     string message(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(modulus_buf.get()), modulus_len);
@@ -2632,10 +2633,12 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(message, &result));
 
     // One smaller than the modulus is okay.
-    BN_sub(rsa->n, rsa->n, BN_value_one());
-    modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    BIGNUM_Ptr n_minus_1(BN_new());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(n_minus_1);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(BN_sub(n_minus_1.get(), n, BN_value_one()));
+    modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(n_minus_1.get());
     ASSERT_EQ(1024U / 8, modulus_len);
-    BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, modulus_buf.get());
+    BN_bn2bin(n_minus_1.get(), modulus_buf.get());
     message = string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(modulus_buf.get()), modulus_len);
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(message, &result));
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index b709904..96580c0 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -2449,10 +2449,11 @@
     EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr /* alloc new */, &p, exported.size()));
     RSA_Ptr rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey.get()));
 
-    size_t modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    const BIGNUM* n = RSA_get0_n(rsa.get());
+    size_t modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(n);
     ASSERT_EQ(2048U / 8, modulus_len);
     std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> modulus_buf(new uint8_t[modulus_len]);
-    BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, modulus_buf.get());
+    BN_bn2bin(n, modulus_buf.get());
 
     // The modulus is too big to encrypt.
     string message(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(modulus_buf.get()), modulus_len);
@@ -2464,10 +2465,12 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(message, &result));
 
     // One smaller than the modulus is okay.
-    BN_sub(rsa->n, rsa->n, BN_value_one());
-    modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+    BIGNUM_Ptr n_minus_1(BN_new());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(n_minus_1);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(BN_sub(n_minus_1.get(), n, BN_value_one()));
+    modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(n_minus_1.get());
     ASSERT_EQ(2048U / 8, modulus_len);
-    BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, modulus_buf.get());
+    BN_bn2bin(n_minus_1.get(), modulus_buf.get());
     message = string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(modulus_buf.get()), modulus_len);
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(message, &result));
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/Android.bp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/Android.bp
index 7bc65ff..8b7af11 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/Android.bp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/Android.bp
@@ -23,4 +23,8 @@
         "android.hidl.base@1.0",
     ],
     gen_java: false,
+    apex_available: [
+        "//apex_available:platform",
+        "com.android.neuralnetworks",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.1/Android.bp b/neuralnetworks/1.1/Android.bp
index 772e5e6..b93c80c 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.1/Android.bp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.1/Android.bp
@@ -21,4 +21,8 @@
         "android.hidl.base@1.0",
     ],
     gen_java: false,
+    apex_available: [
+        "//apex_available:platform",
+        "com.android.neuralnetworks",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/Android.bp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/Android.bp
index 2b83d39..63e0f61 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/Android.bp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/Android.bp
@@ -28,4 +28,8 @@
         "android.hidl.safe_union@1.0",
     ],
     gen_java: false,
+    apex_available: [
+        "//apex_available:platform",
+        "com.android.neuralnetworks",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/Android.bp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/Android.bp
index aa8fc39..c343802 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/Android.bp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/Android.bp
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@
         "android.hidl.safe_union@1.0",
     ],
     gen_java: false,
+    apex_available: [
+        "//apex_available:platform",
+        "com.android.neuralnetworks",
+    ],
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
index 82c8a0d..a4fab55 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@
      *
      *   o The HMAC field must validate correctly.
      *
-     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the challenge value contained in the
-     *     BeginResult returned from IKeyMintDevice::begin().
+     *   o The challenge field in the timestamp token must contain the challenge value contained in
+     *     the BeginResult returned from IKeyMintDevice::begin().
      *
      * The resulting secure time value is then used to authenticate the HardwareAuthToken. For the
      * auth token to be valid, all of the following has to be true:
@@ -139,9 +139,6 @@
      *
      *   o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
      *
-     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the challenge value contained in the
-     *     BeginResult returned from IKeyMintDevice::begin().
-     *
      *   o The timestamp in the auth token plus the value of the Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT must be greater
      *     than the provided secure timestamp.
 
