diff --git a/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp b/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp
index bbc14ad..898c22d 100644
--- a/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp
+++ b/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #define LOG_TAG "audiohalservice"
 
+#include <signal.h>
 #include <string>
 #include <vector>
 
@@ -45,6 +46,8 @@
 }
 
 int main(int /* argc */, char* /* argv */ []) {
+    signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
     ::android::ProcessState::initWithDriver("/dev/vndbinder");
     // start a threadpool for vndbinder interactions
     ::android::ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp
index 4ac0aa5..8adec84 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 
 #include <android/hardware/automotive/vehicle/2.0/IVehicle.h>
 #include <utils/Log.h>
+#include <unordered_set>
 
 #include <gtest/gtest.h>
 #include <hidl/GtestPrinter.h>
@@ -184,20 +185,34 @@
 TEST_P(VehicleHalHidlTest, setProp) {
     ALOGD("VehicleHalHidlTest::setProp");
     hidl_vec<VehiclePropConfig> propConfigs;
+    // skip hvac related properties
+    std::unordered_set<int32_t> hvacProps = {(int)VehicleProperty::HVAC_DEFROSTER,
+                                             (int)VehicleProperty::HVAC_AC_ON,
+                                             (int)VehicleProperty::HVAC_MAX_AC_ON,
+                                             (int)VehicleProperty::HVAC_MAX_DEFROST_ON,
+                                             (int)VehicleProperty::HVAC_RECIRC_ON,
+                                             (int)VehicleProperty::HVAC_DUAL_ON,
+                                             (int)VehicleProperty::HVAC_AUTO_ON,
+                                             (int)VehicleProperty::HVAC_POWER_ON,
+                                             (int)VehicleProperty::HVAC_AUTO_RECIRC_ON,
+                                             (int)VehicleProperty::HVAC_ELECTRIC_DEFROSTER_ON};
     mVehicle->getAllPropConfigs(
             [&propConfigs](const hidl_vec<VehiclePropConfig>& cfgs) { propConfigs = cfgs; });
     for (const VehiclePropConfig& cfg : propConfigs) {
         // test on boolean and writable property
-        if (cfg.access == VehiclePropertyAccess::READ_WRITE && isBooleanGlobalProp(cfg.prop)) {
+        if (cfg.access == VehiclePropertyAccess::READ_WRITE && isBooleanGlobalProp(cfg.prop) &&
+            !hvacProps.count(cfg.prop)) {
             invokeGet(cfg.prop, 0);
             int setValue = mActualValue.value.int32Values[0] == 1 ? 0 : 1;
             VehiclePropValue propToSet = mActualValue;
             propToSet.value.int32Values[0] = setValue;
-            ASSERT_EQ(StatusCode::OK, mVehicle->set(propToSet));
+            ASSERT_EQ(StatusCode::OK, mVehicle->set(propToSet))
+                    << "Invalid status code for setting property: " << cfg.prop;
             // check set success
             invokeGet(cfg.prop, 0);
             ASSERT_EQ(StatusCode::OK, mActualStatusCode);
-            ASSERT_EQ(setValue, mActualValue.value.int32Values[0]);
+            ASSERT_EQ(setValue, mActualValue.value.int32Values[0])
+                    << "Failed to set value for property: " << cfg.prop;
         }
     }
 }
diff --git a/biometrics/face/1.0/default/android.hardware.biometrics.face@1.0-service.rc b/biometrics/face/1.0/default/android.hardware.biometrics.face@1.0-service.rc
index 6c7362f..3fb827d 100644
--- a/biometrics/face/1.0/default/android.hardware.biometrics.face@1.0-service.rc
+++ b/biometrics/face/1.0/default/android.hardware.biometrics.face@1.0-service.rc
@@ -5,6 +5,6 @@
     class late_start
     user system
     group system
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
+    task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
     capabilities SYS_NICE
     rlimit rtprio 10 10
diff --git a/biometrics/fingerprint/2.1/default/android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint@2.1-service.rc b/biometrics/fingerprint/2.1/default/android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint@2.1-service.rc
index 1667677..e7e8d30 100644
--- a/biometrics/fingerprint/2.1/default/android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint@2.1-service.rc
+++ b/biometrics/fingerprint/2.1/default/android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint@2.1-service.rc
@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@
     class late_start
     user system
     group system input uhid
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/system-background/tasks
+    task_profiles ServiceCapacityLow
diff --git a/biometrics/fingerprint/2.2/default/Android.bp b/biometrics/fingerprint/2.2/default/Android.bp
index f4fb57f..2d262f0 100644
--- a/biometrics/fingerprint/2.2/default/Android.bp
+++ b/biometrics/fingerprint/2.2/default/Android.bp
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
         "libhidlbase",
         "libhardware",
         "libutils",
+        "android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint@2.1",
         "android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint@2.2",
     ],
 
diff --git a/cas/1.0/default/android.hardware.cas@1.0-service-lazy.rc b/cas/1.0/default/android.hardware.cas@1.0-service-lazy.rc
index 443549a..622ee8f 100644
--- a/cas/1.0/default/android.hardware.cas@1.0-service-lazy.rc
+++ b/cas/1.0/default/android.hardware.cas@1.0-service-lazy.rc
@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@
     user media
     group mediadrm drmrpc
     ioprio rt 4
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
+    task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
diff --git a/cas/1.0/default/android.hardware.cas@1.0-service.rc b/cas/1.0/default/android.hardware.cas@1.0-service.rc
index 74f2f96..5df4825 100644
--- a/cas/1.0/default/android.hardware.cas@1.0-service.rc
+++ b/cas/1.0/default/android.hardware.cas@1.0-service.rc
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@
     user media
     group mediadrm drmrpc
     ioprio rt 4
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
+    task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
diff --git a/cas/1.1/default/android.hardware.cas@1.1-service-lazy.rc b/cas/1.1/default/android.hardware.cas@1.1-service-lazy.rc
index 73c505d..0721dc3 100644
--- a/cas/1.1/default/android.hardware.cas@1.1-service-lazy.rc
+++ b/cas/1.1/default/android.hardware.cas@1.1-service-lazy.rc
@@ -7,4 +7,4 @@
     user media
     group mediadrm drmrpc
     ioprio rt 4
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
+    task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
diff --git a/cas/1.1/default/android.hardware.cas@1.1-service.rc b/cas/1.1/default/android.hardware.cas@1.1-service.rc
index 4081fe1..132d943 100644
--- a/cas/1.1/default/android.hardware.cas@1.1-service.rc
+++ b/cas/1.1/default/android.hardware.cas@1.1-service.rc
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@
     user media
     group mediadrm drmrpc
     ioprio rt 4
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
+    task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
diff --git a/cas/1.2/default/android.hardware.cas@1.2-service-lazy.rc b/cas/1.2/default/android.hardware.cas@1.2-service-lazy.rc
index 1c75100..d91fdce 100644
--- a/cas/1.2/default/android.hardware.cas@1.2-service-lazy.rc
+++ b/cas/1.2/default/android.hardware.cas@1.2-service-lazy.rc
@@ -8,4 +8,4 @@
     user media
     group mediadrm drmrpc
     ioprio rt 4
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
+    task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
diff --git a/cas/1.2/default/android.hardware.cas@1.2-service.rc b/cas/1.2/default/android.hardware.cas@1.2-service.rc
index d1c853e..b22971a 100644
--- a/cas/1.2/default/android.hardware.cas@1.2-service.rc
+++ b/cas/1.2/default/android.hardware.cas@1.2-service.rc
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@
     user media
     group mediadrm drmrpc
     ioprio rt 4
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
+    task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
diff --git a/current.txt b/current.txt
index bf41e27..c4d8888 100644
--- a/current.txt
+++ b/current.txt
@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@
 e042522daa4b5f7fd4a0a19bcdadb93c79a1b04c09ef2c9813a3a8941032f3f5 android.hardware.contexthub@1.0::IContexthub
 c2f64133b83ede65c9939ef97ab5bd867b73faf3dba0e7e69f77c3c43d9e487e android.hardware.contexthub@1.0::IContexthubCallback
 bda492ec4021d13869de72bd6f8c15c5837b78d6136b8d538efec5320573a5ec android.hardware.gnss@1.0::IGnssMeasurementCallback
-6a271e493907e8ba20912e42771bd0d99ae45431a851d5675ef9496d02510a34 android.hardware.gnss@1.1::IGnssMeasurementCallback
+7ae2025662e30e690a3ffa1c65cc972c6297a68638174055c33cbf3d2e4bbddc android.hardware.gnss@1.1::IGnssMeasurementCallback
 11e9e1a1fd0c9b3d9648750d4b10dc2a839d3a6688904c3fc49500a4e7ca75b0 android.hardware.gnss@2.1::IGnssMeasurementCallback
 2c331a9605f3a08d9c1e0a36169ca57758bc43c11a78ef3f3730509885e52c15 android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.4::IComposerClient
 3da3ce039247872d95c6bd48621dbfdfa1c2d2a91a90f257862f87ee2bc46300 android.hardware.health@2.1::types
diff --git a/drm/1.0/default/android.hardware.drm@1.0-service-lazy.rc b/drm/1.0/default/android.hardware.drm@1.0-service-lazy.rc
index 4b32f7f..e5ae5cd 100644
--- a/drm/1.0/default/android.hardware.drm@1.0-service-lazy.rc
+++ b/drm/1.0/default/android.hardware.drm@1.0-service-lazy.rc
@@ -7,4 +7,4 @@
     user media
     group mediadrm drmrpc
     ioprio rt 4
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
+    task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
diff --git a/drm/1.0/default/android.hardware.drm@1.0-service.rc b/drm/1.0/default/android.hardware.drm@1.0-service.rc
index 790eded..2aba187 100644
--- a/drm/1.0/default/android.hardware.drm@1.0-service.rc
+++ b/drm/1.0/default/android.hardware.drm@1.0-service.rc
@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@
     user media
     group mediadrm drmrpc
     ioprio rt 4
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
+    task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
diff --git a/gnss/1.1/IGnssMeasurementCallback.hal b/gnss/1.1/IGnssMeasurementCallback.hal
index 36841ee..f94c67a 100644
--- a/gnss/1.1/IGnssMeasurementCallback.hal
+++ b/gnss/1.1/IGnssMeasurementCallback.hal
@@ -24,13 +24,38 @@
      * Flags indicating the Accumulated Delta Range's states.
      *
      * See the table below for a detailed interpretation of each state. This is
-     * a continuation of the table from 1.1/IGnssMeasurementCallback.hal.
+     * a continuation of the table from 1.0/IGnssMeasurementCallback.hal.
      *
      * +---------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------+
      * | ADR_STATE           | Time of relevance | Interpretation              |
      * +---------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------+
      * | HALF_CYCLE_RESOLVED | ADR(t)            | Half cycle ambiguity is     |
      * |                     |                   | resolved at time t.         |
+     * |                     |                   |                             |
+     * |                     |                   | For signals that have       |
+     * |                     |                   | databits, the carrier phase |
+     * |                     |                   | tracking loops typically    |
+     * |                     |                   | use a costas loop           |
+     * |                     |                   | discriminator. This type of |
+     * |                     |                   | tracking loop introduces a  |
+     * |                     |                   | half-cycle ambiguity that   |
+     * |                     |                   | is resolved by searching    |
+     * |                     |                   | through the received data   |
+     * |                     |                   | for known patterns of       |
+     * |                     |                   | databits (e.g. GPS uses the |
+     * |                     |                   | TLM word) which then        |
+     * |                     |                   | determines the polarity of  |
+     * |                     |                   | the incoming data and       |
+     * |                     |                   | resolves the half-cycle     |
+     * |                     |                   | ambiguity.                  |
+     * |                     |                   |                             |
+     * |                     |                   | Before the half-cycle       |
+     * |                     |                   | ambiguity has been resolved |
+     * |                     |                   | it is possible that the     |
+     * |                     |                   | ADR_STATE_VALID flag is     |
+     * |                     |                   | set, but the ADR_STATE_     |
+     * |                     |                   | HALF_CYCLE_RESOLVED flag is |
+     * |                     |                   | not set.                    |
      * +---------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------+
      */
     enum GnssAccumulatedDeltaRangeState
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/android/hardware/gnss/GnssMeasurement.aidl b/gnss/aidl/android/hardware/gnss/GnssMeasurement.aidl
index 58f29c5..efecddd 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/android/hardware/gnss/GnssMeasurement.aidl
+++ b/gnss/aidl/android/hardware/gnss/GnssMeasurement.aidl
@@ -438,6 +438,31 @@
      * +---------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------+
      * | HALF_CYCLE_RESOLVED | ADR(t)            | Half cycle ambiguity is     |
      * |                     |                   | resolved at time t.         |
+     * |                     |                   |                             |
+     * |                     |                   | For signals that have       |
+     * |                     |                   | databits, the carrier phase |
+     * |                     |                   | tracking loops typically    |
+     * |                     |                   | use a costas loop           |
+     * |                     |                   | discriminator. This type of |
+     * |                     |                   | tracking loop introduces a  |
+     * |                     |                   | half-cycle ambiguity that   |
+     * |                     |                   | is resolved by searching    |
+     * |                     |                   | through the received data   |
+     * |                     |                   | for known patterns of       |
+     * |                     |                   | databits (e.g. GPS uses the |
+     * |                     |                   | TLM word) which then        |
+     * |                     |                   | determines the polarity of  |
+     * |                     |                   | the incoming data and       |
+     * |                     |                   | resolves the half-cycle     |
+     * |                     |                   | ambiguity.                  |
+     * |                     |                   |                             |
+     * |                     |                   | Before the half-cycle       |
+     * |                     |                   | ambiguity has been resolved |
+     * |                     |                   | it is possible that the     |
+     * |                     |                   | ADR_STATE_VALID flag is     |
+     * |                     |                   | set, but the ADR_STATE_     |
+     * |                     |                   | HALF_CYCLE_RESOLVED flag is |
+     * |                     |                   | not set.                    |
      * +---------------------+-------------------+-----------------------------+
      */
     const int ADR_STATE_UNKNOWN = 0;
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.1/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.1-service.rc b/graphics/composer/2.1/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.1-service.rc
index cbd589a..c8fccdc 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.1/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.1-service.rc
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.1/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.1-service.rc
@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@
     group graphics drmrpc
     capabilities SYS_NICE
     onrestart restart surfaceflinger
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/system-background/tasks
+    task_profiles ServiceCapacityLow
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/vts/ComposerVts.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/vts/ComposerVts.cpp
index 4b6b7c8..55aaf12 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/vts/ComposerVts.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/vts/ComposerVts.cpp
@@ -308,6 +308,12 @@
     writer->reset();
 }
 
