diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..893b016
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ *////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL file. Do not edit it manually. There are
+// two cases:
+// 1). this is a frozen version file - do not edit this in any case.
+// 2). this is a 'current' file. If you make a backwards compatible change to
+//     the interface (from the latest frozen version), the build system will
+//     prompt you to update this file with `m <name>-update-api`.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible change to any AIDL file built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.security.keymint;
+@RustDerive(Clone=true, Eq=true, Hash=true, Ord=true, PartialEq=true, PartialOrd=true) @VintfStability
+parcelable AttestationKey {
+  byte[] keyBlob;
+  android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] attestKeyParams;
+  byte[] issuerSubjectName;
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl
index a35b46c..3faba48 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl
@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@
   UNSUPPORTED_MGF_DIGEST = -79,
   MISSING_NOT_BEFORE = -80,
   MISSING_NOT_AFTER = -81,
+  MISSING_ISSUER_SUBJECT = -82,
+  INVALID_ISSUER_SUBJECT = -83,
   UNIMPLEMENTED = -100,
   VERSION_MISMATCH = -101,
   UNKNOWN_ERROR = -1000,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index 9f4e509..d3c6910 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@
 interface IKeyMintDevice {
   android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyMintHardwareInfo getHardwareInfo();
   void addRngEntropy(in byte[] data);
-  android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCreationResult generateKey(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] keyParams);
-  android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCreationResult importKey(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] keyParams, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyFormat keyFormat, in byte[] keyData);
+  android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCreationResult generateKey(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] keyParams, in @nullable android.hardware.security.keymint.AttestationKey attestationKey);
+  android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCreationResult importKey(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] keyParams, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyFormat keyFormat, in byte[] keyData, in @nullable android.hardware.security.keymint.AttestationKey attestationKey);
   android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCreationResult importWrappedKey(in byte[] wrappedKeyData, in byte[] wrappingKeyBlob, in byte[] maskingKey, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] unwrappingParams, in long passwordSid, in long biometricSid);
-  byte[] upgradeKey(in byte[] inKeyBlobToUpgrade, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] inUpgradeParams);
-  void deleteKey(in byte[] inKeyBlob);
+  byte[] upgradeKey(in byte[] keyBlobToUpgrade, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] upgradeParams);
+  void deleteKey(in byte[] keyBlob);
   void deleteAllKeys();
   void destroyAttestationIds();
-  android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult begin(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose inPurpose, in byte[] inKeyBlob, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] inParams, in android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken inAuthToken);
+  android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult begin(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] params, in android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken authToken);
   void deviceLocked(in boolean passwordOnly, in @nullable android.hardware.security.secureclock.TimeStampToken timestampToken);
   void earlyBootEnded();
   const int AUTH_TOKEN_MAC_LENGTH = 32;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
index c1e92af..61bb7e4 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
@@ -39,4 +39,5 @@
   VERIFY = 3,
   WRAP_KEY = 5,
   AGREE_KEY = 6,
+  ATTEST_KEY = 7,
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8167ceb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.security.keymint;
+
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter;
+
+/**
+ * Contains a key blob with Tag::ATTEST_KEY that can be used to sign an attestation certificate,
+ * and the DER-encoded X.501 Subject Name that will be placed in the Issuer field of the attestation
+ * certificate.
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@RustDerive(Clone=true, Eq=true, PartialEq=true, Ord=true, PartialOrd=true, Hash=true)
+parcelable AttestationKey {
+    byte[] keyBlob;
+    KeyParameter[] attestKeyParams;
+    byte[] issuerSubjectName;
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl
index 35e3827..5765130 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.aidl
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@
     UNSUPPORTED_MGF_DIGEST = -79,
     MISSING_NOT_BEFORE = -80,
     MISSING_NOT_AFTER = -81,
+    MISSING_ISSUER_SUBJECT = -82,
+    INVALID_ISSUER_SUBJECT = -83,
 
     UNIMPLEMENTED = -100,
     VERSION_MISMATCH = -101,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index 71abedd..13e98af 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 package android.hardware.security.keymint;
 
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.AttestationKey;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.ByteArray;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken;
@@ -315,9 +316,18 @@
      *        provided in params.  See above for detailed specifications of which tags are required
      *        for which types of keys.
      *
+     * @param attestationKey, if provided, specifies the key that must be used to sign the
+     *        attestation certificate.  If `keyParams` does not contain a Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE
+     *        but `attestationKey` is non-null, the IKeyMintDevice must return
+     *        ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.  If the provided AttestationKey does not contain a key
+     *        blob containing an asymmetric key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the IKeyMintDevice must
+     *        return ErrorCode::INVALID_PURPOSE.  If the provided AttestationKey has an empty issuer
+     *        subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+     *
      * @return The result of key creation.  See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
      */
-    KeyCreationResult generateKey(in KeyParameter[] keyParams);
+    KeyCreationResult generateKey(
+            in KeyParameter[] keyParams, in @nullable AttestationKey attestationKey);
 
