diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/default/ParametersUtil.cpp b/audio/core/all-versions/default/ParametersUtil.cpp
index e21eff2..c0e2903 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/default/ParametersUtil.cpp
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/default/ParametersUtil.cpp
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
     Result retval = getParam(name, &halValue);
     *value = false;
     if (retval == Result::OK) {
-        if (halValue.empty()) {
+        if (halValue.length() == 0) {
             return Result::NOT_SUPPORTED;
         }
         *value = !(halValue == AudioParameter::valueOff);
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml
index 6010c60..c23d687 100644
--- a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml
+++ b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml
@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@
 
     <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer">
     </target_preparer>
-    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.StopServicesSetup">
-    </target_preparer>
 
     <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RunCommandTargetPreparer">
         <option name="run-command" value="settings put global ble_scan_always_enabled 0" />
@@ -31,6 +29,9 @@
         <option name="teardown-command" value="settings put global ble_scan_always_enabled 1" />
     </target_preparer>
 
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.StopServicesSetup">
+    </target_preparer>
+
     <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
         <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
         <option name="push" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest->/data/local/tmp/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest" />
diff --git a/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.cpp b/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.cpp
index 782122f..013ab7f 100644
--- a/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.cpp
+++ b/bluetooth/aidl/default/BluetoothHci.cpp
@@ -55,6 +55,19 @@
 
 void OnDeath(void* cookie);
 
+std::optional<std::string> GetSystemProperty(const std::string& property) {
+  std::array<char, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX> value_array{0};
+  auto value_len = property_get(property.c_str(), value_array.data(), nullptr);
+  if (value_len <= 0) {
+    return std::nullopt;
+  }
+  return std::string(value_array.data(), value_len);
+}
+
+bool starts_with(const std::string& str, const std::string& prefix) {
+  return str.compare(0, prefix.length(), prefix) == 0;
+}
+
 class BluetoothDeathRecipient {
  public:
   BluetoothDeathRecipient(BluetoothHci* hci) : mHci(hci) {}
@@ -232,8 +245,19 @@
 
   mDeathRecipient->LinkToDeath(mCb);
 
-  // TODO: This should not be necessary when the device implements rfkill.
-  reset();
+  // TODO: HCI Reset on emulators since the bluetooth controller
+  // cannot be powered on/off during the HAL setup; and the stack
+  // might received spurious packets/events during boottime.
+  // Proper solution would be to use bt-virtio or vsock to better
+  // control the link to rootcanal and the controller lifetime.
+  const std::string kBoardProperty = "ro.product.board";
+  const std::string kCuttlefishBoard = "cutf";
+  auto board_name = GetSystemProperty(kBoardProperty);
+  if (board_name.has_value() && (
+        starts_with(board_name.value(), "cutf") ||
+        starts_with(board_name.value(), "goldfish"))) {
+    reset();
+  }
 
   mH4 = std::make_shared<H4Protocol>(
       mFd,
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
index 77e5cb4..40e98ac 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.9.xml
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true" updatable-via-apex="true">
         <name>android.hardware.security.keymint</name>
         <version>1-3</version>
         <interface>
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@
             <instance>strongbox</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true" updatable-via-apex="true">
         <name>android.hardware.security.keymint</name>
         <version>1-3</version>
         <interface>
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@
             <regex-instance>SIM[1-9][0-9]*</regex-instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true" updatable-via-apex="true">
         <name>android.hardware.security.secureclock</name>
         <version>1</version>
         <interface>
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true" updatable-via-apex="true">
         <name>android.hardware.security.sharedsecret</name>
         <version>1</version>
         <interface>
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
index 8aef9d9..a2edd62 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@
         vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
         vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
                   GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                       .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -167,9 +167,11 @@
                               &attested_key_cert_chain));
         KeyBlobDeleter attested_deleter(keymint_, attested_key_blob);
 
+        ASSERT_GT(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+
         AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
         AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
-        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
                                               SecLevel(),
                                               attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
 
@@ -186,7 +188,7 @@
          */
         attested_key_characteristics.resize(0);
         attested_key_cert_chain.resize(0);
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
                   GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                       .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
                                       .Digest(Digest::NONE)
@@ -199,9 +201,11 @@
                               &attested_key_cert_chain));
         KeyBlobDeleter attested_deleter2(keymint_, attested_key_blob);
 
+        ASSERT_GT(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+
         hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
         sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
-        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo2", "bar2", sw_enforced,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo2", "bar2", sw_enforced,
                                               hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
                                               attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
 