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyBlobUpgradeTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyBlobUpgradeTest.cpp
index 6892442..4f72f67 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyBlobUpgradeTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyBlobUpgradeTest.cpp
@@ -36,11 +36,14 @@
 //
 //      adb push keymint-blobs /data/local/tmp/keymint-blobs
 //
-// 5) Run the "*After*" subset of these tests with the `--keyblob_dir <dir>` command-line argument
-//    pointing to the directory with the keyblobs:
+// 5) Run the "*After*" subset of these tests, with the following command-line arguments
+//    `--keyblob_dir <dir>`: pointing to the directory with the keyblobs.
+//    `--expect_upgrade {yes|no}` (Optional): To specify if users expect an upgrade on the keyBlobs,
+//                                            will be "yes" by default.
 //
 //      VtsAidlKeyMintTargetTest --gtest_filter="*KeyBlobUpgradeTest*After*" \
-//                               --keyblob_dir /data/local/tmp/keymint-blobs
+//                               --keyblob_dir /data/local/tmp/keymint-blobs \
+//                               --expect_upgrade {yes|no}
 //
 //    (Note that this skips the `CreateKeyBlobs` test, which would otherwise replace the saved
 //    keyblobs with freshly generated ones.).
@@ -408,12 +411,18 @@
 //
 //     VtsAidlKeyMintTargetTest --gtest_filter="*KeyBlobUpgradeTest.UpgradeKeyBlobsAfter*" \
 //                              --keyblob_dir /data/local/tmp/keymint-blobs
+//                              --expect_upgrade {yes|no}
 //
 // - this replaces the keyblob contents in that directory; if needed, save the upgraded keyblobs
 //   with:
 //      adb pull /data/local/tmp/keymint-blobs/
 TEST_P(KeyBlobUpgradeTest, UpgradeKeyBlobsAfter) {
-    UpgradeKeyBlobs(/* expectUpgrade= */ true);
+    bool expectUpgrade = true;  // this test expects upgrade to happen by default
+    if (expect_upgrade.has_value() && expect_upgrade == false) {
+        std::cout << "Not expecting key upgrade due to --expect_upgrade no\n";
+        expectUpgrade = false;
+    }
+    UpgradeKeyBlobs(expectUpgrade);
 }
 
 // To run this test:
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index a8ea407..b55e609 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@
 bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::arm_deleteAllKeys = false;
 bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations = false;
 std::string KeyMintAidlTestBase::keyblob_dir;
+std::optional<bool> KeyMintAidlTestBase::expect_upgrade = std::nullopt;
 
 uint32_t KeyMintAidlTestBase::boot_patch_level(
         const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
@@ -1605,7 +1606,8 @@
     auto res = property_get("ro.vendor.qti.soc_model", buffer.data(), nullptr);
     if (res <= 0) return false;
 
-    const string allowed_soc_models[] = {"SM8450", "SM8475", "SM8550", "SXR2230P"};
+    const string allowed_soc_models[] = {"SM8450", "SM8475", "SM8550", "SXR2230P",
+                                         "SM4450", "SM7450", "SM6450"};
 
     for (const string model : allowed_soc_models) {
         if (model.compare(buffer.data()) == 0) {
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index 30ac452..415a83e 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@
     // Directory to store/retrieve keyblobs, using subdirectories named for the
     // KeyMint instance in question (e.g. "./default/", "./strongbox/").
     static std::string keyblob_dir;
+    // To specify if users expect an upgrade on the keyBlobs.
+    static std::optional<bool> expect_upgrade;
 
     void SetUp() override;
     void TearDown() override {
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index e99149b..c54a2c9 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -3119,7 +3119,7 @@
  */
 TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, NoUserConfirmation) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                 .RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
+                                                 .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -8718,6 +8718,19 @@
                         std::string(argv[i + 1]);
                 ++i;
             }
+            if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--expect_upgrade") {
+                if (i + 1 >= argc) {
+                    std::cerr << "Missing argument for --expect_upgrade\n";
+                    return 1;
+                }
+                std::string arg = argv[i + 1];
+                aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test::KeyMintAidlTestBase::
+                        expect_upgrade =
+                                arg == "yes"
+                                        ? true
+                                        : (arg == "no" ? false : std::optional<bool>(std::nullopt));
+                ++i;
+            }
         }
     }
     return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
diff --git a/security/rkp/README.md b/security/rkp/README.md
index 7477f80..f8e1d5e 100644
--- a/security/rkp/README.md
+++ b/security/rkp/README.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 ## Objective
 
