diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
index 6de0c1c..000d46e 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #include <keymasterV4_0/attestation_record.h>
 
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 
 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
@@ -26,6 +27,8 @@
 #include <keymasterV4_0/authorization_set.h>
 #include <keymasterV4_0/openssl_utils.h>
 
+#define AT __FILE__ ":" << __LINE__
+
 namespace android {
 namespace hardware {
 namespace keymaster {
@@ -304,6 +307,61 @@
     return extract_auth_list(record->tee_enforced, tee_enforced);
 }
 
+ErrorCode parse_root_of_trust(const uint8_t* asn1_key_desc, size_t asn1_key_desc_len,
+                              hidl_vec<uint8_t>* verified_boot_key,
+                              keymaster_verified_boot_t* verified_boot_state, bool* device_locked,
+                              hidl_vec<uint8_t>* verified_boot_hash) {
+    if (!verified_boot_key || !verified_boot_state || !device_locked || !verified_boot_hash) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "null pointer input(s)";
+        return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    const uint8_t* p = asn1_key_desc;
+    KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION_Ptr record(d2i_KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION(nullptr, &p, asn1_key_desc_len));
+    if (!record.get()) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed record parsing";
+        return ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+    }
+    if (!record->tee_enforced) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed hardware characteristic parsing";
+        return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    if (!record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed root of trust parsing";
+        return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    if (!record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust->verified_boot_key) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed verified boot key parsing";
+        return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust = record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust;
+
+    auto& vb_key = root_of_trust->verified_boot_key;
+    verified_boot_key->resize(vb_key->length);
+    memcpy(verified_boot_key->data(), vb_key->data, vb_key->length);
+
+    *verified_boot_state = static_cast<keymaster_verified_boot_t>(
+            ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(root_of_trust->verified_boot_state));
+    if (!verified_boot_state) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed verified boot state parsing";
+        return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+
+    *device_locked = root_of_trust->device_locked;
+    if (!device_locked) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed device locked parsing";
+        return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+
+    auto& vb_hash = root_of_trust->verified_boot_hash;
+    if (!vb_hash) {
+        LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed verified boot hash parsing";
+        return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    verified_boot_hash->resize(vb_hash->length);
+    memcpy(verified_boot_hash->data(), vb_hash->data, vb_hash->length);
+    return ErrorCode::OK;  // KM_ERROR_OK;
+}
+
 }  // namespace V4_0
 }  // namespace keymaster
 }  // namespace hardware
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/attestation_record.h b/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/attestation_record.h
index fae403a..eb95cea 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/attestation_record.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/include/keymasterV4_0/attestation_record.h
@@ -42,6 +42,13 @@
  */
 static const char kAttestionRecordOid[] = "1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17";
 
+enum keymaster_verified_boot_t {
+    KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED = 0,
+    KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_SELF_SIGNED = 1,
+    KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_UNVERIFIED = 2,
+    KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_FAILED = 3,
+};
+
 ErrorCode parse_attestation_record(const uint8_t* asn1_key_desc, size_t asn1_key_desc_len,
                                    uint32_t* attestation_version,  //
                                    SecurityLevel* attestation_security_level,
@@ -51,6 +58,12 @@
                                    AuthorizationSet* software_enforced,
                                    AuthorizationSet* tee_enforced,  //
                                    hidl_vec<uint8_t>* unique_id);
+
+ErrorCode parse_root_of_trust(const uint8_t* asn1_key_desc, size_t asn1_key_desc_len,
+                              hidl_vec<uint8_t>* verified_boot_key,
+                              keymaster_verified_boot_t* verified_boot_state, bool* device_locked,
+                              hidl_vec<uint8_t>* verified_boot_hash);
+
 }  // namespace V4_0
 }  // namespace keymaster
 }  // namespace hardware
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp
index 995ae4f..a7b6c98 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #include "KeymasterHidlTest.h"
 
+#include <chrono>
 #include <vector>
 
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
@@ -206,6 +207,47 @@
     CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_);
 }
 