@@ -219,7 +223,7 @@
         attested_key_characteristics.resize(0);
         attested_key_cert_chain.resize(0);
         uint64_t timestamp = 1619621648000;
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
                   GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -231,6 +235,8 @@
                               &attested_key_cert_chain));
         KeyBlobDeleter attested_deleter3(keymint_, attested_key_blob);
 
+        ASSERT_GT(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+
         // The returned key characteristics will include CREATION_DATETIME (checked below)
         // in SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE; this will be stripped out in the CheckCharacteristics()
         // call below, to match what getKeyCharacteristics() returns (which doesn't include
@@ -246,7 +252,7 @@
         EXPECT_TRUE(sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, timestamp))
                 << "expected CREATION_TIMESTAMP in sw_enforced:" << sw_enforced
                 << " not in hw_enforced:" << hw_enforced;
-        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
                                               SecLevel(),
                                               attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
 
@@ -336,7 +342,7 @@
 
     AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attest_key_characteristics);
     AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attest_key_characteristics);
-    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), challenge, app_id,  //
+    ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), challenge, app_id,  //
                                           sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
                                           attest_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
 
@@ -354,7 +360,7 @@
     uint64_t serial_int2 = 255;
     vector<uint8_t> serial_blob2(build_serial_blob(serial_int2));
 
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
               GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                   .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
                                   .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -367,9 +373,11 @@
                           &attested_key_cert_chain));
     KeyBlobDeleter attested_deleter(keymint_, attested_key_blob);
 
+    ASSERT_GT(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+
     AuthorizationSet hw_enforced2 = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
     AuthorizationSet sw_enforced2 = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
-    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced2, hw_enforced2,
+    ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced2, hw_enforced2,
                                           SecLevel(),
                                           attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
 
@@ -437,7 +445,7 @@
         AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
         AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
         ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), 0);
-        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
                                               SecLevel(),
                                               cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
 
@@ -512,7 +520,7 @@
         AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
         AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
         ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), 0);
-        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
                                               SecLevel(),
                                               cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
 
@@ -628,7 +636,7 @@
         AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
         AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
         ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), 0);
-        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
                                               SecLevel(),
                                               cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
 
@@ -678,7 +686,7 @@
         vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
         vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING,
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING,
                   GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                       .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -687,7 +695,7 @@
                               attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
                               &attested_key_cert_chain));
 
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING,
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING,
                   GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -725,7 +733,7 @@
         vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
         vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
                   GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                       .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -740,7 +748,7 @@
 
         AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
         AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
-        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
                                               SecLevel(),
                                               attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
 
@@ -756,7 +764,7 @@
         /*
          * Use attestation key to sign EC key
          */
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
                   GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -771,7 +779,7 @@
 
         hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
         sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
-        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
                                               SecLevel(),
                                               attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
 
@@ -809,7 +817,7 @@
     vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
     vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
     vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
               GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                   .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                   .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
@@ -872,6 +880,7 @@
         }
 
         ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+        ASSERT_GT(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
         KeyBlobDeleter attested_deleter(keymint_, attested_key_blob);
 
         AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
@@ -882,7 +891,7 @@
         // attestation extension should contain them, so make sure the extra tag is added.
         hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
 
-        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "challenge", "foo", sw_enforced,
+        ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "challenge", "foo", sw_enforced,
                                               hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
                                               attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
     }
@@ -998,6 +1007,7 @@
     }
 
     ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+    ASSERT_GT(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
     KeyBlobDeleter attested_deleter(keymint_, attested_key_blob);
 
     AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
@@ -1010,7 +1020,7 @@
     KeyParameter imei_tag = Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI, imei_blob);
     hw_enforced.push_back(imei_tag);
 
-    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "challenge", "foo", sw_enforced,
+    ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "challenge", "foo", sw_enforced,
                                           hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
                                           attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
 }
@@ -1069,6 +1079,7 @@
     }
 
     ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+    ASSERT_GT(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
     KeyBlobDeleter attested_deleter(keymint_, attested_key_blob);
 
     AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
@@ -1084,7 +1095,7 @@
     KeyParameter sec_imei_tag = Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI, sec_imei_blob);
     hw_enforced.push_back(sec_imei_tag);
 
