diff --git a/security/rkp/CHANGELOG.md b/security/rkp/CHANGELOG.md
index 9409a6d..f425284 100644
--- a/security/rkp/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/security/rkp/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 * IRemotelyProvisionedComponent
   * The need for an EEK has been removed. There is no longer an encrypted portion of the CSR.
   * Keys for new CSR format must be generated with test mode set to false, effectively removing test
-    mode in the new CSR flow. Old behavior is kept unchanged for backwards compatibility.
+    mode in the new CSR flow.
   * The schema for the CSR itself has been significantly simplified, please see
     IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl for more details. Notably,
     * the chain of signing, MACing, and encryption operations has been replaced with a single
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index 35b83dd..7960c7f 100644
--- a/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -144,9 +144,9 @@
     byte[] generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(in boolean testMode, out MacedPublicKey macedPublicKey);
 
     /**
-     * This method can be removed in version 3 of the HAL. The header is kept around for
-     * backwards compatibility purposes. From v3, this method is allowed to raise a
-     * ServiceSpecificException with an error code of STATUS_REMOVED.
+     * This method has been deprecated since version 3 of the HAL. The header is kept around for
+     * backwards compatibility purposes. From v3, this method must raise a ServiceSpecificException
+     * with an error code of STATUS_REMOVED.
      *
      * For v1 and v2 implementations:
      * generateCertificateRequest creates a certificate request to be sent to the provisioning
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
index bf40976..9f68bfa 100644
--- a/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -408,16 +408,8 @@
         ASSERT_FALSE(HasFatalFailure());
 
         if (rpcHardwareInfo.versionNumber >= VERSION_WITHOUT_TEST_MODE) {
-            bytevec keysToSignMac;
-            DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
-            ProtectedData protectedData;
-            auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
-                    false, {}, {}, {}, &deviceInfo, &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
-            if (!status.isOk() && (status.getServiceSpecificError() ==
-                                   BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_REMOVED)) {
-                GTEST_SKIP() << "This test case applies to RKP v3+ only if "
-                             << "generateCertificateRequest() is implemented.";
-            }
+            GTEST_SKIP() << "This test case only applies to RKP v1 and v2. "
+                         << "RKP version discovered: " << rpcHardwareInfo.versionNumber;
         }
     }
 };
@@ -798,6 +790,20 @@
               BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Call generateCertificateRequest(). Make sure it's removed.
+ */
+TEST_P(CertificateRequestV2Test, CertificateRequestV1Removed) {
+    bytevec keysToSignMac;
+    DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
+    ProtectedData protectedData;
+    auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
+            true /* testMode */, {} /* keysToSign */, {} /* EEK chain */, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
+            &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
+    EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_REMOVED);
+}
+
 void parse_root_of_trust(const vector<uint8_t>& attestation_cert,
                          vector<uint8_t>* verified_boot_key, VerifiedBoot* verified_boot_state,
                          bool* device_locked, vector<uint8_t>* verified_boot_hash) {