     /**
      * Imports key material into an IKeyMintDevice.  Key definition parameters and return values
@@ -345,10 +355,18 @@
      *
      * @param inKeyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
      *
+     * @param attestationKey, if provided, specifies the key that must be used to sign the
+     *        attestation certificate.  If `keyParams` does not contain a Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE
+     *        but `attestationKey` is non-null, the IKeyMintDevice must return
+     *        ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.  If the provided AttestationKey does not contain a key
+     *        blob containing an asymmetric key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the IKeyMintDevice must
+     *        return ErrorCode::INVALID_PURPOSE.  If the provided AttestationKey has an empty issuer
+     *        subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+     *
      * @return The result of key creation.  See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
      */
-    KeyCreationResult importKey(
-            in KeyParameter[] keyParams, in KeyFormat keyFormat, in byte[] keyData);
+    KeyCreationResult importKey(in KeyParameter[] keyParams, in KeyFormat keyFormat,
+            in byte[] keyData, in @nullable AttestationKey attestationKey);
 
     /**
      * Securely imports a key, or key pair, returning a key blob and a description of the imported
@@ -467,7 +485,7 @@
      * @return A new key blob that references the same key as keyBlobToUpgrade, but is in the new
      *         format, or has the new version data.
      */
-    byte[] upgradeKey(in byte[] inKeyBlobToUpgrade, in KeyParameter[] inUpgradeParams);
+    byte[] upgradeKey(in byte[] keyBlobToUpgrade, in KeyParameter[] upgradeParams);
 
     /**
      * Deletes the key, or key pair, associated with the key blob.  Calling this function on
@@ -477,7 +495,7 @@
      *
      * @param inKeyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
      */
-    void deleteKey(in byte[] inKeyBlob);
+    void deleteKey(in byte[] keyBlob);
 
     /**
      * Deletes all keys in the hardware keystore.  Used when keystore is reset completely.  After
@@ -703,8 +721,8 @@
      *         from operations that generate an IV or nonce, and IKeyMintOperation object pointer
      *         which is used to perform update(), finish() or abort() operations.
      */
-    BeginResult begin(in KeyPurpose inPurpose, in byte[] inKeyBlob, in KeyParameter[] inParams,
-            in HardwareAuthToken inAuthToken);
+    BeginResult begin(in KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in KeyParameter[] params,
+            in HardwareAuthToken authToken);
 
     /**
      * Called by client to notify the IKeyMintDevice that the device is now locked, and keys with
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
index 68c1740..978a027 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
@@ -16,12 +16,11 @@
 
 package android.hardware.security.keymint;
 
-
 /**
  * Possible purposes of a key (or pair).
  */
 @VintfStability
-@Backing(type = "int")
+@Backing(type="int")
 enum KeyPurpose {
     /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
     ENCRYPT = 0,
@@ -42,5 +41,7 @@
     /* Key Agreement, usable with EC keys. */
     AGREE_KEY = 6,
 
-    /* TODO(seleneh) add ATTEST_KEY and their corresponding codes and tests later*/
+    /* Usable as an attestation signing key.  Keys with this purpose must not have any other
+     * purpose. */
+    ATTEST_KEY = 7,
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 70f0b8a..7e78c45 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
         "use_libaidlvintf_gtest_helper_static",
     ],
     srcs: [
+        "AttestKeyTest.cpp",
         "KeyMintTest.cpp",
     ],
     shared_libs: [
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e7a466
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "keymint_1_attest_key_test"
+#include <cutils/log.h>
+
+#include <keymint_support/key_param_output.h>
+#include <keymint_support/openssl_utils.h>
+
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
+namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test {
+
+namespace {
+
+vector<uint8_t> make_name_from_str(const string& name) {
+    X509_NAME_Ptr x509_name(X509_NAME_new());
+    EXPECT_TRUE(x509_name.get() != nullptr);
+    if (!x509_name) return {};
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(x509_name.get(),  //
+                                            "CN",             //
+                                            MBSTRING_ASC,
+                                            reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(name.c_str()),
+                                            -1,  // len
+                                            -1,  // loc
+                                            0 /* set */));
+
+    int len = i2d_X509_NAME(x509_name.get(), nullptr /* only return length */);
+    EXPECT_GT(len, 0);
+
+    vector<uint8_t> retval(len);
+    uint8_t* p = retval.data();
+    i2d_X509_NAME(x509_name.get(), &p);
+
+    return retval;
+}
+
+bool IsSelfSigned(const vector<Certificate>& chain) {
+    if (chain.size() != 1) return false;
+    return ChainSignaturesAreValid(chain);
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+using AttestKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
+
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllRsaSizes) {
+    for (auto size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+        /*
+         * Create attestaton key.
+         */
+        AttestationKey attest_key;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+        vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .RsaSigningKey(size, 65537)
+                                                     .AttestKey()
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                             {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+                                             &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+        EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain)) << "Failed on size " << size;
+
+        /*
+         * Use attestation key to sign RSA key
+         */
+        attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+        vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+        vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+                              &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+        EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+        if (attest_key_cert_chain.size() > 0) {
+            attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
+        }
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        /*
+         * Use attestation key to sign EC key
+         */
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+                              &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+
+        hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+        EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+        if (attest_key_cert_chain.size() > 0) {
+            attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
+        }
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        // Bail early if anything failed.
+        if (HasFailure()) return;
+    }
+}
+
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllEcCurves) {
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+        /*
+         * Create attestaton key.
+         */
+        AttestationKey attest_key;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+        vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+                                                     .AttestKey()
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                             {} /* attestation siging key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+                                             &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+        EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain)) << "Failed on curve " << curve;
+
+        /*
+         * Use attestation key to sign RSA key
+         */
+        attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+        vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+        vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+                              &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+        EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+        if (attest_key_cert_chain.size() > 0) {
+            attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
+        }
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        /*
+         * Use attestation key to sign EC key
+         */
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+                              &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+
+        hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+        EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+        if (attest_key_cert_chain.size() > 0) {
+            attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
+        }
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        // Bail early if anything failed.
+        if (HasFailure()) return;
+    }
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AttestKeyTest);
+
+}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index eb66aca..d61a081 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -22,15 +22,23 @@
 