 Design a HAL to support over-the-air provisioning of certificates for asymmetric
-keys. The HAL must interact effectively with Keystore (and other daemons) and
+keys. The HAL must interact effectively with Keystore (and other services) and
 protect device privacy and security.
 
 Note that this API was originally designed for KeyMint, with the intention that
@@ -20,125 +20,52 @@
 To more securely and reliably get keys and certificates to Android devices, we
 need to create a system where no party outside of the device's secure components
 is responsible for managing private keys. The strategy we've chosen is to
-deliver certificates over the air, using an asymmetric key pair created
-on-device in the factory as a root of trust to create an authenticated, secure
-channel. In this document we refer to this device-unique asymmetric key pair as
-Device Key (DK), its public half DK\_pub, its private half DK\_priv and a Device
-Key Certificate containing DK\_pub is denoted DKC.
+deliver certificates over the air, using an asymmetric key pair derived from a
+unique device secret (UDS) as a root of trust for authenticated requests from
+the secure components. We refer to the public half of this asymmetric key pair
+as UDS\_pub.
 
-In order for the provisioning service to use DK (or a key authenticated by DK),
-it must know whether a given DK\_pub is known and trusted. To prove trust, we
-ask device OEMs to use one of two mechanisms:
+In order for the provisioning service to trust UDS\_pub we ask device OEMs to
+use one of two mechanisms:
 
-1.  (Preferred, recommended) The device OEM extracts DK\_pub from each device it
-    manufactures and uploads the public keys to a backend server.
+1.  (Preferred, recommended) The device OEM extracts the UDS\_pub from each
+    device they manufacture and uploads the public keys to a backend server.
 
-1.  The device OEM signs the DK\_pub to produce DKC and stores it on the device.
-    This has the advantage that they don't need to upload a DK\_pub for every
-    device immediately, but the disadvantage that they have to manage their
-    private signing keys, which means they have to have HSMs, configure and
-    secure them correctly, etc. Some backend providers may also require that the
-    OEM passes a factory security audit, and additionally promises to upload the
-    keys eventually as well.
+1.  The device OEM signs the UDS\_pub and stores the certificates on the device
+    rather than uploading a UDS\_pub for every device immediately. However,
+    there are many disadvantages and costs associated with this option as the
+    OEM will need to pass a security audit of their factory's physical security,
+    CA and HSM configuration, and incident response processes before the OEM's
+    public key is registered with the provisioning server.
 
-Note that in the full elaboration of this plan, DK\_pub is not the key used to
-establish a secure channel. Instead, DK\_pub is just the first public key in a
-chain of public keys which ends with the KeyMint public key, KM\_pub. All keys
-in the chain are device-unique and are joined in a certificate chain called the
-_Boot Certificate Chain_ (BCC), because in phases 2 and 3 of the remote
-provisioning project it is a chain of certificates corresponding to boot phases.
-We speak of the BCC even for phase 1, though in phase 1 it contains only a
-single self-signed DKC. This is described in more depth in the Phases section
-below.
-
-The BCC is authenticated by DK\_pub. To authenticate DK\_pub, we may have
-additional DKCs, from the SoC vendor, the device OEM, or both. Those are not
-part of the BCC but included as optional fields in the certificate request
-structure.
-
-The format of the the DK and BCC is specified within [Open Profile for DICE]
-(https://pigweed.googlesource.com/open-dice/+/HEAD/docs/specification.md).  To
-map phrases within this document to their equivalent terminology in the DICE
-specification, read the terms as follows: the DK corresponds to the UDS-derived
-key pair, DKC corresponds to the UDS certificate, and the BCC entries between
-DK\_pub and KM\_pub correspond to a chain of CDI certificates.
-
-Note: In addition to allowing 32 byte hash values for fields in the BCC payload,
-this spec additionally constrains some of the choices allowed in open-DICE.
-Specifically, these include which entries are required and which are optional in
-the BCC payload, and which algorithms are acceptable for use.
+Note that in the full elaboration of this plan, UDS\_pub is not the key used to
+sign certificate requests. Instead, UDS\_pub is just the first public key in a
+chain of public keys that end the KeyMint public key. All keys in the chain are
+transitively derived from the UDS and joined in a certificate chain following
+the specification of the [Android Profile for DICE](#android-profile-for-dice).
 