-    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "challenge", "foo", sw_enforced,
+    ASSERT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(AidlVersion(), "challenge", "foo", sw_enforced,
                                           hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
                                           attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index 1e61a18..022dd3f 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -2565,22 +2565,24 @@
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaDefaultSize
  *
  * Verifies that failing to specify a curve for EC key generation returns
- * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE or UNSUPPORTED_EC_CURVE.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaDefaultSize) {
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
-              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                  .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)
-                                  .SigningKey()
-                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)
+                                      .SigningKey()
+                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE ||
+                result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_EC_CURVE)
+            << "unexpected result " << result;
 }
 
 /*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaInvalidCurve
  *
  * Verifies that specifying an invalid curve for EC key generation returns
- * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE or UNSUPPORTED_EC_CURVE.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaInvalidCurve) {
     for (auto curve : InvalidCurves()) {
@@ -2593,7 +2595,8 @@
                                           .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                   &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
         ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE ||
-                    result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_EC_CURVE);
+                    result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_EC_CURVE)
+                << "unexpected result " << result;
     }
 
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
@@ -8755,6 +8758,7 @@
 
 using VsrRequirementTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
 
+// @VsrTest = VSR-3.10-008
 TEST_P(VsrRequirementTest, Vsr13Test) {
     int vsr_api_level = get_vsr_api_level();
     if (vsr_api_level < __ANDROID_API_T__) {
@@ -8763,6 +8767,7 @@
     EXPECT_GE(AidlVersion(), 2) << "VSR 13+ requires KeyMint version 2";
 }
 
+// @VsrTest = VSR-3.10-013.001
 TEST_P(VsrRequirementTest, Vsr14Test) {
     int vsr_api_level = get_vsr_api_level();
     if (vsr_api_level < __ANDROID_API_U__) {
diff --git a/security/rkp/README.md b/security/rkp/README.md
index 8cd1582..15ea817 100644
--- a/security/rkp/README.md
+++ b/security/rkp/README.md
@@ -42,7 +42,9 @@
 sign certificate requests. Instead, UDS\_pub is just the first public key in a
 chain of public keys that end the KeyMint public key. All keys in the chain are
 transitively derived from the UDS and joined in a certificate chain following
-the specification of the [Android Profile for DICE](#android-profile-for-dice).
+the specification of the [Android Profile for DICE](android-profile-for-dice).
+
+[android-profile-for-dice]: https://pigweed.googlesource.com/open-dice/+/refs/heads/main/docs/android.md
 
 ### Phases
 
@@ -53,7 +55,7 @@
   certificate requests; a single self-signed certificate signifies this phase.
 * DICE (Phase 2): A hardware root of trust key pair is only accessible to ROM
   or ROM extension code; the boot process follows the [Android Profile for
-  DICE](#android-profile-for-dice).
+  DICE](android-profile-for-dice).
 * SoC vendor certified DICE (Phase 3): This is identical to Phase 2, except the
   SoC vendor also does the UDS\_pub extraction or certification in their
   facilities, along with the OEM doing it in the factory. This tightens up the
@@ -163,67 +165,6 @@
 *   **KeyMint** is the secure area component that manages cryptographic keys and
     performs attestations (or perhaps some other secure area component).
 
-### Android Profile for DICE
-
-The Android Profile for DICE is based on the [Open Profile for
-DICE](https://pigweed.googlesource.com/open-dice/+/refs/heads/main/docs/specification.md),
-with additional constraints for details that the Open Profile for DICE leaves
-intentionally underspecified. This section describes the differences from the
-Open Profile for DICE.
-
-#### Algorithms
-
-The choice of algorithm must remain consistent with a given certificate e.g. if
-SHA-256 is used for the code hash then the authority hash, config hash, etc.
-must also use SHA-256.
-
-* UDS and CDI key pairs:
-  * Ed25519 / P-256 / P-384
-* Hash algorithms (digests can be encoded with their natural size and do not
-  need to be the 64-bytes specified by the Open Profile for DICE):
-  * SHA-256 / SHA-384 / SHA-512
-* HKDF with a supported message digest for all key derivation
-
-#### Mode
-
-A certificate must only set the mode to `normal` when all of the following
-conditions are met when loading and verifying the software component that is
-being described by the certificate:
-
-* verified boot with anti-rollback protection is enabled
-* only the verified boot authorities for production images are enabled
-* debug ports, fuses, or other debug facilities are disabled
-* device booted software from the normal primary source e.g. internal flash
-
-The mode should never be `not configured`.
-
-Every certificate in the DICE chain will need to be have the `normal` mode in
-order to be provisioned with production certificates by RKP.
-
-#### Configuration descriptor
-
-The configuration descriptor is a CBOR map with the following optional fields.
-If no fields are relevant, an empty map should be encoded. The key value range
-\[-70000, -70999\] is reserved for the Android Profile for DICE.
-Implementation-specific fields may be added using key values outside of the
-reserved range.
-
-```
-| Name              | Key    | Value type | Meaning                           |
-| ----------------- | ------ | ---------- | ----------------------------------|
-| Component name    | -70002 | tstr       | Name of firmware component / boot |
-:                   :        :            : stage                             :
-| Component version | -70003 | int / tstr | Version of firmware component /   |
-:                   :        :            : boot stage                        :
-| Resettable        | -70004 | null       | If present, key changes on factory|
-:                   :        :            : reset                             :
-| Security version  | -70005 | uint       | Machine-comparable, monotonically |
-:                   :        :            : increasing version of the firmware:
-:                   :        :            : component / boot stage where a    :
-:                   :        :            : greater value indicates a newer   :
-:                   :        :            : version                           :
-```
-
 ### HAL
 
