diff --git a/automotive/evs/OWNERS b/automotive/evs/OWNERS
index 15de48f..4787f0b 100644
--- a/automotive/evs/OWNERS
+++ b/automotive/evs/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ankitarora@google.com
-jwhpryor@google.com
+changyeon@google.com
diff --git a/bluetooth/aidl/vts/Android.bp b/bluetooth/aidl/vts/Android.bp
index 5fc0b2e..ade3bef 100644
--- a/bluetooth/aidl/vts/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/aidl/vts/Android.bp
@@ -16,10 +16,6 @@
     srcs: [
         "VtsHalBluetoothTargetTest.cpp",
         ":BluetoothPacketSources",
-        ":BluetoothHciPacketSources",
-    ],
-    generated_headers: [
-        "BluetoothGeneratedPackets_h",
     ],
     include_dirs: [
         "packages/modules/Bluetooth/system/gd",
@@ -31,7 +27,7 @@
     ],
     static_libs: [
         "android.hardware.bluetooth-V1-ndk",
-        "libbluetooth-types",
+        "libbluetooth_hci_pdl",
     ],
     test_config: "VtsHalBluetoothTargetTest.xml",
     test_suites: [
@@ -57,6 +53,5 @@
     ],
     tidy_disabled_srcs: [
         ":BluetoothPacketSources",
-        ":BluetoothHciPacketSources",
     ],
 }
diff --git a/camera/provider/aidl/vts/camera_aidl_test.cpp b/camera/provider/aidl/vts/camera_aidl_test.cpp
index 08ad0bb..5f9d605 100644
--- a/camera/provider/aidl/vts/camera_aidl_test.cpp
+++ b/camera/provider/aidl/vts/camera_aidl_test.cpp
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
     ABinderProcess_startThreadPool();
 
     SpAIBinder cameraProviderBinder =
-            SpAIBinder(AServiceManager_getService(serviceDescriptor.c_str()));
+            SpAIBinder(AServiceManager_waitForService(serviceDescriptor.c_str()));
     ASSERT_NE(cameraProviderBinder.get(), nullptr);
 
     std::shared_ptr<ICameraProvider> cameraProvider =
diff --git a/security/README.md b/security/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5b5ba8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# Security-Related HALs
+
+The `security/` subdirectory holds various security-related HALs.  (The final two sections of this
+document also describe security-related HALs that are in other places under `hardware/interfaces/`.)
+
+The most significant HAL is KeyMint (**`IKeyMintDevice`** in the
+`hardware/interfaces/security/keymint/` directory), which allows access to cryptographic
+functionality where the key material is restricted to a secure environment.  This functionality is
+used by Android system services, and is also made available to apps via Android Keystore.
+
+A KeyMint implementation (or an implementation of its predecessor, Keymaster) that runs in an
+isolated execution environment (e.g. ARM TrustZone) is required for most Android devices; see [CDD
+9.11](https://source.android.com/docs/compatibility/13/android-13-cdd#911_keys_and_credentials).
+
+A device may optionally also support a second KeyMint instance, running in a dedicated secure
+processor; this is known as StrongBox ([CDD
+9.11.2](https://source.android.com/docs/compatibility/13/android-13-cdd#9112_strongbox)).
+
+Two specific features of KeyMint are worth highlighting, as they have an impact on the other
+security-related HALs:
+
+- KeyMint supports keys that can only be used when the operation is authenticated by the user,
+  either by their lock screen knowledge factor (LSKF, e.g. PIN or pattern) or by a strong biometric
+  (e.g. fingerprint).
+- KeyMint supports *attestation* of public keys: when an asymmetric keypair is created, the secure
+  environment produces a chain of signed certificates:
+  - starting from a trusted root certificate
+  - terminating in a leaf certificate that holds the public key; this leaf certificate may also
+    describe the state of the device and the policies attached to the key.
+
+## Authentication Verification
+
+User authentication must also take place in a secure environment (see the final section below), but
+the results of that authentication are communicated to KeyMint via Android.  As such, the
+authentication result (a *hardware auth token*) is signed with a per-boot shared HMAC key known only
+to the secure components, so that it's authenticity can be verified.
+
+If an authenticator, for example GateKeeper (described by the **`IGatekeeper`** HAL in
+`hardware/interfaces/gatekeeper/`), is co-located in the same secure environment as KeyMint, it can
+use a local, vendor-specific, method to communicate the shared HMAC key.
