Add PASN comeback cookie for secure ranging
Flag: com.android.wifi.flags.secure_ranging
Bug: 364722301
Test: atest com.android.server.wifi
Change-Id: Id061c399d11a278de34879134b3fe8e7fd41b4bd
diff --git a/wifi/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.wifi/current/android/hardware/wifi/RttResult.aidl b/wifi/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.wifi/current/android/hardware/wifi/RttResult.aidl
index 87257be..9d62431 100644
--- a/wifi/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.wifi/current/android/hardware/wifi/RttResult.aidl
+++ b/wifi/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.wifi/current/android/hardware/wifi/RttResult.aidl
@@ -71,4 +71,6 @@
long baseAkm;
long cipherSuite;
int secureHeLtfProtocolVersion;
+ long pasnComebackAfterMillis;
+ @nullable byte[] pasnComebackCookie;
}
diff --git a/wifi/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.wifi/current/android/hardware/wifi/RttSecureConfig.aidl b/wifi/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.wifi/current/android/hardware/wifi/RttSecureConfig.aidl
index c2d7866..64e81de 100644
--- a/wifi/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.wifi/current/android/hardware/wifi/RttSecureConfig.aidl
+++ b/wifi/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.wifi/current/android/hardware/wifi/RttSecureConfig.aidl
@@ -37,4 +37,5 @@
android.hardware.wifi.PasnConfig pasnConfig;
boolean enableSecureHeLtf;
boolean enableRangingFrameProtection;
+ byte[] pasnComebackCookie;
}
diff --git a/wifi/aidl/android/hardware/wifi/RttResult.aidl b/wifi/aidl/android/hardware/wifi/RttResult.aidl
index dd41868..16b823d 100644
--- a/wifi/aidl/android/hardware/wifi/RttResult.aidl
+++ b/wifi/aidl/android/hardware/wifi/RttResult.aidl
@@ -234,4 +234,19 @@
* Secure HE-LTF protocol version used.
*/
int secureHeLtfProtocolVersion;
+ /**
+ * When an AP receives a large volume of initial PASN Authentication frames, it can use the
+ * comeback after field in the PASN Parameters element to indicate a deferral time and
+ * optionally provide a comeback cookie which is an opaque sequence of octets. This field is
+ * set to 0 to indicate that the subsequent ranging request can be retried with the
+ * |pasnComebackCookie|.
+ */
+ long pasnComebackAfterMillis;
+ /**
+ * Comeback cookie is an opaque sequence of octects sent by the AP when PASN authentication
+ * needs to be deferred. The same cookie needs to be passed in |RttSecureConfig| when the
+ * station has to range with the AP after |RttResult.pasnComebackAfterMillis|. Maximum size of
+ * cookie is 255 bytes. Refer IEEE Std 802.11az‐2022, section 9.4.2.303 PASN Parameters element.
+ */
+ @nullable byte[] pasnComebackCookie;
}
diff --git a/wifi/aidl/android/hardware/wifi/RttSecureConfig.aidl b/wifi/aidl/android/hardware/wifi/RttSecureConfig.aidl
index c10e6b5..d1394ab 100644
--- a/wifi/aidl/android/hardware/wifi/RttSecureConfig.aidl
+++ b/wifi/aidl/android/hardware/wifi/RttSecureConfig.aidl
@@ -35,4 +35,8 @@
* Enable Ranging frame protection.
*/
boolean enableRangingFrameProtection;
+ /**
+ * Comeback cookie is an opaque sequence of octets retrieved from |RttResult|.
+ */
+ byte[] pasnComebackCookie;
}
diff --git a/wifi/legacy_headers/include/hardware_legacy/rtt.h b/wifi/legacy_headers/include/hardware_legacy/rtt.h
index 93ea145..3fa4e95 100644
--- a/wifi/legacy_headers/include/hardware_legacy/rtt.h
+++ b/wifi/legacy_headers/include/hardware_legacy/rtt.h
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
#define RTT_SECURITY_MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN 63
#define PMKID_LEN 16
+#define RTT_MAX_COOKIE_LEN 255
typedef struct {
wifi_rtt_akm base_akm; // Base Authentication and Key Management (AKM) protocol used for PASN
@@ -111,7 +112,9 @@
u32 pmkid_len;
u8 pmkid[PMKID_LEN]; // PMKID corresponding to the cached PMK from the base AKM. PMKID can be
// null if no cached PMK is present.
-
+ u8 comeback_cookie_len; // Comeback cookie length. If the length is 0, it indicates there is no
+ // cookie.
+ u8 comeback_cookie[RTT_MAX_COOKIE_LEN]; // Comeback cookie indicated over wifi_rtt_result_v4.
} wifi_rtt_pasn_config;
typedef struct {
@@ -261,6 +264,11 @@
wifi_rtt_akm base_akm;
wifi_rtt_cipher_suite cipher_suite;
int secure_he_ltf_protocol_version;
+ u16 pasn_comeback_after_millis; // The time in milliseconds after which the non-AP STA is
+ // requested to retry the PASN authentication.
+ u8 pasn_comeback_cookie_len; // Comeback cookie length. If the length is 0, it indicates there
+ // is no cookie.
+ u8 pasn_comeback_cookie[RTT_MAX_COOKIE_LEN]; // Comeback cookie octets.
} wifi_rtt_result_v4;
/* RTT result callbacks */