diff --git a/security/rkp/TEST_MAPPING b/security/rkp/TEST_MAPPING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ce5e9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/rkp/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+  "presubmit": [
+    {
+      "name": "VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest"
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c2b6e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+//
+// Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+//
+
+package {
+    // See: http://go/android-license-faq
+    default_applicable_licenses: ["hardware_interfaces_license"],
+}
+
+cc_test {
+    name: "VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest",
+    defaults: [
+        "keymint_vts_defaults",
+    ],
+    srcs: [
+        "VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp",
+    ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "libbinder_ndk",
+        "libcrypto",
+    ],
+    static_libs: [
+        "libcppbor_external",
+        "libgmock_ndk",
+        "libkeymint_vts_test_utils",
+    ],
+    test_config: "VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.xml",
+    test_suites: [
+        "general-tests",
+        "vts",
+    ],
+}
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/AndroidTest.xml b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/AndroidTest.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2375bde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/AndroidTest.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!-- Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+
+     Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+     you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+     You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+          http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+     Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+     distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+     WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+     See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+     limitations under the License.
+-->
+<configuration description="Runs VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest.">
+    <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct" />
+    <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct-native" />
+
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer"/>
+
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
+        <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
+        <option name="push-file"
+            key="VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest"
+            value="/data/local/tmp/VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest" />
+    </target_preparer>
+
+    <test class="com.android.tradefed.testtype.GTest" >
+        <option name="native-test-device-path" value="/data/local/tmp" />
+        <option name="module-name" value="VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest" />
+        <option name="native-test-timeout" value="900000"/> <!-- 15 minutes -->
+    </test>
+</configuration>
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb1c692
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,786 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <string>
+#define LOG_TAG "VtsRemotelyProvisionableComponentTests"
+
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
+#include <android/binder_manager.h>
+#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
+#include <cppbor_parse.h>
+#include <gmock/gmock.h>
+#include <keymaster/cppcose/cppcose.h>
+#include <keymaster/keymaster_configuration.h>
+#include <keymint_support/authorization_set.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
+#include <optional>
+#include <set>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
+namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test {
+
+using ::std::string;
+using ::std::vector;
+
+namespace {
+
+constexpr int32_t VERSION_WITH_UNIQUE_ID_SUPPORT = 2;
+constexpr int32_t VERSION_WITHOUT_TEST_MODE = 3;
+
+#define INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(name)                                         \
+    GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(name);                             \
+    INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(                                                        \
+            PerInstance, name,                                                       \
+            testing::ValuesIn(VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests::build_params()), \
+            ::android::PrintInstanceNameToString)
+
+using ::android::sp;
+using bytevec = std::vector<uint8_t>;
+using testing::MatchesRegex;
+using namespace remote_prov;
+using namespace keymaster;
+
+bytevec string_to_bytevec(const char* s) {
+    const uint8_t* p = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(s);
+    return bytevec(p, p + strlen(s));
+}
+
+ErrMsgOr<MacedPublicKey> corrupt_maced_key(const MacedPublicKey& macedPubKey) {
+    auto [coseMac0, _, mac0ParseErr] = cppbor::parse(macedPubKey.macedKey);
+    if (!coseMac0 || coseMac0->asArray()->size() != kCoseMac0EntryCount) {
+        return "COSE Mac0 parse failed";
+    }
+    auto protParams = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
+    auto unprotParams = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
+    auto payload = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
+    auto tag = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
+    if (!protParams || !unprotParams || !payload || !tag) {
+        return "Invalid COSE_Sign1: missing content";