+
+However, if the authenticator is in a different environment than the KeyMint instance then a local
+communication mechanism may not be possible.  For example, a StrongBox KeyMint instance running in a
+separate secure processor may not have a communication channel with a TEE on the main processor.
+
+To allow for this, the **`ISharedSecret`** HAL (in `hardware/interfaces/security/sharedsecret`)
+describes an N-party shared key agreement protocol for per-boot derivation of the shared HMAC key,
+based on a pre-provisioned shared secret.  This HAL can be implemented by any security component
+&ndash; whether KeyMint instance or authenticator &ndash; that needs access to the shared HMAC key.
+
+User authentication operations are also timestamped, but a StrongBox KeyMint instance may not have
+access to a secure time source that is aligned with the authenticator's time source.
+
+To allow for this, the **`ISecureClock`** HAL (in `hardware/interfaces/secureclock`) describes a
+challenge-based timestamp authentication protocol.  This HAL is optional; it need only be
+implemented if there is a KeyMint instance without a secure source of time.
+
+## Attestation Key Provisioning
+
+As noted above, key generation may also generate an attestation certificate chain, which requires
+that the secure environment have access to a signing key which in turn chains back to the Google
+root.
+
+Historically these signing keys were created by Google and provided to vendors for installation in
+batches of devices (to prevent their use as unique device identifiers).  However, this mechanism had
+significant disadvantages, as it required secure handling of key material and only allowed for
+coarse-grained revocation.
+
+The remote key provisioning HAL (**`IRemotelyProvisionedComponent`** in
+`hardware/interfaces/security/rkp/`) provides a mechanism whereby signing certificates for
+attestation can be retrieved at runtime from Google servers based on pre-registered device identity
+information.  This mechanism is used to provision certificates for KeyMint's signing keys, but is
+not restricted to that purpose; it can also be used in other scenarios where keys need to be
+provisioned (for example, for [Widevine](https://developers.google.com/widevine/drm/overview)).
+
+## Keymaster
+
+The Keymaster HAL (**`IKeymasterDevice`** in `hardware/interfaces/keymaster/`) is the historical
+ancestor of many of the HALs here (and may still be present on older devices).  Its functionality is
+effectively the union of the following current HALs:
+
+- **`IKeyMintDevice`**
+- **`ISharedSecret`**
+- **`ISecureClock`**
+
+## Related Authentication HALs
+
+Authentication of users needs to happen in a secure environment, using vendor-specific
+functionality, and so involves the use of one of the following HALs (all of which are outside the
+`security/` subdirectory).
+
+- The **`IGatekeeper`** HAL (in `hardware/interfaces/gatekeeper/`) provides user authentication
+  functionality based on the user's lock-screen knowledge factor (LSKF), including throttling
+  behaviour to prevent attacks.  Authentication tokens produced by this HAL are consumed by KeyMint,
+  validated using the shared HMAC key described above.
+  - The optional **`IWeaver`** HAL (in `hardware/interfaces/weaver`) improves the security of LSKF
+    authentication by converting the user's LSKF into a *synthetic password* via hashing and
+    stretching. This is required to be implemented on a separate secure element, which prevents
+    offline attacks on Gatekeeper storage. Note that Weaver does not directly interact with KeyMint;
+    the synthetic password is fed into Gatekeeper in place of the plain user password, and then
+    Gatekeeper interacts with KeyMint as normal.
+- The **`IFingerprint`** and **`IFace`** HAL definitions (under `hardware/interfaces/biometrics/`)
+  allow access to biometric authentication functionality that is implemented in a secure
+  environment.  Authentication tokens produced by these HALs are consumed by KeyMint, validated
+  using the shared HMAC key described above.
+- The optional **`IConfirmationUI`** HAL (in `hardware/interfaces/confirmationui`) supports
+  functionality where the user confirms that they have seen a specific message in a secure manner.
+  Confirmation tokens produced by this HAL are consumed by KeyMint, validated using the shared HMAC
+  key described above.
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
index dc0c618..10cbf07 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
 }
 
 int main() {
+    // The global logger object required by keymaster's logging macros in keymaster/logger.h.