+NativeHandleWrapper::~NativeHandleWrapper() {
+    if (mHandle) {
+        mGralloc.freeBuffer(mHandle);
+    }
+}
+
 Gralloc::Gralloc() {
     [this] {
         ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(mGralloc4 = std::make_shared<Gralloc4>("default", "default",
@@ -324,9 +330,10 @@
     }();
 }
 
-const native_handle_t* Gralloc::allocate(uint32_t width, uint32_t height, uint32_t layerCount,
-                                         PixelFormat format, uint64_t usage, bool import,
-                                         uint32_t* outStride) {
+const NativeHandleWrapper Gralloc::allocate(uint32_t width, uint32_t height, uint32_t layerCount,
+                                            PixelFormat format, uint64_t usage, bool import,
+                                            uint32_t* outStride) {
+    const native_handle_t* handle;
     if (mGralloc4) {
         IMapper4::BufferDescriptorInfo info{};
         info.width = width;
@@ -334,7 +341,7 @@
         info.layerCount = layerCount;
         info.format = static_cast<android::hardware::graphics::common::V1_2::PixelFormat>(format);
         info.usage = usage;
-        return mGralloc4->allocate(info, import, outStride);
+        handle = mGralloc4->allocate(info, import, outStride);
     } else if (mGralloc3) {
         IMapper3::BufferDescriptorInfo info{};
         info.width = width;
@@ -342,7 +349,7 @@
         info.layerCount = layerCount;
         info.format = static_cast<android::hardware::graphics::common::V1_2::PixelFormat>(format);
         info.usage = usage;
-        return mGralloc3->allocate(info, import, outStride);
+        handle = mGralloc3->allocate(info, import, outStride);
     } else {
         IMapper2::BufferDescriptorInfo info{};
         info.width = width;
@@ -350,8 +357,9 @@
         info.layerCount = layerCount;
         info.format = format;
         info.usage = usage;
-        return mGralloc2->allocate(info, import, outStride);
+        handle = mGralloc2->allocate(info, import, outStride);
     }
+    return NativeHandleWrapper(*this, handle);
 }
 
 void* Gralloc::lock(const native_handle_t* bufferHandle, uint64_t cpuUsage,
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.1/ComposerVts.h b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.1/ComposerVts.h
index 63aa713..2949823 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.1/ComposerVts.h
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.1/ComposerVts.h
@@ -136,13 +136,30 @@
     int32_t height;
 };
 
+class Gralloc;
+
+// RAII wrapper around native_handle_t*
+class NativeHandleWrapper {
+  public:
+    NativeHandleWrapper(Gralloc& gralloc, const native_handle_t* handle)
+        : mGralloc(gralloc), mHandle(handle) {}
+
+    ~NativeHandleWrapper();
+
+    const native_handle_t* get() { return mHandle; }
+
+  private:
+    Gralloc& mGralloc;
+    const native_handle_t* mHandle;
+};
+
 class Gralloc {
   public:
     explicit Gralloc();
 
-    const native_handle_t* allocate(uint32_t width, uint32_t height, uint32_t layerCount,
-                                    PixelFormat format, uint64_t usage, bool import = true,
-                                    uint32_t* outStride = nullptr);
+    const NativeHandleWrapper allocate(uint32_t width, uint32_t height, uint32_t layerCount,
+                                       PixelFormat format, uint64_t usage, bool import = true,
+                                       uint32_t* outStride = nullptr);
 
     void* lock(const native_handle_t* bufferHandle, uint64_t cpuUsage,
                const AccessRegion& accessRegionRect, int acquireFence);
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_1TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_1TargetTest.cpp
index f0250c0..4822678 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_1TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_1TargetTest.cpp
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@
         ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(GraphicsComposerHidlTest::TearDown());
     }
 
-    const native_handle_t* allocate() {
+    NativeHandleWrapper allocate() {
         uint64_t usage =
                 static_cast<uint64_t>(BufferUsage::CPU_WRITE_OFTEN | BufferUsage::CPU_READ_OFTEN |
                                       BufferUsage::COMPOSER_OVERLAY);
@@ -727,11 +727,11 @@
         display = mComposerClient->createVirtualDisplay(64, 64, PixelFormat::IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED,
                                                         kBufferSlotCount, &format));
 
-    const native_handle_t* handle;
-    ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(handle = allocate());
+    std::unique_ptr<NativeHandleWrapper> handle;
+    ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(handle.reset(new NativeHandleWrapper(allocate())));
 
     mWriter->selectDisplay(display);
-    mWriter->setOutputBuffer(0, handle, -1);
+    mWriter->setOutputBuffer(0, handle->get(), -1);
     execute();
 }
 
@@ -783,7 +783,7 @@
     mComposerClient->setColorMode(mPrimaryDisplay, ColorMode::NATIVE);
 
     auto handle = allocate();
-    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle);
+    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle.get());
 
     IComposerClient::Rect displayFrame{0, 0, mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight};
 
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@
     mWriter->setLayerZOrder(10);
     mWriter->setLayerBlendMode(IComposerClient::BlendMode::NONE);
     mWriter->setLayerSurfaceDamage(std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, displayFrame));
-    mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle, -1);
+    mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle.get(), -1);
     mWriter->setLayerDataspace(Dataspace::UNKNOWN);
 
     mWriter->validateDisplay();
@@ -817,8 +817,8 @@
 
     mWriter->selectLayer(layer);
     auto handle2 = allocate();
-    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle2);
-    mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle2, -1);
+    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle2.get());
+    mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle2.get(), -1);
     mWriter->setLayerSurfaceDamage(std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, {0, 0, 10, 10}));
     mWriter->presentDisplay();
     execute();
@@ -833,12 +833,12 @@
                                 mComposerClient->createLayer(mPrimaryDisplay, kBufferSlotCount));
 
     auto handle = allocate();
-    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle);
+    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle.get());
     IComposerClient::Rect displayFrame{0, 0, mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight};
 
     mWriter->selectDisplay(mPrimaryDisplay);
     mWriter->selectLayer(layer);
-    mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle, -1);
+    mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle.get(), -1);
     mWriter->setLayerCompositionType(IComposerClient::Composition::CURSOR);
     mWriter->setLayerDisplayFrame(displayFrame);
     mWriter->setLayerPlaneAlpha(1);
@@ -871,7 +871,7 @@
  */
 TEST_P(GraphicsComposerHidlCommandTest, SET_LAYER_BUFFER) {
     auto handle = allocate();
-    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle);
+    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle.get());
 
     Layer layer;
     ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(layer =
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@
 
     mWriter->selectDisplay(mPrimaryDisplay);
     mWriter->selectLayer(layer);
-    mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle, -1);
+    mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle.get(), -1);
     execute();
 }
 
@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@
     }
 
     auto handle = allocate();
-    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle);
+    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle.get());
 
     Layer layer;
     ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(layer =
@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@
 
     mWriter->selectDisplay(mPrimaryDisplay);
     mWriter->selectLayer(layer);
-    mWriter->setLayerSidebandStream(handle);
+    mWriter->setLayerSidebandStream(handle.get());
     execute();
 }
 
