Merge "Allow device properties tags for attestation"
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/manifest.vehicle.xml b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/manifest.vehicle.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..832b302
--- /dev/null
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/manifest.vehicle.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<manifest version="1.0" type="device" target-level="3">
+ <hal format="hidl">
+ <name>android.hardware.automotive.vehicle</name>
+ <transport>hwbinder</transport>
+ <version>2.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IVehicle</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+</manifest>
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/CipherSuite.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/CipherSuite.aidl
index 20b02a8..f38134b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/CipherSuite.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/CipherSuite.aidl
@@ -24,13 +24,15 @@
enum CipherSuite {
/**
* Specifies that the cipher suite that will be used to secure communications between the reader
- * is:
+ * and the prover is using the following primitives
*
- * - ECDHE with HKDF-SHA-256 for key agreement.
- * - AES-256 with GCM block mode for authenticated encryption (nonces are incremented by
- * one for every message).
- * - ECDSA with SHA-256 for signing (used for signing session transcripts to defeat
- * man-in-the-middle attacks), signing keys are not ephemeral.
+ * - ECKA-DH (Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Algorithm - Diffie-Hellman, see BSI TR-03111)
+ * - HKDF-SHA-256 (see RFC 5869)
+ * - AES-256-GCM (see NIST SP 800-38D)
+ * - HMAC-SHA-256 (see RFC 2104)
+ *
+ * The exact way these primitives are combined to derive the session key is specified in
+ * section 9.2.1.4 of ISO/IEC 18013-5 (see description of cipher suite '1').
*
* At present this is the only supported cipher suite and it is mandatory for all
* implementations to support it.
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index cc14271..7d14f03 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
* with the reader. The reason for generating the key pair in the secure environment is so that
* the secure environment knows what public key to expect to find in the session transcript.
*
+ * The generated key must be an EC key using the P-256 curve.
+ *
* This method may only be called once per instance. If called more than once, STATUS_FAILED
* will be returned.
*
@@ -61,7 +63,8 @@
* This method may only be called once per instance. If called more than once, STATUS_FAILED
* will be returned.
*
- * @param publicKey contains the reader's ephemeral public key, in uncompressed form.
+ * @param publicKey contains the reader's ephemeral public key, in uncompressed
+ * form (e.g. 0x04 || X || Y).
*/
void setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(in byte[] publicKey);
@@ -82,9 +85,9 @@
* This method be called after createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(),
* createAuthChallenge() and before startRetrieveEntry(). This method call is followed by
* multiple calls of startRetrieveEntryValue(), retrieveEntryValue(), and finally
- * finishRetrieval().This whole process is called a "credential presentation".
+ * finishRetrieval().
*
- * It is permissible to perform multiple credential presentations using the same instance (e.g.
+ * It is permissible to perform data retrievals multiple times using the same instance (e.g.
* startRetrieval(), then multiple calls of startRetrieveEntryValue(), retrieveEntryValue(),
* then finally finishRetrieval()) but if this is done, the sessionTranscript parameter
* must be identical for each startRetrieval() invocation. If this is not the case, this call
@@ -148,6 +151,8 @@
* EReaderKeyBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor EReaderKey.Pub)
* ItemsRequestBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor ItemsRequest)
*
+ * EReaderKey.Pub = COSE_Key ; Ephemeral public key provided by reader
+ *
* The public key corresponding to the key used to made signature, can be found in the
* 'x5chain' unprotected header element of the COSE_Sign1 structure (as as described
* in 'draft-ietf-cose-x509-04'). There will be at least one certificate in said element
@@ -220,13 +225,11 @@
*
* It is permissible to keep retrieving values if an access control check fails.
*
- * @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013"
+ * @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013.5.1"
*
- * @param name is the name of the element.
+ * @param name is the name of the element, e.g. "driving_privileges".
*
- * @param entrySize is the size of the entry value, if it's a text string or a byte string.
- * It must be zero if the entry value is an integer or boolean. If this requirement
- * is not met the call fails with STATUS_INVALID_DATA.