+    keymaster::SoftKeymasterLogger km_logger;
     // Zero threads seems like a useless pool, but below we'll join this thread to it, increasing
     // the pool size to 1.
     ABinderProcess_setThreadPoolMaxThreadCount(0);
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp b/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
index c9c3e4d..780c3d2 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/remote_prov_utils.cpp
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
+#include <iomanip>
 #include <iterator>
 #include <memory>
 #include <set>
@@ -420,6 +421,36 @@
     return entryName + " has an invalid value.\n";
 }
 
+std::string checkMapPatchLevelEntry(bool isFactory, const cppbor::Map& devInfo,
+                                    const std::string& entryName) {
+    std::string error = checkMapEntry(isFactory, devInfo, cppbor::UINT, entryName);
+    if (!error.empty()) {
+        return error;
+    }
+
+    if (isFactory) {
+        return "";
+    }
+
+    const std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item>& val = devInfo.get(entryName);
+    std::string dateString = std::to_string(val->asUint()->unsignedValue());
+    if (dateString.size() == 6) {
+        dateString += "01";
+    }
+    if (dateString.size() != 8) {
+        return entryName + " should in the format YYYYMMDD or YYYYMM\n";
+    }
+
+    std::tm t;
+    std::istringstream ss(dateString);
+    ss >> std::get_time(&t, "%Y%m%d");
+    if (!ss) {
+        return entryName + " should in the format YYYYMMDD or YYYYMM\n";
+    }
+
+    return "";
+}
+
 bool isTeeDeviceInfo(const cppbor::Map& devInfo) {
     return devInfo.get("security_level") && devInfo.get("security_level")->asTstr() &&
            devInfo.get("security_level")->asTstr()->value() == "tee";
@@ -520,6 +551,10 @@
                     error += "Err: Unrecognized key entry: <" + key->asTstr()->value() + ">,\n";
                 }
             }
+            // Checks that only apply to v3.
+            error += checkMapPatchLevelEntry(isFactory, *parsed, "system_patch_level");
+            error += checkMapPatchLevelEntry(isFactory, *parsed, "boot_patch_level");
+            error += checkMapPatchLevelEntry(isFactory, *parsed, "vendor_patch_level");
             FALLTHROUGH_INTENDED;
         case 2:
             for (const auto& entry : kAttestationIdEntrySet) {
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/Android.bp b/security/rkp/aidl/Android.bp
index e2ce649..e9e2021 100644
--- a/security/rkp/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@
         },
         rust: {
             enabled: true,
+            apex_available: [
+                "//apex_available:platform",
+                "com.android.virt",
+            ],
         },
     },
     versions_with_info: [
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index f8a5540..21c5315 100644
--- a/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -185,77 +185,7 @@
      *
      *        In either case, the root is self-signed.
      *
-     *            EekChain = [ + SignedSignatureKey, SignedEek ]
-     *
-     *            SignedSignatureKey = [              ; COSE_Sign1
-     *                protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  ; Algorithm
-     *                },
-     *                unprotected: {},
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
-     *                         bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256,
-     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput) /
-     *                           bstr ECDSA(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
-     *            ]
-     *
-     *            SignatureKeyEd25519 = {             ; COSE_Key
-     *                 1 : 1,                         ; Key type : Octet Key Pair
-     *                 3 : AlgorithmEdDSA,            ; Algorithm
-     *                 -1 : 6,                        ; Curve : Ed25519
-     *                 -2 : bstr                      ; Ed25519 public key
-     *            }
-     *
-     *            SignatureKeyP256 = {                ; COSE_Key
-     *                 1 : 2,                         ; Key type : EC2
-     *                 3 : AlgorithmES256,            ; Algorithm
-     *                 -1 : 1,                        ; Curve: P256
-     *                 -2 : bstr,                     ; X coordinate
-     *                 -3 : bstr                      ; Y coordinate
-     *            }
-     *
-     *            SignatureKeySignatureInput = [
-     *                context: "Signature1",
-     *                body_protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
-     *                external_aad: bstr .size 0,
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
-     *                         bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256
-     *            ]
-     *
-     *            ; COSE_Sign1
-     *            SignedEek = [
-     *                protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
-     *                unprotected: {},
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256,
-     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput) /
-     *                           bstr ECDSA(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
-     *            ]
-     *
-     *            EekX25519 = {            ; COSE_Key
-     *                1 : 1,               ; Key type : Octet Key Pair
-     *                2 : bstr             ; KID : EEK ID
-     *                3 : -25,             ; Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
-     *                -1 : 4,              ; Curve : X25519
-     *                -2 : bstr            ; X25519 public key, little-endian
-     *            }
-     *
-     *            EekP256 = {              ; COSE_Key
-     *                1 : 2,               ; Key type : EC2
-     *                2 : bstr             ; KID : EEK ID
-     *                3 : -25,             ; Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
-     *                -1 : 1,              ; Curve : P256
-     *                -2 : bstr            ; Sender X coordinate
-     *                -3 : bstr            ; Sender Y coordinate
-     *            }
-     *
-     *            EekSignatureInput = [
-     *                context: "Signature1",
-     *                body_protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
-     *                external_aad: bstr .size 0,
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256
-     *            ]
-     *
-     *            AlgorithmES256 = -7      ; RFC 8152 section 8.1
-     *            AlgorithmEdDSA = -8      ; RFC 8152 section 8.2
+     *        See generateCertificateRequest.cddl for CDDL definitions.
