diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
index 3ea14a1..32d69cd 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
@@ -37,10 +37,13 @@
      *         ? "board" : tstr,
      *         ? "vb_state" : "green" / "yellow" / "orange",    // Taken from the AVB values
      *         ? "bootloader_state" : "locked" / "unlocked",    // Taken from the AVB values
+     *         ? "vbmeta_digest": bstr,                         // Taken from the AVB values
      *         ? "os_version" : tstr,                    // Same as android.os.Build.VERSION.release
      *         ? "system_patch_level" : uint,                   // YYYYMMDD
      *         ? "boot_patch_level" : uint,                     // YYYYMMDD
      *         ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint,                   // YYYYMMDD
+     *         "version" : 1,                      // The CDDL schema version.
+     *         "security_level" : "tee" / "strongbox"
      *     }
      */
     byte[] deviceInfo;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index 04d91d0..a29fb08 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
  *
  * The root of trust for secure provisioning is something called the "Boot Certificate Chain", or
  * BCC. The BCC is a chain of public key certificates, represented as COSE_Sign1 objects containing
- * COSE_Key representations of the public keys. The "root" of the BCC is a self-signed certificate
- * for a device-unique public key, denoted DK_pub. All public keys in the BCC are device-unique. The
+ * COSE_Key representations of the public keys. The "root" of the BCC is
+ * a device-unique public key, denoted DK_pub. All public keys in the BCC are device-unique. The
  * public key from each certificate in the chain is used to sign the next certificate in the
  * chain. The final, "leaf" certificate contains a public key, denoted KM_pub, whose corresponding
  * private key, denoted KM_priv, is available for use by the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.
@@ -58,12 +58,8 @@
  * (given the necessary input), but no stage can compute the secret of any preceding stage. Updating
  * the firmware or configuration of any stage changes the key pair of that stage, and of all
  * subsequent stages, and no attacker who compromised the previous version of the updated firmware
- * can know or predict the post-update key pairs.
- *
- * The first BCC certificate is special because its contained public key, DK_pub, will never change,
- * making it a permanent, device-unique identifier. Although the remaining keys in the BCC are also
- * device-unique, they are not necessarily permanent, since they can change when the device software
- * is updated.
+ * can know or predict the post-update key pairs. It is recommended and expected that the BCC is
+ * constructed using the Open Profile for DICE.
  *
  * When the provisioning server receives a message signed by KM_priv and containing a BCC that
  * chains from DK_pub to KM_pub, it can be certain that (barring vulnerabilities in some boot
@@ -78,7 +74,7 @@
  * While a proper BCC, as described above, reflects the complete boot sequence from boot ROM to the
  * secure area image of the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent, it's also possible to use a "degenerate"
  * BCC which consists only of a single, self-signed certificate containing the public key of a
- * hardware-bound key pair. This is an appropriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
+ * hardware-bound key pair. This is an appopriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
  * everything necessary to produce a proper BCC, but can derive a unique key pair in the secure
  * area.  In this degenerate case, DK_pub is the same as KM_pub.
  *
@@ -141,7 +137,7 @@
      *        privateKeyHandle, that the contained public key is for remote certification.
      *
      * @return data representing a handle to the private key. The format is implementation-defined,
-     *         but note that specific services may define a required format.
+     *         but note that specific services may define a required format. KeyMint does.
      */
     byte[] generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(in boolean testMode, out MacedPublicKey macedPublicKey);
 
@@ -162,65 +158,90 @@
      *        If testMode is false, the keysToCertify array must not contain any keys flagged as
      *        test keys. Otherwise, the method must return STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
      *
-     * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X25519 public key which will be used to encrypt
+     * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X22519 public key which will be used to encrypt
      *        the BCC. For flexibility, this is represented as a certificate chain, represented as a
      *        CBOR array of COSE_Sign1 objects, ordered from root to leaf. The leaf contains the
      *        X25519 encryption key, each other element is an Ed25519 key signing the next in the
-     *        chain. The root is self-signed.