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
 #include <android/binder_manager.h>
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
 
+#include <keymint_support/attestation_record.h>
 #include <keymint_support/key_param_output.h>
 #include <keymint_support/keymint_utils.h>
+#include <keymint_support/openssl_utils.h>
 
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint {
 
 using namespace std::literals::chrono_literals;
 using std::endl;
 using std::optional;
+using std::unique_ptr;
+using ::testing::AssertionFailure;
+using ::testing::AssertionResult;
+using ::testing::AssertionSuccess;
 
 ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const AuthorizationSet& set) {
     if (set.size() == 0)
@@ -73,8 +81,67 @@
     return true;
 }
 
+// Extract attestation record from cert. Returned object is still part of cert; don't free it
+// separately.
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING* get_attestation_record(X509* certificate) {
+    ASN1_OBJECT_Ptr oid(OBJ_txt2obj(kAttestionRecordOid, 1 /* dotted string format */));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(!!oid.get());
+    if (!oid.get()) return nullptr;
+
+    int location = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(certificate, oid.get(), -1 /* search from beginning */);
+    EXPECT_NE(-1, location) << "Attestation extension not found in certificate";
+    if (location == -1) return nullptr;
+
+    X509_EXTENSION* attest_rec_ext = X509_get_ext(certificate, location);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec_ext)
+            << "Found attestation extension but couldn't retrieve it?  Probably a BoringSSL bug.";
+    if (!attest_rec_ext) return nullptr;
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(attest_rec_ext);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec) << "Attestation extension contained no data";
+    return attest_rec;
+}
+
+bool avb_verification_enabled() {
+    char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+    return property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", value, "") != 0;
+}
+
+char nibble2hex[16] = {'0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
+                       '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f'};
+
+// Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter the key
+// lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.
+auto kTagsToFilter = {
+        Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS,  //
+        Tag::CREATION_DATETIME,        //
+        Tag::EC_CURVE,
+        Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,
+        Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID,
+};
+
+AuthorizationSet filtered_tags(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
+    AuthorizationSet filtered;
+    std::remove_copy_if(
+            set.begin(), set.end(), std::back_inserter(filtered), [](const auto& entry) -> bool {
+                return std::find(kTagsToFilter.begin(), kTagsToFilter.end(), entry.tag) !=
+                       kTagsToFilter.end();
+            });
+    return filtered;
+}
+
+string x509NameToStr(X509_NAME* name) {
+    char* s = X509_NAME_oneline(name, nullptr, 0);
+    string retval(s);
+    OPENSSL_free(s);
+    return retval;
+}
+
 }  // namespace
 
+bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::arm_deleteAllKeys = false;
+bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations = false;
+
 ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result) {
     if (result.isOk()) return ErrorCode::OK;
 
@@ -110,48 +177,48 @@
 }
 
 ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc,
+                                           const optional<AttestationKey>& attest_key,
                                            vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
-                                           vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics) {
+                                           vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics,
+                                           vector<Certificate>* cert_chain) {
     EXPECT_NE(key_blob, nullptr) << "Key blob pointer must not be null.  Test bug";
     EXPECT_NE(key_characteristics, nullptr)
             << "Previous characteristics not deleted before generating key.  Test bug.";
 
-    // Aidl does not clear these output parameters if the function returns
-    // error.  This is different from hal where output parameter is always
-    // cleared due to hal returning void.  So now we need to do our own clearing
-    // of the output variables prior to calling keyMint aidl libraries.
-    key_blob->clear();
-    key_characteristics->clear();
-    cert_chain_.clear();
-
     KeyCreationResult creationResult;
-    Status result = keymint_->generateKey(key_desc.vector_data(), &creationResult);
-
+    Status result = keymint_->generateKey(key_desc.vector_data(), attest_key, &creationResult);
     if (result.isOk()) {
         EXPECT_PRED2(KeyCharacteristicsBasicallyValid, SecLevel(),
                      creationResult.keyCharacteristics);
         EXPECT_GT(creationResult.keyBlob.size(), 0);
         *key_blob = std::move(creationResult.keyBlob);
         *key_characteristics = std::move(creationResult.keyCharacteristics);
-        cert_chain_ = std::move(creationResult.certificateChain);
+        *cert_chain = std::move(creationResult.certificateChain);
 