      *
      *        If the contents of endpointEncryptionKey do not match the SignedEek structure above,
      *        the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
@@ -283,25 +213,9 @@
      *            HMAC-256(EK_mac, .cbor KeysToMacStructure)
      *
      *        Where EK_mac is an ephemeral MAC key, found in ProtectedData (see below).  The MACed
-     *        data is the "tag" field of a COSE_Mac0 structure like:
+     *        data is the "tag" field of a MacedKeys COSE_Mac0 structure.
      *
-     *            MacedKeys = [                            ; COSE_Mac0
-     *                protected : bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : 5,                           ; Algorithm : HMAC-256
-     *                },
-     *                unprotected : {},
-     *                ; Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ],
-     *                tag: bstr
-     *            ]
-     *
-     *            KeysToMacStructure = [
-     *                context : "MAC0",
-     *                protected : bstr .cbor { 1 : 5 },    ; Algorithm : HMAC-256
-     *                external_aad : bstr .size 0,
-     *                ; Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
-     *                payload : bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ]
-     *            ]
+     *        See generateCertificateRequest.cddl for CDDL definitions.
      */
     byte[] generateCertificateRequest(in boolean testMode, in MacedPublicKey[] keysToSign,
             in byte[] endpointEncryptionCertChain, in byte[] challenge, out DeviceInfo deviceInfo,
@@ -322,168 +236,9 @@
      *        use different semantic data for this field, but the supported sizes must be between 0
      *        and 64 bytes, inclusive.
      *
-     * @return the following CBOR Certificate Signing Request (Csr) serialized into a byte array:
+     * @return a CBOR Certificate Signing Request (Csr) serialized into a byte array.
      *
-     * Csr = AuthenticatedRequest<CsrPayload>
-     *
-     * CsrPayload = [                      ; CBOR Array defining the payload for Csr
-     *     version: 3,                     ; The CsrPayload CDDL Schema version.
-     *     CertificateType,                ; The type of certificate being requested.
-     *     DeviceInfo,                     ; Defined in DeviceInfo.aidl
-     *     KeysToSign,                     ; Provided by the method parameters
-     * ]
-     *
-     *  ; A tstr identifying the type of certificate. The set of supported certificate types may
-     *  ; be extended without requiring a version bump of the HAL. Custom certificate types may
-     *  ; be used, but the provisioning server may reject the request for an unknown certificate
-     *  ; type. The currently defined certificate types are:
-     *  ;  - "widevine"
-     *  ;  - "keymint"
-     *  CertificateType = tstr
-     *
-     * KeysToSign = [ * PublicKey ]   ; Please see MacedPublicKey.aidl for the PublicKey definition.
-     *
-     * AuthenticatedRequest<T> = [
-     *     version: 1,              ; The AuthenticatedRequest CDDL Schema version.