+ * @param entrySize is the size of the entry value encoded in CBOR.
*
* @param accessControlProfileIds specifies the set of access control profiles that can
* authorize access to the provisioned element. If an identifier of a profile
@@ -260,14 +263,12 @@
* @param out mac is empty if signingKeyBlob or the sessionTranscript passed to
* startRetrieval() is empty. Otherwise it is a COSE_Mac0 with empty payload
* and the detached content is set to DeviceAuthentication as defined below.
- * The key used for the MAC operation is EMacKey and is derived as follows:
- *
- * KDF(ECDH(SDeviceKey.Priv, EReaderKey.Pub))
- *
- * where SDeviceKey.Priv is the key identified by signingKeyBlob. The KDF
- * and ECDH functions shall be the same as the ciphersuite selected and
- * passed to IIdentityStore.getCredential(). The EMacKey shall be derived
- * using a salt of 0x00.
+ * This code is produced by using the key agreement and key derivation function
+ * from the ciphersuite with the authentication private key and the reader
+ * ephemeral public key to compute a shared message authentication code (MAC)
+ * key, then using the MAC function from the ciphersuite to compute a MAC of
+ * the authenticated data. See section 9.2.3.5 of ISO/IEC 18013-5 for details
+ * of this operation.
*
* DeviceAuthentication = [
* "DeviceAuthentication",
@@ -308,6 +309,34 @@
/**
* Generate a key pair to be used for signing session data and retrieved data items.
*
+ * The generated key must be an EC key using the P-256 curve.
+ *
+ * This method shall return just a single X.509 certificate which is signed by CredentialKey.
+ * When combined with the certificate chain returned at provisioning time by
+ * getAttestationCertificate() on IWritableIdentityCredential (for the credential key), this
+ * forms a chain all the way from the root of trust to the generated key.
+ *
+ * The public part of a signing key is usually included in issuer-signed data and is
+ * used for anti-cloning purposes or as a mechanism for the issuer to attest to data
+ * generated on the device.
+ *
+ * The following non-optional fields for the X.509 certificate shall be set as follows:
+ *
+ * - version: INTEGER 2 (means v3 certificate).
+ *
+ * - serialNumber: INTEGER 1 (fixed value: same on all certs).
+ *
+ * - signature: must be set to ECDSA.
+ *
+ * - subject: CN shall be set to "Android Identity Credential Authentication Key".
+ *
+ * - issuer: shall be set to "credentialStoreName (credentialStoreAuthorName)" using the
+ * values returned in HardwareInformation.
+ *
+ * - validity: should be from current time and one year in the future.
+ *
+ * - subjectPublicKeyInfo: must contain attested public key.
+ *
* @param out signingKeyBlob contains an encrypted copy of the newly-generated private
* signing key.
*
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.aidl
index 23cb1b7..bd664e8 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.aidl
@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@
*
* - For each namespase, a set of name/value pairs, each with an associated set of access control
* profile IDs. Names are UTF-8 strings of up to 256 bytes in length (most should be much
- * shorter). Values stored must be encoed as valid CBOR (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7049) and
- * the encoeded size is is limited to at most 512 KiB.
+ * shorter). Values stored must be encoded as CBOR (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7049) and
+ * the encoded size is is limited to at most 512 KiB.
*
* - A set of access control profiles, each with a profile ID and a specification of the
* conditions which satisfy the profile's requirements.
@@ -108,12 +108,13 @@
@VintfStability
interface IIdentityCredentialStore {
/**
- * Success.
+ * Success. This is never returned but included for completeness and for use by code
+ * using these statuses for internal use.
*/
const int STATUS_OK = 0;
/**
- * The operation failed. This is used as a generic catch-all for errors that don't belong
+ * The operation failed. This is used as a generic catch-all for errors that don't belong
* in other categories, including memory/resource allocation failures and I/O errors.
