Update KM4 VTS tests to allow s/w implementation to pass.
Although no real devices should have a software implementation,
emulator and cloud devices do, and it's useful to be able to use them
as a development platform, which is facilitated by having useful VTS
tests.
This is in preparation for Keymaster 4.1 implementation and VTS work.
Bug: 140193672
Bug: 140192237
Bug: 140824829
Test: VtsHalKeymaster4.0TargetTest
Change-Id: Idc5de13c342ef1ac62d3131a1a2185d5e78a0d45
Merged-In: Idc5de13c342ef1ac62d3131a1a2185d5e78a0d45
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
index 000d46e..27e00c1 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -321,19 +321,20 @@
LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed record parsing";
return ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
- if (!record->tee_enforced) {
- LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed hardware characteristic parsing";
+
+ KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust = nullptr;
+ if (record->tee_enforced && record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust) {
+ root_of_trust = record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust;
+ } else if (record->software_enforced && record->software_enforced->root_of_trust) {
+ root_of_trust = record->software_enforced->root_of_trust;
+ } else {
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed root of trust parsing";
return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
- if (!record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust) {
- LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed root of trust parsing";
+ if (!root_of_trust->verified_boot_key) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed verified boot key parsing";
return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
- if (!record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust->verified_boot_key) {
- LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed verified boot key parsing";
- return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- }
- KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust = record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust;
auto& vb_key = root_of_trust->verified_boot_key;
verified_boot_key->resize(vb_key->length);
@@ -342,19 +343,19 @@
*verified_boot_state = static_cast<keymaster_verified_boot_t>(
ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(root_of_trust->verified_boot_state));
if (!verified_boot_state) {
- LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed verified boot state parsing";
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed verified boot state parsing";
return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
*device_locked = root_of_trust->device_locked;
if (!device_locked) {
- LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed device locked parsing";
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed device locked parsing";
return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
auto& vb_hash = root_of_trust->verified_boot_hash;
if (!vb_hash) {
- LOG(ERROR) << AT << "Failed verified boot hash parsing";
+ LOG(ERROR) << AT << " Failed verified boot hash parsing";
return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
verified_boot_hash->resize(vb_hash->length);
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp
index 5d0e262..2d2ba63 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.cpp
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
using namespace std::literals::chrono_literals;
void KeymasterHidlTest::InitializeKeymaster() {
+ std::string instance_name = GetParam();
keymaster_ = IKeymasterDevice::getService(GetParam());
ASSERT_NE(keymaster_, nullptr);
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@
string masking_key,
const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params) {
ErrorCode error;
- ImportKey(wrapping_key_desc, KeyFormat::PKCS8, wrapping_key);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(wrapping_key_desc, KeyFormat::PKCS8, wrapping_key));
EXPECT_TRUE(keymaster_
->importWrappedKey(HidlBuf(wrapped_key), key_blob_, HidlBuf(masking_key),
unwrapping_params.hidl_data(), 0 /* passwordSid */,
@@ -196,7 +197,9 @@
HidlBuf empty_buf = {};
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GetCharacteristics(key_blob, client_id, app_data, key_characteristics));
- EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+ EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->hardwareEnforced.size(), 0);
+ }
EXPECT_GT(key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.size(), 0);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
@@ -636,23 +639,25 @@
switch (algorithm) {
case Algorithm::RSA:
switch (SecLevel()) {
+ case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
return {2048, 3072, 4096};
case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
return {2048};
default:
- CHECK(false) << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
break;
}
break;
case Algorithm::EC:
switch (SecLevel()) {
+ case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
return {224, 256, 384, 521};
case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
return {256};
default:
- CHECK(false) << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
break;
}
break;
@@ -667,25 +672,27 @@
return retval;
}
default:
- CHECK(false) << "Invalid Algorithm: " << algorithm;
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid Algorithm: " << algorithm;
return {};
}
- CHECK(false) << "Should be impossible to get here";
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Should be impossible to get here";
return {};
}
+
std::vector<uint32_t> KeymasterHidlTest::InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm) {
- if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) return {};
- CHECK(SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX);
- switch (algorithm) {
- case Algorithm::RSA:
- return {3072, 4096};
- case Algorithm::EC:
- return {224, 384, 521};
- case Algorithm::AES:
- return {192};
- default:
- return {};
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::RSA:
+ return {3072, 4096};
+ case Algorithm::EC:
+ return {224, 384, 521};
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ return {192};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
}
+ return {};
}
std::vector<EcCurve> KeymasterHidlTest::ValidCurves() {
@@ -704,6 +711,7 @@
std::vector<Digest> KeymasterHidlTest::ValidDigests(bool withNone, bool withMD5) {
switch (SecLevel()) {
+ case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
if (withNone) {
if (withMD5)
@@ -729,10 +737,10 @@
return {Digest::SHA_2_256};
break;
default:
- CHECK(false) << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
break;
}
- CHECK(false) << "Should be impossible to get here";
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Should be impossible to get here";
return {};
}
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h
index faa7c75..34a4473 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/KeymasterHidlTest.h
@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics_;
OperationHandle op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel;
+ static std::vector<std::string> build_params() {
+ auto params = android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(IKeymasterDevice::descriptor);
+ return params;
+ }
+
private:
sp<IKeymasterDevice> keymaster_;
uint32_t os_version_;
@@ -214,10 +219,9 @@
hidl_string author_;
};
-#define INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_HIDL_TEST(name) \
- INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, name, \
- testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames( \
- IKeymasterDevice::descriptor)), \
+#define INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_HIDL_TEST(name) \
+ INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, name, \
+ testing::ValuesIn(KeymasterHidlTest::build_params()), \
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString)
} // namespace test
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index fb450d1..ace389b 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -397,10 +397,16 @@
// true. A provided boolean tag that can be pulled back out of the certificate indicates correct
// encoding. No need to check if it's in both lists, since the AuthorizationSet compare below
// will handle mismatches of tags.
- EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
+ if (security_level == SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
+ }
// Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
// the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(att_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
@@ -461,10 +467,10 @@
verified_boot_key.size()));
} else if (!strcmp(property_value, "red")) {
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_FAILED);
- EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
- verified_boot_key.size()));
} else {
- EXPECT_TRUE(false);
+ EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_UNVERIFIED);
+ EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
+ verified_boot_key.size()));
}
att_sw_enforced.Sort();