+    }
+    auto corruptMac0 = cppbor::Array();
+    corruptMac0.add(protParams->clone());
+    corruptMac0.add(unprotParams->clone());
+    corruptMac0.add(payload->clone());
+    vector<uint8_t> tagData = tag->value();
+    tagData[0] ^= 0x08;
+    tagData[tagData.size() - 1] ^= 0x80;
+    corruptMac0.add(cppbor::Bstr(tagData));
+
+    return MacedPublicKey{corruptMac0.encode()};
+}
+
+ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> corrupt_sig(const cppbor::Array* coseSign1) {
+    if (coseSign1->size() != kCoseSign1EntryCount) {
+        return "Invalid COSE_Sign1, wrong entry count";
+    }
+    const cppbor::Bstr* protectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
+    const cppbor::Map* unprotectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
+    const cppbor::Bstr* payload = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Payload)->asBstr();
+    const cppbor::Bstr* signature = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Signature)->asBstr();
+    if (!protectedParams || !unprotectedParams || !payload || !signature) {
+        return "Invalid COSE_Sign1: missing content";
+    }
+
+    auto corruptSig = cppbor::Array();
+    corruptSig.add(protectedParams->clone());
+    corruptSig.add(unprotectedParams->clone());
+    corruptSig.add(payload->clone());
+    vector<uint8_t> sigData = signature->value();
+    sigData[0] ^= 0x08;
+    corruptSig.add(cppbor::Bstr(sigData));
+
+    return std::move(corruptSig);
+}
+
+ErrMsgOr<bytevec> corrupt_sig_chain(const bytevec& encodedEekChain, int which) {
+    auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(encodedEekChain);
+    if (!chain || !chain->asArray()) {
+        return "EekChain parse failed";
+    }
+
+    cppbor::Array* eekChain = chain->asArray();
+    if (which >= eekChain->size()) {
+        return "selected sig out of range";
+    }
+    auto corruptChain = cppbor::Array();
+
+    for (int ii = 0; ii < eekChain->size(); ++ii) {
+        if (ii == which) {
+            auto sig = corrupt_sig(eekChain->get(which)->asArray());
+            if (!sig) {
+                return "Failed to build corrupted signature" + sig.moveMessage();
+            }
+            corruptChain.add(sig.moveValue());
+        } else {
+            corruptChain.add(eekChain->get(ii)->clone());
+        }
+    }
+    return corruptChain.encode();
+}
+
+string device_suffix(const string& name) {
+    size_t pos = name.find('/');
+    if (pos == string::npos) {
+        return name;
+    }
+    return name.substr(pos + 1);
+}
+
+bool matching_keymint_device(const string& rp_name, std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>* keyMint) {
+    string rp_suffix = device_suffix(rp_name);
+
+    vector<string> km_names = ::android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IKeyMintDevice::descriptor);
+    for (const string& km_name : km_names) {
+        // If the suffix of the KeyMint instance equals the suffix of the
+        // RemotelyProvisionedComponent instance, assume they match.
+        if (device_suffix(km_name) == rp_suffix && AServiceManager_isDeclared(km_name.c_str())) {
+            ::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_waitForService(km_name.c_str()));
+            *keyMint = IKeyMintDevice::fromBinder(binder);
+            return true;
+        }
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+class VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
+  public:
+    virtual void SetUp() override {
+        if (AServiceManager_isDeclared(GetParam().c_str())) {
+            ::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_waitForService(GetParam().c_str()));
+            provisionable_ = IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::fromBinder(binder);
+        }
+        ASSERT_NE(provisionable_, nullptr);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(provisionable_->getHardwareInfo(&rpcHardwareInfo).isOk());
+    }
+
+    static vector<string> build_params() {
+        auto params = ::android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::descriptor);
+        return params;
+    }
+
+  protected:
+    std::shared_ptr<IRemotelyProvisionedComponent> provisionable_;
+    RpcHardwareInfo rpcHardwareInfo;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Verify that every implementation reports a different unique id.
+ */
+TEST(NonParameterizedTests, eachRpcHasAUniqueId) {
+    std::set<std::string> uniqueIds;
+    for (auto hal : ::android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::descriptor)) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(AServiceManager_isDeclared(hal.c_str()));
+        ::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_waitForService(hal.c_str()));
+        std::shared_ptr<IRemotelyProvisionedComponent> rpc =
+                IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::fromBinder(binder);
+        ASSERT_NE(rpc, nullptr);
+
+        RpcHardwareInfo hwInfo;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(rpc->getHardwareInfo(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+        if (hwInfo.versionNumber >= VERSION_WITH_UNIQUE_ID_SUPPORT) {
+            ASSERT_TRUE(hwInfo.uniqueId);
+            auto [_, wasInserted] = uniqueIds.insert(*hwInfo.uniqueId);
+            EXPECT_TRUE(wasInserted);
+        } else {
+            ASSERT_FALSE(hwInfo.uniqueId);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+using GetHardwareInfoTests = VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests;
+
+INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(GetHardwareInfoTests);
+
+/**
+ * Verify that a valid curve is reported by the implementation.