+     *        chain. The root is self-signed. An implementor may also choose to use P256 as an
+     *        alternative curve for signing and encryption instead of Curve 25519.
      *
      *            EekChain = [ + SignedSignatureKey, SignedEek ]
      *
      *            SignedSignatureKey = [              // COSE_Sign1
      *                protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *                },
-     *                unprotected: { },
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKey,
-     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
+     *                unprotected: {},
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
+     *                         bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256,
+     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput) /
+     *                           bstr ECDSA(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
      *            ]
      *
-     *            SignatureKey = {                    // COSE_Key
+     *            SignatureKeyEd25519 = {                    // COSE_Key
      *                 1 : 1,                         // Key type : Octet Key Pair
-     *                 3 : -8,                        // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                 3 : AlgorithmEdDSA,            // Algorithm
      *                 -1 : 6,                        // Curve : Ed25519
      *                 -2 : bstr                      // Ed25519 public key
      *            }
      *
+     *            SignatureKeyP256 = {
+     *                 1 : 2,                         // Key type : EC2
+     *                 3 : AlgorithmES256,            // Algorithm
+     *                 -1 : 1,                        // Curve: P256
+     *                 -2 : bstr,                     // X coordinate
+     *                 -3 : bstr                      // Y coordinate
+     *            }
+     *
      *            SignatureKeySignatureInput = [
      *                context: "Signature1",
      *                body_protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,     // Algorithm
      *                },
      *                external_aad: bstr .size 0,
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKey
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
+     *                         bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256
      *            ]
      *
      *            SignedEek = [                       // COSE_Sign1
      *                protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *                },
-     *                unprotected: { },
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor Eek,
-     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
+     *                unprotected: {},
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256,
+     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput) /
+     *                           bstr ECDSA(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
      *            ]
      *
-     *            Eek = {                             // COSE_Key
-     *                1 : 1,                          // Key type : Octet Key Pair
-     *                2 : bstr                        // KID : EEK ID
-     *                3 : -25,                        // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
-     *                -1 : 4,                         // Curve : X25519
-     *                -2 : bstr                       // X25519 public key
+     *            EekX25519 = {            // COSE_Key
+     *                1 : 1,               // Key type : Octet Key Pair
+     *                2 : bstr             // KID : EEK ID
+     *                3 : -25,             // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
+     *                -1 : 4,              // Curve : X25519
+     *                -2 : bstr            // Ed25519 public key
+     *            }
+     *
+     *            EekP256 = {              // COSE_Key
+     *                1 : 2,               // Key type : EC2
+     *                2 : bstr             // KID : EEK ID
+     *                3 : -25,             // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
+     *                -1 : 1,              // Curve : P256
+     *                -2 : bstr            // Sender X coordinate
+     *                -3 : bstr            // Sender Y coordinate
      *            }
      *
      *            EekSignatureInput = [
      *                context: "Signature1",
      *                body_protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,     // Algorithm
      *                },
      *                external_aad: bstr .size 0,
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor Eek
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256
      *            ]
      *
+     *            AlgorithmES256 = -7
+     *            AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
+     *
      *        If the contents of endpointEncryptionKey do not match the SignedEek structure above,
      *        the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
      *
@@ -228,7 +249,7 @@
      *        in the chain, which implies that it must not attempt to validate the signature.
      *
      *        If testMode is false, the method must validate the chain signatures, and must verify
-     *        that the public key in the root certificate is in its pre-configured set of
+     *        that the public key in the root certifictate is in its pre-configured set of
      *        authorized EEK root keys. If the public key is not in the database, or if signature
      *        verification fails, the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
      *
@@ -236,8 +257,13 @@
      *        by the secure area. See the description of the 'signature' output parameter for
      *        details.
      *
-     * @param out keysToSignMac contains the MAC of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest
-     *        structure. Specifically, it contains:
+     * @param out DeviceInfo contains the VerifiedDeviceInfo portion of the DeviceInfo array in
+     *        CertificateRequest. The structure is described within the DeviceInfo.aidl file.