         auto algorithm = key_desc.GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM);
         EXPECT_TRUE(algorithm);
         if (algorithm &&
             (algorithm.value() == Algorithm::RSA || algorithm.value() == Algorithm::EC)) {
-            EXPECT_GE(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
-            if (key_desc.Contains(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE)) EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+            EXPECT_GE(cert_chain->size(), 1);
+            if (key_desc.Contains(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE)) {
+                if (attest_key) {
+                    EXPECT_EQ(cert_chain->size(), 1);
+                } else {
+                    EXPECT_GT(cert_chain->size(), 1);
+                }
+            }
         } else {
             // For symmetric keys there should be no certificates.
-            EXPECT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+            EXPECT_EQ(cert_chain->size(), 0);
         }
     }
 
     return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
 }
 
-ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc) {
-    return GenerateKey(key_desc, &key_blob_, &key_characteristics_);
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc,
+                                           const optional<AttestationKey>& attest_key) {
+    return GenerateKey(key_desc, attest_key, &key_blob_, &key_characteristics_, &cert_chain_);
 }
 
 ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
@@ -166,7 +233,7 @@
     KeyCreationResult creationResult;
     result = keymint_->importKey(key_desc.vector_data(), format,
                                  vector<uint8_t>(key_material.begin(), key_material.end()),
-                                 &creationResult);
+                                 {} /* attestationSigningKeyBlob */, &creationResult);
 
     if (result.isOk()) {
         EXPECT_PRED2(KeyCharacteristicsBasicallyValid, SecLevel(),
@@ -916,6 +983,240 @@
     return result;
 }
 
+bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge,                //
+                               const string& app_id,                   //
+                               AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced,  //
+                               AuthorizationSet expected_hw_enforced,  //
+                               SecurityLevel security_level,
+                               const vector<uint8_t>& attestation_cert) {
+    X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(attestation_cert));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(!!cert.get());
+    if (!cert.get()) return false;
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
+    EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec);
+    if (!attest_rec) return false;
+
+    AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced;
+    AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced;
+    uint32_t att_attestation_version;
+    uint32_t att_keymaster_version;
+    SecurityLevel att_attestation_security_level;
+    SecurityLevel att_keymaster_security_level;
+    vector<uint8_t> att_challenge;
+    vector<uint8_t> att_unique_id;
+    vector<uint8_t> att_app_id;
+
+    auto error = parse_attestation_record(attest_rec->data,                 //
+                                          attest_rec->length,               //
+                                          &att_attestation_version,         //
+                                          &att_attestation_security_level,  //
+                                          &att_keymaster_version,           //
+                                          &att_keymaster_security_level,    //
+                                          &att_challenge,                   //
+                                          &att_sw_enforced,                 //
+                                          &att_hw_enforced,                 //
+                                          &att_unique_id);
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
+    if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return false;
+
+    EXPECT_GE(att_attestation_version, 3U);
+
+    expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
+                                   vector<uint8_t>(app_id.begin(), app_id.end()));
+
+    EXPECT_GE(att_keymaster_version, 4U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymaster_security_level);
+    EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_attestation_security_level);
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
+    EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));
+
+    char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {};
+    // TODO(b/136282179): When running under VTS-on-GSI the TEE-backed
+    // keymaster implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
+    // for the BOOT_PATCH_LEVEL.
+    if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
+        for (int i = 0; i < att_hw_enforced.size(); i++) {
+            if (att_hw_enforced[i].tag == TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL ||
+                att_hw_enforced[i].tag == TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL) {
+                std::string date =
+                        std::to_string(att_hw_enforced[i].value.get<KeyParameterValue::dateTime>());
+                // strptime seems to require delimiters, but the tag value will
+                // be YYYYMMDD
+                date.insert(6, "-");
+                date.insert(4, "-");
+                EXPECT_EQ(date.size(), 10);
+                struct tm time;
+                strptime(date.c_str(), "%Y-%m-%d", &time);
+
+                // Day of the month (0-31)
+                EXPECT_GE(time.tm_mday, 0);
+                EXPECT_LT(time.tm_mday, 32);
+                // Months since Jan (0-11)
+                EXPECT_GE(time.tm_mon, 0);
+                EXPECT_LT(time.tm_mon, 12);
+                // Years since 1900
+                EXPECT_GT(time.tm_year, 110);
+                EXPECT_LT(time.tm_year, 200);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Check to make sure boolean values are properly encoded. Presence of a boolean tag
+    // indicates true. A provided boolean tag that can be pulled back out of the certificate
+    // indicates correct encoding. No need to check if it's in both lists, since the
+    // AuthorizationSet compare below will handle mismatches of tags.
+    if (security_level == SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+        EXPECT_TRUE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
+    } else {
+        EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
+    }
+
+    // Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
+    // the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
+    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(att_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
+
+    if (att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)) {
+        // For ECDSA keys, either an EC_CURVE or a KEY_SIZE can be specified, but one must be.
+        EXPECT_TRUE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) ||
+                    att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE));
+    }
+
+    // Test root of trust elements
+    vector<uint8_t> verified_boot_key;
+    VerifiedBoot verified_boot_state;
+    bool device_locked;
+    vector<uint8_t> verified_boot_hash;
+    error = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &verified_boot_key,
+                                &verified_boot_state, &device_locked, &verified_boot_hash);
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
+
+    if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
+        EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.digest", property_value, ""), 0);
+        string prop_string(property_value);
+        EXPECT_EQ(prop_string.size(), 64);
+        EXPECT_EQ(prop_string, bin2hex(verified_boot_hash));
+
+        EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", property_value, ""), 0);
+        if (!strcmp(property_value, "unlocked")) {
+            EXPECT_FALSE(device_locked);
+        } else {
+            EXPECT_TRUE(device_locked);
+        }
+
+        // Check that the device is locked if not debuggable, e.g., user build
+        // images in CTS. For VTS, debuggable images are used to allow adb root
+        // and the device is unlocked.
+        if (!property_get_bool("ro.debuggable", false)) {
+            EXPECT_TRUE(device_locked);
+        } else {
+            EXPECT_FALSE(device_locked);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Verified boot key should be all 0's if the boot state is not verified or self signed
+    std::string empty_boot_key(32, '\0');
+    std::string verified_boot_key_str((const char*)verified_boot_key.data(),
+                                      verified_boot_key.size());
+    EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", property_value, ""), 0);
+    if (!strcmp(property_value, "green")) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::VERIFIED);
+        EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
+                            verified_boot_key.size()));
+    } else if (!strcmp(property_value, "yellow")) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::SELF_SIGNED);
+        EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
+                            verified_boot_key.size()));
+    } else if (!strcmp(property_value, "orange")) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::UNVERIFIED);
+        EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
+                            verified_boot_key.size()));
+    } else if (!strcmp(property_value, "red")) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::FAILED);
+    } else {
+        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::UNVERIFIED);
+        EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
+                            verified_boot_key.size()));
+    }
+
+    att_sw_enforced.Sort();
+    expected_sw_enforced.Sort();
+    auto a = filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced);
+    auto b = filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced);
+    EXPECT_EQ(a, b);
+
+    att_hw_enforced.Sort();
+    expected_hw_enforced.Sort();
+    EXPECT_EQ(filtered_tags(expected_hw_enforced), filtered_tags(att_hw_enforced));
+
+    return true;
+}
+
+string bin2hex(const vector<uint8_t>& data) {
+    string retval;
+    retval.reserve(data.size() * 2 + 1);
+    for (uint8_t byte : data) {
+        retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & (byte >> 4)]);
+        retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & byte]);
+    }
+    return retval;
+}
+
+AssertionResult ChainSignaturesAreValid(const vector<Certificate>& chain) {
+    std::stringstream cert_data;
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < chain.size(); ++i) {
+        cert_data << bin2hex(chain[i].encodedCertificate) << std::endl;
+
+        X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(chain[i].encodedCertificate));
+        X509_Ptr signing_cert;
+        if (i < chain.size() - 1) {
+            signing_cert = parse_cert_blob(chain[i + 1].encodedCertificate);
+        } else {
+            signing_cert = parse_cert_blob(chain[i].encodedCertificate);
+        }
+        if (!key_cert.get() || !signing_cert.get()) return AssertionFailure() << cert_data.str();
+
+        EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
+        if (!signing_pubkey.get()) return AssertionFailure() << cert_data.str();
+
+        if (!X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get())) {
+            return AssertionFailure()
+                   << "Verification of certificate " << i << " failed "
+                   << "OpenSSL error string: " << ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) << '\n'
+                   << cert_data.str();
+        }
+
+        string cert_issuer = x509NameToStr(X509_get_issuer_name(key_cert.get()));
+        string signer_subj = x509NameToStr(X509_get_subject_name(signing_cert.get()));
+        if (cert_issuer != signer_subj) {
+            return AssertionFailure() << "Cert " << i << " has wrong issuer.\n" << cert_data.str();
+        }
+
+        if (i == 0) {
+            string cert_sub = x509NameToStr(X509_get_subject_name(key_cert.get()));
+            if ("/CN=Android Keystore Key" != cert_sub) {
+                return AssertionFailure()
+                       << "Leaf cert has wrong subject, should be CN=Android Keystore Key, was "
+                       << cert_sub << '\n'
+                       << cert_data.str();
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations) std::cout << cert_data.str();
+    return AssertionSuccess();
+}
+
+X509_Ptr parse_cert_blob(const vector<uint8_t>& blob) {
+    const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
+    return X509_Ptr(d2i_X509(nullptr /* allocate new */, &p, blob.size()));
+}
+
 }  // namespace test
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index 4e546ed..452d2b6 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -21,20 +21,27 @@
 #include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
 #include <binder/ProcessState.h>
 #include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
 
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ErrorCode.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.h>
 
 #include <keymint_support/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keymint_support/openssl_utils.h>
 
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint {
 
 ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const AuthorizationSet& set);
 
+inline bool operator==(const keymint::AuthorizationSet& a, const keymint::AuthorizationSet& b) {
+    return a.size() == b.size() && std::equal(a.begin(), a.end(), b.begin());
+}
+
 namespace test {
 
 using ::android::sp;
 using Status = ::ndk::ScopedAStatus;
+using ::std::optional;
 using ::std::shared_ptr;
 using ::std::string;
 using ::std::vector;
@@ -48,6 +55,9 @@
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> characteristics;
     };
 
+    static bool arm_deleteAllKeys;
+    static bool dump_Attestations;
+
     void SetUp() override;
     void TearDown() override {
         if (key_blob_.size()) {
@@ -62,10 +72,19 @@
     uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }
 