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.2/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.2-service.rc b/graphics/composer/2.2/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.2-service.rc
index efe6dad..7714119 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.2/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.2-service.rc
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.2/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.2-service.rc
@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@
     group graphics drmrpc
     capabilities SYS_NICE
     onrestart restart surfaceflinger
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/system-background/tasks
+    task_profiles ServiceCapacityLow
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/ReadbackVts.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/ReadbackVts.cpp
index 19f5e8c..30596fc 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/ReadbackVts.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/ReadbackVts.cpp
@@ -208,22 +208,13 @@
     mAccessRegion.height = height;
 }
 
-ReadbackBuffer::~ReadbackBuffer() {
-    if (mBufferHandle != nullptr) {
-        mGralloc->freeBuffer(mBufferHandle);
-    }
-}
-
 void ReadbackBuffer::setReadbackBuffer() {
-    if (mBufferHandle != nullptr) {
-        mGralloc->freeBuffer(mBufferHandle);
-        mBufferHandle = nullptr;
-    }
-    mBufferHandle = mGralloc->allocate(mWidth, mHeight, mLayerCount, mFormat, mUsage,
-                                       /*import*/ true, &mStride);
-    ASSERT_NE(false, mGralloc->validateBufferSize(mBufferHandle, mWidth, mHeight, mLayerCount,
-                                                  mFormat, mUsage, mStride));
-    ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(mComposerClient->setReadbackBuffer(mDisplay, mBufferHandle, -1));
+    mBufferHandle.reset(new Gralloc::NativeHandleWrapper(
+            mGralloc->allocate(mWidth, mHeight, mLayerCount, mFormat, mUsage,
+                               /*import*/ true, &mStride)));
+    ASSERT_NE(false, mGralloc->validateBufferSize(mBufferHandle->get(), mWidth, mHeight,
+                                                  mLayerCount, mFormat, mUsage, mStride));
+    ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(mComposerClient->setReadbackBuffer(mDisplay, mBufferHandle->get(), -1));
 }
 
 void ReadbackBuffer::checkReadbackBuffer(std::vector<IComposerClient::Color> expectedColors) {
@@ -231,11 +222,11 @@
     int32_t fenceHandle;
     ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(mComposerClient->getReadbackBufferFence(mDisplay, &fenceHandle));
 
-    void* bufData = mGralloc->lock(mBufferHandle, mUsage, mAccessRegion, fenceHandle);
+    void* bufData = mGralloc->lock(mBufferHandle->get(), mUsage, mAccessRegion, fenceHandle);
     ASSERT_TRUE(mPixelFormat == PixelFormat::RGB_888 || mPixelFormat == PixelFormat::RGBA_8888);
     ReadbackHelper::compareColorBuffers(expectedColors, bufData, mStride, mWidth, mHeight,
                                         mPixelFormat);
-    int32_t unlockFence = mGralloc->unlock(mBufferHandle);
+    int32_t unlockFence = mGralloc->unlock(mBufferHandle->get());
     if (unlockFence != -1) {
         sync_wait(unlockFence, -1);
         close(unlockFence);
@@ -281,23 +272,17 @@
     setSourceCrop({0, 0, (float)width, (float)height});
 }
 
-TestBufferLayer::~TestBufferLayer() {
-    if (mBufferHandle != nullptr) {
-        mGralloc->freeBuffer(mBufferHandle);
-    }
-}
-
 void TestBufferLayer::write(const std::shared_ptr<CommandWriterBase>& writer) {
     TestLayer::write(writer);
     writer->setLayerCompositionType(mComposition);
     writer->setLayerVisibleRegion(std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, mDisplayFrame));
-    if (mBufferHandle != nullptr) writer->setLayerBuffer(0, mBufferHandle, mFillFence);
+    if (mBufferHandle != nullptr) writer->setLayerBuffer(0, mBufferHandle->get(), mFillFence);
 }
 
 LayerSettings TestBufferLayer::toRenderEngineLayerSettings() {
     LayerSettings layerSettings = TestLayer::toRenderEngineLayerSettings();
     layerSettings.source.buffer.buffer = std::make_shared<renderengine::ExternalTexture>(
-            new GraphicBuffer(mBufferHandle, GraphicBuffer::CLONE_HANDLE, mWidth, mHeight,
+            new GraphicBuffer(mBufferHandle->get(), GraphicBuffer::CLONE_HANDLE, mWidth, mHeight,
                               static_cast<int32_t>(mFormat), 1, mUsage, mStride),
             mRenderEngine.getInternalRenderEngine(),
             renderengine::ExternalTexture::Usage::READABLE);
@@ -318,10 +303,10 @@
 }
 
 void TestBufferLayer::fillBuffer(std::vector<IComposerClient::Color> expectedColors) {
-    void* bufData = mGralloc->lock(mBufferHandle, mUsage, mAccessRegion, -1);
+    void* bufData = mGralloc->lock(mBufferHandle->get(), mUsage, mAccessRegion, -1);
     ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
             ReadbackHelper::fillBuffer(mWidth, mHeight, mStride, bufData, mFormat, expectedColors));
-    mFillFence = mGralloc->unlock(mBufferHandle);
+    mFillFence = mGralloc->unlock(mBufferHandle->get());
     if (mFillFence != -1) {
         sync_wait(mFillFence, -1);
         close(mFillFence);
@@ -329,16 +314,13 @@
 }
 
 void TestBufferLayer::setBuffer(std::vector<IComposerClient::Color> colors) {
-    if (mBufferHandle != nullptr) {
-        mGralloc->freeBuffer(mBufferHandle);
-        mBufferHandle = nullptr;
-    }
-    mBufferHandle = mGralloc->allocate(mWidth, mHeight, mLayerCount, mFormat, mUsage,
-                                       /*import*/ true, &mStride);
-    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, mBufferHandle);
+    mBufferHandle.reset(new Gralloc::NativeHandleWrapper(
+            mGralloc->allocate(mWidth, mHeight, mLayerCount, mFormat, mUsage,
+                               /*import*/ true, &mStride)));
+    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, mBufferHandle->get());
     ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(fillBuffer(colors));
-    ASSERT_NE(false, mGralloc->validateBufferSize(mBufferHandle, mWidth, mHeight, mLayerCount,
-                                                  mFormat, mUsage, mStride));
+    ASSERT_NE(false, mGralloc->validateBufferSize(mBufferHandle->get(), mWidth, mHeight,
+                                                  mLayerCount, mFormat, mUsage, mStride));
 }
 
 void TestBufferLayer::setDataspace(Dataspace dataspace,
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.2/ComposerVts.h b/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.2/ComposerVts.h
index 6bc2732..d3bba17 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.2/ComposerVts.h
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.2/ComposerVts.h
@@ -93,10 +93,12 @@
 
 class Gralloc : public V2_1::vts::Gralloc {
   public:
+    using NativeHandleWrapper = V2_1::vts::NativeHandleWrapper;
+
     Gralloc();
-    const native_handle_t* allocate(uint32_t width, uint32_t height, uint32_t layerCount,
-                                    PixelFormat format, uint64_t usage, bool import = true,
-                                    uint32_t* outStride = nullptr) {
+    const NativeHandleWrapper allocate(uint32_t width, uint32_t height, uint32_t layerCount,
+                                       PixelFormat format, uint64_t usage, bool import = true,
+                                       uint32_t* outStride = nullptr) {
         return V2_1::vts::Gralloc::allocate(
                 width, height, layerCount,
                 static_cast<android::hardware::graphics::common::V1_0::PixelFormat>(format), usage,
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.2/ReadbackVts.h b/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.2/ReadbackVts.h
index b24e3b6..58efde9 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.2/ReadbackVts.h
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.2/utils/vts/include/composer-vts/2.2/ReadbackVts.h
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
 #include <mapper-vts/2.1/MapperVts.h>
 #include <renderengine/RenderEngine.h>
 
+#include <memory>
+
 namespace android {
 namespace hardware {
 namespace graphics {
@@ -116,8 +118,6 @@
             PixelFormat format,
             IComposerClient::Composition composition = IComposerClient::Composition::DEVICE);
 
-    ~TestBufferLayer();
-
     void write(const std::shared_ptr<CommandWriterBase>& writer) override;
 
     LayerSettings toRenderEngineLayerSettings() override;
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@
     std::shared_ptr<Gralloc> mGralloc;
     TestRenderEngine& mRenderEngine;
     int32_t mFillFence;
-    const native_handle_t* mBufferHandle = nullptr;
+    std::unique_ptr<Gralloc::NativeHandleWrapper> mBufferHandle;
 };
 
 class ReadbackHelper {
@@ -182,7 +182,6 @@
     ReadbackBuffer(Display display, const std::shared_ptr<ComposerClient>& client,
                    const std::shared_ptr<Gralloc>& gralloc, uint32_t width, uint32_t height,
                    PixelFormat pixelFormat, Dataspace dataspace);
-    ~ReadbackBuffer();
 
     void setReadbackBuffer();
 
@@ -196,7 +195,7 @@
     uint64_t mUsage;
     AccessRegion mAccessRegion;
     uint32_t mStride;
-    const native_handle_t* mBufferHandle = nullptr;
+    std::unique_ptr<Gralloc::NativeHandleWrapper> mBufferHandle = nullptr;
     PixelFormat mPixelFormat;
     Dataspace mDataspace;
     Display mDisplay;
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2ReadbackTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2ReadbackTest.cpp
index 8d52173..7a1568b 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2ReadbackTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2ReadbackTest.cpp
@@ -39,15 +39,13 @@
 namespace vts {
 namespace {
 
-using android::GraphicBuffer;
 using android::Rect;
-using android::hardware::hidl_handle;
 using common::V1_1::BufferUsage;
 using common::V1_1::Dataspace;
 using common::V1_1::PixelFormat;
-using mapper::V2_1::IMapper;
 using V2_1::Config;
 using V2_1::Display;
+using V2_1::vts::NativeHandleWrapper;
 using V2_1::vts::TestCommandReader;
 using vts::Gralloc;
 
@@ -355,9 +353,9 @@
         // This following buffer call should have no effect
         uint64_t usage =
                 static_cast<uint64_t>(BufferUsage::CPU_READ_OFTEN | BufferUsage::CPU_WRITE_OFTEN);
-        const native_handle_t* bufferHandle =
+        NativeHandleWrapper bufferHandle =
                 mGralloc->allocate(mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight, 1, PixelFormat::RGBA_8888, usage);
-        mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, bufferHandle, -1);
+        mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, bufferHandle.get(), -1);
 
         // expected color for each pixel
         std::vector<IComposerClient::Color> expectedColors(mDisplayWidth * mDisplayHeight);
@@ -465,24 +463,24 @@
 
             // create client target buffer
             uint32_t clientStride;
-            const native_handle_t* clientBufferHandle =
+            NativeHandleWrapper clientBufferHandle =
                     mGralloc->allocate(layer->mWidth, layer->mHeight, layer->mLayerCount,
                                        clientFormat, clientUsage, /*import*/ true, &clientStride);
-            ASSERT_NE(nullptr, clientBufferHandle);
+            ASSERT_NE(nullptr, clientBufferHandle.get());
 
             void* clientBufData =
-                    mGralloc->lock(clientBufferHandle, clientUsage, layer->mAccessRegion, -1);
+                    mGralloc->lock(clientBufferHandle.get(), clientUsage, layer->mAccessRegion, -1);
 
             ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(ReadbackHelper::fillBuffer(layer->mWidth, layer->mHeight,
                                                                clientStride, clientBufData,
                                                                clientFormat, expectedColors));
-            int clientFence = mGralloc->unlock(clientBufferHandle);
+            int clientFence = mGralloc->unlock(clientBufferHandle.get());
             if (clientFence != -1) {
                 sync_wait(clientFence, -1);
                 close(clientFence);
             }
 
-            mWriter->setClientTarget(0, clientBufferHandle, clientFence, clientDataspace,
+            mWriter->setClientTarget(0, clientBufferHandle.get(), clientFence, clientDataspace,
                                      std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, damage));
 
             layer->setToClientComposition(mWriter);
@@ -593,12 +591,12 @@
         // create client target buffer
         ASSERT_EQ(1, mReader->mCompositionChanges[0].second);
         uint32_t clientStride;
-        const native_handle_t* clientBufferHandle =
+        NativeHandleWrapper clientBufferHandle =
                 mGralloc->allocate(mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight, clientLayer->mLayerCount,
                                    clientFormat, clientUsage, /*import*/ true, &clientStride);
-        ASSERT_NE(nullptr, clientBufferHandle);
+        ASSERT_NE(nullptr, clientBufferHandle.get());
 
-        void* clientBufData = mGralloc->lock(clientBufferHandle, clientUsage,
+        void* clientBufData = mGralloc->lock(clientBufferHandle.get(), clientUsage,
                                              {0, 0, mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight}, -1);
 
         std::vector<IComposerClient::Color> clientColors(mDisplayWidth * mDisplayHeight);
@@ -606,13 +604,13 @@
         ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(ReadbackHelper::fillBuffer(mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight,
                                                            clientStride, clientBufData,
                                                            clientFormat, clientColors));
-        int clientFence = mGralloc->unlock(clientBufferHandle);
+        int clientFence = mGralloc->unlock(clientBufferHandle.get());
         if (clientFence != -1) {
             sync_wait(clientFence, -1);
             close(clientFence);
         }
 
-        mWriter->setClientTarget(0, clientBufferHandle, clientFence, clientDataspace,
+        mWriter->setClientTarget(0, clientBufferHandle.get(), clientFence, clientDataspace,
                                  std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, clientFrame));
         clientLayer->setToClientComposition(mWriter);
         mWriter->validateDisplay();
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2TargetTest.cpp
index 31ec885..7e25a2e 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.2/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_2TargetTest.cpp
@@ -36,13 +36,11 @@
 namespace {
 
 using common::V1_0::BufferUsage;
-using common::V1_0::ColorTransform;
-using common::V1_0::Transform;
 using common::V1_1::ColorMode;
 using common::V1_1::Dataspace;
 using common::V1_1::PixelFormat;
 using common::V1_1::RenderIntent;
-using mapper::V2_0::IMapper;
+using V2_1::vts::NativeHandleWrapper;
 
 class GraphicsComposerHidlTest : public ::testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
   protected:
@@ -154,7 +152,7 @@
         ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(GraphicsComposerHidlTest::TearDown());
     }
 
-    const native_handle_t* allocate() {
+    NativeHandleWrapper allocate() {
         uint64_t usage =
                 static_cast<uint64_t>(BufferUsage::CPU_WRITE_OFTEN | BufferUsage::CPU_READ_OFTEN);
         return mGralloc->allocate(/*width*/ 64, /*height*/ 64, /*layerCount*/ 1,
@@ -440,12 +438,12 @@
             static_cast<uint64_t>(BufferUsage::COMPOSER_OVERLAY | BufferUsage::CPU_READ_OFTEN);
 
     std::unique_ptr<Gralloc> gralloc;
-    const native_handle_t* buffer;
+    std::unique_ptr<NativeHandleWrapper> buffer;
     ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(gralloc = std::make_unique<Gralloc>());
-    ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(buffer = gralloc->allocate(mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight, 1,
-                                                       mReadbackPixelFormat, usage));
+    ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(buffer.reset(new NativeHandleWrapper(
+            gralloc->allocate(mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight, 1, mReadbackPixelFormat, usage))));
 
-    mComposerClient->setReadbackBuffer(mPrimaryDisplay, buffer, -1);
+    mComposerClient->setReadbackBuffer(mPrimaryDisplay, buffer->get(), -1);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -463,12 +461,13 @@
             static_cast<uint64_t>(BufferUsage::COMPOSER_OVERLAY | BufferUsage::CPU_READ_OFTEN);
 
     std::unique_ptr<Gralloc> gralloc;
-    const native_handle_t* buffer;
+    std::unique_ptr<NativeHandleWrapper> buffer;
     ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(gralloc = std::make_unique<Gralloc>());
-    ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(buffer = gralloc->allocate(mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight, 1,
-                                                       mReadbackPixelFormat, usage));
+    ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(buffer.reset(new NativeHandleWrapper(
+            gralloc->allocate(mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight, 1, mReadbackPixelFormat, usage))));
 
-    Error error = mComposerClient->getRaw()->setReadbackBuffer(mInvalidDisplayId, buffer, nullptr);
+    Error error =
+            mComposerClient->getRaw()->setReadbackBuffer(mInvalidDisplayId, buffer->get(), nullptr);
     ASSERT_EQ(Error::BAD_DISPLAY, error);
 }
 
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.3/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.3-service.rc b/graphics/composer/2.3/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.3-service.rc
index 81ce890..d3835a4 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.3/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.3-service.rc
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.3/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.3-service.rc
@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@
     group graphics drmrpc
     capabilities SYS_NICE
     onrestart restart surfaceflinger
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/system-background/tasks
+    task_profiles ServiceCapacityLow
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.3/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_3TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.3/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_3TargetTest.cpp
index 8b42654..54ba79d 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.3/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_3TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.3/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_3TargetTest.cpp
@@ -38,12 +38,10 @@
 namespace vts {
 namespace {
 
-using common::V1_0::BufferUsage;
 using common::V1_1::RenderIntent;
 using common::V1_2::ColorMode;
 using common::V1_2::Dataspace;
 using common::V1_2::PixelFormat;
-using mapper::V2_0::IMapper;
 using V2_2::vts::Gralloc;
 
 class GraphicsComposerHidlTest : public ::testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
@@ -140,12 +138,6 @@
         ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(GraphicsComposerHidlTest::TearDown());
     }
 
-    const native_handle_t* allocate() {
-        return mGralloc->allocate(
-                64, 64, 1, static_cast<common::V1_1::PixelFormat>(PixelFormat::RGBA_8888),
-                static_cast<uint64_t>(BufferUsage::CPU_WRITE_OFTEN | BufferUsage::CPU_READ_OFTEN));
-    }
-
     void execute() { mComposerClient->execute(mReader.get(), mWriter.get()); }
 
     std::unique_ptr<CommandWriterBase> mWriter;
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.4/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.4-service.rc b/graphics/composer/2.4/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.4-service.rc
index a296b0a..d82dcd9 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.4/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.4-service.rc
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.4/default/android.hardware.graphics.composer@2.4-service.rc
@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@
     group graphics drmrpc
     capabilities SYS_NICE
     onrestart restart surfaceflinger
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/system-background/tasks
+    task_profiles ServiceCapacityLow
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
index 2f0429c..5aceda7 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@
 using common::V1_2::ColorMode;
 using common::V1_2::Dataspace;
 using common::V1_2::PixelFormat;
-using mapper::V2_0::IMapper;
 using V2_1::Layer;
+using V2_1::vts::NativeHandleWrapper;
 using V2_2::Transform;
 using V2_2::vts::Gralloc;
 
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@
 
     void execute() { mComposerClient->execute(mReader.get(), mWriter.get()); }
 
-    const native_handle_t* allocate(int32_t width, int32_t height) {
+    NativeHandleWrapper allocate(int32_t width, int32_t height) {
         return mGralloc->allocate(
                 width, height, /*layerCount*/ 1,
                 static_cast<common::V1_1::PixelFormat>(PixelFormat::RGBA_8888),
@@ -493,46 +493,53 @@
     IComposerClient::FRect displayCrop = display.getCrop();
     int32_t displayWidth = static_cast<int32_t>(std::ceilf(displayCrop.right - displayCrop.left));
     int32_t displayHeight = static_cast<int32_t>(std::ceilf(displayCrop.bottom - displayCrop.top));
-    auto handle = allocate(displayWidth, displayHeight);
-    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle);
-
     Layer layer;
     ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(layer = mComposerClient->createLayer(display.get(), kBufferSlotCount));
-    mWriter->selectLayer(layer);
-    mWriter->setLayerCompositionType(IComposerClient::Composition::DEVICE);
-    mWriter->setLayerDisplayFrame(display.getFrameRect());
-    mWriter->setLayerPlaneAlpha(1);
-    mWriter->setLayerSourceCrop(display.getCrop());
-    mWriter->setLayerTransform(static_cast<Transform>(0));
-    mWriter->setLayerVisibleRegion(std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, display.getFrameRect()));
-    mWriter->setLayerZOrder(10);
-    mWriter->setLayerBlendMode(IComposerClient::BlendMode::NONE);
-    mWriter->setLayerSurfaceDamage(std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, display.getFrameRect()));
-    mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle, -1);
-    mWriter->setLayerDataspace(Dataspace::UNKNOWN);
 
-    mWriter->validateDisplay();
-    execute();
-    ASSERT_EQ(0, mReader->mErrors.size());
-    mReader->mCompositionChanges.clear();
+    {
+        auto handle = allocate(displayWidth, displayHeight);
+        ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle.get());
 
-    mWriter->presentDisplay();
-    execute();
-    ASSERT_EQ(0, mReader->mErrors.size());
+        mWriter->selectLayer(layer);
+        mWriter->setLayerCompositionType(IComposerClient::Composition::DEVICE);
+        mWriter->setLayerDisplayFrame(display.getFrameRect());
+        mWriter->setLayerPlaneAlpha(1);
+        mWriter->setLayerSourceCrop(display.getCrop());
+        mWriter->setLayerTransform(static_cast<Transform>(0));
+        mWriter->setLayerVisibleRegion(
+                std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, display.getFrameRect()));
+        mWriter->setLayerZOrder(10);
+        mWriter->setLayerBlendMode(IComposerClient::BlendMode::NONE);
+        mWriter->setLayerSurfaceDamage(
+                std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, display.getFrameRect()));
+        mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle.get(), -1);
+        mWriter->setLayerDataspace(Dataspace::UNKNOWN);
 
-    mWriter->selectLayer(layer);
-    auto handle2 = allocate(displayWidth, displayHeight);
-    ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle2);
+        mWriter->validateDisplay();
+        execute();
+        ASSERT_EQ(0, mReader->mErrors.size());
+        mReader->mCompositionChanges.clear();
 