 ### Phases
 
-RKP will be deployed in three phases, in terms of managing the root of trust
+RKP will be deployed with phased management of the root of trust
 binding between the device and the backend. To briefly describe them:
 
-* Phase 1: In phase 1 there is only one entry in the BCC; DK_pub and KM_pub are
-  the same key and the certificate is self-signed.
-* Phase 2: This is identical to phase 1, except it leverages the hardware root
-  of trust process described by DICE. Instead of trust being rooted in the TEE,
-  it is now rooted in the ROM by key material blown into fuses which are only
-  accessible to the ROM code.
-* Phase 3: This is identical to Phase 2, except the SoC vendor also does the
-  public key extraction or certification in their facilities, along with the OEM
-  doing it in the factory. This tightens up the "supply chain" and aims to make
-  key upload management more secure.
+* Degenerate DICE (Phase 1): A TEE root of trust key pair is used to sign
+  certificate requests; a single self-signed certificate signifies this phase.
+* DICE (Phase 2): A hardware root of trust key pair is only accessible to ROM
+  code; the boot process follows the [Android Profile for
+  DICE](#android-profile-for-dice).
+* SoC vendor certified DICE (Phase 3): This is identical to Phase 2, except the
+  SoC vendor also does the UDS\_pub extraction or certification in their
+  facilities, along with the OEM doing it in the factory. This tightens up the
+  "supply chain" and aims to make key upload management more secure.
 
 ### Privacy considerations
 
-Because DK and the DKCs are unique, immutable, unspoofable hardware-bound
-identifiers for the device, we must limit access to them to the absolute minimum
-possible. We do this in two ways:
-
-1.  We require KeyMint (which knows the BCC and either knows or at least has the
-ability to use KM\_priv) to refuse to ever divulge the BCC or additional
-signatures in plaintext. Instead, KeyMint requires the caller to provide an
-_Endpoint Encryption Key_ (EEK), with which it will encrypt the data before
-returning it. When provisioning production keys, the EEK must be signed by an
-approved authority whose public key is embedded in KeyMint. When certifying test
-keys, KeyMint will accept any EEK without checking the signature, but will
-encrypt and return a test BCC, rather than the real one.  The result is that
-only an entity in possession of an Trusted EEK (TEEK) private key can discover
-the plaintext of the production BCC.
-1.  Having thus limited access to the public keys to the trusted party only, we
-need to prevent the entity from abusing this unique device identifier.  The
-approach and mechanisms for doing that are beyond the scope of this document
-(they must be addressed in the server design), but generally involve taking care
-to ensure that we do not create any links between user IDs, IP addresses or
-issued certificates and the device pubkey.
-
-Although the details of the mechanisms for preventing the entity from abusing
-the BCC are, as stated, beyond the scope of this document, there is a subtle
-design decision here made specifically to enable abuse prevention. Specifically
-the `CertificateRequest` message sent to the server is (in
-[CDDL](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8610)):
-
-```
-cddl
-CertificateRequest = [
-    DeviceInfo,
-    challenge : bstr,
-    ProtectedData,
-    MacedKeysToSign
-]
-```
-
-The public keys to be attested by the server are in `MacedKeysToSign`, which is
-a COSE\_Mac0 structure, MACed with a key that is found in `ProtectedData`. The
-MAC key is signed by DK\_pub.
-
-This structure allows the backend component that has access to EEK\_priv to
-decrypt `ProtectedData`, validate that the request is from an authorized device,
-check that the request is fresh and verify and extract the MAC key. That backend
-component never sees any data related to the keys to be signed, but can provide
-the MAC key to another backend component that can verify `MacedKeysToSign` and
-proceed to generate the certificates.
-
-In this way, we can partition the provisioning server into one component that
-knows the device identity, as represented by DK\_pub, but never sees the keys to
-be certified or certificates generated, and another component that sees the keys
-to be certified and certificates generated but does not know the device
-identity.
+Because the UDS, CDIs and derived values are unique, immutable, unspoofable
+hardware-bound identifiers for the device, we must limit access to them. We
+require that the values are never exposed in public APIs and are only available
+to the minimum set of system components that require access to them to function
+correctly.
 