+ */
+TEST_P(GetHardwareInfoTests, supportsValidCurve) {
+    RpcHardwareInfo hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(provisionable_->getHardwareInfo(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+    const std::set<int> validCurves = {RpcHardwareInfo::CURVE_P256, RpcHardwareInfo::CURVE_25519};
+    ASSERT_EQ(validCurves.count(hwInfo.supportedEekCurve), 1)
+            << "Invalid curve: " << hwInfo.supportedEekCurve;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify that the unique id is within the length limits as described in RpcHardwareInfo.aidl.
+ */
+TEST_P(GetHardwareInfoTests, uniqueId) {
+    if (rpcHardwareInfo.versionNumber < VERSION_WITH_UNIQUE_ID_SUPPORT) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    RpcHardwareInfo hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(provisionable_->getHardwareInfo(&hwInfo).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(hwInfo.uniqueId);
+    EXPECT_GE(hwInfo.uniqueId->size(), 1);
+    EXPECT_LE(hwInfo.uniqueId->size(), 32);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify implementation supports at least MIN_SUPPORTED_NUM_KEYS_IN_CSR keys in a CSR.
+ */
+TEST_P(GetHardwareInfoTests, supportedNumKeysInCsr) {
+    if (rpcHardwareInfo.versionNumber < VERSION_WITHOUT_TEST_MODE) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    RpcHardwareInfo hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(provisionable_->getHardwareInfo(&hwInfo).isOk());
+    ASSERT_GE(hwInfo.supportedNumKeysInCsr, RpcHardwareInfo::MIN_SUPPORTED_NUM_KEYS_IN_CSR);
+}
+
+using GenerateKeyTests = VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests;
+
+INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(GenerateKeyTests);
+
+/**
+ * Generate and validate a production-mode key.  MAC tag can't be verified, but
+ * the private key blob should be usable in KeyMint operations.
+ */
+TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateEcdsaP256Key_prodMode) {
+    MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
+    bytevec privateKeyBlob;
+    bool testMode = false;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &macedPubKey, &privateKeyBlob);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+    vector<uint8_t> coseKeyData;
+    check_maced_pubkey(macedPubKey, testMode, &coseKeyData);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate and validate a production-mode key, then use it as a KeyMint attestation key.
+ */
+TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateAndUseEcdsaP256Key_prodMode) {
+    // See if there is a matching IKeyMintDevice for this IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.
+    std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> keyMint;
+    if (!matching_keymint_device(GetParam(), &keyMint)) {
+        // No matching IKeyMintDevice.
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping key use test as no matching KeyMint device found";
+        return;
+    }
+    KeyMintHardwareInfo info;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint->getHardwareInfo(&info).isOk());
+
+    MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
+    bytevec privateKeyBlob;
+    bool testMode = false;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &macedPubKey, &privateKeyBlob);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+    vector<uint8_t> coseKeyData;
+    check_maced_pubkey(macedPubKey, testMode, &coseKeyData);
+
+    AttestationKey attestKey;
+    attestKey.keyBlob = std::move(privateKeyBlob);
+    attestKey.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+
+    // Generate an ECDSA key that is attested by the generated P256 keypair.