*/
const int STATUS_FAILED = 1;
@@ -124,7 +125,7 @@
const int STATUS_CIPHER_SUITE_NOT_SUPPORTED = 2;
/**
- * The passed data was invalid. This is a generic catch all for errors that don't belong
+ * The passed data was invalid. This is a generic catch all for errors that don't belong
* in other categories related to parameter validation.
*/
const int STATUS_INVALID_DATA = 3;
@@ -186,16 +187,19 @@
HardwareInformation getHardwareInformation();
/**
- * createCredential creates a new Credential. When a Credential is created, two cryptographic
+ * createCredential creates a new credential. When a credential is created, two cryptographic
* keys are created: StorageKey, an AES key used to secure the externalized Credential
- * contents, and CredentialKeyPair, an EC key pair used to authenticate the store to the IA. In
- * addition, all of the Credential data content is imported and a certificate for the
- * CredentialKeyPair and a signature produced with the CredentialKeyPair are created. These
+ * contents, and CredentialKey, an EC key pair used to authenticate the store to the IA.
+ *
+ * CredentialKey must be an EC key using the P-256 curve.
+ *
+ * In addition, all of the Credential data content is imported and a certificate for the
+ * CredentialKey and a signature produced with the CredentialKey are created. These
* latter values may be checked by an issuing authority to verify that the data was imported
* into secure hardware and that it was imported unmodified.
*
* @param docType is an optional name (may be an empty string) that identifies the type of
- * credential being created, e.g. "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl" (the doc type of the ISO
+ * credential being created, e.g. "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL" (the doc type of the ISO
* driving license standard).
*
* @param testCredential indicates if this is a test store. Test credentials must use an
@@ -213,15 +217,8 @@
* Credential.
*
* The cipher suite used to communicate with the remote verifier must also be specified. Currently
- * only a single cipher-suite is supported and the details of this are as follow:
- *
- * - ECDHE with HKDF-SHA-256 for key agreement.
- * - AES-256 with GCM block mode for authenticated encryption (nonces are incremented by one
- * for every message).
- * - ECDSA with SHA-256 for signing (used for signing session transcripts to defeat
- * man-in-the-middle attacks), signing keys are not ephemeral.
- *
- * Support for other cipher suites may be added in a future version of this HAL.
+ * only a single cipher-suite is supported. Support for other cipher suites may be added in a
+ * future version of this HAL.
*
* This method fails with STATUS_INVALID_DATA if the passed in credentialData cannot be
* decoded or decrypted.
@@ -233,7 +230,7 @@
* return argument of the same name in finishAddingEntries(), in
* IWritableIdentityCredential.
*
- * @return an IIdentityCredential HIDL interface that provides operations on the Credential.
+ * @return an IIdentityCredential interface that provides operations on the Credential.
*/
IIdentityCredential getCredential(in CipherSuite cipherSuite, in byte[] credentialData);
}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
index 483b0c7..9673821 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -60,12 +60,50 @@
* attestationApplicationId.
*
* - The teeEnforced field in the attestation extension must include
- * Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY. This tag indicates that the key is an Identity
- * Credential key (which can only sign/MAC very specific messages) and not an Android
- * Keystore key (which can be used to sign/MAC anything).
+ *
+ * - Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY which indicates that the key is an Identity
+ * Credential key (which can only sign/MAC very specific messages) and not an Android
+ * Keystore key (which can be used to sign/MAC anything).
+ *
+ * - Tag::PURPOSE must be set to SIGN
+ *
+ * - Tag::KEY_SIZE must be set to the appropriate key size, in bits (e.g. 256)
+ *
+ * - Tag::ALGORITHM must be set to EC
+ *
+ * - Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED must be set
+ *
+ * - Tag::DIGEST must be set to SHA_2_256
+ *
+ * - Tag::EC_CURVE must be set to P_256
*
* Additional authorizations may be needed in the softwareEnforced and teeEnforced
- * fields - the above is not an exhaustive list.