 ### Key and cryptographic message formatting
 
@@ -195,24 +122,6 @@
 choice for algorithm implies the implementor should also choose the P256 public
 key group further down in the COSE structure.
 
-### Testability
-
-It's critical that the remote provisioning implementation be testable, to
-minimize the probability that broken devices are sold to end users. To support
-testing, the remote provisioning HAL methods take a `testMode` argument. Keys
-created in test mode are tagged to indicate this. The provisioning server will
-check for the test mode tag and issue test certificates that do not chain back
-to a trusted public key. In test mode, any EEK will be accepted, enabling
-testing tools to use EEKs for which they have the private key so they can
-validate the content of certificate requests. The BCC included in the
-`CertificateRequest` must contain freshly-generated keys, not the real BCC keys.
-
-Keystore (or similar) will need to be able to handle both testMode keys and
-production keys and keep them distinct, generating test certificate requests
-when asked with a test EEK and production certificate requests when asked with a
-production EEK. Likewise, the interface used to instruct Keystore to create keys
-will need to be able to specify whether test or production keys are desired.
-
 ## Design
 
 ### Certificate provisioning flow
@@ -220,25 +129,20 @@
 TODO(jbires): Replace this with a `.png` containing a sequence diagram.  The
 provisioning flow looks something like this:
 
-Provisioner -> Keystore: Prepare N keys
-Keystore -> KeyMint: generateKeyPair
-KeyMint -> KeyMint: Generate  key pair
-KeyMint --> Keystore: key\_blob,pubkey
-Keystore -> Keystore: Store key\_blob,pubkey
-Provisioner -> Server: Get TEEK
-Server --> Provisioner: TEEK
-Provisioner -> Keystore: genCertReq(N, TEEK)
-Keystore -> KeyMint: genCertReq(pubkeys, TEEK)
-KeyMint -> KeyMint: Sign pubkeys & encrypt BCC
-KeyMint --> Keystore: signature, encrypted BCC
-Keystore -> Keystore: Construct cert\_request
-Keystore --> Provisioner: cert\_request
-Provisioner --> Server: cert\_request
-Server -> Server: Validate cert\_request
+rkpd -> KeyMint: generateKeyPair
+KeyMint -> KeyMint: Generate key pair
+KeyMint --> rkpd: key\_blob,pubkey
+rkpd -> rkpd: Store key\_blob,pubkey
+rkpd -> Server: Get challenge
+Server --> rkpd: challenge
+rkpd -> KeyMint: genCertReq(pubkeys, challenge)
+KeyMint -> KeyMint: Sign CSR
+KeyMint --> rkpd: signed CSR
+rkpd --> Server: CSR
+Server -> Server: Validate CSR
 Server -> Server: Generate certificates
-Server --> Provisioner: certificates
-Provisioner -> Keystore: certificates
-Keystore -> Keystore: Store certificates
+Server --> rkpd: certificates
+rkpd -> rkpd: Store certificates
 
 The actors in the above diagram are:
 