     ErrorCode GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result);
-    ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
-                          vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics);
 
-    ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc);
+    ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
+                          vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics) {
+        return GenerateKey(key_desc, std::nullopt /* attest_key */, key_blob, key_characteristics,
+                           &cert_chain_);
+    }
+    ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc,
+                          const optional<AttestationKey>& attest_key, vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
+                          vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics,
+                          vector<Certificate>* cert_chain);
+    ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc,
+                          const optional<AttestationKey>& attest_key = std::nullopt);
+
     ErrorCode ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
                         const string& key_material, vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
                         vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics);
@@ -254,6 +273,16 @@
     long challenge_;
 };
 
+bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge,                //
+                               const string& app_id,                   //
+                               AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced,  //
+                               AuthorizationSet expected_hw_enforced,  //
+                               SecurityLevel security_level,
+                               const vector<uint8_t>& attestation_cert);
+string bin2hex(const vector<uint8_t>& data);
+X509_Ptr parse_cert_blob(const vector<uint8_t>& blob);
+::testing::AssertionResult ChainSignaturesAreValid(const vector<Certificate>& chain);
+
 #define INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(name)                                          \
     INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, name,                                      \
                              testing::ValuesIn(KeyMintAidlTestBase::build_params()), \
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index 7801ed1..71aae90 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
-#define LOG_TAG "keymint_5_test"
+#define LOG_TAG "keymint_1_test"
 #include <cutils/log.h>
 
 #include <signal.h>
@@ -23,34 +23,21 @@
 #include <openssl/ec.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 
 #include <cutils/properties.h>
 
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyFormat.h>
 
-#include <keymint_support/attestation_record.h>
 #include <keymint_support/key_param_output.h>
 #include <keymint_support/openssl_utils.h>
 
 #include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
 
-static bool arm_deleteAllKeys = false;
-static bool dump_Attestations = false;
-
 using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::AuthorizationSet;
 using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyCharacteristics;
 using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::KeyFormat;
 
-namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint {
-
-bool operator==(const keymint::AuthorizationSet& a, const keymint::AuthorizationSet& b) {
-    return a.size() == b.size() && std::equal(a.begin(), a.end(), b.begin());
-}
-
-}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
-
 namespace std {
 
 using namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint;
@@ -183,281 +170,6 @@
     void operator()(RSA* p) { RSA_free(p); }
 };
 