-     *     UdsCerts,
-     *     DiceCertChain,
-     *     SignedData<[
-     *         challenge: bstr .size (0..64), ; Provided by the method parameters
-     *         bstr .cbor T,
-     *     ]>,
-     * ]
-     *
-     * ; COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
-     * SignedData<Data> = [
-     *     protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
-     *     unprotected: {},
-     *     payload: bstr .cbor Data / nil,
-     *     signature: bstr      ; PureEd25519(CDI_Leaf_Priv, SignedDataSigStruct<Data>) /
-     *                          ; ECDSA(CDI_Leaf_Priv, SignedDataSigStruct<Data>)
-     * ]
-     *
-     * ; Sig_structure for SignedData
-     * SignedDataSigStruct<Data> = [
-     *     context: "Signature1",
-     *     protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
-     *     external_aad: bstr .size 0,
-     *     payload: bstr .cbor Data / nil,
-     * ]
-     *
-     * ; UdsCerts allows the platform to provide additional certifications for the UDS_Pub. For
-     * ; example, this could be provided by the hardware vendor, who certifies all of their chips.
-     * ; The SignerName is a free-form string describing who generated the signature. The root
-     * ; certificate will need to be communicated to the verifier out of band, along with the
-     * ; SignerName that is expected for the given root certificate.
-     * UdsCerts = {
-     *     * SignerName => UdsCertChain
-     * }
-     *
-     * ; SignerName is a string identifier that indicates both the signing authority as
-     * ; well as the format of the UdsCertChain
-     * SignerName = tstr
-     *
-     * UdsCertChain = [
-     *     2* X509Certificate       ; Root -> ... -> Leaf. "Root" is the vendor self-signed
-     *                              ; cert, "Leaf" contains UDS_Public. There may also be
-     *                              ; intermediate certificates between Root and Leaf.
-     * ]
-     *
-     * ; A bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or EdDSA)
-     * X509Certificate = bstr
-     *
-     * ; The DICE Chain contains measurements about the device firmware.
-     * ; The first entry in the DICE Chain is the UDS_Pub, encoded as a COSE_key. All entries
-     * ; after the first describe a link in the boot chain (e.g. bootloaders: BL1, BL2, ... BLN)
-     * ; Note that there is no DiceChainEntry for UDS_pub, only a "bare" COSE_key.
-     * DiceCertChain = [
-     *     PubKeyEd25519 / PubKeyECDSA256 / PubKeyECDSA384,  ; UDS_Pub
-     *     + DiceChainEntry,                ; First CDI_Certificate -> Last CDI_Certificate
-     *                                      ; Last certificate corresponds to KeyMint's DICE key.
-     * ]
-     *
-     * ; This is the signed payload for each entry in the DICE chain. Note that the "Configuration
-     * ; Input Values" described by the Open Profile are not used here. Instead, the DICE chain
-     * ; defines its own configuration values for the Configuration Descriptor field. See
-     * ; the Open Profile for DICE for more details on the fields. SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 are
-     * ; acceptable hash algorithms. The digest bstr values in the payload are the digest values
-     * ; without any padding. Note that this implies that the digest is a 32-byte bstr for SHA256
-     * ; and a 48-byte bstr for SHA384. This is an intentional, minor deviation from Open Profile
-     * ; for DICE, which specifies all digests are 64 bytes.
-     * DiceChainEntryPayload = {                    ; CWT [RFC8392]
-     *     1 : tstr,                                ; Issuer
-     *     2 : tstr,                                ; Subject
-     *     -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKeyEd25519 /
-     *                bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA256 /
-     *                bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA384,    ; Subject Public Key
-     *     -4670553 : bstr                          ; Key Usage
-     *
-     *     ; NOTE: All of the following fields may be omitted for a "Degenerate DICE Chain", as
-     *     ;       described above.
-     *     -4670545 : bstr,                         ; Code Hash
-     *     ? -4670546 : bstr,                       ; Code Descriptor
-     *     -4670547 : bstr,                         ; Configuration Hash
-     *     -4670548 : bstr .cbor {                  ; Configuration Descriptor
-     *         ? -70002 : tstr,                         ; Component name
-     *         ? -70003 : int / tstr,                   ; Component version
-     *         ? -70004 : null,                         ; Resettable
-     *         ? -70005 : uint,                         ; Security version
-     *     },
-     *     -4670549 : bstr,                         ; Authority Hash
-     *     ? -4670550 : bstr,                       ; Authority Descriptor
-     *     -4670551 : bstr,                         ; Mode
-     * }
-     *
-     * ; Each entry in the DICE chain is a DiceChainEntryPayload signed by the key from the previous
-     * ; entry in the DICE chain array.