@@ -246,10 +150,12 @@
     the uploaded device public keys and is responsible for providing encryption
     keys, decrypting and validating requests, and generating certificates in
     response to requests.
-*   **Provisioner** is an application that is responsible for communicating with
-    the server and all of the system components that require key certificates
-    from the server. It also implements the policy that defines how many key
-    pairs each client should keep in their pool.
+*   **rkpd** is, optionally, a modular system component that is responsible for
+    communicating with the server and all of the system components that require
+    key certificates from the server. It also implements the policy that defines
+    how many key pairs each client should keep in their pool. When a system
+    ships with rkpd as a modular component, it may be updated independently from
+    the rest of the system.
 *   **Keystore** is the [Android keystore
     daemon](https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore) (or, more
     generally, whatever system component manages communications with a
@@ -257,63 +163,50 @@
 *   **KeyMint** is the secure area component that manages cryptographic keys and
     performs attestations (or perhaps some other secure area component).
 
-### `BCC`
+### Android Profile for DICE
 
-The _Boot Certificate Chain_ (BCC) is the chain of certificates that contains
-DK\_pub as well as other often device-unique certificates. The BCC is
-represented as a COSE\_Key containing DK\_pub followed by an array of
-COSE\_Sign1 "certificates" containing public keys and optional additional
-information, ordered from root to leaf, with each certificate signing the next.
-The first certificate in the array is signed by DK\_pub, the last certificate
-has the KeyMint (or whatever) signing key's public key, KM\_pub. In phase 1
-there is only one entry; DK\_pub and KM\_pub are the same key and the
-certificate is self-signed.
+The Android Profile for DICE is based on the [Open Profile for
+DICE](https://pigweed.googlesource.com/open-dice/+/refs/heads/main/docs/specification.md),
+with additional constraints for details that the Open Profile for DICE leaves
+intentionally underspecified. This section describes the differences from the
+Open Profile for DICE.
 
-Each COSE\_Sign1 certificate is a CBOR Web Token (CWT) as described in [RFC
-8392](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8392) with additional fields as described
-in the Open Profile for DICE. Of these additional fields, only the
-_subjectPublicKey_ and _keyUsage_ fields are expected to be present for the
-KM\_pub entry (that is, the last entry) in a BCC, but all fields required by the
-Open Profile for DICE are expected for other entries (each of which corresponds
-to a particular firmware component or boot stage). The CWT fields _iss_ and
-_sub_ identify the issuer and subject of the certificate and are consistent
-along the BCC entries; the issuer of a given entry matches the subject of the
-previous entry.
+#### Algorithms
 
-The BCC is designed to be constructed using the Open Profile for DICE. In this
-case the DK key pair is derived from the UDS as described by that profile and
-all BCC entries before the leaf are CBOR CDI certificates chained from DK\_pub.
-The KM key pair is not part of the derived DICE chain. It is generated (not
-derived) by the KeyMint module, certified by the last key in the DICE chain, and
-added as the leaf BCC entry. The key usage field in this leaf certificate must
-indicate the key is not used to sign certificates. If a UDS certificate is
-available on the device it should appear in the certificate request as the leaf
-of a DKCertChain in AdditionalDKSignatures (see
-[CertificateRequest](#certificaterequest)).
+The choice of algorithm must remain consistent with a given certificate e.g. if
+SHA-256 is used for the code hash then the authority hash, config hash, etc.
+must also use SHA-256.
+
+* UDS and CDI key pairs:
+  * Ed25519 / P-256 / P-384
+* Hash algorithms (digests can be encoded with their natural size and do not
+  need to be the 64-bytes specified by the Open Profile for DICE):
+  * SHA-256 / SHA-384 / SHA-512
+* HKDF with a supported message digest for all key derivation
 
 #### Mode
 
-The Open Profile for DICE specifies four possible modes with the most important
-mode being `normal`. A certificate must only set the mode to `normal` when all
-of the following conditions are met when loading and verifying the software
-component that is being described by the certificate:
+A certificate must only set the mode to `normal` when all of the following
+conditions are met when loading and verifying the software component that is
+being described by the certificate:
 