-    mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle2, -1);
-    mWriter->setLayerSurfaceDamage(std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, {0, 0, 10, 10}));
-    mWriter->validateDisplay();
-    execute();
-    ASSERT_EQ(0, mReader->mErrors.size());
-    mReader->mCompositionChanges.clear();
+        mWriter->presentDisplay();
+        execute();
+        ASSERT_EQ(0, mReader->mErrors.size());
+    }
 
-    mWriter->presentDisplay();
-    execute();
+    {
+        auto handle = allocate(displayWidth, displayHeight);
+        ASSERT_NE(nullptr, handle.get());
+
+        mWriter->selectLayer(layer);
+        mWriter->setLayerBuffer(0, handle.get(), -1);
+        mWriter->setLayerSurfaceDamage(std::vector<IComposerClient::Rect>(1, {0, 0, 10, 10}));
+        mWriter->validateDisplay();
+        execute();
+        ASSERT_EQ(0, mReader->mErrors.size());
+        mReader->mCompositionChanges.clear();
+
+        mWriter->presentDisplay();
+        execute();
+    }
 
     ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(mComposerClient->destroyLayer(display.get(), layer));
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md b/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md
index 87b3f9f..ffad6ee 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
 EXPECT_EQ(versionedBefore, versionedAfter);
 ```
 
-The `convert` functions operate only on types that used in a HIDL method call directly. The
+The `convert` functions operate only on types that are used in a HIDL method call directly. The
 `unvalidatedConvert` functions operate on types that are either used in a HIDL method call directly
 (i.e., not as a nested class) or used in a subsequent version of the NN HAL. Prefer using `convert`
 over `unvalidatedConvert`.
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp
index 694ce6a..cd45a62 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
         },
         rust: {
             enabled: true,
+            apex_available: [
+                "//apex_available:platform",
+                "com.android.compos",
+            ],
         },
     },
     versions: ["1"],
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
index 3ea14a1..32d69cd 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
@@ -37,10 +37,13 @@
      *         ? "board" : tstr,
      *         ? "vb_state" : "green" / "yellow" / "orange",    // Taken from the AVB values
      *         ? "bootloader_state" : "locked" / "unlocked",    // Taken from the AVB values
+     *         ? "vbmeta_digest": bstr,                         // Taken from the AVB values
      *         ? "os_version" : tstr,                    // Same as android.os.Build.VERSION.release
      *         ? "system_patch_level" : uint,                   // YYYYMMDD
      *         ? "boot_patch_level" : uint,                     // YYYYMMDD
      *         ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint,                   // YYYYMMDD
+     *         "version" : 1,                      // The CDDL schema version.
+     *         "security_level" : "tee" / "strongbox"
      *     }
      */
     byte[] deviceInfo;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index 5b0b303..88b2a26 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -233,8 +233,6 @@
      * indistinguishable from random.  Thus, if the entropy from any source is good, the output
      * must be good.
      *
-     * TODO(seleneh) specify what mixing functions and cprng we allow.
-     *
      * @param data Bytes to be mixed into the CRNG seed.  The caller must not provide more than 2
      *        KiB of data per invocation.
      *
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index 04d91d0..a29fb08 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
  *
  * The root of trust for secure provisioning is something called the "Boot Certificate Chain", or
  * BCC. The BCC is a chain of public key certificates, represented as COSE_Sign1 objects containing
- * COSE_Key representations of the public keys. The "root" of the BCC is a self-signed certificate
- * for a device-unique public key, denoted DK_pub. All public keys in the BCC are device-unique. The
+ * COSE_Key representations of the public keys. The "root" of the BCC is
+ * a device-unique public key, denoted DK_pub. All public keys in the BCC are device-unique. The
  * public key from each certificate in the chain is used to sign the next certificate in the
  * chain. The final, "leaf" certificate contains a public key, denoted KM_pub, whose corresponding
  * private key, denoted KM_priv, is available for use by the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.
@@ -58,12 +58,8 @@
  * (given the necessary input), but no stage can compute the secret of any preceding stage. Updating
  * the firmware or configuration of any stage changes the key pair of that stage, and of all
  * subsequent stages, and no attacker who compromised the previous version of the updated firmware
- * can know or predict the post-update key pairs.
- *
- * The first BCC certificate is special because its contained public key, DK_pub, will never change,
- * making it a permanent, device-unique identifier. Although the remaining keys in the BCC are also
- * device-unique, they are not necessarily permanent, since they can change when the device software
- * is updated.
+ * can know or predict the post-update key pairs. It is recommended and expected that the BCC is
+ * constructed using the Open Profile for DICE.
  *
  * When the provisioning server receives a message signed by KM_priv and containing a BCC that
  * chains from DK_pub to KM_pub, it can be certain that (barring vulnerabilities in some boot
@@ -78,7 +74,7 @@
  * While a proper BCC, as described above, reflects the complete boot sequence from boot ROM to the
  * secure area image of the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent, it's also possible to use a "degenerate"
  * BCC which consists only of a single, self-signed certificate containing the public key of a
- * hardware-bound key pair. This is an appropriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
+ * hardware-bound key pair. This is an appopriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
  * everything necessary to produce a proper BCC, but can derive a unique key pair in the secure
  * area.  In this degenerate case, DK_pub is the same as KM_pub.
  *
@@ -141,7 +137,7 @@
      *        privateKeyHandle, that the contained public key is for remote certification.
      *
      * @return data representing a handle to the private key. The format is implementation-defined,
-     *         but note that specific services may define a required format.
+     *         but note that specific services may define a required format. KeyMint does.
      */
     byte[] generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(in boolean testMode, out MacedPublicKey macedPublicKey);
 
@@ -162,65 +158,90 @@
      *        If testMode is false, the keysToCertify array must not contain any keys flagged as
      *        test keys. Otherwise, the method must return STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
      *
-     * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X25519 public key which will be used to encrypt
+     * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X22519 public key which will be used to encrypt
      *        the BCC. For flexibility, this is represented as a certificate chain, represented as a
      *        CBOR array of COSE_Sign1 objects, ordered from root to leaf. The leaf contains the
      *        X25519 encryption key, each other element is an Ed25519 key signing the next in the
-     *        chain. The root is self-signed.
+     *        chain. The root is self-signed. An implementor may also choose to use P256 as an
+     *        alternative curve for signing and encryption instead of Curve 25519.
      *
      *            EekChain = [ + SignedSignatureKey, SignedEek ]
      *
      *            SignedSignatureKey = [              // COSE_Sign1
      *                protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *                },
-     *                unprotected: { },
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKey,
-     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
+     *                unprotected: {},
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
+     *                         bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256,
+     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput) /
+     *                           bstr ECDSA(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
      *            ]
      *
-     *            SignatureKey = {                    // COSE_Key
+     *            SignatureKeyEd25519 = {                    // COSE_Key
      *                 1 : 1,                         // Key type : Octet Key Pair
-     *                 3 : -8,                        // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                 3 : AlgorithmEdDSA,            // Algorithm
      *                 -1 : 6,                        // Curve : Ed25519
      *                 -2 : bstr                      // Ed25519 public key
      *            }
      *
+     *            SignatureKeyP256 = {
+     *                 1 : 2,                         // Key type : EC2
+     *                 3 : AlgorithmES256,            // Algorithm
+     *                 -1 : 1,                        // Curve: P256
+     *                 -2 : bstr,                     // X coordinate
+     *                 -3 : bstr                      // Y coordinate
+     *            }
+     *
      *            SignatureKeySignatureInput = [
      *                context: "Signature1",
      *                body_protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,     // Algorithm
      *                },
      *                external_aad: bstr .size 0,
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKey
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
+     *                         bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256
      *            ]
      *
      *            SignedEek = [                       // COSE_Sign1
      *                protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *                },
-     *                unprotected: { },
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor Eek,
-     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
+     *                unprotected: {},
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256,
+     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput) /
+     *                           bstr ECDSA(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
      *            ]
      *
-     *            Eek = {                             // COSE_Key
-     *                1 : 1,                          // Key type : Octet Key Pair
-     *                2 : bstr                        // KID : EEK ID
-     *                3 : -25,                        // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
-     *                -1 : 4,                         // Curve : X25519
-     *                -2 : bstr                       // X25519 public key
+     *            EekX25519 = {            // COSE_Key
+     *                1 : 1,               // Key type : Octet Key Pair
+     *                2 : bstr             // KID : EEK ID
+     *                3 : -25,             // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
+     *                -1 : 4,              // Curve : X25519
+     *                -2 : bstr            // Ed25519 public key
+     *            }
+     *
+     *            EekP256 = {              // COSE_Key
+     *                1 : 2,               // Key type : EC2
+     *                2 : bstr             // KID : EEK ID
+     *                3 : -25,             // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
+     *                -1 : 1,              // Curve : P256
+     *                -2 : bstr            // Sender X coordinate
+     *                -3 : bstr            // Sender Y coordinate
      *            }
      *
      *            EekSignatureInput = [
      *                context: "Signature1",
      *                body_protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,     // Algorithm
      *                },
      *                external_aad: bstr .size 0,
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor Eek
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256
      *            ]
      *
+     *            AlgorithmES256 = -7
+     *            AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
+     *
      *        If the contents of endpointEncryptionKey do not match the SignedEek structure above,
      *        the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
      *
@@ -228,7 +249,7 @@
      *        in the chain, which implies that it must not attempt to validate the signature.
      *
      *        If testMode is false, the method must validate the chain signatures, and must verify
-     *        that the public key in the root certificate is in its pre-configured set of
+     *        that the public key in the root certifictate is in its pre-configured set of
      *        authorized EEK root keys. If the public key is not in the database, or if signature
      *        verification fails, the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
      *
@@ -236,8 +257,13 @@
      *        by the secure area. See the description of the 'signature' output parameter for
      *        details.
      *
-     * @param out keysToSignMac contains the MAC of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest
-     *        structure. Specifically, it contains:
+     * @param out DeviceInfo contains the VerifiedDeviceInfo portion of the DeviceInfo array in
+     *        CertificateRequest. The structure is described within the DeviceInfo.aidl file.
+     *
+     * @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
+     *        authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
+     *
+     * @return The of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest structure. Specifically, it contains:
      *
      *            HMAC-256(EK_mac, .cbor KeysToMacStructure)
      *
@@ -248,11 +274,11 @@
      *                protected : bstr .cbor {
      *                    1 : 5,                           // Algorithm : HMAC-256
      *                },
-     *                unprotected : { },
+     *                unprotected : {},
      *                // Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
      *                payload: bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ],
      *                tag: bstr
-     *           ]
+     *            ]
      *
      *            KeysToMacStructure = [
      *                context : "MAC0",
@@ -261,9 +287,6 @@
      *                // Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
      *                payload : bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ]
      *            ]
-     *
-     * @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
-     *        authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
      */
     byte[] generateCertificateRequest(in boolean testMode, in MacedPublicKey[] keysToSign,
             in byte[] endpointEncryptionCertChain, in byte[] challenge, out DeviceInfo deviceInfo,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
index 25fdee3..f0df048 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@
  */
 @VintfStability
 parcelable KeyCharacteristics {
+    /**
+     * The security level enforcing this collection of key properties.
+     */
     SecurityLevel securityLevel = SecurityLevel.SOFTWARE;
+
+    /**
+     * `authorizations` is a list of key properties that are enforced at this security level.
+     * A key can have different properties enforced by components of different security levels.
+     * For example, some properties are provided by the operating system, which has a
+     * different security level to the IKeyMintDevice.
+     * See the `keyCharacteristics` field in `KeyCreationResult` for more details.
+     */
     KeyParameter[] authorizations;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
index 8da7578..b82dee6 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
      * Implementation version of the keymint hardware.  The version number is implementation
      * defined, and not necessarily globally meaningful.  The version is used to distinguish
      * between different versions of a given implementation.
-     * TODO(seleneh) add the version related info to the code.
      */
     int versionNumber;
 
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
index fbb373b..e71a9c9 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@