-char nibble2hex[16] = {'0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-                       '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f'};
-
-string bin2hex(const vector<uint8_t>& data) {
-    string retval;
-    retval.reserve(data.size() * 2 + 1);
-    for (uint8_t byte : data) {
-        retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & (byte >> 4)]);
-        retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & byte]);
-    }
-    return retval;
-}
-
-X509* parse_cert_blob(const vector<uint8_t>& blob) {
-    const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
-    return d2i_X509(nullptr, &p, blob.size());
-}
-
-bool verify_chain(const vector<Certificate>& chain) {
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < chain.size(); ++i) {
-        X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(chain[i].encodedCertificate));
-        X509_Ptr signing_cert;
-        if (i < chain.size() - 1) {
-            signing_cert.reset(parse_cert_blob(chain[i + 1].encodedCertificate));
-        } else {
-            signing_cert.reset(parse_cert_blob(chain[i].encodedCertificate));
-        }
-        EXPECT_TRUE(!!key_cert.get() && !!signing_cert.get());
-        if (!key_cert.get() || !signing_cert.get()) return false;
-
-        EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
-        EXPECT_TRUE(!!signing_pubkey.get());
-        if (!signing_pubkey.get()) return false;
-
-        EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get()))
-                << "Verification of certificate " << i << " failed "
-                << "OpenSSL error string: " << ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL);
-
-        char* cert_issuer =  //
-                X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(key_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
-        char* signer_subj =
-                X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(signing_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
-        EXPECT_STREQ(cert_issuer, signer_subj) << "Cert " << i << " has wrong issuer.";
-        if (i == 0) {
-            char* cert_sub = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(key_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
-            EXPECT_STREQ("/CN=Android Keystore Key", cert_sub)
-                    << "Cert " << i << " has wrong subject.";
-            OPENSSL_free(cert_sub);
-        }
-
-        OPENSSL_free(cert_issuer);
-        OPENSSL_free(signer_subj);
-
-        if (dump_Attestations) std::cout << bin2hex(chain[i].encodedCertificate) << std::endl;
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-// Extract attestation record from cert. Returned object is still part of cert; don't free it
-// separately.
-ASN1_OCTET_STRING* get_attestation_record(X509* certificate) {
-    ASN1_OBJECT_Ptr oid(OBJ_txt2obj(kAttestionRecordOid, 1 /* dotted string format */));
-    EXPECT_TRUE(!!oid.get());
-    if (!oid.get()) return nullptr;
-
-    int location = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(certificate, oid.get(), -1 /* search from beginning */);
-    EXPECT_NE(-1, location) << "Attestation extension not found in certificate";
-    if (location == -1) return nullptr;
-
-    X509_EXTENSION* attest_rec_ext = X509_get_ext(certificate, location);
-    EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec_ext)
-            << "Found attestation extension but couldn't retrieve it?  Probably a BoringSSL bug.";
-    if (!attest_rec_ext) return nullptr;
-
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(attest_rec_ext);
-    EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec) << "Attestation extension contained no data";
-    return attest_rec;
-}
-
-bool tag_in_list(const KeyParameter& entry) {
-    // Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter
-    // the key lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.
-    auto tag_list = {
-            Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS,  //
-            Tag::CREATION_DATETIME,        //
-            Tag::EC_CURVE,
-            Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,
-            Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID,
-    };
-    return std::find(tag_list.begin(), tag_list.end(), entry.tag) != tag_list.end();
-}
-
-AuthorizationSet filtered_tags(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
-    AuthorizationSet filtered;
-    std::remove_copy_if(set.begin(), set.end(), std::back_inserter(filtered), tag_in_list);
-    return filtered;
-}
-
-bool avb_verification_enabled() {
-    char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-    return property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", value, "") != 0;
-}
-
-bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge,                //
-                               const string& app_id,                   //
-                               AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced,  //
-                               AuthorizationSet expected_hw_enforced,  //
-                               SecurityLevel security_level,
-                               const vector<uint8_t>& attestation_cert) {
-    X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(attestation_cert));
-    EXPECT_TRUE(!!cert.get());
-    if (!cert.get()) return false;
-
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
-    EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec);
-    if (!attest_rec) return false;
-
-    AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced;
-    AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced;
-    uint32_t att_attestation_version;
-    uint32_t att_keymaster_version;
-    SecurityLevel att_attestation_security_level;
-    SecurityLevel att_keymaster_security_level;
-    vector<uint8_t> att_challenge;
-    vector<uint8_t> att_unique_id;
-    vector<uint8_t> att_app_id;
-
-    auto error = parse_attestation_record(attest_rec->data,                 //
-                                          attest_rec->length,               //
-                                          &att_attestation_version,         //
-                                          &att_attestation_security_level,  //
-                                          &att_keymaster_version,           //
-                                          &att_keymaster_security_level,    //
-                                          &att_challenge,                   //
-                                          &att_sw_enforced,                 //
-                                          &att_hw_enforced,                 //
-                                          &att_unique_id);
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
-    if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return false;
-
-    EXPECT_GE(att_attestation_version, 3U);
-
-    expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
-                                   vector<uint8_t>(app_id.begin(), app_id.end()));
-
-    EXPECT_GE(att_keymaster_version, 4U);
-    EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymaster_security_level);
-    EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_attestation_security_level);
-
-    EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
-    EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));
-
-    char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {};
-    // TODO(b/136282179): When running under VTS-on-GSI the TEE-backed
-    // keymaster implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
-    // for the BOOT_PATCH_LEVEL.
-    if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
-        for (int i = 0; i < att_hw_enforced.size(); i++) {
-            if (att_hw_enforced[i].tag == TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL ||
-                att_hw_enforced[i].tag == TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL) {
-                std::string date =
-                        std::to_string(att_hw_enforced[i].value.get<KeyParameterValue::dateTime>());
-                // strptime seems to require delimiters, but the tag value will
-                // be YYYYMMDD
-                date.insert(6, "-");
-                date.insert(4, "-");
-                EXPECT_EQ(date.size(), 10);
-                struct tm time;
-                strptime(date.c_str(), "%Y-%m-%d", &time);
-
-                // Day of the month (0-31)
-                EXPECT_GE(time.tm_mday, 0);
-                EXPECT_LT(time.tm_mday, 32);
-                // Months since Jan (0-11)
-                EXPECT_GE(time.tm_mon, 0);
-                EXPECT_LT(time.tm_mon, 12);
-                // Years since 1900
-                EXPECT_GT(time.tm_year, 110);
-                EXPECT_LT(time.tm_year, 200);
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Check to make sure boolean values are properly encoded. Presence of a boolean tag indicates
-    // true. A provided boolean tag that can be pulled back out of the certificate indicates correct
-    // encoding. No need to check if it's in both lists, since the AuthorizationSet compare below
-    // will handle mismatches of tags.
-    if (security_level == SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
-        EXPECT_TRUE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
-    } else {
-        EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
-    }
-
-    // Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
-    // the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
-    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-    EXPECT_FALSE(att_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-    EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-
-    if (att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)) {
-        // For ECDSA keys, either an EC_CURVE or a KEY_SIZE can be specified, but one must be.
-        EXPECT_TRUE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) ||
-                    att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE));
-    }
-
-    // Test root of trust elements
-    vector<uint8_t> verified_boot_key;
-    VerifiedBoot verified_boot_state;
-    bool device_locked;
-    vector<uint8_t> verified_boot_hash;
-    error = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &verified_boot_key,
-                                &verified_boot_state, &device_locked, &verified_boot_hash);
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
-
-    if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
-        EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.digest", property_value, ""), 0);
-        string prop_string(property_value);
-        EXPECT_EQ(prop_string.size(), 64);
-        EXPECT_EQ(prop_string, bin2hex(verified_boot_hash));
-
-        EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", property_value, ""), 0);
-        if (!strcmp(property_value, "unlocked")) {
-            EXPECT_FALSE(device_locked);
-        } else {
-            EXPECT_TRUE(device_locked);
-        }
-
-        // Check that the device is locked if not debuggable, e.g., user build
-        // images in CTS. For VTS, debuggable images are used to allow adb root
-        // and the device is unlocked.
-        if (!property_get_bool("ro.debuggable", false)) {
-            EXPECT_TRUE(device_locked);
-        } else {
-            EXPECT_FALSE(device_locked);
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Verified boot key should be all 0's if the boot state is not verified or self signed
-    std::string empty_boot_key(32, '\0');
-    std::string verified_boot_key_str((const char*)verified_boot_key.data(),
-                                      verified_boot_key.size());
-    EXPECT_NE(property_get("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", property_value, ""), 0);
-    if (!strcmp(property_value, "green")) {
-        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::VERIFIED);
-        EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
-                            verified_boot_key.size()));
-    } else if (!strcmp(property_value, "yellow")) {
-        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::SELF_SIGNED);
-        EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
-                            verified_boot_key.size()));
-    } else if (!strcmp(property_value, "orange")) {
-        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::UNVERIFIED);
-        EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
-                            verified_boot_key.size()));
-    } else if (!strcmp(property_value, "red")) {
-        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::FAILED);
-    } else {
-        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, VerifiedBoot::UNVERIFIED);
-        EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
-                            verified_boot_key.size()));
-    }
-
-    att_sw_enforced.Sort();
-    expected_sw_enforced.Sort();
-    EXPECT_EQ(filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced));
-
-    att_hw_enforced.Sort();
-    expected_hw_enforced.Sort();
-    EXPECT_EQ(filtered_tags(expected_hw_enforced), filtered_tags(att_hw_enforced));
-
-    return true;
-}
-
 std::string make_string(const uint8_t* data, size_t length) {
     return std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data), length);
 }
@@ -596,7 +308,7 @@
                 << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
 