-*   verified boot with anti-rollback protection is enabled
-*   only the verified boot authorities for production images are enabled
-*   debug ports, fuses or other debug facilities are disabled
-*   device booted software from the normal primary source e.g. internal flash
+* verified boot with anti-rollback protection is enabled
+* only the verified boot authorities for production images are enabled
+* debug ports, fuses, or other debug facilities are disabled
+* device booted software from the normal primary source e.g. internal flash
 
-If any of these conditions are not met then it is recommended to explicitly
-acknowledge this fact by using the `debug` mode. The mode should never be `not
-configured`.
+The mode should never be `not configured`.
+
+Every certificate in the DICE chain will need to be have the `normal` mode in
+order to be provisioned with production certificates by RKP.
 
 #### Configuration descriptor
 
-The Open Profile for DICE allows for an arbitrary configuration descriptor. For
-BCC entries, this configuration descriptor is a CBOR map with the following
-optional fields. If no fields are relevant, an empty map should be encoded.
-Additional implementation-specific fields may be added using key values not in
-the range \[-70000, -70999\] (these are reserved for future additions here).
+The configuration descriptor is a CBOR map with the following optional fields.
+If no fields are relevant, an empty map should be encoded. The key value range
+\[-70000, -70999\] is reserved for the Android Profile for DICE.
+Implementation-specific fields may be added using key values outside of the
+reserved range.
 
 ```
 | Name              | Key    | Value type | Meaning                           |
@@ -324,44 +217,13 @@
 :                   :        :            : boot stage                        :
 | Resettable        | -70004 | null       | If present, key changes on factory|
 :                   :        :            : reset                             :
+| Security version  | -70005 | uint       | Machine-comparable, monotonically |
+:                   :        :            : increasing version of the firmware:
+:                   :        :            : component / boot stage where a    :
+:                   :        :            : greater value indicates a newer   :
+:                   :        :            : version                           :
 ```
 
-Please see
-[ProtectedData.aidl](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:hardware/interfaces/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl)
-for a full CDDL definition of the BCC.
-
-### `CertificateRequest`
-
-The full CBOR message that will be sent to the server to request certificates
-is:
-
-```cddl
-CertificateRequest = [
-    DeviceInfo,
-    challenge : bstr,       // Provided by the server
-    ProtectedData,          // See ProtectedData.aidl
-    MacedKeysToSign         // See IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
-]
-
-DeviceInfo = [
-    VerifiedDeviceInfo,     // See DeviceInfo.aidl
-    UnverifiedDeviceInfo
-]
-
-// Unverified info is anything provided by the HLOS. Subject to change out of
-// step with the HAL.
-UnverifiedDeviceInfo = {
-    ? "fingerprint" : tstr,
-}
-
-```
-
-It will be the responsibility of Keystore and the Provisioner to construct the
-`CertificateRequest`. The HAL provides a method to generate the elements that
-need to be constructed on the secure side, which are the tag field of
-`MacedKeysToSign`, `VerifiedDeviceInfo`, and the ciphertext field of
-`ProtectedData`.
-
 ### HAL
 