 package android.hardware.security.keymint;
 
 /**
- * TODO(seleneh) update the description.
- *
  * Padding modes that may be applied to plaintext for encryption operations.  This list includes
  * padding modes for both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms.  Note that implementations should not
  * provide all possible combinations of algorithm and padding, only the
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
index 5199062..31dbb28 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
@@ -40,11 +40,7 @@
      *                     1 : -25         // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
      *                 },
      *                 unprotected : {
-     *                     -1 : {          // COSE_Key
-     *                         1 : 1,      // Key type : Octet Key Pair
-     *                         -1 : 4,     // Curve : X25519
-     *                         -2 : bstr   // Sender X25519 public key
-     *                     }
+     *                     -1 : PubKeyX25519 / PubKeyEcdhP256  // Of the sender
      *                     4 : bstr,       // KID : EEK ID
      *                 },
      *                 ciphertext : nil
@@ -67,7 +63,7 @@
      *             other : bstr            // EEK pubkey
      *         ],
      *         SuppPubInfo : [
-     *             128,                    // Output key length
+     *             256,                    // Output key length
      *             protected : bstr .size 0
      *         ]
      *     ]
@@ -75,34 +71,51 @@
      *     ProtectedDataPayload [
      *         SignedMac,
      *         Bcc,
+     *         ? AdditionalDKSignatures,
+     *     ]
+     *     AdditionalDKSignatures = {
+     *         + SignerName => DKCertChain
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     SignerName = tstr
+     *
+     *     DKCertChain = [
+     *         2* Certificate                      // Root -> Leaf.  Root is the vendor
+     *                                             // self-signed cert, leaf contains DK_pub
      *     ]
      *
-     *     SignedMac = [                       // COSE_Sign1
-     *         bstr .cbor {                    // Protected params
-     *             1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *     Certificate = COSE_Sign1 of a public key
+     *
+     *     SignedMac = [                                  // COSE_Sign1
+     *         bstr .cbor {                               // Protected params
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,   // Algorithm
      *         },
-     *         { },                            // Unprotected params
+     *         {},                   // Unprotected params
      *         bstr .size 32,                  // MAC key
-     *         bstr PureEd25519(DK_priv, .cbor SignedMac_structure)
+     *         bstr PureEd25519(KM_priv, .cbor SignedMac_structure) /
+     *              ECDSA(KM_priv, bstr .cbor SignedMac_structure)
      *     ]
      *
      *     SignedMac_structure = [
      *         "Signature1",
-     *         bstr .cbor {                    // Protected params
-     *             1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *         bstr .cbor {                               // Protected params
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,   // Algorithm
      *         },
      *         bstr .cbor SignedMacAad
-     *         bstr .size 32                   // MAC key
+     *         bstr .size 32                              // MAC key
      *     ]
      *
      *     SignedMacAad = [
      *         challenge : bstr,
-     *         DeviceInfo
+     *         VerifiedDeviceInfo,
+     *         tag: bstr                 // This is the tag from COSE_Mac0 of
+     *                                   // KeysToCertify, to tie the key set to
+     *                                   // the signature.
      *     ]
      *
      *     Bcc = [
-     *         PubKey,                        // DK_pub
-     *         + BccEntry,                    // Root -> leaf (KM_pub)
+     *         PubKeyEd25519 / PubKeyECDSA256, // DK_pub
+     *         + BccEntry,                     // Root -> leaf (KM_pub)
      *     ]
      *
      *     BccPayload = {                     // CWT
@@ -120,44 +133,38 @@
      *         ? -4670549 : bstr,             // Authority Hash
      *         ? -4670550 : bstr,             // Authority Descriptor
      *         ? -4670551 : bstr,             // Mode
-     *         -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKey   // Subject Public Key
+     *         -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKeyEd25519 /
+     *                    bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA256   // Subject Public Key
      *         -4670553 : bstr                // Key Usage
      *     }
      *
-     *     BccEntry = [                       // COSE_Sign1
-     *         protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *             1 : -8,                    // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *     BccEntry = [                                  // COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
+     *         protected : bstr .cbor {
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *         },
-     *         unprotected: { },
+     *         unprotected: {},
      *         payload: bstr .cbor BccPayload,
-     *         // First entry in the chain is signed by DK_pub, the others are each signed by their
-     *         // immediate predecessor.  See RFC 8032 for signature representation.
-     *         signature: bstr .cbor PureEd25519(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput)
+     *         signature: bstr .cbor PureEd25519(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput) /
+     *                    bstr .cbor ECDSA(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput)
+     *         // See RFC 8032 for details of how to encode the signature value for Ed25519.
      *     ]
      *
-     *     PubKey = {                         // COSE_Key
-     *         1 : 1,                         // Key type : octet key pair
-     *         3 : -8,                        // Algorithm : EdDSA
-     *         4 : 2,                         // Ops: Verify
-     *         -1 : 6,                        // Curve : Ed25519
-     *         -2 : bstr                      // X coordinate, little-endian
-     *     }
-     *
      *     BccEntryInput = [
      *         context: "Signature1",
      *         protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *             1 : -8,                    // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *         },
      *         external_aad: bstr .size 0,
      *         payload: bstr .cbor BccPayload
      *     ]
      *
-     *     DeviceInfo = {
+     *     VerifiedDeviceInfo = {
      *         ? "brand" : tstr,
      *         ? "manufacturer" : tstr,
      *         ? "product" : tstr,
      *         ? "model" : tstr,
      *         ? "board" : tstr,
+     *         ? "device" : tstr,
      *         ? "vb_state" : "green" / "yellow" / "orange",
      *         ? "bootloader_state" : "locked" / "unlocked",
      *         ? "os_version" : tstr,
@@ -165,6 +172,39 @@
      *         ? "boot_patch_level" : uint,          // YYYYMMDD
      *         ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint,        // YYYYMMDD
      *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyX25519 = {                 // COSE_Key
+     *          1 : 1,                      // Key type : Octet Key Pair
+     *         -1 : 4,                      // Curve : X25519
+     *         -2 : bstr                    // Sender X25519 public key
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyEd25519 = {                // COSE_Key
+     *         1 : 1,                         // Key type : octet key pair
+     *         3 : AlgorithmEdDSA,            // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *         4 : 2,                         // Ops: Verify
+     *         -1 : 6,                        // Curve : Ed25519
+     *         -2 : bstr                      // X coordinate, little-endian
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyEcdhP256 = {              // COSE_Key
+     *          1 : 2,      // Key type : EC2
+     *          -1 : 1,     // Curve : P256
+     *          -2 : bstr   // Sender X coordinate
+     *          -3 : bstr   // Sender Y coordinate
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyECDSA256 = {                 // COSE_Key
+     *         1 : 2,                         // Key type : EC2
+     *         3 : AlgorithmES256,            // Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-256
+     *         4 : 2,                         // Ops: Verify
+     *         -1 : 1,                        // Curve: P256
+     *         -2 : bstr,                     // X coordinate
+     *         -3 : bstr                      // Y coordinate
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     AlgorithmES256 = -7
+     *     AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
      */
     byte[] protectedData;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index 861084e..972ce2e 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -268,10 +268,6 @@
     USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 402,
 
     /**
-     * TODO(seleneh) this tag need to be deleted.
-     *
-     * TODO(seleneh) this tag need to be deleted.
-     *
      * Tag::MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS specifies the minimum amount of time that elapses between
      * allowed operations using a key.  This can be used to rate-limit uses of keys in contexts
      * where unlimited use may enable brute force attacks.
@@ -289,6 +285,8 @@
      * fails because the table is full, KeyMint returns ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
+     *
+     * TODO(b/191458710): find out if this tag is still supported.
      */
     MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS = TagType.UINT | 403,
 
@@ -876,6 +874,7 @@
     STORAGE_KEY = TagType.BOOL | 722,
 
     /**
+     * OBSOLETE: Do not use. See IKeyMintOperation.updateAad instead.
      * TODO: Delete when keystore1 is deleted.
      */
     ASSOCIATED_DATA = TagType.BYTES | 1000,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index 44b8274..5359b3b 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@
 
 namespace {
 
+// Invalid value for a patchlevel (which is of form YYYYMMDD).
+const uint32_t kInvalidPatchlevel = 99998877;
+
 // Overhead for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature padding of undigested messages.  Digested messages have
 // additional overhead, for the digest algorithmIdentifier required by PKCS#1.
 const size_t kPkcs1UndigestedSignaturePaddingOverhead = 11;
@@ -126,10 +129,9 @@
 // Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter the key
 // lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.
 auto kTagsToFilter = {
-    Tag::CREATION_DATETIME,
-    Tag::EC_CURVE,
-    Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,
-    Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID,
+        Tag::CREATION_DATETIME,
+        Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,
+        Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID,
 };
 
 AuthorizationSet filtered_tags(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
@@ -163,6 +165,28 @@
 bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::arm_deleteAllKeys = false;
 bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations = false;
 
+uint32_t KeyMintAidlTestBase::boot_patch_level(
+        const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
+    // The boot patchlevel is not available as a property, but should be present
+    // in the key characteristics of any created key.
+    AuthorizationSet allAuths;
+    for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+        allAuths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+    }
+    auto patchlevel = allAuths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+    if (patchlevel.has_value()) {
+        return patchlevel.value();
+    } else {
+        // No boot patchlevel is available. Return a value that won't match anything
+        // and so will trigger test failures.
+        return kInvalidPatchlevel;
+    }
+}
+
+uint32_t KeyMintAidlTestBase::boot_patch_level() {
+    return boot_patch_level(key_characteristics_);
+}
+
 ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result) {
     if (result.isOk()) return ErrorCode::OK;
 
@@ -998,16 +1022,7 @@
             }
             break;
         case Algorithm::EC:
-            switch (SecLevel()) {
-                case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
-                case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
-                    return {224, 256, 384, 521};
-                case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
-                    return {256};
-                default:
-                    ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
-                    break;
-            }
+            ADD_FAILURE() << "EC keys must be specified by curve not size";
             break;
         case Algorithm::AES:
             return {128, 256};
@@ -1123,9 +1138,11 @@
 }
 
 vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidCurves() {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) return {};
-    CHECK(SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX);
-    return {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521};
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        return {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521};
+    } else {
+        return {};
+    }
 }
 
 vector<Digest> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidDigests(bool withNone, bool withMD5) {
@@ -1293,9 +1310,9 @@
     AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced;
     AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced;
     uint32_t att_attestation_version;
-    uint32_t att_keymaster_version;
+    uint32_t att_keymint_version;
     SecurityLevel att_attestation_security_level;
-    SecurityLevel att_keymaster_security_level;
+    SecurityLevel att_keymint_security_level;
     vector<uint8_t> att_challenge;
     vector<uint8_t> att_unique_id;
     vector<uint8_t> att_app_id;
@@ -1304,8 +1321,8 @@
                                           attest_rec->length,               //
                                           &att_attestation_version,         //
                                           &att_attestation_security_level,  //
-                                          &att_keymaster_version,           //
-                                          &att_keymaster_security_level,    //
+                                          &att_keymint_version,             //
+                                          &att_keymint_security_level,      //
                                           &att_challenge,                   //
                                           &att_sw_enforced,                 //
                                           &att_hw_enforced,                 //
@@ -1324,14 +1341,14 @@
         expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, appId);
     }
 
-    EXPECT_EQ(att_keymaster_version, 100U);
-    EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymaster_security_level);
+    EXPECT_EQ(att_keymint_version, 100U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymint_security_level);
     EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_attestation_security_level);
 
 
     char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {};
     // TODO(b/136282179): When running under VTS-on-GSI the TEE-backed
-    // keymaster implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
+    // keymint implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
     // for the BOOT_PATCH_LEVEL.
     if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
         for (int i = 0; i < att_hw_enforced.size(); i++) {
@@ -1370,13 +1387,6 @@
         EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
     }
 
-    // Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
-    // the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
-    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-    EXPECT_FALSE(att_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-    EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-
     if (att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)) {
         // For ECDSA keys, either an EC_CURVE or a KEY_SIZE can be specified, but one must be.
         EXPECT_TRUE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) ||
@@ -1442,9 +1452,7 @@
 
     att_sw_enforced.Sort();
     expected_sw_enforced.Sort();
