KeyMint VTS: more attestation info tests
Try all tags in attestion extension one by one
Test: VtsAidlKeyMintTargetTest on CF
Bug: 186735514
Change-Id: I63ca8d298d2d16f707f2437ab48aaa69c1d7563d
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index 44b8274..5a51175 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@
namespace {
+// Invalid value for a patchlevel (which is of form YYYYMMDD).
+const uint32_t kInvalidPatchlevel = 99998877;
+
// Overhead for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature padding of undigested messages. Digested messages have
// additional overhead, for the digest algorithmIdentifier required by PKCS#1.
const size_t kPkcs1UndigestedSignaturePaddingOverhead = 11;
@@ -126,10 +129,9 @@
// Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter the key
// lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.
auto kTagsToFilter = {
- Tag::CREATION_DATETIME,
- Tag::EC_CURVE,
- Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,
- Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID,
+ Tag::CREATION_DATETIME,
+ Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,
+ Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID,
};
AuthorizationSet filtered_tags(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
@@ -163,6 +165,28 @@
bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::arm_deleteAllKeys = false;
bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations = false;
+uint32_t KeyMintAidlTestBase::boot_patch_level(
+ const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
+ // The boot patchlevel is not available as a property, but should be present
+ // in the key characteristics of any created key.
+ AuthorizationSet allAuths;
+ for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+ allAuths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ auto patchlevel = allAuths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (patchlevel.has_value()) {
+ return patchlevel.value();
+ } else {
+ // No boot patchlevel is available. Return a value that won't match anything
+ // and so will trigger test failures.
+ return kInvalidPatchlevel;
+ }
+}
+
+uint32_t KeyMintAidlTestBase::boot_patch_level() {
+ return boot_patch_level(key_characteristics_);
+}
+
ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result) {
if (result.isOk()) return ErrorCode::OK;
@@ -1293,9 +1317,9 @@
AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced;
AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced;
uint32_t att_attestation_version;
- uint32_t att_keymaster_version;
+ uint32_t att_keymint_version;
SecurityLevel att_attestation_security_level;
- SecurityLevel att_keymaster_security_level;
+ SecurityLevel att_keymint_security_level;
vector<uint8_t> att_challenge;
vector<uint8_t> att_unique_id;
vector<uint8_t> att_app_id;
@@ -1304,8 +1328,8 @@
attest_rec->length, //
&att_attestation_version, //
&att_attestation_security_level, //
- &att_keymaster_version, //
- &att_keymaster_security_level, //
+ &att_keymint_version, //
+ &att_keymint_security_level, //
&att_challenge, //
&att_sw_enforced, //
&att_hw_enforced, //
@@ -1324,14 +1348,14 @@
expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, appId);
}
- EXPECT_EQ(att_keymaster_version, 100U);
- EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymaster_security_level);
+ EXPECT_EQ(att_keymint_version, 100U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymint_security_level);
EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_attestation_security_level);
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {};
// TODO(b/136282179): When running under VTS-on-GSI the TEE-backed
- // keymaster implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
+ // keymint implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
// for the BOOT_PATCH_LEVEL.
if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
for (int i = 0; i < att_hw_enforced.size(); i++) {
@@ -1370,13 +1394,6 @@
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
}
- // Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
- // the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
- EXPECT_FALSE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
- EXPECT_FALSE(att_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
- EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
- EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-
if (att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)) {
// For ECDSA keys, either an EC_CURVE or a KEY_SIZE can be specified, but one must be.
EXPECT_TRUE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) ||
@@ -1442,9 +1459,7 @@
att_sw_enforced.Sort();
expected_sw_enforced.Sort();
- auto a = filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced);
- auto b = filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced);
- EXPECT_EQ(a, b);
+ EXPECT_EQ(filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced));
att_hw_enforced.Sort();
expected_hw_enforced.Sort();
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index 82f192a..c8d6f11 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
uint32_t os_version() { return os_version_; }
uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }
uint32_t vendor_patch_level() { return vendor_patch_level_; }
+ uint32_t boot_patch_level(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
+ uint32_t boot_patch_level();
ErrorCode GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result);
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index 295be1a..d4b828a 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#include <cutils/log.h>
#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
#include <iostream>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
@@ -1439,6 +1441,170 @@
}
/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationTags
+ *
+ * Verifies that creation of an attested ECDSA key includes various tags in the
+ * attestation extension.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationTags) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+ auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+ uint64_t serial_int = 0x1010;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+ const AuthorizationSetBuilder base_builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+ // Various tags that map to fields in the attestation extension ASN.1 schema.
+ auto extra_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, 1619621648000)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, 1619621648000)
+ .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, 1619621999000)
+ .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 42)
+ .Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 100000)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY)
+ .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, 1619621648000);
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : extra_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "tag-" << tag);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = base_builder;
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+ if (result == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE &&
+ tag.tag == TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG &&
+ (tag.tag == TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY || tag.tag == TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)) {
+ // Optional tag not supported by this KeyMint implementation.
+ continue;
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+ ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, /* self_signed = */ false);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ if (tag.tag != TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID) {
+ // Expect to find most of the extra tags in the key characteristics
+ // of the generated key (but not for ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID).
+ EXPECT_TRUE(hw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag) || sw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag))
+ << tag << " not in hw:" << hw_enforced << " nor sw:" << sw_enforced;
+ }
+
+ // Verifying the attestation record will check for the specific tag because
+ // it's included in the authorizations.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id, sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+ SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+
+ // Device attestation IDs should be rejected for normal attestation requests; these fields
+ // are only used for device unique attestation.
+ auto invalid_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "brand")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "device")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "product")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "serial")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "imei")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "meid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "manufacturer")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "model");
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : invalid_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "tag-" << tag);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationTagNoApplicationId
+ *
+ * Verifies that creation of an attested ECDSA key does not include APPLICATION_ID.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationTagNoApplicationId) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto attest_app_id = "foo";
+ auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+ uint64_t serial_int = 0x1010;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ // Earlier versions of the attestation extension schema included a slot:
+ // applicationId [601] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ // This should never have been included, and should never be filled in.
+ // Generate an attested key that include APPLICATION_ID and APPLICATION_DATA,
+ // to confirm that this field never makes it into the attestation extension.
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(attest_app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "client_id")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+ ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+ ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, /* self_signed = */ false);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, attest_app_id, sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+ SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ // Check that the app id is not in the cert.
+ string app_id = "clientid";
+ std::vector<uint8_t> needle(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(app_id.data()),
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(app_id.data()) + app_id.size());
+ ASSERT_EQ(std::search(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.begin(),
+ cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.end(), needle.begin(), needle.end()),
+ cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.end());
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+}
+
+/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaSelfSignAttestation
*
* Verifies that if no challenge is provided to an Ecdsa key generation, then