+     *
+     * @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
+     *        authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
+     *
+     * @return The of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest structure. Specifically, it contains:
      *
      *            HMAC-256(EK_mac, .cbor KeysToMacStructure)
      *
@@ -248,11 +274,11 @@
      *                protected : bstr .cbor {
      *                    1 : 5,                           // Algorithm : HMAC-256
      *                },
-     *                unprotected : { },
+     *                unprotected : {},
      *                // Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
      *                payload: bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ],
      *                tag: bstr
-     *           ]
+     *            ]
      *
      *            KeysToMacStructure = [
      *                context : "MAC0",
@@ -261,9 +287,6 @@
      *                // Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
      *                payload : bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ]
      *            ]
-     *
-     * @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
-     *        authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
      */
     byte[] generateCertificateRequest(in boolean testMode, in MacedPublicKey[] keysToSign,
             in byte[] endpointEncryptionCertChain, in byte[] challenge, out DeviceInfo deviceInfo,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
index 5199062..31dbb28 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
@@ -40,11 +40,7 @@
      *                     1 : -25         // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
      *                 },
      *                 unprotected : {
-     *                     -1 : {          // COSE_Key
-     *                         1 : 1,      // Key type : Octet Key Pair
-     *                         -1 : 4,     // Curve : X25519
-     *                         -2 : bstr   // Sender X25519 public key
-     *                     }
+     *                     -1 : PubKeyX25519 / PubKeyEcdhP256  // Of the sender
      *                     4 : bstr,       // KID : EEK ID
      *                 },
      *                 ciphertext : nil
@@ -67,7 +63,7 @@
      *             other : bstr            // EEK pubkey
      *         ],
      *         SuppPubInfo : [
-     *             128,                    // Output key length
+     *             256,                    // Output key length
      *             protected : bstr .size 0
      *         ]
      *     ]
@@ -75,34 +71,51 @@
      *     ProtectedDataPayload [
      *         SignedMac,
      *         Bcc,
+     *         ? AdditionalDKSignatures,
+     *     ]
+     *     AdditionalDKSignatures = {
+     *         + SignerName => DKCertChain
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     SignerName = tstr
+     *
+     *     DKCertChain = [
+     *         2* Certificate                      // Root -> Leaf.  Root is the vendor
+     *                                             // self-signed cert, leaf contains DK_pub
      *     ]
      *
-     *     SignedMac = [                       // COSE_Sign1
-     *         bstr .cbor {                    // Protected params
-     *             1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *     Certificate = COSE_Sign1 of a public key
+     *
+     *     SignedMac = [                                  // COSE_Sign1
+     *         bstr .cbor {                               // Protected params
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,   // Algorithm
      *         },
-     *         { },                            // Unprotected params
+     *         {},                   // Unprotected params
      *         bstr .size 32,                  // MAC key
-     *         bstr PureEd25519(DK_priv, .cbor SignedMac_structure)
+     *         bstr PureEd25519(KM_priv, .cbor SignedMac_structure) /
+     *              ECDSA(KM_priv, bstr .cbor SignedMac_structure)
      *     ]
      *
      *     SignedMac_structure = [
      *         "Signature1",
-     *         bstr .cbor {                    // Protected params
-     *             1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *         bstr .cbor {                               // Protected params
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,   // Algorithm
      *         },
      *         bstr .cbor SignedMacAad
-     *         bstr .size 32                   // MAC key
+     *         bstr .size 32                              // MAC key
      *     ]
      *
      *     SignedMacAad = [
      *         challenge : bstr,
-     *         DeviceInfo
+     *         VerifiedDeviceInfo,
+     *         tag: bstr                 // This is the tag from COSE_Mac0 of
+     *                                   // KeysToCertify, to tie the key set to
+     *                                   // the signature.
