diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index c2acbed..97f7a9e 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
  * validate the request and create certificates.
  *
  * This interface does not provide any way to use the generated and certified key pairs. It's
- * intended to be implemented by a HAL service that does other things with keys (e.g. Keymint).
+ * intended to be implemented by a HAL service that does other things with keys (e.g. KeyMint).
  *
  * The root of trust for secure provisioning is something called the Device Identifier Composition
  * Engine (DICE) Chain. The DICE Chain is a chain of certificates, represented as COSE_Sign1 objects
@@ -79,9 +79,9 @@
  * While a proper DICE Chain, as described above, reflects the complete boot sequence from boot ROM
  * to the secure area image of the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent, it's also possible to use a
  * "degenerate" DICE Chain which consists only of a single, self-signed certificate containing the
- * public key of a hardware-bound key pair. This is an appopriate solution for devices which haven't
- * implemented everything necessary to produce a proper DICE Chain, but can derive a unique key pair
- * in the secure area. In this degenerate case, UDS_Pub is the same as CDI_Leaf_Pub.
+ * public key of a hardware-bound key pair. This is an appropriate solution for devices which
+ * haven't implemented everything necessary to produce a proper DICE Chain, but can derive a unique
+ * key pair in the secure area. In this degenerate case, UDS_Pub is the same as CDI_Leaf_Pub.
  *
  * DICE Chain Privacy
  * ==================
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@
      *        If testMode is false, the keysToCertify array must not contain any keys flagged as
      *        test keys. Otherwise, the method must return STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
      *
-     * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X22519 public key which will be used to encrypt
+     * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X25519 public key which will be used to encrypt
      *        the BCC. For flexibility, this is represented as a certificate chain, represented as a
      *        CBOR array of COSE_Sign1 objects, ordered from root to leaf. The leaf contains the
      *        X25519 encryption key, each other element is an Ed25519 key signing the next in the
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@
      *                 -2 : bstr                      ; Ed25519 public key
      *            }
      *
-     *            SignatureKeyP256 = {
+     *            SignatureKeyP256 = {                ; COSE_Key
      *                 1 : 2,                         ; Key type : EC2
      *                 3 : AlgorithmES256,            ; Algorithm
      *                 -1 : 1,                        ; Curve: P256
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@
      *                2 : bstr             ; KID : EEK ID
      *                3 : -25,             ; Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
      *                -1 : 4,              ; Curve : X25519
-     *                -2 : bstr            ; Ed25519 public key
+     *                -2 : bstr            ; X25519 public key
      *            }
      *
      *            EekP256 = {              ; COSE_Key
@@ -246,8 +246,8 @@
      *                payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256
      *            ]
      *
-     *            AlgorithmES256 = -7
-     *            AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
+     *            AlgorithmES256 = -7      ; RFC 8152 section 8.1
+     *            AlgorithmEdDSA = -8      ; RFC 8152 section 8.2
      *
      *        If the contents of endpointEncryptionKey do not match the SignedEek structure above,
      *        the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@
      *        in the chain, which implies that it must not attempt to validate the signature.
      *
      *        If testMode is false, the method must validate the chain signatures, and must verify
-     *        that the public key in the root certifictate is in its pre-configured set of
+     *        that the public key in the root certificate is in its pre-configured set of
      *        authorized EEK root keys. If the public key is not in the database, or if signature
      *        verification fails, the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
      *
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@
      * @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
      *        authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
      *
-     * @return The of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest structure. Specifically, it contains:
+     * @return The MAC of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest structure. Specifically, it contains:
      *
      *            HMAC-256(EK_mac, .cbor KeysToMacStructure)
      *
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@
      *                              ; intermediate certificates between Root and Leaf.
      * ]
      *
-     * ; A bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or edDSA)
+     * ; A bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or EdDSA)
      * X509Certificate = bstr
      *
      * ; The DICE Chain contains measurements about the device firmware.