-     * DiceChainEntry = [                            ; COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
-     *     protected : bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
-     *     unprotected: {},
-     *     payload: bstr .cbor DiceChainEntryPayload,
-     *     signature: bstr ; PureEd25519(SigningKey, DiceChainEntryInput) /
-     *                     ; ECDSA(SigningKey, DiceChainEntryInput)
-     *                     ; See RFC 8032 for details of how to encode the signature value
-     *                     ; for Ed25519.
-     * ]
-     *
-     * DiceChainEntryInput = [
-     *     context: "Signature1",
-     *     protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
-     *     external_aad: bstr .size 0,
-     *     payload: bstr .cbor DiceChainEntryPayload
-     * ]
-     *
-     * ; The following section defines some types that are reused throughout the above
-     * ; data structures.
-     * ; NOTE: Integer encoding is different for Ed25519 and P256 keys:
-     * ;       - Ed25519 is LE: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032#section-3.1
-     * ;       - P256 is BE: https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf#page=19 (section 2.3.7)
-     * PubKeyEd25519 = {                ; COSE_Key
-     *     1 : 1,                       ; Key type : octet key pair
-     *     3 : AlgorithmEdDSA,          ; Algorithm : EdDSA
-     *     -1 : 6,                      ; Curve : Ed25519
-     *     -2 : bstr                    ; X coordinate, little-endian
-     * }
-     *
-     * PubKeyECDSA256 = {               ; COSE_Key
-     *     1 : 2,                       ; Key type : EC2
-     *     3 : AlgorithmES256,          ; Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-256
-     *     -1 : 1,                      ; Curve: P256
-     *     -2 : bstr,                   ; X coordinate, big-endian
-     *     -3 : bstr                    ; Y coordinate, big-endian
-     * }
-     *
-     * PubKeyECDSA384 = {               ; COSE_Key
-     *     1 : 2,                       ; Key type : EC2
-     *     3 : AlgorithmES384,          ; Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-384
-     *     -1 : 2,                      ; Curve: P384
-     *     -2 : bstr,                   ; X coordinate
-     *     -3 : bstr                    ; Y coordinate
-     * }
-     *
-     * AlgorithmES256 = -7
-     * AlgorithmES384 = -35
-     * AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
+     *         See generateCertificateRequestV2.cddl for CDDL definitions.
      */
     byte[] generateCertificateRequestV2(in MacedPublicKey[] keysToSign, in byte[] challenge);
 }
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/generateCertificateRequest.cddl b/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/generateCertificateRequest.cddl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82930bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/generateCertificateRequest.cddl
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+; CDDL for the deprecated version 1 generateCertificateRequest method
+; in IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+
+EekChain = [ + SignedSignatureKey, SignedEek ]
+
+SignedSignatureKey = [              ; COSE_Sign1
+    protected: bstr .cbor {
+        1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  ; Algorithm
+    },
+    unprotected: {},
+    payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
+                bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256,
+    signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput) /
+                bstr ECDSA(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
+]
+
+SignatureKeyEd25519 = {             ; COSE_Key
+        1 : 1,                         ; Key type : Octet Key Pair
+        3 : AlgorithmEdDSA,            ; Algorithm
+        -1 : 6,                        ; Curve : Ed25519
+        -2 : bstr                      ; Ed25519 public key
+}
+
+SignatureKeyP256 = {                ; COSE_Key
+        1 : 2,                         ; Key type : EC2
+        3 : AlgorithmES256,            ; Algorithm
+        -1 : 1,                        ; Curve: P256
+        -2 : bstr,                     ; X coordinate
+        -3 : bstr                      ; Y coordinate
+}
+
+SignatureKeySignatureInput = [
+    context: "Signature1",
+    body_protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
+    external_aad: bstr .size 0,
+    payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
+                bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256
+]
+
+; COSE_Sign1
+SignedEek = [
+    protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
+    unprotected: {},
+    payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256,
+    signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput) /
+                bstr ECDSA(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
+]
+
+EekX25519 = {            ; COSE_Key
+    1 : 1,               ; Key type : Octet Key Pair
+    2 : bstr             ; KID : EEK ID