+void KeymasterHidlTest::CheckCreationDateTime(
+        const AuthorizationSet& sw_enforced,
+        std::chrono::time_point<std::chrono::system_clock> creation) {
+    for (int i = 0; i < sw_enforced.size(); i++) {
+        if (sw_enforced[i].tag == TAG_CREATION_DATETIME) {
+            std::chrono::time_point<std::chrono::system_clock> now =
+                    std::chrono::system_clock::now();
+            std::chrono::time_point<std::chrono::system_clock> reported_time{
+                    std::chrono::milliseconds(sw_enforced[i].f.dateTime)};
+            // The test is flaky for EC keys, so a buffer time of 1 second will be added.
+            EXPECT_LE(creation - 1s, reported_time);
+            EXPECT_LE(reported_time, now + 1s);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+void KeymasterHidlTest::CheckGetCharacteristics(const HidlBuf& key_blob, const HidlBuf& client_id,
+                                                const HidlBuf& app_data,
+                                                KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics) {
+    HidlBuf empty_buf = {};
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GetCharacteristics(key_blob, client_id, app_data, key_characteristics));
+    EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+    EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              GetCharacteristics(key_blob, empty_buf, app_data, key_characteristics));
+    EXPECT_EQ(key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+    EXPECT_EQ(key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              GetCharacteristics(key_blob, client_id, empty_buf, key_characteristics));
+    EXPECT_EQ(key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+    EXPECT_EQ(key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              GetCharacteristics(key_blob, empty_buf, empty_buf, key_characteristics));
+    EXPECT_EQ(key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+    EXPECT_EQ(key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+}
+
 ErrorCode KeymasterHidlTest::GetCharacteristics(const HidlBuf& key_blob, const HidlBuf& client_id,
                                                 const HidlBuf& app_data,
                                                 KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics) {
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h
index 4cd6a5b..015fc43 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h
@@ -131,6 +131,11 @@
     void CheckedDeleteKey(HidlBuf* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false);
     void CheckedDeleteKey();
 
+    static void CheckCreationDateTime(const AuthorizationSet& sw_enforced,
+                                      std::chrono::time_point<std::chrono::system_clock> creation);
+
+    void CheckGetCharacteristics(const HidlBuf& key_blob, const HidlBuf& client_id,
+                                 const HidlBuf& app_data, KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics);
     ErrorCode GetCharacteristics(const HidlBuf& key_blob, const HidlBuf& client_id,
                                  const HidlBuf& app_data, KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics);
     ErrorCode GetCharacteristics(const HidlBuf& key_blob, KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics);
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index 5c07532..fc96724 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -313,8 +313,9 @@
 
 bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, const string& app_id,
                                AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced,
-                               AuthorizationSet expected_tee_enforced, SecurityLevel security_level,
-                               const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& attestation_cert) {
+                               AuthorizationSet expected_hw_enforced, SecurityLevel security_level,
+                               const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& attestation_cert,
+                               std::chrono::time_point<std::chrono::system_clock> creation_time) {
     X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(attestation_cert));
     EXPECT_TRUE(!!cert.get());
     if (!cert.get()) return false;
@@ -324,7 +325,7 @@
     if (!attest_rec) return false;
 
     AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced;
-    AuthorizationSet att_tee_enforced;
+    AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced;
     uint32_t att_attestation_version;
     uint32_t att_keymaster_version;
     SecurityLevel att_attestation_security_level;
@@ -341,7 +342,7 @@
                                           &att_keymaster_security_level,    //
                                           &att_challenge,                   //
                                           &att_sw_enforced,                 //
-                                          &att_tee_enforced,                //
+                                          &att_hw_enforced,                 //
                                           &att_unique_id);
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
     if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return false;
@@ -357,13 +358,105 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
     EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));
 