 The remote provisioning HAL provides a simple interface that can be implemented
diff --git a/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs b/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs
index cf32694..9587efb 100644
--- a/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs
+++ b/uwb/aidl/default/src/uwb_chip.rs
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use binder::{Result, Strong};
 
-use tokio::fs::{self, File};
-use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
+use tokio::fs::{File, OpenOptions};
+use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
 use tokio::sync::Mutex;
 
 use std::os::fd::AsRawFd;
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
         callbacks: Strong<dyn IUwbClientCallback>,
         #[allow(dead_code)]
         tasks: tokio::task::JoinSet<()>,
+        serial: File,
     },
 }
 
@@ -64,7 +65,11 @@
     async fn open(&self, callbacks: &Strong<dyn IUwbClientCallback>) -> Result<()> {
         log::debug!("open: {:?}", &self.path);
 
-        let mut serial = File::open(&self.path)
+        let serial = OpenOptions::new()
+            .read(true)
+            .write(true)
+            .create(false)
+            .open(&self.path)
             .await
             .and_then(makeraw)
             .map_err(|_| binder::StatusCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR)?;
@@ -75,13 +80,17 @@
             let client_callbacks = callbacks.clone();
 
             let mut tasks = tokio::task::JoinSet::new();
+            let mut reader = serial
+                .try_clone()
+                .await
+                .map_err(|_| binder::StatusCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR)?;
 
             tasks.spawn(async move {
                 loop {
                     const UWB_HEADER_SIZE: usize = 4;
 
                     let mut buffer = vec![0; UWB_HEADER_SIZE];
-                    serial
+                    reader
                         .read_exact(&mut buffer[0..UWB_HEADER_SIZE])
                         .await
                         .unwrap();
@@ -89,7 +98,7 @@
                     let length = buffer[3] as usize + UWB_HEADER_SIZE;
 
                     buffer.resize(length, 0);
-                    serial
+                    reader
                         .read_exact(&mut buffer[UWB_HEADER_SIZE..length])
                         .await
                         .unwrap();
@@ -103,6 +112,7 @@
             *state = State::Opened {
                 callbacks: callbacks.clone(),
                 tasks,
+                serial,
             };
 
             Ok(())
@@ -149,10 +159,11 @@
     async fn sendUciMessage(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<i32> {
         log::debug!("sendUciMessage");
 
-        if let State::Opened { .. } = &mut *self.state.lock().await {
-            fs::write(&self.path, data)
+        if let State::Opened { ref mut serial, .. } = &mut *self.state.lock().await {
+            serial
+                .write(data)
                 .await
-                .map(|_| data.len() as i32)
+                .map(|written| written as i32)
                 .map_err(|_| binder::StatusCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR.into())
         } else {
             Err(binder::ExceptionCode::ILLEGAL_STATE.into())
diff --git a/wifi/netlinkinterceptor/aidl/default/InterceptorRelay.cpp b/wifi/netlinkinterceptor/aidl/default/InterceptorRelay.cpp
index ded9122..e84a5cf 100644
--- a/wifi/netlinkinterceptor/aidl/default/InterceptorRelay.cpp
+++ b/wifi/netlinkinterceptor/aidl/default/InterceptorRelay.cpp
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 using namespace std::chrono_literals;
 
 static constexpr std::chrono::milliseconds kPollTimeout = 300ms;
-static constexpr bool kSuperVerbose = true;
+static constexpr bool kSuperVerbose = false;
 
 InterceptorRelay::InterceptorRelay(uint32_t nlFamily, uint32_t clientNlPid,
                                    const std::string& clientName)