+    3 : -25,             ; Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
+    -1 : 4,              ; Curve : X25519
+    -2 : bstr            ; X25519 public key, little-endian
+}
+
+EekP256 = {              ; COSE_Key
+    1 : 2,               ; Key type : EC2
+    2 : bstr             ; KID : EEK ID
+    3 : -25,             ; Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
+    -1 : 1,              ; Curve : P256
+    -2 : bstr            ; Sender X coordinate
+    -3 : bstr            ; Sender Y coordinate
+}
+
+EekSignatureInput = [
+    context: "Signature1",
+    body_protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
+    external_aad: bstr .size 0,
+    payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256
+]
+
+AlgorithmES256 = -7      ; RFC 8152 section 8.1
+AlgorithmEdDSA = -8      ; RFC 8152 section 8.2
+
+MacedKeys = [                            ; COSE_Mac0
+    protected : bstr .cbor {
+        1 : 5,                           ; Algorithm : HMAC-256
+    },
+    unprotected : {},
+    ; Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
+    payload: bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ],
+    tag: bstr
+]
+
+KeysToMacStructure = [
+    context : "MAC0",
+    protected : bstr .cbor { 1 : 5 },    ; Algorithm : HMAC-256
+    external_aad : bstr .size 0,
+    ; Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
+    payload : bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ]
+]
diff --git a/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/generateCertificateRequestV2.cddl b/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/generateCertificateRequestV2.cddl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea71f98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/rkp/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/generateCertificateRequestV2.cddl
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+; CDDL for the generateCertificateRequestV2 method in
+; IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+
+Csr = AuthenticatedRequest<CsrPayload>
+
+CsrPayload = [                      ; CBOR Array defining the payload for Csr
+    version: 3,                     ; The CsrPayload CDDL Schema version.
+    CertificateType,                ; The type of certificate being requested.
+    DeviceInfo,                     ; Defined in DeviceInfo.aidl
+    KeysToSign,                     ; Provided by the method parameters
+]
+
+; A tstr identifying the type of certificate. The set of supported certificate types may
+; be extended without requiring a version bump of the HAL. Custom certificate types may
+; be used, but the provisioning server may reject the request for an unknown certificate
+; type. The currently defined certificate types are:
+;  - "widevine"
+;  - "keymint"
+CertificateType = tstr
+
+KeysToSign = [ * PublicKey ]   ; Please see MacedPublicKey.aidl for the PublicKey definition.
+
+AuthenticatedRequest<T> = [
+    version: 1,              ; The AuthenticatedRequest CDDL Schema version.
+    UdsCerts,
+    DiceCertChain,
+    SignedData<[
+        challenge: bstr .size (0..64), ; Provided by the method parameters
+        bstr .cbor T,
+    ]>,
+]
+
+; COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
+SignedData<Data> = [
+    protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
+    unprotected: {},
+    payload: bstr .cbor Data / nil,
+    signature: bstr     ; PureEd25519(CDI_Leaf_Priv, SignedDataSigStruct<Data>) /
+                        ; ECDSA(CDI_Leaf_Priv, SignedDataSigStruct<Data>)
+]
+
+; Sig_structure for SignedData
+SignedDataSigStruct<Data> = [
+    context: "Signature1",
+    protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
+    external_aad: bstr .size 0,
+    payload: bstr .cbor Data / nil,
+]
+
+; UdsCerts allows the platform to provide additional certifications for the UDS_Pub. For
+; example, this could be provided by the hardware vendor, who certifies all of their chips.
+; The SignerName is a free-form string describing who generated the signature. The root
+; certificate will need to be communicated to the verifier out of band, along with the
+; SignerName that is expected for the given root certificate.
+UdsCerts = {
+    * SignerName => UdsCertChain
+}
+
+; SignerName is a string identifier that indicates both the signing authority as
+; well as the format of the UdsCertChain
+SignerName = tstr
+
+UdsCertChain = [
+    2* X509Certificate      ; Root -> ... -> Leaf. "Root" is the vendor self-signed
+                            ; cert, "Leaf" contains UDS_Public. There may also be
+                            ; intermediate certificates between Root and Leaf.
+]
+
+; A bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or EdDSA)
+X509Certificate = bstr
+
+; The DICE Chain contains measurements about the device firmware.
+; The first entry in the DICE Chain is the UDS_Pub, encoded as a COSE_key. All entries
+; after the first describe a link in the boot chain (e.g. bootloaders: BL1, BL2, ... BLN)
+; Note that there is no DiceChainEntry for UDS_pub, only a "bare" COSE_key.