-    auto a = filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced);
-    auto b = filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced);
-    EXPECT_EQ(a, b);
+    EXPECT_EQ(filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced));
 
     att_hw_enforced.Sort();
     expected_hw_enforced.Sort();
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index 82f192a..d592d36 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
     uint32_t os_version() { return os_version_; }
     uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }
     uint32_t vendor_patch_level() { return vendor_patch_level_; }
+    uint32_t boot_patch_level(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
+    uint32_t boot_patch_level();
 
     ErrorCode GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result);
 
@@ -253,7 +255,7 @@
         /* ECDSA */
         KeyData ecdsaKeyData;
         AuthorizationSetBuilder ecdsaBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                        .Authorization(tagToTest)
                                                        .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                                        .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index 295be1a..d41d270 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #include <cutils/log.h>
 
 #include <signal.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
 #include <iostream>
 
 #include <openssl/ec.h>
@@ -1362,11 +1364,11 @@
  * have correct characteristics.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Ecdsa) {
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
                                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
@@ -1377,8 +1379,7 @@
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
-        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
-                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
 
         CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
     }
@@ -1400,13 +1401,13 @@
     uint64_t serial_int = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;
     vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
 
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
                   GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
                                       .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                       .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
                                       .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
@@ -1421,8 +1422,7 @@
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
-        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
-                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
         ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
@@ -1439,6 +1439,170 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationTags
+ *
+ * Verifies that creation of an attested ECDSA key includes various tags in the
+ * attestation extension.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationTags) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+    auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+    uint64_t serial_int = 0x1010;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+    const AuthorizationSetBuilder base_builder =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                    .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                    .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                    .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                    .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                    .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+    // Various tags that map to fields in the attestation extension ASN.1 schema.
+    auto extra_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                              .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, 1619621648000)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, 1619621648000)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, 1619621999000)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 42)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 100000)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, 1619621648000);
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : extra_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "tag-" << tag);
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = base_builder;
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+        if (result == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE &&
+            tag.tag == TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG &&
+            (tag.tag == TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY || tag.tag == TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)) {
+            // Optional tag not supported by this KeyMint implementation.
+            continue;
+        }
+        ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+        verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, /* self_signed = */ false);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        if (tag.tag != TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID) {
+            // Expect to find most of the extra tags in the key characteristics
+            // of the generated key (but not for ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID).
+            EXPECT_TRUE(hw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag) || sw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag))
+                    << tag << " not in hw:" << hw_enforced << " nor sw:" << sw_enforced;
+        }
+
+        // Verifying the attestation record will check for the specific tag because
+        // it's included in the authorizations.
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id, sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+                                              SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+
+    // Device attestation IDs should be rejected for normal attestation requests; these fields
+    // are only used for device unique attestation.
+    auto invalid_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "brand")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "device")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "product")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "serial")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "imei")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "meid")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "manufacturer")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "model");
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : invalid_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "tag-" << tag);
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                        .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                        .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                        .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                        .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                        .SetDefaultValidity();
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS,
+                  GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationTagNoApplicationId
+ *
+ * Verifies that creation of an attested ECDSA key does not include APPLICATION_ID.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationTagNoApplicationId) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto attest_app_id = "foo";
+    auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+    uint64_t serial_int = 0x1010;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+    // Earlier versions of the attestation extension schema included a slot:
+    //     applicationId  [601] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+    // This should never have been included, and should never be filled in.
+    // Generate an attested key that include APPLICATION_ID and APPLICATION_DATA,
+    // to confirm that this field never makes it into the attestation extension.
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId(attest_app_id)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "client_id")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+    ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+    ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+    ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+    verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, /* self_signed = */ false);
+
+    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+    AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, attest_app_id, sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+                                          SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+    // Check that the app id is not in the cert.
+    string app_id = "clientid";
+    std::vector<uint8_t> needle(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(app_id.data()),
+                                reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(app_id.data()) + app_id.size());
+    ASSERT_EQ(std::search(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.begin(),
+                          cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.end(), needle.begin(), needle.end()),
+              cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.end());
+
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+}
+
+/*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaSelfSignAttestation
  *
  * Verifies that if no challenge is provided to an Ecdsa key generation, then
@@ -1451,12 +1615,12 @@
     uint64_t serial_int = 0x123456FFF1234;
     vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
 
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
                   GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
                                       .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                       .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
                                       .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
@@ -1469,8 +1633,7 @@
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
-        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
-                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
         verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
@@ -1512,11 +1675,11 @@
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaIgnoreAppId) {
     auto app_id = "foo";
 
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
                                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                      .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
                                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
@@ -1529,8 +1692,7 @@
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
-        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
-                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
         ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
@@ -1552,7 +1714,6 @@
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AttestationApplicationIDLengthProperlyEncoded) {
     auto challenge = "hello";
-    auto key_size = 256;
     std::vector<uint32_t> app_id_lengths{143, 258};
 
     for (uint32_t length : app_id_lengths) {
@@ -1561,7 +1722,7 @@
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                      .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
                                                      .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
@@ -1574,8 +1735,7 @@
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
-        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
-                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)) << "Curve P256 missing";
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
         ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
@@ -1597,11 +1757,11 @@
  * resulting keys have correct characteristics.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, LimitedUsageEcdsa) {
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
                                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                      .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1)
                                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
@@ -1614,8 +1774,7 @@
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
-        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
-                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
 
         // Check the usage count limit tag appears in the authorizations.
         AuthorizationSet auths;
@@ -1632,7 +1791,7 @@
 /*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaDefaultSize
  *
- * Verifies that failing to specify a key size for EC key generation returns
+ * Verifies that failing to specify a curve for EC key generation returns
  * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaDefaultSize) {
@@ -1651,20 +1810,23 @@
  * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaInvalidSize) {
-    for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+    for (auto curve : InvalidCurves()) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
                                                                        .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                                        .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                                                &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
     }
 
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                                   .EcdsaSigningKey(190)
-                                                                   .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                                                   .SetDefaultValidity()));
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 190)
+                                  .SigningKey()
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1676,29 +1838,13 @@
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaMismatchKeySize) {
     if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
 
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT,
-              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(224)
-                                  .Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
-                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
-}
-
-/*
- * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAllValidSizes
- *
- * Verifies that keymint supports all required EC key sizes.
- */
-TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAllValidSizes) {
-    auto valid_sizes = ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC);
-    for (size_t size : valid_sizes) {
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(size)
-                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                                     .SetDefaultValidity()))
-                << "Failed to generate size: " << size;
-        CheckedDeleteKey();
-    }
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 224)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT ||
+                result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2471,31 +2617,6 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes
- *
- * Verifies that ECDSA operations succeed with all possible key sizes and hashes.
- */
-TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes) {
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
-        for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */)) {
-            ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
-                                                  .Digest(digest)
-                                                  .SetDefaultValidity());
-            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate ECDSA key with size " << key_size
-                                            << " and digest " << digest;
-            if (error != ErrorCode::OK) continue;
-
-            string message(1024, 'a');
-            if (digest == Digest::NONE) message.resize(key_size / 8);
-            SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
-            CheckedDeleteKey();
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/*
  * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves
  *
  * Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
@@ -2560,7 +2681,7 @@
 TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaNoDigestHugeData) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
     string message(1 * 1024, 'a');
@@ -2575,7 +2696,7 @@
 TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
@@ -2612,7 +2733,7 @@
 TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaIncompatibleDigest) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
                                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
@@ -3000,13 +3121,12 @@
 TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSuccess) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                                .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                        KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
 
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
-    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
 
@@ -3027,13 +3147,12 @@
 TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256RFC5915Success) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                                .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                        KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_rfc5915));
 
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
-    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
 
@@ -3053,13 +3172,12 @@
 TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256SEC1Success) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                                .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                        KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_sec1));
 
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
-    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
 
@@ -3080,13 +3198,12 @@
     if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(521)
+                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_521)
                                                .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                                .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                        KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_521_key));
 
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
-    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 521U);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_521);
     CheckOrigin();
@@ -3098,21 +3215,6 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaSizeMismatch
- *
- * Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
- * correct way.
- */
-TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSizeMismatch) {
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
-              ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                .EcdsaSigningKey(224 /* Doesn't match key */)
-                                .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                .SetDefaultValidity(),
-                        KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
-}
-
-/*
  * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaCurveMismatch
  *
  * Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a curve that doesn't match the key fails in
@@ -3975,7 +4077,7 @@
 TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, EcdsaEncrypt) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
     auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE);
@@ -6418,7 +6520,7 @@
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                              .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
                                                              .Authorization(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)
-                                                             .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                             .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                              .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                                              .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                                      KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
index a177317..78f8f08 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -335,8 +335,7 @@
         ASSERT_TRUE(deviceInfoMap->asMap());
 
         auto& signingKey = bccContents->back().pubKey;
-        auto macKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(/* ignore_signature = */ false, signedMac->asArray(),
-                                              signingKey,
+        auto macKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(signedMac->asArray(), signingKey,
                                               cppbor::Array()  // SignedMacAad
                                                       .add(challenge_)
                                                       .add(std::move(deviceInfoMap))
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp b/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
index da10eb2..33f1ed3 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
     return EekChain{eekChain.encode(), pub_key, priv_key};
 }
 
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> verifyAndParseCoseSign1Cwt(bool ignoreSignature, const cppbor::Array* coseSign1,
+ErrMsgOr<bytevec> verifyAndParseCoseSign1Cwt(const cppbor::Array* coseSign1,
                                              const bytevec& signingCoseKey, const bytevec& aad) {
     if (!coseSign1 || coseSign1->size() != kCoseSign1EntryCount) {
         return "Invalid COSE_Sign1";
@@ -115,27 +115,22 @@
     auto serializedKey = parsedPayload->asMap()->get(-4670552)->clone();
     if (!serializedKey || !serializedKey->asBstr()) return "Could not find key entry";
 
-    if (!ignoreSignature) {
-        bool selfSigned = signingCoseKey.empty();
-        auto key = CoseKey::parseEd25519(selfSigned ? serializedKey->asBstr()->value()
-                                                    : signingCoseKey);
-        if (!key) return "Bad signing key: " + key.moveMessage();
+    bool selfSigned = signingCoseKey.empty();
+    auto key =
+            CoseKey::parseEd25519(selfSigned ? serializedKey->asBstr()->value() : signingCoseKey);
+    if (!key) return "Bad signing key: " + key.moveMessage();
 
-        bytevec signatureInput = cppbor::Array()
-                                         .add("Signature1")
-                                         .add(*protectedParams)
-                                         .add(aad)
-                                         .add(*payload)
-                                         .encode();
+    bytevec signatureInput =
+            cppbor::Array().add("Signature1").add(*protectedParams).add(aad).add(*payload).encode();
 
-        if (!ED25519_verify(signatureInput.data(), signatureInput.size(), signature->value().data(),
-                            key->getBstrValue(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X)->data())) {
-            return "Signature verification failed";
-        }
+    if (!ED25519_verify(signatureInput.data(), signatureInput.size(), signature->value().data(),
+                        key->getBstrValue(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X)->data())) {
+        return "Signature verification failed";
     }
 
     return serializedKey->asBstr()->value();
 }
+
 ErrMsgOr<std::vector<BccEntryData>> validateBcc(const cppbor::Array* bcc) {
     if (!bcc || bcc->size() == 0) return "Invalid BCC";
 
@@ -148,8 +143,7 @@
         if (!entry || entry->size() != kCoseSign1EntryCount) {
             return "Invalid BCC entry " + std::to_string(i) + ": " + prettyPrint(entry);
         }
-        auto payload = verifyAndParseCoseSign1Cwt(false /* ignoreSignature */, entry,
-                                                  std::move(prevKey), bytevec{} /* AAD */);
+        auto payload = verifyAndParseCoseSign1Cwt(entry, std::move(prevKey), bytevec{} /* AAD */);
         if (!payload) {
             return "Failed to verify entry " + std::to_string(i) + ": " + payload.moveMessage();
         }
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp b/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp
index b70dda9..5235dd5 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@
         },
         rust: {
             enabled: true,
+            apex_available: [
+                "//apex_available:platform",
+                "com.android.compos",
+            ],
         },
     },
     versions: ["1"],
diff --git a/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index 1f579ba..d46cf5a 100644
--- a/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@
 #include <log/log.h>
 #include <utils/SystemClock.h>
 
+#include <algorithm>
 #include <cinttypes>
+#include <unordered_map>
 #include <vector>
 
 using ::android::hardware::Return;
@@ -149,6 +151,7 @@
 TEST_P(SensorsHidlTest, SensorListValid) {
     S()->getSensorsList([&](const auto& list) {
         const size_t count = list.size();
+        std::unordered_map<int32_t, std::vector<std::string>> sensorTypeNameMap;
         for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
             const auto& s = list[i];
             SCOPED_TRACE(::testing::Message()
@@ -167,6 +170,14 @@
             EXPECT_FALSE(s.name.empty());
             EXPECT_FALSE(s.vendor.empty());
 
+            // Make sure that sensors of the same type have a unique name.
+            std::vector<std::string>& v = sensorTypeNameMap[static_cast<int32_t>(s.type)];
+            bool isUniqueName = std::find(v.begin(), v.end(), s.name) == v.end();
+            EXPECT_TRUE(isUniqueName) << "Duplicate sensor Name: " << s.name;
+            if (isUniqueName) {
+                v.push_back(s.name);
+            }
+
             // Test power > 0, maxRange > 0
             EXPECT_LE(0, s.power);
             EXPECT_LT(0, s.maxRange);
diff --git a/sensors/2.0/multihal/android.hardware.sensors@2.0-service-multihal.rc b/sensors/2.0/multihal/android.hardware.sensors@2.0-service-multihal.rc
index 0b3d4c2..8867a1a 100644
--- a/sensors/2.0/multihal/android.hardware.sensors@2.0-service-multihal.rc
+++ b/sensors/2.0/multihal/android.hardware.sensors@2.0-service-multihal.rc
@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
     class hal
     user system
     group system wakelock context_hub
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/system-background/tasks
+    task_profiles ServiceCapacityLow
     capabilities BLOCK_SUSPEND
     rlimit rtprio 10 10
diff --git a/sensors/2.1/multihal/android.hardware.sensors@2.1-service-multihal.rc b/sensors/2.1/multihal/android.hardware.sensors@2.1-service-multihal.rc
index fc99ee7..f47e060 100644
--- a/sensors/2.1/multihal/android.hardware.sensors@2.1-service-multihal.rc
+++ b/sensors/2.1/multihal/android.hardware.sensors@2.1-service-multihal.rc
@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
     class hal
     user system
     group system wakelock context_hub
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/system-background/tasks
+    task_profiles ServiceCapacityLow
     capabilities BLOCK_SUSPEND
     rlimit rtprio 10 10
diff --git a/sensors/common/vts/2_X/VtsHalSensorsV2_XTargetTest.h b/sensors/common/vts/2_X/VtsHalSensorsV2_XTargetTest.h
index 47a8cc0..ea5dc70 100644
--- a/sensors/common/vts/2_X/VtsHalSensorsV2_XTargetTest.h
+++ b/sensors/common/vts/2_X/VtsHalSensorsV2_XTargetTest.h
@@ -26,10 +26,12 @@
 #include <log/log.h>
 #include <utils/SystemClock.h>
 
+#include <algorithm>
 #include <cinttypes>
 #include <condition_variable>
 #include <cstring>
 #include <map>
+#include <unordered_map>
 #include <vector>
 
 /**
@@ -373,6 +375,7 @@
 TEST_P(SensorsHidlTest, SensorListValid) {
     getSensors()->getSensorsList([&](const auto& list) {
         const size_t count = list.size();
+        std::unordered_map<int32_t, std::vector<std::string>> sensorTypeNameMap;
         for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
             const auto& s = list[i];
             SCOPED_TRACE(::testing::Message()
@@ -393,6 +396,14 @@
             EXPECT_FALSE(s.name.empty());
             EXPECT_FALSE(s.vendor.empty());
 
+            // Make sure that sensors of the same type have a unique name.
+            std::vector<std::string>& v = sensorTypeNameMap[static_cast<int32_t>(s.type)];
+            bool isUniqueName = std::find(v.begin(), v.end(), s.name) == v.end();
+            EXPECT_TRUE(isUniqueName) << "Duplicate sensor Name: " << s.name;
+            if (isUniqueName) {
+                v.push_back(s.name);
+            }
+
             // Test power > 0, maxRange > 0
             EXPECT_LE(0, s.power);
             EXPECT_LT(0, s.maxRange);
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.0-service-lazy.rc b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.0-service-lazy.rc
index ad72fae..ed62cee 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.0-service-lazy.rc
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.0-service-lazy.rc
@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@
     user media
     group mediadrm drmrpc
     ioprio rt 4
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
\ No newline at end of file
+    task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.0-service.rc b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.0-service.rc
index 6d59ed7..5d5b943 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/default/android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.0-service.rc
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/default/android.hardware.tv.tuner@1.0-service.rc
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@
     user media
     group mediadrm drmrpc
     ioprio rt 4
-    writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
\ No newline at end of file
+    task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/default/Vibrator.cpp b/vibrator/aidl/default/Vibrator.cpp
index c6682b3..5755ce5 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/default/Vibrator.cpp
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/default/Vibrator.cpp
@@ -138,6 +138,11 @@
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus Vibrator::getPrimitiveDuration(CompositePrimitive primitive,
                                                   int32_t* durationMs) {
+    std::vector<CompositePrimitive> supported;
+    getSupportedPrimitives(&supported);
+    if (std::find(supported.begin(), supported.end(), primitive) == supported.end()) {
+        return ndk::ScopedAStatus::fromExceptionCode(EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+    }
     if (primitive != CompositePrimitive::NOOP) {
         *durationMs = 100;
     } else {
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
index 4d49a12..c56bd9a 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
@@ -309,8 +309,8 @@
         for (EffectStrength strength : kEffectStrengths) {
             int32_t lengthMs;
             Status status = vibrator->perform(effect, strength, nullptr /*callback*/, &lengthMs);
-            EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION)
-                << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
+            EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status))
+                    << status << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
         }
     }
     for (Effect effect : kEffects) {
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@
         ASSERT_NE(durationMs, 0);
         EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
     } else {
-        EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 }
 
diff --git a/wifi/1.5/default/wifi_chip.cpp b/wifi/1.5/default/wifi_chip.cpp
index 961f9da..6fa9601 100644
--- a/wifi/1.5/default/wifi_chip.cpp
+++ b/wifi/1.5/default/wifi_chip.cpp
@@ -1059,7 +1059,8 @@
     // Requires to remove one of the instance in bridge mode
     for (auto const& it : br_ifaces_ap_instances_) {
         if (it.first == ifname) {
-            for (auto const& iface : it.second) {
+            std::vector<std::string> ap_instances = it.second;
+            for (auto const& iface : ap_instances) {
                 if (iface == ifInstanceName) {
                     if (!iface_util_->removeIfaceFromBridge(it.first, iface)) {
                         LOG(ERROR)
@@ -1075,13 +1076,20 @@
                                    << " " << legacyErrorToString(legacy_status);
                         return createWifiStatusFromLegacyError(legacy_status);
                     }
+                    ap_instances.erase(
+                        std::remove(ap_instances.begin(), ap_instances.end(),
+                                    ifInstanceName),
+                        ap_instances.end());
+                    br_ifaces_ap_instances_[ifname] = ap_instances;
+                    break;
                 }
             }
             break;
         }
     }
-    br_ifaces_ap_instances_.erase(ifInstanceName);
     iface->removeInstance(ifInstanceName);
+    setActiveWlanIfaceNameProperty(getFirstActiveWlanIfaceName());
+
     return createWifiStatus(WifiStatusCode::SUCCESS);
 }