      *     ]
      *
      *     Bcc = [
-     *         PubKey,                        // DK_pub
-     *         + BccEntry,                    // Root -> leaf (KM_pub)
+     *         PubKeyEd25519 / PubKeyECDSA256, // DK_pub
+     *         + BccEntry,                     // Root -> leaf (KM_pub)
      *     ]
      *
      *     BccPayload = {                     // CWT
@@ -120,44 +133,38 @@
      *         ? -4670549 : bstr,             // Authority Hash
      *         ? -4670550 : bstr,             // Authority Descriptor
      *         ? -4670551 : bstr,             // Mode
-     *         -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKey   // Subject Public Key
+     *         -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKeyEd25519 /
+     *                    bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA256   // Subject Public Key
      *         -4670553 : bstr                // Key Usage
      *     }
      *
-     *     BccEntry = [                       // COSE_Sign1
-     *         protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *             1 : -8,                    // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *     BccEntry = [                                  // COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
+     *         protected : bstr .cbor {
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *         },
-     *         unprotected: { },
+     *         unprotected: {},
      *         payload: bstr .cbor BccPayload,
-     *         // First entry in the chain is signed by DK_pub, the others are each signed by their
-     *         // immediate predecessor.  See RFC 8032 for signature representation.
-     *         signature: bstr .cbor PureEd25519(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput)
+     *         signature: bstr .cbor PureEd25519(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput) /
+     *                    bstr .cbor ECDSA(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput)
+     *         // See RFC 8032 for details of how to encode the signature value for Ed25519.
      *     ]
      *
-     *     PubKey = {                         // COSE_Key
-     *         1 : 1,                         // Key type : octet key pair
-     *         3 : -8,                        // Algorithm : EdDSA
-     *         4 : 2,                         // Ops: Verify
-     *         -1 : 6,                        // Curve : Ed25519
-     *         -2 : bstr                      // X coordinate, little-endian
-     *     }
-     *
      *     BccEntryInput = [
      *         context: "Signature1",
      *         protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *             1 : -8,                    // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *         },
      *         external_aad: bstr .size 0,
      *         payload: bstr .cbor BccPayload
      *     ]
      *
-     *     DeviceInfo = {
+     *     VerifiedDeviceInfo = {
      *         ? "brand" : tstr,
      *         ? "manufacturer" : tstr,
      *         ? "product" : tstr,
      *         ? "model" : tstr,
      *         ? "board" : tstr,
+     *         ? "device" : tstr,
      *         ? "vb_state" : "green" / "yellow" / "orange",
      *         ? "bootloader_state" : "locked" / "unlocked",
      *         ? "os_version" : tstr,
@@ -165,6 +172,39 @@
      *         ? "boot_patch_level" : uint,          // YYYYMMDD
      *         ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint,        // YYYYMMDD
      *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyX25519 = {                 // COSE_Key
+     *          1 : 1,                      // Key type : Octet Key Pair
+     *         -1 : 4,                      // Curve : X25519
+     *         -2 : bstr                    // Sender X25519 public key
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyEd25519 = {                // COSE_Key
+     *         1 : 1,                         // Key type : octet key pair
+     *         3 : AlgorithmEdDSA,            // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *         4 : 2,                         // Ops: Verify
+     *         -1 : 6,                        // Curve : Ed25519
+     *         -2 : bstr                      // X coordinate, little-endian
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyEcdhP256 = {              // COSE_Key
+     *          1 : 2,      // Key type : EC2
+     *          -1 : 1,     // Curve : P256
+     *          -2 : bstr   // Sender X coordinate
+     *          -3 : bstr   // Sender Y coordinate
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyECDSA256 = {                 // COSE_Key
+     *         1 : 2,                         // Key type : EC2
+     *         3 : AlgorithmES256,            // Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-256
+     *         4 : 2,                         // Ops: Verify
+     *         -1 : 1,                        // Curve: P256
+     *         -2 : bstr,                     // X coordinate
+     *         -3 : bstr                      // Y coordinate
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     AlgorithmES256 = -7
+     *     AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
      */
     byte[] protectedData;
 }