+    AuthorizationSet keyDesc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                       .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+                                       .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                       .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                       .SetDefaultValidity();
+    KeyCreationResult creationResult;
+    auto result = keyMint->generateKey(keyDesc.vector_data(), attestKey, &creationResult);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk());
+    vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob = std::move(creationResult.keyBlob);
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics =
+            std::move(creationResult.keyCharacteristics);
+    vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain = std::move(creationResult.certificateChain);
+    EXPECT_EQ(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+
+    int32_t aidl_version = 0;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint->getInterfaceVersion(&aidl_version).isOk());
+    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+    AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(aidl_version, "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+                                          info.securityLevel,
+                                          attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+    // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+    EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+    // The signature over the attested key should correspond to the P256 public key.
+    X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(key_cert.get());
+    EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey;
+    p256_pub_key(coseKeyData, &signing_pubkey);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(signing_pubkey.get());
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get()))
+            << "Verification of attested certificate failed "
+            << "OpenSSL error string: " << ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate and validate a test-mode key.
+ */
+TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateEcdsaP256Key_testMode) {
+    MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
+    bytevec privateKeyBlob;
+    bool testMode = true;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &macedPubKey, &privateKeyBlob);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+    check_maced_pubkey(macedPubKey, testMode, nullptr);
+}
+
+class CertificateRequestTestBase : public VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests {
+  protected:
+    CertificateRequestTestBase()
+        : eekId_(string_to_bytevec("eekid")), challenge_(randomBytes(64)) {}
+
+    void generateTestEekChain(size_t eekLength) {
+        auto chain = generateEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve, eekLength, eekId_);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(chain) << chain.message();
+        if (chain) testEekChain_ = chain.moveValue();
+        testEekLength_ = eekLength;
+    }
+
+    void generateKeys(bool testMode, size_t numKeys) {
+        keysToSign_ = std::vector<MacedPublicKey>(numKeys);
+        cborKeysToSign_ = cppbor::Array();
+
+        for (auto& key : keysToSign_) {
+            bytevec privateKeyBlob;
+            auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &key, &privateKeyBlob);
+            ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+            vector<uint8_t> payload_value;
+            check_maced_pubkey(key, testMode, &payload_value);
+            cborKeysToSign_.add(cppbor::EncodedItem(payload_value));
+        }
+    }
+
+    bytevec eekId_;
+    size_t testEekLength_;
+    EekChain testEekChain_;
+    bytevec challenge_;
+    std::vector<MacedPublicKey> keysToSign_;
+    cppbor::Array cborKeysToSign_;
+};
+
+class CertificateRequestTest : public CertificateRequestTestBase {
+  protected:
+    void SetUp() override {
+        CertificateRequestTestBase::SetUp();
+
+        if (rpcHardwareInfo.versionNumber >= VERSION_WITHOUT_TEST_MODE) {
+            bytevec keysToSignMac;
+            DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+            ProtectedData protectedData;
+            auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+                    false, {}, {}, {}, &deviceInfo, &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+            if (!status.isOk() && (status.getServiceSpecificError() ==
+                                   BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_REMOVED)) {
+                GTEST_SKIP() << "This test case applies to RKP v3+ only if "
+                             << "generateCertificateRequest() is implemented.";
+            }
+        }
+    }
+};
+
+/**
+ * Generate an empty certificate request in test mode, and decrypt and verify the structure and
+ * content.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_testMode) {
+    bool testMode = true;
+    for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
+        generateTestEekChain(eekLength);
+
+        bytevec keysToSignMac;
+        DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+        ProtectedData protectedData;
+        auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+                testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+                &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+        auto result = verifyProductionProtectedData(
+                deviceInfo, cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_, eekId_,
+                rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.message();
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Ensure that test mode outputs a unique BCC root key every time we request a
+ * certificate request. Else, it's possible that the test mode API could be used
+ * to fingerprint devices. Only the GEEK should be allowed to decrypt the same
+ * device public key multiple times.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NewKeyPerCallInTestMode) {
+    constexpr bool testMode = true;
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    generateTestEekChain(3);
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+    auto firstBcc = verifyProductionProtectedData(
+            deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_,
+            eekId_, rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(firstBcc) << firstBcc.message();
+
+    status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+    auto secondBcc = verifyProductionProtectedData(
+            deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_,
+            eekId_, rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(secondBcc) << secondBcc.message();
+
+    // Verify that none of the keys in the first BCC are repeated in the second one.