+    char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {};
+    for (int i = 0; i < att_hw_enforced.size(); i++) {
+        if (att_hw_enforced[i].tag == TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL ||
+            att_hw_enforced[i].tag == TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL) {
+            std::string date = std::to_string(att_hw_enforced[i].f.integer);
+            // strptime seems to require delimiters, but the tag value will be YYYYMMDD
+            date.insert(6, "-");
+            date.insert(4, "-");
+            EXPECT_EQ(date.size(), 10);
+            struct tm time;
+            strptime(date.c_str(), "%Y-%m-%d", &time);
+
+            // Day of the month (0-31)
+            EXPECT_GT(time.tm_mday, 0);
+            EXPECT_LT(time.tm_mday, 32);
+            // Months since Jan (0-11)
+            EXPECT_GE(time.tm_mon, 0);
+            EXPECT_LT(time.tm_mon, 12);
+            // Years since 1900
+            EXPECT_GT(time.tm_year, 110);
+            EXPECT_LT(time.tm_year, 200);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Check to make sure boolean values are properly encoded. Presence of a boolean tag indicates
+    // true. A provided boolean tag that can be pulled back out of the certificate indicates correct
+    // encoding. No need to check if it's in both lists, since the AuthorizationSet compare below
+    // will handle mismatches of tags.
+    EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
+
+    // Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
+    // the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
+    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
+
+    KeymasterHidlTest::CheckCreationDateTime(att_sw_enforced, creation_time);
+
+    if (att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)) {
+        // For ECDSA keys, either an EC_CURVE or a KEY_SIZE can be specified, but one must be.
+        EXPECT_TRUE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) ||
+                    att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE));
+    }
+
+    // Test root of trust elements
+    HidlBuf verified_boot_key;
+    keymaster_verified_boot_t verified_boot_state;
+    bool device_locked;
+    HidlBuf verified_boot_hash;
+    error = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &verified_boot_key,
+                                &verified_boot_state, &device_locked, &verified_boot_hash);
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
+
+    property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.digest", property_value, "nogood");
+    EXPECT_NE(strcmp(property_value, "nogood"), 0);
+    string prop_string(property_value);
+    EXPECT_EQ(prop_string.size(), 64);
+    EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(verified_boot_hash.data(), prop_string.data(), verified_boot_hash.size()));
+
+    property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", property_value, "nogood");
+    EXPECT_NE(property_value, "nogood");
+    if (!strcmp(property_value, "unlocked")) {
+        EXPECT_FALSE(device_locked);
+    } else {
+        EXPECT_TRUE(device_locked);
+    }
+
+    // Verified boot key should be all 0's if the boot state is not verified or self signed
+    std::string empty_boot_key(32, '\0');
+    std::string verified_boot_key_str((const char*)verified_boot_key.data(),
+                                      verified_boot_key.size());
+    property_get("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", property_value, "nogood");
+    EXPECT_NE(property_value, "nogood");
+    if (!strcmp(property_value, "green")) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED);
+        EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
+                            verified_boot_key.size()));
+    } else if (!strcmp(property_value, "yellow")) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_SELF_SIGNED);
+        EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
+                            verified_boot_key.size()));
+    } else if (!strcmp(property_value, "orange")) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_UNVERIFIED);
+        EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
+                            verified_boot_key.size()));
+    } else if (!strcmp(property_value, "red")) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_FAILED);
+        EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
+                            verified_boot_key.size()));
+    } else {
+        EXPECT_TRUE(false);
+    }
+
     att_sw_enforced.Sort();
     expected_sw_enforced.Sort();
     EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filter_tags(att_sw_enforced));
 
-    att_tee_enforced.Sort();
-    expected_tee_enforced.Sort();
-    EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_tee_enforced), filter_tags(att_tee_enforced));
+    att_hw_enforced.Sort();
+    expected_hw_enforced.Sort();
+    EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_hw_enforced), filter_tags(att_hw_enforced));
 