+ * fields - the above is not an exhaustive list. Specifically, authorizations containing
+ * information about the root of trust, OS version, verified boot state, and so on should
+ * be included.
+ *
+ * Since the chain is required to be generated using Keymaster Attestation, the returned
+ * certificate chain has the following properties:
+ *
+ * - The certificate chain is of at least length three.
+ *
+ * - The root of trust is the same as for Keymaster Attestation. This is usually
+ * a certificate owned by Google but depending on the specific Android device it may
+ * be another certificate.
+ *
+ * As with any user of attestation, the Issuing Authority (as a relying party) wishing
+ * to issue a credential to a device using these APIs, must carefully examine the
+ * returned certificate chain for all of the above (and more). In particular, the Issuing
+ * Authority should check the root of trust, verified boot state, patch level,
+ * application id, etc.
+ *
+ * This all depends on the needs of the Issuing Authority and the kind of credential but
+ * in general an Issuing Authority should never issue a credential to a device without
+ * verified boot enabled, to an unrecognized application, or if it appears the device
+ * hasn't been updated for a long time.
+ *
+ * See https://github.com/google/android-key-attestation for an example of how to
+ * examine attestations generated from Android devices.
*
* @param attestationApplicationId is the DER encoded value to be stored
* in Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID. This schema is described in
@@ -105,7 +143,7 @@
* be used to reference the profile. If this is not satisfied the call fails with
* STATUS_INVALID_DATA.
*
- * @param readerCertificate if non-empty, specifies a X.509 certificate (or chain of
+ * @param readerCertificate if non-empty, specifies a single X.509 certificate (not a chain of
* certificates) that must be used to authenticate requests (see the readerSignature
* parameter in IIdentityCredential.startRetrieval).
*
@@ -142,7 +180,7 @@
* @param accessControlProfileIds specifies the set of access control profiles that can
* authorize access to the provisioned element.
*
- * @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013"
+ * @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013.5.1"
*
* @param name is the name of the element.
*
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/SecureAccessControlProfile.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/SecureAccessControlProfile.aidl
index 01d312d..13f0c6d 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/SecureAccessControlProfile.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/SecureAccessControlProfile.aidl
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
/**
* readerCertificate, if non-empty, specifies a single X.509 certificate (not a chain
* of certificates) that must be used to authenticate requests. For details about how
- * this is done, see the readerSignature paremter of IIdentityCredential.startRetrieval.
+ * this is done, see the readerSignature parameter of IIdentityCredential.startRetrieval.
*/
Certificate readerCertificate;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/vts/functional/ValidateModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/vts/functional/ValidateModel.cpp
index 4c0100e..e590fda 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/vts/functional/ValidateModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/vts/functional/ValidateModel.cpp
@@ -535,13 +535,18 @@
removeValueAndDecrementGreaterValues(&model->main.outputIndexes, index);
}
-static bool removeOperandSkip(size_t operand, const Model& model) {
+static bool removeOperandSkip(size_t operandIndex, const Model& model) {
+ const Operand& operand = model.main.operands[operandIndex];
+ if (operand.numberOfConsumers == 0) {
+ // Removing an unused operand has no effect.
+ return true;
+ }
for (const Operation& operation : model.main.operations) {
// Skip removeOperandTest for the following operations.
// - SPLIT's outputs are not checked during prepareModel.