+    for (const auto& i : *firstBcc) {
+        for (auto& j : *secondBcc) {
+            ASSERT_THAT(i.pubKey, testing::Not(testing::ElementsAreArray(j.pubKey)))
+                    << "Found a repeated pubkey in two generateCertificateRequest test mode calls";
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate an empty certificate request in prod mode. This test must be run explicitly, and
+ * is not run by default. Not all devices are GMS devices, and therefore they do not all
+ * trust the Google EEK root.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_EmptyRequest_prodMode) {
+    bool testMode = false;
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, getProdEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve),
+            challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode.  Decrypt, parse and validate the contents.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testMode) {
+    bool testMode = true;
+    generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
+
+    for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
+        generateTestEekChain(eekLength);
+
+        bytevec keysToSignMac;
+        DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+        ProtectedData protectedData;
+        auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+                testMode, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
+                &keysToSignMac);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+        auto result = verifyProductionProtectedData(
+                deviceInfo, cborKeysToSign_, keysToSignMac, protectedData, testEekChain_, eekId_,
+                rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.message();
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode. This test must be run explicitly, and
+ * is not run by default. Not all devices are GMS devices, and therefore they do not all
+ * trust the Google EEK root.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_NonEmptyRequest_prodMode) {
+    bool testMode = false;
+    generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, keysToSign_, getProdEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve), challenge_,
+            &deviceInfo, &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode, but with the MAC corrupted on the keypair.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_testMode) {
+    bool testMode = true;
+    generateKeys(testMode, 1 /* numKeys */);
+    auto result = corrupt_maced_key(keysToSign_[0]);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.moveMessage();
+    MacedPublicKey keyWithCorruptMac = result.moveValue();
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    generateTestEekChain(3);
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode, but with the MAC corrupted on the keypair.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_prodMode) {
+    bool testMode = false;
+    generateKeys(testMode, 1 /* numKeys */);
+    auto result = corrupt_maced_key(keysToSign_[0]);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.moveMessage();
+    MacedPublicKey keyWithCorruptMac = result.moveValue();
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, getProdEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve),
+            challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode that has a corrupt EEK chain.
+ * Confirm that the request is rejected.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyCorruptEekRequest_prodMode) {
+    bool testMode = false;
+    generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
+
+    auto prodEekChain = getProdEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve);
+    auto [parsedChain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(prodEekChain);
+    ASSERT_NE(parsedChain, nullptr) << parseErr;
+    ASSERT_NE(parsedChain->asArray(), nullptr);
+
+    for (int ii = 0; ii < parsedChain->asArray()->size(); ++ii) {
+        auto chain = corrupt_sig_chain(prodEekChain, ii);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(chain) << chain.message();
+
+        bytevec keysToSignMac;
+        DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+        ProtectedData protectedData;
+        auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(testMode, keysToSign_, *chain,
+                                                                 challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+                                                                 &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+        ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+        ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
+                  BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode that has an incomplete EEK chain.
+ * Confirm that the request is rejected.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyIncompleteEekRequest_prodMode) {
+    bool testMode = false;
+    generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
+
+    // Build an EEK chain that omits the first self-signed cert.