-        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_chain(cert_chain_));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
         ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
 
         AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
@@ -692,7 +404,7 @@
                 << "key usage count limit " << 1U << " missing";
 
         // Check the usage count limit tag also appears in the attestation.
-        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_chain(cert_chain_));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
         ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
 
         AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
@@ -5111,14 +4823,26 @@
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
 
 int main(int argc, char** argv) {
+    std::cout << "Testing ";
+    auto halInstances =
+            aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test::KeyMintAidlTestBase::build_params();
+    std::cout << "HAL instances:\n";
+    for (auto& entry : halInstances) {
+        std::cout << "    " << entry << '\n';
+    }
+
     ::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
     for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
         if (argv[i][0] == '-') {
             if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--arm_deleteAllKeys") {
-                arm_deleteAllKeys = true;
+                aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test::KeyMintAidlTestBase::
+                        arm_deleteAllKeys = true;
             }
             if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--dump_attestations") {
-                dump_Attestations = true;
+                aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test::KeyMintAidlTestBase::
+                        dump_Attestations = true;
+            } else {
+                std::cout << "NOT dumping attestations" << std::endl;
             }
         }
     }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
index db53a8f..45f9df6 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
 /**
  * Generate and validate a production-mode key.  MAC tag can't be verified.
  */
-TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateEcdsaP256Key_prodMode) {
+TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, DISABLED_generateEcdsaP256Key_prodMode) {
     MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
     bytevec privateKeyBlob;
     bool testMode = false;
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
 /**
  * Generate and validate a test-mode key.
  */
-TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateEcdsaP256Key_testMode) {
+TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, DISABLED_generateEcdsaP256Key_testMode) {
     MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
     bytevec privateKeyBlob;
     bool testMode = true;
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@
  * Generate an empty certificate request in test mode, and decrypt and verify the structure and
  * content.
  */
-TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_testMode) {
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_EmptyRequest_testMode) {
     bool testMode = true;
     bytevec keysToSignMac;
     ProtectedData protectedData;
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@
  * TODO(swillden): Get a valid GEEK and use it so the generation can succeed, though we won't be
  * able to decrypt.
  */
-TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_prodMode) {
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_EmptyRequest_prodMode) {
     bool testMode = false;
     bytevec keysToSignMac;
     ProtectedData protectedData;
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@
 /**
  * Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode.  Decrypt, parse and validate the contents.
  */
-TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testMode) {
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_NonEmptyRequest_testMode) {
     bool testMode = true;
     generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
 
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@
  * TODO(swillden): Get a valid GEEK and use it so the generation can succeed, though we won't be
  * able to decrypt.
  */
-TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_prodMode) {
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_NonEmptyRequest_prodMode) {
     bool testMode = false;
     generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
 
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@
  * Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode, with prod keys.  Must fail with
  * STATUS_PRODUCTION_KEY_IN_TEST_REQUEST.
  */
-TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_prodKeyInTestCert) {
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_NonEmptyRequest_prodKeyInTestCert) {
     generateKeys(false /* testMode */, 2 /* numKeys */);
 
     bytevec keysToSignMac;
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@
  * Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode, with test keys.  Must fail with
  * STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
  */
-TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testKeyInProdCert) {
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_NonEmptyRequest_testKeyInProdCert) {
     generateKeys(true /* testMode */, 2 /* numKeys */);
 
     bytevec keysToSignMac;