if (operation.type == OperationType::SPLIT) {
- for (const size_t outOprand : operation.outputs) {
- if (operand == outOprand) {
+ for (const size_t index : operation.outputs) {
+ if (index == operandIndex) {
return true;
}
}
@@ -556,8 +561,8 @@
operation.type == OperationType::UNIDIRECTIONAL_SEQUENCE_RNN ||
operation.type == OperationType::BIDIRECTIONAL_SEQUENCE_LSTM ||
operation.type == OperationType::BIDIRECTIONAL_SEQUENCE_RNN) {
- for (const size_t outOprand : operation.outputs) {
- if (operand == outOprand) {
+ for (const size_t index : operation.outputs) {
+ if (index == operandIndex) {
return true;
}
}
diff --git a/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 4765fa2..7755ef5 100644
--- a/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/sensors/2.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -33,5 +33,9 @@
"libfmq",
"VtsHalSensorsTargetTestUtils",
],
+ test_suites: [
+ "general-tests",
+ "vts",
+ ],
}
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/default/Vibrator.cpp b/vibrator/aidl/default/Vibrator.cpp
index 9236b95..1a8fd3b 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/default/Vibrator.cpp
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/default/Vibrator.cpp
@@ -163,6 +163,10 @@
}
LOG(INFO) << "triggering primitive " << static_cast<int>(e.primitive) << " @ scale "
<< e.scale;
+
+ int32_t durationMs;
+ getPrimitiveDuration(e.primitive, &durationMs);
+ usleep(durationMs * 1000);
}
if (callback != nullptr) {
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
index 411fe7a..9a1b660 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
using android::hardware::vibrator::Effect;
using android::hardware::vibrator::EffectStrength;
using android::hardware::vibrator::IVibrator;
+using std::chrono::high_resolution_clock;
const std::vector<Effect> kEffects{android::enum_range<Effect>().begin(),
android::enum_range<Effect>().end()};
@@ -381,26 +382,52 @@
}
TEST_P(VibratorAidl, ComposeCallback) {
+ constexpr std::chrono::milliseconds allowedLatency{10};
+
if (capabilities & IVibrator::CAP_COMPOSE_EFFECTS) {
- std::promise<void> completionPromise;
- std::future<void> completionFuture{completionPromise.get_future()};
- sp<CompletionCallback> callback =
- new CompletionCallback([&completionPromise] { completionPromise.set_value(); });
- CompositePrimitive primitive = CompositePrimitive::CLICK;
- CompositeEffect effect;
- std::vector<CompositeEffect> composite;
- int32_t duration;
+ std::vector<CompositePrimitive> supported;
- effect.delayMs = 0;
- effect.primitive = primitive;
- effect.scale = 1.0f;
- composite.emplace_back(effect);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(vibrator->getSupportedPrimitives(&supported).isOk());
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_NONE,
- vibrator->getPrimitiveDuration(primitive, &duration).exceptionCode());
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_NONE, vibrator->compose(composite, callback).exceptionCode());
- EXPECT_EQ(completionFuture.wait_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(duration * 2)),
- std::future_status::ready);
+ for (auto primitive : supported) {
+ if (primitive == CompositePrimitive::NOOP) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ std::promise<void> completionPromise;
+ std::future<void> completionFuture{completionPromise.get_future()};
+ sp<CompletionCallback> callback =
+ new CompletionCallback([&completionPromise] { completionPromise.set_value(); });
+ CompositeEffect effect;
+ std::vector<CompositeEffect> composite;
+ int32_t durationMs;
+ std::chrono::milliseconds duration;
+ std::chrono::time_point<high_resolution_clock> start, end;
+ std::chrono::milliseconds elapsed;
+
+ effect.delayMs = 0;
+ effect.primitive = primitive;
+ effect.scale = 1.0f;
+ composite.emplace_back(effect);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_NONE,
+ vibrator->getPrimitiveDuration(primitive, &durationMs).exceptionCode())
+ << toString(primitive);
+ duration = std::chrono::milliseconds(durationMs);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_NONE, vibrator->compose(composite, callback).exceptionCode())
+ << toString(primitive);
+ start = high_resolution_clock::now();
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(completionFuture.wait_for(duration + allowedLatency),
+ std::future_status::ready)
+ << toString(primitive);
+ end = high_resolution_clock::now();
+
+ elapsed = std::chrono::duration_cast<std::chrono::milliseconds>(end - start);
+ EXPECT_LE(elapsed.count(), (duration + allowedLatency).count()) << toString(primitive);
+ EXPECT_GE(elapsed.count(), (duration - allowedLatency).count()) << toString(primitive);
+ }
}
}