+    auto truncatedChain = cppbor::Array();
+    auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(getProdEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(chain);
+    auto eekChain = chain->asArray();
+    ASSERT_NE(eekChain, nullptr);
+    for (size_t ii = 1; ii < eekChain->size(); ii++) {
+        truncatedChain.add(eekChain->get(ii)->clone());
+    }
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            testMode, keysToSign_, truncatedChain.encode(), challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
+            &keysToSignMac);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+    ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode, with prod keys.  Must fail with
+ * STATUS_PRODUCTION_KEY_IN_TEST_REQUEST.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_prodKeyInTestCert) {
+    generateKeys(false /* testMode */, 2 /* numKeys */);
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    generateTestEekChain(3);
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            true /* testMode */, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+    ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
+              BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_PRODUCTION_KEY_IN_TEST_REQUEST);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode, with test keys.  Must fail with
+ * STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testKeyInProdCert) {
+    generateKeys(true /* testMode */, 2 /* numKeys */);
+
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    generateTestEekChain(3);
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            false /* testMode */, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
+    ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
+              BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(CertificateRequestTest);
+
+class CertificateRequestV2Test : public CertificateRequestTestBase {
+    void SetUp() override {
+        CertificateRequestTestBase::SetUp();
+
+        if (rpcHardwareInfo.versionNumber < VERSION_WITHOUT_TEST_MODE) {
+            GTEST_SKIP() << "This test case only applies to RKP v3 and above. "
+                         << "RKP version discovered: " << rpcHardwareInfo.versionNumber;
+        }
+    }
+};
+
+/**
+ * Generate an empty certificate request, and decrypt and verify the structure and content.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestV2Test, EmptyRequest) {
+    bytevec csr;
+
+    auto status =
+            provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2({} /* keysToSign */, challenge_, &csr);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+    auto result = verifyProductionCsr(cppbor::Array(), csr, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.message();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request.  Decrypt, parse and validate the contents.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestV2Test, NonEmptyRequest) {
+    generateKeys(false /* testMode */, 1 /* numKeys */);
+
+    bytevec csr;
+
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2(keysToSign_, challenge_, &csr);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+    auto result = verifyProductionCsr(cborKeysToSign_, csr, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.message();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request.  Make sure contents are reproducible but allow for the
+ * signature to be different since algorithms including ECDSA P-256 can include a random value.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestV2Test, NonEmptyRequestReproducible) {
+    generateKeys(false /* testMode */, 1 /* numKeys */);
+
+    bytevec csr;
+
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2(keysToSign_, challenge_, &csr);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+    auto firstCsr = verifyProductionCsr(cborKeysToSign_, csr, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(firstCsr) << firstCsr.message();
+
+    status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2(keysToSign_, challenge_, &csr);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+    auto secondCsr = verifyProductionCsr(cborKeysToSign_, csr, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(secondCsr) << secondCsr.message();
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(**firstCsr, **secondCsr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request with multiple keys.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestV2Test, NonEmptyRequestMultipleKeys) {
+    generateKeys(false /* testMode */, rpcHardwareInfo.supportedNumKeysInCsr /* numKeys */);
+
+    bytevec csr;
+
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2(keysToSign_, challenge_, &csr);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+
+    auto result = verifyProductionCsr(cborKeysToSign_, csr, provisionable_.get(), challenge_);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.message();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request, but with the MAC corrupted on the keypair.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestV2Test, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac) {
+    generateKeys(false /* testMode */, 1 /* numKeys */);
+    auto result = corrupt_maced_key(keysToSign_[0]);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.moveMessage();
+    MacedPublicKey keyWithCorruptMac = result.moveValue();
+
+    bytevec csr;
+    auto status =
+            provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2({keyWithCorruptMac}, challenge_, &csr);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode, with test keys.  Must fail with
+ * STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestV2Test, NonEmptyRequest_testKeyInProdCert) {
+    generateKeys(true /* testMode */, 1 /* numKeys */);
+
+    bytevec csr;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequestV2(keysToSign_, challenge_, &csr);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
+              BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(CertificateRequestV2Test);
+
+}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.xml b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2375bde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!-- Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+
+     Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+     you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+     You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+          http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+     Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+     distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+     WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+     See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+     limitations under the License.
+-->
+<configuration description="Runs VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest.">
+    <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct" />
+    <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct-native" />
+
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer"/>
+
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
+        <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
+        <option name="push-file"
+            key="VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest"
+            value="/data/local/tmp/VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest" />
+    </target_preparer>
+
+    <test class="com.android.tradefed.testtype.GTest" >
+        <option name="native-test-device-path" value="/data/local/tmp" />
+        <option name="module-name" value="VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest" />
+        <option name="native-test-timeout" value="900000"/> <!-- 15 minutes -->
+    </test>
+</configuration>