+DiceCertChain = [
+    PubKeyEd25519 / PubKeyECDSA256 / PubKeyECDSA384,  ; UDS_Pub
+    + DiceChainEntry,               ; First CDI_Certificate -> Last CDI_Certificate
+                                    ; Last certificate corresponds to KeyMint's DICE key.
+]
+
+; This is the signed payload for each entry in the DICE chain. Note that the "Configuration
+; Input Values" described by the Open Profile are not used here. Instead, the DICE chain
+; defines its own configuration values for the Configuration Descriptor field. See
+; the Open Profile for DICE for more details on the fields. SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 are
+; acceptable hash algorithms. The digest bstr values in the payload are the digest values
+; without any padding. Note that this implies that the digest is a 32-byte bstr for SHA256
+; and a 48-byte bstr for SHA384. This is an intentional, minor deviation from Open Profile
+; for DICE, which specifies all digests are 64 bytes.
+DiceChainEntryPayload = {                    ; CWT [RFC8392]
+    1 : tstr,                                ; Issuer
+    2 : tstr,                                ; Subject
+    -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKeyEd25519 /
+            bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA256 /
+            bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA384,    ; Subject Public Key
+    -4670553 : bstr                          ; Key Usage
+
+    ; NOTE: All of the following fields may be omitted for a "Degenerate DICE Chain", as
+    ;       described above.
+    -4670545 : bstr,                         ; Code Hash
+    ? -4670546 : bstr,                       ; Code Descriptor
+    -4670547 : bstr,                         ; Configuration Hash
+    -4670548 : bstr .cbor {                  ; Configuration Descriptor
+        ? -70002 : tstr,                         ; Component name
+        ? -70003 : int / tstr,                   ; Component version
+        ? -70004 : null,                         ; Resettable
+        ? -70005 : uint,                         ; Security version
+    },
+    -4670549 : bstr,                         ; Authority Hash
+    ? -4670550 : bstr,                       ; Authority Descriptor
+    -4670551 : bstr,                         ; Mode
+}
+
+; Each entry in the DICE chain is a DiceChainEntryPayload signed by the key from the previous
+; entry in the DICE chain array.
+DiceChainEntry = [                            ; COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
+    protected : bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
+    unprotected: {},
+    payload: bstr .cbor DiceChainEntryPayload,
+    signature: bstr ; PureEd25519(SigningKey, DiceChainEntryInput) /
+                    ; ECDSA(SigningKey, DiceChainEntryInput)
+                    ; See RFC 8032 for details of how to encode the signature value
+                    ; for Ed25519.
+]
+
+DiceChainEntryInput = [
+    context: "Signature1",
+    protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
+    external_aad: bstr .size 0,
+    payload: bstr .cbor DiceChainEntryPayload
+]
+
+; The following section defines some types that are reused throughout the above
+; data structures.
+; NOTE: Integer encoding is different for Ed25519 and P256 keys:
+;       - Ed25519 is LE: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032#section-3.1
+;       - P256 is BE: https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf#page=19 (section 2.3.7)
+PubKeyEd25519 = {                ; COSE_Key
+    1 : 1,                       ; Key type : octet key pair
+    3 : AlgorithmEdDSA,          ; Algorithm : EdDSA
+    -1 : 6,                      ; Curve : Ed25519
+    -2 : bstr                    ; X coordinate, little-endian
+}
+
+PubKeyECDSA256 = {               ; COSE_Key
+    1 : 2,                       ; Key type : EC2
+    3 : AlgorithmES256,          ; Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-256
+    -1 : 1,                      ; Curve: P256
+    -2 : bstr,                   ; X coordinate, big-endian
+    -3 : bstr                    ; Y coordinate, big-endian
+}
+
+PubKeyECDSA384 = {               ; COSE_Key
+    1 : 2,                       ; Key type : EC2
+    3 : AlgorithmES384,          ; Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-384
+    -1 : 2,                      ; Curve: P384
+    -2 : bstr,                   ; X coordinate
+    -3 : bstr                    ; Y coordinate
+}
+
+AlgorithmES256 = -7
+AlgorithmES384 = -35
+AlgorithmEdDSA = -8