     return true;
 }
@@ -446,6 +539,24 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaCheckCreationDateTime
+ *
+ * Verifies that creation date time is correct.
+ */
+TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaCheckCreationDateTime) {
+    KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+    auto creation_time = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .RsaSigningKey(2048, 3)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+    GetCharacteristics(key_blob_, &key_characteristics);
+    AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
+    CheckCreationDateTime(sw_enforced, creation_time);
+}
+
+/*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.NoInvalidRsaSizes
  *
  * Verifies that keymaster cannot generate any RSA key sizes that are designated as invalid.
@@ -509,6 +620,23 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcCheckCreationDateTime
+ *
+ * Verifies that creation date time is correct.
+ */
+TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcCheckCreationDateTime) {
+    KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+    auto creation_time = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+    GetCharacteristics(key_blob_, &key_characteristics);
+    AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
+    CheckCreationDateTime(sw_enforced, creation_time);
+}
+
+/*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaDefaultSize
  *
  * Verifies that failing to specify a key size for EC key generation returns UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
@@ -748,6 +876,69 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaGetKeyCharacteristicsRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
+ *
+ * Verifies that getting RSA key characteristics requires the correct app ID/data.
+ */
+TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaGetKeyCharacteristicsRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
+    HidlBuf key_blob;
+    KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata")),
+                          &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+    CheckGetCharacteristics(key_blob, HidlBuf("clientid"), HidlBuf("appdata"),
+                            &key_characteristics);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
+ *
+ * Verifies that using an RSA key requires the correct app ID/data.
+ */
+TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))));
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+                    AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+    AbortIfNeeded();
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+                    AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                            .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                            .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                            .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))));
+    AbortIfNeeded();
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+                    AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                            .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                            .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                            .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))));
+    AbortIfNeeded();
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+                    AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                            .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                            .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                            .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))
+                            .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))));
+    AbortIfNeeded();
+}
+
+/*
  * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssSha256Success
  *
  * Verifies that RSA-PSS signature operations succeed.
@@ -1124,6 +1315,63 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcGetKeyCharacteristicsRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
+ *
+ * Verifies that getting EC key characteristics requires the correct app ID/data.
+ */
+TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, EcGetKeyCharacteristicsRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
+    HidlBuf key_blob;
+    KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata")),
+                          &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+    CheckGetCharacteristics(key_blob, HidlBuf("clientid"), HidlBuf("appdata"),
+                            &key_characteristics);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
+ *
+ * Verifies that using an EC key requires the correct app ID/data.
+ */
+TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, EcUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))));
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE)));
+    AbortIfNeeded();
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+                    AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                            .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                            .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))));
+    AbortIfNeeded();
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+                    AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                            .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                            .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))));
+    AbortIfNeeded();
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+                    AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                            .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                            .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))
+                            .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))));
+    AbortIfNeeded();
+}
+
+/*
  * SigningOperationsTest.AesEcbSign
  *
  * Verifies that attempts to use AES keys to sign fail in the correct way.
@@ -3922,6 +4170,7 @@
  * Verifies that attesting to RSA keys works and generates the expected output.
  */
 TEST_F(AttestationTest, RsaAttestation) {
+    auto creation_time = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                              .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
                                              .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
@@ -3946,7 +4195,7 @@
     EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo",                     //
                                           key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced,  //
                                           key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced,  //
-                                          SecLevel(), cert_chain[0]));
+                                          SecLevel(), cert_chain[0], creation_time));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3970,11 +4219,34 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * AttestationTest.RsaAttestationRequiresCorrectAppId
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA requires the correct app ID.
+ */
+TEST_F(AttestationTest, RsaAttestationRequiresCorrectAppId) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("lol"))));
+
+    hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING,
+              AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
+                                .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("heh")),
+                        &cert_chain));
+}
+
+/*
  * AttestationTest.EcAttestation
  *
  * Verifies that attesting to EC keys works and generates the expected output.
  */
 TEST_F(AttestationTest, EcAttestation) {
+    auto creation_time = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                              .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
                                              .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
@@ -3993,11 +4265,10 @@
     string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
 
     EXPECT_TRUE(verify_chain(cert_chain, message, signature));
-
     EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo",                     //
                                           key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced,  //
                                           key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced,  //
-                                          SecLevel(), cert_chain[0]));
+                                          SecLevel(), cert_chain[0], creation_time));
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/vts/functional/ValidateModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/vts/functional/ValidateModel.cpp
index f87ca89..a0b6d9a 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/vts/functional/ValidateModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/vts/functional/ValidateModel.cpp
@@ -508,15 +508,15 @@
                 }
             }
         }
-        // BIDIRECTIONAL_SEQUENCE_LSTM and BIDIRECTIONAL_SEQUENCE_RNN can have
-        // either one or two outputs depending on their mergeOutputs parameter.
+        // BIDIRECTIONAL_SEQUENCE_LSTM and BIDIRECTIONAL_SEQUENCE_RNN can have either one or two
+        // outputs depending on their mergeOutputs parameter.
         if (operation.type == OperationType::BIDIRECTIONAL_SEQUENCE_LSTM ||
             operation.type == OperationType::BIDIRECTIONAL_SEQUENCE_RNN) {
-          for (const size_t outOprand : operation.outputs) {
-            if (operand == outOprand) {
-              return true;
+            for (const size_t outOprand : operation.outputs) {
+                if (operand == outOprand) {
+                    return true;
+                }
             }
-          }
         }
     }
     return false;