diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
index 706bf55..a328f4f 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
         <name>android.hardware.automotive.sv</name>
         <version>1.0</version>
         <interface>
-            <name>ISurroundView</name>
+            <name>ISurroundViewService</name>
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
diff --git a/memtrack/aidl/vts/VtsHalMemtrackTargetTest.cpp b/memtrack/aidl/vts/VtsHalMemtrackTargetTest.cpp
index 2393c56..d5f4612 100644
--- a/memtrack/aidl/vts/VtsHalMemtrackTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/memtrack/aidl/vts/VtsHalMemtrackTargetTest.cpp
@@ -79,10 +79,10 @@
 
     auto status = memtrack_->getGpuDeviceInfo(&device_info);
 
-    // Devices with < 5.10 kernels aren't required to provide an implementation of
+    // Devices with < 5.4 kernels aren't required to provide an implementation of
     // getGpuDeviceInfo(), and can return EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION
     if (status.getExceptionCode() == EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION) {
-        KernelVersion min_kernel_version = KernelVersion(5, 10, 0);
+        KernelVersion min_kernel_version = KernelVersion(5, 4, 0);
         KernelVersion kernel_version = VintfObject::GetInstance()
                                                ->getRuntimeInfo(RuntimeInfo::FetchFlag::CPU_VERSION)
                                                ->kernelVersion();
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl
index 78da3e8..c720d6d 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl
@@ -36,4 +36,5 @@
   SOFTWARE = 0,
   TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
   STRONGBOX = 2,
+  KEYSTORE = 100,
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
index b149ac9..69bec2d7 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@
      * deciding whether a given tag from `keyParams` argument to the generation/import method should
      * be returned in `keyCharacteristics` are:
      *
-     * - If the IKeyMintDevice cannot fully enforce the semantics of the tag, it should be omitted.
      * - If the semantics of the tag are fully enforced by the IKeyMintDevice, without any
      *   assistance from components running at other security levels, it should be included in an
      *   entry with the SecurityLevel of the IKeyMintDevice.
@@ -45,6 +44,9 @@
      *   SecurityLevel of the involved components.  For example if a StrongBox IKeyMintDevice relies
      *   on a TEE to validate biometric authentication, biometric authentication tags go in an entry
      *   with SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT.
+     * - If the semantics are not enforced by KeyMint at all, SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE is used to
+     *   indicate that Keystore should enforce.  Note that in Keymaster (predecessor to KeyMint),
+     *   these tags would have been in SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE.
      */
     KeyCharacteristics[] keyCharacteristics;
 
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl
index 10363e9..c63859c 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.aidl
@@ -17,16 +17,59 @@
 package android.hardware.security.keymint;
 
 /**
- * Device security levels.
+ * Device security levels.  These enum values are used in two ways:
+ *
+ * 1.  Returned from IKeyMintDevice::getHardwareInfo to identify the security level of the
+ *     IKeyMintDevice.  This characterizes the sort of environment in which the KeyMint
+ *     implementation runs, and therefore the security of its operations.
+ *
+ * 2.  Associated with individual KeyMint authorization Tags in KeyCharacteristics or in attestation
+ *     certificates.  This specifies the security level of the weakest environment involved in
+ *     enforcing that particular tag, i.e. the sort of security environment an attacker would have
+ *     to subvert in order to break the enforcement of that tag.
  */
 @VintfStability
 @Backing(type="int")
 enum SecurityLevel {
+    /**
+     * The SOFTWARE security level represents a KeyMint implementation that runs in an Android
+     * process, or a tag enforced by such an implementation.  An attacker who can compromise that
+     * process, or obtain root, or subvert the kernel on the device can defeat it.
+     *
+     * Note that the distinction between SOFTWARE and KEYSTORE is only relevant on-device.  For
+     * attestation purposes, these categories are combined into the software-enforced authorization
+     * list.
+     */
     SOFTWARE = 0,
+
+    /**
+     * The TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT security level represents a KeyMint implementation that runs in an
+     * Android process, or a tag enforced by such an implementation.  An attacker who completely
+     * compromises Android, including the Linux kernel, does not have the ability to subvert it.  At
+     * attacker who can find an exploit that gains them control of the trusted environment, or who
+     * has access to the physical device and can mount a sophisticated hardware attack, may be able
+     * to defeat it.
+     */
     TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
     /**
-     * STRONGBOX specifies that the secure hardware satisfies the requirements specified in CDD
-     * 9.11.2.
+     * The STRONGBOX security level represents a KeyMint implementation that runs in security
+     * hardware that satisfies the requirements specified in CDD 9.11.2.  Roughly speaking, these
+     * are discrete, security-focus computing environments that are hardened against physical and
+     * side channel attack, and have had their security formally validated by a competent
+     * penetration testing lab.
      */
     STRONGBOX = 2,
+
+    /**
+     * KeyMint implementations must never return the KEYSTORE security level from getHardwareInfo.
+     * It is used to specify tags that are not enforced by the IKeyMintDevice, but are instead
+     * to be enforced by Keystore.  An attacker who can subvert the keystore process or gain root or
+     * subvert the kernel can prevent proper enforcement of these tags.
+     *
+     *
+     * Note that the distinction between SOFTWARE and KEYSTORE is only relevant on-device.  When
+     * KeyMint generates an attestation certificate, these categories are combined into the
+     * software-enforced authorization list.
+     */
+    KEYSTORE = 100
 }
diff --git a/sensors/common/default/2.X/Sensor.cpp b/sensors/common/default/2.X/Sensor.cpp
index 642fc89..1a7c628 100644
--- a/sensors/common/default/2.X/Sensor.cpp
+++ b/sensors/common/default/2.X/Sensor.cpp
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@
     mSensorInfo.maxRange = 1000.0f * M_PI / 180.0f;
     mSensorInfo.resolution = 1000.0f * M_PI / (180.0f * 32768.0f);
     mSensorInfo.power = 0.001f;
-    mSensorInfo.minDelay = 2.5f * 1000;  // microseconds
+    mSensorInfo.minDelay = 10 * 1000;  // microseconds
     mSensorInfo.maxDelay = kDefaultMaxDelayUs;
     mSensorInfo.fifoReservedEventCount = 0;
     mSensorInfo.fifoMaxEventCount = 0;
diff --git a/tetheroffload/control/1.1/IOffloadControl.hal b/tetheroffload/control/1.1/IOffloadControl.hal
index eb5b8a1..2eb54c8 100644
--- a/tetheroffload/control/1.1/IOffloadControl.hal
+++ b/tetheroffload/control/1.1/IOffloadControl.hal
@@ -37,11 +37,9 @@
      * offload is started. This is because the quota values would likely become stale over
      * time and would not reflect any new traffic that has occurred.
      *
-     * This API replaces {@link @1.0::IOffloadControl::setDataLimit}, the framework would always
-     * calls this API if 1.1 HAL is supported. Otherwise, calls the other one. Thus, no
-     * interaction between the two APIs need to be addressed. However, the hardware implementation
-     * still needs to keep functionality of both in case of shipping with older framework that
-     * doesn't support 1.1 HAL.
+     * This API replaces {@link @1.0::IOffloadControl::setDataLimit}, the framework will always
+     * call setDataWarningAndLimit on 1.1 implementations, and setDataLimit on 1.0 implementations.
+     * Thus, no interaction between the two APIs need to be addressed.
      *
      * The specified quota bytes MUST replace any previous quotas set by
      * {@code setDataWarningAndLimit} specified on the same interface. It may be interpreted as