 The remote provisioning HAL provides a simple interface that can be implemented
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index 2a4cba1..b231dae 100644
--- a/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -422,11 +422,12 @@
      *     ;       described above.
      *     -4670545 : bstr,                         ; Code Hash
      *     ? -4670546 : bstr,                       ; Code Descriptor
-     *     ? -4670547 : bstr,                       ; Configuration Hash
+     *     -4670547 : bstr,                         ; Configuration Hash
      *     -4670548 : bstr .cbor {                  ; Configuration Descriptor
      *         ? -70002 : tstr,                         ; Component name
      *         ? -70003 : int / tstr,                   ; Component version
      *         ? -70004 : null,                         ; Resettable
+     *         ? -70005 : uint,                         ; Security version
      *     },
      *     -4670549 : bstr,                         ; Authority Hash
      *     ? -4670550 : bstr,                       ; Authority Descriptor
diff --git a/staging/threadnetwork/aidl/default/thread_chip.cpp b/staging/threadnetwork/aidl/default/thread_chip.cpp
index 38abad4..9bd729d 100644
--- a/staging/threadnetwork/aidl/default/thread_chip.cpp
+++ b/staging/threadnetwork/aidl/default/thread_chip.cpp
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@
 }
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus ThreadChip::reset() {
-    mInterface.OnRcpReset();
+    mInterface.HardwareReset();
     ALOGI("reset()");
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
diff --git a/tetheroffload/control/1.1/Android.bp b/tetheroffload/control/1.1/Android.bp
index 7871c2c..0daa90e 100644
--- a/tetheroffload/control/1.1/Android.bp
+++ b/tetheroffload/control/1.1/Android.bp
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
         "android.hidl.base@1.0",
     ],
     apex_available: [
-        "//apex_available:platform", // Used by InProcessTethering
+        "//apex_available:platform",
         "com.android.tethering",
     ],
     gen_java: true,
diff --git a/usb/OWNERS b/usb/OWNERS
index 2b1d34d..3611b4d 100644
--- a/usb/OWNERS
+++ b/usb/OWNERS
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 # Bug component: 175220
 
+aprasath@google.com
+kumarashishg@google.com
+sarup@google.com
+anothermark@google.com
 albertccwang@google.com
 badhri@google.com
diff --git a/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs b/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs
index 7c2c300..cf32694 100644
--- a/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs
+++ b/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use binder::{Result, Strong};
 
-use tokio::fs::File;
-use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
+use tokio::fs::{self, File};
+use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
 use tokio::sync::Mutex;
 
 use std::os::fd::AsRawFd;
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
         callbacks: Strong<dyn IUwbClientCallback>,
         #[allow(dead_code)]
         tasks: tokio::task::JoinSet<()>,
-        write: File,
     },
 }
 
@@ -65,17 +64,11 @@
     async fn open(&self, callbacks: &Strong<dyn IUwbClientCallback>) -> Result<()> {
         log::debug!("open: {:?}", &self.path);
 
-        let serial = File::open(&self.path)
+        let mut serial = File::open(&self.path)
             .await
             .and_then(makeraw)
             .map_err(|_| binder::StatusCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR)?;
 
-        let mut read = serial
-            .try_clone()
-            .await
-            .map_err(|_| binder::StatusCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR)?;
-        let write = serial;
-
         let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
 
         if let State::Closed = *state {
@@ -88,14 +81,16 @@
                     const UWB_HEADER_SIZE: usize = 4;
 
                     let mut buffer = vec![0; UWB_HEADER_SIZE];
-                    read.read_exact(&mut buffer[0..UWB_HEADER_SIZE])
+                    serial
+                        .read_exact(&mut buffer[0..UWB_HEADER_SIZE])
                         .await
                         .unwrap();
 
                     let length = buffer[3] as usize + UWB_HEADER_SIZE;
 
                     buffer.resize(length, 0);
-                    read.read_exact(&mut buffer[UWB_HEADER_SIZE..length])
+                    serial
+                        .read_exact(&mut buffer[UWB_HEADER_SIZE..length])
                         .await
                         .unwrap();
 
@@ -108,7 +103,6 @@
             *state = State::Opened {
                 callbacks: callbacks.clone(),
                 tasks,
-                write,
             };
 
             Ok(())
@@ -155,11 +149,10 @@
     async fn sendUciMessage(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<i32> {
         log::debug!("sendUciMessage");
 
-        if let State::Opened { write, .. } = &mut *self.state.lock().await {
-            write
-                .write(data)
+        if let State::Opened { .. } = &mut *self.state.lock().await {
+            fs::write(&self.path, data)
                 .await
-                .map(|written| written as i32)
+                .map(|_| data.len() as i32)
                 .map_err(|_| binder::StatusCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR.into())
         } else {
             Err(binder::ExceptionCode::ILLEGAL_STATE.into())